TCREUR_Public/170113.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, January 13, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 010


                            Headlines


G E R M A N Y

MUUEHL PRODUCT: Erfurt Court Confirms Insolvency Plan


I R E L A N D

AVOLON HOLDINGS: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
BUS EIREANN: Faces Risk of Insolvency Within Next 18 Months


I T A L Y

BANCA MARCHE: UBI Banca Makes EUR1 Rescue Offer
MONTE DEI PASCHI: Faces Pressure to Disclose Problem Loans


N E T H E R L A N D S

DELFT BV 2017: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating to Class E Notes


U K R A I N E

PRIVATBANK PJSC: Creditors Plan to Pursue Int'l Arbitration


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AMIGO HOLDINGS: Moody's Assigns (P)B1 Corporate Family Rating
BRADFORD & BINGLEY: Sale Process of Mortgages in Final Stages
GARDEN BRIDGE: Trust Uncertain on Viability of Project


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions


                            *********



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G E R M A N Y
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MUUEHL PRODUCT: Erfurt Court Confirms Insolvency Plan
-----------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the district court Erfurt confirmed the
insolvency plan of Muuehl Product & Services AG i.L. on Jan. 12.



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I R E L A N D
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AVOLON HOLDINGS: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba3 corporate family rating
to Avolon Holdings Limited, a Dublin-based aircraft leasing
company, a Ba2 rating to the $5.5 billion First Lien Term Loan B
issued by indirect subsidiary co-borrowers Avolon TLB Borrow 1
(US) LLC and Avolon TLB Borrower 1 (Luxembourg) S.a.r.l. and a B1
rating to $3 billion of Senior Unsecured Notes issued by indirect
subsidiary Park Aerospace Holdings Limited. The outlook for
ratings is stable.

Proceeds of the new debt issuance will be used by Avolon to fund
its pending acquisition of C2 Aviation Capital, Inc. (C2), the
commercial aircraft leasing business of CIT Group, Inc. (CIT),
expected to close this quarter.

Issuer: Avolon Holdings Limited

Assignments:

Corporate Family Rating, at Ba3, Stable

Issuers: Avolon TLB Borrower 1 (US) LLC / Avolon TLB Borrower 1
(Luxembourg) S.a.r.l. (co-issuers)

Long Term Foreign Currency Secured Term Loan, at Ba2

Outlook, Assigned Stable

Issuer: Park Aerospace Holdings Limited

Long Term Foreign Currency Debt Rating, at B1

Outlook, Assigned Stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating assignments reflect the increased franchise strength of
the combined Avolon and C2 and the high quality fleet and new
aircraft order book which Moody's expects will result in solid
future profitability. The ratings also reflect Avolon's moderate
leverage profile, continued high reliance on secured financing and
the steps the company has taken to strengthen liquidity. Avolon's
ratings are constrained by the relatively weaker credit profile of
Avolon's parent Bohai Capital Limited. The stable outlook reflects
Moody's view that the company will capably manage integration
risks and that the combined company's operating performance will
improve once the two firms are fully integrated.

After the acquisition closes in Q1 2017, Avolon will become the
third largest aircraft leasing company globally with a pro forma
combined fleet of 533 aircraft and an order book of 316 additional
aircraft as of September 30, 2016. Avolon's combined fleet will
primarily consist of popular narrow and mid-wide-body models,
solidifying its position in the newest technology aircraft, and
will be well-diversified both by airline and geography. The
company's low average fleet age coupled with greater fleet
granularity (partially a function of its increased size) suggest a
lower performance volatility. Avolon's increased operating scale
will provide the company improved access to global airlines, a
strong pipeline of desirable new technology aircraft, purchase
economies with aircraft OEMs, operating economies, and the ability
to engage in larger leasing transactions.

On a pro-forma basis, Avolon's leverage (Moody's Debt/Tangible
Common Equity) measures a reasonable 2.7x at 30 September 2016,
and reflects a $2.4 billion capital injection from Bohai. However,
Bohai's capital injection is also partially financed with borrowed
funds initially, resulting in significant double leverage. Moody's
expects that Avolon's operating cash flows will support the
company maintaining leverage of about 2.5x even as it finances
increased delivery of aircraft from its order book over the next
few years.

With the issuance of senior unsecured notes, Avolon is taking a
step toward diversifying its funding. Avolon has also increased
its unsecured revolving credit to a total line amount of $1.025
billion, which improves its alternative liquidity. Notwithstanding
its liquidity strengthening efforts, Avolon remains highly reliant
on secured financing. Nearly all of Avolon's aircraft are pledged,
which limits financial and operational flexibility and
structurally subordinates holders of the senior notes.

Avolon's rating is constrained by parent Bohai Capital's modest
credit profile. Bohai's high leverage, reliance on short-term
financing and high debt-funded growth present the risk of
distributions to the parent should it become distressed. However,
Avolon's strengthened liquidity metrics and acquisition of C2
result in the company having more strategic importance to Bohai,
due to its increased competitive positioning, value, and earnings
contribution, which would likely discourage Bohai from taking
actions that could undermine Avolon's credit strength. Moody's
also believes that Bohai will implement governance standards that
provide for reasonable operational separation between Avolon and
Bohai. Avolon's rating could improve if Bohai's stand-alone credit
profile is strengthened with increased equity capital and lower
leverage.

The Ba2 rating assigned to the First Lien Term Loan B is based on
the loan's strong asset coverage, priority claim, and loan terms
that reduce loss given default, including a loan-to-value covenant
of 80% assessed regularly on the basis of re-appraisals of pledged
aircraft, as well as asset concentration limits. The Term Loan is
secured with the aircraft acquired from C2, and at the outset
features a very strong LTV of 55%. The loan is guaranteed by
Avolon Holdings Limited and subsidiary asset holding entities.

The B1 rating assigned to the senior notes reflects their
structurally subordinate claim on the assets of Avolon's operating
subsidiaries and asset holding entities. Unsecured guarantees from
the C2 aircraft owning entities and from Avolon Holdings help to
moderate loss given default, given the excess collateral coverage
of Term Loan B.

Moody's could upgrade Avolon's ratings if the company further
diversifies its funding to include additional unsecured sources
while maintaining a strong liquidity buffer, solid profitability
and capital adequacy; and if the firm effectively manages the
financing and lease risks of its committed aircraft orders; and if
Bohai's credit profile strengthens based on improved capital
levels and lower leverage.

Avolon's ratings could be downgraded if the firm pursues
aggressive growth that results in significantly higher leverage,
its liquidity position weakens, or if profitability declines
materially below peers.

Avolon is a commercial aircraft leasing company based in Dublin,
Ireland. Its reported total assets were $9.0 billion at 30
September 2016 and $26.0 billion on a pro forma basis, including
the acquisition of C2.


BUS EIREANN: Faces Risk of Insolvency Within Next 18 Months
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that the threat of the State-owned Bus
Eireann becoming insolvent within the next 18 months is very real,
its new acting chief executive has told staff.

Ray Hernan also said it was clear the loss-making company had to
change its business model, The Irish Times relates.

However, he insisted that the Expressway service, the company's
commercial inter-city coach service which receives no State
subsides, would "continue to be part of Bus Eireann", The Irish
Times notes.

The Expressway service faces strong competition from private bus
operators and accounts for the bulk of the company's financial
losses, The Irish Times discloses.

The Irish Times reported on Jan. 11 that external consultants
commissioned by Bus Eireann had concluded that closing down
"Expressway" may be the only viable option for the company.

A total of 516 staff could lose their jobs if the Expressway
service was closed down, The Irish Times states.

Consultants at Grant Thornton expressed doubt at whether a
re-organization plan for Expressway first mooted by the company
last autumn would succeed in placing Bus Eireann on a firm
financial footing The Irish Times relays.

In his letter, Mr. Hernan, as cited by The Irish Times, said the
company was now forecasting losses for the year could be in the
order of EUR8 million.

He said the current challenges faced by Expressway would only be
resolved successfully by retaining this business as part of the
overall total company structure and making it more competitive,
The Irish Times notes.



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I T A L Y
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BANCA MARCHE: UBI Banca Makes EUR1 Rescue Offer
-----------------------------------------------
Rachel Sanderson at The Financial Times reports that UBI Banca has
confirmed it has made an offer of 1 euro to buy three small banks
rescued by the Italian state in 2015.

According to the FT, UBI made the offer to an Italian bank
resolution fund for the remainder of the banks Marche, Etruria,
Carichieti, which will have their bad loans totalling EUR2.2
billion hived off.  These will remain under the control of the
state fund, the FT notes.

UBI said in a statement it will undertake a EUR400 million capital
hike, the FT relays.

Credit Suisse and Morgan Stanley advised on the deal, the FT
discloses.


MONTE DEI PASCHI: Faces Pressure to Disclose Problem Loans
----------------------------------------------------------
James Politi at The Financial Times reports that Banca Monte dei
Paschi di Siena may be forced to reveal the source of some of its
largest problem loans as part of a EUR6.5 billion state-led
bailout.

Italian politicians are discussing whether to require MPS to
disclose a list of problem exposures on its balance sheet, the FT
relates.  Such a move could set a precedent for "naming and
shaming" in European banking, sidestepping confidentiality rules
that protect banking clients, the FT notes.

The political pressure on MPS, the world's oldest bank and Italy's
third-largest by assets, has increased sharply since it admitted
last month that it would need public funds to plug most of an
estimated EUR8.8 billion capital shortfall, the FT discloses.

Opposition lawmakers from the anti-establishment Five Star
Movement and the Northern League, as well as the centre-right
Forza Italia party, hoped to embarrass the ruling Democratic party
by exposing tight links between MPS and centre-left officials and
business people, the FT sates.

Last month, Italy's government approved a EUR20 billion bailout
fund to inject funds into MPS and potentially into other smaller
banks, the FT recounts.

MPS has said it would be "willing" to publish the list if
necessary, but laws do not allow this now, the FT relates.

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is an
Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It provides
traditional banking services, asset management and private
banking, including life insurance, pension funds and investment
trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking, including
project finance, merchant banking and financial advisory services.
The Company comprises more than 3,000 branches, and a structure of
channels of distribution.  Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group
has subsidiaries located throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia
and North Africa.  It has numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim
SpA, MPS Capital Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca
Personale SpA, Banca Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and
Banca MP Belgio SpA.



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N E T H E R L A N D S
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DELFT BV 2017: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional long-term
credit ratings to notes to be issued by Delft 2017 B.V.:

EUR [-]M Class A mortgage backed floating rate notes due January
2040, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR [-]M Class B mortgage backed floating rate notes due January
2040, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

EUR [-]M Class C mortgage backed floating rate notes due January
2040, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

EUR [-]M Class D mortgage backed floating rate notes due January
2040, Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

EUR [-]M Class E mortgage backed floating rate notes due January
2040, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Moody's has not assigned ratings to the EUR [-]M Class Z mortgage
backed zero coupon notes due January 2040 or the Residual
Certificates.

The portfolio backing this transaction consists of Dutch Non-
conforming residential mortgage loans originated by ELQ
Portefeuille I B.V. The portfolio in its entirety is currently
securitized in EMF-NL 2008-1 B.V. (not rated). On the closing date
EMF-NL 2008-1 B.V. will sell the portfolio to Morgan Stanley
Principal Funding, Inc. (not rated). In turn, Morgan Stanley
Principal Funding, Inc. will sell the portfolio to Delft 2017 B.V.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings take into account the credit quality of the underlying
mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined the MILAN Credit
Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss, as well as the
transaction structure and legal considerations.

--Expected Loss and MILAN CE Analysis

The expected portfolio loss of [9.5]% and the MILAN required
credit enhancement of [35]% serve as input parameters for Moody's
cash flow model and tranching model, which is based on a
probabilistic lognormal distribution.

Portfolio expected loss of [9.5]%: this is based on Moody's
assessment of the lifetime loss expectation taking into account:
(i) the high weighted average CLTV of around [97.7]% on a non-
indexed basis; (ii) the collateral performance to date along with
an average seasoning of [9.0] years: [17.8]% of the pool is in
arrears as of 31 October 2016, of which [10.6]% is more than 30
days in arrears; (iii) the current macroeconomic environment and
Moody's view of the future macroeconomic environment in the
Netherlands, and (iv) benchmarking with similar transactions in
the Dutch Non-conforming sector.

MILAN CE of [35]%: this follows Moody's assessment of the loan-by-
loan information taking into account the historical performance
available and the following key drivers: (i) the high weighted
average CLTV of [97.7]% on a non-indexed basis; (ii) the high
proportion of borrowers that self-certified their income at
[24.9%]; (iii) around [99.7]% of interest only loans; (iv)
borrowers with adverse credit history accounting for [36.6%] of
the pool; (v) the level of arrears around [17.8%] as of 31 October
2016, and (vii) benchmarking with other Dutch Non-conforming RMBS
transactions.

--Transaction structure

The provisional mortgage pool balance will consist of EUR [158]
million of loans. The total reserve fund will be funded to [2.0]%
of the initial balance of Classes A to Z and will not amortise.
The total reserve fund will be split into the Liquidity Reserve
Fund and the Non Liquidity Reserve Fund. The Liquidity Reserve
Fund Required Amount will be equal to [2.0]% of Class A
outstanding amount and will be available only to cover senior
expenses and Class A interest. The Liquidity Reserve Fund is
floored at [1%] of the initial principal balance of Class A and
will be released only after Class A is fully repaid. The Non
Liquidity Reserve Fund will be equal to the difference between the
total reserve fund and the Liquidity Reserve Fund, and will be
used to cover interest shortfalls and to cure PDL on Classes A to
E.

Interest on the notes (excluding Class A) is subject to a Net
Weighted Average Coupon (Net WAC) Cap. Net WAC additional amounts
are paid junior in the revenue waterfall being the difference
between the class B, C, D and E coupon and the Net WAC Cap. Net
WAC additional amounts arise when the coupons of the respective
notes are greater than the Net WAC Cap. Moody's ratings assigned
to the Class B, C, D and E do not address the timely and/ or
ultimate payment of Net WAC additional amounts.

Moody's notes that the Net WAC Cap formula defined in the deal
divides the scheduled weighted average loan rate net of fees by
the proportion of the rated notes to the aggregate current balance
of the loans. Consequently, should the aggregate current balance
of the loans become less than the rated notes as a result of high
portfolio losses leading to unpaid PDL on the rated notes, the Net
WAC Cap calculation result would decrease and potentially reduce
the size of promised interest payment to be received by investors
under the Class B through Class E notes to below their stated
coupon and furthermore below the scheduled WAC of the pool.
Moody's views the likelihood of such scenario as consistent with
the ratings of the notes.

--Operational Risk Analysis

Adaxio B.V. (not rated) will be acting as servicer and cash
manager on day 1. For [12] months after the transaction closing
Adaxio B.V. will delegate certain collection and payment
processing services to Stater Nederland B.V. (not rated),
thereafter these responsibilities will be assumed by Adaxio B.V.
Intertrust Administrative Services B.V. (not rated) will act as
independent back up cash manager as well as back-up servicer
facilitator, using commercially reasonable efforts to find a
substitute servicer in case of servicer termination. To ensure
payment continuity over the transaction's lifetime the transaction
documents incorporate estimation language whereby the cash manager
can use the three most recent servicer reports to determine the
cash allocation in case no servicer report is available. The
transaction also benefits from principal to pay interest for the
Class A notes and for Class B to E notes, subject to certain
conditions being met.

--Interest Rate Risk Analysis

All the loans in the portfolio pay a floating rate of interest
linked to 1 month Euribor, while the notes pay a floating rate of
interest linked to 3 months Euribor. The interest rate risk in the
transaction will be unhedged. Moody's has taken into consideration
the risk of margin compression in the portfolio as well as the
basis mismatch in its cash flow modelling.

The provisional ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the Notes. In Moody's
opinion the structure allows for timely payment of interest for
Class A notes, ultimate payment of interest on or before the final
legal maturity date for Classes B, C, D and E notes; and ultimate
payment of principal at par on or before the final legal maturity
date for all rated notes. Moody's issues provisional ratings in
advance of the final sale of securities, but these ratings
represent only Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a
conclusive review of the transaction and associated documentation,
Moody's will endeavour to assign definitive ratings to the Notes.
A definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating. Other
non-credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a
significant effect on yield to investors.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage. Please see Moody's Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN
Framework for further information on Moody's analysis at the
initial rating assignment and the on-going surveillance in RMBS.

-- Parameter Sensitivities

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the portfolio expected loss
was increased from [9.5]% to [17.5]% of current balance, and the
MILAN CE remained unchanged, the model output indicates that the
Class A notes would still achieve (P)Aaa(sf) assuming that all
other factors remained equal. Moody's Parameter Sensitivities
quantify the potential rating impact on a structured finance
security from changing certain input parameters used in the
initial rating.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.

The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with Moody's
expectations at close due to either a change in economic
conditions from Moody's central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic
performance factors would lead to rating actions. For instance,
should economic conditions be worse than forecast, the higher
defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in a downgrade of the ratings.
Deleveraging of the capital structure or conversely a
deterioration in the notes available credit enhancement could
result in an upgrade or a downgrade of the ratings, respectively.



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U K R A I N E
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PRIVATBANK PJSC: Creditors Plan to Pursue Int'l Arbitration
-----------------------------------------------------------
Luca Casiraghi and Daryna Krasnolutska at Bloomberg News report
that creditors to PJSC Privatbank are planning to pursue
international arbitration after US$555 million of bonds were wiped
out in the lender's nationalization.

According to Bloomberg, two people familiar with the situation
said First Geneva Capital Partners, Pala Assets and Pioneer
Investment Management are among international investors working
together in a bid for compensation from PJSC Privatbank.  They
said the group will likely target the lender's overseas assets
through the London Court of International Arbitration, Bloomberg
relates.

The people, as cited by Bloomberg, said the bondholders are
looking for help outside of Ukraine after failed attempts to open
talks with the country's finance minister and central bank.  The
creditors were caught out last month when the government wrote off
Privatbank's senior and junior bonds, as it nationalized the
lender to avert a collapse, Bloomberg recounts.

Ukrainian authorities decided to take over Privatbank last month
after a request for help from the lender's billionaire owners,
Gennady Bogolyubov and Igor Kolomoisky, a former governor of the
Dnipropetrovsk region where the bank is based, Bloomberg relays.

The people said the bondholder group, which is being advised by
lawyers at Dechert, owns about a quarter of Privatbank's US$335
million of senior notes due in January 2018 and February 2018,
according to Bloomberg.

The people said the creditor group is preparing to call in debts,
Bloomberg relays.  They said some bondholders are also considering
pursuing a separate arbitration claim directly against the
Ukrainian government, potentially through the World Bank's
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
Bloomberg notes.

PJSC Privatbank is Ukraine's biggest bank.

                           *   *   *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on  Jan. 3,
2017, Fitch Ratings downgraded PJSC CB PrivatBank's (Privat) Long-
Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD'
(Restricted Default) from 'CCC' and removed it from Rating Watch
Evolving (RWE).

The TCR-Europe reported on Dec. 29, 2016, that S&P Global Ratings
lowered its long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on
Ukraine-based PrivatBank to 'R/R' (indicating the obligor is under
regulatory supervision) from 'B-/C'.



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AMIGO HOLDINGS: Moody's Assigns (P)B1 Corporate Family Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a provisional (P)B1 Corporate
Family Rating (CFR) to Amigo Holdings Limited (Amigo), the holding
company of the UK-based Amigo group. Moody's has also assigned a
(P)B1 rating to the proposed GBP250 million long-term, senior
secured bond, to be issued by Amigo Luxembourg S.A., which is
backed by the parent, Amigo Holdings Limited. The outlook is
stable for both issuers. This is the first time that Moody's has
rated Amigo and Amigo Luxembourg S.A..

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary credit
opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive review
of the final versions of all the documents and legal opinions,
Moody's will endeavour to assign definitive corporate family and
senior secured ratings. A definitive rating may differ from a
provisional rating. The provisional ratings and the stable outlook
assigned to Amigo assume a successful issuance of the bond, the
removal of Amigo Holdings Limited from the restricted group within
90 days following the issue date and the incorporation of a new
holding company, which will be the entity that will produce the
consolidated accounts for Amigo Group. Once incorporated, Moody's
will transfer the (P)B1 CFR to this new holding company and
withdraw the rating assigned to Amigo Holdings Limited.

These ratings are contingent upon Amigo's successful completion of
a proposed GBP250 million senior secured notes offering and the
changes in the restricted group, whereby Amigo will use the
proceeds from the bond issuance to repay an existing senior
facility agreement and partially repay shareholder loan notes. The
remainder of these shareholder loan notes issued by Amigo Holdings
Limited will be converted into common equity in the new holding
that will be incorporated once Amigo Holdings Limited will be
released from the restricted group. Amigo will enter into a new
five year GBP57 million super senior revolving credit facility.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Amigo Group is the leader in the UK market for unsecured guarantor
loans, with an estimated 85% share. The guarantor loan is a
personal loan where interest and principal repayments are
guaranteed by a second individual, typically a family member or a
friend of the borrower. Amigo offers only one product, which is a
guarantor loan under which individuals are able to borrow between
GBP500 and GBP7,500 over a term of between 12 and 60 months at a
fixed annual percentage (with the same rate applicable to all
borrowers).

The CFR of (P)B1 is supported by Amigo's market share and simple
business model, strong profitability and liquidity metrics and a
supporting ownership structure which shows an alignment of
interests between the senior management of the company and its
main shareholder. Moody's also sees constraints to the rating
resulting from the firm's monoline business model, relatively
simple risk management framework, albeit mitigated by a strong
compliance culture, and modest asset quality. In addition,
regulatory risk is a key concern, but the agency believes the
likelihood of a change in the regulatory framework in the
unsecured credit market to be very low.

The provisional rating also incorporates solid capital levels,
despite the reduction following a partial repayment of the
shareholder loan, and a comfortable liquidity position post-
issuance of the proposed bond. Following the transaction, Amigo's
leverage, calculated as Tangible Common Equity (TCE) relative to
Tangible Managed Assets (TMA), will remain solid at 31% from 50%
at end-September 2016, according to Moody's calculation. Moody's
believes that any subsequent improvement would also depend on
Amigo maintaining strong profitability and a disciplined
underwriting criteria. The proposed funding structure is also
expected to improve Amigo's liquidity by providing some
diversification in funding and by lengthening the maturity profile
of its debt facilities. However, Moody's also notes the
concentration in terms of debt maturities, with the GBP57 million
new revolving credit facility maturing in five years and the
senior secured bond in seven years.

Amigo has shown a strong level of profitability significantly
higher than that of peers over the last few years, owing to its
simple and effective business model, whereby it applies an
interest rate typical of near- and subprime clients to customers
which generally have a better credit quality because of the
presence of the guarantor. This, together with disciplined
underwriting criteria, has allowed the company to maintain an
impairment rate well below those of its peers in the near-prime
lending market. However, Moody's believes that competition could
increase over the next few years, driven by the very high margins
of the sector and relatively low barriers to entry.

Moody's views the absence of a dedicated risk management and
internal audit function as a weakness. This is characteristic of
many companies of a similar size to Amigo, but the agency takes
some comfort from the fact that the firm has an experienced
management team and solid compliance culture. The company's focus
on compliance and on mitigating conduct risk is evidenced by the
way employees are assessed and how Amigo's guaranteed loan product
is designed. In addition, the company received its full
authorization to operate from the Financial Conduct Authority in
June 2016. The authorization allows the company to operate on a
permanent basis and indicates that the company's product and
processes are in compliance with regulatory standards in relation
to consumer protection and welfare.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The outlook on Amigo's provisional ratings is stable, reflecting
the company's lengthened maturity profile following the expected
successful issuance of the senior secured note and the agency's
expectation that Amigo will continue to maintain solid internal
capital generation.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Amigo's CFR could be upgraded because of: (i) an improvement in
asset quality metrics, with problem loans falling below 5% of
total gross loans; (ii) a strengthening of the risk management
framework; and (iii) an enhanced degree of diversification away
from the simple guarantor lending model, while maintaining solid
credit fundamentals.

The firm's rating could be downgraded because of: (i) an
unexpected decline in profitability metrics; (ii) a TCE / TMA
ratio falling below 14% for a protracted period; and (iii) a
loosening of underwriting criteria likely to result in higher
credit risk and loan impairments.

LIST OF ASSIGNED RATINGS

Assignments:

Issuer: Amigo Luxembourg S.A.

BACKED Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency),
Assigned (P)B1

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, assigned Stable

Issuer: Amigo Holdings Limited

Corporate Family Rating, Assigned (P)B1

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, assigned Stable


BRADFORD & BINGLEY: Sale Process of Mortgages in Final Stages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Emma Dunkley and Martin Arnold at The Financial Times report that
a range of hedge funds and private equity firms -- but only one UK
bank -- are in the final stages of bidding for GBP12.5 billion of
Bradford & Bingley mortgages being sold by the UK government,
according to people briefed on the plans.

Paragon Bank has made it through to the last stage of bidding for
the portfolio of loans, which comprises buy-to-let mortgages
issued by Bradford & Bingley before its collapse in 2008, the FT
discloses.  The sale is set to be one of the biggest asset
disposals by a European government, the FT notes.

According to the FT, the sources said the bank, which launched in
2014 as part of Paragon, a specialist lender with expertise in
buy-to-let, joins hedge fund groups Och-Ziff, CarVal Investors and
Elliott Management in the final round, along with private equity
firms Blackstone and Cerberus.

The Bradford & Bingley sale is part of a broader effort by Philip
Hammond, the chancellor, to offload state-backed assets and raise
money, the FT states.

Bradford & Bingley plc was a British bank with headquarters in the
West Yorkshire town of Bingley.


GARDEN BRIDGE: Trust Uncertain on Viability of Project
------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that the trust behind a project to build a bridge
covered with trees and shrubs across the Thames in London has
revealed it is "unable to conclude it is a going concern".

The Garden Bridge Trust needs to raise an estimated GBP185 million
to complete the project, BBC discloses.

But its latest annual accounts show a shortfall of GBP56 million,
BBC discloses.  However, Garden Bridge Trust chair Lord Davies
said trustees still expected construction to start this year, BBC
notes.

The trust's accounts for 2016 filed with Companies House show it
has yet to secure the land on the South Bank of the Thames for the
bridge's southern landing, BBC relates.

According to BBC, they also show that the trust may need
additional funding that would not be repayable "if the project is
not able to proceed" in the first half of this year.

And the accounts raise the possibility that "in a worst-case
scenario" the trust might have to consider "whether the project
remains viable", BBC states.

If the project does not go ahead, London mayor Sadiq Khan has
estimated that GBP40 million of public money already spent would
be lost to taxpayers, BBC says.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions
-----------------------------------------------------
Author: Sarkis J. Khoury
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 292 pages
List Price: $34.95

Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher
Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/hl7cni

Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions in the United States will
appeal to a wide range of readers. Dr. Khoury's analysis is
valuable for managers involved in transnational acquisitions,
whether they are acquiring companies or being acquired themselves.

At the same time, he provides a comprehensive and large-scale look
at the industrial sector of the U.S. economy that proves very
useful for policy makers even today. With its nearly 100 tables of
data and numerous examples, Khoury provides a wealth of
information for business historians and researchers as well.
Until the late 1960s, we Americans were confident (some might say
smug) in our belief that U.S. direct investment abroad would
continue to grow as it had in the 1950s and 1960s, and that we
would dominate the other large world economies in foreign
investment for some time to come. And then came the 1970s, U.S.
investment abroad stood at $78 billion, in contrast to only $13
billion in foreign investment in the U.S. In 1978, however, only
eight years later, foreign investment in the U.S. had skyrocketed
to nearly #41 billion, about half of it in acquisition of U.S.
firms. Foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies grew from 20 in
1970 to 188 in 1978. The tables had turned an Americans were
worried. Acquisitions in the banking and insurance sectors were
increasing sharply, which in particular alarmed many analysts.
Thus, when it was first published in 1980, this book met a growing
need for analytical and empirical data on this rapidly increasing
flow of foreign investment money into the U.S., much of it in
acquisitions. Khoury answers many of the questions arising from
the situation as it stood in 1980, many of which are applicable
today: What are the motives for transnational acquisitions? How do
foreign firms plans, evaluate, and negotiate mergers in the U.S.?

What are the effects of these acquisitions on competition, money
and capital markets; relative technological position; balance of
payments and economic policy in the U.S.?

To begin to answer these questions, Khoury researched foreign
investment in the U.S. from 1790 to 1979. His historical review
includes foreign firms' industry preferences, choice of location
in the U.S., and methods for penetrating the U.S. market. He
notes the importance of foreign investment to growth in the U.S.,
particularly until the early 20th century, and that prior to the
1970s, foreign investment had grown steadily throughout U.S.
history, with lapses during and after the world wars.

Khoury found that rates of return to foreign companies were not
excessive. He determined that the effect on the U.S. economy was
generally positive and concluded that restricting the inflow of
direct and indirect foreign investment would hinder U.S. economic
growth both in the short term and long term. Further, he found no
compelling reason to restrict the activities of multinational
corporations in the U.S. from a policy perspective. Khoury's
research broke new ground and provided input for economic policy
at just the right time.

Sarkis J. Khoury holds a Ph.D. in International Finance from
Wharton. He teaches finance and international finance at the
University of California, Riverside, and serves as the Executive
Director of International Programs at the Anderson Graduate School
of Business.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
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Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *