TCREUR_Public/161125.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, November 25, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 234


                            Headlines


A Z E R B A I J A N

INTERNATIONAL BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Ratings
WESTMARK FINANCIAL: Baku Court Opens Insolvency Proceedings


F R A N C E

SOLOCAL GROUP: Confirms Timetable of Revised Restructuring Plan


I R E L A N D

ANGLO IRISH: Solicitor Entitled to Damages, Court Rules
AVOCA CLO V: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to 'CCsf'
AVOCA CLO VI: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Notes
SIAC: Seeks More Than EUR210 Million From Polish Authorities


I T A L Y

BANCA MONTE: Fitch Maintains 'B-' Long Term IDR at RWE
* DBRS Extends Under Review Status on 15 EU Transactions


K A Z A K H S T A N

KAZAKHSTAN MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms BB+ Subordinated Bonds Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

EA PARTNERS I: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on USD700MM Sr. Notes
EA PARTNERS II: Fitch Ups USD500MM Sr. Sec. Notes Rating to 'B'
HARBOURMASTER CLO 3: Fitch Hikes Class B2 Notes Rating to 'Bsf'


N O R W A Y

HAVILA SHIPPING: HAVI08 Bondholders to Accelerate Facilities


P O R T U G A L

SAGRES: DBRS Assigns B Rating to EUR62.7MM Class C Notes


R U S S I A

IKS 5: Fitch Cuts Senior Unsecured Debt Ratings to BB-


S P A I N

CAIXABANK PYMES 8: DBRS Puts Prov. CC Rating to EUR292.5MM Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Ex-Boss Arrested Over Family Firm's Tax Affairs
BHS: Green May Be Forced to Sell Yachts to Settle Pension Debt
ETHICAL FORESTRY: Investors Uncertain on Compensation
GABLE INSURANCE: In Liquidation, Policies to Expire on Dec. 16
TELFORD TIGERS: Set to go Into Voluntary Liquidation

* UK: One in Eight Care Homes Face Insolvency, Report Warns


X X X X X X X X

* EC Issues New Directive on Corporate Insolvency Reform
* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit


                            *********



===================
A Z E R B A I J A N
===================


INTERNATIONAL BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed International Bank of Azerbaijan's
(IBA) Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'. The
Outlook is Negative. The agency has also downgraded IBA's
Viability Rating (VR) to 'f' from 'b-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, SUPPORT RATINGS, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR (SRF)

The affirmation of IBA's IDRs, Support Rating and SRF reflects
Fitch's view that the Azerbaijan sovereign (BB+/Negative) has a
high propensity to provide support to the bank, if needed. The
Negative Outlook on IBA's ratings reflects that on the sovereign.

Fitch's view of the likelihood of support is based on: (i) IBA's
strategic state ownership (the government holds a 55% share in
IBA directly plus an additional 27.3% through a state-controlled
non-banking entity); (ii) IBA's high systemic importance as
reflected by its considerable market shares and substantial
funding from retail depositors and state-controlled companies;
(iii) the sovereign's sizable FX reserves (USD39bn at end-1H16)
and significant financial flexibility, making the cost of
potential support manageable; and (iv) the recently improved
track record of support, as over the last year the authorities
have initiated the clean-up of IBA's balance sheet and completed
the purchase of AZN10bn problem exposures from IBA (around 1.7x
IBA's remaining loan book at end-1H16).

The one-notch difference between the sovereign and IBA reflects
(i) the mixed track record of capital support to the banking
sector as a whole (as a number of privately-owned banks in
Azerbaijan failed during 2016) and IBA in particular, including
some delays in providing capital support to the bank in 2011-
2013; (ii) still insufficient amounts of incoming support for IBA
in 2016, as even after the received support, IBA's capital
position remains tight and vulnerable; (iii) the authorities'
ultimate intention to privatise the bank; and (iv) IBA's
moderately reduced systemic importance after the balance sheet
clean up as market shares in loans will decrease significantly.

VR

The downgrade of IBA's VR to 'f' reflects Fitch's view that the
bank has failed. This in turn reflects the agency's view that the
asset purchases completed in 1H16 revealed a material capital
shortfall, given the very large volume of weakly-reserved
exposures being transferred. The AZN10bn of transfers reported in
the 1H16 IFRS accounts was considerably more than the AZN3bn
initially planned when Fitch reviewed the bank's ratings in March
2016.

Fitch has not immediately upgraded the VR based on the bank's
post-support profile, as in the agency's view, support provided
to date has not been sufficient to restore the bank's viability.
This view is based on (i) IBA's still weak reported capital
ratios; (ii) substantial remaining asset quality risks, based on
planned further credit risk transfers; and (iii) loss-making pre-
impairment performance and a very large short open currency
position, which each represent a further threat to the bank's
solvency.

Fitch estimates that IBA's Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio was
around 7% at end-1H16, offering very limited capacity to absorb
additional losses. At the same time, Fitch understands that the
volume of weakly-reserved credit exposures still to be
transferred (in 4Q16-1Q17) materially exceeds FCC by several
times.

Capital is likely to have come under further pressure since end-
1H16 due to translation losses and negative core operating
results. IBA's short open currency position under IFRS was equal
to AZN6.3bn at end-1H16 (11x FCC), as payments for transferred
loans were received in manats while the majority of the loans
sold were US dollar-denominated. The AZN has depreciated by 11%
against the dollar since end-1H16, meaning that IBA would have
lost its entire IFRS equity if its currency position has remained
unchanged. Fitch understands that the position has only reduced
moderately, as a result of early repayment of some foreign
currency liabilities. IBA's regulatory Tier 1 capital was 9.4% at
end-10M16, supported by lower regulatory impairment reserves and
risk-weightings than under IFRS/Basel.

In Fitch's view, IBA has become structurally loss making due to
insufficient interest-yielding assets. The bank reported a
negative net interest margin in 1H16 equal to 1.5% of average
earning assets, and this would have fallen further to minus 6% if
adjusted for interest income accrued but not received in cash.
IBA posted an AZN344m net loss (48% of opening equity, not
annualised) under IFRS in 1H16.

Fitch understands that the following support measures are being
planned to improve IBA's solvency: (i) a AZN500m equity
injection, equal to 90% of end-1H16 FCC, by end-2016 (although
this may be fully or largely offset by losses in 2H16); (ii)
further credit risk transfers, as outlined above; and (iii)
various measures to help reduce the foreign currency position,
including the purchase of the latest loan exposures for US
dollars and the conversion of accounts of state-related
depositors into local currency.

IBA remains highly reliant on wholesale funding (32% of end-1H16
liabilities), which is mostly sourced from foreign banks.
Customer funding is dominated by placements of local state-
controlled companies (37% of end-1H16 liabilities). Funding
dollarisation is substantial, as over 80% of end-1H16 liabilities
were in foreign currency.

IBA's liquidity position is generally adequate, although more
tight in foreign currency. Contractual repayments on wholesale
funding attracted from foreign banks for the remainder of 2016
and 1H17 are moderate, at around USD450m. IBA's foreign currency
liquidity as of 1 November 2016 exceeded USD250m, but in Fitch's
view, could be supported by the authorities, in particular, if
this is needed to ensure timely repayments of maturing
liabilities. Local currency liquidity is ample and exceeds AZN5bn
of deposits placed with the Central Bank, although IBA's ability
to exchange these deposits into foreign currency (and thus
improve its currency position and foreign currency liquidity) is
currently limited.

SENIOR UNSECURED DEBT

IBA's senior unsecured debt rating is in line with IBA's Long-
Term IDR, reflecting Fitch's view of average recovery prospects,
in case of default.

IBA Moscow's expected senior unsecured debt rating has been
withdrawn as the issue is no longer planned.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch may downgrade IBA's support-driven IDRs if the agency
believes that the sovereign's propensity to support the bank has
weakened. Fitch may take this view if IBA's solvency is not
strengthened by the planned support measures outlined above.

IBA's Long-Term IDR may also be downgraded in case of a sovereign
downgrade. Conversely, a revision of the Outlook on the sovereign
to Stable could result in similar action on IBA. Upside potential
for IBA's support-driven IDRs is limited at present.

Fitch will review IBA's VR after the package of further support
measures has been implemented. If Fitch concludes that the bank
has become viable after these measures, the agency will upgrade
the VR to a level which reflects the bank's revised standalone
creditworthiness.

The rating actions are as follows:

   IBA

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
      Negative

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

   -- Viability Rating: downgraded to 'f' from 'b-'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BB'

   -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BB'

   IBA-Moscow

   -- Senior unsecured debt: 'BB(EXP)', withdrawn


WESTMARK FINANCIAL: Baku Court Opens Insolvency Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------------
ABC.az reports that Baku Administrative Economic Court #1 has
opened proceedings on the claim of insolvency and bankruptcy of
investment company Westmark Financial Leasing.

The court informs that judge Vusala Bahyshova will deal with the
case of bankruptcy of the company, ABC.az says.

"She appointed preliminary hearing on the case for November 18,"
the court reported.

Ten banks and several insurance companies have been declared
bankrupt in the financial sector during the crisis 2015-2016,
ABC.az says. Quantitatively, the sector has declined by 25-35%.


===========
F R A N C E
===========


SOLOCAL GROUP: Confirms Timetable of Revised Restructuring Plan
---------------------------------------------------------------
SoLocal Group on Nov. 21 confirmed the timetable of its revised
financial restructuring plan.

The revised plan will be therefore, as announced, submitted to
creditors at a meeting scheduled on November 30, 2016, and to
shareholders at an Extraordinary General Shareholders' Meeting on
December 15, 2016, in the perspective of a hearing at the
Commercial Court of Nanterre scheduled on December 16, 2016.

The revised financial restructuring plan proposes substantial
improvements for shareholders compared to the initial plan.

Its approval is critical to ensure the going concern and to
sustain the future of the Company.  This revised financial
restructuring plan is intended to drastically reduce SoLocal
Group's debt and to strengthen its equity.  This plan was
established with the support of the RegroupementPPLocal
association who called SoLocal Group shareholders for their
mobilization to approve its terms during the next Extraordinary
General Shareholders' Meeting.  This revised plan was approved
unanimously by the members of the Board of Directors, including
the three new directors appointed at the Combined General
Shareholders' Meeting of October 19, 2016, members of the
financial sub-committee of the Board of Directors in charge of
the refinancing.

Suspension of interest payment and consequences of the potential
rejection of the revised financial restructuring plan

In the light of the latest statements from some shareholders of
SoLocal Group on the one hand and creditors on the other hand,
approval of this plan remains uncertain. In this context, SoLocal
Group will be forced to not proceed with the payment of the next
deadline for interest on financial debt (due December 1, 2016,
for an amount of around EUR15 million) and this in a context
where the Treasury of SoLocal Group is reduced and where
PagesJaunes SA, main subsidiary of SoLocal Group, may no longer
be able soon to grant additional overdrafts to SoLocal Group in
order to protect its financial capacity, to normally continue its
operational activities and to meet its commitments.

This payment of interests would be deferred to the date of the
implementation of the revised plan (if approved).

In the event that this revised plan would not be approved by the
shareholders or the creditors according to this timetable,
SoLocal Group may be insolvent as it could not pay its interests.
On their side, the creditors will probably claim, in the very
short term, various defaults that have occurred or to be
occurred, and request the immediate acceleration of their debt.
In such case, SoLocal Group will have to consider the opening of
collective proceedings in a manner that has not yet been
determined.  At its hearing on December 16, 2016, the Commercial
Court of Nanterre will rule on the situation of the Company.

Financial agenda

In accordance with the calendar of financial communication,
SoLocal Group will announce its results of the 3rd quarter of
2016 on next November 25 before the opening of the Paris stock
exchange.


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I R E L A N D
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ANGLO IRISH: Solicitor Entitled to Damages, Court Rules
-------------------------------------------------------
Mary Carolan at The Irish Times reports that a solicitor who was
one of several "high-net-worth" individuals who separately
invested sums totalling GBP51 million in a redevelopment that
never proceeded is entitled to damages over "seriously
misleading" negligent misrepresentations by the former Anglo
Irish Bank concerning that project, the Court of Appeal has
ruled.

The amount of damages for John Spencer -- whose equity from his
GBP1 million investment of 2005 in the planned redevelopment of
Whitgift Shopping Centre, Croydon, London, was zero by 2010 --
will be assessed later by the High Court, The Irish Times notes.
Mr. Spencer, a Nenagh-based solicitor who in 2005 had a portfolio
of about 15 properties in Ireland and England, anticipated a
return of some 220% on his Whitgift investment, the High Court
had heard, The Irish Times relates.

He was giving the three-judge court's judgment allowing
Mr. Spencer's appeal over the High Court's dismissal of his claim
for damages for negligent misstatement and misrepresentation in
statements made to him by the bank in 2005 concerning a proposed
redevelopment of the Whitgift centre by a joint venture involving
the bank and Howard Holdings, an Irish and UK-based property
development company, The Irish Times discloses.

Under that, the bank was to provide a GBP166 million debt
facility and raise GBP51 from its client base of high-net-worth
individuals, The Irish Times notes.

Arising from the collapse and nationalization of Anglo into
State-owned IBRC, and the latter's sale of relevant loans to a
fund, Stapleford Finance Ltd., Mr. Spencer's case was against
IBRC and Stapleford, The Irish Times states.  The fund counter-
claimed for judgment against Mr. Spencer over loans taken out
with Anglo to fund the investment, The Irish Times relays.

While the High Court found there was misrepresentation by the
bank, it ruled Mr. Spencer was not entitled to damages based on
findings including he would still have proceeded with what was a
high-risk investment, The Irish Times notes.

His appeal was concerned with a EUR1 million loan he personally
invested in a life assurance bond offered by Anglo Irish
Assurance Company Ltd., an Anglo subsidiary, The Irish Times
says.  It was not concerned with a separate EUR1 million borrowed
by him so a partnership could also purchase a bond, according to
The Irish Times.

In his judgment, Mr. Justice Hogan found there was negligent
misstatement by the bank concerning the investment and that
certain of its written documents sent to Mr. Spencer concerning
the investment included a number of material misrepresentations,
The Irish Times relates.

He said the bank's conduct had serious consequences for
Mr. Spencer whose equity, along with that of the other investors,
had dropped to nil by 2010, The Irish Times relays.  He noted
that the loss was later crystallized by IBRC's sale of the
underlying asset, The Irish Times discloses.

He said Mr. Spencer was entitled to say he would have avoided
those losses were it not for the misrepresentations and
negligence on the bank's part, according to The Irish Times.

                      About Anglo Irish

Anglo Irish Bank was an Irish bank headquartered in Dublin from
1964 to 2011.  It went into wind-down mode after nationalization
in 2009.  In July 2011, Anglo Irish merged with the Irish
Nationwide Building Society, with the new company being named the
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC).

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Irish Bank
Resolution Corp. Ltd. (IBRC) to 'D/D' from 'B-/C'.   S&P also
lowered the senior unsecured ratings to 'D' from 'B-'.  S&P then
withdrew the counterparty credit ratings, the senior unsecured
ratings, and the preferred stock ratings on IBRC.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'BBB+' issue rating on three government-
guaranteed debt issues.

The rating actions follow the Feb. 6, 2013, announcement that the
Irish government has liquidated IBRC.

The former Irish bank sought protection from creditors under
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on Aug. 26, 2013 (Bankr.
D. Del., Case No. 13-12159).  The former bank's Foreign
Representatives are Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson.  Its
U.S. bankruptcy counsel are Mark D. Collins, Esq., and Jason M.
Madron, Esq., at Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., in Wilmington,
Delaware.


AVOCA CLO V: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to 'CCsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Avoca CLO V plc's class E and F
notes and affirmed the others, as follows:

   -- Class C1 (ISIN XS0256537423): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Class C2 (ISIN XS0256538157): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Class D (ISIN XS0256538405): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Class E (ISIN XS0256539122): downgraded to 'B-sf' from
      'Bsf'; Outlook Negative

   -- Class F (ISIN XS0256539635): downgraded to 'CCsf' from
      'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate 0%

Avoca CLO V plc. is a managed cash arbitrage securitisation of
secured leveraged loans, primarily domiciled in Europe. The
transaction closed in 2006 and is actively managed by KKR Credit
Advisors.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade of the class E and F notes reflects the decrease in
credit enhancement (CE). CE for the class F notes is negative and
the note is under-collateralised, with CE of -3%. CE for the
class E notes has decreased to 10% from 13% at the last annual
review. CE decreased after the manager offloaded a portion of the
'CCC' assets at discount and the default of one obligor that
represents 4% of the current portfolio. The percentage of 'CCC'
or below assets now represents 8.8% of the portfolio.

The Negative Outlook on the class E notesreflects the potential
of a downgrade if the portfolio deteriorates further. The class F
OC test is failing by 7.4% and the class E OC test cushion has
decreased to 3.4% from 5.4% since the previous review.

CE for the class C notes has increased to 68% from 51% and for
the class D notes to 39% from 32% following the portfolio
amortisation of EUR31m. However, as the portfolio deleverages the
transaction is becoming more exposed to obligor concentration,
hence the affirmations. The number of obligors excluding defaults
has decreased to 14 from 22 and the largest 10 assets now
represent 87% of the total portfolio. The largest obligor
represents 16%.

The transaction has limited excess spread benefit given the
coupon on the fixed rate liabilities. For this review Fitch
performed a sensitivity analysis to assess near-term performance
volatility if large obligors were to default or if they were to
prepay.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Increasing the default rate by 25% or decreasing the recovery
rate by 25% to all assets in the portfolio would result in a
downgrade of two notches.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch and/or other
rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis:

   -- Loan-by-loan data provided by Deutsche Bank as of 31
      October 2016.

   -- Trustee report provided by Deutsche Bank as of 31 October
      2016.


AVOCA CLO VI: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three tranches of Avoca CLO VI plc and
affirmed the others, as follows:

   -- Class A2 (ISIN XS0272580266): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Class B (ISIN XS0272580779): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Class C (ISIN XS0272580936): upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'Asf';
      Outlook Stable

   -- Class D (ISIN XS0272582395): upgraded to 'Asf' from
      'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class E (ISIN XS0272583286): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Class F (ISIN XS0272583955): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
      revised to Negative from Stable

   -- Class V (ISIN XS0272586891): upgraded to 'Asf' from
      'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable

Avoca CLO VI plc. is a managed cash arbitrage securitisation of
secured leveraged loans, primarily domiciled in Europe. The
transaction closed in 2006 and is actively managed by KKR Credit
Advisors.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of the class C and D notes reflects the increase in
credit enhancement (CE) following the EUR62m amortisation of the
class A-1 and A-2 notes. CE for the class C notes has increased
to 48% from 30% and for the class D notes to 32% from 21%.

The revision of the Outlook on the class F notes reflects the
marginal decrease in CE following the manager offloading the
'CCC' assets below par and the marginal deterioration in the
portfolio credit quality. The Fitch calculated weighted average
rating factor of the portfolio has increased to 34.4 from 32.7
following the repayment of a portion of the higher quality loans.
The weighted average rating is now 'B'/'B-'. In addition, the
class F overcollateralisation test is failing by 0.4%, following
an additional default of EUR2.4m, with high losses expected for
the mezzanine loans.

The portfolio has deleveraged by approximately EUR63m and CE for
the class A-2 and B notes is now 88% and 73% (from 53% and 44%).
However, as the portfolio deleverages the transaction is becoming
more exposed to obligor concentration. The number of obligors has
decreased to 28 from 39 and the largest 10 assets now represent
66% of the total portfolio. The largest obligor is 9% of the
current portfolio. The percentage of 'CCC' assets has marginally
increased to 9% from 8% but is still above the transaction limit
of 5%. For this review, Fitch performed a sensitivity analysis to
assess near-term performance volatility if large obligors were to
default or if they were to prepay.

The upgrade of the class V combo notes reflects the upgrade of
the class D notes, its main underlying component.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Increasing the default rate by 25% to all assets in the portfolio
would result in a downgrade of up to two notches. Decreasing the
recovery rate by 25% to all assets in the portfolio would result
in a downgrade of up to three notches.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch and/or other
rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis:

   -- Loan-by-loan data provided by Deutsche Bank as of 31
      October 2016.

   -- Trustee report provided by Deutsche Bank as of 31 October
      2016.


SIAC: Seeks More Than EUR210 Million From Polish Authorities
------------------------------------------------------------
Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times reports that building and
engineering group Siac Construction Ltd. and its partner are
pursuing the Polish authorities for more than EUR210 million as a
result of the dispute that forced the Irish company to seek court
protection from its creditors.

The High Court appointed Michael McAteer --
michael.mcateer@ie.gt.com -- of Grant Thornton as examiner to
Siac in late 2013 after the fallout from the dispute over a
EUR400 million contract to build part of the A4 motorway in
Poland threatened its survival, The Irish Times relates.

Siac's accounts for 2015 state that the partnership it formed
with local builder PBG to work on the contract has so far
submitted claims for EUR64 million against GDDKiA, Poland's roads
directorate, stemming from the dispute, and plans to seek a
further EUR150 million in coming months, The Irish Times
discloses.

The Irish company's share of this will be more than EUR100
million, The Irish Times states.  This indicates that trade
creditors who lost out under the restructuring that resulted from
the examinership could stand to gain about EUR20 million from
this, The Irish Times notes.

According to The Irish Times, as part of the rescue plan agreed
in early 2014 under the examinership, the group committed to
paying 20% of whatever it recovered from its Polish litigation to
unsecured creditors of Siac Holdings Ireland and Siac Bituminous
Products.


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I T A L Y
=========


BANCA MONTE: Fitch Maintains 'B-' Long Term IDR at RWE
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena's
(MPS) 'B-' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) on Rating Watch
Evolving (RWE) and downgraded the bank's Viability Rating (VR) to
'c' from 'ccc'. The VR is removed from RWE. The rating actions
follow MPS's offer to buy back from retail and institutional
investors certain of its outstanding subordinated and junior
notes.

Fitch has also taken action on the rated subordinated and junior
notes that are included in the offer.

Fitch views the offer as a distressed debt exchange (DDE). The
bondholders tendering their notes will have to invest the cash in
new shares issued by the bank. The offer is part of the bank's
plan to increase capital by up to EUR5bn, partly through the
issue of new shares, and to dispose of its entire stock of
doubtful loans (sofferenze). The offer affects a total
outstanding amount of securities of approximately EUR4.3bn. Tier
2 securities will be offered 100% of their nominal value, Tier 1
securities 85% of their nominal value, with the exception of
XS0180906439, which will be offered 20% of its nominal value.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

The downgrade of the VR to 'c' reflects Fitch's view that MPS's
offer to junior and subordinated bondholders qualifies as a DDE
under our criteria since the cash tender, with obligation to
invest the proceeds in the bank's equity, represents a material
reduction in terms.

In our view a DDE signals the failure of a bank, and the
downgrade of the VR indicates that this has now become
inevitable. Although the offer formally is voluntary, failure to
achieve a sufficient amount of tendered bonds would put the
bank's entire non-performing loan (NPL) disposal and capital
increase at risk. This would, in Fitch's opinion, further
increase the risk of the bank's resolution under the EU's Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) or the write-down of
capital instruments. The offer announcement makes explicit
reference to this risk.

Alternatively, if the bank's plan, including the DDE, is not
implemented, Fitch believes a material capital shortfall will
occur following the European Central Bank's (ECB) decision to
impose an accelerated disposal of MPS's portfolio of impaired
loans, which will result in material additional provisions,
leading to losses and depleting MPS's capital.

The VR continues to reflect the very weak asset quality of MPS
and the pressure this puts on its capital. Gross impaired loans
at end-9M16 accounted for just over one-third of gross loans, and
net impaired exposures (sofferenze and unlikely-to-pay exposures)
accounted for approximately 270% of Fitch Core Capital (FCC) at
the same date, which is very high.

MPS's ratings also reflect Fitch's view that funding and
liquidity are extremely vulnerable to market sentiment. The bank
suffered significant deposit outflows in the year to date and its
liquidity position since our last rating review on 4 August 2016
has deteriorated further.

MPS's Long-Term IDR and senior debt are rated above the VR to
reflect Fitch's view that the probability that senior creditors
will have to bear losses is lower than the probability of failure
for the bank. This is because they benefit from protection from
junior debt, either in event of a liability management exercise
such as that envisaged in the proposed DDE, or in other potential
failure scenarios such as use of resolution powers to write down
capital instruments.

The RWE reflects Fitch's view that MPS's Long-Term IDR could be
upgraded or downgraded depending on whether the announced
transaction goes ahead as planned or not. Fitch sees material
execution risks related to the disposal of impaired loans and the
capital strengthening because of the complexity of the
transactions.

The RWE on the senior debt ratings reflect Fitch's expectation
that these could be upgraded if the entire transaction is
completed successfully, but also that failure to complete the
transaction will increase the risk of losses being imposed on
senior creditors in a resolution and could lead to a downgrade of
the ratings.

The Short-Term IDR remains on Rating Watch Negative (RWN) because
it is mapped from the Long-Term IDR, and an upgrade would require
a Long-Term IDR of at least 'BBB-', which we do not expect.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The SR and SRF reflect Fitch's view that senior creditors cannot
expect to receive full extraordinary support from the sovereign
in the event that the bank becomes non-viable. The BRRD and the
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for eurozone banks provide a
framework for the resolution of banks that requires senior
creditors to participate in losses, if necessary, instead, or
ahead, of a bank receiving sovereign support.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

MPS's legacy lower and upper tier 2 securities that are included
in the offer are rated in line with our criteria for rating non-
performing issues. "Although the holders of these securities will
be offered 100% of their nominal value, the terms of the offer
require the proceeds to be invested in new shares issued by the
bank and we believe that significant uncertainty exists over the
prospects for realising the notional value. Therefore the 'RR3'
Recovery Rating for these issues reflects the likelihood of large
economic losses being sustained by bondholders." Fitch said.

The other legacy tier 2 securities (XS0374000171) that are not
included in the offer are rated 'CC'/RWE, reflecting that if the
entire transaction does not go ahead bondholders are at risk of
losses.

The ratings, including the 'RR6' Recovery Rating, of the Tier 1
instruments and preferred securities reflect their non-
performance and the likelihood of severe economic losses being
sustained by bondholders

SENIOR STATE-GUARANTEED DEBT

The long-term rating of MPS's state-guaranteed debt is based on
Italy's direct, unconditional and irrevocable guarantee for the
issues, which covers payments of both principal and interest.
Italy's guarantee was issued by the Ministry of Economy and
Finance under Law Decree 6 December 2011, n.201, subsequently
converted into Law 22 December 2011, n. 214.

The ratings reflect Fitch's expectation that Italy will honour
the guarantee provided to the noteholders in a full and timely
manner. The state guarantee ranks pari passu with Italy's other
unsecured and unguaranteed senior obligations. As a result, the
notes' long-term ratings are in line with Italy's 'BBB+' Long-
Term IDR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

If the bank's planned transaction, which comprises the disposal
of impaired loans and capital strengthening, including through
debt conversion to equity, is completed successfully, MPS's
creditworthiness would improve. This would result in an upgrade
of the VR, Long-Term IDR and senior debt ratings. In line with
Fitch's DDE criteria, MPS's VR would be downgraded to 'f'
immediately before being upgraded to the level reflecting the
bank's profile following the capital increase.

An upgrade would primarily reflect improved asset quality and
lower pressure on capital from net impaired exposures as well as
reduced risk of further pressures on funding. The extent of the
upgrade will depend on our assessment of the bank's
capitalisation and asset quality after the transaction, the
bank's business profile after the transaction, the bank's
earnings potential, and the strategic objectives included in the
bank's new business plan.

"We will monitor the bank's ability, post-completion of the
transaction, to implement its new strategy and expect any
resulting earnings improvements to be gradual. This is likely to
constrain the VR in the 'b' range immediately following the
recapitalisation." Fitch said.

"If the transaction is not completed, MPS's VR would likely be
downgraded to 'f' and the Long-Term IDR and senior debt ratings
could be downgraded to a level commensurate with our view of
heightened risk of senior creditors bearing losses in a
resolution of the bank," Fitch said.

Fitch expects to resolve the RWE when the outcome of the planned
transactions is known.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

If the transaction proceeds as planned, the ratings of untendered
bonds could be upgraded as the VR is upgraded applying the
appropriate notching differential for the then determined VR
level. The ratings of tendered bonds could be withdrawn shortly
after the completion of the transaction, if the entire issue is
exchanged and those securities are extinguished in the exchange.

If the transaction does not go ahead, then the ratings of the
securities could be downgraded to 'C', the lowest issue rating,
and Recovery Ratings downgraded to as low as 'RR6' if, for
example, in a resolution subordinated notes are entirely wiped
out to bear the losses.

SENIOR STATE-GUARANTEED DEBT

The state-guaranteed debt ratings are sensitive to changes in
Italy's Long-Term IDR or to changes in Fitch's expectation that
the sovereign would honour its obligation. A downgrade of Italy's
Long-Term IDR, currently on Negative Outlook, would be reflected
in the notes' long-term ratings.

SR AND SRF

An upgrade of the SR and any upward revision of the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support MPS. While not impossible, this is highly unlikely, in
Fitch's view.

The rating actions are as follows:

   -- Long-Term IDR: 'B-'; maintained on RWE

   -- Short-Term IDR: 'B' maintained on RWN

   -- Viability Rating: downgraded to 'c' from 'ccc', removed
      from RWE

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   -- Debt issuance programme (senior debt): 'B-'/'RR4';
      maintained on RWE

   -- Senior unsecured debt: 'B-'/'RR4'; maintained on RWE

   -- Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt: 'CC', revised to 'RR3' from
      'RR5'; maintained on RWE

   -- Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: 'CC', revised to 'RR3' from
      'RR5'; maintained on RWE

   -- Preferred stock and Tier 1 notes: affirmed at 'C'/'RR6'

   -- State-guaranteed debt (IT0004804362): affirmed at 'BBB+'


* DBRS Extends Under Review Status on 15 EU Transactions
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited extended the current Under Review with
Negative Implications (UR-Neg.) status on 23 ratings from 15
European Structured Finance Transactions.

The rating actions reflect the extension of the UR-Neg. Republic
of Italy (Italy) Long-Term Foreign Currency - Issuer Rating on
November 3, 2016.

DBRS considers that the ratings listed below could be negatively
affected by a potential downgrade of the sovereign rating of
Italy (A (low), UR-Neg.), as envisaged in the aforementioned
rating action taken on 5 August 2016. DBRS has identified three
different groups of transactions potentially affected:

   -- Securitisations collateralised by a sovereign inflation-
      linked bond issued by the Republic of Italy (the
      Collateral) where the noteholders are effectively exposed
      to the risk that either the Collateral or the
      counterparties default. As such, DBRS regards the ratings
      of the Notes to be linked to those of the Collateral and
      Hedging Counterparty, and uses the ratings of Italy to
      evaluate the credit risk of the Collateral and monitor its
      credit risk on an ongoing basis.

   -- Securitisations where the notes are backed by salary-backed
      loan receivables (the Receivables) originated in Italy. The
      Receivables may include salary assignment loans (Cessione
      del Quinto di Stipendio or CQS), pension assignment loans
      (Cessione del Quinto di Pensione) and payment delegation
      loans (Delegazione di Pagamento) (CQS transactions). Given
      the relevance of the exposure to Italian sovereign risk,
      DBRS's rating analysis assumes the credit risk of the rated
      notes of CQS transactions to be highly correlated with the
      sovereign rating.

   -- Transactions where DBRS, as part of its analysis, has
      investigated the sensitivity of the transaction base case
      default and recovery base case assumptions to a potential
      downgrade of the Italian sovereign rating. The sovereign
      stress is incorporated into DBRS's structured finance
      analysis as seen in its "The Effect of Sovereign Risk on
      Securitisations in the Euro Area" commentary:

The list of ratings affected by the rating action can be found
below.

Notes:

All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.

The principal methodologies applicable are "Master European
Structured Finance Surveillance Methodology" and "Rating CLOs and
CDOs of Large Corporate Credit".

This is an event driven rating action and, in DBRS's opinion, the
analysis does not require the application of the entire principal
methodologies. Therefore, an analysis of operational risk,
counterparty risk, and transaction-specific performance
indicators, was not conducted. A review of the legal transaction
documents was also not conducted.

DBRS is undertaking a review and will remove the ratings from
this status as soon as it is appropriate.
Other methodologies referenced in this transaction are listed at
the end of this press release.

The source of information used for this rating action is solely
the potential impact of a downgrade of the sovereign rating of
Italy, as envisaged in the rating action taken on 5 August 2016,
and the subsequent press release announcing the extension of its
UR-Neg. status. DBRS ratings are under regular surveillance.

DBRS does not rely upon third-party due diligence in order to
conduct its analysis. DBRS was not supplied with third-party
assessments. However, this did not impact the rating analysis.

DBRS considers the information available to it for the purposes
of providing this rating to be of satisfactory quality.

DBRS does not audit the information it receives in connection
with the rating process, and it does not and cannot independently
verify that information in every instance.

The last rating action date for each transaction is listed at the
end of this press release.

The ratings listed below are UR-Neg. Generally, the conditions
that lead to the assignment of reviews are resolved within a 90-
day period. However, this time DBRS anticipates a longer UR-Neg.
period, which will be resolved upon further analysis of the
affected transactions, to be conducted once the UR-Neg. status of
the sovereign rating has been resolved. DBRS reviews and ratings
are under regular surveillance.

Ratings assigned by DBRS Ratings Limited are subject to EU
regulations only.

Arianna SPV S.r.l.

Initial Rating Date: 23 December 2013
Last Rating Action Date: 23 August 2016

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Andrew Lynch, Senior Financial Analyst
Rating Committee Chair: Christian Aufsatz, Senior Vice President

Golden Bar (Securitisation) S.r.l. - Series 2015-1

Initial Rating Date: 9 October 2015
Last Rating Action Date: 26 August 2016

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Andrew Lynch, Senior Financial Analyst
Rating Committee Chair: Christian Aufsatz, Senior Vice President

Golden Bar (Securitisation) S.r.l. - Series 2016-1

Initial Rating Date: 2 August 2016
Last Rating Action Date: 23 August 2016

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Andrew Lynch, Senior Financial Analyst
Rating Committee Chair: Christian Aufsatz, Senior Vice President

IBL CQS 2013 S.r.l.

Initial Rating Date: 20 December 2013
Last Rating Action Date: 23 August 2016

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Antonio Di Marco, Senior Financial
Analyst
Rating Committee Chair: Christian Aufsatz, Senior Vice President

IBL Finance S.r.l. (IBL CQS 2015)

Initial Rating Date: 22 May 2015
Last Rating Action Date: 23 August 2016

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Antonio Di Marco, Senior Financial
Analyst
Rating Committee Chair: Christian Aufsatz, Senior Vice President

Madeleine SPV S.r.l.

Initial Rating Date: 17 July 2014
Last Rating Action Date: 29 September 2016.

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Antonio Di Marco, Senior Financial
Analyst
Rating Committee Chair: Christian Aufsatz, Senior Vice President

Quarzo CQS S.r.l.

Initial Rating Date: 9 March 2015
Last Rating Action Date: 23 August 2016.

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Joana Seara da Costa, Senior Financial
Analyst
Rating Committee Chair: Christian Aufsatz, Senior Vice President

Towers CQ S.r.l.

Initial Rating Date: 2 June 2016
Last Rating Action Date: 23 August 2016

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Joana Seara da Costa, Senior Financial
Analyst
Rating Committee Chair: Christian Aufsatz, Senior Vice President

Palladium Securities 1 S.A. Acting in Relation to Compartment
114-2013-14

Initial Rating Date: 6 June 2013
Last Rating Action Date: 23 August 2016

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Alfonso Candelas, Vice President
Rating Committee Chair: Jerry van Koolbergen, Managing Director

Palladium Securities 1 S.A. Acting in Relation to Compartment
117-2013-17

Initial Rating Date: 7 August 2013
Last Rating Action Date: 23 August 2016

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Alfonso Candelas, Vice President
Rating Committee Chair: Jerry van Koolbergen, Managing Director

Palladium Securities 1 S.A. Acting in Relation to Compartment
121-2013-21

Initial Rating Date: 7 October 2013
Last Rating Action Date: 23 August 2016

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Alfonso Candelas, Vice President
Rating Committee Chair: Jerry van Koolbergen, Managing Director

Palladium Securities 1 S.A. Acting in Relation to Compartment
124-2013-24

Initial Rating Date: 15 January 2014
Last Rating Action Date: 23 August 2016

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Alfonso Candelas, Vice President
Rating Committee Chair: Jerry van Koolbergen, Managing Director

Palladium Securities 1 S.A. Acting in Relation to Compartment
131-2014-06

Initial Rating Date: 6 May 2014
Last Rating Action Date: 23 August 2016

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Alfonso Candelas, Vice President
Rating Committee Chair: Jerry van Koolbergen, Managing Director

Palladium Securities 1 S.A. Acting in relation to Compartment
145-2014-20

Initial Rating Date: 19 January 2015
Last Rating Action Date: 23 August 2016

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Alfonso Candelas, Vice President
Rating Committee Chair: Jerry van Koolbergen, Managing Director

Palladium Securities 1 S.A. Acting in relation to Compartment
148-2014-23

Initial Rating Date: 25 February 2015
Last Rating Action Date: 23 August 2016

Lead Surveillance Analyst: Alfonso Candelas, Vice President
Rating Committee Chair: Jerry van Koolbergen, Managing Director

DBRS Ratings Limited
20 Fenchurch Street
31st Floor
London EC3M 3BY
United Kingdom

Registered in England and Wales: No. 7139960

   -- Master European Structured Finance Surveillance Methodology

   -- Rating CLOs and CDOs of Large Corporate Credit

   -- Rating European Consumer and Commercial Asset-Backed
      Securitisations

   -- Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions

   -- Derivative Criteria for European Structured Finance
      Transactions

   -- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance
      Servicers

   -- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance
      Originators

   -- Unified Interest Rate Model for European Securitisations

A full text copy of the ratings is available free at:

                       https://is.gd/A3k4YS


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


KAZAKHSTAN MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms BB+ Subordinated Bonds Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Kazakhstan Mortgage Company's (KMC)
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) at 'BBB-' with Stable Outlook. The Short-Term Foreign
Currency IDR has been affirmed at 'F3'.

Fitch has also affirmed the Long-term rating of KMC's outstanding
senior debt at 'BBB-' and the Long-term rating of the outstanding
subordinated bonds at 'BB+'.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's unchanged view of KMC as a
credit-linked entity under its public-sector entities rating
criteria and unchanged assessment of the entity's linkage with
the Republic of Kazakhstan (BBB/Stable/F2).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

KMC's ratings reflect the company's ultimate ownership by the
government, its high strategic importance in social housing and
strong control and oversight by the state. The one-notch rating
differential factors in a "mid-range" assessment of its legal
status and integration with the state.

Legal Status Assessed as Midrange

Fitch considers KMC's legal link with the state as moderate. This
results from KMC's legal status as a joint-stock company, which
is indirectly owned by the state. Fitch views Kazakhstan as the
ultimate owner of KMC as the company's shares are held by the
National Managing Holding Company Baiterek (BBB/Stable/F2), which
is 100%-owned by the state. KMC acts as the government's agent
authorised to implement government policy in the housing sector,
although the company operates under the general legal regime and
subject to bankruptcy.

Strategic Importance Assessed as Stronger

Fitch views KMC as strategically important to the state due to
its key role in developing housing affordability in the republic,
as announced in the Kazakhstan's Programme for Regions'
Development to 2020. Under this programme, KMC is required to
deliver about 1.4 million sq. m. of social rental housing across
the republic until 2020. The total cost of the programme is
estimated at KZT239.1bn, of which state funding comprises
KZT163.3bn, or 68%. The remaining financing will come from bond
issues and KMC's rental proceeds.

Control Assessed as Stronger

KMC continues to operate under strong control and oversight from
the central government. KMC's Board of Directors is controlled by
the head of Baiterek, whose Board of Directors is chaired by the
Prime Minister of Kazakhstan. Baiterek approves KMC's annual
budgets, borrowing decisions, investments and dividend policy.
The company is monitored by various state auditors and
controllers for the use of funds allocated from the state budget
and the National Fund of Kazakhstan.

Integration Assessed as Midrange

Fitch views KMC's integration into the general government sector
as moderate. The company has a separate budget and its debt is
not consolidated in state debt. However, KMC heavily relies on
funding received from the government and state-owned institutions
in the form of equity injections, subsidised loans and financing
through bond issues.

In 2016, KMC received two loans from Baiterek for a total
KZT41.6bn (2015: KZT92.5bn) to be invested in social rental
housing. The funding was sourced from the National Fund of
Kazakhstan (KZT22.5bn) and the state budget (KZT19.1bn). Both
loans have a 30-year maturity and a 0.15% annual interest rate.
The loans were the final direct state funding suggested by the
programme. However, Fitch expects the government to continue
support the entity throughout the programme with additional
financing or by adjusting the programme's target in case of need
as has happened before.

KMC also benefits from indirect support from state-owned
institutions. At October 1, 2016, 76% (end-2015: 72%) of KMC's
KZT59bn outstanding domestic bonds were held by state-owned
institutions such as the Uniform Pension Fund, Development Bank
of Kazakhstan (BBB-/Stable/F3) and House Construction Savings
Bank of Kazakhstan (BBB-/Stable/F3). This underpins Fitch's view
that KMC would be eligible for government support in case of
need.

Improved Operating Performance

KMC's performance has been improving during the last three years
supported by low-cost funding. In 2015, the company recorded
KZT3.8bn net profit (2014: KZT1.2bn). Net interest income
improved to 5.1% in 2015 from 2.9% in 2014. Management expects
the company will remain profitable over the medium term.

Changing Assets Structure

KMC's operations are now focused on the provision of social
rental housing. In 2016, the entity did not invest in a mortgage
portfolio and does not plan to do so in 2017-2018. This led KMC's
assets to be dominated by rental-related assets, which made up
38% of total assets at end-2015 (2014: 8%), while the
concentration of mortgage loans reduced to 34% from 52% in 2014.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

An upgrade may result from an upgrade of the sovereign ratings,
provided that KMC's links to the government are unchanged, or
from tighter integration with the sovereign, including an
explicit government guarantee.

Changes to KMC's legal status, leading to a dilution of control
or weakening of support by the sovereign could lead Fitch to
widen the notching, resulting in a downgrade. Negative rating
action on the Republic of Kazakhstan would also be reflected by
KMC's ratings.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


EA PARTNERS I: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on USD700MM Sr. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed EA Partners I B.V.'s USD700m 6.875%
senior secured notes due 2020 at 'B-' with a Stable Outlook. The
Recovery Rating is 'RR4'.

EA Partners I B.V. on-lent the proceeds from the notes' issue to
respective obligors (defined as debt obligations). These notes
are secured over assets that represent senior unsecured claims to
the respective obligors. The rating reflects our view of the
credit profiles of the obligors and is constrained at 'B-' by the
obligor of the weakest credit quality.

EA Partners I B.V. is a private company with limited liability
established solely for the purpose of this transaction, and whose
sole shareholder is a foundation.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Unsecured Claims

The proceeds from the notes' issue represent separate debt
obligations of seven obligors, including Etihad Airways PJSC
(USD132m or 18.85% of total), Air Berlin PLC (USD132m), Jet
Airways (India) Limited (USD113m equivalent), Alitalia Societa
Aerea Italiana S.p.A. (USD132m), Air SERBIA, a.d. Belgrade
(USD56.5m), Air Seychelles Limited (USD21.5m) and Etihad Airport
Services LLC (USD113m). On-lending of proceeds from this
transaction's secured notes creates back-to-back senior unsecured
claims on the relevant obligors, which rank behind each obligor's
other prior-ranking, including secured debt.

Weakest Obligor Credit

Given the transaction's recourse to each obligor on a several
basis, the rating is constrained at the 'B-' level by the obligor
of the weakest credit quality. The rating of the notes reflects
our view of the creditworthiness, and the senior unsecured
ranking, of the obligors, including our assessment of their links
with their respective parents.

This reflects the sole cash flow for the service and repayment of
the notes being the individual cash flow streams from the
obligors under their respective loans. Failure of any obligor to
make interest or principal payments under its respective debt
obligation, which remains uncured following the re-marketing of
the respective debt obligation and/or through the liquidity pool,
may lead to an event of default under the notes and their
acceleration. The noteholders are thus exposed to the underlying
creditworthiness of each individual obligor.

Obligors' Credit Quality Varies

The credit quality of the obligors varies substantially -- from
that of Etihad Airways (A/Stable) whose rating is three notches
below Abu Dhabi's (AA/Stable), its sole ultimate shareholder, to
that of the obligor with the weakest credit quality -- which
constrains the notes' rating. While the obligors with weaker
profiles also benefit from the shareholder support of their
minority parent, Etihad Airways or soon to be established Etihad
Aviation Group, their standalone profiles remain weak largely due
to feeble credit metrics.

Cross Default

The notes do not have a cross-default provision, which means that
a default by one obligor under its debt obligation does not
constitute an event of default under other debt obligations
incurred under this transaction by other obligors.

However, events of default under each debt obligation include a
customary cross-default provision which states that a failure by
the respective 'obligor or any of its material subsidiaries to
pay any of its own financial indebtedness when due' will lead to
an event of default under the debt obligations of this obligor
but not of any other obligor other than in the case of Etihad
Airways and Etihad Airport Services.

Etihad Airport Services is considered a material subsidiary of
Etihad Airways under this transaction's documentation. Therefore,
an uncured failure by Etihad Airport Services to make payments
under this transaction's debt obligation will constitute an event
of default under Etihad Airways' debt obligation under this
transaction. Etihad Airways or any other non-defaulting obligor
may also provide support to other obligors by purchasing their
debt obligations through the 're-marketing event', if it takes
place upon default of another obligor on its payments under the
debt obligation. However, this can be exercised at Etihad
Airways' or any other non-defaulting obligor's discretion and is
not an obligation under this transaction.

This lack of legal obligation to support other entities underpins
this transaction's rating approach based on the credit profile of
the weakest obligor rather than on the stronger entities
supporting the weakest.

Average Recovery Prospect

"We assess the recovery (given default) prospect of the notes as
average (31%-50%, 'RR4') based on the average of our assessment
of the recovery prospects of the obligors and their respective
country caps," Fitch said.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

The rating reflects our view of the credit profiles and recovery
assumptions for the obligors and is constrained at 'B-' by the
obligor of the weakest credit quality. The credit quality of the
obligors varies substantially depending on their business
profiles and financial profiles that we generally see as weak
compared with peers. Shareholder support improves our assessment
of the obligors.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- The proceeds from the notes' issue are on-lent to seven
      obligors.

   -- This transaction's notes are secured over assets that
      represent senior unsecured claims to respective obligors.

   -- The notes do not have a cross-default provision.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

   -- The improvement of the credit quality of the obligor with
      the weakest credit profile

   -- Improvement of the recovery prospects for the senior
      unsecured creditors of the obligor of the weakest credit
      quality, unless there are limitations due to country-
      specific treatment of Recovery Ratings.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- The deterioration of the credit quality of the obligor with
      the weakest credit profile

   -- Worsening of the recovery prospects to below-average for
      the senior unsecured creditors of the obligor of the
      weakest credit quality.


EA PARTNERS II: Fitch Ups USD500MM Sr. Sec. Notes Rating to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded EA Partners II B.V.'s senior secured
USD500m 6.75% notes due 2021 to 'B' from 'B-'. The Outlook is
Stable and the Recovery Rating is 'RR4'.

The upgrade is driven by an improvement of the credit quality of
the obligor with the weakest credit quality. EA Partners II B.V.
on-lent the proceeds from the notes' issue to respective
obligors. These notes are secured over assets that represent
senior unsecured claims to the respective obligors.

EA Partners II B.V. is a private company with limited liability
established solely for the purpose of this transaction, and whose
sole shareholder is a foundation.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Unsecured Claims

The proceeds from the notes' issue represent separate debt
obligations of six obligors, including Etihad Airways PJSC (17.8%
of the issue), Air Berlin PLC (19.9%), Alitalia Societa Aerea
Italiana S.p.A. (19.9%), Air SERBIA, a.d. Belgrade (12.6%), Air
Seychelles Limited (10%) and Etihad Airport Services LLC (19.8%).
On-lending of proceeds from this transaction's secured notes
create back-to-back senior unsecured claims on the relevant
obligors, which rank behind each obligor's other prior ranking,
including secured debt.

Weakest Obligor Credit

Given the transaction's recourse to each obligor on a several
basis, the rating is constrained at the 'B' level by the obligors
of the weakest credit quality. The rating on the notes reflects
our view of the creditworthiness and the senior unsecured ranking
of the obligors, including our assessment of their links with
their respective parents.

This reflects the sole cash flow for the service and repayment of
the notes being the individual cash flow streams from the
obligors under their respective loans. Failure of any obligor to
make interest or principal payments under its respective debt
obligation, which remains uncured following the remarketing of
the respective debt obligation and/or through the liquidity pool,
may lead to an event of default under the notes. As a result, the
noteholders are exposed to the underlying creditworthiness of
each obligor.

Obligors' Credit Quality Varies

The credit quality of the obligors varies substantially - from
that of Etihad Airways (A/Stable) whose rating is three notches
below Abu Dhabi's (AA/Stable), its sole ultimate shareholder, to
that of obligors with the weakest credit quality - which
constrain the notes' rating. While the obligors with the weakest
profiles benefit from the shareholder support of their minority
parent, Etihad Airways or soon to be established Etihad Aviation
Group, their standalone profiles remain weak due to feeble credit
metrics.

Cross Default

The notes do not have a cross-default provision, which means that
a default by one obligor under its debt obligation does not
constitute an event of default under other debt obligations
incurred under this transaction by the other obligors.

However, events of default under each debt obligation include a
customary cross-default provision, which states that a failure by
the respective "obligor or any of its material subsidiaries to
pay any of its own financial indebtedness when due" will lead to
an event of default under the debt obligation of this obligor but
not of any other obligor other than in the case of Etihad Airways
and Etihad Airport Services.

Etihad Airport Services is considered to be a material subsidiary
of Etihad Airways under this transaction's documentation.
Therefore, an uncured failure by Etihad Airport Services to make
payments under this transaction's debt obligation will constitute
an event of default under Etihad Airways' debt obligation.

Etihad Airways or any other non-defaulting obligor may also
provide support to other obligors by purchasing their debt
obligations through the "re-marketing event", if it takes place
upon default of another obligor on its payments under the debt
obligation. However, this can be exercised at Etihad Airways' or
any other non-defaulting obligor's discretion and is not an
obligation under this transaction.

This lack of legal obligation to support other entities underpins
the rating approach based on the credit profiles of the weakest
obligors rather than on the stronger entities supporting the
weakest.

Average Recovery Prospect

"We assess the recovery (given default) prospect of the notes as
average (31%-50%, RR4) based on the average of our assessment of
the recovery prospects of the obligors and their respective
country caps and adjusting for the volatility in the recovery
percentages," Fitch said.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

The rating reflects our view of the credit profiles and recovery
assumptions for the obligors and is constrained at 'B' by the
obligors of the weakest credit quality. The credit quality of the
obligors varies substantially depending on their business
profiles and financial profiles that we generally see as weak
compared with peers. Shareholder support improves our assessment
of the obligors.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- The proceeds from the notes' issue are on-lent to six
      obligors.

   -- This transaction's notes are secured over assets that
      represent senior unsecured claims to respective obligors.

   -- The notes do not have a cross-default provision.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Developments that could lead to positive rating action
include:

   -- The improvement of the credit quality of the obligors with
      the weakest credit profiles.

   -- Sustained improvement of the recovery prospects for the
      senior unsecured creditors of the obligors of the weakest
      credit quality, unless there are limitations due to
      country-specific treatment of Recovery Ratings.

Negative: Developments that could lead to negative rating action
include:

   -- The deterioration of the credit quality of the obligors
      with the weakest credit profile.

   -- Worsening of the recovery prospects to below-average for
      the senior unsecured creditors of the obligors of the
      weakest credit quality.


HARBOURMASTER CLO 3: Fitch Hikes Class B2 Notes Rating to 'Bsf'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 3 B.V.'s
class A2, A3, A4, B1, B2 and S4 notes and affirmed the others as
follows:

   -- Class A1-T: affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class A1-VF: affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class A2: upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class A3: upgraded to 'A+sf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class A4: upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class B1: upgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class B2: upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class S4: upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 3 B.V. is a securitisation of mainly
European senior secured loans, senior unsecured loans, second-
lien loans, mezzanine obligations and high-yield bonds. At
closing, total note issuance of EUR612m was used to invest in a
target portfolio of EUR598m. The portfolio is actively managed by
Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Management Europe Limited.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrades reflect the increase in credit enhancement (CE)
across the capital structure due to the transaction's
deleveraging . The senior class A1 notes have paid down by
EUR121.2m over the past 12 months.

The reinvestment period ended in September 2014 but the
collateral manager was able to reinvest unscheduled proceeds
until the payment date failing in September 2016. During the past
year, the collateral manager purchased approximatively EUR39.5m
of additional assets and sold approximatively EUR16.6m of assets.

Following the transaction's deleveraging, the portfolio credit
quality has slightly deteriorated and assets rated 'CCC' and
below by Fitch increased to 3.3% of the performing portfolio,
from 0.7% 12 months ago. As of the October 2016 investor report,
all coverage tests, portfolio profile tests and collateral
quality tests were passing.

The overcollateralisation (OC) tests have never been breached and
results have improved since October 2015. A haircut to the value
of assets rated 'CCC' or below is only applied for the
calculation of the class A2 OC test. There is continued
uncertainty regarding the definition of defaulted assets for the
purpose of the coverage tests, which may reduce the efficiency of
the OC tests.

Currently there are no revolving or delayed drawdown notes in the
portfolio. Of the portfolio, 18.3% is non-euro-denominated. 13.1%
is hedged by the variable funding note and the remainder is
hedged by currency swaps that meet Fitch's counterparty criteria.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability may lead to a
downgrade of up to one notch for the rated notes. A 25% reduction
in expected recovery rates may lead to a downgrade of up to two
notches for the rated notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch and/or other
rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis:

   -- Investor report as of 31 October 2016 provided by Deutsche
      Bank

   -- Loan-by-loan data of 31 October 2016 provided by Deutsche
      Bank


===========
N O R W A Y
===========


HAVILA SHIPPING: HAVI08 Bondholders to Accelerate Facilities
------------------------------------------------------------
Reference is made to the stock exchange notice dated November 23,
2016 where it was informed that the bondholders of HAVI08 did not
support the proposal for restructuring of Havila Shipping ASA as
set out in the stock exchange notice dated November 9, 2016 and
the term sheet enclosed thereto.

The Company has received a notice (enclosed) from its secured
bank lenders collectively that they intend to accelerate the
relevant facilities, and proceed with formal acceleration notices
imminently.

The Company had discussed the notice with representatives of the
secured bank lenders on November 24, 2016.  The Company's Board
of Directors has concluded that the restructuring proposal as set
out in the stock exchange notice dated November 9, 2016 is the
only viable alternative to a bankruptcy.  The proposal to the
Company's bondholders would in effect be identical to that
described in the enclosed summons to bondholders' meetings, dated
November 9, 2016.

The Board of Directors has set a deadline by 15:00 CET on Monday
November 28, 2016, at the latest to obtain the required support
from all stakeholders.

Headquartered in Fosnavag, Norway, Havila Shipping ASA operates a
number of vessels, including platform supply vessels, anchor
handling tug supply vessels, and rescue and recovery vessels.
The Company provides supply services to offshore companies both
national and international.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


SAGRES: DBRS Assigns B Rating to EUR62.7MM Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized the provisional ratings on the
following notes issued by SAGRES - Sociedade de Titularizacao de
Creditos, S.A. (Lusitano SME No. 3) (the Issuer):

   -- EUR385,600,000 Class A asset backed securitisation Notes,
      due 2037: AA (low) (sf)

   -- EUR62,700,000 Class B asset backed securitisation Notes,
      due 2037: BBB (high) (sf)

   -- EUR62,700,000 Class C asset backed securitisation Notes,
      due 2037: B (high) (sf)

The Issuer is a limited liability company incorporated under the
laws of Portugal. The transaction is a cash flow securitisation
collateralised by a portfolio of bank loans originated by NOVO
BANCO, S.A. (Novo Banco or the Originator) to Portuguese
corporates, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and self-
employed individuals.

The rating on the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal payable on or
before the Final Legal Maturity Date in 2037. The ratings on the
Class B Notes and Class C Notes address the ultimate payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal payable on or
before the Final Legal Maturity Date in 2037.

As of September 9, 2016 (the Collateral Determination Date), the
transaction portfolio consisted of 4,545 loans extended to 3,321
borrower groups, with an outstanding principal balance equal to
EUR627 million. As of the Collateral Determination Date all of
the portfolio was fully performing.

The portfolio exhibits significant borrower concentration, with
the top ten obligor groups each representing more than 1.00% of
the total portfolio balance. The largest obligor group represents
2.3% of the portfolio balance and the top ten and top 20
borrowers represent 20.5% and 31.1% of the outstanding pool
balance, respectively. As per DBRS's industry classification, the
pool exhibits a high industry concentration in the Building &
Development sector, which represents 20.8% of the pool balance,
followed by the Lodging & Casinos and Clothing & Textiles sectors
(at 8.6% and 8.3%, respectively). The exposure to the Building &
Development sector remains a source of concern, considering the
challenging economic situation in Portugal. DBRS has assumed a
conservative probability of default (PD) for the obligors in the
sector.

These ratings are based upon DBRS's review of the following
items:

   -- The transaction structure, the form and sufficiency of
      available credit enhancement and the portfolio
      characteristics.

   -- At closing, the Class A Notes benefit from a total credit
      enhancement of 40%, that DBRS considers to be sufficient to
      support the AA (low) (sf) rating. The Class B Notes benefit
      from a credit enhancement of 30.0%, that DBRS considers to
      be sufficient to support the BBB (high) (sf) rating. The
      Class C Notes benefit from a total credit enhancement of
      20%, that DBRS considers to be sufficient to support a B
      (high) (sf) rating. Credit enhancement is provided by
      subordination and the Reserve Fund.

   -- The Cash Reserve Account was funded at closing with EUR9.5
      million, corresponding to 1.5% of the initial aggregate
      balance of the Floating Rate Notes. The Cash Reserve
      Account will be available to cover interest shortfalls of
      the Class A Notes and expenses senior to the replenishment
      of the Cash Reserve Account. The Cash Reserve Account will
      also support the Class B Notes and Class C Notes, once the
      Class A Notes have been redeemed in full. The Cash Reserve
      Account is allowed to amortise if certain conditions
      relating to the performance of the portfolio and
      deleveraging of the transaction are met.

DBRS determined these ratings as follows, as per the principal
methodology specified below:

   -- The PD for the portfolio was determined using the
      historical performance information supplied. However, the
      data provided was not detailed enough to determine the
      historical performance for all the four different segments
      included in the portfolio: SME, Small Business, Corporates
      and Real Estate. From the data provided, DBRS was able to
      determine a base case PD for SME and Small Business
      segments of 3.53%. For the Corporates and Real Estate
      segments DBRS assumed a conservative PD of 18.79%
     (equivalent to the PD for CCC (high) rated loans). The
      weighted-average PD assumed for the portfolio was 7.9%.

   -- The assumed weighted-average life (WAL) of the portfolio
      was 2.51 years.

   -- The PD and WAL were used in the DBRS Diversity Model to
      generate the hurdle rates for the target ratings.

   -- The recovery rate was determined considering the market
      value declines for Portugal, the security level and type of
      the collateral. For Class A Notes, recovery rates of 42.96%
      and 15.75% were used for the secured and unsecured loans,
      respectively, at the AA (low) (sf) rating level. For
      Class B Notes, recovery rates of 50.70% and 17.00% were
      used for the secured and unsecured loans, respectively, at
      the BBB (high) (sf) rating level. For Class C Notes,
      recovery rates of 57.35% and 21.50% were used for the
      secured and unsecured loans, respectively, at the B
     (high) (sf) rating level.

   -- The break-even rates for the interest rate stresses and
      default timings were determined using the DBRS cash flow
      model.

Notes:

All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.

The principal methodology applicable is "Rating CLOs Backed by
Loans to European SMEs." DBRS has applied the principal
methodology consistently and conducted a review of the
transaction in accordance with the principal methodology.

Other methodologies and criteria referenced in this transaction
are listed at the end of this press release.

The sources of information used for these ratings include the
parties involved in the ratings, including but not limited to the
Originator, NOVO BANCO, S.A., and provided via the co-arrangers
(on behalf of the originator), J.P. Morgan Securities Plc and
Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch.

DBRS does not rely upon third-party due diligence in order to
conduct its analysis; DBRS was supplied with third-party
assessments. However, this did not impact the rating analysis.

DBRS determined key inputs used in its analysis based on
historical performance data provided for the Originator and
Servicer as well as analysis of the current economic environment.
The PD for the portfolio was determined using the historical
performance information supplied. However, the data provided was
not detailed enough to determine the historical performance for
all the four different segments included in the portfolio: SME,
Small Business, Corporates and Real Estate. From the data
provided, DBRS determined a base case PD for SME and Small
Business segments of 3.53%. For the Corporates and Real Estate
segments, where granular vintage data was not available, DBRS
assumed a conservative PD of 18.79% (equivalent to the PD for CCC
(high) rated loans). Despite the above, DBRS considers the
information available to it for the purposes of providing this
rating to be of satisfactory quality.

DBRS does not audit the information it receives in connection
with the rating process, and it does not and cannot independently
verify that information in every instance.

These ratings concern newly issued financial instruments. This is
the first DBRS rating on this financial instrument.

Information regarding DBRS ratings, including definitions,
policies and methodologies is available on www.dbrs.com.

To assess the impact a change of the transaction parameters would
have on the ratings, DBRS considered the following stress
scenarios as compared with the parameters used to determine the
rating (the Base Case):

   -- PD Rates Used: base case PD of 7.91%, a 10% and a 20%
      increase of the base case PD.

   -- Recovery Rates Used: base case Recovery Rates of 26.20% at
      AA (low) (sf), 29.76% at BBB (high) (sf) and 35.27% at B
      (high) (sf) stress levels and a 10% and 20% decrease in the
      respective base case Recovery Rates.

With respect to the Class A Notes, DBRS concludes that a
hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 20% or a decrease of
the recovery rate by 20%, ceteris paribus, would each lead to a
downgrade of the Class A Notes to A (high) (sf). A scenario
combining both an increase in the PD by 10% and a decrease in the
recovery rate by 10% would lead to a downgrade of the Class A
Notes to A (high) (sf).

With respect to the Class B Notes, DBRS concludes that a
hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 20% would lead to a
downgrade of the Class B Notes to BBB (low) (sf). A hypothetical
decrease of the recovery rate by 20% would lead to a downgrade of
the Class B Notes to BBB (sf). A scenario combining both an
increase in the PD by 10% and a decrease in the recovery rate by
10% would lead to a downgrade of the Class B Notes to BBB (low)
(sf).

With respect to the Class C Notes, DBRS concludes that a
hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 20% would lead to a
downgrade of the Class C Notes to CCC (high) (sf). A hypothetical
decrease of the recovery rate by 20%, ceteris paribus, would lead
to a downgrade of the Class C Notes to B (sf). A scenario
combining both an increase in the PD by 10% and a decrease in the
recovery rate by 10% would lead to a downgrade of the Class C
Notes to B (low) (sf).

It should be noted that the interest rates and other parameters
that would normally vary with the rating level, including the
recovery rates, were allowed to change as per the DBRS
methodologies and criteria.

Ratings assigned by DBRS Ratings Limited are subject to EU
regulations only.

Lead Analyst: Carlos Silva
Rating Committee Chair: Jerry van Koolbergen
Initial Rating Date: 7 November 2016

DBRS Ratings Limited
20 Fenchurch Street, 31st Floor
London EC3M 3BY
United Kingdom
Registered in England and Wales: No. 7139960

   -- Rating CLOs Backed by Loans to European SMEs

   -- Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions

   -- Master European Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
      Rating Methodology and Jurisdictional Addenda

   -- Unified Interest Rate Model for European Securitisations

   -- Rating CLOs and CDOs of Large Corporate Credit

   -- Cash Flow Assumptions for Corporate Credit Securitizations

   -- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance
      Servicers

   -- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance
      Originators


===========
R U S S I A
===========


IKS 5: Fitch Cuts Senior Unsecured Debt Ratings to BB-
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch downgraded the Senior Unsecured Debt ratings of IKS 5
Finance OOO to BB- from BB on November 1, 2016.


=========
S P A I N
=========


CAIXABANK PYMES 8: DBRS Puts Prov. CC Rating to EUR292.5MM Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited (DBRS) has assigned provisional ratings to
the following notes issued by Caixabank PYMES 8, FT (the Issuer):

   -- EUR1,957.5 million Series A Notes rated A (low) (sf) (the
      Series A Notes)

   -- EUR292.5 million Series B Notes rated CC (sf) (the
      Series B Notes; together, the Notes).

The transaction is a cash flow securitisation collateralised by a
portfolio of term loans and current drawdowns of a revolving
mortgage credit line originated by Caixabank, S.A. (Caixabank or
the Originator) to small and medium-sized enterprises and self-
employed individuals based in Spain. As of 24 October 2016, the
transaction's provisional portfolio included 31,414 loans and
current drawdowns of a revolving mortgage credit line to 27,827
obligor groups, totalling EUR2,427 million.

At closing, the Originator will select the final portfolio of
EUR2,250 million from the provisional pool.

The rating on the Series A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
Legal Maturity Date in January 2054. The rating on the Series B
Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest and the ultimate
payment of principal on or before the Legal Maturity Date January
2054.

Interest and principal payments on the Notes will be made
quarterly on the 19th of January, April, July and October with
the first payment date on 18 April 2017. The Notes will pay an
interest rate equal to three-month Euribor plus a 1.25% margin
and 1.50% for Series A and Series B, respectively.

The provisional pool is well diversified with no significant
borrower concentration and relatively low industry concentration.
There is some concentration to borrowers in Catalonia (31.20% of
the portfolio balance), which is expected given that Catalonia is
the home region of the Originator. The top one, ten and twenty
borrowers represent 0.79%, 5.07% and 7.87% of the portfolio
balance, respectively. The top three industry sectors by DBRS
industry definition include Building & Development, Business
Equipment & Services and Farming & Agriculture, representing
18.93%, 11.99% and 9.58% of the portfolio outstanding balance,
respectively.

These ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following items:

   -- The transaction structure, the form and sufficiency of
      available credit enhancement and the portfolio
      characteristics.

   -- At closing, the Series A Notes benefit from a total credit
      enhancement of 17.10%, which DBRS considers to be
      sufficient to support the A (low) (sf) rating. The Series B
      Notes benefit from a credit enhancement of 4.10%, which
      DBRS considers to be sufficient to support the CC (sf)
      rating. Credit enhancement is provided by subordination and
      the Reserve Fund.

   -- The Reserve Fund will be allowed to amortise after the
      first two years if certain conditions -- relating to the
      performance of the portfolio and deleveraging of the
      transaction -- are met. The Reserve Fund cannot amortise
      below EUR42.0 million.

   -- The transaction parties' financial strength and
      capabilities to perform their respective duties and the
      quality of origination, underwriting and servicing
      practices.

DBRS determined these ratings as follows, as per the principal
methodology specified below:

   -- The probability of default for the portfolio was determined
      using the historical performance information supplied. DBRS
      assumed an annualised probability of default (PD) of 2.10%
      for this portfolio.

   -- The assumed weighted-average life (WAL) of the portfolio
      was 4.55 years.

   -- The PD and WAL were used in the DBRS Diversity Model to
      generate the hurdle rate for the target ratings.

   -- The recovery rate was determined by considering the market
      value declines for Spain, the security level and type of
      the collateral. For the Series A Notes, DBRS applied the
      following recovery rates: 54.58% for secured loans and
      16.25% for unsecured loans. For the Series B Notes, DBRS
      applied the following recovery rates: 70.67% for secured
      loans and 21.5% for unsecured loans.

   -- The break-even rates for the interest rate stresses and
      default timings were determined using the DBRS cash flow
      model.

Notes:

All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.

The principal methodology applicable is Rating CLOs Backed by
Loans to European SMEs. DBRS has applied the principal
methodology consistently and conducted a review of the
transaction in accordance with the principal methodology.

Other methodologies and criteria referenced in this transaction
are listed at the end of this press release.

The sources of information used for these ratings include the
parties involved in the ratings, including but not limited to the
Originator, Caixabank, S.A., the Issuer, and GestiCaixa S.G.F.T.,
S.A.

DBRS does not rely upon third-party due diligence in order to
conduct its analysis; DBRS was supplied with third party
assessments. However, this did not impact the rating analysis.

DBRS determined key inputs used in its analysis based on
historical performance data provided for the Originator and
Servicer as well as analysis of the current economic environment.
DBRS considers the information available to it for the purposes
of providing this rating was of satisfactory quality.

DBRS does not audit the information it receives in connection
with the rating process, and it does not and cannot independently
verify that information in every instance.

These ratings concern newly issued financial instruments.

To assess the impact a change of the transaction parameters would
have on the ratings, DBRS considered the following stress
scenarios as compared with the parameters used to determine the
rating (the Base Case):

   -- Probability of Default Rates Used: Base Case PD of 2.1%, a
      10% increase of the base case and a 20% increase of the
      base case PD.

   -- Recovery Rates Used: Base Case Recovery Rates of 31.08% at
      the A (low) (sf) stress level for the Class A Notes, a 10%
      and 20% decrease in the Base Case Recovery Rates.

DBRS concludes that a hypothetical increase of the Base Case PD
by 20% would lead to a downgrade of the Series A Notes to BBB
(high) (sf), and a hypothetical decrease of the recovery rate by
20% and would lead to a downgrade of the Series A Notes to BBB
(high) (sf). A scenario combining both an increase in the Base
Case PD by 10% and a decrease in the Base Case Recovery Rate by
10% would lead to a downgrade of the Series A Notes to BBB (high)
(sf).

Regarding the Series B Notes, rating would not be affected by any
hypothetical change in neither PD nor Recovery rate.

It should be noted that the interest rates and other parameters
that would normally vary with the rating level, including the
recovery rates, were allowed to change as per the DBRS
methodologies and criteria.

Ratings assigned by DBRS Ratings Limited are subject to EU
regulations only.

Initial Lead Analyst: Mar°a L¢pez, Vice President
Initial Rating Date: 22 November 2016
Initial Rating Committee Chair: Christian Aufsatz, Senior Vice
President

DBRS Ratings Limited
20 Fenchurch Street, 31st Floor
London EC3M 3BY
United Kingdom
Registered in England and Wales: No. 7139960

   -- Rating CLOs Backed by Loans to European SMEs

   -- Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions

   -- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structure Finance
      Originators

   -- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structure Finance
      Servicers

   -- Unified Interest Rate Model for European Securitisations

   -- Cash Flow Assumptions for Corporate Credit Securitizations

   -- Rating Methodology for CLOs and CDOs of Large Corporate
      Credit

   -- European RMBS Insight Methodology and European RMBS
Insight:
      Spanish Addendum

RATINGS

Issuer           Debt Rated           Rating Action      Rating
------           ----------           -------------      ------
Caixabank       Series A Notes         Provis.-New
A(low)(sf)
PYMES 8, FT

Caixabank       Series B Notes         Provis.-New      CC (sf)
PYMES 8, FT


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BHS GROUP: Ex-Boss Arrested Over Family Firm's Tax Affairs
----------------------------------------------------------
The Mail on Sunday reports that the last boss of BHS has been
arrested by tax officers over a firm linked to the retail giant.

Dominic Chappell -- the playboy businessman who bought BHS from
billionaire Sir Philip Green for a token GBP1 -- was arrested by
HMRC officers as part of an investigation into the tax affairs of
his family firm, Swiss Rock, the report discloses.

The Mail on Sunday understands the disgraced millionaire was
arrested at his country bolthole near Blandford Forum in Dorset.
The property was also searched by investigators, it is believed.

According to the report, the arrest of the 49-year-old comes amid
reports that he owed HMRC more than GBP500,000 in unpaid
Corporation Tax and VAT following the collapse of BHS and the
closure of its 164 stores.

The troubled chain was placed into administration in April after
88 years' trading with the loss of 11,000 jobs and a half-a-
billion pound pensions black hole, the report says.

HMRC on Nov. 12 refused to comment, but sources said the arrest
took place on November 2. They said the probe relates to Swiss
Rock, which is insolvent, Mail on Sunday relays.

The Mail on Sunday relates that a spokesman for HMRC said: 'We do
not comment on identifiable cases, but can confirm we arrested a
49-year-old businessman.'

Mr. Chappell refused to comment when approached by The Mail on
Sunday at his GBP1.5 million Dorset mansion. He said: 'I don't
have time to talk to you. Please leave my property,' the report
quotes Mr. Chappell as saying.

His arrest follows a damning Parliamentary inquiry into the
collapse of BHS, which condemned Mr. Chappell for his 'systematic
plunder' of the retail chain before its closure, the report says.

It also comes amid investigations by several other law
enforcement and government bodies, which include the Serious
Fraud Office, adds Mail on Sunday.

BHS Group was a high street retailer offering fashion for the
whole family, furniture and home accessories.


BHS: Green May Be Forced to Sell Yachts to Settle Pension Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Josephine Cumbo at The Financial Times reports that the Pensions
Regulator has suggested Sir Philip Green could be forced to sell
his multimillion-pound yachts to settle a funding dispute over
the BHS pension scheme.

Giving evidence to MPs on Nov. 23, Lesley Titcomb, chief
executive of the regulator, said a court could look to assets,
other than cash, to force a person to settle pension debt, the FT
relates.

Ms. Titcomb was responding to a question from the Work and
Pensions Select Committee, which is investigating the GBP571
million pension deficit left behind by the failure of retailer
BHS, the FT discloses.

This month, the regulator threatened legal action against Sir
Philip, who sold the BHS chain for GBP1 barely a year before it
collapsed, as it sought to fill the pension shortfall, the FT
relays.  It issued warning notices to Sir Philip and companies
controlled by his wife, the FT recounts.

According to the FT, during the session on Nov. 23, Frank Field,
committee chairman, said the public had noted the "ostentatious
displays of wealth" by Sir Philip, who pledged to "sort" the BHS
pension debt six months ago.

Mr. Field asked Ms. Titcomb whether a court could decide to force
a sale of Sir Philip's boats in order to secure a deal for the
more than 20,000 BHS pensioners facing a haircut to their
retirement income, the FT notes.

"Should push come to shove, the court would take whatever normal
process it would to enforce [recovery of] that debt," the FT
quotes Ms. Titcomb as saying.  "Essentially, what we are looking
for is sources for support . . . cash, guarantees or some other
structure. There is a great deal of flexibility in what could be
taken into account."

Ms. Titcomb, as cited by the FT, said a decision about whether
the watchdog could chase Sir Philip to settle the pension debt --
to be made by the Determination Panel, an arm's-length body to
the regulator -- was "unlikely to be before the middle of next
year".

BHS Group was a high street retailer offering fashion for the
whole family, furniture and home accessories.


ETHICAL FORESTRY: Investors Uncertain on Compensation
-----------------------------------------------------
Jack Gilbert at Citywire reports that investors in Costa-Rican
Ethical Forestry are uncertain whether they can receive
compensation following the collapse of the UK firms marketing the
unregulated plantation investment scheme because Sipp pension
firms have provided different valuations for it.

The report relates that the difference in valuations means that
some investors have received pay-outs over advice given to invest
in Ethical Forestry through their pension, whereas those with a
different provider have not.

Despite the insolvency of the Ethical Forestery marketing firms
earlier this year, Liberty Sipp has claimed the underlying scheme
'remains a viable long-term investment,' Citywire relates.

At least 3,000 UK investors are thought to have invested a
minimum of GBP18,000 each into Ethical Forestry, meaning it could
have over GBP50 million invested in it, according to Citywire.

These investors were left uncertain about their investments when
the firms promoting the scheme collapsed earlier this year, the
report notes.

Citywire says the Costa Rican company running the plantation,
Ethical Forestry SA, is understood to be still running but 80% of
its shares were owned by the UK firms, meaning they were passed
to the liquidator HJS Solutions when they collapsed.

A deal is being worked on between HJS Solutions and the
individual who was running the scheme in Costa Rica, to buy the
assets from the liquidator, the report states. Despite the
liquidator's claim that a deal was four weeks away in July, this
deal is still to be reached. When contacted, HJS Solutions said
it will know if a deal is going ahead by this week, Citywire
says.

When an investor complains about an adviser to the Financial
Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) it will normally ask the Sipp
provider for a valuation of the underlying investment in order to
work out how much compensation the individual is due, the report
says.

In a letter, seen by Citywire's New Model Adviser(R), the FSCS
says it could not 'fully quantify' any possible loss in Ethical
Forestry until the client 'sells or assigns ownership interest in
the property'.

As such the FSCS said it would base its compensation of the
investment on the valuation given by the Sipp provider, Citywire
relays.

Liberty Sipp is giving a 'book value', meaning the amount the
investor initially paid, for Ethical Forestry, the report notes.

John Fox, director of Liberty Sipp, said this was because the
investment was still viable, despite the collapse of the UK
companies, adds Citywire.

The UK group was split into four companies; Ethical Forestry
Limited, Ethical Forestry Holdings, EF Forestry Management
Limited, EF Sales and Marketing Limited. In January the firms
appointed HJS Solutions as a liquidator, according to Citywire.


GABLE INSURANCE: In Liquidation, Policies to Expire on Dec. 16
--------------------------------------------------------------
On November 17, 2016 Gable Insurance AG, a Liechtenstein
insurance company that provided private motor and commercial
insurance for UK customers, went into liquidation.  This follows
a formal order that was issued to Gable on September 7, 2016, by
the Liechtenstein Financial Market Authority (FMA) to stop
writing insurance over concerns with Gable's financial position.
Gable was also placed into Special Administration by the FMA on
October 10, 2016, to protect the interests of policyholders.

Customers' insurance policies are still valid and claims should
be reported in the normal way.  However, under Liechtenstein
Insurance Contract Law, insurance contracts will automatically
expire and no longer be valid four weeks after Gable's
liquidation was made public.  Gable's insurance policies will
expire on December 16, 2016 and customers should take urgent
action and contact their brokers and put alternative insurance in
place before that date. Customers should also talk to their
brokers about the best course of action following Gable's
liquidation.

In particular, customers of Gable who have motor insurance
policies should take urgent action to put alternative cover in
place before December 16, 2016.  This is because after that date
it will be against the law to drive under these policies and you
will not be covered for any accident after this date.

Customers of Gable have the right to terminate their insurance
policies with Gable immediately and do not necessarily have to
wait for them to automatically expire on December 16, 2016.
Customers should ensure they have replacement cover in place
before terminating their Gable policies.

Gable's appointed liquidator, Batliner Wanger Batliner Attorneys
at Law Limited, Liechtenstein, have provided an email address for
questions on the legal position of policyholders and other
parties: gable@bwb.li

Eligible customers are covered by the UK's Financial Services
Compensation Scheme (FSCS) who have declared Gable in default and
are arranging to pay claims and return unused insurance premiums.


TELFORD TIGERS: Set to go Into Voluntary Liquidation
----------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that ice hockey league leaders Telford Tigers
are to go into voluntary liquidation with debts of about
GBP500,000.

Insolvency practitioner Robson Scott Associates said it
understands the club has a strong fan base and will look at
options to "preserve the team," BBC News relates.

BBC News says the move is likely to be confirmed at a creditors
meeting on November 30, a spokesman said.

Telford-born businessman Wayne Scholes sold his stake in the club
last year, the report says.

He stepped down as chief executive in April, information at
Companies House stated.

According to the report, Robson Scott Associates said the
majority of the debt is "due to the investors in respect of
financial support provided prior to the appointment of the
current board of directors."

BBC News relates that in a statement, the firm said: "Telford Ice
Sports Ltd, the company behind the Telford Tigers ice hockey
team, has instructed Robson Scott Associates a firm of business
recovery specialists and insolvency practitioners to assist in
placing the company into creditors voluntary liquidation."

However, third parties have expressed an interest in taking the
team forward, the spokesman added.

The report says the club are currently top of the English Premier
Ice Hockey League and it is expected their upcoming games at the
weekend will go ahead, although the owners will make a decision
later this week.

Telford Ice Sports Ltd currently owns ice hockey league team
Telford Tigers.


* UK: One in Eight Care Homes Face Insolvency, Report Warns
-----------------------------------------------------------
Alan Jones at Daily Mirror reports that around one in eight care
homes are at risk of going insolvent in the next three years, a
report warns.

A study found the sector has been under "considerable financial
strain" in recent years because of rising costs and a lack of
funding from local authorities because of Government cuts, the
report says.

Daily Mirror relates that accountancy firm Moore Stephens said
the introduction of the national living wage earlier this year
had also increased the financial pressure, particularly on
smaller care homes.

"It's become increasingly difficult for care homes, particularly
smaller providers, to keep up a consistently high level of care
whilst breaking even or worse, remaining solvent," the report
quotes Mike Finch, of Moore Stephens, as saying.

"The introduction of the living wage has increased the financial
pressure on care homes to even higher levels, and this is only
likely to continue as the living wage keeps increasing to reach
the target of GBP9 by 2020.

"This is creating an unsustainable situation in a lot of care
homes, where more staff is needed to cater for the increase in
demand, but the money simply isn't there to cover rising staff
costs.

"Cuts to local authority fees have meant that care homes have had
to cope with an increasing proportion of the financial burden,"
he said, notes the report.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EC Issues New Directive on Corporate Insolvency Reform
--------------------------------------------------------
The European Commission's new Directive on corporate insolvency
reform is a welcome step towards improving business rescue
procedures across Europe, says insolvency and restructuring trade
body R3.

R3 adds that the UK's world-class insolvency and restructuring
regime already meets many of the standards in the new Directive,
while the government is currently carrying out its own corporate
insolvency reform project.  Many of the EU's proposals are
reflected in what the UK government has already consulted on.

Andrew Tate, R3 president, comments: "The focus on early advice
and restructuring in the new Directive is welcome.  The earlier
companies seek advice about their problems, the more likely that
businesses and jobs can be saved."

"There is already an increasing focus on restructuring and early
intervention as part of the insolvency regime in the UK, and an
EU-wide framework for this type of work will make it much easier
to handle cross-border cases."

"The UK's world-class regime already meets many of the standards
set out in the new Directive, so changes here will be limited
compared to those changes that might be expected in other Member
States."

"Of course, the introduction of the Directive is complicated by
Brexit.  There is still no clear timetable for when the UK will
leave the EU, so while we expect the government to start work to
ensure the UK is compliant with the Directive, we don't know how
long the Directive will apply for."

"In its Brexit negotiations, the government must ensure that
certain insolvency benefits of EU membership are not lost for the
UK.  The loss of automatic recognition of UK insolvency
practitioners' powers across the EU -- provided by the EU's
Insolvency Regulation -- would make cross-border insolvency work
much more expensive and jeopardize the return of money from the
EU owed to UK creditors."


* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
-------------------------------------------
Author: Frank H. Knight
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 381 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher
Order your personal copy today at
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1587981262/internetbankrup
t

The tenets Frank H. Knight sets out in this, his first book,
have become an integral part of modern economic theory. Still
readable today, it was included as a classic in the 1998 Forbes
reading list. The book grew out of Knight's 1917 Cornell
University doctoral thesis, which took second prize in an essay
contest that year sponsored by Hart, Schaffner and Marx. In it,
he examined the relationship between knowledge on the part of
entrepreneurs and changes in the economy. He, quite famously,
distinguished between two types of change, risk and uncertainty,
defining risk as randomness with knowable probabilities and
uncertainty as randomness with unknowable probabilities. Risk,
he said, arises from repeated changes for which probabilities
can be calculated and insured against, such as the risk of fire.
Uncertainty arises from unpredictable changes in an economy,
such as resources, preferences, and knowledge, changes that
cannot be insured against. Uncertainty, he said "is one of the
fundamental facts of life."

One of the larger issues of Knight's time was how the
entrepreneur, the central figure in a free enterprise system,
earns profits in the face of competition. It was thought that
competition would reduce profits to zero across a sector because
any profits would attract more entrepreneurs into the sector and
increase supply, which would drive prices down, resulting in
competitive equilibrium and zero profit.

Knight argued that uncertainty itself may allow some
entrepreneurs to earn profits despite this equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs, he said, are forced to guess at their expected
total receipts. They cannot foresee the number of products they
will sell because of the unpredictability of consumer
preferences. Still, they must purchase product inputs, so they
base these purchases on the number of products they guess they
will sell. Finally, they have to guess the price at which their
products will sell. These factors are all uncertain and
impossible to know. Profits are earned when uncertainty yields
higher total receipts than forecasted total receipts. Thus,
Knight postulated, profits are merely due to luck. Such
entrepreneurs who "get lucky" will try to reproduce their
success, but will be unable to because their luck will eventually
turn.

At the time, some theorists were saying that when this luck runs
out, entrepreneurs will then rely on and substitute improved
decision making and management for their original
entrepreneurship, and the profits will return. Knight saw
entrepreneurs as poor managers, however, who will in time fail
against new and lucky entrepreneurs. He concluded that economic
change is a result of this constant interplay between new
entrepreneurial action and existing businesses hedging against
uncertainty by improving their internal organization.
Frank H. Knight has been called "among the most broad-ranging
and influential economists of the twentieth century" and "one of
the most eclectic economists and perhaps the deepest thinker and
scholar American economics has produced." He stands among the
giants of American economists that include Schumpeter and Viner.
His students included Nobel Laureates Milton Friedman, George
Stigler and James Buchanan, as well as Paul Samuelson. At the
University of Chicago, Knight specialized in the history of
economic thought. He revolutionized the economics department
there, becoming one the leaders of what has become known as the
Chicago School of Economics. Under his tutelage and guidance,
the University of Chicago became the bulwark against the more
interventionist and anti-market approaches followed elsewhere in
American economic thought. He died in 1972.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *