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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Tuesday, December 6, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 241


                            Headlines


G E R M A N Y

MEINL BANK: Fitch Withdraws 'B-' LT IDR for Commercial Reasons


G R E E C E

GREECE: Nears Agreement with Creditors on Second Bailout Review


I R E L A N D

EUROPEAN RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class C Notes


I T A L Y

MONTE DEI PASCHI: Bankers Seek to Secure EUR5BB Recapitalization


N E T H E R L A N D S

CNH INDUSTRIAL: DBRS Confirms BB Issuer Rating
DRYDEN 48 EURO: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes


P O L A N D

MENNICA METALE: Applies for Opening of Rehabilitation Proceedings
ROOF POLAND 2014 DAC: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class B Notes


P O R T U G A L

PELICAN MORTGAGES 4: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Debt


S P A I N

BANCO SABADELL: Moody's Hikes Subordinated Debt Rating to Ba3
FT SANTANDER 2016-2: Moody's Rates Class E Notes (P)Ba1 (sf)
FT SANTANDER CONSUMO 2: Moody's Rates Class F Notes (P)B3 (sf)
FT SANTANDER CONSUMO 2: DBRS Assigns CCC Prov. Rating to F Notes
GRUPO ISOLUX: In Talks with Ferrovial Over Brazil Projects

IM GRUPO VII: Moody's Assigns Caa2 Rating to Class B Notes


S W E D E N

VERISURE MIDHOLDING: Moody's Affirms B2 Corporate Family Rating


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

FOUR SEASONS: More Homes to Close Following Debt Woes
ROYAL BANK: Settles Shareholder Suit Over 2008 Rescue Fundraising
TIG FINCO: Moody's Affirms B3 Corporate Family Rating
UMV GLOBAL: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Rating to B1


                            *********



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G E R M A N Y
=============


MEINL BANK: Fitch Withdraws 'B-' LT IDR for Commercial Reasons
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Meinl Bank AG's ratings.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch has withdrawn the ratings for commercial reasons.
Therefore, Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical
coverage for Meinl Bank AG.  The ratings have been withdrawn
without prior rating action because the bank has ceased to
participate in the rating process and Fitch has insufficient
information to assess its creditworthiness.

Fitch's last full review of Meinl Bank AG's ratings was on 5
February 2016, when Fitch affirmed the bank's Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'B-' and Viability Rating at 'b-' and
removed them from Rating Watch Negative.

The rating actions are:

  Long-Term IDR: 'B-'/Stable withdrawn
  Short-Term IDR: 'B' withdrawn
  Viability Rating: 'b-' withdrawn
  Support Rating: '5' withdrawn
  Support Rating Floor: 'No Floor' withdrawn


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G R E E C E
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GREECE: Nears Agreement with Creditors on Second Bailout Review
---------------------------------------------------------------
According to Greek Reporter's Philip Chrysopoulos, Prime Minister
Alexis Tsipras and European Commissioner for Economic and
Monetary Affairs Pierre Moscovici on Nov. 28 agreed Greece and
creditors are close to an agreement on the second bailout program
review.

Regarding the negotiations on the bailout review amidst the
refugee crisis and tensions in the region, Mr. Tsipras, as cited
by Greek Reporter, said, "This is why I believe it is now more
crucial than ever to take courageous decisions for all sides.  We
have already shown our will and now we expect our partners to do
the same."

"We are no longer talking about a Grexit.  We want a success
story for Greece, the Eurozone and Europe as a whole . . . We
have already achieved impressive results and now it is the right
time to make the necessary efforts to ensure that Greece will
recover rapidly," Greek Reporter quotes Mr. Tsipras as saying.

On his part Mr. Moscovici said talks on Greek debt must start,
noting that an important milestone will be the Eurogroup on
December 5, which should open the road to a comprehensive
solution, which would be good for both Greece and the euro zone,
Greek Reporter relates.

"I think we are very close to an agreement.  We had a very
successful first program review and the second is underway,"
Mr. Moscovici, as cited by Greek Reporter, said, adding that
Greece should implement the required reforms.

The EU Commissioner said the Eurogroup on December 5 is crucial,
but warned debt talks will not conclude in one meeting, Greek
Reporter notes.  Instead, they will open the way for a
comprehensive solution in the interests of Greece and the euro
zone, according to Greek Reporter.


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I R E L A N D
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EUROPEAN RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Class C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned credit ratings to the
following notes issued by European Residential Loan
Securitisation 2016-1 DAC:

   -- EUR272,300,000 Class A Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
      due January 2059, Definitive Rating Assigned A2(sf)

   -- EUR12,300,000 Class B Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
      due January 2059, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3(sf)

   -- EUR12,300,000 Class C Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
      due January 2059, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3(sf)

Moody's has not assigned ratings to EUR40,000,000 Class P and EUR
199,600,000 Class D Mortgage Backed Notes due January 2059.

This transaction represents the first securitisation transaction
that Moody's rates in Ireland that is partially backed by non-
performing loans ("NPL"). The assets supporting the notes are
performing loans ("PLs") and NPLs extended primarily to borrowers
in Ireland. Moody's assigned provisional ratings to these notes
on November 28, 2016.

The portfolio is serviced by Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland)
DAC ("Pepper"; NR). The servicing activities performed by Pepper
are monitored by the servicing consultant, Hudson Advisors
Ireland DAC ("Hudson"; NR). Hudson has also been appointed as
back-up servicer facilitator in place to assist the issuer to
find a substitute servicer in case the servicing agreement with
Pepper is terminated.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings reflect an analysis of the characteristics of the
underlying pool of the PLs and NPLs, sector-wide and servicer-
specific performance data, protection provided by credit
enhancement, the roles of external counterparties, and the
structural integrity of the transaction.

In order to estimate the cash flows generated by the pool Moody's
has split the pool into PLs and NPLs.

In analysing the PLs, Moody's determined the MILAN Credit
Enhancement (CE) of 33% and the portfolio Expected Loss (EL) of
13.0%. The MILAN CE and portfolio EL are key input parameters for
Moody's cash flow model in assessing the cash flows for the PLs.

MILAN CE of 33.0%: this is above the average for other Irish RMBS
transactions and follows Moody's assessment of the loan-by-loan
information taking into account the historical performance and
the pool composition including (i) the high weighted average
current loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 91.0% and indexed LTV of
103.9% of the total pool and (ii) the inclusion of restructured
loans.

Portfolio expected loss of 13%This is above the average for other
Irish RMBS transactions and is based on Moody's assessment of the
lifetime loss expectation for the pool taking into account (i)
the historical collateral performance of the loans to date, as
provided by the seller; (ii) the current macroeconomic
environment in Ireland and (iii) benchmarking with similar Irish
RMBS transactions.

In order to estimate the cash flows generated by the NPLs,
Moody's used a Monte Carlo based simulation that generates for
each property backing a loan an estimate of the property value at
the sale date based on the timing of collections.

The key drivers for the estimates of the collections and their
timing are: (i) the historical data received from the servicer;
(ii) the timings of collections for the secured loans based on
the legal stage a loan is located at; (iii) the current and
projected house values at the time of default and (iv) the
servicer's strategies and capabilities in maximising the
recoveries on the loans and in foreclosing on properties.

Hedging: As the collections from the pool are not directly
connected to a floating interest rate, a higher index payable on
the notes would not be offset with higher collections from the
NPLs. The transaction therefore benefits from an interest rate
cap, linked to one-month EURIBOR, with HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (Aa3/
(P)P-1/ A1(cr)) as cap counterparty. The notional of the interest
rate cap is equal to the closing balance of the class A, B and C
notes.

Transaction structure: The transaction benefits from an
amortising general reserve equal to around 3.0% of the class A, B
and C notes balance. An additional portfolio sale reserve fund
will be established in the event part of the assets are sold
prior to the step up date in October 2019. Both the general
reserve and the portfolio sale reserve (once established) can
only be used for liquidity purposes and cannot be used to cure
credit losses prior to the legal maturity of the notes. Both
reserves can only be used to cover class B and class C interest
if the respective PDL is below 10%. Unpaid interest on class B
and class C is deferrable with interest accruing on the deferred
amounts at the rate of interest applicable to the respective
note.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: The model output indicates that
if a) on the performing pool MILAN were to be increased to 39.3%
and the EL were to be increased to 15.6% and b) on the non-
performing pool house price volatility were to be increased to
5.89% from 5.35% and it would take an additional 6 months to go
through the foreclosure process the class A notes would move to
Baa1. Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a
quantitative/model-indicated calculation of the number of rating
notches that a Moody's structured finance security may vary if
certain input parameters used in the initial rating process
differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is
not intended to measure how the rating of the security might
migrate over time, but rather how the initial rating of the
security might have differed if key rating input parameters were
varied.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and
Re-Performing Loans" published in August 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include that
the recovery process of the NPLs produces significantly higher
cash flows realised in a shorter time frame than expected and a
better than expected performance on the PLs.

Factors that may cause a downgrade of the ratings include
significantly less or slower cash flows generated from the
recovery process on the NPLs and a worse than expected
performance on the PLs compared with our expectations at close
due to either a longer time for the courts to process the
foreclosures and bankruptcies or a change in economic conditions
from our central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic performance
factors.

For instance, should economic conditions be worse than
forecasted, falling property prices could result, upon the sale
of the properties, in less cash flows for the Issuer or it would
take a longer time to sell the properties and the higher defaults
and loss severities resulting from a greater unemployment,
worsening household affordability and a weaker housing market
could result in downgrade of the rating. Additionally
counterparty risk could cause a downgrade of the rating due to a
weakening of the credit profile of transaction counterparties.
Finally, unforeseen regulatory changes or significant changes in
the legal environment may also result in changes of the ratings.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity. In Moody's opinionthe structure allows for
timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal with
respect to the Class A notes by the legal final maturity date,
and ultimate payment of interest and principal with respect to
Classes B and C by legal final maturity. Moody's ratings address
only the credit risks associated with the transaction. Other non-
credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant
effect on yield to investors.


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I T A L Y
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MONTE DEI PASCHI: Bankers Seek to Secure EUR5BB Recapitalization
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Sanderson at The Financial Times reports that bankers were
scrambling on Dec. 5 to secure a EUR5 billion recapitalization of
Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the world's oldest lender, after Prime
Minister Matteo Renzi's decisive loss in Italy's referendum on
constitutional reform threatened to derail the deal.

Italy's troubled banking system and a complex rescue and
restructuring of MPS has lurched into investor focus after Mr.
Renzi confirmed he would step down after a worse than expected
defeat in Sunday's vote, the FT relates.

JPMorgan and Mediobanca, advisers to MPS, are working with Pier
Carlo Padoan, Italy's finance minister, to persuade Qatar's
Investment Authority to pump EUR1 billion into the bank, Italy's
third largest, the FT relays, citing people involved in the
urgent talks.

Bankers are under pressure to make a decision on MPS within
hours, the FT notes.  The bank consortium has until the end of
the day today, Dec. 6, to agree a rescue for MPS to be able to
conclude a capital hike for the remainder of the EUR5 billion
before the end of the year, the FT states.

According to the FT, those involved in the discussions hope that
securing support from QIA, one of the world's largest sovereign
wealth funds, will pave the way for between 10 to 20 more
investors to take part, putting about EUR100 million each into
the bank.

The bank, which has a market value of just EUR570 million, has
burnt through EUR8 billion raised in the past four years, the FT
states.

Senior bankers fear that a failure to shore up MPS, the worst
loser of this summer's European bank healthcheck, could damage
already jittery investor confidence about Italy's EUR4 trillion
banking sector, which is hobbled by EUR360 billion of soured
loans and weak profitability, the FT notes.

A failure to secure QIA as an anchor investor for MPS would
probably sink the bank's complex cross-conditional restructuring
deal, under which it would hive off EUR28 billion in bad loans
under pressure from the European bank regulators, the FT relays,
citing people involved the talks.

                    About Monte dei Paschi

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.


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N E T H E R L A N D S
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CNH INDUSTRIAL: DBRS Confirms BB Issuer Rating
----------------------------------------------
DBRS confirmed the Issuer Rating of CNH Industrial N.V. (CNHI or
the Company) at BB (high) with a Stable trend. The confirmation
recognizes the Company's stable business profile and modestly
improved operating results. However, the financial profile
weakened modestly in 2016 compared to the end of 2015, because of
a temporary rise in debt levels from higher working capital
usage, but remained compatible with the current rating. Going
forward, a still soft agricultural equipment market would limit
improvement in CNHI's operating results. Hence, DBRS expects the
Company's current rating to remain stable in the near future.

CNHI has performed modestly above DBRS's expectations in 2016.
The diversity of its businesses and geographical markets
positioned the Company to benefit from the varied operating
environment, offsetting declines in some businesses (Agricultural
Equipment (AG) and Construction Equipment (CE)) with gains from
others (Commercial Vehicles (CV) and Powertrain). CNHI edged out
a marginal increase in operating profit (as defined by DBRS) and
operating margins despite lower sales in the first nine months of
2016, compared to the same period last year. Benefits from cost
savings and productivity improvement initiatives and lower
material costs were the key profit contributors.

The agricultural equipment market has been in a severe down
cycle. Sequential sales results seem to support a stabilizing
market but signs of a firm recovery remain elusive. Commercial
vehicle demand appears to have peaked especially in southern
Europe where the Company has a strong position. Powertrain is
expected to maintain its gradual improvement from expanding its
sales to external customers, which is an encouraging development.
Construction equipment is expected to improve, albeit from a low
base, buoyed by the improving United States economy. With ongoing
benefits from cost savings and productivity measures, DBRS
expects operating results at CNHI to show a modest improvement in
2017. The Company is unlikely to improve operating results
meaningfully until AG is on a firm recovery path.

At the end of September 2016, net debt rose to $2.7 billion from
$1.6 billion at the end of 2015, to fund a deficit in free cash
flow because of high working capital cash usage, mostly on
inventory. Q4 is traditionally a strong cash generating period
and CNHI expects to reduce net debt to between $2.0 billion and
$2.3 billion at the end of 2016. If not for the payment of EUR
495 million ($543 million) in fines related to a settlement with
the European Union, net debt at the end of 2016 would have been
comparable to 2015. The Company has strong liquidity to help
weather any unexpected deterioration in its operations.

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.

The applicable methodology is Rating Companies in the Industrial
Products Industry, which can be found on our web site under
Methodologies.

RATINGS

Issuer            Debt Rated         Rating Action        Rating
------            ----------         -------------        ------
CNH Industrial   Issuer Rating        Confirmed         BB (high)
N.V.


DRYDEN 48 EURO: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned these
provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Dryden 48 Euro CLO
2016 B.V.:

  EUR230,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2031, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  EUR10,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
   2031, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  EUR45,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2031, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  EUR7,500,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
   2031, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  EUR25,500,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
   Rate Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  EUR20,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
   Rate Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

  EUR22,000,000 Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
   Rate Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

  EUR11,000,000 Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
   Rate Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2031.  The provisional ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure.  Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, PGIM Limited, has
sufficient experience and operational capacity and is capable of
managing this CLO.

Dryden 48 Euro CLO 2016 B.V. is a managed cash flow CLO.  At
least 90% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans
and senior secured bonds.  The portfolio is expected to be 80%
ramped up as of the closing date and to be comprised
predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western
Europe.

PGIM Limited will manage the CLO.  It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
improved and credit risk obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR43.0 mil. of subordinated notes, which will
not be rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty.  The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  PGIM Limited's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
October 2016.  The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders.  Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.  As such,
Moody's encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used these base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR 400,000,000
Diversity Score: 43
Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800
Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.25%
Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.85%
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 41.5%
Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Moody's has analyzed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries.  As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling of A1 or below.  For countries which are not member of
the European Union, the foreign currency country risk ceiling
applies at the same levels under this transaction.  Following the
effective date, and given the portfolio constraints and the
current sovereign ratings in Europe, such exposure may not exceed
15% of the total portfolio.  As a result and in conjunction with
the current foreign government bond ratings of the eligible
countries, as a worst case scenario, a maximum 15% of the pool
would be domiciled in countries with A3 local or foreign currency
country ceiling.  The remainder of the pool will be domiciled in
countries which currently have a local or foreign currency
country ceiling of Aaa or Aa1 to Aa3.  Given this portfolio
composition, the model was run with different target par amounts
depending on the target rating of each class as further described
in the methodology.  The portfolio haircuts are a function of the
exposure size to peripheral countries and the target ratings of
the rated notes and amount to 2.00% for the Class A-1 and A-2
notes, 1.25% for the Class B-1 and B-2 notes, 0.50% for the Class
C and 0% for Classes D, E, and F.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the provisional rating assigned to the
rated notes.  This sensitivity analysis includes increased
default probability relative to the base case.  Below is a
summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3220 from 2800)
Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0
Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0
Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2
Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2
Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3640 from 2800)
Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:
Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1
Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3
Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3
Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4
Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3
Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1
Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.


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P O L A N D
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MENNICA METALE: Applies for Opening of Rehabilitation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Mennica Polska SA on Dec. 3 said that its
unit, Mennica Metale Szlachetne SA, applied to court in Warsaw
for opening of rehabilitation proceedings.

According to Reuters, the unit plans to open the rehabilitation
proceedings due to the state of insolvency connected with
termination on Nov. 2 agreement on debt repayment.

The agreement on debt repayment was concluded in July 2013 with
Bank Millennium SA, Credit Agricole Bank Polska SA, Bank BGZ BNP
Paribas SA, DZ Bank AG Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank
Frankfurt am Main and Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski
SA, Reuters relates.

Mennica Metale Szlachetne filed also to court in Warsaw a motion
for bankruptcy until the final decision on the application for
opening restructuring procedures, Reuters discloses.


ROOF POLAND 2014 DAC: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class B Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Roof Poland Leasing
2014 DAC as:

  PLN636 mil. class A-1 floating-rate secured notes: affirmed at
   'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable

  PLN234.2 mil. class A2 floating-rate secured notes: affirmed at
   'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable

  PLN383.5 mil. class B floating-rate secured notes: affirmed at
   'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable

This transaction is a securitization of lease installments
related to new and used cars, trucks, trailers and machinery
originated in Poland by Raiffeisen Leasing Polska S.A. (RLP).
Originally closed in December 2014, the transaction acquired more
assets and issued further notes in December 2015.  The
transaction is to revolve for one more year.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Portfolio Characteristics
The receivable pool's stratification in client and lease object
segments has not changed materially from the initial analysis of
the restructured transaction in December 2015.  Equally, lessee
exposure concentration is little changed, with the 20 biggest
lessee exposures at 3.6% of portfolio principal.

Fitch views the amortization events as reasonably stringent.  Two
years into the three-year revolving period the residual risk of
receivable repurchases decreasing the triggers' efficiency has
not materialized.  The pool's performance has consistently been
inside Fitch's baseline assumptions, confirming these assumptions
as sufficiently conservative.

Performance in Line with Expectation
RLP is a major company in the Polish leasing market, operating
since 1998.  Fitch has maintained its initial asset assumptions:
a weighted average lifetime default rate of about 4.4% under the
transaction's definition before any adjustment, and 5.7% if early
lease terminations are incorporated.  As of end-September 2016,
defaults amounted to 0.43% of the underlying receivables balance,
and arrears in the 60 to 120dpd bucket stood at 0.19%.

Originator Risk Contained
Fitch's analysis assumes RLP's insolvency.  This assumption
mainly impacts the commingling of funds - for which Fitch has
assumed a 6% loss - and the exclusion from assumed recoveries of
asset sale proceeds, which the transaction might not be able to
access after RLP's insolvency.  The risk that the new owner of
RLP, currently for sale, may relax underwriting standards during
the revolving period is in Fitch's view addressed by its initial
stressed assumptions.  If the acquisition of RLP by PKO Bank
Polski (PKO BP) is implemented as agreed, the new merged entity
will become Poland's leading leasing provider.  Thus far no
indications have presented themselves for potentially relaxed
underwriting standards.

Sovereign-Related Cap
As per the Criteria for Country Risk in global Structured Finance
and Covered Bonds Polish ABS transactions are currently capped at
'AAsf', ie four notches above the sovereign's Long-Term Local-
Currency Issuer Default Rating (LC IDR).

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating sensitivity to increased default rate assumptions
(class A / class B)
  Current ratings: 'AA-sf' / 'BB-sf'
  Increase in default rate by 10%: 'Asf' / 'B+sf'
  Increase in default rate by 25%: 'A-sf' / 'Bsf'
  Increase in default rate by 50%: 'BBBsf' / below 'Bsf'

Rating sensitivity to reduced recovery rate assumptions
(class A / class B)
  Current ratings: 'AA-sf' / 'BB-sf'
  Decrease in recovery rate by 10%: 'A+sf' / 'B+sf'
  Decrease in recovery rate by 25%: 'A+sf' / 'B+sf'
  Decrease in recovery rate by 50%: 'A+sf' / 'B+sf'

Rating sensitivity to multiple factors (class A / class B)
  Current ratings: 'AA-( sf' / 'BB-sf'
  Increase in default rate by 10%, decrease in recovery rate by
   10%: 'Asf' / 'B+sf'
  Increase in default rate by 25%, decrease in recovery rate by
   25%: 'BBB+sf' / 'Bsf'
  Increase in default rate by 50%, decrease in recovery rate by
   50%: 'BBB-sf' / below 'Bsf'

Sovereign-Related Cap

A further downgrade of Poland's Long-Term LC IDR below the
current 'A-' could lead to a review of the notes' rating.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


PELICAN MORTGAGES 4: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two tranches of Pelican Mortgages No.5
and affirmed Pelican Mortgages No.4 and Pelican Mortgages No. 6,
as:

Sagres, STC S.A. / Pelican Mortgages No.4 Plc:
  Class A (XS0365137990): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class B (XS0365138295): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class C (XS0365138964): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class D (XS0365139004): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class E (XS0365139939): affirmed at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable

Sagres, STC S.A. / Pelican Mortgages No.5:
  Class A (XS0419743033): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class B (XS0419743389): upgraded to 'A-sf' from 'BBB+sf';
   Outlook Stable
  Class C (XS0419743462): upgraded to 'BBB-sf' from 'BB+sf';
   Outlook Stable

Sagres, STC S.A. / Pelican Mortgages No.6:
  Class A (PTSSCQOM0006): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable

The three RMBS transactions are part of the Pelican Mortgage
Series originated and serviced by Caixa Economica Montepio Geral
(Montepio; B/Stable/B).  The transactions were issued in 2008,
2009 and 2012, respectively, and comprise portfolios of
Portuguese residential mortgages.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

Robust Performance
The performance of the underlying portfolios has remained stable
over the past year and Fitch believes this will continue due to
the portfolios' significant seasoning between 10 and 8.5 years.
The low interest rate environment also implies low debt repayment
amounts as the mortgages are floating interest rate loans.

The volume of loans in three-months plus arrears excluding
defaults currently range from 0.2% (Pelican No.4) to 1.5%
(Pelican No. 6) of the outstanding pool balances.  As a
proportion of the original collateral balance, defaults range
between 1.2% (Pelican 5) and 4.4% (Pelican 6).

Expected Provisioning Needs
All three transactions have a staggered provisioning mechanism,
diverting excess spread to cover for principal losses.  The
mechanism depends on the number of monthly installments in
arrears, as such Pelican No. 6 provisions for 50% after 12 months
in arrears and the remaining 50% after 24 months, whereas Pelican
No. 4 and No. 5 provision for 30% after 12 months, another 30%
after 24 months and the remaining 40% after 36 months.

To account for the staggered nature of the provisions, Fitch has
estimated the amounts of loans that have defaulted, but for which
full provisions have not yet been made of the outstanding
performing collateral balance.  Those amounts have been deducted
from the available existing resources in Fitch's analysis, since
they are expected to be payable in the coming quarters.

Pro-Rata Amortization
Pelican No. 4 and Pelican No. 5 have been amortizing pro rata
since 2013, leading to credit enhancement increasing more slowly
than the sequential paying notes of the other Pelican RMBS
series. Both transactions include triggers to return to
sequential amortization should the portfolio's performance
deteriorate, as measured by default and delinquency indicators,
or once the outstanding notes balance is 10% or less of the
initial euro balance (currently 68% for Pelican 4 and 5
respectively).

Unhedged Basis Risk
Pelican 6 does not feature a basis swap agreement to hedge the
interest rate mismatch between the assets and the liabilities.
To account for the exposure, Fitch stressed the excess spread
applied in Fitch's EMEA RMBS Surveillance model.  The subsequent
reduction in excess spread had no effect on the ratings, as
reflected in their affirmation.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

Deterioration in asset performance may result from economic
factors.  A corresponding increase in new defaults and associated
pressure on excess spread and reserve funds, beyond Fitch's
assumptions, could result in negative rating action.
Furthermore, an abrupt shift of the underlying interest rates
might jeopardize the loan affordability of the underlying
borrowers.

The ratings are also sensitive to changes in Portugal's Country
Ceiling of 'A+' and consequently changes to the highest
achievable 'A+sf' rating of Portuguese structured finance notes.


=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCO SABADELL: Moody's Hikes Subordinated Debt Rating to Ba3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the following ratings and
assessments of Banco Sabadell, S.A. and its supported entities:
(1) the deposit ratings to Baa2/Prime-2 from Baa3/Prime-3; (2)
the senior debt ratings to Baa3 from Ba1; (3) the subordinated
debt rating to Ba3 from B1; (4) the preference shares to B3(hyb)
from Caa1(hyb); (5) the baseline credit assessment (BCA) and
adjusted BCA to ba2 from ba3; and (6) the Counterparty Risk
Assessment (CR Assessment) to Baa2(cr)/Prime-2(cr) from
Baa3(cr)/Prime-3(cr). The outlook on Banco Sabadell's long-term
deposit and senior debt ratings is stable.

This rating action reflects the improvement of Banco Sabadell's
credit fundamentals, notably in terms of asset risk, with a
sustained decline in the stock of problematic assets. Moody's
expects this trend to continue in 2017, underpinned by the sound
growth prospects of the Spanish economy. The rating agency views
that any pressure that could arise on the credit profile Banco
Sabadell's subsidiary TSB Bank plc (TSB; Baa2 negative; baa2) as
a consequence of the risks related to the United Kingdom's (UK)
Brexit vote would be offset by the positive trends in the Spanish
operations, which represent close to 80% of the group's assets.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR UPGRADING THE BCA

The upgrade of Banco Sabadell's BCA to ba2 from ba3 reflects the
bank's improved credit fundamentals, notably in terms of asset
risk, while other key rating factors such as capital and
profitability have proven resilient in recent months. Since 2013,
Banco Sabadell has displayed a sustained improvement in its asset
risk metrics. This improving trend has been more pronounced since
mid-2015 with the stock of non-performing loans (NPLs) declining
by 27%, which led to a decline in Moody's NPL ratio to 6.9% at
end-September 2016. This compares favorably to the system's
average of 8.6% and stands 200 basis points below the 8.9%
reported at end-September 2015.

Moody's has also considered the decline in Banco Sabadell's total
problematic exposures (measured as NPLs + foreclosed real estate
assets + performing refinanced loans), which stood at 17.1% of
total loans and foreclosed assets at end-September 2016. This
ratio is well below the 20.5% reported at end-September 2015 and
also compares favorably with the estimated system's average of
23.3% (as of end-December 2015, latest system data available).
Moody's views that some asset risk deterioration is likely to
occur in TSB (NPL ratio of 0.51% at end-September 2016) as a
result of a weaker macro environment in the UK. However, the
rating agency acknowledges that this pressure will be offset by
the positive trends in the Spanish domestic portfolio that are
expected to continue in 2017 supported by the sound growth
prospects of the Spanish economy (i.e. Moody's expects Spain's
GDP to grow by 2% in 2017).

In upgrading Banco Sabadell's BCA, Moody's has also taken into
consideration the bank's resilient profitability despite
continued pressures stemming from the very low interest rates,
lower trading gains (accounting for 13% of operating income at
end-September 2016 vs. 27% a year earlier) and subdued business
volumes in Spain. The bank expects to close 2016 with a profit of
around EUR800 million, which represents approximately a Moody's
adjusted 0.3% of the bank's tangible assets, which is modest
compared to the group's pre-crisis levels but compares well to
domestic peers in the current operating environment. In assessing
Banco Sabadell's profitability, Moody's has considered some
pressures that could stem from the integration of TSB
(representing 27% of the group's profits at end-September 2016).
However, Moody's expects these pressures to be offset by the
group's lower provisioning needs as asset risk continues to
improve in Spain and the maintenance of a resilient operating
income supported by its sound domestic franchise in the small and
medium-sized enterprise (SME) segment. Furthermore, Banco
Sabadell should start benefitting from some cost synergies once
the integration of TSB will be accomplished.

Banco Sabadell's capital has gradually improved in recent months,
but remains modest when compared to international peers. Moody's
defined tangible common equity (TCE) to risk weighted assets
(RWA) ratio stood at 8.5% at end-June 2016 above the 7.9%
reported at end-December 2015, but below the 11.4% median range
of ba2 BCA rated banks. Moody's assessment of Banco Sabadell's
capital position is negatively impacted by a relatively high
leverage, with Moody's calculated leverage ratio standing at a
modest 4.0% at end-June 2016 , which nevertheless improved from
3.7% at end-December 2015.

RATIONALE FOR UPGRADING THE LONG-TERM DEPOSIT AND SENIOR DEBT
RATINGS

The upgrade of Banco Sabadell's long-term deposit rating to Baa2
and the senior debt rating to Baa3 reflects: (1) The upgrade of
the bank's BCA and adjusted BCA to ba2 from ba3; (2) the result
from the rating agency's Advanced Loss-Given Failure (LGF)
analysis which remains unchanged with two notches of uplift for
the deposit rating and one notch of uplift for the senior debt
rating; and (3) Moody's assessment of a moderate probability of
government support for Banco Sabadell, which results in an
unchanged further one notch of uplift for the deposit and the
senior debt ratings.

RATIONALE FOR UPGRADING THE CR ASSESSMENT

As part of today's rating action, Moody's has also upgraded to
Baa2(cr)/Prime-2 (cr) from Baa3(cr)/Prime-3(cr) the CR Assessment
of Banco Sabadell, three notches above the adjusted BCA of ba2.
The CR Assessment is driven by the banks' adjusted BCA, moderate
likelihood of systemic support and by the cushion against default
provided to the senior obligations represented by the CR
Assessment by subordinated instruments amounting to 21% of
tangible banking assets.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The outlook on the long-term deposit and senior debt ratings of
Banco Sabadell is stable, which incorporates Moody's view that
the bank's financial fundamentals will show some modest
improvement in 2017 underpinned by the expected further decline
in problematic assets, but will remain consistent with the BCA of
ba2. The stable outlook also reflects the rating agency's
expectation that any deterioration at the level of TSB following
the UK's Brexit vote will be mitigated by the positive trends of
Banco Sabadell's domestic operations.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Banco Sabadell's BCA could be upgraded as a consequence of: (1)
Further significant improvement of asset risk indicators, namely
a material reduction of the stock of problematic assets; (2)
stronger TCE levels; and (3) a sustained recovery of recurrent
profitability levels.

Downward pressure on the bank's BCA could develop as a result of:
(1) The reversal in current asset risk trends with an increase in
the stock of NPLs and/or other problematic exposures; (2) a
weakening of Banco Sabadell's internal capital-generation and
risk-absorption capacity as a result of subdued profitability
levels; and/or (3) a deterioration in the bank's liquidity
position.

As the bank's debt and deposit ratings are linked to the
standalone BCA, any change to the BCA would likely also affect
these ratings.

Banco Sabadell's deposit and senior debt ratings could also
experience upward pressure from movements in the loss-given-
failure faced by these securities. Along these lines, upward
pressure on ratings could develop with the issuance of senior or
subordinated instruments. Based on the current liability
structure, there is no downward pressure on Banco Sabadell's debt
and deposit ratings resulting from Moody's LGF analysis.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Banco Sabadell, S.A.

Upgrades:

   -- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to
      Baa2(cr) from Baa3(cr)

   -- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to
      P-2(cr) from P-3(cr)

   -- Long-term Deposit Ratings, upgraded to Baa2 Stable from
      Baa3 Stable

   -- Short-term Deposit Ratings, upgraded to P-2 from P-3

   -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to Baa3
      Stable from Ba1 Stable

   -- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, upgraded to
      (P)Baa3 from (P)Ba1

   -- Senior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to Ba3
      from B1

   -- Senior Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, upgraded to
      (P)Ba3 from (P)B1

   -- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to Ba3 from B1

   -- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, upgraded to (P)Ba3
      from (P)B1

   -- Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, upgraded to B3(hyb) from
      Caa1(hyb)

   -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to ba2 from
      ba3

   -- Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to ba2 from ba3

Outlook Action:

   -- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Banco Sabadell S.A., London Branch

Upgrades:

   -- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to
      Baa2(cr) from Baa3(cr)


   -- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to
      P-2(cr) from P-3(cr)

   -- Long-term Deposit Rating, upgraded to Baa2 Stable from Baa3
      Stable

   -- Short-term Deposit Rating, upgraded to P-2 from P-3

   -- Commercial Paper, upgraded to P-3 from NP

Outlook Action:

   -- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: CAM Global Finance

Upgrades:

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to
      Baa3 Stable from Ba1 Stable

Outlook Action:

   -- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: CAM Global Finance, S.A. Sociedad Unipersonal

Upgrades:

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to
      Baa3 Stable from Ba1 Stable

Outlook Action:

   -- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: CAM International Issues, SA Sociedad Unipers

Upgrades:

   -- Backed Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to Ba3
      from B1

Outlook Action:

   -- No Outlook

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


FT SANTANDER 2016-2: Moody's Rates Class E Notes (P)Ba1 (sf)
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned these provisional ratings
to the debt to be issued by Fondo De Titulizacion Santander
Consumer Spain Auto 2016-2:

  EUR552.4 mil. Class A Notes due September 2033, Assigned
   (P)Aa2 (sf)

  EUR26.0 mil. Class B Notes due September 2033, Assigned
   (P)A2 (sf)

  EUR35.8 mil. Class C Notes due September 2033, Assigned
   (P)Baa1 (sf)

  EUR19.5 mil. Class D Notes due September 2033, Assigned
   (P)Baa3 (sf)

  EUR16.3 mil. Class E Notes due September 2033, Assigned
   (P)Ba1 (sf)

Moody's did not assign ratings to the EUR13.0 mil. Class F Notes
which will also be issued at the same time.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

FT Santander Consumer Spain Auto 2016-2 is a 4 year revolving
securitisation of auto loans granted by Santander Consumer,
E.F.C., S.A., 100% owned by Santander Consumer Finance S.A.
(A3/P-2 Bank Deposits; A3(cr)/P-2(cr)), to private and corporate
obligors in Spain.  Santander Consumer is acting as originator
and servicer of the loans while Santander de Titulizacion
S.G.F.T., S.A. (NR) is the Management Company.

As of Nov. 3, 2016, the provisional portfolio comprised 61,306
auto loans granted to obligors located in Spain, 96.72% of whom
are private individuals.  The weighted average seasoning of the
portfolio is 5.53 months and its weighted average remaining term
is 65.97 months.  Around 77.96% of the loans were originated to
purchase new vehicles, while the remaining 22.04% were made to
purchase used vehicles.  Geographically, the pool is concentrated
mostly in Andalucia (19.54%), Madrid (15.71%) and Catalonia
(15.23%).  The portfolio, as of its pool cut-off date, did not
include any loans in arrears.

Moody's analysis focused, amongst other factors, on, (i) an
evaluation of the underlying portfolio of loans; (ii) the
historical performance information of the total book and past ABS
transactions; (iii) the credit enhancement provided by the
subordination, the excess spread and the reserve fund; (iv) the
liquidity support available in the transaction, by way of the
liquidity reserve, the principal to pay interest, and the reserve
fund; (v) the commingling reserve provisions, which mitigates
commingling risk; (vi) the exposure to the issuer's account bank;
(vii) the set-off risk related to insurance contracts (viii) the
overall legal and structural integrity of the transaction.

According to Moody's, the transaction benefits from several
credit strengths such as the granularity of the portfolio,
securitisation experience of Santander Consumer, significant
excess spread and the sequential amortisation on the notes during
the amortisation period.  Moody's, however, notes that the
transaction features a number of credit weaknesses, such as the
relatively high linkage to the unrated originator and servicer,
the exposure to larger cash amounts deposited at the account bank
and the set-off risk related to insurance contracts.  Moody's
also took into account the worse than expected performance of
some Auto ABS in Spain and the relatively stable performance of
the previous Santander Auto ABS transactions.  These
characteristics, amongst others, were considered in Moody's
analysis and ratings.

The high linkage to an unrated originator and servicer is
partially mitigated by the Santander Consumer's requirement to
fund a 1% liquidity reserve if the Parent's rating is downgraded
below Baa2 or below P-2, or if the Parent's ownership of
Santander Consumer drops below 95%.  In addition, both the Parent
and the Management Company will act as back-up servicer
facilitators.

The transaction has medium linkage to the account bank Santander
Consumer Finance S.A. (A3/P-2 Bank Deposits; A3(cr)/P-2(cr)),
which can hold significant amounts of cash due to certain
structural features, including the 2.0% non amortising reserve
fund, the ability to hold up to 5% of the outstanding balances of
Class A through E in non-reinvested principal cash flows during
the revolving period and quarterly payment dates.  The minimum
issuer account bank's required ratings are Baa2/P-2.  Moody's has
assessed the impact of a default of the issuer account bank on
the ratings of the transaction.

Set-off risk could arise if insurance policies signed together
with the loan contract are not honored in the event of a default
of the insurance provider, also part of the Santander group, and
a default of the originator.  In such a scenario, borrowers may
be able to set-off the unused premium amount, which has been paid
up front, against the outstanding loan.  In the portfolio, 97.33%
of the receivables have at least one insurance policy connected
to the loan contract and 7.86% have more than one insurance
policy. Due to legal uncertainty, Moody's has taken this risk
into account in the quantitative analysis.

                       MAIN MODEL ASSUMPTIONS

In its quantitative assessment, Moody's assumed a mean default
rate of 5.0%, with a coefficient of variation of around 60% and a
recovery rate of 30%.  This corresponds to a portfolio credit
enhancement (PCE) of 16%.

The Spanish country ceiling is Aa2, and is therefore the maximum
rating that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer
including structured finance transactions backed by Spanish
receivables.  The portfolio credit enhancement represents the
required credit enhancement under the senior tranche for it to
achieve the country ceiling.  The methodology alters the loss
distribution curve and implies an increased probability of high
loss scenarios.

Under the methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks.  Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for SF and the
applicable credit enhancement for this rating uniquely determine
the volatility of the portfolio distribution, which is typically
measured as the coefficient of variation (COV) for ABS
transactions.  All things equal, a higher applicable CE for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable CE both translate into a higher COV.

As a result, the standard deviation of the default distribution
has been initially defined following analysis of the historical
data, as well as by benchmarking this portfolio with past and
similar transactions and the sovereign-related risk impact.

                        STRESS SCENARIOS

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Moody's principal portfolio
model inputs are Moody's cumulative default rate assumption and
the recovery rate.  Moody's tested various scenarios derived from
different combinations of mean default rate (i.e. adding a stress
on the expected average portfolio quality) and recovery rate.
For example, Moody's tested for the mean default rate: 5.0% as
base case ranging to 6.0% and for the recovery rate: 30.0% as
base case ranging to 20.0%.  At the time the rating was assigned,
the model output indicated that Class A would have achieved Aa3
output even if the cumulative mean default probability (DP) had
been as high as 6.0%, and the recovery rate as low as 20.0% (all
other factors being constant).  Moody's Parameter Sensitivities
provide a quantitative / model-indicated calculation of the
number of rating notches that a Moody's-rated structured finance
security may vary if certain input parameters would change.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged.  It is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather, how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if the two parameters within a given sector that
have the greatest rating impact were varied.

                           METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS,
published in October 2016.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Factors that may cause an upgrade of the ratings include a
significantly better than expected performance of the pool
together with an increase in credit enhancement of the notes and
an upgrade of Spain's local country currency (LCC) rating.

Factors that may cause a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the overall performance of the pool or a downgrade of
Spain's local country currency (LCC) rating.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal with respect to the Class A, Class B, Class
C, Class D, and Class E notes by the legal final maturity.
Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction.  Other non-credit risks have not been addressed but
may have a significant effect on yield to investors.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and the above rating reflects Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only.  Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation and the final note structure,
Moody's will endeavor to assign a definitive rating to the Class
A to Class E Notes.  A definitive rating may differ from a
provisional rating.

                   LOSS AND CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

In rating this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the cash
flows and determine the loss for each tranche.  The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate.  In each default
scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes is
calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the
outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.  Therefore,
the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of
(i) the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and
(ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.

Therefore, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress
scenarios.


FT SANTANDER CONSUMO 2: Moody's Rates Class F Notes (P)B3 (sf)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following provisional
ratings to the debt to be issued by FONDO DE TITULIZACION
SANTANDER CONSUMO 2 ("FT Santander Consumo 2"):

   -- EUR865.0M Class A Notes due April 2031, Provisional Rating
      Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

   -- EUR50.0M Class B Notes due April 2031, Provisional Rating
      Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

   -- EUR50.0M Class C Notes due April 2031, Provisional Rating
      Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

   -- EUR20.0M Class D Notes due April 2031, Provisional Rating
      Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

   -- EUR15.0M Class E Notes due April 2031, Provisional Rating
      Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

   -- EUR15.0M Class F Notes due April 2031, Provisional Rating
      Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

FT SANTANDER CONSUMO 2 is a 28 month revolving securitisation of
consumer loans granted by Banco Santander S.A. (Spain)
("Santander"), (A3/P-2 Bank Deposits; A3(cr)/P-2(cr)), to private
obligors in Spain. Santander is acting as originator and servicer
of the loans while Santander de Titulizacion S.G.F.T., S.A. (NR)
is the Management Company ("Gestora").

As of 25 October 2016, the eligible portfolio was composed of
149,976 consumer loans granted to private obligors located in
Spain, 91.84% of the loans are paying fixed rate. The weighted
average seasoning of the portfolio is 21 months and its weighted
average remaining term is 50 months. Around 35% of the
outstanding portfolio are loans without specific loan purpose and
28% are loans to finance small consumer expenditures.
Geographically, the pool is concentrated mostly in Madrid
(20.05%), Andaluc°a (17.65%) and Catalonia (11.50%). The
portfolio, as of its pool cut-off date, did include around 2.84%
of loans with less than 30 days in arrears.

Moody's analysis focused, amongst other factors, on, (i) an
evaluation of the underlying portfolio of loans at closing and
incremental risk due to loans being added during the revolving
period; (ii) the historical performance information of the total
book and past ABS transactions; (iii) the credit enhancement
provided by the subordination, the excess spread and the cash
reserve; (iv) the liquidity support available in the transaction,
by way of principal to pay interest, and the cash reserve; (v)
the cash sweeping mechanism, which partially mitigates
commingling risk; (vi) the exposure to the issuer's account bank;
(vii) the set-off risk related to insurance contracts and (viii)
the overall legal and structural integrity of the transaction.

According to Moody's, the transaction benefits from several
credit strengths such as the granularity of the portfolio,
securitisation experience of Santander, significant excess spread
and the sequential amortisation on the notes during the
amortisation period. Moody's, however, notes that the transaction
features a number of credit weaknesses, such as the relatively
high linkage to Santander representing the originator, servicer
and paying agent, and the set-off risk related to insurance
contracts. Moody's also took into account the performance of
other consumer loan ABS in Spain and the positive selection of
consumer loans in this portfolio not being originated through
brokers. These characteristics, amongst others, were considered
in Moody's analysis and ratings.

MAIN MODEL ASSUMPTIONS

Moody's determined the portfolio lifetime expected defaults of
5.50%, expected recoveries of 25% and Aa2 portfolio credit
enhancement ("PCE") of 18.00% related to borrower receivables.
"The expected defaults and recoveries capture our expectations of
performance considering the current economic outlook, while the
PCE captures the loss we expect the portfolio to suffer in the
event of a severe recession scenario." Moody's said. Expected
defaults and PCE are parameters used by Moody's to calibrate its
lognormal portfolio loss distribution curve and to associate a
probability with each potential future loss scenario in the
ABSROM cash flow model to rate Auto ABS.

Portfolio expected defaults of 5.50% are lower than the EMEA
Consumer Loan ABS average and are based on Moody's assessment of
the lifetime expectation for the pool taking into account (i)
historic performance of the loan book of the originator, (ii)
higher quality products i.e. pre-approved loans being originated
through Santander branches directly instead of through brokers,
(iii) benchmark transactions, and (iv) other qualitative
considerations.

Portfolio expected recoveries of 25% are higher than the EMEA
Consumer Loan ABS average and are based on Moody's assessment of
the lifetime expectation for the pool taking into account (i)
historic performance of the loan book of the originator, (ii)
benchmark transactions, and (iii) other qualitative
considerations.

PCE of 18.00% is higher than the EMEA Consumer Loan ABS average
but in line with Spanish Consumer Loan ABS transactions. The PCE
level of 18.00% results in an implied coefficient of variation
("CoV") of 53.21%.

The Spanish country ceiling is Aa2, and is therefore the maximum
rating that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer
including structured finance transactions backed by Spanish
receivables. The portfolio credit enhancement represents the
required credit enhancement under the senior tranche for it to
achieve the country ceiling. The methodology alters the loss
distribution curve and implies an increased probability of high
loss scenarios.

Under the methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for SF and the
applicable credit enhancement for this rating uniquely determine
the volatility of the portfolio distribution, which is typically
measured as the coefficient of variation (COV) for ABS
transactions. All things equal, a higher applicable CE for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable CE both translate into a higher COV.

As a result, the standard deviation of the default distribution
has been initially defined following analysis of the historical
data, as well as by benchmarking this portfolio with past and
similar transactions and the sovereign-related risk impact.

METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan-Backed ABS, published in
September 2015.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal with respect to the Class A, Class B, Class
C, Class D and Class E notes and ultimate payment of interest and
principal on the Class F notes by the legal final maturity.
Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed but
may have a significant effect on yield to investors.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and the above rating reflects Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation and the final note structure,
Moody's will endeavor to assign a definitive rating to the Class
A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E and Class F Notes. A
definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Factors that may cause an upgrade of the ratings include a
significantly better than expected performance of the pool
together with an increase in credit enhancement of the notes and
an upgrade of Spain's local country currency (LCC) rating.

Factors that may cause a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the overall performance of the pool or a downgrade of
Spain's local country currency (LCC) rating.

LOSS AND CASH FLOW ANALYSIS:

In rating this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the cash
flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.

Therefore, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress
scenarios.

STRESS SCENARIOS:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Moody's principal portfolio
model inputs are Moody's cumulative default rate assumption and
the recovery rate. Moody's tested various scenarios derived from
different combinations of mean default rate (i.e. adding a stress
on the expected average portfolio quality) and recovery rate. For
example, Moody's tested for the mean default rate: 5.5% as base
case ranging to 6.5% and for the recovery rate: 25.0% as base
case ranging to 15.0%. At the time the rating was assigned, the
model output indicated that class A would have achieved A1 output
even if the cumulative mean default probability (DP) had been as
high as 6.5%, and the recovery rate as low as 15.0% (all other
factors being constant). Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide
a quantitative / model-indicated calculation of the number of
rating notches that a Moody's-rated structured finance security
may vary if certain input parameters would change. The analysis
assumes that the deal has not aged. It is not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might migrate over time, but
rather, how the initial rating of the security might have
differed if the two parameters within a given sector that have
the greatest rating impact were varied.


FT SANTANDER CONSUMO 2: DBRS Assigns CCC Prov. Rating to F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned provisional ratings to the notes to
be issued by Fondo de Titulizacion Santander Consumo 2 (the
issuer) as follows:

   -- Class A Notes at AA (sf)

   -- Class B Notes at A (sf)

   -- Class C Notes at BBB (sf)

   -- Class D Notes at BB (sf)

   -- Class E Notes at B (sf) and

   -- Class F Notes at CCC (high) (sf).

The ratings on the Class A to E notes address the timely payment
of interest and the ultimate payment of principal payable on or
before the notes' legal maturity date. The ratings on the Class F
Notes address the ultimate payment of interest and the ultimate
payment of principal payable on or before the notes' legal
maturity date.

The transaction represents the issuance of Notes backed by
approximately EUR 1 billion of receivables relating to consumer
loan contracts originated by Banco Santander, SA (Santander) to
individuals who are residents of Spain. The receivables are
serviced by Santander and the transaction managed by Santander de
Titulizacion.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

   -- The transaction capital structure and the form and
      sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

   -- Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support the
      expected cumulative net loss assumption under various
      stress scenarios at a AA (sf), A (sf), BBB (sf), BB (sf)
      and B (sf) standard for the Class A Notes, Class B Notes,
      Class C Notes, Class D Notes and Class E Notes,
      respectively.

   -- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
      flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms
      under which they have invested.

   -- The transaction parties' capabilities with respect to
      originations, underwriting, servicing and financial
      strength.

   -- The credit quality of the collateral and ability of
      Santander, as the servicer, to perform collection
      activities on the collateral.

   -- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions
      addressing the assignment of the assets to the Issuer and
      the consistency with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European
      Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

The transaction was modelled in Intex Dealmaker.

Notes:

All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.

The principal methodology applicable is Rating European Consumer
and Commercial Asset Backed Securitisations.

DBRS has applied the principal methodology consistently and
conducted a review of the transaction in accordance with the
principal methodology.

Other methodologies referenced in this transaction are listed at
the end of this press release.

The sources of information used for this rating include
performance and portfolio data relating to the lease receivables
sourced by Santander directly or through their agents, Santander
GCB, Credit Agricole CIB and Santander de Titulizacion SGFT, SA.

DBRS does not rely upon third-party due diligence in order to
conduct its analysis.

DBRS was supplied with third party assessments. However, this did
not impact the rating analysis.

DBRS considers the information available to it for the purposes
of providing this rating to be of satisfactory quality.

DBRS does not audit the information it receives in connection
with the rating process, and it does not and cannot independently
verify that information in every instance.

This rating concerns a newly issued financial instrument. This is
the first DBRS rating on this financial instrument.

To assess the impact of changing the transaction parameters on
the rating, DBRS considered the following stress scenarios, as
compared to the parameters used to determine the rating (the Base
Case):

   -- Probability of Default Rates Used: Base Case PD of 8.14%, a
      25% and 50% increase on the base case PD.

   -- Recovery Rates Used: Recovery Rate of 45.8%, with a 25% and
      50% decrease in the base case Recovery Rate.

DBRS concludes that for the Class A Notes:

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD or LGD by 25%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class A
      Notes to A (high) (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD or LGD by 50%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class A
      Notes to A (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD and LGD by 25%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class A
      Notes to A (low) (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and a
      hypothetical increase of the LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus,
      would lead to a downgrade of the Class A Notes to BBB
     (high) (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and a
      hypothetical increase of the LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus,
      would lead to a downgrade of the Class A Notes to BBB
     (high) (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD and LGD by 50%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class A
      Notes to BBB (low) (sf).

DBRS concludes that for the Class B Notes:

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD or LGD by 25%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class B
      Notes to BBB (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD or LGD by 50%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class B
      Notes to BB (high) (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD and LGD by 25%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class B
      Notes to BB (high) (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and a
      hypothetical increase of the LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus,
      would lead to a downgrade of the Class B Notes to B (high)
      (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and a
      hypothetical increase of the LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus,
      would lead to a downgrade of the Class B Notes to B (high)
      (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD and LGD by 50%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class B
      Notes to B (low) (sf).

DBRS concludes that for the Class C Notes:

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD or LGD by 25%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class C
      Notes to BB (low) (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD or LGD by 50%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class C
      Notes to B (low) (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD and LGD by 25%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class C
      Notes to B (low) (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and a
      hypothetical increase of the LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus,
      would lead to a downgrade of the Class C Notes to CCC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and a
      hypothetical increase of the LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus,
      would lead to a downgrade of the Class C Notes to CCC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD and LGD by 50%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class C
      Notes to CC (sf).

DBRS concludes that for the Class D Notes:

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD or LGD by 25%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class D
      Notes to B (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD or LGD by 50%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class D
      Notes to CCC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD and LGD by 25%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class D
      Notes to CCC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and a
      hypothetical increase of the LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus,
      would lead to a downgrade of the Class D Notes to CC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and a
      hypothetical increase of the LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus,
      would lead to a downgrade of the Class D Notes to CC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD and LGD by 50%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class D
      Notes to CC (sf).

DBRS concludes that for the Class E Notes:

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD or LGD by 25%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class E
      Notes to B (low) (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD or LGD by 50%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class E
      Notes to CCC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD and LGD by 25%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class E
      Notes to CCC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and a
      hypothetical increase of the LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus,
      would lead to a downgrade of the Class E Notes to CC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and a hy
      pothetical increase of the LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus,
      would lead to a downgrade of the Class E Notes to CC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD and LGD by 50%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class E
      Notes to CC (sf).

DBRS concludes that for the Class F Notes:

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD or LGD by 25%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class E
      Notes to CCC (low) (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD or LGD by 50%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class E
      Notes to CC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD and LGD by 25%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class E
      Notes to CC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 50% and a
      hypothetical increase of the LGD by 25%, ceteris paribus,
      would lead to a downgrade of the Class E Notes to CC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD by 25% and a
      hypothetical increase of the LGD by 50%, ceteris paribus,
      would lead to a downgrade of the Class E Notes to CC (sf).

   -- A hypothetical increase of the base case PD and LGD by 50%,
      ceteris paribus, would lead to a downgrade of the Class E
      Notes to CC (sf).

Ratings assigned by DBRS Ratings Limited are subject to EU
regulations only.

Initial Lead Analyst: Belen Bulnes Meneses, Senior Financial
Analyst
Initial Rating Date: 1 December 2016
Initial Rating Committee Chair: Erin Stafford, Managing Director

DBRS Ratings Limited
20 Fenchurch Street, 31st Floor,
London, United Kingdom
EC3M 3BY
Registered in England and Wales: No. 7139960

   -- Rating European Consumer and Commercial Asset-Backed
      Securitisations

   -- Legal Crtieria for European Structured Finance Transactions

   -- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance
      Servicers

   -- Operational Risk Assessment for European Structured Finance
      Originators

   -- Unified Interest Rate Model for European Securitisations


GRUPO ISOLUX: In Talks with Ferrovial Over Brazil Projects
----------------------------------------------------------
Luciano Costa at Reuters reports that Spain's infrastructure
company Ferrovial SA is in talks to acquire from its Spanish
rival Grupo Isolux Corsan SA's three power transmission projects
in Brazil.

Isolux is undergoing debt restructuring in Spain and has stopped
development of the power transmission lines, whose licenses it
obtained from the Brazilian government in licensing tenders in
2014 and 2015, Reuters notes.

According to Reuters, Brazil's electricity watchdog, Aneel, is
considering canceling the licenses and promoting a new tender to
find a substitute for the battered Spanish company.

Ferrovial sent a letter to Aneel saying it was in talks with
Isolux, Reuters relates.  In the document, it asked the regulator
to hold off on the possible cancellation of the licenses, Reuters
recounts.

Ferrovial, as cited by Reuters, said it was evaluating the three
projects and that it intended to present an offer to Isolux by
Dec. 22 to take responsibility for finishing the transmission
lines.

Grupo Isolux Corsan SA is a Spanish construction company.


IM GRUPO VII: Moody's Assigns Caa2 Rating to Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned these definitive ratings
to the notes issued by IM GRUPO BANCO POPULAR EMPRESAS VII, FT:

  EUR1825 mil. Class A Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

  EUR675 mil. Class B Notes, Definitive Rating Assigned Caa2 (sf)

IM Grupo Banco Popular Empresas VII, FT is a revolving cash
securitization of loans granted by Banco Popular Espanol S.A.
(Banco Popular, Long Term Deposit Rating: Ba1 Not on Watch) and
Banco Pastor, S.A.U. (NR) to small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) and self-employed individuals located in Spain.

Banco Popular Espanol S.A. and Banco Pastor, S.A.U. will act as
servicers of the loans, while InterMoney Titulizacion, S.G.F.T.,
S.A. will be the management company (Gestora) of the Issuer.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings are primarily based on the credit quality of the
portfolio, its diversity, the structural features of the
transaction and its legal integrity.

The provisional pool analysed was, as of October 2016, composed
of a portfolio of 33,546 loan contracts granted to obligors
located in Spain.  Most of the assets were originated between
2015 and 2016, and have a weighted average seasoning of 1.1 years
and a weighted average remaining term of 4.0 years.  The top
three industry sectors in the pool, in terms of Moody's industry
classification, are Beverage, Food & Tobacco (26.2%),
Construction & Building (15.4%) and Hotel, Gaming & Leisure (7%).
The entire pool consists of unsecured loans.  Geographically, the
borrowers are located mostly in the regions of Catalonia (18.1%),
Andalusia (16.4%) and Madrid (13.9%).  At closing, there will be
no loans more than 90 days in arrears and loans more than 30 days
in arrears will be limited to 1% of the pool balance.

In Moody's view, the credit positive features of this deal
include, among others: (i) granular pool (with an effective
number of obligors of over 4,000), (ii) the portfolio is
diversified across industry sectors and geographical regions;
(iii) low exposure to the real estate development sector,
representing 2.5% of the pool volume of the initial portfolio and
limited to 6% in the replenished portfolio.  The transaction also
shows a number of credit weaknesses, including: (i) there is a
high degree of linkage to Banco Popular which acts as the
Issuer's account bank, as this account may hold significant
amounts of non-invested collections during the revolving period,
as well as holding the reserve fund (both amounts may add up to a
maximum exposure to Banco Popular equivalent to 17% of the notes
balance); (ii) the two-year revolving period allows for a
potential deterioration of the credit quality of the portfolio;
(iii) while the portfolio eligibility criteria exclude the
refinancing of loans that were previously in arrears, they do not
exclude those refinancing loans granted to prevent the arrears
situation, potentially exposing the portfolio to weaker obligors
and hence potential arrears volatility at the end of the
revolving period; (iv) there is no interest rate hedge mechanism
in place while the notes pay a floating coupon and 38.6% of the
pool balance are fixed rate loans.

In its quantitative assessment, Moody's assumed an inverse normal
default distribution for this securitised portfolio due to its
granularity.  The rating agency derived the default distribution,
namely the relevant main inputs such as the mean default
probability and its related standard deviation, via the analysis
of: (i) the characteristics of the loan-by-loan portfolio
information, complemented by the available historical vintage
data; (ii) the potential fluctuations in the macroeconomic
environment during the lifetime of this transaction; and (iii)
the portfolio concentrations in terms of industry sectors and
single obligors.  Moody's assumed the cumulative default
probability of the initial portfolio to be equal to 8.0% over a
weighted average life of 2.3 years, with a coefficient of
variation (CoV, i.e. the ratio of standard deviation over mean
default rate) of 50%.  To account for a potential deterioration
in the credit quality of the portfolio through the pool
replenishments, Moody's assumed that the cumulative default
probability of the portfolio will increase gradually, reaching
13.7% over a weighted average life of 3 years at the end of the
revolving period.  The rating agency has assumed stochastic
recoveries with a mean recovery rate of 35% and a standard
deviation of 20%.  In addition, Moody's has assumed the
prepayments to be 15% per year.  These assumptions correspond to
a portfolio credit enhancement of 21.2% for the initial
portfolio.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Global Approach to Rating SME Balance Sheet Securitizations
published in October 2015.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes.  Moody's ratings address only
the credit risk associated with the transaction, Other non-credit
risks have not been addressed but may have a significant effect
on yield to investors.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings affected by the action would be (1) worse-than-expected
performance of the underlying collateral; (2) an increase in
counterparty risk; (3) an increase in country risk.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings affected by today's action would be the better-than-
expected performance of the underlying assets, a decline in
counterparty risk or decreased country risk.

Moody's also tested other set of assumptions under its Parameter
Sensitivities analysis.  If the assumed default probability of 8%
used in determining the initial rating was changed to 10.4% and
the recovery rate of 35% was changed to 25%, the model-indicated
ratings for Serie A and Serie B of A3(sf) and Caa2(sf) would be
Baa3 (sf) and Caa3 (sf) respectively.

Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative, model-indicated
calculation of the number of notches that a Moody's-rated
structured finance security may vary if certain input parameters
used in the initial rating process differed.  The analysis
assumes that the deal has not aged.  It is not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time,
but rather, how the initial rating of the security might differ
as certain key parameters vary.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


VERISURE MIDHOLDING: Moody's Affirms B2 Corporate Family Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, ("Moody's") has changed the outlook on
the ratings of Sweden-based monitored alarm company Verisure
Midholding AB (Verisure or the company) to positive from stable.

The change in outlook takes into account the following factors:

   -- strong growth in subscribers, and revenue and profitability
      per customer, alongside stable attrition rates

   -- gradual improvement in cash generation on a steady-state
      basis, excluding costs of growing the subscriber base

   -- significant reduction in leverage since Hellman & Friedman
      acquired majority control of the company in November 2015

   -- partially offset by continued releveraging events from
      additional debt raising exercises and negative free cash
      flows after new customer acquisition costs

At the same time, Moody's has affirmed Verisure's corporate
family rating (CFR) of B2 and probability of default rating of
B2-PD. Moody's has also affirmed the B1 instrument ratings on the
approximately EUR1.5 billion senior secured term loans maturing
in 2022, the EUR300 million senior secured revolving credit
facility maturing in 2021 and the EUR700m million senior secured
notes due 2022, all issued by Verisure Holding AB, and the Caa1
instrument rating on the senior unsecured notes due 2023 issued
by Verisure Midholding AB.

A complete list of affected companies and rating actions can be
found at the end of this press release.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The B2 CFR reflects high leverage of 6.5x as of 30 September 2016
(pro forma for an expected Term Loan B upsize in December 2016),
albeit significantly below June 2015 (at 8.2x pro forma for the
LBO transaction) due to strong EBITDA growth. It also reflects
the negative free cash flow as a result of significant investment
to capture new subscribers and the relatively high geographic
concentration with 38% of revenues originating in Spain. In
addition the rating reflects the potential long term threat from
new entrants and existing players, including cable and
telecommunication providers.

On the other hand, the ratings capture the group's leading
position in the European residential home and small business
monitored alarms (RHSB) market, which remains underpenetrated
compared to the US and offering continued high growth potential.
It also reflects Verisure's solid track record of sustained
growth in average revenue per user (ARPU) and subscriber base
while lowering churn rates. The rating incorporates the strong
current trading performance and positive deleveraging prospects
and Moody's expectation of a gradual cash flow improvement
supported by the low churn rate and the implementation of cost
saving initiatives.

Since the follow-on LBO transaction in 2015 Verisure has achieved
strong growth, with organic revenue and company adjusted EBITDA
up by 15% and 25% respectively in the nine months ended 30
September 2016, compared to the prior period. The company has
delevered on the basis of several alarm-industry specific
metrics, with debt to recurring monthly revenues reducing to
34.4x at September 2016 compared to 42x at June 2015 (pro forma
for the transaction). Debt to steady-state EBITDA (excluding
costs to grow the subscriber base) reduced to 5.7x from 6.4x over
this period. Subscriber acquisition costs have remained stable
and the company has maintained its industry-leading low attrition
rates of 6.8%.

The company has however also raised an additional EUR245 million
of debt during 2016, including the proposed EUR110 million term
loan B upsizing in November 2016 which will be used to finance a
dividend payment. As the customer portfolio grows and the company
becomes closer to self-funding its growth, further debt raising
may become more limited. However there remain ongoing risks that
new debt will be raised either for subscriber acquisitions or
dividends which would slow the pace of deleveraging.

Rating Outlook

The positive outlook reflects Moody's expectation of sustained
deleveraging through EBITDA growth whilst cancellation rates and
customer acquisition costs remain stable. Moody's expects the
subscriber base to grow leading to improved cash flow on a
steady-state basis before growth in new subscribers, which in the
near term will provide sufficient cash flows to sustain growth in
new subscribers. Moody's also anticipates that releveraging
events through tapping the existing debt will be more limited
than seen in 2016.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

Positive rating pressure could develop if Verisure reduces its
debt / RMR below 30x and increases free cash flow (before growth
spending) to debt towards 10%, with free cash flow (after growth
spending) becoming positive. It also assumes a stable
cancellation rate and customer acquisition costs, and no change
to the current financial policy with no further dividends
payments and limited requirements for additional debt financing.

What Could Change the Rating - Down

Downward rating pressure could develop if the company fails to
reduce its debt / RMR below 40x within the next 12-18 months, if
steady-state cash generation trends towards zero, or if liquidity
concerns arise.

List of affected ratings:

Affirmations:

   Issuer: Verisure Midholding AB

   -- LT Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed B2

   -- Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed B2-PD

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed
      Caa1

   Issuer: Verisure Holding AB

   -- Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed B1

   -- Backed Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1

Outlook Actions:

   Issuer: Verisure Midholding AB

   -- Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

   Issuer: Verisure Holding AB

   -- Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

Other Considerations

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016.

Corporate Profile

Headquartered in Malmo, Sweden, Verisure Midholding AB
("Verisure"), is a leading provider of monitored alarm solutions
operating under the Securitas Direct and Verisure brand names. It
designs, sells and installs alarms and provides ongoing
monitoring services to residential and small sized businesses
across 14 countries in Europe and Latin America. The customer
base consists of approximately 2.2 million subscribers. The
company has around 9,000 employees and for the last twelve months
ended 30 September 2016, it reported revenues of approximately
EUR1.3 billion.

Verisure (then Securitas Direct) was founded in 1988 as a unit of
Securitas AB. It was demerged and listed on the Stockholm Stock
Exchange in 2006. The company is controlled by Hellman & Friedman
(93% equity) and management (7%).


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


FOUR SEASONS: More Homes to Close Following Debt Woes
-----------------------------------------------------
Gill Plimmer at The Financial Times reports that Four Seasons
Health Care, the lossmaking care home operator, has closed or
sold 51 homes for the elderly over the past 18 months as it seeks
to cut costs ahead of a financial restructuring next year.

Britain's biggest care home operator, which runs 370 homes, plans
to dispose of a similar number in 2017, the FT discloses.

The closures will heighten anxiety that cuts to government
funding for local authorities, which pay fees to care home
operators for some residents, is rapidly reducing the number of
beds available for the elderly, the FT notes.

Four Seasons remains weighed down by hefty interest payments
after being bought in a debt-fuelled GBP825 million deal in 2012
by the private equity business Terra Firma, the FT states.

According to the FT, Nick Hood, analyst at consultancy Opus, said
it was hard to see how the group could "avoid ending up in the
hands of its lenders."

"This is a business that is drowning in debt, nowhere near
covering the interest burden and will need the mother of all
restructurings very soon," the FT quotes Mr. Hood as saying.

Net debt grew from GBP510 million in the last quarter to GBP565
million in September forcing the company to pay interest of GBP50
million, via two tranches in June and December, the FT discloses.
This means the group is making less money than it needs to
service creditors, although it insists it has enough cash in the
medium term, the FT says.

One in four care homes could need financial rescue within the
next three years, according to a study by Opus, the insolvency
specialist, which said "every part of the adult care system is in
crisis", according to the FT.

Since mid 2015, Four Seasons has closed 18 homes, sold a further
18 and handed around 15 back to landlords, the FT relays.


ROYAL BANK: Settles Shareholder Suit Over 2008 Rescue Fundraising
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Martin at The Telegraph reports that Royal Bank of Scotland
has agreed to pay out GBP800 million to investors in an attempt
to avert a lengthy legal battle over claims it misled
shareholders who took part in its GBP12 billion rescue
fundraising at the height of the financial crisis.

The state-owned lender has reached a "full and final settlement"
with three of the five shareholder groups that have been pursuing
claims totalling GBP4 billion against the bank, The Telegraph
relates.  The trio account for 77% of the claims by value and the
shareholders will receive 41.2p for each pound that they invested
in the cash call eight years ago, The Telegraph notes.

According to The Telegraph, RBS said the GBP800 million in total
it has set aside, which is provided for by existing provisions it
has made, would also cover the claims of the two groups that have
not yet settled with the bank.

The capital raising at the heart of the investor claims took
place just months before RBS' GBP45 billion Government bailout in
2008, The Telegraph recounts.

The Royal Bank of Scotland, commonly abbreviated as RBS, is one
of the retail banking subsidiaries of The Royal Bank of Scotland
Group plc, together with NatWest and Ulster Bank.


TIG FINCO: Moody's Affirms B3 Corporate Family Rating
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the B3 Corporate Family Rating
(CFR) on TIG Finco Plc (TIG), the intermediate holding company of
the Towergate Group, and changed the outlook to negative from
stable. Moody's also affirmed the Ba3 backed super senior secured
debt rating and the B3 backed senior secured debt rating on the
instruments issued by TIG.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of the B3 CFR is supported by Towergate's: (i)
unique position in the UK property & casualty insurance broker
market and focus on niche segments; (ii) significant influence
over carriers thanks to its size and focus on specialist lines,
where barriers to entry are high; and (iii) diversified business
model with the group providing services across the insurance
value chain. Moody's also views favourably Towergate's
experienced management team and ownership by private equity firms
HPS Investment Partners, LLC (60% shareholding) and Madison
Dearborn Partners, LLC (18%).

The negative outlook reflects the group's weakened liquidity
position and decline of revenue and profitability in the first
nine months of 2016, which were adversely affected by legacy
issues. Although many corrective actions have been put in place
by the new management, Moody's believes that execution risk has
heightened and that it may take management longer to restore the
group's earnings, cash-flows and leverage position than
previously anticipated by Moody's.

As at 3Q16, the group's available cash resources had fallen to
around GBP25 million (YE2015: GBP57 million), despite benefitting
from GBP29 million of cash proceeds relating to the sale of the
group's smallest division, Broker Network, in July 2016. Moody's
notes that part of this deterioration was driven by significant
negative one-offs including IT upgrade costs, legacy regulatory
fines and a material increase in working capital in Q3.

Liquidity pressure has been alleviated by the group securing a
loan facility with net proceeds of GBP26 million provided by its
major shareholder, HPS, and will be further boosted by a rights
issue, backed by core shareholders, which is expected to complete
before 1Q17. Moody's notes that the group could also benefit from
various liquidity initiatives, including (i) earn-outs from the
Broker Network sale of up to GBP17 million; (ii) recoveries on
redress payments of up to GBP12 million; and (iii) working
capital normalisation of up to GBP15-20 million. However, the
agency also expects cash outflows to remain significant in the
medium to long term, including ongoing business investment, the
GBP19 million interest payment due in May 2017 and any customer
redress payments related to historic ETV / UCIS mis-selling
practices.

Moody's acknowledges that Towergate has made good progress
against its medium-term strategic goals. Management has
identified GBP39 million of cost savings of which 90% were either
delivered or underway by 3Q16. In addition, to stabilise revenue,
the group has also been hiring front end staff, launching new
products and expanding the panel of insurers to increase new
business volumes, redeploying resources to restored retention
rates, renegotiated more favourable commission/profit sharing
agreements and re-pricing unprofitable lines.

However, the group is still in a transition period and, at this
juncture, the magnitude of benefits from these initiatives
remains uncertain and may take longer than previously anticipated
to fully materialise. Commenting further on profitability, Moody
notes that notwithstanding the growth reported in the discrete
third quarter, Towergate's adjusted run-rate EBITDA was down 11%
to GBP60 million for the first 9 months of 2016. This reduction
in adjusted EBITDA, together with any uptick in financial debt,
will also negatively impact Towergate's leverage profile.
Assuming the group fully utilises its new debt facility, Moody's
estimates that debt-to-EBITDA will continue to exceed 8x beyond
YE2017.

DEBT RATINGS AND PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT

Moody's Ba3/LGD1 ratings on TIG's GBP75 million backed super
senior secured notes is three notches above the B3/LGD4 ratings
on TIG's GBP425million backed senior secured notes, reflecting
the super senior secured notes' priority over enforcement
proceeds. The debt ratings also incorporate Moody's view of the
value of the notes' secured status over all assets and 100% of
the shares of TIG and the benefit from upstream guarantees.

Moody's B3-PD Probability of Default Rating (PDR) is now in line
with the CFR. The PDR has been derived from the LGD model and
reflects Moody's standard family recovery rate for capital
structures with more than one tranche of senior secured debt and
no financial maintenance covenants.

WHAT COULD DRIVE THE RATING UP / DOWN

The following factors could lead to a downgrade: (1) failure to
complete a rights issue before 1Q17 or any other actions to
restore liquidity; (2) continued net cash outflows beyond 1H17
with available cash resources consistently below GBP45 million;
(3) corrective actions failing to stabilise revenue income,
translating into an ongoing decline in run-rate EBITDA profits
over the next 6-12 months; and/or (4) debt-to-EBITDA remaining
above 8.0x beyond YE2017.

Whilst an upgrade is unlikely to occur over the next 12-18
months, Moody's says the following factors could stabilise the
outlook: (1) positive net cash flows sufficiently funding the
group's operations, growth initiatives and interest payments; (2)
the stabilisation of revenues; (3) sustaining adjusted EBITDA
margins above 20% with improvements in adjusted run-rate
profitability translating into statutory earnings; and (4) debt-
to-EBITDA below 8.0x with EBITDA coverage of interest
consistently above 1.0x.

Moody's has affirmed the following ratings on TIG Finco Plc:

   -- Corporate Family Rating at B3

   -- GBP425 million Backed Senior Secured Debt Rating at B3

   -- GBP75 million Backed Super Senior Secured Debt Rating at
      Ba3

Moody's downgraded the following ratings on TIG Finco Plc:

   -- Probability of Default Rating to B3-PD from B2-PD

   -- The outlook for TIG Finco Plc has changed to negative from
      stable.

In the first 9 months to September 2016, Towergate reported total
revenues of GBP246 million (3Q15 pro-forma: GBP262 million) and
adjusted run-rate EBITDA of GBP60 million (3Q15 pro-forma: GPB67
million). TIG Finco Ltd reported total equity at GBP156 million
and total assets of GBP935 million as at 30 September 2016.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Insurance
Brokers and Service Companies published in December 2015.


UMV GLOBAL: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Rating to B1
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded UK-based leading
biscuits manufacturer UMV Global Foods Holding Company Ltd's
(United Biscuits or the company) corporate family rating (CFR) to
B1 from Ba3 and probability of default rating (PDR) to B2-PD from
B1-PD. Concurrently, the ratings on the senior secured term loans
and revolving credit facility at UMV Global Foods Company Ltd
were also downgraded to B1 from Ba3. The outlook has changed to
negative from stable.

Today's action was driven by (1) the weaker year-to-date
operating performance which led to an increased leverage above
levels no longer commensurate with a Ba3 CFR, even excluding the
volatility in the gross pension deficit, and (2) Moody's
expectations that any material improvements in the next 12 to 18
months will be constrained by continued challenging market
conditions in the UK and overseas markets, and higher raw
material prices.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The company's reported EBITDA in the year-to-date ending 8
October 2016 (YTD Q3 2016) declined by 17% year-on-year
predominantly due to weaker operating performance in its Northern
European and International segments. YTD EBITDA was down 51% and
62% respectively in these segments while trading in the UK was
more resilient albeit YTD EBITDA declined by 5.9% (including
insurance proceeds for the Carlisle flood) due to lower sales of
the go ahead! brand and savoury biscuits partially offset by the
successful launch of the McVitie's Digestive Nibbles range. As a
result, the company's Moody's-adjusted EBIT margin declined to
9.9% from 12.2%. Moody's calculation of the company's adjusted
EBITDA and EBIT include restructuring costs, which have
historically been recurring.

The company's Moody's-adjusted debt to EBITDA stood at 7.9x as of
Q3 2016 including an adjustment for the company's gross pension
deficit of GBP277 million as per Moody's methodology, compared to
5.7x as of 2 January 2016 (FY2015). The increase was
predominantly due to the lower YTD EBITDA but also to the higher
pension deficit which increased by approximately GBP126 million
because of the lower discount rate. However, Moody's typically
assesses pension deficit liabilities over the medium term rather
than at a single point in time, and place greater emphasis on the
impact of the obligations on cash flow generation. Excluding the
impact of the pension deficit adjustment, the Moody's-adjusted
leverage was at around 6.1x as of Q3 2016 compared to 4.9x as of
FY2015. The increase in leverage was also partly related to the
translational impact on the Euro tranche of the term loan B which
increased to GBP-equivalent 286 million as of Q3 2016 from GBP-
equivalent 234 million as of FY2015.

Moody's views the current leverage as high for the current B1
CFR, and does not anticipate visible improvements in operating
performance over the next 12 to 18 months as market conditions
across the company's main markets will likely remain challenging.
Moody's expects trading conditions in the company's largest
market of the UK (respectively 62% of sales and 76% of reported
EBITDA before central costs in FY2015) to remain affected by the
highly competitive and price sensitive UK food retail market
which in turn heightens competitive pressures from larger
international companies and private label; the national living
wage; and rising raw material prices including the impact of the
weaker pound which would increase the cost of imported raw
materials.

More positively, the ratings also incorporate (1) the strength of
United Biscuits' core UK operations as reflected by its dominant
market share, and portfolio of well-known and trusted brands; (2)
its leading market positions in France and the Benelux, and
successful penetration in certain emerging markets; and (3) its
large addressable global market with growth opportunities in many
geographies.

Moody's also views the liquidity profile as adequate and expects
the company to continue generating positive free cash flow over
the next to 12 to 18 months. But overall cash flow generation
will be constrained by the need to maintain capex at high levels
to support growth projects, pension contributions of GBP28
million per annum (similar levels as in previous years), and
accelerating debt amortisation under the term loan A.

As of Q3 2016, the company had a cash balance of GBP47 million
and an undrawn revolving credit facility (RCF) of GBP75 million.
However, while headroom under the company's single net leverage
financial maintenance covenant was sufficient as of Q3 2016,
Moody's expects the headroom to tighten over the next quarters
due to further step-downs in the target ratio. That being said,
the B1 CFR assumes that the company will be able to obtain a
waiver of any breach and/or reset covenants if necessary.

Last but not least, the ratings also assume that the company will
use net proceeds from of disposal of non-core assets to reduce
its gross indebtedness.

RATING OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectations that market
conditions across the company's main markets will remain
challenging over the next 12 to 18 months, constraining
deleveraging from an already high level for the current B1 CFR.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE / DOWNGRADE

Near-term upward rating are unlikely given today's rating action
but the negative outlook could be revised to stable if over the
next 12 to 18 months the company stabilises the decline in
overall margins and profitability, maintains a Moody's-adjusted
Debt / EBITDA sustainably below 7.0x (or below 5.5x excluding the
pension deficit), and maintains an adequate liquidity profile
including positive free cash flow after pension contributions.
Moody's treats pension contributions in excess of current service
costs as debt repayments, and therefore does not include them in
its free cash flow calculation.

Moody's would consider an upgrade if the company delivers
sustained improvements in operating performance resulting in an
Moody's-adjusted EBIT margin in the low teens, a Moody's-adjusted
debt / EBITDA decreasing below 6.0x (or below 4.5x excluding the
pension deficit), and a solid liquidity profile including
positive free cash flow after pension contributions.

Conversely, Moody's would consider downgrading the ratings if the
company's overall margins and profitability continue to
deteriorate, Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA remains sustainably
above 7.0x (or above 5.5x excluding the pension deficit), or
liquidity profile deteriorates including negative free cash flow
after pension contributions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Packaged Goods published in June 2013.

Headquartered in the UK, United Biscuits is a leading European
biscuits manufacturer that sells sweet and savoury biscuits,
baked snacks and other consumer foods mainly in the UK and
Ireland where it derived 62% of its sales in 2015 as well as
Northern Europe and in Western Europe, North America, Asia,
Africa and the Middle East via its International division. In the
fiscal year 2015, United Biscuits reported sales of GBP1.2
billion.

Turkish food and beverages group Yildiz Holding A.S. (Yildiz)
acquired United Biscuits in November 2014.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
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Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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