TCREUR_Public/161216.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Friday, December 16, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 249


                            Headlines


F I N L A N D

TEOLLISUUDEN VOIMA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' CCRs, Outlook Stable


F R A N C E

SOCIETE GENERALE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Capital


G E R M A N Y

CART 1: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class E Notes
DEUTSCHE BANK: Fitch Maintains 'BB' Addt'l Tier 1 Notes on RWN


G R E E C E

GREECE: Creditors Suspend Debt Relief Deal for Athens


I R E L A N D

STAR ELM: Directors Face "Phoenix Syndrome" Charges


I T A L Y

MONTE DEI PASCHI: DBRS Cuts Senior Long-Term Debt Rating to B


R U S S I A

RUSPOLYMET JSC: Fitch Withdraws 'B-' LT Issuer Default Rating
RCB JSC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: U.S. Court Approves Unit's Bankruptcy Exit


S W I T Z E R L A N D

CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Notes
UBS GROUP: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Tier 1 Subordinated Notes


U K R A I N E

DTEK ENERGY: Eurobond Holders Allowed to Vote on Restructuring


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BARCLAYS PLC: Fitch Affirms BB+ Addt'l Tier 1 Instruments' Rating
LONDON WELSH: Winding-Up Petition Adjourned Until January
RAF-LONDON LIMITED: Director Gets 9 Year Ban Over Unpaid Tax
SALISBURY SECURITIES: Fitch Ups Cl. N Notes Rating to 'BB(EXP)sf'
TOWD POINT 2016-VANTAGE1: S&P Assigns B Rating to Class F Notes

* UK: Legal Experts Warn of 'Another Farepak' Savings Scandal


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Oil Business in Latin America: The Early Years


                            *********


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F I N L A N D
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TEOLLISUUDEN VOIMA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' CCRs, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+/B' long-term and short-term
corporate credit ratings on Finland-based nuclear power producer
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO).  The outlook is stable.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB+' issue rating on TVO's EUR1.3 million
revolving credit facility (RCF) and EUR4.0 billion euro medium-
term note program (EMTN).

The affirmation reflects TVO's protection from competition and
market price volatility thanks to the contractual arrangements
with its shareholders.  TVO's ratings are also supported by its
importance in the Finnish electricity market as it generates
about 20% of total electricity produced in Finland, and this
share will grow when its third nuclear reactor comes on-stream,
scheduled for end of 2018.  Its existing plants have a strong
operational track record, with a high capacity utilization rate
(above 90%, despite recent years' outages for upgrades) and the
contractual ability to pass through its fixed and variable costs
to shareholders insulates the company from volatility of
profitability.

TVO is a Finnish nuclear power operator operating under a
"Mankala" model.  Its purpose is to provide a stable electricity
supply at cost to its shareholders, which are Finnish industry,
utilities, and municipalities.

According to TVO's articles of association, the shareholders are
severally liable for the company's annual variable and fixed
costs (accounting for about 80%-85% of total costs), including
interest expenses and loan installments.  S&P believes that TVO's
shareholders view their stakes as long term.  They have shown
support by supplying equity in the form of shareholder loans to
help fund the third nuclear power plant Olkiluoto 3 (OL3).  S&P's
view of the shareholders' willingness and ability to continue
providing support to TVO is incorporated as a positive adjustment
in its final rating.

S&P also sees the shareholders' support to TVO as an effective
mitigant to TVO's weakening cost competitiveness due to the
deterioration in Finnish power prices and future price
expectations.  Future prices are currently predicted by the
market to be at a similar level to TVO's expected full cost of
production when the third nuclear power plant OL3 is commissioned
at the end of 2018.  In S&P's view, despite this diminishing the
cost advantage TVO currently offers to its shareholders, S&P
expects them to continue support the company.

The ratings are constrained by the company's high level of debt
(about EUR5 billion) compared to its EBITDA, also taking into
consideration the expected increase of tariffs charged from
shareholders after commissioning of OL3.  The debt level has
increased significantly over the past years due to cost overruns
in the OL3 project.  S&P understands that due to the company's
business model, TVO's financial ratios are less indicative than
those of profit-maximizing enterprises.  Nevertheless, S&P still
considers that its financial metrics are likely to remain under
pressure even after the OL3 commissioning, and that it would take
many years before the company undertakes any meaningful
deleveraging. At the same time, S&P notes that TVO, according to
its articles of association, can always charge its shareholders
its yearly interest expenses, which is a positive credit factor.

TVO has a relatively short-dated debt-maturity profile -- about
four years -- compared with the economic lifetime of its asset
base of over 40 years.  This increases the company's exposure to
refinancing risk.  Although TVO should be able to charge its
shareholders for installments and interest payments on loans
falling due annually -- in accordance with its loan agreements --
TVO's debt does not benefit from any guarantees.

   -- Finnish area power prices of about EUR30-EUR32/megawatt
      hour (mwh) reducing to about EUR25-EUR27/mwh in the medium
      term.
   -- TVO will continue to fully cover its production costs
      (including interest expenses) for existing plants OL1 and
      OL2, which S&P expects will remain competitive in the near
      term.
   -- No unexpected outages at OL1 and OL2.
   -- No further cost overruns in the completion of OL3.
   -- Use of EUR300 million of shareholder loan commitments for
      OL3.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 15x-17x from 2019 onwards; and
   -- FFO interest coverage of 2.3x- 2.4x from 2019.

S&P now analyzes TVO under our 2013 Corporate Methodology to
better align its ratings assessment with S&P's understanding of
the company's underlying risks and the atypical "not-for-profit"
nature of the organization being a Mankala company.  S&P notes
that, in the event that shareholders refuse to purchase the
power, the company is also entitled to sell electricity to third
parties. The ability to sell surplus power into the market at the
market price provides some degree of flexibility that pure not-
profit entities do not have.  Furthermore, although TVO is not a
profit maximizer as such, S&P acknowledges that the company has
to maintain its cost competitiveness in the long term in order to
remain attractive for its shareholders and that higher tariffs
will be charged after OL3 is commissioned in order to cover for
the increased costs, and gradually repay TVO's debt.

The stable outlook reflects the stability of cash flow driven by
the contractual nature of TVO's revenue and cost structure backed
by its shareholders.  It also reflects S&P's assumption that the
completion of the third nuclear reactor will not face further
significant delays or cost overruns, and that TVO's cost
advantage versus market prices would not further deteriorate.

S&P could lower the rating on TVO if S&P sees further
deterioration in Finnish area power prices or an unexpected
increase in the cost of completion of OL3, as this could indicate
weakening cost advantage and lower future value for shareholders.
S&P could also lower the ratings if it saw signs that the
financial risk profile further weakens beyond S&P's expectations
during the final completion of OL3, or if S&P would doubt that
there would be a gradual improvement following the completion of
the plant at the end of 2018.  This could, for example, be the
case if there were continued cost overruns and delays of
completing the plant or any cash outflows from the arbitration
process with the supplier, and if this were not mitigated by
extended shareholder support.  Finally, S&P could also lower the
ratings if it saw a diminishing willingness or ability of the
shareholders to support TVO.

S&P could raise the rating on TVO if the company significantly
reduced its leverage, but S&P sees this scenario as unlikely at
the moment.


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F R A N C E
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SOCIETE GENERALE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Capital
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Societe Generale's (SG) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'A', Short-Term IDR at 'F1' and
Viability Rating (VR) at 'a'. The bank's debt ratings have also
been affirmed.

In addition, Fitch has assigned SG a Derivative Counterparty
Rating (DCR) of 'A(dcr)' as part of its roll-out of DCRs to
significant derivative counterparties in western Europe and the
US. DCRs are issuer ratings and express Fitch's view of banks'
relative vulnerability to default under derivative contracts with
third-party, non-government counterparties.

The rating actions have been taken in conjunction with Fitch's
periodic review of the Global Trading and Universal Banks
(GTUBs), which comprise 12 large and globally active banking
groups.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

SG's IDRs, VR and senior debt ratings reflect the bank's sound
company profile underpinned by selected franchise strengths
across a diverse range of products and geographies. These include
a multi-channel presence in domestic retail operations, largely
focusing on more affluent urban areas, as well as international
retail banking and financial services to corporates. SG's sound
corporate franchise in the eurozone also benefits its securities
business, where the bank has leading positions in euro-
denominated debt capital markets and equity derivatives.

The ratings also factor in the bank's asset quality, which
despite gradual improvements remains weaker than French and GTUB
peers'. At end-2Q16, gross impaired loans stood at 6% of gross
loans. Despite adequate coverage at 63%, unreserved impaired
loans stood at over 20% of Fitch Core Capital, which exposes the
bank's capital to the realisation of collateral, often in the
form real estate. SG's stock of impaired loans partly reflects
slower write-off practices in France, as the bank typically aims
to fully resolve problem loans, of which it has a sound track
record.

"We expect the pressure on French retail's net interest margins
to continue, given prolonged low interest rates and limited
pricing flexibility on the liability side due to the regulated
nature of many savings schemes," Fitch said. At the same time,
investments in digitalisation and branch rationalisation, which
should improve operating efficiency in the longer-term, will
likely limit cost flexibility in the short-term. At end-9M16, the
bank contained operating expense growth at below 1%. Cost
management and developing fee income will be key to offsetting
revenue pressure in France.

SG's diversified franchise, in our view, enables the bank to
generate resilient and sustainable earnings, as demonstrated in
3Q16 when a sharp pick-up in profitability in Global Banking and
Investor Solutions (GBIS), and falling loan impairment charges
(LICs) in international retail helped to sustain sound
performance amid domestic revenue pressure. However, our ratings
also take into account earnings volatility introduced by the GBIS
division, which includes sales, trading, prime and securities
services, and accounted for 37% of SG's risk-weighted assets
(RWAs) at end-3Q16.

Improving credit conditions domestically and the bank's focus on
higher-quality borrowers in higher-risk markets, including in
Russia, should help LICs remain within the bank's updated
guidance of below 50bp of gross loans for 2016. Continued risk
reduction in international retail banking will be important to
underpinning the group's profitability, which was demonstrated in
9M16, when operating income in International Retail Banking and
Financial Services (IRBFS) rose 28% yoy to EUR1.8bn, largely
reflecting materially lower LICs. This also underpins our view
that SG's presence in higher-risk jurisdictions is mitigated by a
generally cautious approach and a track record of limited losses
to date.

Capital and leverage ratios are at the lower end of GTUB peers',
but this is more than offset by SG's strong internal capital
generation versus peers. The bank's fully-loaded CET1 ratio
increased 50bp to 11.4% in 9M16, and its fully-loaded Basel III
leverage ratio stood at 4.1% at end-3Q16. The ECB notified the
bank of its 2017 capital requirements pursuant to the Supervisory
Review Evaluation Process (SREP), which will by 1 January 2019
stand at a 9.5% CET1 ratio, including a 1.5% Pillar 2 requirement
component, an 11% Tier 1 capital ratio and a 13% total capital
ratio. SG's fully-loaded total capital ratio was at end-3Q16 just
40bp below the bank's 2017 target of 18%, and we expect the bank
to reach its targeted 2019 19.5% total loss-absorbing capacity
(TLAC) requirements by issuing senior non-preferred debt, which
would in a resolution be bailed in ahead of other senior
creditors.

The Stable Outlook reflects our expectation that the bank will
continue generating sound profitability while progressing towards
its capital targets and gradually improving its asset quality
metrics.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

SG's Support Rating and Support Rating Floor reflect Fitch's view
that senior creditors cannot rely on receiving full extraordinary
support from the French sovereign in the event that the group
becomes non-viable. In Fitch's view, the EU's Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism
(SRM) provide a framework for resolving banks that is likely to
require senior creditors participating in losses, if necessary,
instead of or ahead of a bank receiving sovereign support.

DERIVATIVE COUNTERPARTY RATING

Fitch assigned a DCR to SG for its material derivatives
counterparty activity. The DCR is at the same level as SG's Long-
Term IDR because derivative counterparties in France have no
definitive preferential status over other senior obligations in a
resolution scenario.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid securities issued by SG are
all notched down from its VR in accordance with Fitch's
assessment of each instrument's respective non-performance and
relative loss severity risk profiles, which vary considerably.

Subordinated lower Tier 2 debt is rated one notch below the VR
for loss severity, reflecting below-average recoveries.

Legacy Tier 1 securities are rated four notches below the VR,
comprising two notches for higher-than-average loss severity, and
two further notches for non-performance risk due to partly
discretionary coupon omission.

Basel III-compliant additional Tier 1 instruments are rated five
notches below the VR. The issues are notched down twice for loss
severity, reflecting poor recoveries as the instruments can be
written down well ahead of resolution. In addition, they are
notched down three times for very high non-performance risk due
to fully discretionary coupon omission.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY

The Long- and Short-Term IDRs and Support Rating of SG's French
specialist car financing subsidiary Compagnie Generale de
Location d'Equipement are based on institutional support from SG.
The subsidiary is rated under Fitch's Global Non-Bank Financial
Institutions Criteria. Compagnie Generale de Location
d'Equipements' Long-and Short-Term IDRs are equalised with those
of SG and the subsidiary's Outlooks are the same as the parent's.
This is because we view this entity as a core subsidiary given
its importance to and integration with its parent.

Societe Generale Acceptance N.V., SG Option Europe and SG
Structured Products Inc. are SG's wholly owned financing
subsidiaries, whose debt ratings are aligned with those of SG
based on Fitch's view of an extremely high probability of
support, if required.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

SG's IDRs, VR and senior debt ratings are primarily sensitive to
structural deterioration in earnings that would jeopardise the
bank's currently strong internal capital generation, or from
failure to reduce the stock of unreserved impaired loans.
Although currently not expected, outsized losses resulting from
legal or misconduct cases that would materially dent capital
would also be rating-negative.

Upside to the ratings is currently limited and would require a
material improvement in asset quality while maintaining
sustainable earnings, sound capitalisation and an unchanged risk
appetite.

SG's senior debt that will become senior preferred, if
legislation passed in France in November 2016 comes into force,
could be upgraded to one notch above the bank's Long-Term IDR
once the buffer of qualifying junior debt and senior non-
preferred debt is together sufficient to protect senior preferred
creditors from default in case of failure. SG's qualifying junior
debt buffer includes additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments and
stood at 7.1% of RWAs at end-3Q16, suggesting that upside for the
bank's existing senior debt could materialise in 2017 given
current issuance plans. "We would consider an upgrade of the then
senior preferred debt when the buffer of qualifying junior debt
and senior non-preferred debt exceeds 8%-9%, provided that this
buffer is sustainable," Fitch said.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

An upgrade of SG's Support Rating and upward revision to its
Support Rating Floor would be contingent on a positive change in
the sovereign's propensity to support its banks. While not
impossible, this is highly unlikely in Fitch's view.

DERIVATIVE COUNTERPARTY RATING

SG's DCR is currently aligned with the bank's Long-Term IDR and
is therefore primarily sensitive to changes to the Long-Term IDR.
Under new French legislation, derivative counterparties will rank
pari-passu with senior preferred creditors. This means that the
DCR will likely be upgraded if the bank's senior preferred debt
rating is upgraded.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital ratings are primarily
sensitive to a change in SG's VR. The securities' ratings are
also sensitive to a change in their notching, which could arise
if Fitch changes its assessment of the probability of their non-
performance relative to the risk captured in the respective
issuers' VRs. This may reflect a change in capital management in
the group or an unexpected shift in regulatory buffer
requirements, for example. The ratings are also sensitive to a
change in Fitch's assessment of each instrument's loss severity,
which could reflect a change in the expected treatment of
liability classes during a resolution.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY

The ratings of Compagnie Generale de Location d'Equipements are
sensitive to changes in SG's IDRs and could also be sensitive to
changes in the subsidiary's strategic importance to the rest of
the group.

Societe Generale Acceptance N.V.'s, SG Option Europe's and SG
Structured Products Inc.'s ratings are sensitive to the same
factors that might drive a change in SG's IDR.

The rating actions are as follows:

   Societe Generale

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   -- Derivative Counterparty Rating: assigned at 'A(dcr)'

   -- Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Long-term debt: affirmed at 'A'

   -- Short-term debt: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Market-linked securities: affirmed at 'Aemr'

   -- Lower Tier 2 notes: affirmed at 'A-'

   -- Hybrid capital instruments: affirmed at 'BBB-'

   -- Additional Tier 1 capital: affirmed at 'BB+'

   Societe Generale Acceptance N.V.

   -- Market-linked guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'Aemr'

   -- Senior guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'A'

   -- Short-term guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'F1'

   SG Option Europe

   -- Senior notes: affirmed at 'A'/'F1'

   SG Structured Products Inc.

   -- Senior guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'A'

   Compagnie Generale de Location d'Equipements

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

   -- Certificate of deposit programme: affirmed at 'F1'


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G E R M A N Y
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CART 1: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' credit rating on CART
1 Ltd.'s class E notes.

The affirmation follows S&P's review of the transaction using the
Sept. 15, 2016 payment date report.

The class A+, A, B, C, and D notes have been fully repaid.

All the assets in the underlying portfolio are in default and the
only source of cash flows for the rated notes is the recovery
proceeds realized on these assets.  Defaults are defined in the
transaction documents as bankruptcy or failure to pay for 90 days
or more.

The aggregate defaulted notional is EUR56.94 million, consisting
of 18 individual issuers.  The outstanding principal balance of
the class E notes is currently EUR32.61 million.  In order to
fully repay the principal balance of the class E notes, the
issuer should realize a recovery of about 57.0% on assets that
are currently in default and undergoing the workout process.  In
S&P's view, given the mezzanine nature of the underlying assets,
it is uncertain whether the issuer can realize the required
proportion of recoveries before the June 15, 2018 legal maturity
date on the notes.  Consequently, S&P considers that the class E
notes remain vulnerable to a payment default at maturity.
Therefore, S&P has affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class E
notes.

CART 1 is a partially funded synthetic balance-sheet
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in
April 2007.  The reference portfolio includes loans, revolving
credit facilities, and other claims that Deutsche Bank AG or any
of its subsidiaries or affiliates originated and granted to
predominately German small and midsize enterprises and larger
companies.  Subordination is the only source of credit
enhancement for the rated notes, which redeem sequentially,
starting with a reduction of the unfunded senior portion.  The
transaction allocates realized losses to the notes in reverse
order of seniority, starting with the unrated class F notes.


DEUTSCHE BANK: Fitch Maintains 'BB' Addt'l Tier 1 Notes on RWN
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings is maintaining Deutsche Bank AG's ratings,
including the 'A-' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR), 'F1'
Short Term IDR and 'a-' Viability Rating (VR), on Rating Watch
Negative (RWN). Fitch expects to resolve the RWN at the latest
after the bank's 1Q17 earnings are published.

The rating actions have been taken in conjunction with Fitch's
periodic review of the Global Trading and Universal Bank (GTUB),
which comprises 12 large and globally active banking groups.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs, VR, DCR, DEPOSIT AND SENIOR DEBT
RATINGS

The RWN reflects our view that the challenges posed by a sluggish
business environment, particularly in Europe but also in Asia
Pacific, will make it harder for Deutsche Bank to build revenue
and, therefore, capital during 2017 in line with its 2020
strategy.

At the same time, vulnerable customer sentiment and staff morale
during the restructuring phase, and prolonged negative publicity
around the bank's litigation risk, are making it more difficult
for Deutsche Bank to compete effectively against peers, which
have less restructuring to do to adapt business models and
improve efficiency, or have made more progress in resolving
legacy litigation. Deutsche Bank's business model is more focused
on capital markets businesses than those of the other Europe-
based GTUBs, which makes the bank more sensitive to the business
environment.

Deutsche Bank has made good progress at implementing an
ambitious, intensive restructuring programme. This is
demonstrated by agreed or completed business disposals, progress
in running down the Non-Core Operating Unit (NCOU) to EUR18bn
risk-weighted assets (RWAs) at end-9M16, and further to below
EUR10bn by year-end, and agreements with the works council over
reducing staff in Germany.

Deleveraging has allowed the bank to maintain acceptable leverage
and CET1 ratios (end-September 2016: 3.5% and 11.1% respectively,
both on a fully loaded basis), although the stock of CET1 capital
has declined. Completion of the sale of Hua Xia Bank, which was
approved by the Chinese regulators, should add around 10 and 50
basis points to the leverage and CET1 ratios, respectively,
according to the bank's pro-forma calculations.

As the bulk of restructuring expenses is front-loaded, earnings
are likely to remain weaker than peers' for 2016 as a whole.
Improvements should be visible from 1Q17, as the benefits of
cost-cutting efforts feed through and earnings are less distorted
by losses related to deleveraging. Management indicated that net
income for 2016 could be negative, depending on the timing and
amount of litigation and misconduct charges.

Maintaining the corporate and capital markets franchises is
paramount for Deutsche Bank's ratings. Performance in 9M16 has
been weaker than in the past and market shares in some capital
markets businesses have declined. This decline partly relates to
the strength and improvement of US fixed income versus
sluggishness in Europe. It also reflects Deutsche Bank's decision
to exit some markets, such as US securitisation trading, which
performed well in 3Q16. "However, we expect some franchise
erosion this year from the bank's focus on restructuring, coupled
with headline "noise" around the DoJ settlement. We expect
European capital markets to remain challenging well into 2017,
which will make it even more important for Deutsche Bank to
demonstrate its franchise strength." Fitch said.

The private banking, wealth and asset management businesses are
smaller contributors to earnings. Deutsche Bank plans to spin off
its domestic retail banking subsidiary, Deutsche Postbank
(BBB+/Stable), which will boost its CET1 and especially its
leverage targets. However, although the bank has been separated
from the rest of the business operationally, the sale may be
delayed because of unfavourable market pricing.

Deutsche Bank's Short-Term IDR and short-term debt rating of
'F1', the higher of the two Short-Term IDRs that map to an 'A-'
Long-Term IDR on our rating scale, reflect our view of a solid
liquidity profile, ample liquidity reserves and a funding profile
that is well-diversified by geography, product and customer base.
However, the cost of wholesale funding has increased in 2016 and
the bank has experienced some, but not substantial, deposit
outflows related to the negative publicity around its DoJ
settlement. The short-term ratings are on RWN because a downgrade
of the Long-Term IDR to 'BBB+' would map to a Short-Term IDR of
'F2'.

Deutsche Bank AG's DCR, deposit rating and senior market-linked
notes are rated one notch above the IDR because derivatives and
deposits will have preferential status over the bank's large
buffer of qualifying junior debt and statutorily subordinated
senior debt from January 1, 2017.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUBSIDIARIES' IDRs AND SENIOR DEBT

The IDRs and debt ratings of Deutsche Bank's rated subsidiaries
in the US and Australia are equalised with Deutsche Bank's to
reflect their core roles within the group, especially Deutsche
Bank's capital markets activities, and their high integration
with the parent bank or their role as issuing vehicles.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Deutsche Bank's Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating
Floor (SRF) of 'No Floor' reflect our view that senior creditors
cannot rely on receiving full extraordinary support from the
sovereign in the event that it becomes non-viable.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital instruments issued by
Deutsche Bank and its subsidiaries are all notched down from
Deutsche Bank's VR in accordance with our assessment of each
instrument's respective non-performance and relative loss
severity risk profiles.

Legacy Tier 1 securities are rated four notches below the VR,
reflecting higher-than-average loss severity (two notches), as
well as high risk of non-performance (an additional two notches)
given partial discretionary coupon omission.

High and low trigger contingent additional capital Tier 1 (AT1)
instruments are rated five notches below the VR. The issues are
notched down twice for loss severity, reflecting poor recoveries
as the instruments can be converted to equity or written down
well ahead of resolution. In addition, they are notched down
three times for high non-performance risk, reflecting fully
discretionary coupon omission.

Available Distributable Items (ADIs) referenced for these
securities are calculated annually under German GAAP for the
parent bank. ADIs at end-2015 were EUR1.09bn and Deutsche Bank
paid an AT1 coupon in April 2016. "We understand from the bank
that its coupon distribution capacity for 2017 can benefit from
EUR1.9bn remaining German GAAP reserves and a EUR1.6bn pro-forma
positive effect from the Hua Xia Bank sale." Fitch said.
Conversely, a settlement on outstanding litigation could trigger
impairment of goodwill at the parent bank, which would negatively
impact ADIs. However, we believe that management has sufficient
flexibility to ensure that AT1 coupons will remain current for
the foreseeable future.

Non-payment of Deutsche Bank's AT1 coupon would also be triggered
if the bank breaches its Maximum Distributable Amount (MDA)
requirement, which in 2016 refers to the 10.76% combined CET1 and
buffers requirement, including the Pillar 2 add-on resulting from
the ECB's Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP).
Deutsche Bank had a 184bp CET1 ratio buffer over this threshold
at end-9M16.

"We expect the MDA threshold to fall in 2017, so the buffer of
capital held above this will increase." Fitch said. The increased
buffer will result from a recent change to how SREP is set for EU
banks, which splits the Pillar 2 amount between a binding
requirement and non-binding guidance, and the guidance part is
excluded from the MDA. This benefit will to some extent be
counterbalanced by a decreasing buffer resulting from the bank's
declining transitional CET1 ratio as it moves through the
transitional phases until 2019 and from the increasing required
GSIB add-on. The net effect of these moving parts will depend on
the new Pillar 2 requirement for the bank set by the ECB, which
we expect Deutsche Bank to disclose at the latest with its end-
2016 results. "We expect the bank to maintain a comfortable
buffer above the ECB's MDA threshold," Fitch said.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs, VR, DCR, DEPOSIT AND SENIOR DEBT RATINGS

The RWN signals our view that Deutsche Bank's IDRs, VR and senior
debt ratings will be downgraded if one of the following occurs:
significant revenue reduction in 4Q16; failure to achieve
sufficient improvement in underlying earnings in 1Q17 to
demonstrate a competitive position and ability to build capital
to required levels; incremental litigation and misconduct
settlement charges that cannot be easily absorbed by underlying
earnings.

The IDRs would most likely be downgraded by one notch to
'BBB+'/'F2' and VR to 'bbb+', the DCR to 'A-(dcr)', deposit
ratings to 'A-'/'F2' and senior market-linked securities to 'A-'.
However, more severe downgrades could occur if the bank's
performance worsens materially beyond expectations or litigation
and regulatory charges are substantially more than provision
levels and earnings capacity.

Deutsche Bank's DCRs, deposit and debt ratings are primarily
sensitive to changes in the Long-Term IDR. In addition, Deutsche
Bank's DCRs, deposit rating and ratings of the senior structured
notes with embedded market risk are also sensitive to the amount
of subordinated and senior vanilla debt buffers relative to the
recapitalisation amount likely to be needed to restore viability
and prevent default on more senior derivative obligations,
deposits and structured notes with embedded market risk.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES

The RWN on Deutsche Bank subsidiaries' ratings reflect the RWN on
the parent bank's ratings and the ratings would move in line with
Deutsche Bank's. The SRs would be downgraded to '2' from '1' if
the parent's ratings are downgraded, reflecting a weakened
ability to support. "They are further sensitive to changes in our
assumptions around the propensity of Deutsche Bank to provide
timely support," Fitch said.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

An upgrade of Deutsche Bank's SR and upward revision of the SRF
would be contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's
propensity to support its banks. While not impossible, this is
highly unlikely in our view.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid securities are primarily
sensitive to a change in Deutsche Bank's VR. The securities'
ratings are also sensitive to a change in their notching, which
could arise if Fitch changes its assessment of the probability of
their non-performance relative to the risk captured in the
respective issuers' VRs. This may reflect a change in capital
management in the group or an unexpected shift in regulatory
buffer requirements, for example.

For AT1 instruments, non-performance risk could increase and the
instruments notched further from the VR if the MDA buffer
tightens considerably as a result of a heightened Pillar 2
binding requirement or CET1 erosion from losses. The latter would
also likely reduce ADI.

The rating actions are as follows:

   Deutsche Bank AG

   -- Long-Term IDR of 'A-' maintained on RWN

   -- Short-Term IDR of 'F1' maintained on RWN

   -- Viability Rating of 'a-' maintained on RWN

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   -- Derivative Counterparty Rating: 'A(dcr)' maintained on RWN

   -- Deposit ratings: 'A'/'F1' maintained on RWN

   -- Senior debt, including programme, ratings: 'A-'/'F1'
      maintained on RWN

   -- Senior market-linked securities: 'A-(emr)'/'F1(emr)'
      maintained on RWN

   -- Subordinated market-linked securities: 'BBB+(emr)'
      maintained on RWN

   -- Subordinated Lower Tier II debt: 'BBB+' maintained on RWN

   -- Additional Tier 1 notes: 'BB' maintained on RWN

   Deutsche Bank Securities

   -- Long-Term IDR of 'A-' maintained on RWN

   -- Short-Term IDR of 'F1' maintained on RWN

   -- Support Rating of '1' maintained on RWN

   -- Derivative Counterparty Rating of 'A-(dcr)' maintained on
      RWN

   Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas

   -- Long-Term IDR of 'A-' maintained on RWN

   -- Short-Term IDR of 'F1' maintained on RWN

   -- Support Rating of '1' maintained on RWN

   -- Senior debt, including programme, ratings of 'F1'
      maintained on RWN

   Deutsche Bank Trust Corporation

   -- Long-Term IDR of 'A-' maintained on RWN

   -- Short-Term IDR of 'F1' maintained on RWN

   -- Support Rating of '1' maintained on RWN

   -- Senior debt, including programme, ratings of 'A-'/'F1'
      maintained on RWN

   Deutsche Bank Australia Ltd.

   -- Commercial paper short-term rating of 'F1' maintained on
      RWN

   Deutsche Bank Financial LLC

   -- Short-Term IDR of 'F1' maintained on RWN

   -- Commercial paper short-term rating of 'F1' maintained on
      RWN

   -- Deutsche Bank Contingent Capital Trust II preferred
      securities rating of 'BB+' maintained on RWN

   -- Deutsche Bank Contingent Capital Trust III preferred
      securities rating of 'BB+' maintained on RWN

   -- Deutsche Bank Contingent Capital Trust IV preferred
      securities rating of 'BB+' maintained on RWN

   -- Deutsche Bank Contingent Capital Trust V preferred
      securities rating of 'BB+' maintained on RWN


===========
G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: Creditors Suspend Debt Relief Deal for Athens
-----------------------------------------------------
Harry Yorke at The Telegraph reports that Greece's creditors have
suspended a debt relief deal for Athens after the country's
leftist prime minister announced a series of spending increases
in defiance of Brussels' austerity demands.

Just days after eurozone finance ministers agreed measures
designed to shave 20 percentage points off the country's debt
share by 2060, the group reversed its decision, citing concerns
that recent spending measures announced by the Greek prime
minister Alexis Tsipras would hamper agreed budget targets, The
Telegraph relates.

According to The Telegraph, a spokesman for Eurogroup president
Jeroen Dijsselbloem said: "The institutions have concluded that
the actions of the Greek government appear to not be in line with
our agreements."

The announcements were made without consulting the country's
creditors, including austerity champion Germany, in a move many
observers believe to be a direct rebuttal of the eurozone's calls
for greater spending cuts, The Telegraph notes.

Defending the spending increases on Dec. 13, Mr. Tsipras, as
cited by The Telegraph, said that the country's creditors "should
respect the Greek people", who he added had made "huge sacrifices
in the name of Europe".

"We have carried the weight of the refugee crisis. In the name of
Europe we have, in recent years, implemented an extremely harsh
policy of austerity.

"Everything that we are doing is absolutely within the framework
of the accord which we are keeping and which our partners should
keep too."

A spokesman for the European Stability Mechanism, the bailout
fund keeping Greece afloat, said creditors would assess the
impact of recent spending decisions before coming to final
decision on future debt relief in January, The Telegraph relays.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


STAR ELM: Directors Face "Phoenix Syndrome" Charges
---------------------------------------------------
John Mulligan at Independent.ie reports that Limerick-based Star
Elm Frames, a company whose directors include the chief executive
of the Rose of Tralee festival, Anthony O'Gara, has been
embroiled in allegations that it was liquidated this year only
for the business to be effectively transferred the next day to
another individual.

The Revenue Commissioners labels such activity as "Phoenix
Syndrome", Independent.ie notes.

In 2013, the company, which made frames for windows and doors,
exited examinership after a pledge that a EUR60,000 loan would be
made to it, and an investment of EUR60,000 made in the business,
Independent.ie relates.

Revenue had opposed the scheme of arrangement, but the High Court
approved it, Independent.ie recounts.

In hearing a petition this year by the Revenue Commissioners for
the compulsorily winding up of the firm, the High Court said that
no loan or investment had been made in the business as per the
scheme of arrangement, Independent.ie relays.  It also heard that
Mr. O'Gara appeared to be acting as a non-executive director,
rather than in an executive capacity, Independent.ie states.

It was also questioned in court as to whether or not Mr. Sage had
continued to act as a shadow director, Independent.ie relays.

Revenue alleged that it had been misled in relation to the 2013
examinership process, Independent.ie notes.

On July 1 this year, the Revenue Commissioners placed public
notices that a petition by them to have Star Elm compulsorily
wound up would be heard on July 18, Independent.ie recounts.  In
March, the Revenue had issued Star Elm with a demand for almost
EUR590,000, Independent.ie states.

On July 6, Star Elm ceased trading and, according to the High
Court, appeared to have entered into a rental agreement the next
day with David Sage, Independent.ie relates.  The court, as cited
by Independent.ie, said that the Revenue Commissioner
characterizes that as a transfer of business and a "phoenix
operation".

Anthony Fitzpatrick was appointed liquidator of Star Elm by its
creditors on July 18, but the judge said he had "misunderstood"
his role as a voluntary liquidator, Independent.ie relays.

Revenue wanted a compulsory winding-up to take the place of the
creditors' winding-up, Independent.ie notes.

The judge ruled in favor of the Revenue petition and replaced
Mr. Fitzpatrick as liquidator with Mr. Miles Kirby,
Independent.ie recounts.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


MONTE DEI PASCHI: DBRS Cuts Senior Long-Term Debt Rating to B
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited lowered Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena
SpA's (BMPS or the Bank) Senior Long-Term Debt & Deposit rating
to B (low) from B (high), and the Bank's Short-Term Debt &
Deposits rating was downgraded to R-5. The Bank's Intrinsic
Assessment (IA) was also lowered to B (low). Concurrently, DBRS
changed the review on BMPS' B (low) / R-5 ratings to Developing
from Negative Implications.

The downgrade reflects the heightened execution risk for the
Bank's planned market recapitalisation, as well as increased
investor concerns over political stability in Italy following the
outcome of the Constitutional referendum. Against this backdrop,
BMPS has submitted a request to the ECB to extend the deadline
for completing its capital plan to January 20, 2017, from the
initial date set for December 31, 2016, but unofficial
indications are that the extension is unlikely to be granted.
Although DBRS still does not see a bail-in of the Bank's senior
debt as being the most likely outcome, the increasing likelihood
that the Bank may not be able to successfully raise the EUR5
billion from the markets and may need to rely upon state
intervention is a key factor in the downgrade to B (low). The
change of the review on BMPS' ratings to Developing implications
reflects DBRS' view that the ratings may be downgraded, confirmed
or upgraded depending on the evolution of the Bank's
recapitalisation.

BMPS, which reported a negative CET1 ratio of 2.2% under the
adverse scenario of the July 2016 EBA stress test, has been
attempting to raise EUR 5 billion in additional equity via a
complex plan with three interlocking pieces: (i) a debt-to-equity
swap, (ii) a capital increase, and (iii) the disposal of a
significant portion of non-performing loans (NPLs). On
December 2, BMPS' bondholders agreed to convert approximately
EUR1 billion of subordinated notes into equity as part of a
voluntary offer on EUR4.3 billion in Tier 1 and Tier 2
instruments.

Following the debt conversion, the next step in this process for
the Bank is the requirement to raise around EUR4 billion in
equity. This had been expected to come from a tranche reserved
for anchor investors, as well as a capital increase (fully non
pre-emptive) for the existing shareholders. However, in the
context of weak investor appetite and increasing political risk
post the Constitutional referendum, on December 11, the Bank
announced its intention to re-open the debt-to-equity offer for
its junior bondholders subject to the authorisation of the
relevant authorities. In addition, DBRS notes that the Bank's
capital increase is no longer supported by a pre-underwriting
agreement with a consortium of domestic and international banks.
The failure to complete the capital plan by year-end 2016, could
potentially result in the resolution of the Bank or trigger a
precautionary recapitalisation under the EU's State Aid rules.
Although burden sharing with junior debt instruments is already a
part of the Bank's recapitalisation plan, it still appears less
likely that a bail-in of senior debt instruments will take place,
given the potential knock-on effect on the rest of the Italian
banking system.

The Critical Obligations Ratings (COR) were not lowered along
with the senior debt and deposit rating and remain at BBB (low) /
R-2 (middle) Under Review with Negative Implications (URN). This
reflects DBRS' expectation that, in the event of a resolution of
the Bank, certain liabilities (such as payment and collection
services, obligations under a covered bond program, payment and
collection services, etc.) have a greater probability of avoiding
being bailed-in and are likely to be included in a going-concern
entity.

RATING DRIVERS

The B (low) / R-5 ratings, which are currently Under Review with
Developing Implications (URD), may be downgraded, confirmed or
upgraded depending on the evolution of the Bank's
recapitalisation. During the review period, DBRS will consider
any progress of the Bank's capital plan, as well as the
possibility of burden sharing and bail-in under State Aid rules.
As part of the review, DBRS will also monitor any potential
negative implications for the Bank's liquidity position linked to
the ongoing uncertainty for the Bank's recapitalisation.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


RUSPOLYMET JSC: Fitch Withdraws 'B-' LT Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn JSC Ruspolymet's ratings of as the
issuer has chosen to stop participating in the rating process.
Therefore, Fitch will no longer have sufficient information to
maintain the ratings. Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide
ratings (or analytical coverage) for JSC Ruspolymet.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Not applicable

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

   -- Long-Term Issuer Default Rating: 'B-'; Outlook Positive;
      Withdrawn

   -- Long-Term National Rating: 'BB+(rus)'; Outlook Positive;
      Withdrawn

   -- Expected senior unsecured rating: 'B-(EXP)'/RR4; Withdrawn


RCB JSC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
----------------------------------------------------
During the inspection of the financial standing of JSC RCB, its
provisional administration appointed by virtue of Bank of Russia
Order No. OD-3140, dated September 19, 2016, following the
revocation of the banking license, has revealed operations,
conducted by the bank's former management and owners and bearing
evidence of moving out assets in the amount of no less than
RUB2.7 billion, such as knowingly providing non-performing loans
to insolvent borrowers resembling shell companies.

The provisional administration has also revealed that the bank's
former management took actions to include overvalued real estate
investments in the balance sheet.

According to the provisional administration estimates, the value
of JSC RCB assets does not exceed RUR0.5 billion, while its
liabilities to creditors amount to RUR2.4 billion.

On November 14, 2016, the Court of Arbitration of the Ulyanovsk
Region made a ruling to recognize JSC RCB as insolvent (bankrupt)
and initiate bankruptcy proceedings with the state corporation
Deposit Insurance Agency appointed as a receiver.

The Bank of Russia submitted the information on financial
operations bearing evidence of criminal offences of JSC RCB
former management and owners to the Prosecutor General's Office
of the Russian Federation, the Russian Ministry of Internal
Affairs and the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation
for consideration and procedural decision-making.


=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: U.S. Court Approves Unit's Bankruptcy Exit
------------------------------------------------------
Tracy Rucinski at Reuters reports that a leading U.S. subsidiary
of Abengoa SA received U.S. court approval to exit its Chapter 11
bankruptcy, according to court records filed on Dec. 14, putting
the Spanish renewable energy group closer to achieving a global
debt-cutting plan.

Abeinsa Holding Inc. was one of dozens of U.S. Abengoa
subsidiaries that filed for U.S. bankruptcy protection while the
Seville-based parent worked out a high-stakes plan to cut $10
billion of debt and avoid its own bankruptcy in Spain, Reuters
relates.

"It is both relevant and consequential that confirmation of the
(Abeinsa) plan is a material component, and a condition, of the
global restructuring of the Spanish companies," Reuters quotes
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Carey as saying in a written ruling.

According to Reuters, under Abengoa's so-called master
restructuring agreement, big bank lenders such as Santander will
take equity in exchange for debt in the family-founded
engineering company that invested heavily to finance a quick
expansion in global renewable energy.

As part of the U.S. reorganization, Abengoa will retain its
control of the U.S. businesses, which range from engineering and
construction firms to biofuel and solar energy plants, thanks to
a US$23 million cash payment by its new bank owners, Reuters
discloses.

Abengoa will also put funds into a litigation trust to resolve
potential lawsuits and a separate reserve pool for potential
insurer claims, Reuters states.

Judge Carey overruled objections to the plan by Portland General
Electric, which had sued Abengoa over alleged cost overruns and
construction defects at a power plant in Oregon, and by the U.S.
Trustee, a government bankruptcy watchdog, Reuters relays.

While Judge Carey agreed with the U.S. Trustee's concern that
lawsuit shields provided to Abengoa and affiliated parties were
overly broad, he said there was "no doubt that the plan before me
is part of the overall restructuring of the Abengoa group",
Reuters notes.

                      About Abengoa S.A.

Spanish energy giant Abengoa S.A. is an engineering and clean
technology company with operations in more than 50 countries
worldwide that provides innovative solutions for a diverse range
of customers in the energy and environmental sectors.  Abengoa is
one of the world's top builders of power lines transporting
energy across Latin America and a top engineering and
construction business, making massive renewable-energy power
plants worldwide.

As of the end of 2015, Abengoa, S.A. was the parent company of
687 other companies around the world, including 577 subsidiaries,
78 associates, 31 joint ventures, and 211 Spanish partnerships.
Additionally, the Abengoa Group held a number of other interests
of less than 20% in other entities.

On Nov. 25, 2015 in Spain, Abengoa S.A. announced its intention
to seek protection under Article 5bis of Spanish insolvency law,
a pre-insolvency statute that permits a company to enter into
negotiations with certain creditors for restricting of its
financial affairs.  The Spanish company is facing a March 28,
2016, deadline to agree on a viability plan or restructuring plan
with its banks and bondholders, without which it could be forced
to declare bankruptcy.

On March 16, 2016, Abengoa presented its Business Plan and
Financial Restructuring Plan in Madrid to all of its
stakeholders.

                        U.S. Bankruptcy

Abengoa, S.A., and 24 of its subsidiaries filed Chapter 15
petitions (Bankr. D. Del. Case Nos. 16-10754 to 16-10778) on
March 28, 2016, to seek U.S. recognition of its restructuring
proceedings in Spain.  Christopher Morris signed the petitions as
foreign representative.  DLA Piper LLP (US) represents the
Debtors as counsel.

Involuntary petitions were filed against the three affiliated
entities -- Abengoa Bioenergy of Nebraska, LLC, Abengoa Bioenergy
Company, LLC, and Abengoa Bioenergy Biomass of Kansas, LLC
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nebraska and the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas.  The
bankruptcy cases for affiliate Abengoa Bioenergy of Nebraska, LLC
and Abengoa Bioenergy Company, LLC were converted to cases under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and transferred to the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

On Feb. 24, 2016, Abengoa Bioenergy US Holding, LLC and 5 five
other U.S. units of Abengoa S.A., which collectively own,
operate, and/or service four ethanol plants in Ravenna, York,
Colwich, and Portales, each filed a voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri.  The cases are pending before the Honorable Kathy A.
Surratt-States and are jointly administered under Case No. 16-
41161.

Abeinsa Holding Inc., and 12 other affiliates, which are energy,
engineering and environmental companies and indirect subsidiaries
of Abengoa, filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions (Bankr. D. Del.
Proposed Lead Case No. 16-10790) on March 29, 2016.

The Chapter 11 petitions were signed by Javier Ramirez as
treasurer. They listed $1 billion to $10 billion in both assets
and liabilities.

Abener Teyma Hugoton General Partnership and five other entities
filed separate Chapter 11 petitions on April 6, 2016; and Abengoa
US Holding, LLC, Abengoa US, LLC and Abengoa US Operations, LLC
filed Chapter 11 petitions on April 7, 2016.  The cases are
consolidated under Lead Case No. 16-10790.

DLA Piper LLP (US) represents the Debtors as counsel.  Prime
Clerk serves as the Debtors' claims and noticing agent.

Andrew Vara, acting U.S. trustee for Region 3, appointed five
creditors of Abeinsa Holding Inc. and its affiliates to serve on
the official committee of unsecured creditors.

The Abeinsa Committee is represented by MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT &
TUNNELL LLP's Robert J. Dehney, Esq., Andrew R. Remming, Esq.,
and Marcy J. McLaughlin, Esq.; and HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP's
Christopher R. Donoho, III, Esq., Ronald J. Silverman, Esq., and
M. Shane Johnson, Esq.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


CREDIT SUISSE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Tier 1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Credit Suisse AG's (Credit Suisse)
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and Viability Rating (VR)
at 'A' and 'a-', respectively. At the same time, Fitch has
affirmed Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGAG), the group's holding
company, at 'A-' Long-Term IDR and 'a-' VR. The ratings on Credit
Suisse's domestic subsidiary, Credit Suisse (Schweiz) AG (CS
Schweiz), have also been affirmed at 'A' Long-Term IDR and 'a'
VR.

The Outlooks on Credit Suisse's, CSGAG's and CS Schweiz's Long-
Term IDRs are Stable.

In addition, Fitch has assigned Derivative Counterparty Ratings
(DCRs) to Credit Suisse AG, Credit Suisse (Schweiz) AG and Credit
Suisse International as part of its roll-out of DCRs to
significant derivative counterparties in western Europe and the
US. DCRs are issuer ratings and express Fitch's view of banks'
relative vulnerability to default under derivative contracts with
third-party, non-government counterparties.

The rating actions have been taken in conjunction with Fitch's
periodic review of the Global Trading and Universal Banks
(GTUBs), which comprise 12 large and globally active banking
groups.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

VR, IDRs, DCRs AND SENIOR DEBT

Credit Suisse:

Credit Suisse's VR reflects the bank's strong franchise in wealth
management, domestic corporate and retail banking and selected
strengths in investment banking, in addition to sound
capitalisation, and a diversified funding profile. It also takes
into account our expectation that continued strong execution of
the group's plan, which envisages CHF4.2bn net cost savings by
end-2018 and a reallocation of resources towards capital-light
activities, should improve the earnings profile of the bank in
the medium term.

The bank's company profile is of high importance for the ratings
and balances the earnings generation of a sound, predominantly
fee-based global franchise in private banking with the downside
of the securities business. The latter's earnings are inherently
more volatile than traditional commercial banking, and account
for a material portion of the group's risk profile, which limits
upside to Credit Suisse's VR. Sales, trading, underwriting and
advisory accounted for 45% of group revenues in 9M16. "The
group's strategy to redeploy resources towards wealth management
activities should in the long-term improve Credit Suisse's
company profile, but we expect the securities business to remain
a material earnings contributor," Fitch said.

Credit Suisse has made good progress towards its strategic
targets, as it expects to have achieved CHF1.6bn net cost savings
in 2016 compared to the 2015 cost base (constant currency). The
bank announced a cost reduction target in December 2016 of CHF1bn
by end-2018 further to the previously announced CHF3bn. The bank
also exited businesses and activities, which it no longer deemed
to be strategic, contributing to a reduction of 26% in the risk-
weighted assets (RWA) of its Strategic Resolution Unit (SRU), to
CHF53bn. "While CHF846m restructuring expenses had been incurred
since the group announced its strategy in October 2015, the bank
guided for a further CHF0.6bn restructuring expenses in 2017, and
we expect performance in the medium-term to remain burdened by
restructuring and, to a lesser extent, by non-core asset exit
costs," Fitch said.

Performance in 2016 has been weak and suffered from particularly
challenging markets in 1Q16 and from the group's repositioning of
the investment bank. Fitch will look for a demonstrated longer
track record showing that the resized sales and trading business
can generate sustainable revenue above its natural cost base,
following the exits in 2Q16 from distressed debt trading and
European securitised finance, which were material revenue
contributors to Global Markets (GM). The group's wealth
management divisions generated around CHF31bn net new money in
9M16 and were generally resilient despite erosion in net margins
on assets under management (AuM).

Credit Suisse's consolidated capitalisation is in line with
peers', as the bank reached the upper end of its targeted 11% -
12% CET1 ratio range for 2016, but notable double leverage at the
level of Credit Suisse AG puts its capitalisation behind peers.
The 60bp year-to-date improvement in the group's CET1 ratio was
largely due to deleveraging of non-strategic activities. "As with
global trading and universal bank peers, we view operational and
conduct risk as one of the most relevant. We believe a potential
settlement on US RMBS, together with the annual review of
defined-benefit pension plan actuarial assumptions in 4Q16, could
put pressure on currently sound capital ratios," Fitch said.

In complying with too-big-to-fail regulatory capital requirements
in Switzerland, the bank will have to meet going concern 5%
leverage ratios (of which 3.5% in CET1) and 14.3% (of which 10%
in CET1) RWA-based capital ratios, with equivalent amounts in
gone concern capital. Consistent with its single-point-of-entry
preferred resolution strategy, we expect the bank to continue
issuing holding company senior debt to meet the shortfall of gone
concern capital requirements of a currently estimated CHF15bn by
2020. Further issuance of high-trigger additional Tier 1 capital,
which qualifies for inclusion in going-concern buffers, will also
be required.

Credit Suisse's risk controls are, in our view, sound despite
CHF1bn mark-to-market losses incurred in 4Q15 and 1Q16, and
underpin the bank's conservative underwriting standards. Although
rising, unreserved impaired loans were still a low 4% of Fitch
Core Capital at end-3Q16, largely driven by deteriorating credit
quality in International Wealth Management and Asia Pacific.
"Nonetheless, we expect its asset quality to remain strong,
despite the bank's foreign expansion strategy in wealth
management, due to prudent underwriting standards," Fitch said.

Credit Suisse's Long-Term IDR is rated one notch above the bank's
VR, reflecting our view that substantial buffers of qualifying
junior debt (QJD) and bail-in holding company senior debt provide
material protection to the bank's senior creditors. This means
the risk of the bank defaulting on senior obligations, as
measured by its Long-Term IDR, is lower than that of the bank
failing, as captured by its VR.

"We would expect resolution action being taken on Credit Suisse
when it comes close to breaching minimum capital requirements,
which we assume would be when the group's consolidated CET1 ratio
is 6% (after high-trigger capital instruments but before low-
trigger capital instruments have been triggered). We then assume
that the regulator would require Credit Suisse to be
recapitalised to a CET1 ratio of above 14.3%," Fitch said. This
assumes a restoration of its 10% minimum CET1 ratio as well as
its 4.3% Tier 1 high-trigger capital buffer (since the bank,
post-resolution action, would not be in a position to issue
capital instruments in the market).

"Our view of the regulatory intervention point and post-
resolution capital needs together suggests a junior debt buffer
above 9% of RWAs could be required to restore viability without
affecting senior creditors. At end-3Q16, the bank's QJD and bail-
in holding company senior debt buffer stood at 16% of RWAs. In
our view, capital requirements applicable to the group provide
strong incentives for the permanence of such buffers, which
underpins the uplift to Credit Suisse's Long-Term IDR," Fitch
said.

The DCR is at the same level as Credit Suisse's Long-Term IDR
because derivative counterparties have no definitive preferential
status over other senior obligations in a resolution scenario.

CSGAG:

The VR of CSGAG is equalised with that of Credit Suisse, which
accounts for 98% of the former's consolidated assets, reflecting
its almost exclusive role as Credit Suisse's holding company.
"Double leverage at CSGAG (106% at end-2015 according to our
calculation) is below the maximum 120% threshold, where we would
usually notch the holding company's VR down," Fitch said.

"CSGAG's Long-Term IDR and senior debt rating are one notch below
Credit Suisse's, because the quantum of qualifying junior debt
available as a buffer for holding company senior creditors is
insufficient to warrant a one-notch uplift, and we do not expect
it to become sufficiently large given the single-point-of-entry
resolution strategy focussed on building up total loss-absorbing
capacity (TLAC) in the form of senior holding company debt,"
Fitch said.

CSGAG's Short-Term IDR of 'F2' is at the lower of two options
mapping to a Long-Term IDR of 'A-' because group liquidity is
managed and retained at Credit Suisse level rather than at CSGAG.

TLAC-eligible senior unsecured debt issued by Credit Suisse Group
Funding (Guernsey) Limited and guaranteed by CSGAG is rated in
line with the guarantor's Long-Term IDR.

CS Schweiz:

CS Schweiz is Credit Suisse's wholly-owned domestic subsidiary,
whose Long-Term IDR is driven by its VR and reflects its low risk
domestic loan book, moderate volumes of trading assets, sound
capitalisation and a strong deposit franchise. The ratings also
reflect a strong risk correlation with its parent bank as a
result of Credit Suisse performing a central treasury role, which
caps CS Schweiz's VR at the level of Credit Suisse's Long-Term
IDR.

The rating actions today are in line with the final ratings
published on November 21 and the rating drivers are identical to
those outlined in the previous rating action commentary on CS
Schweiz.

The DCR is at the same level as CS Schweiz's Long-Term IDR
because derivative counterparties have no definitive preferential
status over other senior obligations in a resolution scenario.

SUPPORT RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATING FLOORS

Credit Suisse and CSGAG:

"CSGAG's and Credit Suisse's Support Ratings (SR) and Support
Rating Floors (SRF) reflect our view that senior creditors of
both the holding and the operating banks can no longer rely on
receiving full extraordinary support from the sovereign in the
event that Credit Suisse becomes non-viable largely due to
progress made in Swiss legislation and regulation to address the
'too big to fail' problem for the two big Swiss banks," Fitch
said.

CS Schweiz:

CS Schweiz's Support Rating of '1' reflects primarily our view
that the entity is an integral part of Credit Suisse, and whose
default would constitute significant reputational risk to its
parent, thus increasing Credit Suisse's propensity to provide
extraordinary support, if required.

While CS Schweiz makes up a significant part of the group's total
assets and equity, we believe it would be unlikely that the Swiss
regulator would impose significant restrictions on recapitalising
CS Schweiz using resources from the rest of the group, or
upstreaming capital from other Credit Suisse subsidiaries where
available. CS Schweiz's significant relative size is further
mitigated by our view that the subsidiary's need for support is
unlikely to arise simultaneously with that of other foreign
subsidiaries.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid securities issued by Credit
Suisse, CSGAG and by various issuing vehicles are all notched
down from Credit Suisse's and CSGAG's VRs in accordance with
Fitch's assessment of each instrument's respective non-
performance and relative loss severity risk profiles, which vary
considerably.

Subordinated lower Tier 2 debt is rated one notch below the VR
for loss severity, reflecting below-average recoveries.

Low trigger contingent capital Tier 2 notes are rated two notches
below the VR, reflecting loss severity, due to contractual full
and permanent write-down language.

Upper Tier 2 instruments are rated three notches below the VR,
including one notch for loss severity and two notches for
incremental non-performance risk due to cumulative coupon
deferral.

High trigger contingent capital Tier 2 notes are rated four
notches below the VR. The notes are notched down twice for loss
severity, reflecting poor recoveries as the instruments can be
converted to equity or written down well ahead of resolution. In
addition, they are notched down twice for high non-performance
risk, as the trigger can result in contractual loss absorption
ahead of non-viability.

Legacy Tier 1 securities are rated four notches below the VR,
comprising two notches for higher-than-average loss severity, and
two further notches for non-performance risk due to partly
discretionary coupon omission.

High and low trigger contingent capital Tier 1 instruments are
rated five notches below the VR. The issues are notched down
twice for loss severity, reflecting poor recoveries as the
instruments can be converted to equity or written down well ahead
of resolution. In addition, they are notched down three times for
very high non-performance risk due to fully discretionary coupon
omission.

SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES

CSI is a UK-based wholly-owned subsidiary of Credit Suisse, and
CSUSA is a US holding company directly held by Credit Suisse
Holdings (USA), Inc., the group's US intermediate holding company
(IHC). "We view these entities as integral to the group's
business and core to Credit Suisse's strategy and their Long-Term
IDRs are aligned with Credit Suisse's VR and unlike Credit
Suisse's Long-Term IDR, they do not benefit from a one-notch
uplift," Fitch said.

"We would apply the one-notch uplift to a foreign subsidiary's
Long-Term IDR and DCR if sufficient qualifying junior debt,
including internal TLAC, is allocated to ensure its
recapitalisation in a resolution event," Fitch said. The amount
of qualifying junior debt to be down-streamed to Credit Suisse's
foreign subsidiaries is unclear at this stage. The Positive
Outlook on CSUSA's Long-Term IDR reflects our view that the US
authorities will require a sizeable amount of internal TLAC to be
down-streamed to the IHC and we expect clarity on this within the
next two years.

CSI is incorporated as an unlimited liability company, which
underpins Fitch's view of an extremely high probability of
support from its parent, if needed. "However, we have not applied
the one-notch uplift because it is not clear what impact
unlimited liability status would have in protecting senior
creditors in a resolution event," Fitch said.

CSI's DCR is at the same level as the entity's Long-Term IDR
because derivative counterparties have no definitive preferential
status over other senior obligations in a resolution scenario.

CSI's and CSUSA's Short-Term IDRs of 'F1', the higher of two
Short-Term IDRS mapping to an 'A-' Long-Term IDR, reflect the
benefits for the subsidiaries of the group's central treasury
approach and strong funding and liquidity at Credit Suisse level.

The IDRs of Credit Suisse New York branch are at the same level
as those of Credit Suisse as the branch is part of the same legal
entity without any country risk restrictions. The alignment of
IDRs reflects our view that senior creditors of the branch would
be treated identically to other senior creditors of Credit
Suisse.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

VR, IDRs, DCRs AND SENIOR DEBT

Credit Suisse:

Should litigation and conduct costs significantly dent Credit
Suisse's capitalisation without a plan to restore it swiftly and
credibly on a path towards meeting the bank's targeted 13% CET1
ratio by end-2018, this would put pressure on the VR and IDRs.
Material slippage in realising the bank's targeted CHF4.2bn net
cost savings by 2018, or higher-than-expected exit costs for
legacy positions in the Strategic Resolution Unit would also be
negative for the ratings.

Should operating performance in the securities business-focused
Global Markets and Investment Banking and Capital Markets
divisions not improve as cost savings are realised and the
franchise is stabilised, this would likely lead to negative
rating action.

Upside to the ratings is limited in the short-term given
execution risks in the group's strategy and consequently our
expectation of subdued earnings in the short- to medium-term.
However, the ratings may be upgraded on materially stronger
profitability in the securities business, and resilient
performance in wealth management without compromising the bank's
currently sound capitalisation or risk appetite.

DCRs are primarily sensitive to changes in the respective
issuers' Long-Term IDRs. In addition, they could be upgraded to
one notch above the IDR if a change in legislation (for example
as recently proposed in the EU) creates legal preference for
derivatives over certain other senior obligations, and in Fitch's
view, the volume of all legally subordinated obligations provides
a substantial enough buffer to protect derivative counterparties
from default in a resolution scenario.

CSGAG:

CSGAG's Long-Term IDR is primarily sensitive to a change in the
VR. Rating sensitivities that apply to Credit Suisse are also
applicable to CSGAG. "The Stable Outlook reflects our view that
the group will continue to successfully execute its strategy and
that qualifying junior debt buffers at the CSGAG level are
unlikely to be sufficient to allow us to notch up to Long-Term
IDR from the VR, given Switzerland's single-point-of-entry
approach to bank resolution," Fitch said.

TLAC senior notes are rated in line with CSGAG's Long-Term IDR
and are therefore primarily sensitive to a change to the Long-
Term IDR.

CS Schweiz:

A longer track record of strong and stable earnings and
capitalisation could provide upside to CS Schweiz's VR, provided
it is no longer constrained at the same level by large unsecured
exposures to Credit Suisse. "Conversely, weaker capitalisation or
asset quality or reduced earnings stability than we currently
expect, or a downgrade of CS's Long-Term IDR, would put pressure
on CS Schweiz's VR," Fitch said.

"CS Schweiz's Long-Term IDR and DCR could be rated above the VR
if we believe buffers of qualifying junior debt and internal
loss-absorbing capacity pre-placed at the CS Schweiz level are
sufficient to result in a significantly lower risk of default on
CS Schweiz's senior obligations than the risk of the bank
failing. For this to happen we would have to conclude that CS
Schweiz could reach a higher Long-Term IDR were the buffers in
the form of Fitch Core Capital, which is unlikely given the close
risk correlation with its parent," Fitch said. Clear requirements
on internal buffers at CS Schweiz ensuring their permanence would
also be necessary for its Long-Term IDR to be rated above its VR.

SUPPORT RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATING FLOORS

Credit Suisse and CSGAG:

An upgrade to Credit Suisse's or CSGAG's SRs and an upward
revision to the SRFs would be contingent on a positive change in
Switzerland's propensity to support its banks. "This is highly
unlikely in our view, though not impossible," Fitch said.

CS Schweiz:

The Support Rating is sensitive to changes in our assessment of
Credit Suisse's ability to provide extraordinary support to CS
Schweiz as well as the importance of CS Schweiz to the rest of
the group.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital ratings are primarily
sensitive to a change in the VRs of Credit Suisse or CSGAG. The
securities' ratings are also sensitive to a change in their
notching, which could arise if Fitch changes its assessment of
the probability of their non-performance relative to the risk
captured in the respective issuers' VRs. This may reflect a
change in capital management in the group or an unexpected shift
in regulatory buffer requirements, for example.

SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES

CSI's and CSUSA's Long-Term IDRs are sensitive to changes in the
parent bank Credit Suisse's VR. The subsidiaries' Long-Term IDRs
could benefit from a one-notch uplift if we believe that
sufficient TLAC will be down-streamed from the parent to the
subsidiaries to recapitalise them sufficiently in a resolution
event.

"We expect internal TLAC requirements to become binding for
Credit Suisse's US IHC from January 1, 2019. Once regulatory
requirements on TLAC pre-positioning in the US IHC are in force
and the bank commits to pre-placing these debt buffers, this
could result in CSUSA's Long-Term IDR being upgraded by one notch
and aligned with Credit Suisse's, if we conclude that the buffers
provide sufficient additional protection to CSUSA's senior
creditors," Fitch said.

Similarly, further clarity on internal TLAC pre-positioning for
CSI or clarity favouring support from its Swiss parent in a
resolution scenario due to its unlimited liability status could
lead to a one-notch upgrade of its Long-Term IDR.

The subsidiaries' IDRs are sensitive to adverse changes in the
parent's propensity to provide support.

The rating actions are as follows:

   Credit Suisse:

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Derivative Counterparty Rating: assigned at 'A(dcr)'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a-'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   -- Senior unsecured debt (including programme ratings):
      affirmed at 'A'/'F1'

   -- Senior market-linked notes: affirmed at 'Aemr'

   -- Subordinated lower Tier 2 notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'

   -- Subordinated notes: affirmed at 'BBB'

   -- Tier 1 notes and preferred securities: affirmed at 'BB+'

   Credit Suisse Group AG:

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a-'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   -- Senior unsecured debt (including programme ratings):
      affirmed at 'A-'/'F2'

   -- Senior market-linked notes: affirmed at 'A-emr'

   -- Subordinated notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'

   -- Additional Tier 1 notes: affirmed at 'BB'

   -- Preferred stock (ISIN XS0148995888): affirmed at 'BBB-'

   Credit Suisse (Schweiz) AG

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Derivative Counterparty Rating: assigned at 'A(dcr)'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

   Credit Suisse International:

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Derivative Counterparty Rating: assigned at 'A-(dcr)'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

   -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A-'

   -- Commercial paper programme: affirmed at 'F1'

   Credit Suisse (USA) Inc.:

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A-', Outlook Positive

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

   -- Senior unsecured debt (including programme ratings):
      affirmed at 'A-'

   -- Commercial paper programme: affirmed at 'F1'

   Credit Suisse NY (branch):

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A', Outlook Stable

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Senior unsecured debt (including programme ratings):
      affirmed at 'A'

   -- Commercial paper programme: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Senior market-linked notes: affirmed at 'Aemr'

   Credit Suisse Group Funding (Guernsey) Limited

   -- Senior unsecured notes (with TLAC language): affirmed at
      'A-'/'F2'

   Credit Suisse Group (Guernsey) II Limited

   -- Tier 1 buffer capital perpetual notes: affirmed at 'BB'

   Credit Suisse Group (Guernsey) IV Limited

   -- Tier 2 contingent notes: affirmed at 'BB+'


UBS GROUP: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Tier 1 Subordinated Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed UBS Group AG's Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'A' and UBS AG's and UBS Switzerland AG's
Long-Term IDRs at 'A+'. Fitch has also affirmed all three
entities' Viability Rating (VR) at 'a' and Short-Term IDRs at
'F1'. The Outlook on the Long-Term IDR of UBG Group is Positive
while that of UBS AG and UBS Switzerland AG is Stable.

Fitch has also affirmed the ratings of UBS Limited and UBS Bank
USA, as well as the ratings of the group's issuing vehicles.

In addition, Fitch has assigned Derivative Counterparty Ratings
(DCR) to UBS AG, UBS Switzerland AG and UBS Limited as part of
its roll-out of DCRs to significant derivative counterparties in
western Europe and the US. DCRs are issuer ratings and express
Fitch's view of banks' relative vulnerability to default under
derivative contracts with third-party, non-government
counterparties.

The Positive Outlook on UBS Group AG's IDR reflects Fitch's view
that the group's VR, as well as the VR of UBS AG and UBS
Switzerland AG, could be upgraded if the group establishes a
longer track record of generating improved, sound and stable
earnings despite challenging markets. UBS AG's and UBS
Switzerland AG's Stable Outlooks reflect Fitch's view that their
Long-Term IDR would be unlikely to benefit from an uplift above
the VR if their VR is upgraded to 'a+' due to the group's current
business model, which in our view constrains the ratings to the
'A'/'a' categories.

The rating actions have been taken in conjunction with Fitch's
periodic review of the Global Trading and Universal Banks
(GTUBs), which comprise 12 large and globally active banking
groups.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

VRs

"UBS AG and UBS Switzerland AG have common VRs as we believe that
the credit profiles of the two operating entities will remain
closely connected, at least for as long as UBS Switzerland AG
remains a subsidiary of UBS AG," Fitch said. UBS Switzerland AG's
large size, with just under CHF300bn total assets under Swiss
GAAP, in relation to UBS AG's consolidated assets (CHF936bn under
IFRS) also drives the common VR.

In Fitch's opinion, the joint and several liability arrangement
between UBS AG and UBS Switzerland AG underpins the close
integration of the two entities. At end-3Q16, UBS Switzerland AG
assumed joint liability for about CHF95bn of contractual
obligations of UBS AG. The joint liability of UBS AG for
obligations of UBS Switzerland AG at the same date was
immaterial.

The VRs reflect the group's well-defined and executed strategy to
remain a leading global asset gatherer through net new money
growth, while maintaining large domestic personal and corporate
banking activities and running a sizeable investment bank. The
group has reduced its risk profile by tightening controls and
outlining a clearly defined risk appetite. It has strengthened
its balance sheet by building up capital and reducing tail risk
by exiting businesses which it considers higher-risk and no
longer strategic. The group's funding and liquidity are strong
and stable and benefit from the group's global wealth management
operations, as well as a strong domestic retail and commercial
banking franchise.

However, a factor of high importance in our assessment of the VR
is the business model, which is complex and reliant on market
sentiment and customer transaction volumes, both of which
contribute to earnings volatility. "This constraint on the
ratings stems from the continued material weighting of capital
markets in UBS's business model, although we believe this is
necessary to retain the group's leading global wealth management
presence, as ultra-high net worth individuals are an increasingly
important part of this market," Fitch said.

"Market conditions in all its businesses, including wealth
management and domestic banking, are likely to remain challenging
in 2017, in our view," Fitch said. Nonetheless, the bank has
addressed the pressure on margins with a plan to reduce costs in
the business by CHF2.1bn p.a. by end-2017, and is well on its way
to meeting this target. Eventually, this should enable it to
generate robust and stable earnings, which could result in an
upgrade of its VR.

Profitability in 2016 has been weighed down by restructuring
charges, and this is likely to continue in 2017. "Provisions for
litigation, regulatory and similar matters have been material and
we expect them to remain a drag on earnings at least for the
coming year, given pending legal cases and regulatory
investigations," Fitch said. While the extent of further
litigation costs is hard to predict, the ratings factor in our
assumptions that the bank's litigation reserves and
capitalisation, if required, could absorb sizeable further
misconduct and litigation costs.

Capital ratios based on risk-weighted assets (RWAs) are among the
strongest in the GTUB peer group, with UBS Group AG reporting a
consolidated 14% fully-applied Basel III common equity Tier 1
(CET1) ratio at end-3Q16. "Leverage, however, is still high and
we expect the group's leverage ratio to continue to improve as
UBS retains earnings and issues additional Tier 1 (AT1)
instruments. UBS will have to meet the new Swiss regulatory
requirement of a minimum 5% tier 1 leverage ratio by end-2019.
Our ratings are based on the assumption that UBS will meet the
new requirements for going- and gone-concern capital required
under the revised Swiss regulations for the country's two global
systemically important banks (G-SIBs)," Fitch said.

"We expect the group to continue to manage capital and funding on
a group-wide basis, but regulatory requirements for individual
legal entities will, in our opinion, result in an increasing
focus on local capital and liquidity requirements," Fitch said.

"We have equalised UBS Group AG's VR with the common VR of UBS AG
and UBS Switzerland AG because of UBS Group AG's role as the
group's holding company and the issuer (or guarantor) of loss-
absorbing capacity (LAC), including AT1 instruments and senior
unsecured long-term debt. We do not expect double leverage at the
holding company to exceed 120%, a level at which we would
consider notching the holding company's VR below the operating
banks' VRs. We expect the holding company to maintain prudent
management of liquidity, which should be helped by existing
policies to manage liquidity across a large number of legal
entities globally," Fitch said.

IDRS, DCR AND SENIOR DEBT

"We rate UBS AG's and UBS Switzerland AG's IDRs and senior debt
ratings one notch above their VR because we believe that the
group's buffer of qualifying junior debt (QJD), combined with
senior debt issued by the holding company, is sufficient to
protect their senior obligations from default in case of failure,
either under a resolution process or as part of a private sector
solution (such as a distressed debt exchange) to avoid a
resolution action. We therefore consider that the risk of default
on UBS AG's and UBS Switzerland AG's senior obligations, as
measured by the Long-Term IDRs, is lower than the risk of the
banks failing, as measured by their VRs," Fitch said.

"Our assumption is that absent a private sector solution, a
resolution action is taken on UBS if it breaches a CET1 ratio of
6% (after high-trigger capital instruments but before low-trigger
capital instruments have been triggered). We assume that the
regulator would require UBS to be recapitalised to a CET1 ratio
of above 14.3% on a consolidated basis. This means that the
group's 10% minimum CET1 ratio as well as its 4.3% Tier 1 high-
trigger capital buffer would be met with CET1 capital post-
resolution as the group at that point would in our opinion not be
in a position to issue capital instruments in the market," Fitch
said.

"Our view of the regulatory intervention point and post-
resolution capital needs together suggests that a combined buffer
of qualifying junior debt and holding company senior debt of
above 9% of RWAs could be required to restore viability without
imposing losses on the operating companies' senior creditors,"
Fitch said.

At end-3Q16, UBS's qualifying junior debt and holding company
senior debt buffer amounted to about CHF36bn, equal to 17% of
end-3Q16 RWAs or 4.2% of the leverage ratio denominator. This
amount, in Fitch's opinion, should be sufficient to recapitalise
the group in a resolution scenario to meet adequate CET1 and
leverage ratios. "We believe that the revised Swiss going- and
gone-concern capital requirements provide strong and transparent
incentives to ensure that these buffers remain in place," Fitch
said.

"We have not applied this one-notch uplift to UBS Group AG's IDR
as its QJD buffer is insufficient to recapitalise it to minimum
requirements. We also do not expect it to become sufficiently
large given the single-point-of-entry resolution strategy based
on issuing external senior debt at holding company level and
down-streaming it to operating companies. Consequently, its IDR
is at the same level as its VR," Fitch said.

UBS AG's, UBS Switzerland AG's and UBS Group AG's Short-Term IDRs
are 'F1', the rating which maps onto a Long-Term IDR of either an
'A' or an 'A+'. "For the operating banks, we have applied the
lower of two potential Short-Term ratings mapping to an 'A+'
because the Long-Term IDR benefits from the buffer uplift above
the VR, and there is no specific driver from the buffer favouring
repayment in the short-term," Fitch said.

The DCRs assigned to UBS AG and UBS Switzerland AG are in line
with their respective IDRs because they have no definitive
preferential status over other senior obligations in a resolution
scenario.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The Support Ratings and Support Rating Floors reflect Fitch's
view that senior creditors can no longer rely on receiving full
extraordinary support from the sovereign in the event that UBS
Group AG, UBS AG or UBS Switzerland AG become non-viable.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other junior and hybrid capital issued by
UBS Group AG, UBS AG and its affiliates are all notched down from
UBS AG's or UBS Group AG's VR in accordance with Fitch's
assessment of each instrument's respective non-performance and
relative loss severity risk profiles, which vary considerably.

Legacy subordinated lower Tier 2 debt is rated one notch below
the VR for loss severity, reflecting below-average recoveries.

Low trigger contingent capital Tier 2 notes are rated two notches
below the VR, reflecting loss severity in the form of contractual
full and permanent write-down language.

Legacy Tier 1 securities are rated four notches below the VR,
comprising two notches for loss severity, and two further notches
for non-performance risk due to partly discretionary coupon
omission.

High and low trigger additional Tier 1 instruments are rated five
notches below the VR. The notes are notched twice for loss
severity, and three times for non-performance risk due to fully
discretionary coupon omission.

SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES

London-based UBS Limited is a wholly owned subsidiary of UBS AG.
Its Support Rating, IDR, DCR and debt ratings reflect Fitch's
view that UBS Limited as a key part of the UBS group and
integrated into its investment banking activities.

UBS Limited's contractual counterparties continue to benefit from
an irrevocable and unconditional guarantee by UBS, which further
supports our view that the subsidiary is an integral part of the
group's business. "We therefore see an extremely high probability
that UBS AG would support it if needed, leading to the
equalisation of their IDRs and debt ratings. The DCR assigned to
UBS Limited is in line with its IDR as we believe UK legislation
provides no explicit protection to derivative counterparties
relative to other senior creditors," Fitch said.

UBS Bank USA is a direct subsidiary of UBS Americas Inc., which
in turn is wholly owned by UBS AG through UBS Americas Holdings
LLC. The Support and Short-Term ratings reflect Fitch's view of
UBS Bank USA's integration and important role within the group
would mean an extremely high probability of support from UBS AG
in case of need.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

VR

"The VRs of UBS Group AG, UBS AG and UBS Switzerland AG may be
upgraded to 'a+' once we see a longer track record of sustainably
improved earnings. Such improvement would be driven by the
restructuring the UBS group has undertaken, by reduced tail risk
when legacy regulatory and litigation issues are settled, and by
lower risk from tightened controls, supplemented by revenue
momentum. However, we expect pressure on earnings from the
challenging market to persist well into 2017," Fitch said.

"Conversely, ratings could be under pressure if the bank's
revenue and earnings demonstrate excessive vulnerability to
market volatility, which could be indicated by losses in the
investment bank business division arising from spikes in market
volatility or earnings volatility exceeding that of its global
peers, neither of which we expect," Fitch said.

Ratings would also be downgraded if misconduct and litigation
costs are higher than our expectations and affect the group's
capitalisation with no credible plan for restoring it over a
reasonably short period. Any material restrictions on the group's
ability to conduct businesses, which could be the result of
penalties by authorities, would also put the ratings under
pressure.

UBS Switzerland AG's VR is also sensitive to a change in the
subsidiary's integration in the group. Should it become less
integrated, which could occur if higher-than-expected amounts of
regulatory capital are trapped in the subsidiary, the VRs could
diverge. A material reduction in UBS Switzerland AG's exposure to
its parent, or the complete run-off of the joint and several
liability arrangements between the two entities could also result
in rating differentiation over time. "We expect capital in excess
of regulatory requirements and the management buffer to be up-
streamed to UBS AG, at least for as long as the group entities
remain strongly investment-grade," Fitch said.

Changes to UBS's group structure, including changes to UBS
Switzerland AG's ownership structure, could also result in rating
differentiation in the VRs if Fitch concludes that this reduces
UBS Switzerland AG's, UBS AG's and other group entities'
integration with each other. The group has stated that it is
considering further changes to its legal structure, which could
include the transfer of operating subsidiaries of UBS AG to
become direct subsidiaries of UBS Group AG and the creation of
additional subsidiaries.

In addition to the factors above UBS Group AG's VR could be
notched down from UBS AG's VR if double leverage at the holding
company increases above 120% or if the role of the holding
company changes.

IDRs, DCRs AND SENIOR DEBT

UBS Group AG's IDRs are primarily sensitive to a change in the
group's VR. In addition, UBS AG's and UBS Switzerland AG's IDRs
are sensitive to the presence of sufficient QJD to recapitalise
the banks to the minimum requirements of the regulators.

"Our criteria allow us to apply the one-notch uplift to the IDRs
of the two operating banks above their VRs, only if the higher
rating could achieved were their debt buffer in the form of Fitch
Core Capital. However, as we believe that the group's business
model constrains the IDRs to the 'A' category, we would not give
the Long-Term IDRs any uplift above VRs of 'a+'. In the event of
VR upgrades to 'a+', the Long-Term IDRs of all three entities
would be 'A+'," Fitch said.

DCRs and senior notes are rated in line with the various UBS
companies' respective Long-Term IDRs and are therefore primarily
sensitive to a change to the IDRs. As with the IDRs at 'A+', the
DCRs are at the top of the rating range implied by the group's
company profile.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

An upgrade of the Support Rating and upward revision of the
Support Rating Floor would be contingent on a positive change in
the sovereign's propensity to support its banks. While not
impossible, this is highly unlikely in Fitch's view.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings of UBS AG's and UBS Group AG's subordinated and
hybrid debt issues are primarily sensitive to a change in their
respective VRs. The securities' ratings are also sensitive to a
change in their notching, which could arise if Fitch changes its
assessment of the probability of their non-performance relative
to the risk captured in the respective issuers' VRs. This may
reflect a change in capital management in the group or an
unexpected shift in regulatory buffer requirements, for example.

SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES

The ratings of UBS Limited are primarily sensitive to a change in
UBS AG's IDRs. In addition, should regulatory developments lead
to the subsidiary becoming less integrated within UBS AG, e.g.
through restrictions on intragroup funding flows, this could
result in a downgrade of the UK subsidiary.

UBS Bank USA's Short-Term IDR, which is derived from the bank's
implicit Long-Term IDR, is primarily sensitive to UBS AG's
ability and propensity to support the subsidiary. Its ability is
primarily sensitive to a change in UBS AG's VR and any regulatory
restrictions placed on capital or liquidity supply from UBS AG.
Its propensity to support it is driven by the subsidiary's
importance and role in the group.

The rating actions are as follows:

   UBS Group AG

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Positive

   -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   -- Tier 1 subordinated notes ('high-trigger'): affirmed at
      'BB+'

   -- Tier 1 subordinated notes ('low-trigger'): affirmed at
      'BB+'

   UBS AG

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A+', Outlook Stable

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   -- Derivative Counterparty Rating: assigned at 'A+ (dcr)'

   -- Long-Term and Short-Term senior unsecured debt: affirmed at
      'A+'/'F1'

   -- Senior unsecured market linked securities: affirmed at
      'A+emr'

   -- Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'A-'

   -- Tier 2 subordinated notes (low-trigger loss-absorbing
      notes): affirmed at 'BBB+'

   -- Commercial paper: affirmed at 'A+'/'F1'

   UBS Switzerland AG

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook Stable

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   -- Derivative Counterparty Rating: assigned at 'A+ (dcr)'

   UBS Limited

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook Stable

   -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

   -- Derivative Counterparty Rating: assigned at 'A+ (dcr)'

   UBS Bank USA

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

   UBS Group Funding (Jersey) Limited

   -- Unsubordinated notes: affirmed at 'A'

   -- Senior debt programme: affirmed at 'A'/'F1'

   -- UBS Capital Securities (Jersey Ltd) Preferred Securities:
      affirmed at 'BBB-'


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


DTEK ENERGY: Eurobond Holders Allowed to Vote on Restructuring
--------------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the Royal Courts of Justice
(London) has allowed Ukraine's largest private energy holding
DTEK Energy to convene eurobond holders to vote on the issue of
the long-term restructuring of the securities.

The court made the corresponding ruling on December 2, 2016,
Interfax-Ukraine relates.

"DTEK Energy plans the results of voting will be known no later
than December 19.  After that the issuer will go to court for the
final approval of the results and obtaining authorization to use
the results of voting to all eurobond holders," Interfax-Ukraine
quotes the company as saying.

DTEK Energy at the beginning of April 2016 announced inability to
pay coupons on eurobonds for US$750 million with a rate of 7.875%
per annum and maturing on April 4, 2018, and on eurobonds worth
US$160 million at a rate of 10.375% maturing on April 28, 2018,
Interfax-Ukraine recounts.

The energy holding attracted Rothschild as an adviser on
organization of restructuring and Latham & Watkins as a legal
advisor and initiated an agreement on a temporary moratorium and
standstill for the period until October 28, 2016, Interfax-
Ukraine discloses.  During the period of the moratorium the
energy holding planned to conduct the full-scale restructuring of
the capital structure, Interfax-Ukraine notes.

DTEK is the largest privately-owned vertically-integrated energy
company in Ukraine.

                             *   *   *

On May 20, 2016, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported
that Moody's Investor Service downgraded the probability of
default rating of DTEK ENERGY B.V (DTEK) to D-PD from Ca-PD. At
the same time, Moody's affirmed DTEK's corporate family rating
(CFR) Ca rating and also the Ca rating of DTEK Finance Plc's $750
million 7.875% notes due April 4, 2018 with a loss given default
(LGD) assessment of LGD4/50%. The outlook on all ratings remains
negative.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 14,
2016, Fitch Ratings downgraded Ukraine-based DTEK Energy B.V.'s
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD' (Restricted
Default) from 'C', as Fitch understands from management that the
company is in the payment default under several bank loans due to
uncured expiry of the grace period on some bank debt.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BARCLAYS PLC: Fitch Affirms BB+ Addt'l Tier 1 Instruments' Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Barclays plc's and Barclays Bank plc's
Long- and Short-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'A'/'F1' and
Viability Ratings (VRs) at 'a'. The Outlooks are Stable. Fitch
has also assigned a Derivative Counterparty Rating (DCR) of 'A'
to Barclays Bank plc.

Fitch has assigned a Derivative Counterparty Rating (DCR) of 'A'
to Barclays Bank as part of its roll-out of DCRs to significant
derivative counterparties in western Europe and the US. DCRs are
issuer ratings and express Fitch's view of banks' relative
vulnerability to default under derivative contracts with third-
party, non-government counterparties.

The rating actions have been taken in conjunction with Fitch's
periodic review of the Global Trading and Universal Banks (GTUB),
which comprises 12 large and globally active banking groups.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR, SENIOR DEBT, and DCR

Barclays' (the holding company) and Barclays Bank's (the
operating company) ratings are analysed on a consolidated basis
as their VRs are driven substantially by the same factors, with
no significant difference in the likelihood of failure between
the two entities, in our view. The VRs of the two entities are at
the same level, and in both cases, the VRs drive the IDRs.

The VRs and IDRs of the two entities are equalised because of the
lack of holding company double leverage and as yet insufficient
junior debt buffer to protect the operating company's senior
debt. Because senior debt down-streamed from the holding company
to Barclays Bank should rank pari-passu with Barclays Banks'
external senior creditors in resolution, in our view it does not
afford any protection to Barclays Bank's external senior
creditors.

"Our assessment of the VRs places high importance on Barclays'
company profile, which benefits from a balanced and well-
diversified core business model and strong franchises in domestic
retail and commercial banking, and UK and US cards," Fitch said.
Its capital markets activities, which we regard as more volatile,
have been scaled back, but remain sizeable, effectively limiting
the VR's upside. Barclays non-core (BNC) and its associated tail
risk are gradually diminishing but parts of it will remain and
will be re-integrated within the bank.

The group's company profile is still evolving, with large parts
(Barclays Africa Group Limited (BAGL) and BNC) earmarked for
sale. In addition the bank has set up an intermediate holding
company (IHC) in the US in July 2016 and is planning to set up a
new bank to contain ring-fenced domestic activities by 2019.
These changes are costly and could lead to business disruptions.
The increased subsidiarisation of businesses, which leads to
reduced fungibility of capital and liquidity, also acts as a
constraint on the group's VR.

Barclays' common equity tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 11.6% and leverage
ratio of 4.2% at end-9M16 are commensurate with the bank's risk
profile and broadly in line with European GTUB peers. The group's
capital planning foresees further strengthening of the CET1 ratio
to 100-150bp above fully-loaded regulatory requirements,
currently at 10.8% (based on end-2015 risk-weighted assets
(RWAs)). "We expect Barclays to achieve this primarily through
deleveraging (planned run-down of BNC and deconsolidation of
BAGL), given that internal capital generation is challenged by
costs associated with restructuring, business sales and
litigation. The reduction in the dividend until end-2017 should
also support this," Fitch said.

Barclays' modest profitability is a result of a satisfactory
underlying performance by the group's core businesses, dragged
down by losses related to the non-core unit and charges for
previous misconduct. The group's core businesses achieved an
underlying 10.7% return on tangible equity (RoTE) during 9M16,
aided by continued healthy performance in the cards businesses,
strong third quarter trading results and the appreciation of the
US dollar against sterling, but net of non-core losses and other
items, RoTE was just 4.4%.

"We expect profitability to remain under pressure in 2017. In the
UK businesses, we expect low base rates, lower volumes of
business and higher loan impairment charges, relating to
uncertainties around Brexit," Fitch said. Restructuring and
business disposal-related charges will likely remain high as
Barclays progresses with its plan to run-down BNC. Litigation
costs, which in 9M16 mainly related to UK customer redress, will
likely continue to burden profitability as the group works
through its legacy cases. Barclays continues to focus on
improving cost efficiency through strategic cost-cutting
programmes, but the long-term cost-income ratio target, which is
now set at below 60%, is ambitious in our view.

Fitch believes that Barclays' NPLs are at a cyclical low,
underpinned by a benign economic environment and low interest
rates in the group's key markets UK and US. "A high share of
unsecured lending in the UK and US expose Barclays to some loan
quality deterioration if the economic environment worsens, which
we expect to a certain extent after the Brexit vote, and if
interest rates increase in the US. But overall we expect the
group's moderate risk appetite, and its reducing footprint in
countries with weaker asset quality, to mitigate this," Fitch
said.

Barclays' well-matched and diversified funding profile benefits
from the group's domestic retail franchise to fund retail assets
and good market access to fund wholesale operations. Barclays'
funding structure is evolving because of the group's resolution
planning and structural changes required around ring-fencing.
Liquidity is ample, with a loan coverage ratio (LCR) at 125% and
an available liquidity pool of GBP157bn well above requirements.

The minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities
(MREL) set by the Bank of England, equivalent to 24% of RWAs) by
2022, suggests that the group will be an active issuer of
eligible debt over the next few years. The UK's approach to
resolution planning means that Barclays is required to use
structural subordination, involving the issuance of external MREL
through the holding company, to meet requirements. Currently
externally raised funds are down-streamed as corresponding
instruments to the operating company, which means that as they
stand they would rank pari-passu in resolution. "We expect that
this will change once internal MREL requirements are known and
the future shape of the group materializes," Fitch said.

The bank has seen material senior management turnover over the
past three years, which as with other GTUB peers, highlights the
challenges to restore profitability in light of higher capital
requirements and high costs related to past misconduct. Barclays'
strategy has evolved, but the plan to become increasingly focused
on transatlantic consumer, corporate and investment banking
businesses supports and extends past strategic reviews. "At the
same time, we view that a certain degree of fine-tuning is
inherent to Barclays' capital markets businesses and a necessary
reaction to the evolving regulatory environment. We judge that
the bank's execution on building capital and reshaping its
businesses has been adequate so far, but execution risk related
to implementing structural reform and down-sizing BNC and
reducing its stake in African banking, remain substantial," Fitch
said.

The Stable Outlook is based on Fitch's expectation that the BNC
targets will be achieved in a capital-accretive way and in a
sufficient quantity to allow the group to achieve its stated
capital trajectory over the medium-term. This will be despite
expected losses in this division and possibly large additional
conduct and litigation charges.

A DCR has been assigned to Barclays Bank because it has
significant derivatives activity. The DCR is at the same level as
Barclays Bank's Long-Term IDRs because derivative counterparties
have no definitive preferential status over other senior
obligations in a resolution scenario.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Barclays Bank's and Barclays plc's SRs and SRFs reflect Fitch's
view that senior creditors of the bank and the holding company
cannot rely on extraordinary support from the sovereign in the
event that Barclays Bank becomes non-viable. In our opinion, the
UK has implemented legislation and regulations to provide a
framework that is likely to require senior creditors
participating in losses for resolving even large banking groups.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by Barclays
Bank and Barclays are all notched down from their respective VRs,
in accordance with Fitch's assessment of each instrument's
respective non-performance and relative loss severity risk
profiles, which vary considerably.

Subordinated lower Tier 2 debt is rated one notch below the VR
for loss severity, reflecting below-average recoveries. Upper
Tier 2 instruments are rated three notches below the VR,
including one notch for loss severity and two notches for
incremental non-performance risk, reflecting cumulative coupon
deferral.

High trigger contingent capital Tier 2 notes are rated four
notches below the VR. The notes are notched down twice for loss
severity, reflecting loss absorption if the bank breaches a 7%
CRD IV transitional (FSA October 2012 statement) CET1 ratio. In
addition, they are notched down twice for non-performance risk.

Barclays' high-trigger contingent capital Tier 1 instruments and
preference shares with no constraints on coupon omission are
rated five notches below the VR. The issues are notched down
twice for loss severity, reflecting poor recoveries as the
instruments can be converted to equity or written down well ahead
of resolution. In addition, they are notched down three times for
very high non-performance risk due to fully discretionary coupon
omission.

Other legacy Tier 1 securities are rated four notches below the
VR, comprising two notches for higher-than-average loss severity,
and two further notches for non-performance risk due to partly
discretionary coupon omission.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, VR, SENIOR DEBT and DCR

Barclays' and Barclays Bank's IDRs, VRs and senior debt ratings
are primarily sensitive to the group's progress in meeting
performance and capital targets, as the ratings rely on our
expectation that the release of RWAs will be sufficient to absorb
non-core and misconduct costs.

Failure to reduce exposure in a timely and controlled manner,
leading to persistently weaker profitability and capital ratios,
could put the ratings under pressure. Upside for the VR is
limited in the medium term unless the bank shows sustainable
improvement in earnings, resulting in a materially stronger
capacity to generate capital internally.

The VRs and IDRs are also sensitive to a material worsening of
earnings and asset quality if the economic environment
deteriorates substantially following the UK's decision to leave
the EU. The ratings would also come under pressure if the bank
increases its risk appetite materially, particularly in the
corporate and investment banking division.

The creation of separately capitalised and ring-fenced legal
entities within the group could result in rating differentiation.
Barclays has indicated that it plans to transfer domestic retail
and the UK SME portfolio currently in Barclays Bank plc to a new
legal entity in 1H18, in preparation for meeting UK ring-fencing
requirements by 2019. "Fitch expects to incorporate such
considerations into the ratings once we have sufficient and
credible information to form an opinion around the
creditworthiness of the future ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced
entities separately, and of the impact on the group, if any, in
light of the planned changes. We expect any rating
differentiation between legal entities arising from UK ring-
fencing requirements to be small," Fitch said.

The Long-Term IDRs of Barclays plc are equalised with its VR.
Fitch does not consider the group's layer of subordinated debt
and hybrid capital instruments to be large enough to provide
sufficient protection to senior debt-holders such as to warrant
an uplift of the group's IDR above its VR. Barclays plc' IDR
could be rated above the VR if the group materially increases its
qualifying junior debt buffer. "Conversely it could be rated
lower if common equity double leverage increases above 120% or if
the role of the holding company changes, both of which we do not
expect," Fitch said.

Barclays Bank's IDR could be upgraded one notch above the VR if
the quantum of debt issued by the holding company and Barclays
Bank's own external qualifying junior debt are sufficient and
structurally subordinated to provide greater protection to other
senior creditors of Barclays Bank. External senior debt issued by
the holding company is currently down-streamed as senior debt to
Barclays Bank and ranks pari passu with Barclays Bank's external
senior debt.

The DCR is primarily sensitive to changes in Barclays Bank's
Long-term IDRs. In addition, it could be upgraded to one notch
above the IDR if a change in legislation (for example as recently
proposed in the EU) creates legal preference for derivatives over
certain other senior obligations and if, in Fitch's view, the
volume of all legally subordinated obligations provides a
substantial enough buffer to protect derivative counterparties
from default in a resolution scenario.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

An upgrade of Barclays Bank's SR and upward revision of its SRF
would be contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's
propensity to support its banks, which we do not expect.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital ratings are primarily
sensitive to changes in the VRs of Barclays Bank plc and Barclays
plc. The securities' ratings are also sensitive to a change in
their notching, which could arise if Fitch changes its assessment
of the probability of their non-performance relative to the risk
captured in the respective issuers' VRs. This may reflect a
change in capital management in the group or an unexpected shift
in regulatory buffer requirements, for example.

The rating actions are as follows:

   Barclays Bank Plc

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   -- Derivative Counterparty Rating: assigned at 'A(dcr)'

   -- Senior unsecured debt, including programme ratings:
      affirmed at 'A'/ 'F1'

   -- Commercial paper and certificates of deposits: affirmed at
      'F1'

   -- Market-linked senior securities: affirmed at 'Aemr'

   -- Government-guaranteed senior long-term debt: affirmed at
      'AA'

   -- Lower Tier 2 debt: affirmed at 'A-'

   -- Upper Tier 2 debt: affirmed at 'BBB'

   -- Additional Tier 1 instruments: affirmed at 'BB+'

   -- Preference shares with no constraints on coupon omission:
      affirmed at 'BB+'

   -- Other hybrid Tier 1 instruments: affirmed at 'BBB-'

   -- Tier 2 contingent capital notes (US06740L8C27): affirmed at
      'BBB-'

   Barclays plc

   -- Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable

   -- Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'a'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

   -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

   -- Senior debt including programme ratings: affirmed at
      'A'/'F1'

   -- Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1'

   -- Tier 2 instruments: affirmed at 'A-'

   -- Basel III-compliant additional Tier 1 instruments: affirmed
      at 'BB+'

   Barclays US CCP Funding LLC

   -- US repo notes programme: affirmed at 'F1'


LONDON WELSH: Winding-Up Petition Adjourned Until January
---------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that a winding-up petition issued against London
Welsh, for an unpaid tax bill of more than GBP90,000, has been
adjourned until next month.

According to the report, officials at HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC)
had asked for the Exiles to be wound up at a Bankruptcy and
Companies Court hearing in London on Dec. 12.

But Registrar Christine Derrett adjourned the application until
January 23 to give creditors time to meet, the report says.

Championship side Welsh entered voluntary liquidation last week,
BBC discloses.

They were disqualified from the British and Irish Cup after being
unable to raise a side for Saturday's tie against Doncaster
Knights, says BBC News.


RAF-LONDON LIMITED: Director Gets 9 Year Ban Over Unpaid Tax
------------------------------------------------------------
Rafal Bogdan, the director of RAF-London Limited, has been
disqualified for nine years for failing to ensure that the
company accounted for cash receipts totaling GBP1,199,000 which
resulted in an estimated loss of revenue to HM Revenue & Customs
of GBP288,414.

Following an investigation by the Insolvency Service Rafal Bogdan
entered into a disqualification undertaking, which prevents him
from becoming involved in the promotion, formation or management
of a company for the duration of the relevant undertaking.

RAF-London Limited undertook building and construction work and
entered liquidation on July 29, 2015, with liabilities to
creditors of GBP448,351 of which GBP436,155 was owed to HM
Revenue & Customs (HMRC) with GBP288,414 estimated to relate to
under-declaration of VAT, Corporation Tax and Construction
Industry Scheme tax from under-declared cash receipts of
GBP1,199,000.

Mr. Bogdan was the sole registered director from May 28, 2004,
until the company went into liquidation on July 29, 2015. The
estimated deficiency as regards creditors and shareholders was
GBP399,649.

On Oct. 25, 2016, the Secretary of State accepted a
Disqualification Undertaking from Mr. Rafal Bogdan, effective
from Nov. 15, 2016, for 9 years. The matters of unfitness that
Mr. Bogdan accepted were that between May 2004 and April 2009, he
failed to ensure RAF-London Limited accounted to HMRC for cash
receipts totaling GBP1,199,000 which resulted in an estimated
loss to HMRC of GBP106,924 in VAT, GBP117,370 in Construction
Industry Scheme Tax and at least GBP64,120 in Corporation Tax.

Sue MacLeod, Chief Investigator of Insolvent Investigations,
Midlands & West at the Insolvency Service, said:

"Company directors have a duty to ensure businesses meet their
legal obligations, including paying taxes. Neglect of tax affairs
is not a victimless action as it deprives the taxpayer of funds
needed to operate public services.

"The Insolvency Service will take action against directors who do
not take their obligations seriously and abuse their position."

Mr. Bogdan's date of birth is October 1974 and he is known to
have resided in London.

RAF-London Limited was incorporated on May 28, 2004, and traded
from London as a provider of building and construction services.


SALISBURY SECURITIES: Fitch Ups Cl. N Notes Rating to 'BB(EXP)sf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Salisbury Securities 2015 Limited and
removed the ratings from Rating Watch Positive (RWP) as follows:

   -- Class A: affirmed at 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class B: affirmed at 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

   -- Class C: affirmed at 'AA+(EXP)sf'; off RWP; Outlook Stable

   -- Class D: upgraded to 'AA+(EXP)sf' from 'AA(EXP)sf'; off
      RWP; Outlook Stable

   -- Class E: upgraded to 'AA(EXP)sf' from 'AA-(EXP)sf'; off
      RWP; Outlook Stable

   -- Class F: affirmed at 'A+(EXP)sf'; off RWP; Outlook Stable

   -- Class G: upgraded to 'A+(EXP)sf' from 'A(EXP)sf'; off RWP;
      Outlook Stable

   -- Class H: upgraded to 'A+(EXP)sf' from 'A-(EXP)sf'; off RWP;
      Outlook Stable

   -- Class I: affirmed at 'BBB+(EXP)sf'; off RWP; Outlook Stable

   -- Class J: upgraded to 'BBB+(EXP)sf' from 'BBB(EXP)sf'; off
      RWP; Outlook Stable

   -- Class K: upgraded to 'BBB(EXP)sf' from 'BBB-(EXP)sf'; off
      RWP; Outlook Stable

   -- Class L: affirmed at 'BB+(EXP)sf'; off RWP; Outlook Stable

   -- Class M: upgraded to 'BB+(EXP)sf' from 'BB(EXP)sf'; off
      RWP; Outlook Stable

   -- Class N: upgraded to 'BB(EXP)sf' from 'BB-(EXP)sf'; off
      RWP; Outlook Stable

   -- Class Z: not rated

Fitch placed the ratings of the class C to N notes on RWP in
November 2016 following a model correction which leads to a
higher Rating Recovery Rate (RRR) in the Portfolio Credit Model
(PCM) output.

The transaction is a granular synthetic securitisation of
GBP789.4m unfunded credit default swap (CDS), which referenced
loans granted to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)
investing in the UK real estate sector. The loans are secured
with real estate collateral and were originated by Lloyds Banking
Group.

Lloyds has bought protection under the CDS contract relating to
the equity risk position but has not specified the date of
execution of the contracts relating to the rest of the capital
structure. The expected ratings are based on the un-executed
documents provided to Fitch, which have the same terms as the
executed equity CDS contract. Fitch understands from Lloyds
Banking Group that it has no immediate need to buy protection on
the remaining capital structure.

Should the documents not be executed, Fitch will nevertheless
monitor the expected ratings using the applicable criteria for as
long as the CDS contract exists.

The ratings of the notes address the likelihood of a claim being
made by the protection buyer under the unfunded CDS by the end of
the 10-year protection period in accordance with the
documentation.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade reflects the improved portfolio quality and the
revised stress portfolio PCM loss rate follow the correction of
the model and shorter term of the CDS agreement.

The portfolio quality improved significantly following the
positive rating migration of the portfolio as a result the
weighted average probability default rate decreased to 2.89% from
3.12% at closing. There is GBP596,500 of current defaulted loans
and the aggregated loss balance is 0.02% compared with the
aggregate 1.5% reinvestment stop trigger. The credit enhancement
available to each notes decreased marginally by between 0.01% and
0.02% for the senior and junior notes. The weighted average loan
to value decreased to 50.41% from 52% at closing, which leads to
a higher RRR in the PCM compared with Fitch's stress portfolio
RRR.

The transaction is in the second year of the initial three years
reinvestment period with a possibility to extend to five years.
Fitch assesses the risks of the notes base on a stress portfolio
during the reinvestment period. For the stress portfolio, Fitch
assumed dilution of the underlying mortgage collateral by
applying a property value haircut such that the aggregate
borrower LTV is equal to 70%, which is the limit under Lloyds
underwriting criteria. The transaction features a cumulative loss
trigger set at 1.5%, which if hit during the replenishment period
would stop further replenishment. Fitch analysed the additional
loss risk due to extended risk horizon resulting from the
replenishment period by adding the loss trigger to the rating
loss rate for the stress portfolio.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Increasing the default probabilities assigned to the underlying
obligors and reducing their assumed recovery rates by 25% each
could result in a downgrade of up to three notches to the notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis.

   -- Loan-by-loan data provided by US Bank as at 26 October 2016

   -- Transaction reporting provided by US Bank as at 31 October
      2016

   -- Collateral data provided by Lloyds as at 22 November 2016


TOWD POINT 2016-VANTAGE1: S&P Assigns B Rating to Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned credit ratings to Towd Point Mortgage
Funding 2016-Vantage1 PLC's class A1 to F notes.  At closing,
Towd Point also issued unrated class Z notes, as well as SDC,
DC1, and DC2 certificates.

Towd Point is a securitization of a pool of first-ranking owner-
occupied and buy-to-let nonconforming residential mortgage loans,
secured on properties in England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern
Ireland.

On or about the closing date the seller, Cerberus European
Residential Holdings B.V., acquired the equitable and beneficial
interest in the portfolio from Promontoria (Vantage) Ltd. before
on-selling to the issuer.  At closing, the issuer purchased the
portfolio from the seller and obtained the equitable interest and
beneficial title to the mortgage loans. The legal title remains
with Promontoria (Vantage).

Promontoria (Vantage) originally purchased the portfolio from
First National Mortgage Corporation Ltd., FN Mortgages Ltd., GE
Money Consumer Lending Ltd., GE Money Home Lending Ltd., GE Money
Home Finance Ltd., GE Money Mortgages Ltd., GE Money Secured
Loans Ltd., Household Mortgage Corporation Ltd., Igroup 2 Ltd.,
Igroup UK Loans Ltd., Igroup 3 Ltd., Igroup BDA Ltd., and Maes
ECP No. 1 Ltd. (the original sellers). Pepper (UK) Ltd. is the
servicer.

The portfolio has a weighted-average original loan-to-value ratio
of 80.99%, and a weighted-average seasoning of 10.4 years.  Of
the pool, 38.34% has arrears equal to or greater than one month,
and 13.80% of the pool's loans had previously been restructured
and are not currently in arrears.

S&P treats the class B to D notes as deferrable-interest notes in
its analysis.  Under the transaction documents, the issuer can
defer interest payments on these notes, and any deferral of
interest would not constitute an event of default, even when this
class of notes is the most senior.  While S&P's 'AAA (sf)'
ratings on the class A1 and A2 notes address the timely payment
of interest and the ultimate payment of principal, S&P's ratings
on the class B to D notes address the ultimate payment of
principal and interest.  The class E and F notes do not accrue
any interest and S&P's ratings address the ultimate payment of
principal on these notes.

Interest on the class A1 and A2 notes is equal to three-month
British pound sterling LIBOR plus a class-specific margin.
However, the class B to D notes are somewhat unique in the
European residential mortgage-backed securities market in that
they pay interest based on the lower of the coupon on the notes
(three-month sterling LIBOR plus a class-specific margin) and the
net weighted-average coupon (WAC).  The net WAC on the assets is
based on the interest accrued on the assets (whether it was
collected or not) during the quarter, less senior fees, divided
by the current balance of the assets at the beginning of the
collection period.  The net WAC is then applied to the
outstanding balance of the notes in question to determine the
required interest.

In line with S&P's imputed promises criteria, its ratings address
the lower of these two rates.  A failure to pay the lower of
these amounts results, for the class B to D notes, in interest
being deferred.  Deferred interest also accrues at the lower of
the two rates.  S&P's ratings however, do not address the payment
of what are termed "net WAC additional amounts" i.e., the
difference between the coupon and the net WAC where the coupon
exceeds the net WAC.  Such amounts are subordinated in the
interest priority of payments.  In S&P's view, neither the
initial coupons on the notes nor the initial net WAC are "de
minimis", and nonpayment of the net WAC additional amounts is not
considered an event of default under the transaction documents.
Therefore, S&P do not need to consider these amounts in its cash
flow analysis, in line with its criteria for imputed promises.

Within the mortgage pool, the loans are linked to the Barclays
Bank PLC base rate (BBBR) (98.50%), which is linked to the Bank
of England base rate (BBR), a variable rate index (1.39%), or a
fixed rate (reverting to a non-tracker variable rate at a later
date) (0.11%).  There is no swap in the transaction to cover the
interest rate mismatches between the assets and liabilities.  S&P
has stressed for basis risk accordingly.

S&P's ratings reflect its assessment of the transaction's payment
structure, cash flow mechanics, and the results of S&P's cash
flow analysis to assess whether the notes would be repaid under
stress test scenarios.  Subordination and excess spread (there is
no reserve fund to provide credit enhancement in this
transaction) provides credit enhancement to the rated notes that
are senior to the unrated notes and certificates. Taking these
factors into account, S&P considers that the available credit
enhancement for the rated notes is commensurate with the ratings
assigned.

RATINGS LIST

Towd Point Mortgage Funding 2016-Vantage1 PLC
GBP821.7 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Notes (Including
Unrated Notes And Certificates)

Class                   Rating           Amount
                                            (%)

A1                      AAA (sf)          55.00
A2                      AAA (sf)           4.00
B-Dfrd                  AA (sf)            6.20
C-Dfrd                  A (sf)             7.00
D-Dfrd                  BBB+ (sf)          4.90
E                       BB+ (sf)           5.50
F                       B (sf)             7.40
SDC cert.               N/A                 N/A
Z                       NR                10.00
DC1 cert.               N/A                 N/A
DC2 cert.               N/A                 N/A

NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable.


* UK: Legal Experts Warn of 'Another Farepak' Savings Scandal
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Savage at BBC Scotland News reports that legal experts
have warned there is nothing to stop the collapse of another
savings scheme like Farepak.

It is 10 years since the Christmas savings club, which allowed
people to spread the cost of food and presents, went bust, the
report relates.

BBC says the UK government is considering a report from the Law
Commission which recommends new protections are introduced for
customers.

The SNP has described the lack of a change in the law as
"disappointing".

According to the report, the Law Commission can only make
recommendations for England and Wales, but much of consumer law
is reserved to Westminster, so any changes made would affect the
whole of the UK.

About 116,000 people, including 30,000 Scots, lost money when the
company went out of business in October 2006, the report
discloses.

In 2012 liquidators announced customers could eventually receive
back up to half of their savings.

The Law Commission has recommended that the most vulnerable
consumers be given added protection, adds BBC.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Oil Business in Latin America: The Early Years
-------------------------------------------------------------
Author: John D. Wirth Ed.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 282 pages
List price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher

Buy a copy for yourself and one for a colleague on-line at
http://is.gd/DvFouR

This book grew out of a 1981 meeting of the American Historical
Society. It highlights the origin and evolution of the stateowned
petroleum companies in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and
Venezuela.

Argentina was the first country ever to nationalize its
petroleum industry, and soon it was the norm worldwide, with the
notable exception of the United States. John Wirth calls this
phenomenon "perhaps in our century the oldest and most
celebrated of confrontations between powerful private entities
and the state."

The book consists of five case studies and a conclusion, as
follows:

* Jersey Standard and the Politics of Latin American Oil
Production, 1911-30 (Jonathan C. Brown)
* YPF: The Formative Years of Latin America's Pioneer State
Oil Company, 1922-39 (Carl E. Solberg)
* Setting the Brazilian Agenda, 1936-39 (John Wirth)
* Pemex: The Trajectory of National Oil Policy (Esperanza
157
Duran)
* The Politics of Energy in Venezuela (Edwin Lieuwen)
* The State Companies: A Public Policy Perspective (Alfred
H. Saulniers)

The authors assess the conditions at the time they were writing,
and relate them back to the critical formative years for each of
the companies under review. They also examine the four
interconnecting roles of a state-run oil industry and
distinguish them from those of a private company. First, is the
entrepreneurial role of control, management, and exploitation of
a nation's oil resources. Second, is production for the private
industrial sector at attractive prices. Third, is the
integration of plans for military, financial, and development
programs into the overall industrial policy planning process.
Finally, in some countries is the promotion of social
development by subsidizing energy for consumers and by promoting
the government's ideas of social and labor policy and labor
relations.

The author's approach is "conceptual and policy oriented rather
than narrative," but they provide a fascinating look at the
politics and development of the region. Mr. Brown provides a
concise history of the early years of the Standard Oil group and
the effects of its 1911 dissolution on its Latin American
operations, as well as power struggles with competitors and
governments that eventually nationalized most of its activities.
Mr. Solberg covers the many years of internal conflict over oil
policy in Argentina and YPF's lack of monopoly control over all
sectors of the oil industry. Mr. Wirth describes the politics
and individuals behind the privatization of Brazil's oil
industry leading to the creation of Petrobras in 1953. Mr. Duran
notes the wrangling between provinces and central government in
the evolution of Pemex, and in other Latin American countries.
Mr. Lieuwin discusses the mixed blessing that oil has proven for
Venezuela., creating a lopsided economy dependent on the ups and
downs of international markets. Mr. Saunders concludes that many
of the then-current problems of the state oil companies were
rooted in their early and checkered histories." Indeed, he says,
"the problems of the past have endured not because the public
petroleum companies behaved like the public enterprises they
are; they have endured because governments, as public owners,
have abdicated their responsibilities to the companies."

Jonh D. Wirth is Gildred Professor of Latin American Studies at
Standford University.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *