TCREUR_Public/170105.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, January 5, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 004



MINSK CITY: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B-' Issuer Credit Rating




ZAGREBACKI CITY: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable


STX OFFSHORE: Fincantieri Named Preferred Bidder for French Unit
VIVARTE SAS: Plans to Sell Lossmaking Andre Shoe Brand


BANCO BPM: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Long Term Issuer Rating


KAZINVESTBANK: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'D/D'


DTEK ENERGO: Creditors Support Debt Conversion Proposal
TRUST BANK: Nat'l Bank of Ukraine Opts to Liquidate Business

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALL LEISURE: Ceases Trading, Administrator Appointed



MINSK CITY: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B-' Issuer Credit Rating
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' long-term issuer credit
rating on the Belarusian City of Minsk. S&P subsequently withdrew
the rating at issuer's request.  At the time of withdrawal, the
outlook was stable.

As a "sovereign rating" (as defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009
"EU CRA Regulation"), the ratings on Minsk are subject to certain
publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA
Regulation, including publication in accordance with S&P's pre-
established calendar of 2016 sovereign, regional, and local
government rating publication dates.

Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the announced
calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and must be
accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for the
deviation. In this case, the reason for the deviation is the
issuer's request that S&P withdraw the rating.


At the time of withdrawal, the rating on Minsk reflected S&P's
long-term sovereign credit rating on the Republic of Belarus

S&P assessed Minsk's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at 'b+'.
The SACP is not a credit rating.  Instead, it is a measure of a
local or regional government's (LRG's) intrinsic creditworthiness,
were the rating not constrained by the rating on the sovereign.
The SACP results from the combination of S&P's assessment of an
LRG's individual credit profile and the institutional framework in
which it operates.

S&P's view of Minsk's SACP reflected S&P's assessment of Belarus'
very volatile and underfunded institutional framework for LRGs,
which underpins the city's very weak budgetary flexibility, its
weak economy by international standards, weak management, and high
contingent liabilities.  Factors supporting the rating were the
city's very low debt burden, adequate liquidity, and average
budgetary performance.

At the time of withdrawal, the stable outlook on Minsk mirrored
the outlook on Belarus.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating


                                      To              From
Minsk (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency          B-/Stable/--   B-/Stable/--

Ratings Subsequently Withdrawn

Minsk (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency          NR             B-/Stable/--

NR--Not rated


S&P Global Ratings kept its 'B' long-term corporate credit rating
on the Bulgarian electricity company Natsionalna Elektricheska
Kompania EAD (NEK) on CreditWatch with negative implications.  S&P
placed it on CreditWatch on Oct. 10, 2016.

The CreditWatch reflects continued pressures on NEK's credit
quality if the company's profits and cash flows remain weak, or if
continuing electricity industry challenges diminish support from
its parent Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH) to cover external debt

In December 2016, the Bulgarian government provided NEK with a
EUR601.6 million loan and NEK used the proceeds to fully repay its
litigation obligation to Atomstroyexport (ASE). The government
loan is long term (seven years), has zero interest, and doesn't
stipulate an event of default, but it is not subordinated to NEK's
other debt; and if NEK manages to sell the nuclear assets received
from ASE, it would need to prepay the government for its loan up
to the amount received as sale proceeds in three days.  Therefore,
S&P treats it as debt, although it notes its favorable structure.

Although the litigation issue has been resolved without impacting
NEK's liquidity, the company's profitability and cash flow remain
well below S&P's expectations, despite better supplier terms and
the compensation of expenses via the Security of the Electricity
System Fund established by the regulator.  NEK continues to carry
out the function of a public electricity provider in the country;
and the electricity prices remain low.  S&P do not expect any
further material regulatory changes in the near term following the
government's resignation in mid-November.  S&P continues to see
uncertainties regarding the ability of NEK and BEH to improve
profitability and cash flow by early 2017.

S&P continues to believe that NEK's financial position remains
unsustainable in the long term and its stand-alone capacity to
meet its financial obligations mainly depends on how quickly the
recent changes in regulatory conditions will translate into
positive cash flow generation. NEK's losses have reduced, but the
company's EBITDA and funds from operations (FFO) remained negative
in the first nine months of 2016.  S&P's 'ccc+' assessment of
NEK's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) therefore includes ongoing
support from the parent.  In particular, S&P understands most of
NEK's debt is due to the parent.  As of Sept. 30, 2016, more than
90% NEK's Bulgarian lev (BGN) 2.4 billion (EUR1.2 billion) debt is
to BEH, and S&P understands that after Dec. 8, 2016, NEK's debt
will also include EUR601.6 million of debt to the Bulgarian

S&P continues to regard NEK as a strategically important
subsidiary of BEH.  S&P consequently factors in two notches of
uplift from NEK's 'ccc+' SACP.  S&P's rating on NEK is capped at
one notch below the 'b+' group credit profile (GCP).  Although S&P
do not rate BEH, it factors its credit quality into its rating on
NEK.  S&P regards BEH as a government-related entity with moderate
likelihood of extraordinary state support.  S&P's assessment of
BEH's GCP is 'b+', factoring in potential extraordinary state
support.  That said, in S&P's view, BEH's future credit quality
could be affected if NEK's performance remains weak, or if NEK's
liquidity issues erode BEH's standing on financial markets.

In S&P's view, NEK should avoid default on its minimal external
debt obligations over the next 12 months if it obtains timely
financial support from BEH and from the government.  If NEK fails
to obtain such support, S&P may reassess its view on NEK's status
in the group and with regard to the government.

S&P views NEK's liquidity as weak, because of potential liquidity
shortfalls in the next 12 months.  S&P bases its assessment on the
company's stand-alone liquidity arrangements.  S&P understands
that BEH is willing, and so far is able, to provide sufficient
liquidity support to NEK in a timely manner.

S&P understands that NEK continues to breach its current financial
ratio covenant on some of its loans.  S&P thinks there is a low
risk of the loan maturities being accelerated, however, because
most of the loans that have this covenant benefit from a
government guarantee.

The CreditWatch status reflects continued pressure on the rating
if NEK's profitability and cash flow do not return to positive in
early 2017, despite the recent regulatory reforms and improving
supplier terms.  In S&P's view, this could affect NEK's stand-
alone credit quality, as well as S&P's view of the parent's credit
quality and BEH's ability to continue to provide ongoing liquidity
support to NEK.  The CreditWatch also reflects risks to liquidity
if NEK doesn't receive sufficient financial support from the
government or BEH to cover its ongoing payments on external debt.
S&P will reassess the situation within the next three months.

S&P would likely lower the rating if NEK accumulates new power
tariff deficits and continues to accumulate mounting overdue
payables.  S&P could also lower the rating in case of continuing
liquidity pressures, or if parental support from BEH diminishes.

S&P could affirm the rating if NEK demonstrates sustainable
profits and cash flows, and continues to enjoy group support.


ZAGREBACKI CITY: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Croatian-based multi-
utility Zagrebacki Holding d.o.o (ZGH) to stable from negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' long-term corporate
credit rating on ZGH and S&P's 'BB-' issue rating on its senior
unsecured debt.

The outlook revision mirrors that on the rating on ZGH's parent,
the City of Zagreb.  It reflects S&P's view that Zagreb's ability
to provide support to ZGH has stabilized.  S&P considers ZGH to be
a government-related entity (GRE), and believe there is a very
high likelihood that Zagreb would provide extraordinary support to
ZGH in the event of financial distress.  This results in a two-
notch uplift from the company's stand-alone credit profile (SACP),
which S&P assess at 'b'.  S&P do not foresee any material
pressures on the SACP in the next one-to-two years.

S&P continues to see ZGH's financial risk profile as aggressive.
S&P thinks that the financial risk profile will be supported by
funds from operations (FFO) to debt staying at about 12% in 2016-
2017, slightly improving thereafter, and an FFO interest coverage
ratio of 3.0x-4.0x in the next two years.

S&P's assessment of the business risk profile continues to reflect
ZGH's weak regulatory environment, its poor operational
performance (for instance, water leakage at ZGH's water-supply
subsidiary amounts to about 50% of the total water supply), low
profitability, and track record of inefficient decisions and
negative returns.  These weaknesses are offset by ZGH's monopoly
position as a provider of public services; strong ongoing support
from its owner via operating and capital subsidies; guarantees on
some debt (which is repaid indirectly from the city's budget); and
asset transfers.  Overall, transfers from the city's budget make
up almost 14% of the company's revenues and about 23% when taking
financing, rents, and subsidies into account.  The city's
government determines the makeup of ZGH's management board, most
tariffs for its regulated businesses, and its investment plan.

S&P believes that ZGH is at the lower end of the weak business
risk profile compared to its peers, notably with its weak
operating efficiency.  This also reflects its lack of strategic
clarity about its future structure; S&P notes that the city, as
the company's owner, has yet to develop a view on this matter.

The stable outlook reflects that on ZGH's immediate parent, the
City of Zagreb.

It also reflects S&P's opinion that the company's SACP will remain
at least at 'b'; this assumes in particular that ZGH will
proactively manage its liquidity position to avoid any liquidity
pressures and keep FFO to debt above 12%.

S&P might downgrade ZGH if we were to downgrade Zagreb.

Negative pressure on the rating might also build if S&P revises
ZGH's SACP down by one notch.  This might be driven by
deterioration of liquidity or extensive debt accumulation because
of higher capex than S&P assumes, a decrease in tariffs,
structural reorganizations leading to a contraction of EBITDA or
lower ongoing support from the city (in the form of subsidies and
long-term receivables repayment), with FFO to debt falling below
12% without short-term recovery prospects.

An upgrade is remote at this stage because S&P would have to raise
the rating on Zagreb by two notches.

S&P could also raise the rating on ZGH if S&P raises its SACP by
three notches, but this is not likely.


STX OFFSHORE: Fincantieri Named Preferred Bidder for French Unit
AFP reports that a South Korean court handling the bankruptcy of
STX Offshore and Shipbuilding Co. said on Jan. 3 that Italian
shipbuilder Fincantieri had been named preferred bidder for STX's
profitable French unit.

Judge Choi Ung-Young, who acts as a spokesman for the Seoul
Central District Insolvency Court, told AFP the court reached the
decision on Jan. 3.  According to AFP, he said Fincantieri would
now conduct field research on the shipyard and agree a price with
the South Korean firm before signing a deal for a 66.6% stake.

Fincantieri, Netherlands-based Damen Shipyards Group and French
state-controlled naval shipbuilder DCNS had initially expressed
interest in acquiring STX France, AFP notes.

But the Italian shipbuilding giant was the sole bidder to submit a
binding proposal last month, AFP recounts.

Fincantieri later issued a brief statement confirming it had "been
selected as the exclusive buyer" of a two-thirds stake in STX
France, AFP relays.

STX Offshore & Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. is a Korea-based company
mainly engaged in the shipbuilding and offshore business.  The
company operates its business through five segments: merchant
vessel, cruise, offshore and specialized vessel (OSV), vessel
apparatus and other segment.

VIVARTE SAS: Plans to Sell Lossmaking Andre Shoe Brand
According to Bloomberg News' David Whitehouse, Europe1, citing an
unidentified person, reports on its Web site that Vivarte is
likely to announce as soon as the end of January that it wants to
sell its lossmaking Andre shoe brand.

Europe1 says Vivarte is likely to have to pay to offload the
brand, Bloomberg relates.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 19,
2016, Bloomberg News related that the company won a waiver to
terms of a EUR535 million (US$596 million) loan after terror
attacks in Paris and warm winter weather hurt the company's
earnings late last year.  The company in 2014 was taken over by
creditors who agreed to restructure EUR2.8 billion of loans after
France's sluggish economy and high unemployment took its toll on
earnings, Bloomberg disclosed.

Vivarte SAS is a French fashion retailer.  It owns brands
including Kookai and Naf Naf.


BANCO BPM: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Long Term Issuer Rating
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to
Banco BPM SpA (Banco BPM): (1) deposit ratings of Ba1/Not Prime;
(2) a long-term issuer rating of Ba2;(3) a standalone baseline
credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA of b1; and (4)
Counterparty Risk Assessments (CR Assessment) of Ba1(cr)/Not
Prime(cr). The outlook on the bank's long-term deposit rating is
stable, and negative on the issuer rating.

At the same time, Moody's has withdrawn the following ratings of
Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa (Banco Popolare) and Banca
Popolare di Milano S.C. a r.l. (BPM) which ceased to exist on 31
December 2016: (1) BCAs and adjusted BCAs of b1; (2) deposit
ratings of Ba1/Not Prime; (3) issuer ratings of Ba2; (4) MTN
ratings of (P)Ba2/(P)B2; and (5) CR Assessments of Ba1(cr)/Not
Prime(cr). The ratings on debt instruments originally issued by
Banco Popolare and BPM, which have all been assumed by Banco BPM,
were affirmed.

The rating action reflects the completion of the merger between
Banco Popolare and BPM, which was approved on October 15, 2016, by
the banks' shareholders. The merger became effective on January 1,
2017, after Banco Popolare and BPM transferred all of their assets
and liabilities to the newly-created bank Banco BPM. Prior to this
action, the ratings on Banco Popolare and BPM were aligned,
already reflecting Moody's assessment of the credit profile of a
combined Banco BPM.



The b1 standalone BCA assigned to Banco BPM reflects Moody's view
that the group's credit profile is constrained by the large stock
of problem loans and weak profitability. The b1 BCA also reflects
Banco BPM's relatively sound capital and liquidity position.

Banco BPM displays very weak asset risk in view of its large stock
of problem loans representing around 22% of gross loans at end-
September 2016 (based on aggregated financials for Banco Popolare
and BPM). This compares unfavourably with the most recently
available Italian and European Union (EU) averages of 17.7% and
5.4% as at end-June 2016 respectively. Banco BPM is planning on
reducing its stock of problem loans to 18% of nominal loans by
2019 through a combination of disposals and enhanced management of
problematic exposures. Moody's also considers the group's asset
risk to be constrained by the lower-than-average coverage of
problem loans, which the rating agency estimated at 36% (excluding
write-offs) at end-September 2016, significantly lower than the
46% system average as of end-June 2016. As Banco Popolare is
expected to book high loan loss charges in Q4 2016, Moody's
expects Banco BPM's coverage ratio to rise to around 40%
(excluding write-offs) as of December 2016.

In assigning a b1 BCA, Moody's has taken into consideration Banco
BPM's weak profitability. Following EUR1.1 billion additional
provisions aimed at increasing coverage of problem loans for Banco
Popolare, the combined Banco BPM would lost about EUR1 billion
before tax in Q3 2016. As part of its integration plan, Banco BPM
expects to reach a EUR1.1 billion net profit in 2019, which, in
the rating agency's view, will be challenging given the very
modest macro-economic prospects in Italy, whose GDP Moody's
forecasts to grow by 0.8% in 2017 and 1% in 2018.

Capitalization is good, and in Moody's view a relative strength
for the bank, albeit increased provisions at Banco Popolare in Q4
2016 are likely to result in a loss for the combined Banco
Popolare and BPM at year-end 2016, which will have a negative
impact on capital. Banco Popolare and BPM reported a pro forma
combined 12.3% Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) as at December 2015;
Banco BPM is targeting only a small improvement in capital with a
12.9% fully loaded CET1 ratio in 2019. In line with the targets of
the integration plan, Moody's does not anticipate a significant
improvement in Banco BPM's capital ratio.

Funding and liquidity are also a relative strength for Banco BPM.
Moody's believes that both Banco Popolare and BPM had a balanced
funding profile focused on retail clients, as well as a sound
stock of liquid assets, which will be maintained by Banco BPM.


Moody's has assigned Ba1/Not Prime deposit ratings and Ba2 issuer
ratings to Banco BPM, in line with the deposit ratings of both
Banco Popolare and BPM. The rating agency also affirmed the debt
instruments originally issued by Banco Popolare, Banca Italease
S.p.A. (former subsidiary of Banco Popolare), and BPM, which have
been assumed by Banco BPM.

Moody's said it believes that Banco BPM's deposits would likely
face extremely low loss-given-failure, due to the loss absorption
provided by the residual equity that it expects in resolution,
subordinated debt and senior unsecured debt, as well as the volume
of deposits themselves. This results in an uplift of three notches
from the bank's b1 BCA. Furthermore, the rating agency believes
that Banco BPM's senior unsecured debt (including those
instruments originally issued by Banco Popolare, Banca Italease,
and BPM and now assumed by Banco BPM would likely face very low
loss-given-failure. This is due to the loss absorption provided by
the residual equity that it expects in resolution, subordinated
debt, as well as the volume of senior unsecured debt itself. This
results in an uplift of two notches from the bank's BCA.


Moody's assumes a low probability of government support for Banco
BPM. With total assets of around EUR170 billion, Banco BPM is the
third largest bank in Italy; however, being significantly smaller
than the largest two banks in Italy (UniCredit SpA (Baa1/Baa1
Stable, ba1) and Intesa Sanpaolo Spa (A3 Negative/Baa1 Stable,
baa3)), Moody's said it believes that there is only a low
probability that Banco BPM will receive government support in case
of need. As a result there is no further uplift to the deposit and
issuer ratings of Banco BPM.


Moody's assigned a stable outlook to Banco BPM's long-term deposit
rating, reflecting the rating agency's expectation that the credit
profile of the new group will remain unchanged over the next 12-18
months. Despite the near-term challenges stemming from the
integration of Banco Popolare and BPM, Moody's considers that the
new group's solvency and liquidity will support its
creditworthiness, mitigating pressures on both asset risk and

The outlook on the issuer rating of Banco BPM is negative because
the stock of bail-in-able senior debt is likely to reduce over the
next 12-18 months, given the bank's funding plans and the
maturities of retail bonds in particular. This would result in a
higher loss-given-failure for this class of debt.


As part of the rating action Moody's has also assigned a
Ba1(cr)/Not Prime(cr) CR Assessment to Banco BPM, three notches
above the bank's b1 BCA, reflecting substantial bail-in-able debt
and deposits, which would likely support operating obligations in
resolution. The low probability of government support means that
there is no further uplift.


Moody's has withdrawn the b1 BCAs, the Ba1/Not Prime deposit
ratings, the Ba2 issuer ratings, and the Ba1(cr)/Not Prime(cr) CR
Assessments of Banco Popolare and BPM, following the transfer of
all assets and liabilities of the two banks to Banco BPM.


The standalone BCA of Banco BPM could be upgraded if the group
were to meet the financial targets set out in its integration
plan, which assumes an improving trend in asset risk metrics
(mostly through problem loan disposals) while preserving profit
generation capacity and capital.

An upgrade in the BCA would likely result in upgrades of all


A downgrade in the BCA would drive a downgrade in all ratings.
This could be triggered by the group's failure to meet the group's
targeted cost savings and synergies, or if there were a
deterioration in the asset risk or capital.

The issuer rating would likely be downgraded following a reduction
in the volume of senior debt outstanding.


Issuer: Banco BPM SpA


Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, assigned Ba1(cr)

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, assigned NP(cr)

Long-term Deposit Ratings, assigned Ba1 Stable

Short-term Deposit Ratings, assigned NP

Long-term Issuer Rating, assigned Ba2 Negative

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, assigned b1

Baseline Credit Assessment, assigned b1

Outlook Action:

Outlook assigned Stable(m)

Issuer: Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa


  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Ba2 Negative

  Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed B2

  Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, affirmed Caa1(hyb)


Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated Ba1(cr)

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated NP(cr)

Long-term Deposit Ratings, previously rated Ba1, outlook changed
to Ratings Withdrawn from Stable

Short-term Deposit Ratings, previously rated NP

Long-term Issuer Rating, previously rated Ba2, outlook changed to
Ratings Withdrawn from Negative

Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, previously rated

Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, previously rated (P)B2

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b1

Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b1

Outlook Action:

Outlook changed to No Outlook from Stable(m)

Issuer: Banca Italease S.p.A.


  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Ba2 Negative

Outlook Action:

  Outlook changed to No Outlook from Negative

Issuer: Banca Popolare di Milano S.C. a r.l.


Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Ba2 Negative

Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed B2

Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, affirmed Caa1(hyb)


Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated Ba1(cr)

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated NP(cr)

Long-term Deposit Ratings, previously rated Ba1, outlook changed
to Ratings Withdrawn from Stable

Short-term Deposit Ratings, previously rated NP

Long-term Issuer Rating, previously rated Ba2, outlook changed to
Ratings Withdrawn from Negative

Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, previously rated

Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, previously rated (P)B2

Other Short Term, previously rated (P)NP

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b1

Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b1

Outlook Action:

Outlook changed to No Outlook from Stable(m)


The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


KAZINVESTBANK: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'D/D'
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long- and short-term counterparty
credit ratings on Kazakhstan-based KazInvestBank to 'D/D' from 'B-
/C'.  S&P also lowered its Kazakhstan national scale rating on the
bank to 'D' from 'kzB+'.

At the same time, S&P lowered its ratings on KazInvestBank's rated
senior unsecured and subordinated bonds to 'D' from 'B-' and 'CCC'

The rating actions follow the National Bank of Kazakhstan's
(NBK's) revocation of KazInvestBank's banking license on Dec. 27,
2016.  In S&P's view, the regulator's action means that
KazInvestBank is currently unable to fulfil its obligations to its
counterparties according to the terms of the respective

KazInvestBank had faced an acute liquidity shortage in December
2016, caused by deposit and interbank funding withdrawals as well
as limited funding sources for the bank in the market, which led
to a failure to meet its financial liabilities starting from
Dec. 22, 2016.  KazInvestBank's official request to the regulator
for the provision of short-term liquidity was refused.


DTEK ENERGO: Creditors Support Debt Conversion Proposal
Ukrainian News Agency reports that creditors of DTEK Energo
company have supported a proposal to convert part of the company's
bank debt of USD300 million into Eurobonds.

"The tender for creditor banks, at which the DTEK Energy proposed
converting part of its bank debt in the amount of USD300 million
into Eurobonds was completed successfully.  Creditor banks
supported the company's proposal," Ukrainian News quotes the
company as saying in the statement.

The conversion of part of the company's bank debt into Eurobonds
and long-term restructuring of its bank loans are expected to take
place in January 2017, Ukrainian News discloses.

DTEK Energo exchanged Eurobonds worth USD750 million and USD160
million issued in 2013 and 2015, respectively, for a new, single
Eurobond issue with a maturity of up to December 31, 2024 on
December 29, Ukrainian News recounts.

TRUST BANK: Nat'l Bank of Ukraine Opts to Liquidate Business
Ukrainian News Agency reports that the National Bank of Ukraine
has decided to liquidate Trust Bank.

The decision to liquidate Trust Bank was made by the NBU board on
December 29, Ukrainian News relates.  On December 30, Deposit
Guarantee Fund has started the procedure of the bank liquidation,
Ukrainian News relays.

Volodymyr Kukharev was given the authorities of the bank's
liquidator, Ukrainian News discloses.

The National Bank of Ukraine declared Trust Bank insolvent on
December 6, Ukrainian News recounts.

Trust Bank is based in Kyiv.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALL LEISURE: Ceases Trading, Administrator Appointed
Ben Martin at The Telegraph reports that about 400 holidaymakers
have been left in chaos abroad after the travel business behind
Swan Hellenic cruises collapsed, forcing regulator the Civil
Aviation Authority to step in to help bring its customers home.

According to The Telegraph, All Leisure Holidays, the Atol-
protected company that also owns the Voyages of Discovery cruise
brand, has stopped trading with immediate effect.  Grant Thornton
has been appointed administrator to the business, The Telegraph

Abta, the travel association, said the firm had taken about 13,000
future bookings, all of which have now been cancelled, The
Telegraph relates.

Swan Hellenic, a historic brand that traces its roots back to the
1950s, operates the Minerva vessel while Voyages of Discovery runs
the Voyager cruise ship, The Telegraph discloses.  There had been
speculation about the financial health of All Leisure in recent
days after it abruptly cancelled two cruises on the vessels that
were due to depart over the New Year period, The Telegraph notes.

In accounts filed with Companies House for the year to the end of
October 2015, the firm's cruise business posted an annual
operating loss of GBP2.6 million, The Telegraph recounts.

All Leisure's chairman, Roger Allard, warned in the 2015 results
that "trading conditions are expected to remain very challenging,
especially in view of the escalating conflict in the Middle East
and recent acts of terrorism, and the effect these events may have
on consumers' propensity to travel", The Telegraph relays.

Since then, All Leisure has had to contend with the impact of the
EU referendum, which has rattled the tourism industry by weakening
the pound and making it more expensive for Britons to travel
abroad, The Telegraph states.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *