TCREUR_Public/161202.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Friday, December 2, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 239


                            Headlines


D E N M A R K

OW BUNKER: ING Bank's Motion for Reconsideration Denied


F R A N C E

LOXAM SAS: S&P Puts 'BB-' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
PEUGEOT SA: Fitch Hikes LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB+'
SOLOCAL GROUP: Creditors Approve Revised Restructuring Plan


G E R M A N Y

HELIOCENTRIS ENERGY: Court Opens Insolvency Proceedings


G R E E C E

FREESEAS INC: Alpha Capital Holds 4.9% Equity Stake as of Nov. 18
FREESEAS INC: To Hold Annual Meeting on Dec. 22


I R E L A N D

MAYO RENEWABLE: Put Into Liquidation After Rescue Plan Fails


I T A L Y

FIAT CHRYSLER: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Rating


L U X E M B O U R G

SAPINDA INVEST: Abu Dhabi Capital Provides Bond Guarantee
SWISSPORT GROUP: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

GLOBAL TIP: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B+'; Outlook Stable
HALCYON STRUCTURED 2007-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. E Notes to B+
IHS NETHERLANDS: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Final LT IDR
UCL RAIL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT FC Issuer Default Ratings


N O R W A Y

PETROLEUM GEO-SERVICES: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CC' on Exchange Offer


P O R T U G A L

CAIXA GERAL: DBRS Reviews 'BB' Rating on Dated Subordinated Notes
ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Positive


R U S S I A

B&N BANK: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B/B'
EUROPLAN JSC: Fitch Ratings Unaffected by Planned Reorganization


S P A I N

IBEREOLICA: Declared Voluntary Bankruptcy Proceedings for 7 Units
IM GRUPO VII: DBRS Assigns Prov. CC Rating to Series B Notes
IM SABADELL PYME 10: DBRS Assigns CCC Rating to Series B Notes


S W I T Z E R L A N D

GATEGROUP HOLDING: S&P Maintains 'BB-' CCR on CreditWatch Neg.


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DECO 11: Fitch Cuts Class A1-B Notes Rating to 'CCCsf'
HILLZONE PRODUCTS: Director Faces Boardroom Ban After Collapse
Q HOLDING: Moody's Retains B3 CFR on New $113MM Loan Add-On

* UK: New Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 Comes Into Force


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: The Money Wars


                            *********


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D E N M A R K
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OW BUNKER: ING Bank's Motion for Reconsideration Denied
-------------------------------------------------------
Jack Newsham, writing for Bankruptcy Law360, reported that U.S.
District Judge Katherine B. Forrest rejected several requests by
ING Bank NV to reconsider her decisions to deny it maritime liens
before briefing had even wrapped up on Nov. 28.  The Judge said
the bank merely re-argued the points of a sprawling ship fuel
debt dispute that she already dealt with.  ING Bank loaned money
to Denmark-based OW Bunker A/S before its 2014 bankruptcy and was
designated its security agent.

                         About O.W. Bunker

OW Bunker AS is a global marine fuel (bunker) company founded in
Denmark.

On Nov. 6, 2014, OW Bunker A/S placed OWB Trading and O.W. Bunker
Supply & Trading A/S in an in-court restructuring procedure with
the probate court in Aalborg, Denmark.  By Nov. 7, 2014, the
Danish entities (plus O.W. Bunker Supply & Trading A/S, O.W.
Cargo Denmark A/S, and Dynamic Oil Trading A/S) were placed under
formal Danish bankruptcy (liquidation) proceedings in the Aalborg
probate court.

The company declared bankruptcy following its admission that it
had lost US$275 million through a combination of fraud committed
by senior executives at its Singaporean unit.

The Danish company placed its U.S. subsidiaries -- O.W. Bunker
Holding North America Inc., O.W. Bunker North America Inc. and
O.W. Bunker USA Inc. -- in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Bankr. D. Conn.
Case Nos. 14-51720 to 14-51722) in Bridgeport, Conn., on Nov. 13,
2014.  The U.S. cases are assigned to Judge Alan H.W. Shiff.  The
U.S. Debtors tapped Patrick M. Birney, Esq., and Michael R.
Enright, Esq., at Robinson & Cole LLP, as counsel.   McCracken,
Walker & Rhoads LLP served as co-counsel.  Alvarez & Marsal acted
as the financial advisor.

The Office of the United States Trustee formed an official
committee of unsecured creditors of the Debtors on Nov. 26, 2014.
The Committee tapped Hunton & Williams LLP as its attorneys.

On Dec. 15, 2015, the U.S. Debtors obtained confirmation of their
First Modified Liquidation Plans.  Under the plan, the Debtors
proposed to create two liquidating trusts, one for each of its
North American units, to hold the estate assets of each company
and make distributions to creditors, while parent OW Bunker
Holding North America Inc. will dissolve.

According to a Bloomberg report, under the First Modified Plan,
administrative claims of $0.94 million, U.S. Trustee Fees, non-
tax priority claims against OWB USA and NA, Priority tax claims
of $0.05 million, secured claims against OWB USA and NA and fee
claims will be paid in full in cash.  Subordinated claims against
OWB USA and NA will not receive any distribution.  Electing OWB
USA unaffiliated trade claims of $13.3 million will have a
recovery of 40% amounting to $5.31 million.  OWB NA affiliated
unsecured claims and non-electing OWB NA unaffiliated trade
claims will have a recovery of 1% in cash.  OWB USA affiliated
unsecured claims will have a recovery of 0.4% in cash.  Electing
OWB NA unaffiliated trade claims will receive pro rata payment of
$2.5 million in cash.  Non-Electing OWB USA unaffiliated trade
claims of $18.36 million will be paid $0.07 million in cash, a
recovery of 0.4%.  Equity interests in OWB USA and NA will be
cancelled and will not receive any distribution.  The plan will
be funded by cash in hand and sale of assets.


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F R A N C E
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LOXAM SAS: S&P Puts 'BB-' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'BB-' long-term corporate credit
rating and all issue-level ratings on France-based equipment
rental company Loxam SAS on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The CreditWatch placement follows Loxam's unexpected announcement
that it has approached Lavendon for a possible cash offer for the
latter.  Albeit a firm offer for Lavendon has not yet been made,
the discussion indicates to S&P that Loxam's acquisition policy
may be much more aggressive than S&P had previously assumed.  S&P
notes that a competitor has made an offer of about GBP350
million, and S&P believes that Loxam's offer would have to be at
least the same or higher.  The transaction will likely be fully
debt financed and will result in increased gross debt, in turn
leading to weaker credit metrics compared to S&P's previous base
case. Furthermore, the approach comes just after Loxam announced
the acquisition of Hune Group, and a EUR100 million share buy-
back, and S&P believes this may signal a more aggressive
financial policy from Loxam.

S&P believes that Loxam, due to the acquisition of Hune and the
share buy back, has exhausted its headroom under S&P's current
adequate liquidity assessment.  While S&P continues to view the
liquidity position as adequate, as no firm bid has been made,
depending on the financing sources the Lavendon transaction may
lead to a weaker liquidity assessment.  This could put further
pressure on the rating.

S&P anticipates that the acquisition will not change its
assessment of Loxam's business risk profile.  Although S&P
recognizes that Loxam is making a big step to diversify its
business geographically, the company is entering the rather
competitive U.K. market and will compete with larger players like
Ashtead.

S&P will review the CreditWatch placement within the next three
months, when it knows more details regarding the potential
acquisition of Lavendon.  S&P believes a lowering of the
corporate credit rating is possible, given that the company's
financial leverage may increase as a result of the potential
transaction. Funds from operations to debt below 15% and debt to
EBITDA above 4.5x would likely pressure the rating, but it would
also depend on our view of the acquisitions policy going forward.
Even if the transaction doesn't go through, S&P could potentially
reassess its view of Loxam's acquisition policy considering the
magnitude of the Lavendon offer.  It indicates that Loxam's
appetite for acquisitions is larger than we had previously
assumed.


PEUGEOT SA: Fitch Hikes LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Peugeot SA's (PSA) Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured rating to 'BB+' from
'BB'. The Outlook on the Long-Term IDR is Stable.

The upgrade reflects our expectation that the improvement in
PSA's key credit metrics, reflected in the solid results posted
by the group in 2015, is sustainable. "We view PSA's financial
profile as being in line with a low investment-grade rating but
believe that the rating remains constrained by a business profile
more adequately positioned at the high end of the 'BB' category."
Fitch said. In particular, the group remains reliant on Europe
and has a modest global scale.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Successful Restructuring

Measures to streamline the product portfolio, to improve pricing
power and profitably expand global operations, as well as cash-
preservation and cost-reduction have reduced the breakeven point
and will further support profitability. PSA's automotive
operating margin increased to 5% in 2015 from 0.2% in 2014 and
Fitch projects it will remain above 4.5% through to 2018.

Positive FCF

"We expect PSA's FCF margin to remain above 2% in the foreseeable
future." Fitch said. PSA's free cash flow (FCF) margin increased
significantly to 4.5% in 2015 from 1.8% in 2014, supported by
stronger underlying FFO, a EUR0.6bn material inflow from working
capital, including Fitch's adjustments for factoring, and
contained capex. "We expect a potential moderate reversal in
working capital in 2016, a gradual and modest increase in
investments and the resumption of dividend payments from 2017 to
weigh on cash generation," Fitch said.

Lower Leverage

Since 2013, indebtedness has been sharply reduced, due to
positive FCF, the issue of warrants, and the creation of JVs with
Santander Consumer Finance, releasing cash from Banque PSA
Finance and paid as dividends to PSA. "We expect FFO adjusted net
leverage to decline further and become negative from about zero
at end-2015," Fitch said.

Product Pipeline Drives Recovery

The group's strategy includes a smaller product range and
stronger pricing. This could hinder substantial volume growth,
although it should support the group's pricing power, investment
focus and profitability. "However, we expect the launch of
several new products from late 2016 to mark the start of a more
aggressive product offensive, boosting top line growth and
further supporting operating profit in the next two to three
years," Fitch said.

Weak Competitive Position

PSA's sales remain biased toward the European market, and the
mass-market small and medium car segments where competition and
price pressure are most fierce. This is in spite of recent
consistent increases in sales. Competition is also intensifying
in foreign markets into which PSA has diversified, including
Latin America, Russia and China.

Capital Increase

The French state and Dongfeng Motor have become the largest
shareholders in PSA, in line with the Peugeot family, each with a
13.7% stake. The capital increase has benefited the financial
profile but the new shareholding structure may present some
challenges in meeting the potentially divergent interests of the
various shareholders.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

PSA's financial credit profile has improved materially over the
past two years, with credit metrics now consistent with a low
investment grade company and in line with higher-rated
manufacturers. However, the group's competitive position is weak
compared with global peers. Sales remain biased toward the
European market and the mass-market small and medium car
segments, where competition and price pressure are most fierce.
No country-ceiling, parent/subsidiary or operating environment
aspects impact the ratings.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Industrial operations' revenue growth stable in 2016 before
      accelerating to 3%-5% in 2017-2018;

   -- Auto operating margin remaining between 5%-5.5% through to
      2018;

   -- Capex to increase to about EUR3.3bn-3.5bn;

   -- Moderate working capital outflow in 2016, neutral in 2017-
      2018;

   -- Slight increase in dividends received from JVs in China and
      dividend payment to PSA shareholders to resume in 2017;

   -- Dividends and further release of equity from the JV between
      Banque PSA Finance and Santander Consumer Finance of about
      EUR1bn between 2016 and 2018.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

   -- Larger scale and further diversification in sales, combined
      with a sufficient track record or confidence that the
      company can meet the achieve automotive operating margins
      above 4%; FCF above 2% and FFO adjusted net leverage below
      0.5x.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

   -- Automotive operating margins below 2%

   -- FCF below 1%

   -- FFO adjusted net leverage above 1.5x

   -- Cash flow from operations/adjusted debt above 30%

LIQUIDITY

Sound Liquidity

Liquidity remains healthy, including EUR10.8bn of readily
available cash and securities for its industrial operations at
end-June 2016, including Fitch's adjustments of EUR2bn for not
readily available cash and marketable securities. In addition,
committed credit lines of EUR4.2bn, including EUR1.2bn at
Faurecia, were undrawn at end-June 2016.


SOLOCAL GROUP: Creditors Approve Revised Restructuring Plan
-----------------------------------------------------------
SoLocal Group on Nov. 30 disclosed that more than two-thirds of
the creditors have approved its revised financial restructuring
plan.

The plan will now be submitted to the vote of shareholders at the
Extraordinary General Shareholders' Meeting on December 15, 2016,
which will be decisive for the implementation of both the
financial restructuring plan and "Conquer 2018" plan.  In this
respect, the Company reminds that the adoption of the revised
plan is urgent in regard to the recent evolution of its activity.
This adoption is critical to ensure the continuity of the
business, safeguard its social entity and guarantee the future of
the Company.

As a reminder, in case of approval by the General Shareholders'
Meeting, the plan will still have to be submitted to the approval
of the Commercial Court of Nanterre.

Independent expert report

Moreover, SoLocal Group announces to its shareholders that the
report issued by Didier Kling & Associes, who acted as an
independent expert with the mission to provide a fairness opinion
of the proposed subscription prices for the reserved issuances of
shares concerning the financial restructuring plan of the Group,
is now available.

This report issued by Didier Kling & Associes is available on the
Company's website: http://www.solocalgroup.com.

The conclusion of the Didier Kling & Associes report is the
following:

"The revised financial restructuring plan satisfies the desire to
address the particularly delicate situation which SoLocal faces
with debt of EUR1.164M due and payable.  Its approval appears
absolutely critical at a time when the company's continuity is
threatened.  Creditors have indicated that they will not support
the restructuring project if it is not accepted by the
shareholders.

This plan was developed with the assistance of an ad hoc agent
and has been approved by the current parties.  The goal of this
restructuring plan is to implement a balanced solution for each
stakeholder with, first, shareholders which will be diluted to
varying degrees depending on whether they decide to subscribe for
the capital increase and, second, creditors which will have to
waive a signification portion of their debt.

The planned mechanism is designed to reduce the level of
SoLocal's indebtedness to EUR400M, i.e., a level deemed
sustainable to allow SoLocal to continue its business and roll
out its "Conquer 2018" strategic plan.

The procedures for this restructuring are particularly complex.
Also, it is difficult to model the plan's consequences. These
consequences are related to multiple factors, including:

   -- the individual behaviour of each shareholder, as well as
the collective behaviour of all shareholders;

   -- the post-restructuring SOLOCAL stock price, which is
particularly uncertain given the current situation and the
uncertainties related to the success of the financial
restructuring.

An analysis of the impact of the restructuring based on the
current conditions prior thereto does not seem appropriate.
Continuation of SoLocal's business without a financial
restructuring would be compromised.  Such a scenario would lead a
reduction in the value of SoLocal's current debt to its
enterprise value, which is not sustainable and would result in
the SoLocal share price dropping to zero.

The work we completed to assess SoLocal's value led us to value
the company using the discounted cash flow method with net
financial debt after restructuring:

   -- enterprise value (core value) of EUR1.480M;
   -- net financial debt of EUR432M;
   -- i.e., owners' equity of EUR1.048M and a value per share
between EUR1.53 and EUR1.81 (based on the number of shares after
the capital increases)

These values assume that the financial restructuring will be
approved.

The initial financial restructuring plan was based on procedures
which had been assessed by an independent expert who concluded
that these procedures were fair to SoLocal shareholders.  The
terms offered to shareholders under the revised plan are more
favourable than those under the prior plan, which was rejected at
the October 19, 2016 shareholders' meeting, included, inter alia,
a grant of additional free shares and a reduction in the number
of warrants assigned to creditors.

Shareholders are encouraged to subscribe for the capital increase
at a price of EUR1, which is a discount if one uses the value per
share after the restructuring based on our analysis (EUR1.53 to
EUR1.81) as a reference.  Subscription will allow them to
materially limit their dilution.  The dilution will be eased by
the grant of free shares.

Creditors may subscribe at EUr1, with a continuation of the
preferential subscription right, to guarantee the capital
increase. The other issues (new shares with warrants and MCB)
specify a subscriptions price for creditors between EUR1.94 and
EUR4.73, which is higher than the value per share based on our
analysis (EUR1.53 to EUR1.81) and the subscription price offered
to shareholders.

Upon conclusion of the various stages of the restructuring, the
status of creditors may be assessed using the nominal value of
the receivables that they hold from the company and the value of
the assets (shares, residual debts and any cash) that they will
hold after the plan is approved.  Creditors will subscribe by
setting of receivables at nominal value which, from a legal
perspective, is justified because repayment for at nominal value
is contractually provided.  As a result, it seems to us
appropriate to analyse the effects of the restructuring using the
value of the debt at nominal value by comparing it with the post-
restructuring SoLocal value per share.  Accordingly, creditors
will be granted terms which may result in a premium or discount
(from - 20% to +10%) compared to the "counter-value" received in
exchange for a portion their face debt.  For information, this
"counter-value" would lead to discounts or premiums between -20%
to +84% if one applies a 0 to 40% discount to debt face value.

They will receive SoLocal shares and, if appropriate, warrants,
which will allow them to realize a potential value which remains
difficult to quantify and which will depend on changes in the
SoLocal share price after the restructuring.

This approach is designed to grant these terms to creditors and
is based on the fact that creditors benefit from a priority
ranking over equity holders and that, as at the date hereof,
there is no credible alternative for the company to survive the
financial impasse which it faces.

In summary and in light of the foregoing, the terms of the
various issues seem to us to be fair to the shareholders from a
financial point of view as they will ensure the company's
continuity."

Threshold crossings

Furthermore, SoLocal Group took note of the following threshold
crossings:

   -- As of November 23, 2016, Boussard & Gavaudan Partners
Limited in the name of and on behalf of BG Master Fund ICAV,
Boussard & Gavaudan SICAV, Amundi Absolute Return BG Enhanced
Master Fund regarding their holding of 486 085 shares,
representing 1.25% of the capital of the company.

   -- As of November 30, 2016, JMPI Limited holding 1 337 300
shares, representing 3.44% of the capital of the Company.

                      About SoLocal Group

Solocal Group is a French directories publisher.

                           *   *   *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 15,
2016, Fitch Ratings downgraded French media group Solocal Group
SA's (SLG) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'C' from 'CC'.  At
the same time the agency has downgraded the senior secured bonds
issued by PagesJaunes Finance to 'C'/'RR4' from 'CCC-'/'RR3'. The
downgrades reflect management's announced plans to restructure
debt, include an equity rights issue of up to EUR400 mil., debt
for equity exchange and write-down of existing borrowings, the
gross amount of which currently stands at EUR1,164 mil.

The TCR-Europe reported on Aug. 11, 2016, that Moody's Investors
Service downgraded the ratings of SoLocal Group S.A.'s
("SoLocal"), including the Corporate Family Rating (CFR) to Ca
from Caa2, the Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to Ca-PD from
Caa2-PD and the rating of the EUR350 million senior secured notes
due 2018 issued by PagesJaunes Finance & Co. S.C.A. to Ca
from Caa2.  The outlook on all ratings is negative.  The
downgrade of SoLocal's ratings follows the announcement of its
Financial Restructuring Plan ("FRP") on August 1, 2016.  The FRP
proposes a reduction in gross debt to EUR400 million from
EUR1,164 million based on a mixture of prepayment, equitization
and distressed exchange.


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G E R M A N Y
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HELIOCENTRIS ENERGY: Court Opens Insolvency Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------------
The local court Berlin-Charlottenburg on Dec. 1 resolved to open
the insolvency proceedings over the assets of Heliocentris Energy
Solutions AG and its German subsidiaries Heliocentris Academia
GmbH, Heliocentris Industry GmbH and Heliocentris Fuel Cell
Solutions GmbH.

To enable a fast and seamless implementation of the different
investor solutions currently discussed, the management board
withdrew the application for self-administration.  Joachim
Voigt-Salus, Berlin, was appointed as administrator.  Business
operations of Heliocentris group continue under the direction of
the existing management board for the time being.

Heliocentris Energy Solutions AG provides energy management
systems and hybrid power solutions for distributed stationary
industrial applications worldwide.


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G R E E C E
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FREESEAS INC: Alpha Capital Holds 4.9% Equity Stake as of Nov. 18
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In an amended Schedule 13G filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Alpha Capital Anstalt disclosed that as of Nov. 18,
2016, it beneficially owns 13,680,408 shares of common stock of
FreeSeas Inc. which represents 4.99% (based on the total of
[274,156,481] outstanding shares of Common Stock).  A full-text
copy of the regulatory filing is available for free at:

                     https://is.gd/eAc8oE

                      About FreeSeas Inc.

Headquartered in Athens, Greece, FreeSeas Inc., formerly known as
Adventure Holdings S.A., was incorporated in the Marshall Islands
on April 23, 2004, for the purpose of being the ultimate holding
company of ship-owning companies.  The management of FreeSeas'
vessels is performed by Free Bulkers S.A., a Marshall Islands
company that is controlled by Ion G. Varouxakis, the Company's
Chairman, President and CEO, and one of the Company's principal
shareholders.

The Company's fleet consists of six Handysize vessels and one
Handymax vessel that carry a variety of drybulk commodities,
including iron ore, grain and coal, which are referred to as
"major bulks," as well as bauxite, phosphate, fertilizers, steel
products, cement, sugar and rice, or "minor bulks."  As of
Oct. 12, 2012, the aggregate dwt of the Company's operational
fleet is approximately 197,200 dwt and the average age of its
fleet is 15 years.

Freeseas reported a net loss of US$52.94 million on US$2.30
million of operating revenues for the year ended Dec. 31, 2015,
compared to a net loss of US$12.68 million on US$3.77 million of
operating revenues for the year ended Dec. 31, 2014.  As of
Dec. 31, 2015, FreeSeas had US$18.71 million in total assets,
US$35.47 million in total liabilities and a total shareholders'
deficit of US$16.76 million.

RBSM LLP, in New York, issued a "going concern" qualification on
the consolidated financial statements for the year ended Dec. 31,
2015, citing that the Company has incurred recurring operating
losses and has a working capital deficiency.  In addition, the
Company has failed to meet scheduled payment obligations under
its loan facilities and has not complied with certain covenants
included in its loan agreements and is in default in other
agreements with various counter parties.  Furthermore, the vast
majority of the Company's assets are considered to be highly
illiquid and if the Company were forced to liquidate, the amount
realized by the Company could be substantially lower that the
carrying value of these assets.  These conditions among others
raise substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue
as a going concern.


FREESEAS INC: To Hold Annual Meeting on Dec. 22
-----------------------------------------------
The 2016 annual meeting of shareholders of FreeSeas Inc., a
corporation organized under the laws of the Republic of the
Marshall Islands will be held on Dec. 22, 2016, at the principal
executive offices of FreeSeas Inc. at 10, Eleftheriou Venizelou
Street (Panepistimiou Ave.) 106 71, Athens, Greece, at 15:00
Greek time/12:00 pm Eastern Standard Time.  The purposes of the
Annual Meeting are as follows:

   1. To elect one director of the Company to serve until the
      2019 Annual Meeting of Shareholders;

   2. To consider and vote upon a proposal to ratify the
      appointment of RBSM LLP, as the Company's independent
      registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year
      ending Dec. 31, 2016;

   3. To grant discretionary authority to the Company's board of
      directors to (A) amend the Amended and Restated Articles of
      Incorporation of the Company to effect one or more
      consolidations of the issued and outstanding shares of
      common stock, pursuant to which the shares of common stock
      would be combined and reclassified into one share of common
      stock ratios within the range from 1-for-2 up to 1-for-
      10,000 and (B) determine whether to arrange for the
      disposition of fractional interests by shareholder entitled
      thereto, to pay in cash the fair value of fractions of a
      share of common stock as of the time when those entitled to
      receive those fractions are determined, or to entitle
      shareholder to receive from the Company's transfer agent,
      in lieu of any fractional share, the number of shares of
      common stock rounded up to the next whole number, provided
      that, (X) that the Company will not effect Reverse Stock
      Splits that, in the aggregate, exceeds 1-for-10,000, and
      (Y) any Reverse Stock Split is completed no later than the
      first anniversary of the date of the Annual Meeting;

   4. To approve an amendment to the Amended and Restated
      Articles of Incorporation of the Company to increase the
      Company's authorized shares of common stock from
      750,000,000 to 10,000,000,000; and

   5. To transact such other business as may properly come before
      the Annual Meeting and any adjournments or postponements
      thereof.

The Company's Board of Directors has fixed the close of business
on Nov. 4, 2016, as the record date for determining those
shareholders entitled to notice of, and to vote at, the Annual
Meeting and any adjournments or postponements thereof.

                     About FreeSeas Inc.

Headquartered in Athens, Greece, FreeSeas Inc., formerly known as
Adventure Holdings S.A., was incorporated in the Marshall Islands
on April 23, 2004, for the purpose of being the ultimate holding
company of ship-owning companies.  The management of FreeSeas'
vessels is performed by Free Bulkers S.A., a Marshall Islands
company that is controlled by Ion G. Varouxakis, the Company's
Chairman, President and CEO, and one of the Company's principal
shareholders.

The Company's fleet consists of six Handysize vessels and one
Handymax vessel that carry a variety of drybulk commodities,
including iron ore, grain and coal, which are referred to as
"major bulks," as well as bauxite, phosphate, fertilizers, steel
products, cement, sugar and rice, or "minor bulks."  As of
Oct. 12, 2012, the aggregate dwt of the Company's operational
fleet is approximately 197,200 dwt and the average age of its
fleet is 15 years.

Freeseas reported a net loss of US$52.94 million on US$2.30
million of operating revenues for the year ended Dec. 31, 2015,
compared to a net loss of US$12.68 million on US$3.77 million of
operating revenues for the year ended Dec. 31, 2014.  As of Dec.
31, 2015, FreeSeas had US$18.71 million in total assets, US$35.47
million in total liabilities and a total shareholders' deficit of
US$16.76 million.

RBSM LLP, in New York, issued a "going concern" qualification on
the consolidated financial statements for the year ended Dec. 31,
2015, citing that the Company has incurred recurring operating
losses and has a working capital deficiency.  In addition, the
Company has failed to meet scheduled payment obligations under
its loan facilities and has not complied with certain covenants
included in its loan agreements and is in default in other
agreements with various counter parties.  Furthermore, the vast
majority of the Company's assets are considered to be highly
illiquid and if the Company were forced to liquidate, the amount
realized by the Company could be substantially lower that the
carrying value of these assets.  These conditions among others
raise substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue
as a going concern.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


MAYO RENEWABLE: Put Into Liquidation After Rescue Plan Fails
------------------------------------------------------------
Joe Brennan and Mary Carolan at The Irish Times report that the
High Court has moved to put Mayo Renewable Power into liquidation
after efforts to come up with a rescue plan for the insolvent
company, with EUR125 million of debts, failed.

The court appointed Michael McAteer -- michael.mcateer@ie.gt.com
-- of Grant Thornton on Nov. 30 as liquidator to the company,
which initially sought court protection from its creditors under
examinership in August, The Irish Times relates.

Mr. McAteer, who was appointed examiner in September to the
company, was subsequently unable to come up with a workable
so-called scheme of arrangements to secure the company's future
and was duly tasked with liquidating the firm, The Irish Times
discloses.  The liquidator will now seek to sell the company's
assets, The Irish Times states.

US-backed Mayo Renewable, which was officially launched last year
by Taoiseach Enda Kenny, had plans to build a wood-chip burning
electricity generator in Killala at a cost of up to EUR200
million, The Irish Times notes.  The project was half-completed
when work ceased in July as the project ran into a funding
shortage, The Irish Times recounts.

According to The Irish Times, Declan Murphy, for Mr. McAteer,
said it had been hoped investment could be secured to continue
the construction but, despite efforts to secure an investor, it
was clear as of Nov. 25, a number of parties which had expressed
an interest were no longer interested.

Mayo Renewable has about EUR95 million of secured debt and a
further EUR30 million to trade creditors, The Irish Times says.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


FIAT CHRYSLER: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V.'s (FCA)
Outlook to Positive from Stable, while affirming the group's
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured rating
at 'BB-' and Short-Term IDR at 'B'. The agency has also affirmed
Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe S.A.'s senior unsecured rating at
'BB-'.

The rating action reflects Fitch's projections that free cash
flow (FCF) generation, a major credit weakness for the group,
will improve in the foreseeable future. Confirmation in the next
12-18 months that FCF will remain positive could lead to an
upgrade.

The ratings reflect FCA's weak credit metrics, in particular high
leverage and limited FCF, and operational challenges,
particularly FCA's substantial investment needs. However, they
also reflect FCA's solid business profile, including broad
product and geographic diversification, robust brands and an
ambitious strategy.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Earnings, Weak FCF

Group adjusted EBIT margin increased to 4.3% in 2015 from 3.9% in
2014. Fitch expects a further strengthening to 5.5%-6% in 2016-
2018. In particular, Fitch expects a potential moderate erosion
of margins in the US to be fully offset by a recovery in Latam
from 2017 onwards and a further strengthening in Europe.

FCF is weak for the ratings as funds from operations (FFO) are
absorbed by increasing investments to make up for the cuts made
in past years. Fitch projects FCF to remain weak in 2016 before
gradually improving due to improved underlying profitability.

Solid Business Profile

Fitch believes that FCA's business profile is consistent with a
rating at the high end of the 'BB' category. Despite the recent
spin-off of Ferrari, the business profile reflects the group's
ambitious strategy and positive track record since the merger
with Chrysler, its broad product and geographic diversification,
and well-recognised brands.

Improving Financial Structure

FCA's consolidated gross debt and leverage are high for the
ratings, with FFO adjusted gross leverage just below 3x at end-
2015. However, the group maintains substantial cash, and
consolidated FFO adjusted net leverage is more commensurate with
the ratings at below 1.5x. The recent debt restructuring at FCA
US formally removed the ring-fencing around its cash and improved
the group's financial structure. This should also reduce interest
expenses and bolster FFO. Fitch expects FFO adjusted net leverage
to decline towards 1x by end-2017.

Higher Investments

FCA's business plan targets a 52% sales increase between 2013 and
2018, notably by expanding the geographical footprint,
reassessing the group's product portfolio via a refocused effort
on premium brands and realigning capacity in NAFTA to meet
consumer demand for SUVs and pickup trucks.

FCA's plan makes strategic sense but carries execution risks. In
addition, Fitch believes that FCA is underestimating the effect
of, and underinvesting in, growing technologies such as electric
powertrains and autonomous driving, notably as competitors boost
their efforts in these fields. This should either result in the
group lagging behind peers or an acceleration of investment in
the medium term to catch up with peers.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

FCA is the most leveraged auto manufacturer in Fitch's portfolio
and with the weakest cash generation, particularly at FCF level.
However, this is mitigated by adequate profitability compared
with peers in the 'BB' and 'BBB' rating categories. FCA's
business profile is also supported by the group's large scale,
broad end-market diversification versus other mass-market
carmakers and a portfolio of solid brands. No country-ceiling,
parent/subsidiary or operating environment aspects impact the
ratings.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Group revenue to increase slightly in 2016 and grow in low-
      single digits in 2017-2018;

   -- Group adjusted EBIT margin to increase to 5.9% in 2016 and
      further towards 6% by 2018, with the NAFTA region's solid
      profitability offsetting weaker margins in the EMEA and
      Latam markets;

   -- Capex to decline slightly in 2016 before increasing to
      EUR9bn-9.5bn in 2017-2018;

   -- No dividend distribution in 2016-2018.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

   -- Sustained positive FCF (2015: 0.4%, 2016E: 0.4%, 2017E:
      0.7%)

   -- Higher group operating margins (2015: 4.3%, 2016E: 5.9%,
      2017E: 5.9%), in particular at auto mass market brands

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

   -- Sustained fall in revenue and operating margins, including
      group adjusted EBIT margin falling below 2%

   -- Consolidated FFO adjusted net leverage above 2.5x on a
      sustained basis (2015: 1.4x, 2016E: 1.1x, 2017E: 1.0x)

   -- Sustained negative FCF

   -- Mounting liquidity issues, including refinancing risk

LIQUIDITY

Healthy Liquidity

FCA reported EUR13.9bn in cash and equivalents at end-3Q16,
excluding Fitch's EUR3.1bn adjustments for minimum operational
cash. Liquidity is also supported by EUR6.2bn of undrawn
revolving credit facilities (RCF) at end-September 2016. This
largely covers debt of EUR9.6bn maturing over 4Q16 and 2017.

In June 2016, the maturity of the first EUR2.5bn tranche of the
RCF was extended to July 2019. The maturity of the second
EUR2.5bn tranche of the RCF remained unchanged (June 2020). At
end-September 2016, undrawn committed credit lines totalled
EUR6.2bn, including the EUR5bn RCF and approximately EUR1.2bn of
other revolving credit facilities.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


SAPINDA INVEST: Abu Dhabi Capital Provides Bond Guarantee
---------------------------------------------------------
Luca Casiraghi at Bloomberg News reports that Abu Dhabi Capital
ended more than six months of talks to provide a EUR1 billion
(US$1.1 billion) bond guarantee and an equity injection for Lars
Windhorst's main vehicle, Sapinda Invest, the private investment
fund, which is majority-owned by Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al
Nahyan, the eldest son of the U.A.E.'s president.

Within hours of that announcement, Mr. Windhorst, as cited by
Bloomberg, said he separately arranged a EUR200 million financing
package from existing stakeholders.

According to Bloomberg, the challenges are financial and legal:
two of his early investors, billionaire Len Blavatnik and Italian
entrepreneur Silvio Scaglia, sued him in London in separate
lawsuits this year seeking as much as EUR86 million in total.
Outside court, his companies have had cash issues, Bloomberg
notes.  His main vehicle, Sapinda Invest, was six weeks late
paying interest on its EUR1 billion of notes due in June, while
Sequa Petroleum NV, one of his holdings, told bondholders in
November that interest would be delayed because it hadn't
received enough funds from Sapinda Invest and another Sapinda-
related company, Bloomberg relays.

Mr. Blavatnik's AI International Holdings, a unit of his Access
Industries, filed suit against Mr. Windhorst in July, Bloomberg
recounts.  The claim was that he failed to make good on a promise
to buy back EUR60 million of Sapinda's bonds that AI had bought
in February to provide short-term financing, Bloomberg says,
citing court documents.  Mr. Windhorst said that Abu Dhabi
Capital would support Sapinda Invest and would buy bonds in the
company, allowing him to meet his obligations, according to
e-mails submitted to the court, Bloomberg notes.

"If within 48 hours Abu Dhabi Capital has not booked the trade
through a reputable broker or bank with Merrill Lynch we consider
it failed and draw a line in the sand," Mr. Windhorst promised in
an e-mail to Lincoln Benet, CEO of Access Industries, on June 15.
"I take responsibility."

The transfer to Mr. Blavatnik was never made, and he took the
matter to court, Bloomberg states.  On Oct. 28, Mr. Windhorst
admitted liability to a judge, Bloomberg recounts.  A hearing
will be held in 2017 to assess damages, Bloomberg discloses.

Sapinda Invest is based in Luxembourg.


SWISSPORT GROUP: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had affirmed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on Luxembourg-based airport services
provider Swissport Group S.a.r.l (Swissport) and related
entities. The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' issue rating on the Swiss
franc 110 million senior secured revolving credit facility, the
EUR660 million term loan B, and the EUR400 million senior secured
notes issued by Swissport International Ltd. and Swissport
Investment S.A.  The recovery rating on these instruments is '3',
reflecting that S&P's recovery expectations in the higher half of
the 50%-70% range in the event of a payment default.

S&P also affirmed its 'CCC+' issue rating on the EUR290 million
senior unsecured notes issued by Swissport Investment S.A., two
notches below the corporate credit rating.  The recovery rating
on the notes is '6', indicating S&P's expectation of negligible
recovery (0%-10%) in the event of a default.

The affirmation follows S&P's review of Swissport's 100%
shareholder, the Chinese privately-owned HNA Group, S&P's
reassessment of the impact of HNA Group's ownership on group
members, and S&P's view that the HNA Group's creditworthiness
does not affect its rating on Swissport at the current level.

"We assess the creditworthiness of the combined diversified, but
highly leveraged, HNA Group to be commensurate with a 'b+' group
credit profile (GCP).  Following its several acquisitions in
recent years, HNA Group is a large Chinese conglomerate operating
in the aviation, infrastructure, real estate, financial services,
tourism, and logistics sectors.  In our view, the group benefits
from broad scale and diversification of operations.  However, we
view the group's financial policy as aggressive, based on its
acquisition strategy and high debt leverage," S&P said.

S&P views Swissport as a moderately strategic subsidiary of HNA
Group.  S&P considers it unlikely that HNA Group would sell
Swissport in the near to medium term, given that the company
provides backward integration to the group's aviation business
through its ground handling and cargo business.  S&P also sees
some potential for support from the group if Swissport falls into
financial difficulty.

S&P's business risk assessment continues to reflect Swissport's
position as a leading independent provider of ground handling
services and its well-diversified customer base.  S&P considers
the EUR70 billion-EUR90 billion global ground handling market as
highly fragmented.  Traditionally, ground handling services have
been provided by airports or airlines themselves, but the opening
up of the market has resulted in the outsourcing of up to 50% of
ground handling services globally to third parties such as
Swissport, according to the International Air Transport
Association.

S&P forecasts that Swissport's adjusted EBITDA margins will
improve slightly in 2016, from 10.8% in 2015.  S&P also thinks
that under HNA Group's ownership, Swissport could benefit from
further higher-margin opportunities in Asia and Africa in 2017.
Swissport started operations in Ghana, Saudi Arabia, and
Kazakhstan in 2016.

S&P continues to view Swissport's financial risk profile as
highly leveraged.  S&P forecasts that cash flow generation will
contribute to some leverage reduction over the medium term and
that major acquisitions will have a deleveraging effect.  That
said, under S&P's base-case scenario, it forecasts that the
company will achieve S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA
of about 6.0x and EBITDA interest coverage of at least 2.0x in
2017, which is commensurate with S&P's 'b' stand-alone credit
profile (SACP) and its rating on Swissport.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Swissport will likely
maintain or improve its profitability, especially when it fully
realizes synergies from its recent acquisitions and successfully
executes its growth strategy in Asia and Africa.  Furthermore,
S&P believes that Swissport will generate free cash flow and that
major acquisitions will have a deleveraging effect, prompting
gradually improved credit measures in the next 12-18 months,
including adjusted EBITDA interest coverage of at least 2.0x and
debt to EBITDA around 6.0x or less.  S&P also anticipates that
the company will maintain adequate liquidity and that its GCP on
HNA Group will not weaken and, therefore, not weigh negatively on
S&P's rating on Swissport.

S&P could raise its rating on Swissport if it reduced its debt
through improved operating performance, leading to stronger
credit metrics.  Specifically, S&P would look for a decrease in
adjusted debt to EBITDA to less than 5.0x on a sustainable basis.
An upgrade would also depend on our view on whether HNA Group's
GCP would support a higher rating on Swissport.

S&P could lower its rating on Swissport if S&P observed that the
HNA Group's creditworthiness had significantly weakened.

S&P could also downgrade Swissport if its SACP deteriorated to
'b-', combined with S&P's view that Swissport's subsidiary status
within HNA Group was no longer consistent with a moderately
strategic assessment.

Swissport's SACP could weaken following, for instance, a decline
in revenues and profitability as a result of a loss of major
contracts, significant cash outflow due to higher-than-expected
integration and start-up costs for new businesses, or excessive
debt-funded investments.  This could trigger a fall in the
company's EBITDA interest coverage to less than 1.5x, or prompt
marked weakening its liquidity.  Such deterioration might also
signal weakening of the strategic importance of Swissport to HNA
Group, leading S&P to review and likely reassess Swissport's
subsidiary status within the group.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


GLOBAL TIP: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B+'; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it has lowered to 'B+' from 'BB' its
long-term corporate credit rating on Netherlands-based trailer
services provider Global TIP Holdings Two B.V., the holding
company of TIP Trailer Services.  The outlook is stable.

The downgrade reflects both TIP's higher leverage on a stand-
alone basis as a result of its partly-debt financed growth over
recent years, and S&P's assessment of HNA Group's credit
worthiness at 'b+'.  S&P do not generally rate a strong
subsidiary higher than its weaker parent because, in S&P's view,
the relatively weaker parent could take assets from the
subsidiary or burden it with liabilities during times of
financial stress.

TIP's 100% shareholder HNA Group is a large Chinese conglomerate
operating in the aviation, infrastructure, real estate, financial
services, tourism, and logistics sectors.  In S&P's view, the
group benefits from such scale and diversification of operations.
However, S&P views the group's financial policy as aggressive
regarding its acquisition strategy and high debt leverage.

Since late 2013 when the conglomerate acquired TIP from General
Electric, TIP has undergone a period of considerable expansion,
renewing and growing its leasing and service businesses after a
period of fleet underinvestment under its former parent.  TIP has
grown its fleet by about 30% since 2013.  In 2016, the company
accelerated its growth strategy further and S&P expects it to
continue playing a consolidator role in the trailer leasing and
service market in the coming years.  The company anticipates
spending about EUR380 million in capex and acquisitions in 2016
(versus our previous assumption of about EUR280 million) after a
similar spend in 2015.  A portion of this is financed with debt
which has led to a deterioration in TIP's credit metrics, in
particular funds from operations (FFO) to debt decreased to 22%
in 2015 (from 32% in 2014).  S&P believes that it will decline
further to below 20% in 2016.  TIP's debt is expected to rise by
about 60% in 2016 to about EUR650 million, whereas S&P forecasts
an EBITDA increase of about 30%.

S&P notes, however, that HNA Group has also financially supported
TIP in the period of high capex outlays by not extracting any
dividends and partly repaying its intracompany loan
(EUR35 million) in 2016 to support growth.

S&P assess TIP's stand-alone credit profile at 'bb-'.  It is
supported by good customer diversification and the pan-European
span of its operations.  TIP also benefits from some degree of
predictability in its cash flows owing to the long-term portion
of its operating lease contracts (about 45% of total revenues),
backed by a long-term lease revenue backlog of about
EUR380 million at year-end 2015 (a 45% increase over 2014), which
S&P understands has further increased over the course of 2016.
The company delivers its services to a wide range of end
industries including food, logistics, mail and package express,
as well as industrial goods manufacturers which should contribute
to earnings stability.  S&P's assessment of TIP's stand-alone
credit quality is constrained by its small size relative to some
global rated peers in the transportation operating leasing
industry as well as its increased leverage.

S&P believes that TIP's strategy of focusing on full-service
long-term leases--those that include maintenance and other
services--will support future earnings visibility.  S&P also
thinks that a shift in the fleet mix toward higher-value trailer
types will gradually increase lease rates and help stabilize
profitability, with an EBITDA margin of about 30%.  S&P thinks
TIP will likely benefit from end customers' plans to renew fleets
as the demand for their services continues to grow modestly, led
by stable consumer spending in Europe.

S&P's base case for TIP assumes:

   -- Relatively slow overall economic growth in the eurozone
      (TIP's main end markets) with about 1.0%-1.5% expected GDP
      growth throughout the remainder of 2016 and 2017.

   -- Revenue growth of about 10%-20% -- depending on the scale
      of TIP's growth investments -- in the next two years
      supported by acquisition revenues, stable utilization rates
      at about 85%, and a growing fleet as a result of the
      current investment strategy.

   -- EBITDA margins stabilizing at about 30% as the share of
      long-term lease contracts in total revenues continues to be
      stable at about 45%-50%.

   -- Capex of about EUR200 million per year in full year 2016
      and 2017.

   -- Acquisition spending of about EUR70 million per year
      starting from 2017, down from our expectation of about
      EUR160 million for full-year 2016.

   -- No shareholder distribution as the current shareholder is
      supportive of the company reinvesting its cash flows into
      capex.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
for 2016 and 2017:

   -- Adjusted FFO to debt in the range of 15%-20%; and

   -- Negative free operating cash flow.

Additionally, S&P takes some comfort in the willingness of TIP's
shareholder to provide additional funds to finance its expansion
(as it recently did repaying EUR35 million under its intracompany
loan from TIP to help finance acquisitions) and proactive
liquidity management -- in S&P's view -- including monthly
internal covenants testing to ensure compliance.

The outlook is stable and reflects S&P's view that TIP will
likely continue to pursue its partially debt-financed expansion
strategy under the HNA Group, while maintaining its rating-
commensurate credit measures, such as FFO to debt above 12%.

S&P currently views an upgrade as remote as long as the company
is controlled by HNA Group with its tolerance for high leverage
and aggressive growth.  However, S&P could consider a positive
rating action if it was to revise its assessment of HNA's overall
credit quality upward.

"We could consider a downgrade if TIP's expansion strategy is
more aggressive than we currently expect, leading to a further
increase in debt, with FFO to debt declining to less than 12%.
We could also consider a negative rating action if our revenue
growth forecast does not materialize despite the currently high
fleet investments, or if liquidity deteriorates as a result of
unexpected operational challenges or lower remarketing proceeds
than we anticipate.  We could also lower the rating if HNA
Group's financial policy becomes more aggressive than we
currently anticipate, for example, if it involves a change in
TIP's dividend policy or if we lower our assessment of HNA
Group's credit quality," S&P said.


HALCYON STRUCTURED 2007-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. E Notes to B+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings took various rating actions in Halcyon
Structured Asset Management European CLO 2007-1 B.V.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Affirmed its rating on the class A2 notes;
   -- Raised its rating on the class B notes; and
   -- Lowered its ratings on the class C, D, and E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the Sept. 30, 2016 investor report.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate for each rated class of
notes at the respective rating level.  In our analysis, we used
the reported portfolio balance that we consider to be performing,
the current weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average
recovery rates that we considered to be appropriate.  We applied
various cash flow stress scenarios, using different default
patterns, in conjunction with different interest rate and
sovereign stress scenarios for each liability rating category as
outlined in our criteria," S&P said.

"In our analysis, we have observed that the portfolio balance has
reduced since our previous review on Feb. 3, 2016.  This is
partly due to the repayment of the senior notes following the
reinvestment period, which has increased the available credit
enhancement for the class A2, B, and C notes, and partly due to
the occurrence of defaults in the underlying portfolio, which has
decreased the available credit enhancement for the mezzanine and
junior class D and E notes.  The class A2 notes, which are now
the most senior class of notes, have amortized to a note factor
(the current notional amount divided by the notional amount at
closing) of approximately 82.6%," S&P noted.

S&P has observed that the assets that it considers to be rated in
the 'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-') have increased to
7.74% of the collateral portfolio, compared with 7.08% at S&P's
previous review.  Defaulted assets (rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD'
[selective default], or 'D') have increased markedly to 3.85%
from 0% of the collateral balance, over the same period, thereby
eroding the credit protection available to the rated notes.

The weighted-average spread earned on the portfolio is more or
less unchanged at 4.0%.  The par coverage tests continue to be
above the required levels for all classes of notes, except the
class E notes par coverage test, which is failing due to
additional defaults.

In S&P's analysis, it has excluded the "Obligations Remboursables
en Actions" (ORA) bond exposure to Novartex, as this bond
contains a mandatory conversion to equity at redemption, the
value of which is uncertain.

S&P determined that the available credit enhancement for the
class A2 and B notes is commensurate with a 'AAA' rating stress.
S&P has therefore affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A2
notes and raised to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' S&P's rating on
the class B notes.

Defaults in the portfolio have reduced the available credit
enhancement for the class D and E notes.  This, combined with
increased obligor concentration risk, has led to S&P's ratings on
the class C, D, and E notes being capped through the application
of S&P's largest obligor default test.  The largest obligor
default test assesses whether a rated tranche has sufficient
credit enhancement to withstand specified combinations of
underlying asset defaults based on the ratings on the underlying
assets, with a flat recovery of 5%.  For example, for a 'BBB'
rating stress S&P tests, among other combinations, whether the
note can withstand the default of four largest borrowers rated in
the 'B+' to 'CCC-' range without defaulting.  The portfolio
currently has 40 individual borrowers, with the largest borrower
accounting for 6.9%, the five largest for 31.4%, and the ten
largest at 52.9% of the portfolio.

The application of S&P's largest obligor default test indicates
that the available credit enhancement for the class C, D, and E
notes is no longer commensurate with the currently assigned
ratings.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'A+ (sf)' from 'AA (sf)'
its rating on the class C notes, to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)'
S&P's rating on the class D notes, and to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB
(sf)' its rating on the class E notes.

Halcyon Structured Asset Management European CLO 2007-1 is a cash
flow CLO transaction that securitizes loans to U.S. and European
speculative-grade corporates, and is managed by Halcyon Loan
Investors LP.

RATINGS LIST

Class                 Rating
                To             From

Halcyon Structured Asset Management European CLO 2007-1 B.V.
EUR600 Million Senior Secured Variable Funding Floating-Rate
Notes

Rating Affirmed

A2              AAA (sf)

Rating Raised

B               AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)

Ratings Lowered

C               A+ (sf)        AA (sf)
D               BB+ (sf)       BBB- (sf)
E               B+ (sf)        BB (sf)


IHS NETHERLANDS: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Final LT IDR
------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned IHS Netherlands Holdco B.V. (IHS
Netherlands) a final Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and
senior unsecured rating of 'B+' and a final National Long-Term
Rating of 'AA(nga) ', following the successful USD800m bond
placement and subsequent refinancing of the group's debt. The
Outlooks are Stable.

Fitch has also upgraded IHS Towers NG Limited's Long-Term IDR and
National Long-term Rating to 'B+' and 'AA(nga)' respectively with
Stable Outlooks, as the company is now part of the IHS
Netherlands restricted group. "We have affirmed the senior
unsecured ratings of IHS Towers NG Limited and IHS Towers
Netherlands FinCo NG B.V. at 'B'/RR5, a notch lower than the
senior unsecured rating of IHS Netherlands," Fitch said. IHS
Towers NG Limited and IHS Towers Netherlands FinCo NG B.V.'s
ratings have been removed from Rating Watch Positive and
simultaneously withdrawn.

Fitch has withdrawn the ratings of IHS Towers NG Limited and IHS
Towers Netherlands FinCo NG B.V. as these companies are being
included in the IHS Netherlands restricted group. Accordingly,
Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage for
IHS Towers NG Limited and IHS Towers Netherlands FinCo NG B.V..

IHS Netherlands' 3Q16 results were in line with our expectations.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IHS Netherlands Debt Structure

IHS Netherlands has successfully issued a USD800m senior
unsecured bond, guaranteed by 100% owned operating subsidiaries,
IHS Nigeria Limited (IHSN) and IHS Towers NG Limited.
Collectively these companies form the restricted group, owned
ultimately by IHS Holding Limited (IHS Group), the mobile
telecommunications infrastructure company that operates around
23,000 towers across Africa. IHSN has entered into NGN26.5bn
credit facility. IHS Group also has an undrawn USD120m RCF, which
is guaranteed by the restricted group. As part of the
transaction, almost all existing debt at IHSN and IHS Towers NG
Limited has been refinanced, which includes the successful tender
offer for IHS Towers NG Limited's 2019 notes. Following the
tender offer, USD13m remains outstanding from IHS Towers NG
Limited's notes.

The restricted group's senior unsecured notes and NGN credit
facility rank pari passu with any outstanding IHS Towers NG
Limited notes and the guarantee of the IHS Group's RCF. "We
include the drawn amount of this RCF in the calculation of the
restricted group's credit metrics," Fitch said.

Impact on IHS Towers NG Limited

"Following the successful transaction, we have aligned IHS Towers
NG Limited's ratings with the restricted group's rating as IHS
Towers NG Limited has been incorporated into the operations of
the restricted group," Fitch said.

However, the outstanding USD13m of notes issued by IHS Towers
Netherlands FinCo NG B.V. following the successful tender offer
have had their covenants removed. These notes rank pari passu
with the restricted group's debt, but they only have recourse to
the assets of IHS Towers NG Limited, and not the whole restricted
group. These weaker recovery prospects are reflected in an
instrument rating that is one notch below that of debt issued by
the restricted group.

Leading Nigerian Tower Operator

IHS group is the leading tower company in Nigeria. Following
recent in-country consolidation and tower sales by mobile
operators, IHS Group controls just over 50% of all telecoms tower
infrastructure in Nigeria. It owns and manages 6,320 towers as of
30 Sep 2016 through the fully owned subsidiaries of the
restricted group and just over 9,000 towers through the 49/51
joint venture IHS Group has with MTN. The JV is managed by the
restricted group, which has full operational control.

The towers represent over 70% of the towers in Nigeria not
directly owned by telecoms operators. Even with further
consolidation among the other tower owners, IHS Group should
still retain its number one position. Glo is the only one of the
four main Nigerian mobile operators that has not sold its tower
portfolio (around 6,000 towers) to independent tower companies.

Strong Underlying Demand

The restricted group is well placed to benefit from strong growth
potential in Nigerian telecoms. "We expect it to continue growing
strongly in line with the telecommunications market in Nigeria,
which is seeing strong demand for mobile services." Fitch said.
With fixed-line population penetration of 0.1% in Nigeria in
2015, 3G and LTE networks are the main way of providing high-
speed broadband connectivity.

"We expect mobile operators to densify their networks to increase
capacity as smartphone take up increases and as data traffic
grows, resulting in growing demand for passive tower
infrastructure over the next five years. The Nigerian telecoms
regulator is focused on improving network quality. We believe
that the regulator views the shared use of towers as a way of
increasing capital efficiency for network operators," Fitch said.

Strong Business Model

The restricted group's market position is protected by high
barriers to entry, switching costs, and the quality of its
service. It benefits from a visible revenue stream driven by
long-term lease agreements, which comprise embedded contractual
escalators to mitigate inflation risk and, in some cases, cost
pass-through mechanisms for power costs. The average length of
the master agreements the restricted group has with its customers
was 7.6 years as of June 30, 2016.

"We expect significant revenue growth in 2017 from contracted new
tower builds, 3G/4G upgrades and as FX rates are reset from 1
January following the naira's devaluation in 2016. This will
boost 2017 EBITDA with strong margin expansion, helped by
continued energy efficiency gains. We expect free cash flow (FCF)
to be negative in 2017 due to significant expansion capex. We
forecast FCF will turn positive in 2018 and grow strongly in the
following years as capex falls and EBITDA growth continues,"
Fitch said.

Growth More Certain

IHSN signed an amendment to its existing contract with MTN
Nigeria effective July 2016. In this agreement, MTN committed to
provide IHSN with a portion of its intended network rollout of
more than 11,200 sites in Nigeria by end-2017. This should result
in IHSN gaining around 2,000 new 3G/LTE tenancies and 1,650 new
build towers or co-locations by end-2017. This amount of new
sites is significant considering that IHSN built 1,648 new sites
from 2013 to 2015 and 96 in 1H16.

Limited FX Exposure

Seventy-eight per cent of the restricted group's revenue as of 30
June 2016 was linked to the US dollar. Payments are made in naira
and the US dollar component is converted to naira for settlement
at a fixed conversion rate for a stated period. Depending on the
contract, the conversion rate is reset after three, six or 12
months.

The proportion of revenue linked to the US dollar is set to
decline to 72% in 2018, but the company aims to reduce its
foreign exchange revenue exposure by moving more contracts to a
three-month reset (48% of revenue in 2018 linked to the US dollar
with a three-month reset by 2018, compared with 49% in 2016
linked to the US dollar with a 12-month reset). Of the 19% of
revenue not linked to the US dollar, roughly half is linked to
the naira, with the rest linked to the price of diesel, where
volatility is passed on to the customer.

A significant part of the company's EBITDA is linked to the US
dollar. This is due to most of the company's operating costs
being either related to the cost of diesel, where there are some
pass through components, or naira-denominated. Capex is paid in
naira, with elements linked to the US dollar.

Exposure to Diesel Price

The restricted group has some exposure to the cost of diesel as
not all energy costs are passed on to customers. However, the
company is investing in more efficient generators and deploying
power management solutions. As of end-Sept 2016, 1,909 sites have
been upgraded, where diesel consumption per refurbished site has
dropped by more than 50%. "We expect overall diesel consumption
to fall as power management solutions are deployed to more sites
over the next two years. This should mitigate most of any
reasonable increase in the cost of diesel," Fitch said.

Rating Sovereign Constraint

All of the restricted group's assets are based in Nigeria, which
means the company is exposed to the risks associated with the
Nigerian sovereign (B+/Stable). Even though the restricted group
may have an operating and credit profile stronger than the 'B'
category, its rating is constrained by the Nigerian Country
Ceiling of 'B+'. Changes to the sovereign rating may lead to
rating changes for the restricted group.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

IHS Netherlands HoldCo B.V.'s 'B+' rating is constrained by the
country cap associated with its home sovereign Nigeria (B+). IHS
Netherlands is well positioned within the Nigerian market as it
commands the number one position (out of two operators) with an
72% market share in the largest telecom market in Africa.
Underlying demand is strong -- with fixed-line population
penetration of 0.1% in Nigeria in 2015, 3G and LTE networks are
the main way of providing high-speed broadband connectivity.

IHS Netherlands is reasonably positioned compared with its
investment grade international peers, with strong margins and
moderate leverage; EBITDA margin 50% and FFO adjusted net
leverage of 3.5x. (vs American Tower 62% and 6.6x, EI Towers 48%
and 3.1x.)

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Revenue growth in USD of over 20% per year in 2017 and
      2018, driven by the FX reset in early 2017 and strong
      underlying growth, assuming no major devaluation of the
      naira. Growth in 2019 is likely to be in the high single
      digit percentage range.

   -- EBITDA margin increasing to 60% in 2017 from 51% in 1H16,
      driven by the FX reset, strong revenue growth and continued
      cost efficiencies. EBITDA margin should rise slightly in
      2018 and 2019.

   -- Capex-to-revenue of over 80% in 2017 as the company invests
      heavily in medium-term growth opportunities, mainly new
      build towers and upgrading power management systems. Capex
      intensity should fall to around 23% in 2018 and decline
      further in 2019.

   -- No dividends paid in 2017-2019.

   -- The company will need more financing in 2017 to fund capex
      if it pursues all investment opportunities as FCF is likely
      to be negative in 2017.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

   -- An upgrade of the Nigerian sovereign rating, together with
      FFO-adjusted net leverage below 5.0x on a sustained basis,
      and FFO fixed charge cover greater than 2.5x.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

   -- Funds from operations (FFO)-adjusted net leverage above
      5.5x on a sustained basis (3.5x at end-2015).

   -- FFO fixed charge below 2.0x (2.6x at end-2015).

   -- Weak FCF due to limited EBITDA growth, higher capex and
      shareholder distributions, or adverse changes to the
      restricted group's regulatory or competitive environment.

   -- A downgrade of the Nigerian sovereign rating.

Rating Sensitivities for the Nigerian sovereign:
Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating action include:

   -- A loss of foreign exchange reserves that increases
      vulnerability to external shocks.

   -- Reversal of key structural reforms and anti-corruption and
      transparency measures.

   -- Worsening of political and security risks that reduces oil
      production for a prolonged period or worsens ethnic or
      sectarian tension.

   -- Failure to narrow the fiscal deficit leading to a marked
      increase in public debt.

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to positive rating action include:

   -- A rise in non-oil revenues that leads to a reduction of the
      fiscal deficit and the maintenance of a manageable debt
      burden.

   -- A revival of economic growth supported by the sustained
      implementation of coherent macroeconomic policies.

   -- Increase in foreign exchange reserves to a level that
      reduces vulnerability to external shocks.

LIQUIDITY

Capex Growth Pressures Liquidity

On a pro forma basis, the restricted group had USD87m cash at the
end of 1H16. Assuming that all existing debt is refinanced as
part of the transaction, the company will only have its first
debt repayment in 2018. Liquidity is likely to remain limited due
to significant capex plans in 2017. The restricted group will
need support from IHS Group if the company wants to invest to
take advantage of all medium-term growth opportunities.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

IHS Netherlands Holdco B.V.

   -- Long-Term IDR: assigned final rating of 'B+'; Outlook
      Stable

   -- Senior unsecured rating: assigned final rating of
      'B+'/'RR4'

   -- National Long-Term Rating: assigned final rating of
      'AA(nga)'; Outlook Stable

IHS Towers NG Limited

   -- Long-Term IDR: upgraded to 'B+' from 'B'; Outlook Stable,
      RWP removed, rating withdrawn

   -- Senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'B'/RR5; RWP removed,
      rating withdrawn

   -- National Long-Term Rating: upgraded to 'AA(nga)' from 'A-
      (nga)'; RWP removed, rating withdrawn

IHS Towers Netherlands FinCo NG B.V.

   -- Senior unsecured notes guaranteed by IHS Towers NG Limited
      and Tower Infrastructure Company Limited: affirmed at
      'B'/RR5; RWP removed, rating withdrawn


UCL RAIL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT FC Issuer Default Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) of UCL Rail B.V. (UCLR) and its key 100%
subsidiary JSC Freight One at 'BB+' and revised the Outlook to
Stable from Negative.

The Outlook revision reflects our expectation that leverage will
improve to levels commensurate with the current rating level
within the rating horizon. "We forecast Freight One's funds from
operations (FFO)-adjusted net leverage to be slightly below 2.5x
at end-2016 and beyond due to improving gondola rates, expected
scrap proceeds from the sale of old rail fleet and zero
dividends," Fitch said.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improving Market Fundamentals

The forecast modest Russian GDP growth will support freight rail
transportation volumes, which, coupled with gradual rail fleet
disposals following the ban on use of old rail fleet from 2016
and low fleet production, will continue to support gondola rate
growth in 2017, although at a slower pace than in 2016. This
should boost the revenue of rail operators with a significant
share of gondola cars, like Freight One. "We expect JSC Russian
Railways' tariff growth to be lower than in 2016, about
inflation, which should support rail operators' margins, as
empty-run costs are the major contributors to their total
operating costs," Fitch said.

Mixed Impact from Ban on Old Fleet Use

The ban on use of old rail fleet from 2016 prompted disposal of
railcars and helped reduce their oversupply on the market,
boosting gondola use daily rates, which had been stagnating in
recent years. This is positive for rail operators. Freight One
expects to write off a material part of its fleet over 2016-2019.
"Nevertheless, we expect the company to retain its market share
either through operating leases, as in 2016, or the purchase of
additional railcars in the coming years. Our rating case also
includes RUB8.5bn of scrap proceeds from sale of old rail fleet
in 2016, and more, although significantly below this level, in
2017-2019," Fitch said.

Lease-Adjusted Credit Metrics

"We consider the increased proportion of operating leases in 2016
in response to the ban on use of old rail fleet a temporary
measure rather than a long-term strategy shift. We expect the
company to return to fleet acquisitions, partially substituting
the leased fleet as market conditions improve. Therefore we
expect the share of the fleet under operating leases will remain
small and in line with the historical average." Fitch said.

Fitch treats rail fleet operating lease rentals as a debt-like
obligation and applied a 4x multiple (instead of the standard 6x
multiple in Russia) to capitalise the related costs, reflecting
the flexibility of operating-lease contracts, which can be
dissolved at relatively short notice and the company's
demonstrated ability to manage lease costs to match the stage of
the business cycle. Fitch would revise the multiple to 6x if the
company permanently shifts its strategy towards having a
significant and steady share of operating leases from its
historical practice of using leases for a number of small and
specific business opportunities.

Deleveraging Under Way

"Freight One continues to deleverage. Its net debt position
decreased to RUB58bn at end-2015 from RUB106bn at end-2012 and we
expect it to fall further by end-2016. As we expect the company
to partially substitute the leased fleet with owned fleet as the
market environment improves, we expect it to increase capex to
about RUB22bn on average over 2017-2019. Our rating case also
includes the proceeds from old rail fleet sales for scrap and
zero dividends. Therefore we expect FFO-adjusted net leverage to
drop below 2.5x on average over 2016-2019. This leverage
expectation supports the Outlook revision," Fitch said.

Focus on Service Contracts

The competition between rail operators has intensified in recent
years. Rail operators including Freight One have entered medium-
to long-term service agreements with their key customers to
increase the visibility of cash flows. Under these agreements
Freight One is responsible for transporting 25%-100% of its
customers' freight. The company generates about 60% of total
revenue under these contracts. The agreements' tenor ranges from
two to seven years. However, Freight One remains exposed to
volume risk as some contracts fix only the percentage of the
customers' cargo volumes, but not actual volumes.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Freight One is the leading nationwide commercial rolling stock
operator in Russia, with an estimated market share of about 16%
at end-2016. It is followed by Globaltrans Investment Plc
(BB/Stable), which has about 8% based on rail transportation
volumes. Rail operators' business is exposed to volatile economic
drivers affecting transported volumes and freight rates. Like
Globaltrans, Freight One operates under long-term contracts with
major customers. However, its rail fleet is older and therefore
it is more exposed to the ban on use of old rail fleet introduced
at end-2015. Freight One expects to write off a material part of
its rail fleet over 2016-2018 and partially replace it with
leased-in fleet.

Freight One will maintain the largest fleet in operations among
private rail operators.

UCL Rail's ratings are equalised with those of Freight One, as
the latter is the sole contributor to the group's revenues and
earnings following a reorganisation in 2015.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Domestic GDP decline of 0.5% in 2016 and 1.3%-2% growth
      over 2017-2019

   -- Inflation to grow at 7% in 2016 and 5%-6% over 2017-2019

   -- Freight prices to grow at about or slightly lower than
      inflation rate

   -- Capex in line with company's guidance for 2016 and our
      expectation of RUB22bn on average over 2017-2019 to
      substitute the recent increase of rail fleet under
      operating lease with the owned railcars

   -- Rail fleet size under operations in line with management
      expectations

   -- Scrap proceeds in line with management expectation for 2016
      of RUB8.5bn and more, although significantly below this
      level, over 2017-2019.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future Developments That May, Individually or
Collectively, Lead to Positive Rating Action

   -- A sustained decrease in FFO lease-adjusted net leverage
      below 1.5x and FFO fixed charge coverage of above 3.5x

   -- Sustained stronger economic growth and infrastructure
      improvements

   -- Diversification of the customer base and lengthening of
      contract duration with volume visibility with key customers

Negative: Future Developments That May, Individually or
Collectively, Lead to Negative Rating Action

   -- FFO-adjusted net leverage above 2.5x and FFO fixed charge
      coverage below 2.5x on a sustained basis, due to weak
      industrial activity in Russia and weaker-than-expected
      operating results, larger capex or dividend payments or
      failure to execute asset disposals as planned

   -- Unfavourable changes to the Russian legislative framework
      for the railway transportation industry

LIQUIDITY

At end-1H16 Freight One had RUB12bn of cash and cash equivalents
and bank deposits, which is sufficient to cover the company's
short-term maturities of about RUB6bn. "Freight One also had
unused credit facilities of RUB49bn, mainly from VTB, Alfa-Bank
(BB+/Negative) and Promsvyazbank and we expect the company to be
free cash flow positive," Fitch said. Freight One does not pay
any commitment fees under unused credit facilities, which is
common practice in Russia.

Freight One's outstanding debt of RUB61bn at end-1H16 was mostly
raised in roubles. Debt of RUB19bn was secured by pledge of rail
fleet. At end-1H16 rail fleet with balance value of RUB33bn
(about 32% of total assets) was either pledged under loan
agreements or used as a security under finance lease agreements.
But the company still had a significant share of unencumbered
assets, which leaves significant asset value for senior unsecured
creditors.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

UCL Rail

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook
      revised to Stable from Negative

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'

   -- Foreign currency senior unsecured rating affirmed at 'BB+'

   -- Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook
      revised to Stable from Negative

   -- Short-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'B'

   -- Local currency senior unsecured rating affirmed at 'BB+'

   -- National Long-term rating affirmed at 'AA(rus)', Outlook
      revised to Stable from Negative

Freight One

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook
      revised to Stable from Negative

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'

   -- Foreign currency senior unsecured rating affirmed at 'BB+'

   -- Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook
      revised to Stable from Negative

   -- Short-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'B'

   -- National Long-term rating affirmed at 'AA(rus)', Outlook
      revised to Stable from Negative

   -- Local currency senior unsecured rating affirmed at 'BB+'


===========
N O R W A Y
===========


PETROLEUM GEO-SERVICES: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CC' on Exchange Offer
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered to 'CC' from 'CCC+' its long-term
corporate credit rating on the Norwegian seismic group Petroleum
Geo-Services (PGS).  The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P lowered its issue rating on PGS's
$450 million senior unsecured due 2018 to 'C' from 'CCC-'.  S&P
placed on CreditWatch negative the 'CCC+' rating on the
$400 million senior secured notes.

The downgrade reflects PGS's recently announced exchange offer on
its $450 million senior unsecured notes due September 2018.  S&P
views this offer as distressed, rather than opportunistic.  Upon
completion of the transaction S&P is likely to lower the rating
to 'SD' (selective default) and shortly thereafter S&P will
revise the ratings based on PGS's updated liquidity position,
capital structure, and maturity schedule.

The transaction includes these linked and conditional elements:

   -- Dealing with the maturity of the $450 million due December
      2018.  Under the offer 50% of notes will be exchanged with
      new notes due December 2020, with no change in the coupon,
      and the rest will be redeemed at a price of 89% (or 95% for
      early birds).

   -- A private placement raising $225 million in equity.  The
      company completed this transaction on Nov. 23 and will,
      depending on market circumstances, offer another rights
      issue totaling $35 million.

   -- Extending the RCF from September 2018 to September 2020,
      while reducing the size of the facility gradually to
      $350 million from $500 million.

The company expects to complete the transaction by late December.

S&P's decision to see the offer as a distressed exchange offer
reflects:

   -- S&P's view of the company's current capital structure as
      unsustainable and liquidity as less than adequate, factored
      into S&P's 'CCC+' corporate credit rating.  S&P projected
      adjusted debt to EBITDA (excluding cash) to be about 8x in
      2016 amid a very challenging market environment.  Post the
      transaction, adjusted debt to EBITDA is expected to improve
      only modestly to 6.5x-7.0x.

   -- S&P's view that the noteholders are obtaining less than the
      originally promised amount.  In this respect, the
      redemption is being done below the nominal value of the
      liability and the noteholders are not being compensated for
      delaying the maturity by two years.

The negative outlook reflects that S&P will lower PGS's corporate
credit rating to 'SD' (selective default) and the rating on its
notes due 2018 to 'D' in the  next few weeks if noteholders
accept the exchange offer.

Following the finalization of the transactions, S&P will revise
the ratings based on PGS's updated liquidity position, capital
structure, and maturity schedule.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


CAIXA GERAL: DBRS Reviews 'BB' Rating on Dated Subordinated Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited placed the ratings for Caixa Geral de
Depositos, S.A. (CGD or the Group) and its subsidiaries Under
Review with Negative Implications. The review includes the Senior
Long-Term Debt & Deposit rating of BBB (low), the Short-Term Debt
& Deposit rating of R-2 (middle), the Dated Subordinated Notes
rating of BB (high) and the BBB (high) / R-1 (low) Critical
Obligations Rating. As part of the review, the Group's Intrinsic
Assessment (IA) of BBB (low) will also be reassessed.

The review of the ratings reflects the increased risks that the
Group is facing in relation to corporate governance issues, the
planned recapitalisation, and the Group's ongoing difficulties in
improving profitability and asset quality. In particular, the
review will consider how the recent resignation of the majority
of the board of directors on November 27 will affect the planned
restructuring of the Group. In addition, although the Group is in
the process of a significant recapitalisation which would
strengthen the balance sheet, the review period considers the
delays that are taking place in this process and the execution
risk for the plan. As a result, DBRS expects the Group to be
weakly capitalised for longer than initially envisaged.

The Group is in the process of a recapitalisation plan involving
an injection from its sole shareholder, the Portuguese
government, of up to EUR2.7 billion, the EUR 500 million transfer
of shares of ParCaixa, and the conversion of EUR 900 million
government held contingent convertible bonds into CGD shares. The
transaction is essential to strengthen the Group's balance sheet.
Also as part of the recapitalisation initially agreed between the
Portuguese government and the European Commission (EC), the Group
is required to issue EUR1 billion of subordinated instruments to
private investors. DBRS sees the successful placement of the
subordinated instruments in the market as challenging given the
present global financial volatility and the very limited access
of CGD to the non- secured funding markets. The recent
resignation of the board of directors, is in DBRS's view posing
further challenges for the Group to return to profitability,
reduce asset quality problems and improve investor confidence in
the Group. Whilst DBRS understand that the government has
continued to support the Bank when needed, it sees as less likely
that such support will remain unconditional if the Group needed
to further reinforce its capital position in the medium term.

DBRS considers that CGD remains challenged to return to
sustainable profitability due to ongoing asset quality
deterioration and the challenging operating environment, which is
characterised by low interest rates, increasing regulation and
sluggish economic prospects for Portugal. This weakness continues
to lead to asset-quality issues and high loan-loss provisions.
CGD reported a net attributable loss of EUR189.3 million in 9M16,
compared to net attributable income of EUR3.4 million in 9M15.
The Group has remained loss making since 2012, largely as a
result of weakening domestic earnings generation and high loan
impairment charges due to asset quality deterioration. Gross
operating revenues (as calculated by DBRS and including revenues
for associated companies) were down 26.5% in 9M16 year-on-year
(YoY) and loan impairment charges totalled EUR407.4 million in
9M16, which were up 14.3% YoY. Asset quality deteriorated in 9M16
and the Credit at risk loans (CaR) ratio weakened to 12.2% at
end-September 2016 compared to 11.5% at end-2015.
DBRS notes that CGD's ratings continue to reflect its leading
banking franchise in Portugal, where the Group has solid market
shares of around 22% for loans and 29% for customer deposits, as
well as the Group's sound funding profile underpinned by a
resilient customer deposit base.

RATING DRIVERS

Positive rating pressure is unlikely in the short-to-medium term
given the review. It could require an upgrade of Portugal's
sovereign rating together with a sustained track record of sound
profitability, significant derisking of the balance sheet and
further strengthening of the Group's domestic franchise.

The ratings are Under Review with Negative Implications. During
the review period, which could last longer than 3 months, DBRS
will focus on the recapitalisation process, including the
placement of subordinated debt instruments to private investors,
as well as the corporate governance issues and asset quality and
profitability challenges.

Notes:

All figures are in EUR unless otherwise noted.

The principal applicable methodology is the Global Methodology
for Rating Banks and Banking Organisations (July 2016). Other
applicable methodologies include the DBRS Criteria: Support
Assessments for Banks and Banking Organisations (March 2016),
DBRS Criteria: Rating Bank Capital Securities - Subordinated,
Hybrid, Preferred & Contingent Capital Securities (February 2016)
and Critical Obligations Rating Criteria (February 2016), DBRS
Criteria: Guarantees and Other Forms of Support (February 2016).

The sources of information used for this rating include company
documents, SNL Financial and the Bank of Portugal. DBRS considers
the information available to it for the purposes of providing
this rating to be of satisfactory quality.

DBRS does not audit the information it receives in connection
with the rating process, and it does not and cannot independently
verify that information in every instance.

This rating is under review. Generally, the conditions that lead
to the assignment of reviews are resolved within a 90 day period.
DBRS reviews and ratings are under regular surveillance.

Ratings assigned by DBRS Ratings Limited are subject to EU
regulations only.


ENERGIAS DE PORTUGAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Positive
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+' long- and 'B' short-term
corporate credit rating on integrated utility EDP - Energias de
Portugal S.A.  The outlook remains positive.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+' issue rating on EDP's
senior unsecured debt.  The '3' recovery rating is unchanged,
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-70%, at
the higher end of the range) in the event of a payment default.

"Our decision to maintain the positive outlook reflects the
positive steps EDP has taken to improve its credit metrics, which
have partially mitigated the challenges it has faced in the
recent past," said S&P Global Ratings credit analyst Massimo
Schiavo.  "It further reflects management's intention to continue
to reduce debt in the next two years, notably through tariff
deficit securitizations and positive free cash flow generation,
which we expect will support a significant improvement in credit
metrics by 2018.  Absent unforeseen adverse operating conditions
and with the execution of the business plan, we could upgrade EDP
to 'BBB-' over the next year."

The ratings on EDP are supported by the company's strong business
risk profile, which benefits from the overwhelming contribution
to cash flows of EDP's networks, renewable activities, and long-
term contracted asset-based operations, which should represent
more than 75% of the consolidated EBITDA by 2018.

Regulated gas and electricity distribution operations in Spain
and Portugal (about 25% of EBITDA in 2015) benefit from
supportive regulatory environments.  In addition to its regulated
network activities, EDP benefits from good earnings visibility
stemming from its renewables business.  Through its 77.5% owned
subsidiary EDPR, EDP is the fourth largest wind operator
worldwide, with farms for energy generation principally in the
Iberian Peninsula and the United States. EPDR enjoys stable and
predictable cash flows stemming from long-term remuneration
frameworks, with limited exposure to volume and price
risk, and an average remaining contract life of more than 10
years.

EDP's position is also underpinned by its strong position in its
key markets, being the largest generator, distributor, and
supplier of electricity in Portugal, and the third largest
electricity generation companies and one of the largest gas
distribution companies in the Iberian Peninsula.

Factors mitigating these strengths include the uncertainty over
power prices and demand in the liberalized Iberian power market,
to which EDP will gradually increase its exposure until 2017
(from 10% of EBITDA in 2015 to 23% in 2018, according to S&P's
estimates), due to the expiration of Power Purchase Agreements
(PPAs) contracts.  This will be only partially moderated by the
final adjustment to the Costs with the Maintenance of Contractual
Equilibrium (CMEC) contracts to be paid in constant annual
payments until 2027.  Other threats include the political and
regulatory uncertainty in Brazil (about 20% of EBITDA in 2015)
and the accumulated tariff debt in Portugal, which S&P
expects to remain almost stable at around EUR1 billion until 2018
at EDP's level.

Through its 51% owned subsidiary EDP Brazil, EDP is the fifth
largest private operator in electricity generation in Brazil.  It
has two electricity distribution concessions (Bandeirante and
Escelsa) and is the fourth largest private supplier in the
liberalized market.  S&P expects a stabilization of the operating
environment in Brazil, with less volatile prices (in the range of
R$170-R$200/MWh) and the regulator starting to implement policies
to prevent the high cash volatility seen in the past due to hydro
conditions (GSF Insurance, agreed in December 2015).

S&P's assessment of EDP's financial risk profile as aggressive is
supported by EDP's cost discipline and solid operating
performance, as well as the group's low-cost, low-carbon-
intensive, diversified, and modern generation portfolio.  S&P
expects EDP to reduce its debt burden over 2016-2018 through
positive free cash flow on the back of declining capital
expenditures (capex) and the securitization of regulatory
receivables, which is non-recourse to EDP and is executed
at EDP's sole discretion.  The securitization of receivables has
allowed EDP to improve its reported net debt position by more
than EUR1 billion in the first nine months of 2016, but the
positive effect is partially offset by S&P's anticipation of a
related one-off tax expense of EUR350 million, which it expects
to be paid in 2017.  Going forward, S&P believes that further
securitization of regulatory receivables will be necessary for
the group to achieve its deleveraging targets.

Some ongoing financial support through asset disposals with China
Three Gorges (CTG), EDP's largest shareholder, is another
positive factor.

S&P also takes into account consistently high but stable
shareholder returns, and EDP's high debt burden coupled with
stretched credit metrics.  S&P benchmarks EDP's credit metrics
against the standard volatility table.

EDP's largest shareholder is CTG, which currently owns a 21.35%
stake, followed by Capital Group Companies, with a 14.99% stake.
The People's Republic of China owns CTG, which is the country's
largest clean energy group.  CTG has sound financials and
competitive access to long-term capital that benefited EDP,
notably in 2012.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- A gradual recovery in economic growth and therefore
      electricity consumption in Iberia, which could lower
      political pressure on affordability and facilitate tariff
      hikes to lower the outstanding EUR5.2 billion tariff debt
      in Portugal, as of September 2016.

   -- S&P expects Portugal's economic recovery will decelerate in
      2016, primarily due to a slowdown in exports and investment
      activity, which also reflects longstanding challenges to
      Portugal's banks.  In September 2016, S&P revised our
      forecast downward to 1.2% and 1.3% GDP growth in 2016 and
      2017 respectively.  In Spain S&P forecasts an average GDP
      growth rate of 2.1% over the next two years.

   -- The liberalized power market in Iberia remains structurally
      oversupplied, but market conditions are slightly improving
      with forward power prices in the range of EUR40-EUR45/MWh.
      On this point S&P highlights EDP's hedging strategy to
      hedge 70%-80% of the electricity volumes in Iberia over the
      next 12-18 months.  Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of
      4% by 2018 in EBITDA supported by capacity additions in
      EDPR renewables, the completion of hydro projects in
      Portugal and Brazil, and the consolidation of the 50% stake
      in Pecem (Brazil) and ENEOP (Portuguese renewable assets).

   -- EUR1 billion of securitization in 2017 and EUR500 million
      in 2018.  A stable income tax rate and the rollover until
      2019 of the EUR62 million extraordinary levy.

   -- Net capex down to EUR1.2 billion in 2016-2017 from about
      EUR1.7 billion in 2015.  This is net of about EUR0.8
      billion of asset rotation proceeds in 2016.

   -- The disposal of Italian and Polish wind assets to CTG for
      EUR363 million, concluded in October 2016.

   -- Dividend payout of EUR750 million.

   -- EUR750 million hybrid securities treated as intermediate
      equity content given EDP's management publicly stated
      intention to keep them in the capital structure also after
      the first call date.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
for the next three years (2016-2018):

   -- Adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of 14%-16%;
   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of 4.5x-5.5x; and
   -- Positive free cash flow after capex and dividends.

The short-term rating on EDP is 'B'.  S&P assess EDP's liquidity
as strong.  EDP's projected sources of funds exceed projected
uses by more than 1.5x over the coming 12 months and over 1.0x
over the coming 24 months.  Sources cover uses even if forecast
EBITDA were to decline by 30%. EDP has well-established and solid
relationships with banks, which have proven robust in recent
times of sovereign stress contagion and unpredictable market
access.

Principal liquidity sources as of Sept. 30, 2016, primarily
consist of:

   -- Unrestricted cash of EUR1.7 billion;
   -- About EUR3.8 billion in available committed lines maturing
      beyond 12 months;
   -- S&P's forecast of FFO of about EUR2.2 billion;
   -- Disposal proceeds of about EUR400 million; and
   -- Working capital inflow of about EUR650 million, taking into
      account the sales of tariff deficits.

Principal liquidity uses as of Sept. 30, 2016, include:

   -- Short-term debt of about EUR1.7 billion, including
      subsidiaries' short-term debt;
   -- S&P's estimate of EUR1.2 billion of committed net capex;
      and
   -- Dividend payments of about EUR850 million (including
      dividends to subsidiaries' minority shareholders).

The positive outlook on EDP reflects S&P's expectation that the
group's financial risk profile will continue to improve over the
next two years, notably the FFO to debt should increase from
about 12.5% at year-end 2016 (including the EUR350 million one-
off tax) towards 16% in 2018.  S&P anticipates that EDP's debt
will gradually decrease while its credit metrics will strengthen
over the next two years, thanks to additional asset sales, tariff
deficit securitizations, cuts in capital spending, and organic
growth, mainly from renewable operations.

S&P could upgrade EDP if it become more confident that it could
achieve and sustain adjusted FFO to debt of about 16%, and
assuming no unexpected material weakening of the regulatory,
fiscal, or economic environments in EDP's core markets, notably
Portugal and Brazil.  A one-notch downgrade of Portugal would not
prevent EDP from getting upgraded.

S&P would likely return the outlook to stable if EDP appeared
unable to reach adjusted FFO to debt of about 16% by the end of
2018. Material power price declines in Iberia, or an inability to
effectively securitize tariff deficit or to achieve its asset
rotation target in 2020 could prompt this, as could large,
unexpected and debt-financed acquisitions.  Downside to S&P's
forecasts could result from any additional unexpected market
disruption, or any regulatory or fiscal effects.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


B&N BANK: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B/B'
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long- and short-term counterparty
credit ratings on Russia-based B&N Bank (formerly MDM Bank) to
'B/B' from 'B-/C'.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P raised the Russia national scale rating on
B&N Bank to 'ruA-' from 'ruBBB'.

S&P has withdrawn its ratings on the entity previously named B&N
Bank, at the issuer's request, due to its merger into MDM Bank.

The upgrade follows the completion of the merger of B&N Bank into
MDM Bank and the simultaneous renaming of the combined entity as
B&N Bank.  Given the new B&N Bank's increased market share in
sector total assets (2.3%) and retail deposits (2.5%), S&P now
considers it to have moderate systemic importance for the Russian
banking sector.  S&P therefore believes it would likely receive
support, if required, from the Russian government, which S&P
classifies as supportive toward systemically important private-
sector commercial banks.  The counterparty credit rating is
therefore one notch above our assessment of the bank's stand-
alone credit profile, which S&P assess at 'b-'.

S&P's assessment of B&N Bank's business position remains
unchanged, balancing increased market share and still volatile
earnings as well as the potential risks the entity could face
while accomplishing full integration of the banks.  S&P thinks
that B&N Bank's development strategy is reasonable and expect the
management team to continue transforming the bank into a strong
player with a reliable long-term business model, efficiency
comparable with peers', and improved earnings capacity.

The merger had an overall positive effect for the combined bank's
capital position.  S&P anticipates that B&N Bank's risk-adjusted
capital (RAC) ratio will stay in the range of 4.7%-5.0% over the
next two years, if S&P takes into account a planned additional
capital injection of RUB10 billion (about $154 million) from the
owners and other capital support measures amounting to
RUB15 billion to be completed by year-end 2016.

S&P forecasts that credit costs are likely to reduce and then
stabilize at around 3.0% for the consolidated entity, due to the
expected reduction in nonperforming loans and a currently
sufficient level of loan loss provisions.  In S&P's view,
internal capital generation remains a constraint to the bank's
stand-alone credit quality while S&P expects earnings buffers to
be marginally positive (within 20 basis points), suggesting some
ability to cover normalized losses and therefore to support
internal capitalization capacity.

S&P's assessment of B&N Bank's risk position factors in the risks
related to the bank's quite aggressive expansion over recent
years, its substantial exposure to the problematic ROST Bank, as
well as its asset quality, which is average for the system.
Exposure to ROST Bank remains one of the key risks for B&N Bank,
in S&P's view.  S&P estimates this exposure at RUB466 billion, or
5x total adjusted capital (TAC) as of mid-2016.  B&N Bank remains
directly exposed to the risks of ROST Bank through an interbank
loan.  Further evolution of this exposure will depend on the
performance of Rost Bank's loan portfolio, which is expected
(under the current financial rehabilitation plan to be approved
by Central Bank of Russia and Deposit Insurance Agency) to start
principal repayments after 2020.  S&P believes that it has
adequately captured this exposure in our risk position assessment
of moderate.

The bank's average funding and adequate liquidity reflects its
predominantly deposit-based funding, and an adequate share of
liquid assets.  Customer deposits amounted to about 73% of the
bank's consolidated total liabilities as of mid-2016, with a
major part of that (81%) coming from retail customers, supporting
good single-name diversification (with the top-20 deposits
accounting for less than 10% of total deposits at mid-2016).

The stable outlook reflects S&P's belief that, following the
merger with MDM Bank, the newly enlarged B&N Bank will maintain
its franchise and financial profile, supported by its improving
capitalization and profitability, despite the continuing economic
slowdown in Russia and ongoing integration process.
Nevertheless, S&P acknowledges that the integration process
continues and the bank still needs to demonstrate that the merger
will result in the creation of a sustainably stronger entity than
either of the two entities individually.

S&P could take a negative rating action if the bank's loss-
absorption capacity materially weakens over the next 12 months
due to faster-than-expected balance sheet growth, creation of
significant additional provisions, or other one-off items that
could negatively affect profitability and capitalization, as
indicated by our RAC ratio falling close to or below 3%.

S&P considers ratings upside to be limited this stage and would
depend on: the bank's ability to show that the business model of
the merged entity is stable and sustainable; the absence of
additional integration risks; and generation of positive net
income while maintaining capitalization with significant buffers.


EUROPLAN JSC: Fitch Ratings Unaffected by Planned Reorganization
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says the recent announcement by Russian leasing
company Europlan JSC (BB-/Stable) of its planned reorganisation
has no immediate impact on the company's ratings.

In the first stage of the reorganisation, Europlan will become
the owner of the other non-banking financial assets of its main
shareholder, the Safmar holding (formally known as B&N group).
Safmar will contribute its 49% stake in VSK Insurance (BB-
/Stable) and a 100% stake in Safmar pension fund to Europlan as
new equity, and management expects Europlan to attract RUB15bn of
equity in cash via a secondary public offering.

In the second stage of the reorganisation, Europlan will transfer
its leasing business to a new subsidiary (new leaseco). Fitch
expects all the financial liabilities of Europlan and all of its
leasing assets (but not necessarily all of its cash and liquid
assets) to be transferred to the new leaseco. Management expects
the reorganisation to be completed by mid-2017.

Fitch is of the opinion that the credit profile of the new
leaseco, to which Europlan's current creditors will become
exposed, should not be materially different to the current credit
profile of Europlan.

Europlan's 'BB-' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) and
senior debt rating reflect the company's significant franchise in
the Russian auto leasing sector, so far conservative management
and risk appetite, and sound financial metrics. Performance
remained strong in 9M16 amid flattish business volumes.

At the same time, the ratings also reflect the high-risk Russian
operating environment and contagion risks resulting from the
recent acquisition of Europlan by the B&N group. In May 2016,
Fitch downgraded Europlan by one notch to 'BB-' to reflect these
contagion risks.

While Fitch's base case expectation is that the reorganisation
will be neutral for Europlan's creditors, moderate risks exist in
relation to the leverage of the new leaseco. Fitch understands
from management that they have not yet decided what proportion of
Europlan's liquid assets will be transferred to the new leaseco.
Given this, and also some execution risk relating to the planned
cash equity injection, Fitch is not able to forecast the leverage
of the new leaseco. At end-3Q16, Europlan's debt/equity ratio was
a strong 1.5x (equity adjusted down for a RUB631m receivable from
the shareholder).

Management has informed Fitch that they view a debt/equity ratio
of around 4x as comfortable, and Fitch would view such leverage
as still being consistent with the 'BB-' rating, providing there
are no other material negative changes to the credit profile.
However, a leverage ratio closer to 6x, which the company has
covenanted in some of its bilateral debt agreements, could put
downward pressure on ratings.

Repayment of part of Europlan's existing debt is possible if this
is accelerated as a result of the reorganisation, although Fitch
views it as unlikely that debt acceleration, if any, will put
significant pressure on the company's liquidity. This is due to
the likely strong coverage of the bank's third-part liabilities
by liquid assets at the time of the second stage of the
reorganisation.

At end-3Q16, Europlan held RUB5.5bn of liquid assets, and these
could increase by a further RUB15bn as a result of the equity
injection. Against this, the company had RUB21bn of liabilities
at end-3Q16, of which approximately RUB5bn were bonds held by
Safmar's pension funds and RUB16bn was owed to third parties.
Regarding the latter, Fitch understands from management that the
company has already reached provisional agreement with some bank
creditors on non-acceleration (i.e. transfer to the new leaseco)
of debt.


=========
S P A I N
=========


IBEREOLICA: Declared Voluntary Bankruptcy Proceedings for 7 Units
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews, citing announcements in the Official Gazette, reports
that Spanish renewables group Ibereolica declared voluntary
bankruptcy proceedings for seven out of its 11 solar thermal
power subsidiaries.

According to SeeNews, the process concerns Ibereolica Solar,
Ibereolica Solar Badajoz 2, Ibereolica Solar Medellin, Ibereolica
Solar Santa Amalia, Ibereolica Solar Puebla 1, Ibereolica Solar
Puebla 2 and Planta Termosolar Valdetorres.  Their outstanding
debts should be known within a month, SeeNews notes.

Rousaud Costas Duran SLP serves as administrator, SeeNews
discloses.


IM GRUPO VII: DBRS Assigns Prov. CC Rating to Series B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned provisional ratings to the
following notes issued by IM Grupo Banco Popular Empresas VII, FT
(the Issuer):

   -- EUR1,825 million Series A Notes, rated A (high) (sf) (the
      Series A Notes)

   -- EUR675 million Series B Notes, rated CC (sf) (the Series B
      Notes; together, the Notes).

The transaction is a cash flow securitisation collateralised by a
portfolio of term loans originated by Banco Popular Espa§ol, S.A.
(Banco Popular or the Originator) and Banco Pastor, S.A.U (Banco
Pastor or the Originator and with Banco Popular, the Originators)
to small and medium-sized enterprises and self-employed
individuals based in Spain. Banco Pastor is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Grupo Banco Popular. As of 15 October 2016, the
transaction's provisional portfolio included 33,600 loans to
27,153 obligor groups, totalling EUR 2,979 million.

At closing, the Originator will select the initial portfolio of
EUR 2,500 million from the provisional pool.

The transaction has a two-year revolving period, during which
Banco Popular and Banco Pastor have the option to sell new loans
at par to the Issuer as long as the eligibility criteria is
complied with. The revolving period will end prematurely after
the occurrence of certain events (Replenishment Termination
Events), including the cumulative default rate or cumulative
delinquency rate exceeding 5.0% and 5.0% of the initial portfolio
balance, respectively.

The rating on the Series A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
Final Date. The Final Date is defined as the next Payment Date
after 42 months of the maturity of the last loan. The rating on
the Series B Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest and
the ultimate payment of principal on or before the Final Date.

Interest and principal payments on the Notes will be made
quarterly on the 22nd of March, June, September and December,
with the first interest payment date on 22 March 2017. The Notes
will pay an interest rate equal to three-month Euribor, plus a
0.40% margin and 0.50% for Series A and Series B, respectively.


These ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following items:

   -- The Eligibility Criteria, based on which DBRS has created a
      worst-case portfolio.

   -- The fixed loans of the portfolio could increase up to 50.0%
      of the total portfolio, in this case and in a scenario in
      which interest rates go up, the transaction could incur in
      a significant interest rate risk.

   -- The transaction structure, the form and sufficiency of
      available credit enhancement and the portfolio
      characteristics.

   -- At closing, the Series A Notes benefit from a total credit
      enhancement of 31.0% that DBRS considers to be sufficient
      to support the A (high) (sf) rating. The Series B Notes
      benefit from a credit enhancement of 4.0% that DBRS
      considers to be sufficient to support the CC (sf) rating.
      Credit enhancement is provided by subordination and the
      Reserve Fund.

   -- The Reserve Fund is non-amortising for the life of the
      transaction. The Reserve Fund has a balance of EUR 100.0
      million, 4.0% of the aggregate balance of the Notes, and is
      available to cover shortfalls in the senior expenses and
      interest in the Series A Notes and once the Series A Notes
      are fully paid, interest on Series B throughout the life of
      the Notes. The Reserve Fund will only be available as a
      credit support for the Notes at the Final Date.

   -- DBRS considers that there are inadequate mitigants to the
      commingling risk. To address this risk, DBRS analysis
      includes a stress equivalent to the interruption of
      interest and principal proceeds for a period of six months
      by assuming senior expenses and interest on the Series A
      Notes would be paid from the Reserve Fund for this period.

DBRS determined these ratings as follows, as per the principal
methodology specified below:

   -- The probability of default for the portfolio was determined
      using the historical performance information supplied in
      2015, instead of the historical data sent for this
      transaction. The most recent historical performance dataset
      would have suggested a significant improvement to
      historical performance that is, in DBRS's view, not
      expected nor consistent with the historical information we
      received for previous Banco Popular transactions. DBRS
      assumed an annualised probability of default (PD) of 2.56%
      for this portfolio.

   -- The assumed weighted-average life (WAL) of the portfolio
      was 5.23 years based on the maximum allowed under the
      replenishment criteria, three years, plus two years of
      revolving period and permitted variations along the life of
      the transaction.

   -- The PD and WAL were used in the DBRS Diversity Model to
      generate the hurdle rate for the target ratings.

   -- DBRS applied the following recovery rates: 16.3% for the
      Series A Notes and 21.5% for Series B Notes as the
      portfolio is composed exclusively by senior unsecured
      loans.

   -- The break-even rates for the interest rate stresses and
      default timings were determined using the DBRS cash flow
      model.

Notes:

All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.

The principal methodology applicable is Rating CLOs Backed by
Loans to European SMEs. DBRS has applied the principal
methodology consistently and conducted a review of the
transaction in accordance with the principal methodology.

Other methodologies and criteria referenced in this transaction
are listed at the end of this press release.

The sources of information used for these ratings include the
parties involved in the ratings, including but not limited to the
Originators, Banco Popular Espa§ol, S.A. and Banco Pastor,
S.A.U., the Issuer and InterMoney Titulizacion, S.G.F.T., S.A.

DBRS does not rely upon third-party due diligence in order to
conduct its analysis; DBRS was supplied with third party
assessments. However, this did not impact the rating analysis.

DBRS determined key inputs used in its analysis based on
historical performance data provided for the Originators and
Servicers as well as analysis of the current economic
environment. DBRS considers the information available to it for
the purposes of providing this rating was of satisfactory
quality.

DBRS does not audit the information it receives in connection
with the rating process, and it does not and cannot independently
verify that information in every instance.

These ratings concern newly issued financial instruments.

To assess the impact a change of the transaction parameters would
have on the ratings, DBRS considered the following stress
scenarios as compared with the parameters used to determine the
rating (the Base Case):

   -- Probability of Default Rates Used: Base Case PD of 2.56%, a
      10% increase of the Base Case and a 20% increase of the
      Base Case PD.

   -- Recovery Rates Used: Base Case Recovery Rates of 16.3% at
      the A (high) (sf) stress level for the Class A Notes, a 10%
      and 20% decrease in the Base Case Recovery Rates.

DBRS concludes that a hypothetical increase of the Base Case PD
by 20% would lead to a downgrade of the Series A Notes to A (low)
(sf), and a hypothetical decrease of the recovery rate by 20%
would lead to a downgrade of the Series A Notes to A (low) (sf).
A scenario combining both an increase in the Base Case PD by 10%
and a decrease in the Base Case Recovery Rate by 10% would lead
to a downgrade of the Series A Notes to A (low) (sf).

Regarding the Series B Notes, the rating would not be affected by
any hypothetical change in neither PD nor Recovery Rate.

It should be noted that the interest rates and other parameters
that would normally vary with the rating level, including the
recovery rates, were allowed to change as per the DBRS
methodologies and criteria.

Ratings assigned by DBRS Ratings Limited are subject to EU
regulations only.

RATINGS

Issuer              Debt Rated        Rating Action      Rating
------              ----------        -------------      ------
IM Grupo Banco     Series A Notes   Provis.-New
A(high)(sf)
Popular Empresas
VII, FT

IM Grupo Banco     Series B Notes   Provis.-New       CC(sf)
Popular Empresas
VII, FT


IM SABADELL PYME 10: DBRS Assigns CCC Rating to Series B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited released a report on IM Sabadell PYME 10, FT
that provides further detail on the recent finalisation of the
provisional ratings.

RATINGS

Issuer            Debt Rating         Rating Action      Rating
------            -----------         -------------      ------
IM Sabadell       Series A Notes      Provis.-Final      AA(sf)
PYME 10, FT

IM Sabadell       Series B Notes      Provis.-Final  CCC(low)(sf)
PYME 10, FT


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


GATEGROUP HOLDING: S&P Maintains 'BB-' CCR on CreditWatch Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings maintained its 'BB-' long-term corporate
credit rating on Switzerland-based airline solutions provider
gategroup Holding AG on CreditWatch with negative implications.
S&P originally placed the rating on CreditWatch negative on April
20, 2016.

The CreditWatch placement indicates that S&P would likely
downgrade gategroup to 'B+' upon completion of its acquisition by
China-based HNA Group.  The CreditWatch reflects S&P's view that
HNA Group's ownership and influence may result in a more
aggressive financial policy at gategroup and lead to potential
negative intervention by the parent during times of financial
stress.

Furthermore, S&P would apply its group rating methodology for
gategroup after HNA Group acquires it.  Under S&P's group
methodology, it generally do not rate a subsidiary higher than
the group credit profile (GCP), even if the stand-alone credit
profile of the subsidiary is higher than the GCP (HNA's GCP is
'b+' whereas gategroup's SACP is 'bb-').  This is mainly because
in S&P's view the weaker parent could divert assets from the
subsidiary or burden it with liabilities in periods of financial
stress, and the subsidiary could have much less debt- and
capital-raising flexibility.  In addition, S&P thinks that in
some jurisdictions a bankruptcy petition by the parent could
include the subsidiary regardless of its stand-alone credit
strength.

S&P has completed a review of HNA Group, gategroup's likely 100%
owner.  S&P assess the creditworthiness of the combined
diversified but highly leveraged HNA Group to be commensurate
with a 'b+' GCP.  Following a number of acquisitions in recent
years, HNA Group is a large Chinese conglomerate operating in the
aviation, infrastructure, real estate, financial services,
tourism, and logistics sectors.  In S&P's view, the group
benefits from broad scale and diversification of operations.
However, S&P views the group's financial policy as aggressive
based on its acquisition strategy and high leverage.

"Under our base case, we expect gategroup will benefit from its
recent acquisitions like Inflight Services Group (IFS), as well
as high growth in emerging markets, where margins are wider than
in mature markets, as well as from its cost-cutting program.
This, together with a reduced cash interest bill, should enable
the company to improve its FFO to debt ratio to about 25% until
the year end, which is a material improvement compare to 13% at
the end of last year.  Under our base-case scenario, we forecast
that gategroup will generate significant free operating cash flow
in 2016 and 2017 -- supported by its low maintenance capital
expenditure (capex) needs," S&P said.

In S&P's base case for gategroup, S&P assumes:

   -- Revenue growth of 12%-15% in 2016, largely driven by the
      full year impact of the IFS acquisition and good organic
      growth.  For 2017 S&P assumes low to mid-single-digits
      revenue growth.  Reported EBITDA margin to improve to about
      6% in 2016 and 2017, on the back of direct cost savings,
      synergies from IFS, and a stricter contract renewal
      process.

   -- Capex of around Swiss franc (CHF) 60 million
      (EUR55 million).  Significant free operating cash flow in
      2016 and 2017, supported by low maintenance capex needs.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
in 2016 and 2017:

   -- Adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt about 25%, up
      from about 13% in 2015.

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of 3.0x-3.2x, down from about 4.4x
      in 2015.

S&P continues to assess gategroup's liquidity as strong.  This
reflects S&P's view that the company's liquidity sources will
exceed its funding needs by more than 1.5x for the 12 months to
Sept. 30, 2017, and above 1.0x for the subsequent 12 months.

S&P forecasts total sources of liquidity in the 12 months to
Sept. 30, 2017, will include:

   -- Unrestricted cash and cash equivalents of about
      CHF125 million;
   -- S&P's forecast of unadjusted FFO of CHF130 million-
      CHF150 million; and
   -- Availability of about CHF135 million under a five-year
      multi-currency revolving credit facility (RCF) of
      EUR350 million.

S&P assess uses of liquidity for the same period comprising:

   -- About CHF8 million of short-term debt;
   -- About CHF60 million of capex; and
   -- Approximately CHF30 million in working capital outflow.

The CreditWatch placement reflects the likelihood that S&P will
lower its rating on gategroup to 'B+' from 'BB-', if the HNA
Group transaction closes as expected.  S&P understands that the
transaction is currently expected to close by the end of the
year.

By the time of the transaction's completion, S&P will seek to
gain further information regarding HNA Group's influence,
strategy, and financial policy for gategroup, and consider the
potential implications for the company under its new group
status.

In the unlikely event that the transaction does not close, S&P
would likely affirm its ratings on gategroup, with a positive
outlook, all other things being equal.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


DECO 11: Fitch Cuts Class A1-B Notes Rating to 'CCCsf'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded DECO 11 - UK Conduit 3 plc's class
A1 floating rate notes due 2020 and affirmed the others as
follows:

   -- GBP54.6m class A1-A (XS0279810468) downgraded to 'Bsf' from
      'Asf'; Outlook Stable

   -- GBP70.7m class A1-B (XS0279812597) downgraded to 'CCCsf'
      from 'B-sf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) 100%

   -- GBP43.2m class A2 (XS0279814452) affirmed at 'CCsf'';
      Recovery RE 10%

   -- GBP26.2m class B (XS0279815426) affirmed at 'Csf'; RE 0%

   -- GBP36.1m class C (XS0279816580) affirmed at 'Csf'; RE0%

   -- GBP28.2m class D (XS0279817398) affirmed at 'Csf'; RE0%

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrades reflect the increased risk of the issuer
defaulting at legal final maturity (LFM, January 2020) as a
result of a restructuring of the largest loan (the GBP216.4m
Mapeley III). The restructuring incentivises capital expenditure
on some of the 24 properties, with the sponsor and the issuer set
to share any upside above GBP143m (equating to the current
valuation of GBP123m plus a GBP10m premium from capex and a
GBP10m equity injection used to fund initial capex). The first
GBP133m, after senior costs, is owed to the issuer only.

All of the notes are dependent on Mapeley III repaying principal.
Fitch does not view the restructuring as negative for the
eventual recovery prospects for the issuer, as indicated by
affirmations of the class A2, B, C and D notes,. However, the
accompanying loan "standstill", which could last until four
months before LFM (or even later), limits the power of the
special servicer to enforce loan security.

Solutus Advisors took over from Hatfield Phillips International
in the same noteholder action that approved the restructuring,
with its affiliate, First Investments, appointed as asset manager
responsible for execution of the sponsor's business plan. There
is no surety that executing the business plan will be aligned
with the interests of any particular class of notes.

With the restructuring compressing the tail period, the class A1-
A notes are no longer rated investment grade. Unless the asset
manager chooses to liquidate collateral during the standstill,
rather than reinvesting proceeds as capex, both A1 classes will
have little margin from a timing perspective, with the class A1-B
so reliant on Mapeley III collateral value being returned to the
issuer more or less intact that it has fallen into the distressed
category.

The transaction was originally the securitisation of 17
commercial mortgages originated by Deutsche Bank AG (A-/RWN). The
loans were secured on 56 properties located across the UK. As of
October 2016, four loans remained, all in special servicing with
Solutus Advisors/Hatfield Philips International. All principal
proceeds are allocated to the notes sequentially as the loan
defaults and loss allocations to the junior (non-rated) notes
breached various triggers.

There are three smaller loans remaining in the transaction -
GBP37.1m Wildmoor Northpoint Ltd, GBP7.4m CPI Retail Active
Management and GBP1.4m Investco Estates Limited. All three are in
default at varying stages of workout, and largely unchanged since
our last rating action. Fitch expects losses on each loan. The
senior notes cannot be repaid in full without significant
principal from Mapeley III.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A speedy execution of the business plan for Mapeley III may
restore sufficient tail period to allow either or both the A1
note classes to be upgraded.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis.

   -- Loan-by-loan data provided by Solutus Advisors as at
      September 2016

   -- Investor reporting provided by Situs Asset Management as at
      July 2016

   -- Cash manager reporting provided by Deutsche Bank AG as at
      October 2016


HILLZONE PRODUCTS: Director Faces Boardroom Ban After Collapse
--------------------------------------------------------------
Margaret Canning at Belfast Telegraph reports that Brian Quinn,
the boss of a Co Tyrone company that formerly traded as Rocwell
Mineral Water has been disqualified from working as a director
after the business went bust owing nearly GBP500,000.

According to Belfast Telegraph, Mr. Quinn (62), from Limehill
Road in Pomeroy, accepted a boardroom ban of five years from the
Department for the Economy over his conduct at the helm of
Hillzone Products Ltd., which also made water coolers.

The firm, which was set up in 2010, had assets of GBP16,000 when
it went into liquidation in 2014, Belfast Telegraph recounts.  It
owed preferential creditors nearly GBP9,000, and unsecured
creditors almost GBP503,800, Belfast Telegraph relays.  With
assets taken into account, it had debts of just under GBP500,000,
Belfast Telegraph discloses.

The business traded as Rocwell Natural Mineral Water Ltd. until
2013, when it changed its name to Hillzone, Belfast Telegraph
notes.


Q HOLDING: Moody's Retains B3 CFR on New $113MM Loan Add-On
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service said that Q Holding Company's proposed
$113 million add-on to its $173 million term loan due 2021 is
credit negative because it increases debt and leverage.
Nevertheless, the transaction does not impact the company's
ratings including its B3 Corporate Family Rating, Caa1-PD
Probability of Default Rating, B3 rating on its senior secured
credit facilities, or stable rating outlook.

The principal methodology used in this rating/analysis was Global
Manufacturing Companies published in July 2014.

Q Holding Company, headquartered in Twinsburg, Ohio, is a global
manufacturer of precision-molded rubber and silicone components.
Pro-forma for Degania acquisition, Q will serve medical devices
(approximately 50% of revenue), automotive (approximately 35%)
and industrial markets.  It is owned by private equity funds
affiliated with 3i Group plc, a global private equity and venture
capital company headquartered in London, United Kingdom.


* UK: New Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 Comes Into Force
---------------------------------------------------------
Accountant in Bankruptcy (AiB) disclosed that Scottish laws on
insolvency have been brought together for the first time in a
generation as the new Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 came into
force on Nov. 30.

The Act captures all of the amendments made to the primary
legislation governing bankruptcy in Scotland, the Bankruptcy
(Scotland) Act 1985, including the wide-ranging reforms
introduced in April 2015 through the Bankruptcy and Debt Advice
(Scotland) Act 2014.  The existing Bankruptcy Regulations have
also been updated and consolidated and will come into force along
with the new Act.

Policy officials from Accountant in Bankruptcy worked with the
Scottish Law Commission, which published a consultation paper on
consolidating bankruptcy legislation in 2011 and led the process
of drafting the Bill.

By consolidating all of the various elements of legislation in
one place, the aim of the new Act is to make the complex area of
bankruptcy more accessible for insolvency professionals, money
advisers and those experiencing financial difficulties.

The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act is only the second ever
consolidation of primary legislation considered by the Scottish
Parliament, following the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries
(Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 2003.

Welcoming the new legislation, Minister for Business, Innovation
and Energy Paul Wheelhouse said: "Much has changed in the 30
years since the existing bankruptcy Act was introduced and there
is no doubt it has become somewhat impenetrable.

"This valuable work to clean up the statute book will make the
legislation much easier to use and understand and has created the
platform upon which debt solutions appropriate for the challenges
we face today can be delivered.

"There has been a comprehensive programme of consultation -- and
I thank all those who fed their views to us -- and it is
tremendously pleasing to see this activity bearing fruit with the
legislation coming into force [Wednes]day."

The consolidation of the legislation has also been warmly
received by the money advice and insolvency industry.

David Menzies, Director of Insolvency with chartered accountancy
professional body ICAS said: "The introduction of the Bankruptcy
(Scotland) Act 2016 and supporting Regulations will be of
significant benefit to insolvency practitioners and others who
access the legislation on a regular basis.

"The collaborative approach adopted by the Scottish Government,
the Accountant in Bankruptcy and the profession through ICAS and
other bodies to deliver the consolidated legislation reflects the
desire of all to ensure there is an accessible and suitable
framework for the people of Scotland to deal with debt problems.

"The commencement of the new legislation is not the end of that
process, but is the beginning of a fresh phase building on
reinforced foundations."

Eileen Blackburn, chair of insolvency trade body R3 in Scotland's
Technical Committee, added: "The much-anticipated Bankruptcy
(Scotland) Act 2016 is the culmination of a process of
modernisation of personal insolvency in Scotland which has been
ongoing since 2009.

"It provides a cohesive and user-friendly piece of legislation,
fit-for-purpose for the 21st century."

Accountant in Bankruptcy (AiB) -- http://www.aib.gov.uk-- is an
Executive Agency of the Scottish Government with responsibility
for administering the process of personal bankruptcy,
administering the Debt Arrangement Scheme and recording corporate
insolvencies in Scotland.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: The Money Wars
-----------------------------
Author: Roy C. Smith
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 370 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by David Henderson
Get your own personal today at
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1893122697/internetbankrup
t

Business is war by civilized means. It won't get you a tailhook
landing on an n aircraft carrier docked in San Diego, but the
spoils of war can be glorious to behold.

Most executives do not approach business this way. They are
content to nudge along their behemoths, cash their options, and
pillage their workers. This author calls those managers "inertia
ridden." He quotes Carl Icahn describing their companies as run
by "gross and widespread incompetent management."

In cycles though, the U.S. economy generates a few business
warriors with the drive, or hubris, to treat the market as a
battlefield. The 1980s saw the last great spectacle of business
titans clashing. (The '90s, by contrast, was an era of the
investment banks waging war on the gullible.) The Money Wars is
the story of the last great buyout boom. Between 1982 and 1988,
more than ten thousand transactions were completed within the
U.S. alone, aggregating more than $1 trillion of capitalization.
Roy Smith has written a breezy read, traversing the reader
through an important piece of U.S. history, not just business
history. Two thirds of the way through the book, after covering
early twentieth century business history, the growth of financial
engineering after WWII, the conglomerate era, the RJR-Nabisco
story, and the financial machinations of KKR, we finally meet the
star of the show, Michael Milken. The picture painted by the
author leads the reader to observe that, every now and then, an
individual comes along at the right time and place in history who
knows exactly where he or she is in that history, and leaves a
world-historical footprint as a result. Whatever one may think of
Milken's ethics or his priorities, the reader will conclude that
he is the greatest financial genius this country has produced
since J.P. Morgan.

No high-flying financial era has ever happened in this country
without the frothy market attracting common criminals, or in some
cases making criminals out of weak, but previously honest men
(and it always seems to be men). Something there is about
testosterone and money. With so many deals being done, insider
trading was inevitable. Was Michael Milken guilty of insider
trading? Probably, but in all likelihood, everybody who attended
his lavish parties, called "Predators' Balls," shared the same
information.

Why did the Justice Department go after Milken and his firm,
Drexel Burnham Lambert with such raw enthusiasm? That history has
not yet been written, but Drexel had created a lot of envy and
enemies on the Street. When a better history of the period is
written, it will be a study in the confluence of forces that made
Michael Milken's genius possible: the sclerotic management of
irrational conglomerates, a ready market for the junk bonds
Milken was selling, and a few malcontent capitalist like Carl
Icahn and Ted Turner, who were ready and able to wage their own
financial warfare. This book is a must read for any student of
business who did not live through any of these fascination
financial eras. Roy C. Smith is a professor of entrepreneurship,
finance and international business at NYU, and teaches on the
faculty there of the Stern School of Business. Prior to 1987, he
was a partner at Goldman Sachs. He received a B.S. from the Naval
Academy in 1960 and an M.B.A. from Harvard in 1966.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *