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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Tuesday, January 24, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 17


                            Headlines


G E R M A N Y

FTE VERWALTUNGS: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term CCR, Outlook Positive


G R E E C E

GREECE: S&P Affirms 'B-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings


I R E L A N D

BUS EIREANN: Plans to Seek Intervention of Labour Court
TAURUS 2016-1: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Notes


I T A L Y

BLUE PANORAMA: March 31 Deadline Set for Submission of Offers
FIAT CHRYSLER: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' CCRs, Outlook Stable
SIENA LEASE 2016-2: Fitch Ups Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+sf'


L U X E M B O U R G

APERAM SA: S&P Revises Outlook to Positive & Affirms 'BB+' CCR
LSF10 XL: Moody's Assigns B2 Corp. Family Rating, Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

KETER GROUP: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term CCR, Outlook Stable


P O L A N D

PFLEIDERER GROUP: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+', Outlook Positive


P O R T U G A L

BANCO BPI: Moody's Confirms Ba3 Sr. Debt & Deposit Ratings


R U S S I A

NOVATSIYA PJSC: Put on Provisional Administration
POLYUS GOLD: S&P Revises Outlook to Positive & Affirms 'BB-' CCR
SIBERIAN BANK: Put On Provisional Administration, License Revoked
TALMENKA BANK: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked


S P A I N

IM CAJAMAR 4: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on Class E Notes
IM CAJAMAR 6: Fitch Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'B+sf'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

LONDON WELSH: Judge Dismisses HMRC's Winding-Up Application
SOUTHEND UNITED: Judge Dismisses HMRC's Winding-Up Application

* UK: Insolvency Numbers Up in 2016, KMPG Analysis Shows


                            *********



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G E R M A N Y
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FTE VERWALTUNGS: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term CCR, Outlook Positive
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating on Germany-based auto parts manufacturer FTE Verwaltungs
GmbH.  The outlook is positive.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB' issue rating on the
EUR42.5 million super senior revolving credit facility (RCF) and
S&P's 'B' issue rating on the EUR263.3 million senior secured
notes.  The recovery ratings of '1+' on the RCF and '3' on the
senior secured notes remain unchanged.

S&P removed all the ratings from CreditWatch with positive
implications, where S&P had placed them on June 8, 2016.

The CreditWatch resolution is based on S&P's expectation that
Valeo's acquisition of FTE, if it actually takes place, will
close significantly later in 2017, compared with S&P's initial
expectation of year-end 2016 or first-quarter 2017.

Valeo has announced that it intends to reissue its acquisition
notification as soon as possible, in view of getting clearance to
buy FTE from its private-equity owner, Bain Capital Private
Equity, and closing the transaction in 2017.  The transaction
values FTE at EUR819 million.  S&P expects that FTE's credit
profile may benefit from being acquired by financially stronger
Valeo (BBB/Positive/A-2), and S&P would need to assess FTE's
strategic importance for Valeo to solidify S&P's opinion of FTE's
credit quality, post transaction.

FTE's business risk profile is constrained by the competitive,
cyclical, and capital-intensive nature of the markets in which it
operates, as well as the company's small size and limited
business diversity.  The company's customer concentration is also
high and skewed toward the Volkswagen group, which accounts for
more than one-quarter of total revenues.  On the positive side,
FTE has extended its customer base to new Asian original
equipment customers and expanding its aftermarket activities.
S&P considers that FTE has strong niche market positions in
hydraulic clutch actuation systems, particularly in Europe and
the Americas, with increasing market shares in emerging markets.

The newly launched dual clutch transmission (DCT) products are
also ramping up well in Europe and China, with a 78% increase in
electric shift and electric pump technology in the first nine
months of 2016.  FTE sold about 13% of EUR420 million in first-
nine-months 2016 sales in DCT, compared with about 6% as of year-
end 2015.  This has also led to significant improvement in
adjusted EBITDA margins to 15.7% at end-September 2016, from
13.4% at year-end 2015.  In addition, leverage ratios have
improved, namely with debt to EBITDA strengthening to 4.8x by
end-September 2016 from 5.8x at year-end 2015.

The positive outlook reflects a one-in-three possibility that S&P
could raise its rating on FTE over the coming year if the
acquisition by Valeo closes.

S&P could upgrade FTE if Valeo acquires it.  In such a scenario,
the magnitude of the upgrade would depend on our assessment of
FTE's strategic importance within the Valeo group.  An upgrade
could also occur if S&P observes that under its financial policy,
FTE maintains credit ratios in line with an aggressive financial
risk profile.  More specifically, S&P could raise its rating if
it thinks the company can achieve and comfortably maintain an
adjusted debt to EBITDA ratio of below 5x, including shareholder
loans.

S&P would revise the outlook to stable if the transaction doesn't
take place.  S&P would also revise the outlook to stable if FTE's
2017 operating results were weaker than it expects, namely with
debt to EBITDA staying above 5x and negative FOCF.  This could
occur, for instance, if the automotive market slowed markedly in
2017 and if the new business for its dual-clutch technology does
not materialize as anticipated.  S&P might consider lowering the
rating if the company adopted a more aggressive financial policy
or undertook a major debt-funded acquisition that weighs on its
financial risk profile.


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G R E E C E
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GREECE: S&P Affirms 'B-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-/B' long- and short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Hellenic Republic (Greece).  The outlook is stable.

                             RATIONALE

The affirmation reflects S&P's assessment that:

   -- The Greek government is meeting -- albeit with delays --
      the formal terms of its EUR86 billion financial support
      program (Third Economic Adjustment Program) financed by
      eurozone member states via the European Stability Mechanism
     (ESM).

   -- S&P expects program disbursements to meet debt servicing
      needs, including the redemption of commercial debt of about
      EUR2 billion in July 2017, and to reduce the stock of
      government arrears to the rest of the economy.

   -- The Greek authorities' relationship with its official
      creditors, and the IMF in particular, continues to be
      tested by the composition of Greek general government
      budgetary spending rather than headline fiscal results.

   -- Specifically, spending on pensions absorbs most of Greece's
      fiscal resources at the expense of spending on health,
      education, and the unemployed.  The pension system is
      operating an unsustainably high deficit of close to 11% of
      GDP, representing an outsized intertemporal transfer from
      participants in Greece's heavily taxed labor market to
      pensioners.  At the same time, the IMF publicly supports a
      more relaxed pace of fiscal austerity in Greece, not a
      tightening as is often suggested.

   -- The IMF's participation in the program is yet to be
      determined.  Nor is the inclusion of Greek government
      securities in the ECB's asset purchase program yet a
      certainty, though QE eligibility remains a strong incentive
      for the government to reach an accord with its EU creditors
      and the IMF.

   -- Economic growth over 2017-2020 will be supported by
      tourism, and a gradually improving jobs market.  The
      outlook for investment remains constrained, given
      challenges to Greece's banks.

   -- The banking sector will remain impaired over the forecast
      horizon.  The Bank of Greece targets a reduction in overall
      banks' nonperforming exposures (NPEs) to 34% in 2019 from
      51% currently.  Moreover, despite the incremental easing of
      capital controls, S&P expects deposits will return to the
      system quite slowly, maintaining the system's reliance on
      official funding.

   -- Despite the high stock of general government debt (at an
      estimated 180% of GDP in 2016, Greece has the second
      highest debt-to-GDP ratio of all the sovereigns S&P rates),
      the cost of debt servicing is very low, currently ranging
      between 1.0% and 1.5%.  In contrast to most of the
      government's S&P rates, the lion's share of Greece's
      sovereign debt -- about 84% -- is official, with over four-
      fifths lent by eurozone governments and institutions at
      highly concessional rates and maturities, including grace
      periods on principal payments averaging between three years
      for the Greek Loan Facility (GLF) to 17 years for ESM
      loans.

   -- In S&P's view, Greece's protracted economic crisis has
      weakened the country's administrative capacity.  One
      example is the weak absorption of available subsidized
      financing to Greece to improve conditions in the country's
      numerous refugees camps.  Impediments introduced by central
      and local governments have contributed to this low
      absorption rate, in S&P's opinion.

Compared to S&P's forecast of a 1% contraction in real GDP in its
July 2016 review, S&P now estimates a small statistical recovery
for the year.  This has been driven by a rebound in investment
and private consumption.  Employment has been rising, albeit
largely in more precarious temporary, rather than permanent,
positions. Although down from its peak in 2014, at 23% in
October, Greek unemployment remains the highest in the EU and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Over 2017-2020, S&P expects the economy to grow on average by
nearly 3% in the absence of any large, disruptive events.  S&P
bases this forecast on its expectation of a gradual strengthening
of the labor market, an improvement in private sector liquidity
following the pay-down of government arrears, and the steady,
albeit incremental, easing of capital controls.  All of these
should boost consumer and investor confidence, as would the
completion of program benchmarks and restructuring of Greek
banks' high stock of NPEs.  An acceleration of the ongoing
privatization of state assets, were it to materialize, would also
potentially attract foreign capital into the country and boost
investment activity.

The outlook for Greece's major services sectors is mixed.
Shipping remains mired in a supply glut, combined with a global
slowdown in trade.  The performance of the tourism sector, which
is a larger contributor to overall GDP compared to shipping, has
remained relatively strong, however, enabling the current account
deficit to turn into a small surplus of an estimated 1% of GDP in
2016.  The current account has also been helped by ongoing import
compression, lower prices of imported energy, and EU creditors
extending interest rate subsidies to the Greek government on its
external debt.  S&P expects that the current account surplus will
gradually decline toward balance through 2020, alongside
gradually strengthening import demand.

Despite S&P's projections of relatively strong real growth, it
still expects that the Greek economy, which has lost a third of
its value since 2009, will be about 15% smaller compared to 2008.
S&P estimates investment will amount to below 10% of GDP in 2017
compared to about 25% before the global financial crisis.

The recouping of this lost value will be conditional upon the
recovery in Greece's distressed financial sector, in S&P's
opinion. Greek banks depend on official financing, with the ECB
and emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) lines covering 25% of
assets.  Between September 2010 and November 2016, an estimated
EUR128 billion or 70% of estimated 2017 GDP (cumulatively) of
deposits exited the Greek banking system, though levels appeared
to stabilize in the second half of 2016.  With NPEs at 51% of
total exposures (on balance sheet only), banks are not in a
position to finance private-sector investment, while companies
and households may choose to prioritize payment of their rising
tax debt (which the Greek tax administration estimates at 50% of
GDP) rather than their bank loans.

Distress in the banking system represents a potential contingent
liability to the state.  S&P's projections for public-sector debt
don't reflect any further government capital injections into
domestic banks, although there is a material risk that additional
public support is required.  S&P thinks that the ECB's
reinstating of its waiver on the eligibility of Greek sovereign
and sovereign-guaranteed bank collateral for ECB financing,
rather than costlier Bank of Greece ELA, will lift the
profitability of Greece's highly challenged banking system.  S&P
anticipates, however, an only gradual lifting of the capital
controls still in place, including withdrawal limits on household
deposits.

S&P understands that one of the program's objectives is to enable
the Greek government to refinance itself fully in the commercial
debt markets by August 2018, when the program concludes.  Despite
delays to the second review and the occasional flaring up of
tensions between Greece and its creditors, S&P anticipates broad
adherence to program objectives by the Greek authorities.  S&P
estimates that the general government primary surplus will
accordingly increase through to 2018, putting the general
government debt-to-GDP ratio on a downward trajectory.  Even
then, S&P estimates that net general government debt will amount
to 168% of GDP, among the highest projected debt burdens of all
rated sovereigns.

Given the narrow majority of three seats for the Syriza-led
government and the rising popularity of the largest opposition
party, New Democracy, the probability of implementing long-term
reforms, for instance to the judicial system and public
administration, seems low.  The government's delivery on
structural and particularly labor market reforms appears to S&P
to be piecemeal, with limited success in attracting private
foreign capital into sectors that could create employment.

Risks to program disbursements remain: most recently as a
consequence of the Tsipras government's introduction of fiscal
easing measures, including a Christmas bonus to pensioners and a
freeze on VAT rates for some Aegean islands.  As a consequence,
Greece's creditors are delaying short-term debt relief measures
to smoothe the repayment profile to the EFSF and to fix Greece's
formerly floating interest rate payment schedule on EFSF
obligations.

Although S&P views these short-term debt measures as helpful in
backstopping the sustainability of Greece's concessional debt
burden, S&P don't see future net present value reductions as
equivalent to frontloaded principal write-downs if the goal is to
restore confidence in Greece's solvency, and to enable Greece to
finance itself in commercial debt markets at low interest rates
and long maturities.  Understandably, however, Greece's creditors
are reluctant to concede outright debt write-offs, particularly
in a year with a busy electoral calendar.

S&P thinks it unlikely that Greece would be included in the ECB's
asset purchase program until the conclusion of the second review
and until some of the short-term debt relief measures are
implemented.  S&P's forecasts for Greece do not assume that Greek
government bonds will be eligible for inclusion in the ECB's
quantitative easing program in the current year.  However, if
they were to be, S&P believes that apart from a direct reduction
in government bond yields, the borrowing costs for other
nonsovereign entities could potentially be lower.  Further, a
boost to confidence could further aid economic recovery and also
the process of deposits returning to the banking system.

S&P's baseline expectation is that Greece can and will service
its limited commercial debt stock (about one-sixth of the total
or about 30% of GDP) when it comes due.  In 2017, excluding
Treasury bills, Greece faces about EUR11 billion of loan
repayments and debt redemptions against an estimated EUR10
billion of deposit assets (as of September 2016), including about
EUR3 billion in the Treasury Single Account.  This means it has
some headroom if program reviews are delayed.  Having said that,
Greece faces a particularly heavy repayment period in July this
year with about EUR6.4 billion coming due, including about EUR2
billion in commercial redemptions.

                              OUTLOOK

The stable outlook indicates S&P's view that, over the next 12
months, risks to its 'B-' rating on Greece are balanced.

S&P could consider an upgrade if it saw stronger growth
performance and measurable progress in reducing the still-high
ratio of nonperforming loans in Greece's banking system alongside
compliance with the parameters of the ESM program.  Rating upside
would also stem from the lifting of capital controls, including
deposit withdrawal limits, which would be a strong indication of
recovered confidence in financial stability and, in turn, growth.
S&P could also consider raising the rating in the event of an
unexpected write-down of Greece's level of net general government
debt.

S&P could lower the ratings on Greece if the delay in or non-
implementation of reforms stipulated under the program resulted
in a prolonged period where the government's financing needs
weren't met by disbursements.  This could, over time, lead to a
default on Greek government debt, including on commercial
obligations, and reverse the nascent economic recovery.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that all key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                        Rating
                                        To             From
Greece (Hellenic Republic)
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency            B-/Stable/B    B-
/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   AAA            AAA
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign and Local Currency [#1]       B-             B-
  Foreign and Local Currency            B-             B-
Short-Term Debt
  Foreign and Local Currency [#1]       B              B
Commercial Paper
  Local Currency                        B              B

[#1] Issuer: National Bank of Greece S.A., Guarantor: Greece
(Hellenic Republic)


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BUS EIREANN: Plans to Seek Intervention of Labour Court
-------------------------------------------------------
Martin Wall at The Irish Times reports that Bus Eireann will seek
the intervention of the Labour Court if trade unions do not agree
to take part in talks on its survival plan for the company.

However, a spokeswoman for the company said any such process must
take place over a period of weeks, not months, The Irish Times
notes.  According to The Irish Times, the company said its losses
were accelerating.

A number of unions have said they will not accept an invitation
by the company to attend talks this week to discuss radical
proposals, including redundancies and cuts to premium payments
and allowances as well as out-sourcing, The Irish Times relays.
Unions have pledged to resist the company's proposals which they
maintain would see their members' earnings reduce by up to 30%,
The Irish Times states.

Bus Eireann has argued its financial position is unsustainable,
and without action to tackle its cost base and inefficiencies it
will go out of business within two years, says the report.

Senior management at Bus Eireann are scheduled to attend a
meeting of the Oireachtas committee on transport this week,
according to The Irish Times.

Unions are expected to meet this week to discuss a common
strategy to oppose the management's proposals, The Irish Times
discloses.


TAURUS 2016-1: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of six classes
of Notes issued by Taurus 2016-1 DEU DAC.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Issuer: Taurus 2016-1 DEU DAC

  EUR141.6M A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 21,
  2016 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR38.2M B Notes, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2016
  Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

  EUR25.5M C Notes, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2016
  Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

  EUR41.8M D Notes, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 21,
  2016 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  EUR52.6M E Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2016
  Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

  EUR17.35M F Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Mar 21, 2016
  Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class X Notes.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation action reflects the stable performance of the
transaction since closing in March 2016. Moody's base expected
loss is in the range of 0%-5% of the current balance, unchanged
from closing. Moody's derives this loss expectation from the
analysis of the default probability of the securitised loans
(both during the term and at maturity) and its value assessment
of the collateral. To date there are no realised losses on the
pool.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating EMEA CMBS Transactions published in November
2016.

Other factors used in these ratings are described in CMBS -
Europe: European CMBS: 2016-18 Central Scenarios published in
April 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Main factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of
the ratings are generally (i) a decline in the property values
backing the underlying loans or (ii) an increase in default risk
assessment or (iii) a deterioration in the credit of the
counterparties, such as the account bank.

Main factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of
the ratings are generally (i) an increase in the property values
backing the underlying loans, or (ii) a decrease in default risk
assessment.

MOODY'S PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS

As of the November 2016 interest payment date (IPD), the
transaction balance has declined by 0.25% to EUR316.3 million
from EUR317.0 million at closing in March 2016. The principal
distribution came from scheduled amortisation on the single loan
in the pool and was allocated pro rata among the classes of
notes, leaving the credit enhancement for each class unchanged
from closing. The current Moody's note-to-value ratio is 81.8%.

The notes are currently secured by first-ranking legal mortgages
over 55 commercial retail and mixed use properties, the largest
one representing less than 6% of the current pool balance by
allocated loan amount. The portfolio has an above average
concentration in terms of geographic location (100% Germany) and
property type (78% retail and 22% mixed use weighted by net
operation income).

SUMMARY OF MOODY'S LOAN ASSUMPTIONS

Kingfisher Loan -- Moody's LTV: 91% (Whole)/ 82% (A-Loan); Total
Default probability Medium/High; Expected Loss 0%-5%.

Moody's value assessment of the 55 properties is unchanged since
closing in March 2016 at EUR404.8 million due to 1) stable rent,
vacancy and weighted average lease term of the portfolio and 2)
the stable capitalisation rates for such properties over the past
year. A number of small leases were extended, mostly at flat
rents and few small vacant spaces were let. The overall vacancy
declined slightly as a result to 6.9% at the Nov 2016 IPD from
7.2% at closing.

The future value of the portfolio is highly dependent on the
performance of the retailers and the successful asset management
of the properties, given that a large part of the portfolio
comprises of single tenanted retail stores, where the bulk of the
property value comes from the remaining lease payments. In
general, vacant possession values for such property types are
significantly lower than the market value of occupied ones.
Currently, do-it-yourself (DIY) stores, supermarkets and retail
warehouses account for 40%, 10% and 3% of net operating income
respectively.

The lease with Helios Kliniken, the single tenant of the clinic
in Hattingen and one of the largest operators of clinics in
Germany, was recently extended for five years until Nov 2022 on
similar terms and the asset is currently in sales process. The
sale of the clinic, which accounts for 5% of the total
portfolio's value is credit positive because it will slightly
deleverage the loan, given the 115% release premium over its
allocated loan amount of EUR18.3 million. There have been no
asset disposals as of Nov 2016 IPD.

The whole loan balance at the Nov 2016 IPD was EUR369.9 million
(332.9 million senior loan and 37.0 million mezzanine loan). Only
95% of the senior loan, or EUR316.3 million, is securitised, the
remainder has been retained by the originator.


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BLUE PANORAMA: March 31 Deadline Set for Submission of Offers
-------------------------------------------------------------
Giuseppe Leogrande, The Extraordinary Commissioner of B.P.A.
S.p.A., as sole shareholder of Blue Panorama Airlines S.p.A., in
accordance with the authorization provided by the Italian
Ministry of Economic Development on December 9, 2016, announced
that Deloite Financial Advisory S.r.l. has been appointed to
identify in the market an industrial partner and/or a financial
investor interested in the acquisition of all or part of the
shares of Blue Panorama Airlines S.p.A.

Any interested party may contact Deloitte Financial Advisory
S.r.l. (to the attention of Andrea Chiappa Tel: +39 0283325394 E-
mail: achiappa@deloitte.it) and submit a purchase offer no later
than March 31, 2017.

A process letter, describing the next steps and a detailed
timeline of the sale procedure, will be sent to such interested
parties.


FIAT CHRYSLER: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' CCRs, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB/B' long- and short-term
corporate credit ratings on automotive manufacturer Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles N.V. (FCA) and its 'BB' long-term corporate credit
rating on FCA US LLC (FCA US).  The outlook on both entities is
stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BBB-' issue rating on FCA US'
senior secured term loans.  The recovery rating remains unchanged
at '1', reflecting S&P's expectation of very high recovery in the
90%-100% range in the event of a payment default.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB' issue rating on the senior unsecured
debt issued and guaranteed by FCA.  The recovery rating remains
unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's recovery expectations in the
higher half of the 50%-70% range in case of default.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that there is a degree of
headroom in its ratings, should FCA face fines in the U.S.
arising from a notice of violation of the Clean Air Act issued by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and California Air
Resources Board (CARB).  These alleged violations relate to the
installation and failure to disclose certain engine management
software in around 104,000 light-duty 2014-2016 model year Jeep
Grand Cherokees and Ram 1500 trucks equipped with 3.0 liter
diesel engines.  The EPA is also investigating whether the
software constitute "defeat devices," and S&P understands the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is also investigating the
matter.

There is a risk that FCA could face material fines, but S&P do
not include them in its base-case scenario at this stage as the
magnitude is uncertain.  S&P continues to expect FCA will
maintain leverage metrics in line with the rating, namely funds
from operations (FFO) to debt above 25% and debt to EBITDA below
3.0x for 2016 and 2017.  S&P also notes FCA's significant cash
balances of EUR16.6 billion as well as EUR6.2 billion of undrawn
committed credit facilities (as of Sept. 30, 2016), which provide
ample liquidity should a fine be levied.  S&P has not revised its
assessment of FCA's management and governance as it is not clear
that FCA engaged in illegal behavior or misconduct, though
reporting and compliance procedures may have been deficient.

S&P will continue to monitor developments, as there would likely
be a negative impact on FCA's leverage metrics, business
activities, and reputation, should FCA face material fines, which
may reduce available ratings headroom.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that FCA will
maintain leverage metrics of above 25% FFO to debt and below 3.0x
debt to EBITDA during 2016 and 2017, barring any substantial
legal costs or provisions.

S&P could lower the long-term ratings if FCA's profitability and
cash flows are weaker than it expects, and S&P anticipates that
FFO to adjusted debt will be below 20% on a prolonged basis.
This could occur, for example, if there are material fines, and
FCA's existing business is weakened.

S&P could raise the long-term ratings if it felt that FCA could
achieve and sustain stronger leverage, such that the ratio of FFO
to adjusted debt was comfortably in the range of 30%-35%.  This
could occur, for example, if there were no material fines, and
the company further improved profit margins and reduced debt,
despite more difficult macroeconomic conditions and substantial
capex. Furthermore, FOCF would need to be positive on a
sustainable basis, at a level above 10% of adjusted debt.


SIENA LEASE 2016-2: Fitch Ups Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+sf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken these rating actions on Siena Lease 2016-
2 S.r.l.'s notes:

  EUR454.6 mil. Class A notes: affirmed at 'AA+sf', Outlook
   Negative
  EUR202.5 mil. Class B notes: upgraded to 'A+sf' from 'BBB+sf';
   Outlook Positive
  EUR202.5 mil. Class C notes: upgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'Bsf';
   Outlook Positive

The transaction is a granular cash flow securitisation of a
static pool of euro-denominated receivables deriving from lease
agreements entered into between Italian small and medium- sized
enterprises, entrepreneurs, artisans and self-employed
individuals, and Monte dei Paschi di Siena Leasing and Factoring
Banca per i servizi finanziari alle imprese (MPS L&F), a fully
owned subsidiary of Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Rapid Deleveraging
The transaction has deleveraged by 20% after less than one year
since closing in January 2016.  Credit enhancement (CE) of the
class B notes totalled 49.6%, which is not far away from the
original CE of the class A notes.  As of August 2016, the
securitised portfolio remains fairly diversified, with the
largest Fitch industry and the top 10 lessees accounting for 27%
and 6% of the portfolio, respectively.  The increase in CE,
together with stable performance of the pool and improved
performance of the bank lease book shown in updated data received
from the originator, was the main driver for the rating actions.

Class B Deferability Possible
The rating of the class B notes is capped at 'A+sf' due to the
presence of a cumulative default trigger that -- if breached --
would cause class B interest to be deferred.  Fitch sees this
deferability feature as a structural weakness in a severe stress
scenario.  Heavily front-loaded defaults would make the
transaction hit the cumulative default trigger of 35% before the
class A notes are repaid in full, thus causing a deferral of
class B interest.

Positive Outlooks
Should the rapid deleveraging continue, and excluding a material
worsening of the pool performance, credit risk for the class B
and C notes is likely to gradually decrease, thus resulting in
the Positive Outlook.  As the pool amortizes interest
deferability on the class B notes becomes less likely, thus
leading to the Positive Outlook on the class B notes.

Sovereign Cap
The class A notes are capped at 'AA+sf'/Negative, driven by
sovereign dependency, in accordance with Fitch's Criteria for
Sovereign Risk in Developed Markets for Structured Finance and
Covered Bonds

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

An increase in default probability by 25% will not affect the
ratings on the class A and B notes due to the considerable buffer
offered by the available CE over their current capped ratings.
The same increase of default probability for the class C notes
would however cause a downgrade by one full category.

Reducing our recovery assumption by 25% would not affect the
ratings on the class A and B notes but would lead to a downgrade
of the class C notes by one notch.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


APERAM SA: S&P Revises Outlook to Positive & Affirms 'BB+' CCR
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook to positive from stable on
Luxembourg-based stainless steel producer Aperam S.A.  S&P
affirmed the corporate credit rating at 'BB+'.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+' issue ratings on
Aperam's convertible notes, including the $200 million senior
unsecured convertible bonds maturing 2020 and the $300 million
senior unsecured convertible bonds maturing 2021.  The recovery
rating remains unchanged at '3H'.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view of Aperam's continued
strong and resilient operational performance, on the back of past
years restructuring and cost reduction.  It also reflects S&P's
view that the stainless steel industry is well positioned to
support further increases in EBITDA and free cash flows in the
coming years, lengthening the company's track record of operating
with lower leverage than ever before.  S&P also takes into
account that macroeconomic uncertainties weighing on Aperam's
operations have dwindled, thanks in part to notably stronger
growth prospects in China and Brazil.  Facilitated by these
factors, in S&P's view, the company could report S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 60%
for 2016, possibly climbing to about 80% in 2017.  This level
would be commensurate with a higher rating, in S&P's view.

S&P now forecasts that Aperam will report about $500 million in
adjusted EBITDA for 2016.  Although this is somewhat lower than
in S&P's previous base-case scenario, it reflects Aperam's
superior operating resilience relative to peers in a difficult
industry environment marked by pronounced pressure on steel
prices in the first half of 2016, including stainless products,
on nickel price, global overcapacities, and the soft demand
mirroring macroeconomic uncertainties in emerging markets.  S&P
thinks that demand firmed up in Europe in the second half of 2016
and that it appears robust in the coming quarters, while
utilization rates in Brazil have remained relatively high despite
headwinds.  Also, S&P now expects Brazil's GDP growth to turn
positive in 2017 to 0.5% after -3.6% expected in 2016.  In
addition, the nickel price has somewhat recovered from early 2016
lows, and S&P expects the price will hold at about $10,500 per
ton on average in 2017, with further upside toward $12,000 per
ton in 2018 and 2019. S&P believes that restructuring of
capacities for stainless steel in Europe has been completed in
recent years, and that the sector is currently protected from
Chinese exports on the back of anti-dumping measures in Europe
and in Brazil.

S&P anticipates that Aperam's continued strong operating
performance, supported by S&P's view of management's conservative
financial policy, could support a higher rating.  S&P now
forecasts 2017 adjusted EBITDA at or slightly above $550 million,
which continues to point at the company's efficient operational
set-up with regard to scrap sourcing, distribution network, and
vertical integration in charcoal in Brazil, which S&P views as a
competitive advantage.  This should translate into free cash flow
generation of about $200 million-$300 million in 2017, which
appears sustainable.  As such, S&P estimates that adjusted FFO to
debt in 2017 could reach about 80%.  S&P views this level as
supportive of a higher rating, reflecting consistent deleveraging
in recent years leading to the strongest balance sheet in the
sector.  S&P also expects the variability of credit metrics --
induced by the industry's inherent volatility -- to be less in
the future than observed in 2012.  S&P also takes into account
the company's strict financial policies with regard to debt
management, dividend distributions, and acquisitions.

The positive outlook reflects that S&P could raise the rating to
'BBB-' if the company sustains strong and stable operating
performance over 2017 and the $200 million convertible bonds due
2020 are converted to equity in 2017, as S&P currently expects.
This could result in FFO to debt surpassing 80% in 2017, a level
supportive of a higher rating.

S&P would revise the outlook to stable if there was material
pressure on the stainless industry, either from unexpected
negative macroeconomic developments in Europe or in Brazil, or in
the event of a severe and abrupt fall in stainless steel prices,
which S&P currently views as unlikely.  Any deviation in the
company's financial policy -- regarding the application of excess
cash flows, re-leveraging, unexpected rise in dividends, or
mergers and acquisitions -- could also constrain S&P's view of
rating upside.


LSF10 XL: Moody's Assigns B2 Corp. Family Rating, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B2 Corporate Family rating
(CFR) and a B2-PD Probability of Default rating to LSF10 XL
Investments S.a r.l. (Xella), the ultimate holding company of the
Xella group. Concurrently Moody's has assigned B2 ratings to a
EUR1,150 million senior secured term loan B, to a EUR175 million
senior secured revolving credit facility and to EUR250 million
senior secured notes to be issued by LSF10 XL Bidco SCA. The
outlook on all ratings is stable.

The existing debt instrument ratings of Xella International S.A.
and Xefin Lux S.C.A., namely senior secured term loan facilities
due in 2018/2019 and senior secured notes due in 2019 remain
unchanged. Moody's expects the legacy term loan and notes to be
repaid by LSF10 XL Bidco SCA upon closing of the acquisition of
the Xella group by this entity. In the meantime, the credit
quality of these instruments remain unchanged and Moody's expects
to withdraw these instrument ratings upon repayment.

As part of this rating action, Moody's has withdrawn the B1
Corporate Family rating, B1-PD Probability of Default rating and
stable outlook assigned to Xella International Holdings S.a r.l.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The B2 CFR assigned to LSF10 XL Investments S.a r.l reflects the
group's (1) strong market position in its key geographies,
supported by its continuous focus on product innovation; (2) its
diversification in the more resilient lime and dry lining
businesses; (3) some degree of flexibility in its cost structure,
altogether resulting in a fairly resilient performance over the
past few years in comparison with its peers, and (4) the tangible
impact of the X-celerate cost cutting program, which has
materially improved the group's profitability since the start of
the implementation in 2014.

At the same time, Xella is constrained by its (1) high exposure
to the cyclical residential construction sector mainly via its
building materials division, representing 62% of 2015 revenue;
(2) exposure to raw materials and energy costs fluctuation; and
(3) high level of leverage with a 2016E pro-forma Moody's
adjusted Debt/EBITDA of 6.2x.

LIQUIDITY PROFILE

Xella's liquidity profile at the closing of the acquisition will
be adequate. The group's liquidity will be supported by EUR25
million cash overfunding, which is relatively low given the
timing of the closing of the acquisition at the start of the
construction season. However this is mitigated by a sizeable
revolving credit facility of EUR175 million, which should give
Xella well enough flexibility to build its usual working capital
for the core of the season. Xella should also benefit from a
loose financial covenant package with a springing covenant to be
tested only if the revolver is drawn more than 35% with a senior
secured leverage test.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The new proposed EUR1,150 million senior secured term loan B,
EUR175 million revolving credit facility and EUR250 million
senior secured notes will all rank pari passu among themselves
and will share the same collateral package mainly consisting of
share pledges over operating subsidiaries of the Xella group
accounting for at least 80% of the group's assets and EBITDA.

Moody's has assumed a standard recovery rate of 50% due to the
mixture of bank debt and notes in the proposed new capital
structure of the group.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Positive rating pressure would build on Xella if Debt/EBITDA
would drop sustainably below 5.5x with FCF/debt moving towards
5%.

Conversely negative pressure would arise if Debt/EBITDA would
increase to above 6.5x sustainably and / or Xella would start
generating negative free cash flow leading to a weakening of the
group's liquidity profile.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


KETER GROUP: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term CCR, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it has affirmed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on Keter Group B.V.  The outlook is
stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' issue rating on the
existing EUR690 million term loan B due 2023 and the EUR100
million revolving credit facility (RCF).  S&P is also assigning a
'B' issue rating to the proposed incremental EUR300 million term
loan B issuance and EUR10 million increase in the RCF.  The
recovery rating on all issue ratings is '3', reflecting S&P's
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

The affirmation follows BC Partners' agreement to acquire ABM
Italia for EUR413 million, subject to anti-trust approvals, using
a combination of debt and equity instruments.  The group has
increased its term loan facility by EUR300 million while also
increasing the RCF by EUR10 million to EUR110 million with
maturities of 2023 and 2022, respectively, in line with the
existing financing structure.  This purchase is expected to be
beneficial to the group's future performance as it will benefit
from new brands, new markets, new product types, and
manufacturing expertise which can be integrated into the existing
business.  The combined business is expected to record revenues
in excess of EUR1 billion, with reported earnings in excess of
EUR200 million, and will benefit from efficiency gains given the
enhanced economies of scale.

Since S&P's initial rating assignment in September 2016, Keter
has started its transformation process under its new owners and
key operational and management initiatives have been introduced
to achieve the group's revenue growth and profitability
objectives. The group is in the final stages of selecting a
senior management team for the combined business and S&P
understands that, based on full-year preliminary numbers for
2016, the group should record reported earnings in line with
S&P's expectations of EUR155 million-EUR165 million.  S&P now
understands, however, that a significant proportion of the equity
injection that was used in finalizing the leveraged buy-out (LBO)
transaction was ultimately made up of cumulative preference
shares.  Following S&P's assessment of these instruments, it has
decided to include these noncommon equity shares in S&P's debt
calculations as the economic incentives are not aligned with
common shares in the capital structure.

ABM Italia enjoys strong positions in European markets, including
Italy, France, and Germany.  Its product offering includes indoor
storage, cabinets and shelving, and medical accessories.  The
group is also present in the U.S. and Canada and has long-
established relationships with retailers including IKEA, Bauhaus,
Kingfisher, and Canadian Tire.  This is expected to aid Keter's
business strategy of market penetration and cross-selling its
products in new channels.  The majority of ABM Italia's portfolio
is marketed at mid-to-low price points of the consumer basket
which contrasts with the more premium mid-to-high price points of
the existing Keter product range.  S&P sees the overlay of
customer relationships, product categories, and price points as
complementary to the existing Keter business and, as such, there
will be significant potential for increased sales volumes for the
combined entity.  The ability to exploit new and existing
customer relationships can help to further augment revenue growth
going forward as the group continues to introduce innovative
products to the market place.

The ABM Italia business has had significant success in realizing
marginally higher margins in the past two years with reported
EBITDA margins of 20%-22%, driven by its cost base management and
optimal distribution network.  Although the group enjoys a lower
average selling price for its products than the existing Keter
business, the group has built up expertise in working with
recycled materials to manufacture durable, value-for-money
merchandise for its consumers.  The majority of ABM Italia's
revenues are derived from its proprietary brands KIS and AP
Medical, while it also enjoys a strong co-manufacturing
relationship with major retailers including IKEA, which is viewed
as a potential source for significant volume growth.  S&P also
notes that there is less seasonality in ABM Italia's earnings
generation as it is not exposed to outdoor storage furniture in
sales volumes and so there is less volatility in working capital
requirements and underlying demand.

S&P still views the niche focus of the group's operations in the
consumer plastic industry as a constraint on our assessment of
the business risk profile.  The industry remains relatively
fragmented with the ability to successfully integrate bolt-on
acquisitions and introduce innovative products that are valued by
consumers viewed as crucial to preserving the group's market
positions. Despite the strengthening of the group's European
operations as a result of the ABM Italia acquisition, S&P also
notes that the North American market -- which is largest in
value -- remains dominated by competitors across the hardware,
outdoor storage, home organization, and furniture categories.
These factors, combined with the group's exposure to substitute
products from other materials, such as wood and metal, and the
changing tastes and preferences of the consumer, support S&P's
current assessment of the business risk profile as fair.

S&P maintains its highly leveraged financial risk profile
assessment, reflecting its S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt-to-
EBITDA ratio of 8.0x-9.0x over the next two years.  This supports
S&P's FS-6 financial policy assessment, given the group's private
equity ownership, and S&P's expectation that the owners will seek
to drive enterprise value with debt-funded acquisitions.

S&P's debt calculation estimate includes the existing
EUR690 million term loan B, EUR150 million payment-in-kind (PIK)
toggle notes, and operating lease and pension adjustments of over
EUR25 million.  S&P also includes the noncommon equity proportion
of the capital injection from the owners that was made in the LBO
transaction, which adds a further EUR700 million to the amount in
2017.  S&P notes, however, that similar to the PIK-paying debt,
there is no mandatory obligation to make cash payments and
therefore S&P views positively the cash-preserving features of
the instrument.  That said, S&P expects these shares -- which
have a prescribed fixed preferential dividend of 10% per year --
to continue to accrue, thus increasing adjusted debt figures
going forward.  However, S&P expects that following the
completion of the transaction, the group will record revenues of
EUR1.0 billion-EUR1.1 billion in 2017, rising to EUR1.1 billion-
EUR1.2 billion in 2018 as the group employs its marketing
strategy.  For 2017, S&P forecasts adjusted EBITDA of EUR200
million-EUR220 million and adjusted free operating cash flow
(FOCF) of EUR50 million-EUR60 million, rising to above EUR220
million and EUR80 million, respectively, in 2018; supported by
the full-year contribution of the ABM Italia acquisition, smaller
bolt-ons, and organic top-line growth.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Revenue growth of 10%-25% over the next two years,
      reflecting modest volume growth in the existing Keter
      business in the U.S., DACH region (Germany, Austria, and
      Switzerland), and Eastern Europe.  S&P expects this organic
      growth will be supplemented by the ABM Italia business
      which enjoys strong market positions in Canada and Western
      Europe, and will also give the group access to additional
      customers to market its portfolio of innovative products.

   -- Reported EBITDA margins to remain largely stable over S&P's
      forecast horizon despite a reduction in the reported gross
      profit margins as a result of an increase in polypropylene
      prices toward the end of 2017.  However, the group will
      benefit from ABM Italia's product portfolio being less
      seasonal with slightly higher profitability than the
      existing business.  S&P expects the management team should
      be able to gain efficiency and synergies in corporate
      overheads, procurement, and logistics which will allow the
      group to record EBITDA margins between 18%-21% over the
      next 12-24 months.

   -- Modest increase in working capital requirements driven by
      sales growth and offset by careful management of the cash
      conversion cycle.

   -- Capital expenditure (capex) of 4%-6% of sales over S&P's
      forecast period, with maintenance capex accounting for
      approximately 40%-50% of the total.

   -- Bolt-on acquisitions of approximately EUR10 million-
      EUR25 million annually, helping to drive earnings growth
      going forward.

   -- No dividend distributions.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Revenues of EUR1.1 billion-EUR1.2 billion in 2017, rising
      to EUR1.1 billion-EUR1.2 billion in 2018.

   -- Stable operating performance, resulting in adjusted EBITDA
      margins of 18%-21% in 2017 and 2018.

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of 8.0x-9.0x in 2017 and 2018.

   -- Forecast adjusted funds from operations (FFO) cash interest
      coverage of 4.0x-5.0x.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's views that Keter will exploit
its strong brand portfolio, customer relationships, and research
and development capabilities to drive market penetration as it
introduces innovative products.  S&P forecasts that the group
will maintain adjusted EBITDA margins of 18%-21% over the next
three years, supported by management's ongoing operational
efficiency projects and improved procurement processes to
mitigate any volatility in raw material prices, as well as labor
and energy costs.  As a result, S&P expects Keter to enjoy FFO
cash interest coverage of above 4.0x and generate healthy FOCF
due to the prudent management of working capital seasonality,
even if core leverage metrics were to remain above 8.0x over the
next three years.

S&P would only raise the ratings if it saw stronger leverage and
interest coverage metrics on a sustainable basis, including S&P's
assessment of the noncommon equity instruments.  Given the
financial sponsor ownership, S&P would have to see a clear track
record of Keter reducing its debt amount and debt-like financing
in its capital structure, such that adjusted debt to EBITDA
remains below 5.0x in S&P's forecasts.  This would most likely
occur if the company substantially outperforms S&P's base case
with a mixture of organic and acquisitive growth, with generated
cash flows prioritized to debt repayment, thus reducing long-term
refinancing risk.

S&P could lower the ratings if Keter fails to generate positive
FOCF, which would constrain the group's liquidity and increase
the risk of future refinancing.  S&P will also closely monitor
the FFO cash interest coverage--if this metric weakens to 2.0x or
below, S&P could also lower the ratings.  In S&P's view, the most
likely causes of such failures would be a significant reduction
in sales volumes as a result of a major operational disruption or
a substantial reduction in consumer demand due to changing tastes
and preferences.


===========
P O L A N D
===========


PFLEIDERER GROUP: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+', Outlook Positive
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term corporate credit rating
on Poland-based wood panels producer Pfleiderer Group S.A. and
its wholly-owned Germany-based subsidiary PCF GmbH to 'B+' from
'B'. The outlook is positive.

Pfleiderer has announced a refinancing of its high-yield bond,
and S&P expects that lower interest costs in combination with
lower restructuring costs will lead to improving credit metrics.

At the same time, S&P raised the issue rating of the senior
secured notes issued by PCF GmbH to 'B+' from 'B' and affirmed
the recovery rating at '4', indicating S&P's expectation of
average recovery prospects (30%).

The upgrade follows Pfleiderer's recently improving underlying
operational performance and S&P's expectation that lower interest
and restructuring expenses will result in improving credit
metrics in 2017 and 2018.

Following the transaction in early 2016, when Pfleiderer GmbH was
taken over by its subsidiary Pfleiderer Grajewo, the group is now
listed at the Warsaw Stock Exchange and has rebranded itself as
Pfleiderer Group S.A.  During 2016, the operating environment
remained highly competitive because the Polish market was
oversupplied with volumes from neighboring countries in the east.
This resulted in heavy price pressure and a fall in the group's
sales for the first nine months of 2016.  However, increasing
volumes and an improved product mix to focus on value-added
products resulted in increasing underlying margins and EBITDA
generation.  S&P views these developments as positive because
they indicate that the company has the ability to navigate
through the competitive environment and improve its product
portfolio.  S&P acknowledges that reported EBITDA and cash flow
generation for 2016 will be dented by around EUR30 million in
project expenses relating to the reverse takeover and
restructuring costs relating to the consolidation of the group.
However, S&P understands that these will be less material from
2017.

Alongside improving earnings, S&P also thinks that Pfleiderer's
cash flow generation could improve in 2017 if the company's
proposed refinancing is executed as planned.  Pfleiderer has
announced it will call its outstanding EUR322 million bond which
pays a coupon of 7.875% and replace it with bank debt, which will
likely reduce interest expenses significantly, benefitting cash
flow and interest coverage ratios in the coming years.

S&P still considers Pfleiderer's business risk profile to be
constrained by its exposure to the highly cyclical and
commoditized wood-based panels industry, characterized by price-
based competition, volatile demand, high sensitivity to raw
material costs, and relatively high market fragmentation.  S&P's
assessment also reflects Pfleiderer's relatively limited size and
scope, with production concentrated at eight sites in Germany and
Poland, and a high degree of sales geared toward mature Western
European markets.  S&P also considers Pfleiderer's historical
underinvestment in core assets as a constraint, although this is
somewhat mitigated by the past few years' investments to improve
the efficiency of its plants.  S&P believes that Pfleiderer's
profitability will remain highly dependent on the general
economic environment and that a decline in consumer confidence
can lead to sharp declines in sales and earnings for the company.
That said, the company has performed well since the bond
transaction in 2014, outperforming its financial targets,
supported by an improving market environment and internal
efficiency measures.  S&P thinks that Pfleiderer will continue to
benefit from strong market sentiment in Germany and Poland, its
focus on value-added products, a continued strong internal focus
on cost savings, and greater integration of the German and Polish
business units.

Although S&P views Pfleiderer's recent improvement in financial
credit metrics as clearly positive, S&P views its financial
policy as shareholder-friendly and potentially negative for cash
flow generation.  S&P acknowledges that Pfleiderer's shareholding
structure is dominated by potentially aggressive shareholders,
Atlantik and SVP Global, and that this could result in higher
shareholder distributions than S&P's forecast if the share price
development is not in line with their expectations.  However, S&P
thinks it is possible that these two shareholders could dispose
of their shares in the medium term if Pfleiderer's share price
continues to develop positively in 2017.

S&P considers Pfleiderer's lack of established operating and
financial track record after the bankruptcy in 2012, the
following restructuring, and the more recent corporate
reorganization as a constraint for the rating.  This is reflected
in S&P's negative comparable ratings analysis modifier.  S&P
could remove this modifier if Pfleiderer continued to show
resilient performance in the coming year and if S&P was to assess
it as likely that Pfleiderer's cash flow generation would be less
volatile than in the past.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- GDP growth in Germany of 1.4% in 2017 and 1.3% in 2018,
      supported by resilient domestic demand.  S&P also assumes
      GDP growth to be stronger in Poland and other parts of
      Eastern Europe, increasing in Poland by 3.2% in 2017 and
      3.1% in 2018.

   -- Pfleiderer group revenue growth of around 5% per year in
      2017 and 2018, assuming volume growth above GDP, driven by
      capacity addition and an increase in existing capacity
      utilization over the period.  Some pricing pressure is
      expected to persist, especially in Poland.  Adjusted EBITDA
      margins of about 16.0%-16.5% in 2017 and 2018 (compared
      with an estimated 14%-15% for 2016), supported by lower
      non-sustainable items, an increase in the proportion of
      higher-value-added products, and the group's internal
      efficiency improvement program.

   -- A capital expenditure increase to around EUR60 million-
      EUR65 million per year for 2017-2018 as the company invests
      in new capacity.

   -- Dividend payments in line with the stated dividend policy
      of up to 70% of net income.

   -- Asset-backed securities and factoring utilization (which is
      added to S&P's adjusted debt metrics) to remain steady at
      EUR82 million.

   -- Interest cost savings of about EUR15 million post the
      refinancing.  No significant mergers or acquisitions.  Any
      such debt-funded activity could represent a downside to
      S&P's forecasts.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these adjusted credit
measures for 2017 and 2018:

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 24%-28%.
   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 3x.
   -- FFO cash interest cover of around 8x-10x.

S&P assess Pfleiderer's liquidity profile as adequate.  Despite
an increase in capital expenditure and shareholder distributions,
S&P expects the group's sources of liquidity to exceed uses by
1.2x over the next 12 months, supported by its modest cash
balance, robust FFO generation and almost undrawn revolving
credit facilities (RCFs).

Pfleiderer's principal liquidity sources for the 12 months ending
Sept. 30, 2017, are:

   -- Estimated cash on the balance sheet of about
      EUR77.1 million, as of Sept. 30, 2016

   -- S&P's forecast of unadjusted FFO of EUR100 million-EUR110
      million; and

   -- Access to about EUR105 million of undrawn committed RCFs,
      consisting of a EUR60 million and a Polish zloty (PLN) 200
      million (about EUR46 million) facility, both maturing in
      2019.  S&P understands that, although the RCFs are undrawn,
      the group has issued several guarantees under these
      facilities totaling around EUR5 million.

Pfleiderer's principal liquidity uses over this period are:

   -- Short-term debt maturities of about EUR100 million;
   -- Capital expenditures of around EUR60 million-EUR65 million;
   -- Minimal working capital outflows; and
   -- Dividend payments in line with the company's stated policy
      of up to 70% of net income.

S&P also expects Pfleiderer to maintain adequate headroom under
its net debt to EBITDA financial covenant.

The positive outlook takes into account S&P's expectations that
Pfleiderer's operational performance will improve slightly in
2017 and that this, in combination with lower interest expenses
and restructuring costs, will support improving credit metrics,
possibly to the extent that S&P could raise the rating by one
notch in 12 months' time.

S&P could raise the rating if Pfleiderer continues to display
resilient and improving earnings and if S&P thinks that there is
limited risk of credit metrics deteriorating.  S&P thinks that
this scenario could materialize if Pfleiderer continues to
improve its product mix, while internal efficiency measures will
further improve its cost base.  S&P would view a ratio of FFO to
debt of consistently around 25% as commensurate with a higher
rating.  For a higher rating, S&P would also have to be
comfortable that Pfleiderer's shareholder base does not pose a
significant risk of higher leverage.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it thinks upside to the
rating is limited.  This could be the case if Pfleiderer's
operating performance were to deteriorate sharply, if
restructuring costs continue to be high, or if the planned
refinancing did not materialize, hence limiting any improvement
in Pfleiderer's credit metrics.  S&P could also revise the
outlook to stable or potentially lower the rating if Pfleiderer
engaged in any large-scale debt-funded M&A activity, although S&P
thinks such a scenario is unlikely in the coming year.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO BPI: Moody's Confirms Ba3 Sr. Debt & Deposit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the following ratings of
Banco BPI S.A. (BPI) and its supported entities: (1) the Ba3
long-term senior debt and deposit ratings; and (2) the baseline
credit assessment (BCA) of b1. At the same time, the rating
agency has upgraded the following ratings: (1) the subordinated
debt ratings to B1 from B2; (2) the junior subordinated programme
ratings to (P)B2 from (P)B3; (3) the backed preference shares
rating to B3(hyb) from Caa1(hyb); (4) the bank's adjusted BCA to
ba3 from b1; and (5) its long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment
(CRA) to Ba1(cr) from Ba2(cr). The outlook on the bank's long-
term senior debt and deposit ratings is stable.

The rating action was triggered by BPI's announcement on 5
January 2017 that it has transferred 2% of its stake in Banco de
Fomento de Angola S.A. (BFA, unrated) to Unitel S.A. (unrated).
This transaction has decreased BPI's stake in the Angolan bank to
48.1% and increased Unitel's to 51.9%, therefore allowing the
Portuguese bank to cease to fully consolidate the Angolan
subsidiary. Moody's assumes that this sale remedies BPI's breach
of the regulatory large exposure limits to Angola (B1 negative),
consequently avoiding European Central Bank (ECB) sanctions.

In addition, the rating action also reflects CaixaBank, S.A.'s
mandatory public tender offer launched on 21 September 2016 to
acquire the 54.50% of BPI's share capital that it does not
already own. The acceptance period for the offer started on 17
January 2017 and will finalise 7 February 2017. Moody's has
therefore factored into BPI's ratings affiliate support,
reflecting the benefit to BPI's senior creditors from the bank's
closer integration into CaixaBank while reducing expectations of
Portuguese government support for the bank.

The rating action on BPI closes the review on the bank's ratings
which was opened on 22 March 2016 and extended on 20 April 2016.

BPI's short-term deposit ratings at Not Prime, programme rating
at (P)Not Prime and its short-term CRA of Not Prime(cr) are
unaffected by the rating action.

RATINGS RATIONALE

-- RATIONALE FOR THE CONFIRMATION OF THE BCA

The confirmation of BPI's BCA at b1 is prompted by the bank's
announcement on January 5, 2017 that it has sold 2% of its stake
in BFA to Unitel and Moody's views that this transaction has
eliminated the breach of large exposure limits and therefore the
risk of supervisory sanctions. However, given that the remaining
stake of BPI in BFA remains material, the rating agency believes
that the bank's overall risk profile has not materially changed.

The announced sale allows BPI to cease to fully consolidate BFA.
Therefore, Moody's assumes that it solves the large exposure
limit breaches in Angola, thus avoiding ECB fines for this excess
exposure. The review for downgrade of BPI's BCA, which was opened
last March, was triggered by Moody's rising concerns about the
bank's financial profile, as the ECB's imposed deadline of 10
April 2016 was approaching, but no solution had been approved for
BPI's large exposures to the Angolan state and the National Bank
of Angola (Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA)).

As a result of the announced transaction, BPI will cease to fully
consolidate BFA and this will significantly reduce the weight of
the Angolan operations in BPI's financial statements (BFA
accounted for 18% of the group's total assets and 68% of the
group's net profit at end-September 2016). However, Moody's notes
that the risks associated to the exposure to Angola have not
dissipated, given that the bank still holds a 48.1% stake of the
Angolan subsidiary. In addition, the rating agency acknowledges
that this sale will negatively affect BPI's profitability, given
the very large relevance of earnings from this subsidiary, which
will now only be 48.1% integrated into the group's profits.
Moody's also believes that the loss of control in BFA increases
the likelihood that BPI will reduce its stake in the Angolan bank
further, which would be positive in terms of solvency but could
affect the bank's profitability indicators more severely.

-- RATIONALE FOR CONFIRMATION OF SENIOR DEBT AND DEPOSIT RATINGS
    WITH A STABLE OUTLOOK

The confirmation of BPI's long-term debt and deposit ratings at
Ba3 reflects: (1) the confirmation of the bank's b1 BCA; (2) the
upgrade of the bank's adjusted BCA to ba3 from b1 after
considering affiliate support from CaixaBank; (3) no uplift from
Moody's Advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis; and (4) the
reduced government support assumptions, leading to a removal of
the one-notch government support ratings uplift.

Moody's believes that there is a very high likelihood of
CaixaBank achieving a majority stake in BPI after the completion
of the tender offer, and that BPI's senior creditors will benefit
from CaixaBank's affiliate support. Consequently, the rating
agency has decided to incorporate a moderate likelihood of
affiliate support from CaixaBank into BPI's ratings. As a result
of this support assessment, BPI's adjusted BCA is ba3, one notch
above its BCA.

In addition, Moody's has reduced the expectation of support from
the Government of Portugal (Ba1 stable) for BPI to low from
previous moderate. The rating agency considers that any support
needed after the takeover bid is resolved will likely come from
BPI's largest shareholder CaixaBank, rather than from the
Portuguese government.

The stable outlook on the long-term deposit and senior debt
ratings of BPI reflects Moody's views that the bank's credit
profile will be resilient despite Moody's expectations of lower
profitability levels and continued challenges stemming from
Portugal's persistently weak operating environment.

-- RATIONALE FOR THE UPGRADE OF THE CR ASSESSMENT

As part of the rating action, Moody's has also upgraded the CR
Assessment of BPI to Ba1(cr) from Ba2(cr), two notches above the
adjusted BCA of ba3. The CR Assessment is driven by the banks'
adjusted BCA and by the cushion against default provided to the
senior obligations represented by the CR Assessment by
subordinated instruments amounting to 9.2% of tangible banking
assets.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Upward pressure on BPI's adjusted BCA could be driven by: (1)
Stronger Tangible Common Equity (TCE) levels; (2) a material
improvement in its asset risk profile; and (3) a sustainable
recovery in the bank's domestic recurring earnings; and (4)
Moody's reassessment of the likelihood of affiliate support. As
the bank's debt and deposit ratings are linked to the adjusted
BCA, any change to it would likely also affect these ratings.

Downward pressure on the bank's adjusted BCA could develop as a
result of: (1) A reversal in current asset risk trends with an
increase in the stock of non-performing loans (NPLs) and/or other
problematic exposures; and (2) a weakening of BPI's risk-
absorption capacity when measured against its asset risk profile;
and (3) Moody's reassessment of the likelihood of affiliate
support. As the bank's debt and deposit ratings are linked to the
adjusted BCA, any change to it would likely also affect these
ratings.

BPI's deposit and senior debt ratings could also change due to
movements in the loss-given failure faced by these securities.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Banco BPI S.A.

Upgrades:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to Ba1(cr) from
Ba2(cr)

Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, upgraded to (P)B1 from
(P)B2

Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to B1 from B2

Junior Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, upgraded to (P)B2
from (P)B3

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to ba3 from b1

Confirmations:

Long-term Deposit Ratings, confirmed at Ba3, outlook changed to
Stable from Ratings under Review

Long-term Issuer Rating, confirmed at Ba3, outlook changed to
Stable from Ratings under Review

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, confirmed at Ba3,
outlook changed to Stable from Ratings under Review

Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, confirmed at (P)Ba3

Baseline Credit Assessment, confirmed at b1

Outlook Action:

Outlook changed to Stable from Ratings under Review

Issuer: Banco BPI S.A. (Santa Maria)

Upgrade:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to Ba1(cr) from
Ba2(cr)

Outlook Action:

Outlook changed to No Outlook from Ratings under Review

Issuer: BPI Capital Finance Ltd.

Upgrade:

Backed Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, upgraded to B3(hyb) from
Caa1(hyb)

Outlook Action:

Outlook changed to No Outlook from Ratings under Review

Issuer: Banco BPI S.A. (Cayman)

Upgrades:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to Ba1(cr) from
Ba2(cr)

Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to B1 from B2

Confirmations:

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, confirmed at Ba3,
outlook changed to Stable from Ratings under Review

Outlook Actions:

Outlook changed to Stable from Ratings under Review

Issuer: Banco BPI S.A. (Madeira)

Upgrade:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to Ba1(cr) from
Ba2(cr)

Outlook Action:

Outlook changed to No Outlook from Ratings under Review

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


NOVATSIYA PJSC: Put on Provisional Administration
-------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-111, dated January 23,
2017, revoked the banking license of Maikop-based credit
institution Novatsiya Joint-stock Commercial Bank (Public Joint-
stock Society) (PJSC JSCB Novatsiya) from January 23, 2017,
according to the press service of the Central Bank of Russia.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, and the application of measures envisaged by the
Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank
of Russia)", and considering the existence of a serious threat to
creditors' and depositors' interests.

PJSC JSCB Novatsiya implemented high-risk lending policy linked
to the placement of funds into low-quality assets. Adequate
assessment of risks assumed created grounds for the credit
institutions' initiating measures to prevent insolvency
(bankruptcy).  Besides, due to the loss of liquidity the credit
institution failed to timely honor its obligations to creditors.
The management and owners of the bank have not taken measures
required to normalize its activities.  Under these circumstances,
the Bank of Russia decided to take out PJSC JSCB Novatsiya from
the banking services market.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-112, dated January 23,
appointed a provisional administration to PJSC JSCB Novatsiya for
the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator
under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the
credit institution's executive bodies are suspended.

PJSC JSCB Novatsiya is a member of the deposit insurance system.
The revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but not more than RUR1.4 million per
depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of January 1, 2017,
PJSC JSCB Novatsiya ranked 416th by assets in the Russian banking
system.


POLYUS GOLD: S&P Revises Outlook to Positive & Affirms 'BB-' CCR
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Russian gold miner
Polyus Gold International Ltd. and its core subsidiary Polyus
Gold PJSC to positive from stable.  S&P affirmed its 'BB-' long-
term corporate credit rating on both companies.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB-' issue rating on Polyus Gold
International's senior unsecured debt.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's perception that Polyus'
financial policy will likely be more conservative going forward
than S&P previously assumed and than was demonstrated in 2015 and
the first half of 2016.  This is notably signaled by the
announcement of the new dividend policy and planned secondary
public offering (SPO).

In October 2016, Polyus adopted a new dividend policy stipulating
a payout of 30% of EBITDA if the company's net leverage is below
2.5x.  This new policy does not formally restrict the board from
paying special dividends and leaves the amounts at the board's
consideration if net leverage exceeds 2.5x.  S&P also notes that
the board has three independent directors, as well as three who
are representatives of the majority shareholder and three of
management.  Notwithstanding this, S&P views the new policy as a
credit-supportive development, especially in the context of the
company's intention to launch an SPO that could further reduce
the risk of high special dividends or share buybacks that S&P
currently factors in its rating.  An equity transaction, in S&P's
opinion, could on one hand help to reduce the leverage at the
level of Polyus or its shareholder, and on the other hand make
the new financial policy more entrenched.

As the company builds a track record of this more conservative
financial policy over the next 12 months, S&P may revise its
assessment of the risk of high shareholder distributions.  This
became a very important factor after the company's acquisition by
Wandle Holdings Ltd. in November 2015, which as S&P understands
was largely debt-financed, and notably after the share buyback
worth $3.2 billion in March 2016.  Although these financial
policy risks are likely to diminish in S&P's view, it do not
expect them to disappear completely in the medium term, because
S&P has not been able to obtain a clear view of the debt amount
and capital structure at the shareholder's level and because S&P
expects the current shareholder will retain control.  As such,
S&P may reduce its current two-notch downward adjustment for the
financial policy to one notch, but believe financial policy is
unlikely to become a neutral factor for the rating.

"Our positive rating action also reflects our expectation of the
company's supportive operational and financial results for 2016
and going forward.  We note that production levels increased in
2016 to about 2.0 million ounces of gold (from 1.8 million ounces
in 2015) and expect further above-peer average growth in 2017-
2019, which in combination with the strong profitability
supported by ruble devaluation, efficiency gains, and manageable
capital expenditure (capex) levels translates to consistently
positive free operating cash flow (FOCF) generation (about $0.6
billion in 2016) and moderate leverage.  We estimate the company
will demonstrate record low cash operating costs of below $400
per ounce (/oz) in 2016, which ensures the company's position on
the left side of the first quartile of the global gold miners'
cost curve," S&P said.

The company has a solid market position as the ninth gold
producer globally by output and fourth by reserves.  It boasts
long reserves life of more than 30 years and low production
costs. These positive factors are mitigated by the exposure to a
single commodity and Russia's high country risk where the
company's operating assets are located, and S&P assess Polyus'
business risk as fair.

The positive outlook reflects that S&P may raise the rating on
Polyus if the company demonstrates a track record of more credit-
friendly financial policies in 2017 and onward, enabling it to
maintain moderate leverage.

For S&P to upgrade Polyus over the next 12 months, S&P would need
to observe a combination of:

   -- The company refraining from extra shareholder distributions
      on top of the approved dividend payout ratio.

   -- Moderate leverage, with FFO to debt comfortably in the 30%-
      45% range through the cycle.

   -- Consistent positive FOCF that enables gradual deleveraging
      at the company and/or shareholder level.

An upgrade might also stem from an equity transaction, such as an
SPO that, in S&P's view, would signal lower financial policy
risks and help deleveraging at the company and/or shareholder
level.

S&P might revise the outlook to stable if it sees the company
exercising more aggressive policies than S&P currently expects or
if S&P sees a risk of weakening metrics (because of higher capex,
acquisitions, or dividends) with FFO to debt slipping below 30%.


SIBERIAN BANK: Put On Provisional Administration, License Revoked
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-108, dated January 23,
2017, revoked the banking license of Omsk-based credit
institution Siberian Bank Sirius (limited liability company)
(Siberian Bank Sirius LLC) from January 23, 2017, according to
the press service of the Central Bank of Russia.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, repeated breaches of Article 7 (except for Clause 3
of Article 7) of Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism" over the year, non-compliance with Bank of Russia
regulations related to the said Federal Law and because of the
application of measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)".

Siberian Bank Sirius LLC placed funds in low quality assets and
inadequately assessed the risks assumed.  The execution of
authorized body's order to establish adequate provisions created
grounds for taking insolvency (bankruptcy) prevention measures.
Moreover, by not providing complete information on operations
subject to mandatory supervision, the bank did not comply with
laws and Bank of Russia regulations on countering the
legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained incomes and the
financing of terrorism.

The management and owners of the bank did not take effective
measures to bring its activities back to normal and under such
circumstances the Bank of Russia decided to remove Siberian Bank
Sirius LLC from the banking market.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-109, dated January 23,
2017, appointed a provisional administration to Siberian Bank
Sirius LLC for the period until the appointment of a receiver
pursuant to the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies are suspended.

According to the financial statements, as of January 1, 2017,
Siberian Bank Sirius LLC ranked 527th by assets in the Russian
banking system.


TALMENKA BANK: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Then Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-106, dated January 23,
2017, revoked the banking license of Barnaul-based credit
institution Commercial Bank Talmenka Bank, Limited Liability
Company (CB Talmenka Bank LLC) from January 23, 2017.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, repeated violations within a year of the
requirements of Articles 6 and 7 (except for Clause 3 of Article
7) of the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism", and the related Bank of Russia regulations, capital
adequacy below 2%, decrease in equity capital below the minimal
amount of the authorized capital established as of the date of
the state registration of the credit institution, and given the
repeated application over a year of supervisory measures
envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian
Federation (Bank of Russia)".

As a result of meeting the supervisor's requirements on creating
provisions adequate to the risks assumed, the credit institution
lost its equity capital.  The bank failed to comply with the
legislation and Bank of Russia regulations on anti-money
laundering and the financing of terrorism in terms of reliable
and timely reporting to the authorized body and customer
identification.

The management and owners of CB Talmenka Bank LLC did not take
measures to bring its activities back to normal.  In these
circumstances, pursuant to Article 20 of the Federal Law "On
Banks and Banking Activities", the Bank of Russia revoked the
banking license from the credit institution.

By its Order No. OD-107, dated 23 January 2017, the Bank of
Russia has appointed a provisional administration to CB Talmenka
Bank LLC for the period until the appointment of a receiver
pursuant to the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies are suspended.

CB Talmenka Bank LLC is a member of the deposit insurance system.
The revocation of banking license is an insured event envisaged
by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On Insurance of Household Deposits
with Russian Banks" regarding the bank's obligations on deposits
of households determined in accordance with the legislation. This
Federal Law provides for the payment of insurance indemnity to
the bank's depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the
amount of 100% of their balances but not exceeding the total of
RUR1.4 million per depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of January 1, 2017, CB
Talmenka Bank LLC ranked 425th by assets in the Russian banking
system.


=========
S P A I N
=========


IM CAJAMAR 4: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed IM Cajamar 4 and 5, FTA, as:

IM Cajamar 4, FTA
  Class A (ES0349044000): affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class B (ES0349044018): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class C (ES0349044026): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class D (ES0349044034): affirmed at 'BBsf'; off Rating Watch
   Negative; Outlook Stable
  Class E (ES0349044042): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate
   85%

IM Cajamar 5, FTA
  Class A (ES0347566004): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
  Class B (ES0347566012): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; off Rating Watch
   Positive (RWP); Outlook Stable
  Class C (ES0347566020): affirmed at 'BB+sf'; off RWP; Outlook
   Stable
  Class D (ES0347566038): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class E (ES0347566046): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate
   85%

The transactions are part of a series of prime Spanish RMBS
originated and serviced by Cajamar Caja Rural, Sociedad
Cooperativa de Credito (Cajamar; BB-/Stable/B).

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Credit Enhancement
Credit enhancement (CE) across the structures has been stable
since 2014 and 2015, respectively, as both transactions continue
to amortize on a pro rata basis.  With all conditions for pro
rata payment and reserve fund amortization fulfilled, Fitch
expects that CE will remain stable.  CE for the class A notes
remains at 10.2% and 10.7% for IM Cajamar 4 and IM Cajamar 5,
respectively.

The removal of the Rating Watch on IM Cajamar 4's class D notes
and IM Cajamar 5's class B and C notes reflects their current and
projected CE levels being in line with the current ratings.  The
notes were put on Rating Watch after the discovery of an error in
October 2016.

Stable Portfolio Performance
The portfolios' performance has remained stable for both
transactions since the last review in January 2016.  Fitch
expects this stable performance to continue, mainly due to the
significant seasoning of the portfolios of more than 10 years.
Arrears over three months have decreased to 0.45% from 0.75% in
January 2016 for IM Cajamar 4, and to 0.41% from 0.53% for IM
Cajamar 5.  In both cases arrears remain well below the Spanish
average of just under 1% observed by Fitch.

Gross cumulative defaults (defined as loans in arrears for more
than 12 months) for IM Cajamar 4 remained low at 3.7% of the
portfolio's initial balance, and stand very close to the Spanish
RMBS average of 5.5% for IM Cajamar 5 as of October 2016.

Payment Interruption Risk Mitigated
Cajamar is the servicer and collection account bank in both
transactions.  Although no back-up servicer arrangement is in
place, Fitch believes that a hypothetical servicer disruption
risk is mitigated by the daily sweep of cash collections to the
SPV account banks.  Moreover, Fitch views the projected balance
of cash reserves as sufficient to support the transactions in
meeting the senior non-deferrable payment obligations if a
servicer disruption event was to take place, until alternative
cash collection arrangements were introduced.

                     VARIATION FROM CRITERIA

Both transactions allow loan modifications in the form of
maturity extensions or interest rate reductions to a maximum of
10% of the initial portfolio balance.  A total of 2.2% and 3.1%
of the initial portfolios have been subject to maturity
extensions for IM Cajamar 4 and 5, respectively.

According to Fitch's Spanish criteria addendum, restructured
loans for which full payment history over the past four years has
not been received will be added to the 90 day delinquent bucket.
However, based on the information provided by the transaction
trustee, Fitch has assessed that the credit performance of loans
with maturity extensions in the portfolios is in line with the
remaining portfolio.  Consequently, Fitch has not considered
those loans subject to maturity extensions as restructured loans
and has not treated them as loans in arrears over 90 days within
its credit analysis.

Lack of Hedging

Fitch believes the absence of interest rate hedge agreements on
IM Cajamar 5 introduces basis and reset risks to the transaction.
Therefore, the agency applied an additional cash flow stress in
its analysis.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

A worsening of the Spanish macroeconomic environment, especially
employment conditions or an abrupt shift of interest rates could
jeopardise the underlying borrowers' affordability.  As IM
Cajamar 5 is unhedged, an unexpected sharp rise or high
volatility in interest rates beyond Fitch's stresses could cause
the transactions to suffer cash shortfalls, which may result in
negative rating action.


IM CAJAMAR 6: Fitch Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'B+sf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded IM Cajamar 6, FTA and TDA Cajamar 2,
FTA and affirmed IM Cajamar 3, FTA as:

IM Cajamar 3, FTA
  Class A (ES0347783005): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class B (ES0347783013): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class C (ES0347783021): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class D (ES0347783039): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

IM Cajamar 6, FTA
  Class A (ES0347559009): upgraded to 'A+sf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class B (ES0347559017): upgraded to 'A-sf' from 'BBBsf';
   Outlook Stable
  Class C (ES0347559025): upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf';
   Outlook Stable
  Class D (ES0347559033): upgraded to 'B+sf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class E (ES0347559041): affirmed at 'CCsf'; revised Recovery
   Estimate to 55% from 25%

TDA Cajamar 2, FTA
  Class A2 (ES0377965019): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class A3 (ES0377965027): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
  Class B (ES0377965035): upgraded to 'AA-sf' from 'Asf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class C (ES0377965043): upgraded to 'A+sf' from 'A-sf'; Outlook
   Stable
  Class D (ES0377965050): upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from 'BB+sf';
   Outlook Stable

The transactions are part of a series of prime Spanish RMBS
originated and serviced by Cajamar Caja Rural, Sociedad
Cooperativa de Credito (Cajamar; BB-/Stable/B).

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Credit Enhancement

All three transactions are currently amortising pro rata and
credit enhancement (CE) has remained stable.  IM Cajamar 3, FTA
and IM Cajamar 6, FTA have staggered pro rata amortisation
features allowing for pro rata amortisation to be switched off
for subordinated notes if delinquencies over 90 days exceed the
note specific trigger levels.  Both transactions are amortising
pro rata throughout the capital structure since 2014 and 2016,
respectively.  Subsequently CE of IM Cajamar 3's class A notes
has remained stable at 10.5% over the past 12 months, whereas CE
on IM Cajamar 6's class A notes has increased marginally to 16.9%
from 16%.

TDA Cajamar 2, FTA is currently also amortising pro rata, with
the exception of the class A3 notes which are currently not
amortising.  CE on the class A notes has increased marginally to
11.2% from 10.9% over the last 12 months.

Stable Portfolio Performance
The portfolio performance of all three transactions has remained
stable over the past 12 months and, which Fitch expects to
continue.

Arrears over three months decreased for all three transactions.
They range from 0.13% (TDA Cajamar 2) of the outstanding
portfolio balance to 0.42% (IM Cajamar 6).  Overall, arrears over
three months remain significantly below the average observed for
Spanish transactions of 0.97%.

Gross cumulative defaults (defined as loans in arrears for more
than 12 months) have remained stable over the past 12 months.
For TDA Cajamar 2 and IM Cajamar 3 they remain below the average
observed for Spain of 5.53% of the outstanding balance, with
current defaults of 1.85% and 3.47%, respectively.  IM Cajamar 6,
which was issued at the peak of the market, has however shown
higher gross cumulative defaults since 2009.  They currently
stand at 7.83%.

Payment Interruption Risk Mitigated
Cajamar is servicer and collection account bank in all
transactions.  Although no back-up servicer arrangement is in
place, Fitch believes that servicer disruption risk is mitigated
by the daily sweep of cash collections to the SPVs' account
banks.

Fitch views the projected balance of cash reserves as sufficient
to meet senior non-deferrable payment obligations if a servicer
disruption takes place, until alternative cash collection
arrangements are introduced.

Variation to Criteria
All three transactions allow for loan modifications in the form
of maturity extensions or interest rate reductions to a maximum
of 5%-10% of the initial portfolio balance.  A total of 1.9% and
2% of the initial portfolios have been subject to maturity
extensions for IM Cajamar 3 and 6, respectively, according to the
most recent investor reporting.  Fitch received a list of loans
subject to maturity extensions for TDA Cajamar 2 and calculated
that those loans make up for around 3% of the initial portfolio
balance.

According to Fitch's Spanish criteria addendum, restructured
loans for which full payment history over the past four years has
not been received are added to the 90-day delinquent bucket.
However, based on the information provided by the transaction
trustee, Fitch has assessed that the credit performance of loans
with maturity extensions in the portfolios is in line with the
remaining portfolio.  As such, Fitch has not considered those
loans subject to maturity extensions as restructured loans and
has not treated them as loans in arrears over 90 days within its
credit analysis.

Lack of Hedging
Fitch believes the absence of interest rate hedge agreements on
IM Cajamar 6 introduces basis and reset risks to the transaction.
Therefore, the agency applied an additional cash flow stress in
its analysis.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

A worsening of the Spanish macroeconomic environment, especially
employment conditions or an abrupt shift of interest rates, could
jeopardise the underlying borrowers' affordability.  As IM
Cajamar 6 is unhedged, an unexpected sharp rise or high
volatility in interest rates beyond Fitch's stresses could cause
the transactions to suffer cash shortfalls, which may result in
negative actions.

The ratings are also sensitive to changes in Spain's Country
Ceiling of 'AA+' and consequently changes to the highest
achievable 'AA+sf' rating of Spanish structured finance notes.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


LONDON WELSH: Judge Dismisses HMRC's Winding-Up Application
-----------------------------------------------------------
Brian Farmer at Press Association reports that a judge has
dismissed an application by the taxman to wind up London Welsh
after being told the debt-ridden rugby union club had gone into
liquidation.

Officials at HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) had asked for the club,
which in the 1960s and 1970s boasted some of the biggest names in
Welsh rugby among its ranks, to be wound up at hearings in the
Bankruptcy & Companies Court in London, Press Association
relates.

But Registrar Nicholas Briggs on Jan. 23 dismissed the
application after a lawyer representing HMRC told him the club
had gone into liquidation before Christmas, according to Press
Association.

A lawyer had indicated at an earlier hearing the club owed more
than GBP90,000 in tax, Press Association discloses.


SOUTHEND UNITED: Judge Dismisses HMRC's Winding-Up Application
--------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Farmer at Press Association reports that a judge has
dismissed a bid to wind up League One football club Southend
United after being told that a debt had been cleared.

Tax officials had made an application for a winding up order,
Press Association discloses.

But Registrar Nicholas Briggs dismissed the application -- at a
Bankruptcy & Companies Court hearing in London on Jan. 23 --
after a lawyer representing HM Revenue & Customs told him that
money owed has been paid, Press Association relates.

No indication of the size of the debt emerged at the hearing,
Press Association notes.


* UK: Insolvency Numbers Up in 2016, KMPG Analysis Shows
--------------------------------------------------------
Sam Metcalf at TheBusinessDesk reports that new analysis from
KPMG reveals that 2016 saw the reversal of a six year downward
trend in levels of insolvency for British businesses, following
an uptick in companies entering into administration in the second
half of the year.

The numbers, taken from notices in the London Gazette, show that
1,174 companies, or groups of companies, entered into
administration across the UK during 2016, compared with the
15-year low of 1,111 in the previous year, TheBusinessDesk
discloses.  The picture in the Midlands shows a similar trend,
with insolvencies in the region increasing in the year from 163
to 169, TheBusinessDesk notes.

According to TheBusinessDesk, Chris Pole, restructuring partner
at KPMG in the Midlands, believes ongoing uncertainty in the
geo-political and economic environment, coupled with the
depreciation of sterling, is now starting to be felt more keenly
by the region's businesses.

Mr. Pole, as cited by TheBusinessDesk, said: "Although the
numbers have risen, the failure rate of region's businesses
following the Brexit vote was lower than initial predictions.
However, while businesses may have adapted well to Brexit, it's
likely that they will face ongoing financial pressures as a
result of the uncertainty in the market."

Looking at which sectors were most vulnerable in 2016, the
manufacturing industry fared the worst in the Midlands with 33
firms entering administration, largely due to an increase in
costs for imported raw materials, which subsequently, squeezed
profit margins, TheBusinessDesk states.  Nationally, the
construction industry was hit the worst, with 174 firms becoming
insolvent, TheBusinessDesk states.

Looking ahead to 2017, Mr. Pole expects the numbers of
insolvencies to tread a steady path, TheBusinessDesk relays.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *