TCREUR_Public/170215.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

         Wednesday, February 15, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 33



UNICREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on Hybrid Capital Notes


GREECE: Plans to Tap Rotschild to Advise on Debts Amid Talks
* Fitch Says Program Review Underpins Greek Sovereign Assessment


BANCA POPOLARE: Submits Draft Merger Plan to EU Central Bank
CREDITO VALTELLINESE: Fitch Withdraws 'BB-(EXP)' Sub. Debt Rating


MAUSER HOLDING: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative


E-MAC DE 2006-I: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on EUR7MM E Notes
LEVERAGED FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'D'
WOOD STREET CLO 1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba3


ALMA MARKET: Files Motion to Commence Bankruptcy Proceedings
INTERBUD LUBLIN: Court Opens Arrangement Proceedings


BANCO BPI: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'BB+'


ROSENERGOBANK: Moody's Cuts Deposit Rating to Caa2, Outlook Neg.


ABENGOA SA: S&P Withdraws 'SD' Rating on Insufficient Information
BBVA FINANZIA: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class C Notes

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Private Equity, Challengers Eye Acquisition
EMERALD 2: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to B3
JERROLD FINCO: Fitch Rates GBP200MM Sec. Notes Issue BB-(EXP)
KING & WOOD MALLESONS: Business Failure Investigation Started
MARRACHE & CO: Jyske Bank's Handling of Accounts Scrutinized

MIDLAND EXPRESSWAY: Owners Mull Refinancing of M6 Toll Road
PURBROOKS: Latest London Print House to Enter Liquidation
TATA STEEL UK: Sells Speciality Steel Business to Liberty House



UNICREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on Hybrid Capital Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Unicredit Bank AG's (HVB) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'A-' and its Viability Rating (VR)
at 'a-'. The Outlook on the Long-Term IDR is Negative.

HVB's IDRs and senior debt ratings reflect the bank's standalone
credit strength, as expressed by its VR. The bank's strong
capitalisation has a high influence on its VR. Capital ratios
remain well above peers even after the planned one-off dividend
payment to its parent, UniCredit S.p.A. (UC; BBB+/Negative). The
VR also reflects HVB's largely wholesale business model based on
a well-established domestic corporate and investment banking
franchise, its solid asset quality, which benefits from the
resilient German economy and its moderate profitability with some

HVB's VR reflects Fitch's assumption that UC's strategic plan
announced in December 2016 will not have a material impact on
HVB's standalone strength. The measures, which include the
payment of a EUR3bn special dividend from HVB to UC in May 2017,
confirm Fitch's expectation that capital is increasingly managed
across the UC group. However, Fitch expects HVB's capitalisation
to remain in line with its VR, which is one notch above UC's VR.
In Fitch's view, intragroup contagion risk means that a
subsidiary's VR would not typically be rated more than a notch
above its parent's within the eurozone.

HVB's fully loaded common equity Tier 1 ratio (CET1) is likely to
drop to about 19% at end-2Q17 from 22.3% at end-1H16 as a direct
effect of the special dividend payment. Therefore, Fitch expects
HVB to remain strongly capitalised and comfortably exceed current
and future regulatory requirements. In addition, UC and HVB have
agreed with their respective national regulators that HVB's own
funds ratio will not fall below 13%.

HVB's relatively stable profits in commercial banking mitigate
its more volatile earnings from corporate and investment banking
(CIB). Fitch expects the bank's disciplined pricing of corporate
loans and the cost-cutting measures already implemented to
continue to mitigate the prevailing regulatory cost pressure.

However, low interest rates and intense competition in German
corporate banking put pressure on interest margins and commission
income in all segments. Moreover, Fitch believes that HVB faces
somewhat limited growth prospects in corporate banking and CIB in
Germany's saturated market. In addition, the relatively modest
contribution of household clients to the commercial banking
segment's performance reflects the fact that the bank's retail
presence is limited to selected German regions.

HVB's asset quality benefits from its primary focus on Germany,
and to a lesser extent, on other countries with strong economic
environments. Net writedowns remain low, but Fitch expects a
normalisation of risk charges in the medium term. The bank has
gradually run down non-performing loans (NPLs), although less
actively than peers, and it continues to work out higher-risk
non-strategic assets. While this could trigger a further modest
improvement of its NPL ratio, HVB remains vulnerable to a
deterioration of its sizeable loan exposure to the troubled
shipping sector.

The Negative Outlook on HVB's Long-Term IDR mirrors that on UC
and reflects the potential pressure on HVB's capitalisation and
financial flexibility from a deterioration of UC's financial
strength. Such deterioration could, in Fitch's opinion, result in
a need to upstream further capital from HVB to UC. Moreover,
under its assumed single-point-of-entry resolution model, UC
would continue to operate under its current parent bank
structure. Fitch believes that the higher fungibility of capital
and liquidity within the UC group that would result from this
approach makes material capital upstreaming more likely. This
could constrain HVB's financial flexibility.

HVB's DCR and Deposit Ratings are aligned with its IDRs. The
bank's qualifying junior and vanilla senior debt buffers are
large, but Fitch believes that their sustainability is not yet
clear. This is because there are still some uncertainties on the
timing of UC's plans to allocate total loss absorbing capacity
(TLAC) within the group, which could change HVB's liabilities
structure over the medium term.

HVB's Support Rating (SR) indicates a 'BB' Long-Term rating floor
based on institutional support. It reflects Fitch's opinion that
despite UC's strong propensity to support HVB, its constrained
ability to do so results in a moderate likelihood of
extraordinary support. This is because of the large solvency
support that HVB would be likely to require relative to the
capital available in the rest of the group, given that a large
share of UC's consolidated equity is in HVB. Fitch's view that
UC's propensity to support is strong is primarily based on HVB's
role as the group's investment banking hub and sizeable corporate
banking operations in Europe's largest economy.

HVB's hybrid capital notes issued through HVB Funding Trusts I
and II are rated four notches below the bank's VR: two notches
for loss severity and two notches for incremental non-performance
risk. While the regulator could order a coupon deferral in line
with the terms and conditions of these profit-linked instruments,
Fitch views such intervention as unlikely in light of HVB's solid
standalone financial profile.

HVB's IDRs and VR are primarily sensitive to a change in UC's
IDRs. A downgrade of UC's ratings would lead to a downgrade of
HVB's ratings because Fitch believes that a weakening of UC's
financial strength would increase the risk of upstreaming further
capital from HVB.

Fitch could affirm HVB's ratings if UC's ratings are affirmed and
if HVB demonstrates that it can maintain strong capitalisation
despite its stated intention to distribute the vast majority of
its profits to UC in the next few years, which should result in
minimal internal capital generation at HVB. HVB has considerably
reduced its funding exposure to UC group entities and Fitch
understands that it has no plans for further extraordinary
dividend payments exceeding HVB's annual profit.

HVB's VR and IDR are also sensitive to rising integration and
fungibility of capital and funding within the UC group, which
Fitch views as likely under the European Single Supervision and
Single Resolution Mechanisms. Under Fitch's criteria, a highly
integrated bank that accounts for a large share of its parent's
consolidated assets and overall credit profile can be assigned a
common VR with its parent. Therefore, Fitch would likely assign
common VRs to UC and HVB if Fitch conclude that lower
restrictions to capital movements within the UC group make it
impossible to separate the credit profiles of its largest
subsidiaries. HVB's VR, and therefore IDR, would then converge
toward UC's ratings, which are currently a notch below HVB's.

Apart from UC's influence, HVB's VR and IDRs are also sensitive
to a decline in HVB's recurring operating profitability.

HVB's DCR and Deposit Ratings are primarily sensitive to changes
in its IDRs. The DCR and Deposit Ratings could be notched above
HVB's IDRs if Fitch conclude that the bank's qualifying junior
and vanilla senior debt buffers are sustainably sufficient to
restore viability and prevent a default on derivative obligations
and deposits after a failure. Fitch believes that further clarity
on the sustainability of these buffers should become available
when UC starts to downstream internal TLAC into HVB.

The DCR and Deposit Ratings are also sensitive to future changes
to the resolution regime, which may alter the hierarchy of the
various instruments in resolution, although this is not Fitch's
current expectation in Germany.

The SR is sensitive to significant changes to UC's ability to
support HVB, which could be indicated by a change to UC's
ratings. It is also sensitive to any negative changes to Fitch's
view of UC's propensity to provide support, which Fitch currently
does not expect. Fitch would withdraw HVB's SR if it decides to
assign a common VR to UC and HVB.

HVB's subordinated debt and hybrid securities' ratings are
sensitive to changes in the bank's VR or to a change in the
securities' notching, which could arise if Fitch changes its
assessment of the notes' loss severity or relative non-
performance risk.

The rating actions are:

UniCredit Bank AG
Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Negative Outlook
Short-Term IDR affirmed at 'F2'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'a-'
Derivative Counterparty Rating affirmed at 'A-(dcr)'
Deposit Ratings affirmed at 'A-'/'F2'
Support Rating affirmed at '3'
Senior unsecured certificates of deposit affirmed at 'F2'
Senior unsecured debt issuance programme affirmed at 'A-'/'F2'
Senior unsecured MTN programme affirmed at 'A-'
Senior unsecured EMTN programme affirmed at 'A-'/'F2'
Senior unsecured notes affirmed at 'A-'
Tier 2 subordinated notes affirmed at 'BBB+'

HVB Funding Trusts I and II hybrid capital notes affirmed at 'BB+


GREECE: Plans to Tap Rotschild to Advise on Debts Amid Talks
Elaine Moore and Anne-Sylvaine Chassany at The Financial Times
report that Greece is planning to appoint Rothschild to advise on
its debts as the country attempts to end a long-running creditor
stand-off and avert default.

According to the FT, government officials hope to finalize the
appointment before a gathering of eurozone finance ministers on
Feb. 20 that has been described as the last chance for Greece's
lenders to overcome their differences before European attention
shifts to general elections in eurozone countries.

Unless Greece receives fresh funds it will not be able to make
EUR7 billion of debt payments due this July, including EUR2.1
billion to private sector creditors, the FT says.

Under the plan, Rothschild will advise the country on all areas
connected to its debt, including negotiations with creditors,
potential inclusion in the European Central Bank's EUR80
billion-a-month bond-buying program and the resumption of Greek
government bond sales, the FT relays, citing two people with
direct knowledge of the matter.

They said it is expected to be paid a bonus when Greece regains
access to global debt markets, the FT notes.

* Fitch Says Program Review Underpins Greek Sovereign Assessment
Recurrent tensions between Greece and its official sector
creditors are already reflected in Greece's sovereign rating,
which has been at or below 'CCC' for nearly two years, Fitch
Ratings says. Fitch's sovereign credit assessment is underpinned
by its assumption that the second review of Greece's third
bailout programme will be completed well ahead of July,
maintaining access to official funding.

The IMF executive board last week reiterated its view that
Greece's debt is "unsustainable". It said that "[m]ost Directors
consider that . . .  further [debt] relief may well be required
to restore debt sustainability". This has highlighted
disagreement with some of Greece's European creditors, who oppose
further upfront debt relief, but see the IMF's financial
involvement alongside the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as
important for the programme's credibility. The IMF is not
currently lending to Greece under the EUR86bn ESM programme.

The Greek government agrees with the IMF that debt relief is
needed, but has objected to the Fund's position that the
government should pre-legislate for specific automatic fiscal
correction measures if it misses future primary surplus targets.
Even so, the current stand-off appears to be driven more by the
inter-creditor disagreement. Press reports suggest that the IMF
and the Europeans have taken a common position on the size of the
automatic measures, but details remain unclear, as does the Greek
government's response.

Relations between the Greek government and official creditors
have stayed on a relatively firm footing since the current ESM
programme was agreed. Greece has broadly met programme conditions
and recorded a primary surplus of EUR4.4bn in 2016 thanks to
higher-than-budgeted revenues. GDP rose 1.8% yoy in 3Q16, the
largest annual increase in over eight years. This progress is one
reason that Fitch thinks Greece's European creditors would be
prepared to proceed with the second review and to disburse funds
without IMF involvement. Another reason is their desire to avoid
a Greek political crisis during an already congested election
year in Europe.

Completing the second programme review and disbursing the
associated ESM funds would enable Greece to meet its July
maturities, which total more than EUR6bn (including EUR3.9bn to
the European Central Bank). Doing so in a timely fashion and
avoiding the level of brinksmanship of the first half of 2015
would reduce the risk that Greece's economic recovery is
undermined by a hit to confidence or by the Greek government
building up arrears to conserve liquidity. Recent events
highlight that political risk remains a sovereign rating weakness
for Greece, despite positive economic and fiscal developments.

Fitch affirmed Greece's 'CCC' sovereign rating in September, and
its next scheduled review is due on February 24.


BANCA POPOLARE: Submits Draft Merger Plan to EU Central Bank
Valentina Za at Reuters, citing Il Messaggero, reports that
Italian banks Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca have
submitted a draft merger plan to the European Central Bank that
includes a new capital injection of between EUR4 billion and EUR5
billion (US$4.3-5.3 billion).

According to Reuters, the paper said the draft plan had been
submitted also to European Union's competition authorities to
clear the way for an expected investment by the Italian state in
the two ailing regional banks.

The paper said the plan prepared by Popolare di Vicenza CEO
Fabrizio Viola also envisages the creation of a bad bank where
the two bank's EUR9 billion of bad loans would be transferred,
Reuters relates.

Italy could tap the EUR20 billion bank aid fund it introduced in
December which it used to bail out Monte dei Paschi di Siena,
Reuters discloses.

Banca Popolare di Vicenza (BPVi) is an Italian bank. The bank was
the 13th largest retail and corporate bank of Italy by total
assets, according to Mediobanca.

CREDITO VALTELLINESE: Fitch Withdraws 'BB-(EXP)' Sub. Debt Rating
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Credito Valtellinese's planned issue
of subordinated Tier 2 debt 'BB-(EXP)' expected rating as the
issuance is no longer expected to convert to a final rating in
the near term. Fitch may assign the issue an expected rating
again if the transaction proceeds.

The expected rating was initially assigned on Sept. 30, 2016 and
was notched once from Creval's 'bb' Viability Rating to reflect
below-average recovery prospects for the notes in case of the
bank's failure.


MAUSER HOLDING: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating on Luxembourg-registered rigid packaging group Mauser
Holding S.a.r.l. on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The CreditWatch placement follows the announcement that U.S.-
based private equity firm Stone Canyon Industries, through rigid
plastic and metal container manufacturer BWAY Holding Co. (BWAY),
has agreed to acquire Mauser Holding.  At this stage limited
details have been disclosed regarding the transaction, although
S&P believes there could be negative repercussions for the credit
quality of Mauser Holding, given the higher leverage of BWAY and
its lower corporate credit rating of 'B-'.  S&P expects to
analyze the implications of the acquisition within the next three
months, by which time S&P would resolve the CreditWatch

The outcome of the CreditWatch placement will depend on the
materialization of the transaction, as well as the impact of the
acquisition on the combined entity's capital structure.

The negative CreditWatch placement reflects that S&P could
consider downgrading Mauser Holding once the transaction has
finally materialized.  At this stage, S&P expects the credit
quality of the combined group to be weaker than that of Mauser
Holding on a stand-alone basis, due to S&P's expectation of
considerably higher leverage.

S&P could lower the ratings to 'B-' if the acquisition went
through and the combined entity's credit metrics did not show
significant improvement from the leverage levels currently
exhibited by the parent company.

S&P could reassess the outlook on Mauser as stable if the
transaction did not materialize, or if S&P thought that the
credit quality of the combined group showed significant
improvement from that currently exhibited by BWAY, for example,
as a result of a significant equity injection.


E-MAC DE 2006-I: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on EUR7MM E Notes
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the B note
and affirmed the ratings of the A, C, D and E notes in E-MAC DE
2006-I B.V.

The upgrade of note B in E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V. reflects the better
than expected collateral performance and increased level of
credit enhancement.

Moody's affirmed the ratings of the notes that had sufficient
credit enhancement to maintain current rating on the affected


Issuer: E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V.

-- EUR437M A Notes, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 22,
2016 Affirmed Baa1 (sf)

-- EUR27M B Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 22,
2016 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

-- EUR17.5M C Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 22,
2016 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

-- EUR11.5M D Notes, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2013
Affirmed Ca (sf)

-- EUR7M E Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011
Downgraded to C (sf)


The rating action of note B in E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V. is prompted
by a decrease in key collateral assumptions, namely the portfolio
Expected Loss (EL) assumptions due to better than expected
collateral performance. Moody's decreased the expected loss
assumption to 12.66% as a percentage of original pool balance
from 13.25% in E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V.

The upgrade of note B in E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V. is also prompted by
deal deleveraging resulting in an increase in credit enhancement
for the affected tranche. Sequential amortization led to the
increase in the credit enhancement available in the transaction.

The rating action took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as servicer, account banks or swap
providers. Moody's considered how the liquidity available in the
transaction and other mitigants support continuity of note
payments, in case of servicer default, using the CR Assessment as
a reference point for servicers. The ratings of the senior notes
in E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V. is constrained by operational risk.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2016.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
these ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that
become less relevant or typically remain unchanged during the
surveillance stage.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) performance of the underlying collateral that
is better than Moody's expected, (2) deleveraging of the capital
structure and (3) improvements in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk (2) performance
of the underlying collateral that is worse than Moody's expected,
(3) deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement and
(4) deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction

LEVERAGED FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'D'
S&P Global Ratings lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' and to
'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its credit ratings on Leveraged
Finance Europe Capital III B.V. (LFEC III)'s class D and E notes,

According to the latest trustee report from Jan. 20, 2017, the
portfolio currently comprises EUR9.45 million in loans to
distinct European obligors with 'B+' ratings and below.  The
amount of defaulted loans, considering current market prices,
EUR1.78 million and the cash in the transaction's principal
account is EUR68,580.

Since S&P's previous review on June 10, 2014, trading losses have
affected the transaction's principal balance.

On the Aug. 30, 2016 measurement date, the aggregate sum of the
principal balances of collateral debt obligations and the balance
in the principal account was less than 100% of the aggregate
principal amount outstanding of the class D notes.  On Sept. 1,
2016, LFEC III communicated to the trustee, the investment
manager, and to S&P the occurrence of an event of default.  After
being notified by the trustee, noteholders have to date not given
notice to the issuer to accelerate the outstanding balance of the

Although the overcollateralization event of default was triggered
on Sept. 1, 2016, with the relevant notice from the trustee, as
the noteholders did not accelerate the transaction no change in
the priority of payments has taken place.

The class A, B, and C notes have been fully repaid.

On LFEC III's latest payment date (Jan. 20, 2017), the interest
due on class D notes was EUR62,291.51, but LFEC III was only able
to pay EUR44,017.89, which resulted in EUR18,273.62 of defaulted
interest.  Following the application of S&P's timeliness of
payments criteria, it has lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'
S&P's rating on the class D notes.

The aggregate principal amount outstanding of the class E notes
is EUR2.43 million, plus an outstanding amount of EUR1.11 million
of deferred interest.  S&P estimates that in order to fully repay
the class E notes at maturity including deferred interest, the
portfolio would need to be liquidated at an average price of
about 135% of their par amount.  In S&P's opinion, the class E
notes are highly vulnerable to nonpayment.  Following the
application of S&P's criteria for assigning 'CCC' category
ratings, it has lowered to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating
on the class E notes.

LFEC III is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to European speculative-grade
corporate firms and is managed by BNP Paribas Asset Management.
The transaction closed in October 2004 and its reinvestment
period ended in October 2009.


Class      Rating
      To       From

Leverage Finance Europe Capital III B.V.
EUR306.5 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

D     D (sf)     CCC- (sf)
E     CC (sf)    CCC- (sf)

WOOD STREET CLO 1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba3
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Wood Street CLO 1 B.V.:

-- EUR27.75M Class D1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR1.50M Class D2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR10.575M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Affirmed
B1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the following notes issued by Wood Street
CLO 1 B.V.:

-- EUR36M (outstanding balance EUR 19.73M) Class B Senior
Secured Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar
8, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR29.925M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded to
Aaa (sf)

Wood Street CLO 1 B.V., issued in September 2005, is a
collateralised loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Alcentra Limited. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in November 2011.


The rating upgrades of the notes are primarily a result of the
deleveraging of the senior notes on the last two payment dates
and subsequent increases of the overcollateralization ratios (the
"OC ratios") of the remaining classes of notes. Moody's notes
that following the November 2016 payment date the class A notes
have fully redeemed and that the Class B Notes have partially
redeemed by 16.27M. As a result of the deleveraging, the OC
ratios of the notes have increased significantly. According to
the January 2017 trustee report, the classes A/B, C, D and E OC
ratios are 545.06%, 216.55%, 136.27% and 120.16% respectively
compared to the levels one year ago, in January 2016 of 227.80%,
158.10%, 121.70% and 112.35%.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a
cash and performing par balance of EUR 90.46 million, a weighted
average default probability of 24.14% (consistent with a WARF of
3723 and a weighted average life of 3.54 years), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.55% for a Aaa liability
target rating and a diversity score of 12.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it lowered the weighted average recovery rate by 5
percentage points; the model generated outputs that were
unchanged for classes B and C and within two notches of the base
case results for classes D and E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

* Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortisation would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

* Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralisation levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analysed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

* Around 24.39% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed
large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate
as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009 and
available at

* Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction
maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend on
the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


ALMA MARKET: Files Motion to Commence Bankruptcy Proceedings
Reuters reports that the Krakow court decided to discontinue the
rehabilitation proceedings of Alma Market SA on Feb. 10.

According to Reuters, Alma Market decided to file a motion for
opening of bankruptcy proceedings with liquidation of assets.

Alma Market Spolka Akcyjna, together with its subsidiaries,
engages in the retail of fast moving consumer goods in Poland.

INTERBUD LUBLIN: Court Opens Arrangement Proceedings
Reuters reports that the court in Lublin opened arrangement
proceedings for Interbud Lublin SA.

Interbud Lublin SA is a Poland-based company active in
construction and engineering.


BANCO BPI: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'BB+'
S&P Global Ratings raised to 'BB+' from 'BB-' the long-term
counterparty credit ratings on Portugal-based Banco BPI S.A. and
its core subsidiary Banco Portugues de Investimento S.A.  At the
same time, S&P removed the long-term ratings on the two banks
from CreditWatch with positive implications, where it placed them
on Jan. 18, 2017.  S&P also affirmed its 'B' short-term ratings
on both banks.  The outlook is stable.

On Feb. 8, 2017, Caixabank S.A. announced that, following its
takeover offer, the bank increased its stake in Portugal-based
Banco BPI's share capital to 84.52% from 45.5%, giving it
management control.  S&P now views Banco BPI as a strategically
important subsidiary of Caixabank and we expect it to benefit
from parental support if needed.

S&P also raised its issue ratings on BPI's senior unsecured debt
to 'BB+' from 'BB-', its subordinated debt to 'B+' from 'B-', its
preference shares to 'B-' from 'CCC', and removed all the ratings
from CreditWatch positive.

The upgrade follows Caixabank's announcement on Feb. 8 that, as a
result of the takeover offer, it increased its stake in BPI's
share capital to 84.52% from 45.5%, thereby giving it management

S&P considers that BPI is now a strategically important
subsidiary of Caixabank.  After years of holding a strong
minority stake in BPI, Caixabank has now acquired a large
majority of the shares and gained management control, making BPI
an important asset for the group's long-term strategy.  S&P
therefore expects BPI to benefit from parental support, including
financial support, if needed.  That said, the long-term rating is
capped by the long-term sovereign credit rating on Portugal,
which limits the rating uplift to two notches from BPI's stand-
alone credit profile (SACP).  This reflects S&P's view that
Caixabank would be unlikely to sufficiently support BPI during
stress associated with a hypothetical sovereign default.

BPI shares the same business focus on retail banking as Caixabank
and S&P expects BPI to leverage on economies of scale with the
group to improve its operating efficiency and explore cross-
selling opportunities by enhancing the asset management business.

Caixabank has gained significant expertise in integrating
acquired entities into the group, and has prior knowledge of BPI
as it has been part of its shareholder structure for many years.
However, improving BPI's profitability represents a managerial
challenge for Caixabank, especially if BPI's participation in
BFA, its Angolan subsidiary, is to reduce further.  BFA has been
consistently profitable and has compensated for low domestic
earnings generation throughout the crisis.

S&P raised the issue ratings on BPI's subordinated debt and
preference shares because S&P expects the group to support the
subsidiary's hybrid capital instruments and to maintain payments
on the subsidiary's hybrids.  As a result, the issue credit
ratings are notched down from the issuer credit rating on BPI.

The stable outlook on the long-term rating on BPI mirrors that on
Portugal and reflects S&P's view that it do not expect a rating
change over the next 12 months.  Given that S&P's ratings on BPI
are constrained by the long-term rating on the sovereign, S&P
would expect any rating action on the long-term sovereign credit
rating on Portugal to lead to a similar action on the ratings on

A negative rating action triggered by a deterioration of BPI's
stand-alone creditworthiness is unlikely at this stage.  Should
BPI's SACP weaken by only one notch, the issuer credit rating on
BPI would be cushioned by an additional notch of uplift for
extraordinary parental support, as long as the bank remains a
strategically important subsidiary of Caixabank.


ROSENERGOBANK: Moody's Cuts Deposit Rating to Caa2, Outlook Neg.
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Rosenergobank's long-
term local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings to Caa2 from B3
and assigned negative outlook to these ratings. Concurrently, the
bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA were
downgraded to caa2 from b3, and its long-term Counterparty Risk
Assessment (CR Assessment) was downgraded to Caa1(cr) from
B2(cr). Simultaneously, Moody's has affirmed Rosenergobank's Not
Prime short-term local-currency and foreign-currency deposit
ratings, as well as its short-term CR Assessment of Not

Moody's rating action concludes the review of Rosenergobank's
ratings initiated on 9 December 2016. The rating action is
primarily based on Rosenergobank's audited financial statements
for 2015 prepared under International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS), its unaudited financial statements for 2016 and
2017 year to date prepared under local GAAP, as well as
information received from the bank management.


The downgrade of Rosenergobank's ratings is primarily driven by
the bank's deteriorated liquidity position. Moody's also takes
into account the bank's weakened asset quality. The negative
outlook assigned to the ratings reflects the bank's unsustainable
liquidity profile and its high vulnerability to retail deposit
withdrawals and/or departure of any sizeable large corporate

Rosenergobank's liquidity cushion (mainly formed by cash and cash
equivalents and accounts "due from banks") has been on a gradual
declining trend over the 2016 and 2017 year to date and,
according to Moody's estimate, stood well below 10% of the bank's
total assets at 1 February 2017. Although in late 2016,
Rosenergobank's management announced that the bank was
contemplating expansion of its liquidity cushion through
attraction of more corporate deposits, these plans have not
materialised over the review period. The bank management's plans
to replenish liquidity cushion through borrowers' earlier
repayments of some of their loans bear a considerable element of
uncertainty, in Moody's opinion.

Rosenergobank's asset quality is weak. According to the bank's
local GAAP financial statements as of 1 October 2016, the
aggregate proportion of group 4 and group 5 loans ("problem" and
"uncollectable" loans, under the Central Bank of Russia (CBR)
classification), increased to 13.9% from 10.3% over the first
nine months of 2016. Correspondingly, the loan loss reserves
accumulated under local GAAP increased to 12.2% from 9.5% over
the same period. Moody's expects that the heightened provisioning
charges will protract into 2017, because a large proportion of
Rosenergobank's loans have been renegotiated. The latest publicly
reported proportion of renegotiated loans stood at 26.9% of the
bank's total gross loans at 1 January 2016, whilst in absence of
renegotiation these loans would have fallen overdue.

Rosenergobank's loss-absorbing capital buffer has somewhat
improved following the conversion -- in October 2016 -- of
subordinated loans for the total amount of RUB1.5 billion into
common equity Tier 1 (CET1). As a result, at 1 February 2017, the
bank's regulatory CET 1 and total capital adequacy ratios stood
at 6.2% and 14.2%, whereas the regulatory minimum levels are 4.5%
and 8%, respectively. The above being said, the rating agency
expectation is that credit losses will continue to erode
Rosenergobank's capital going forward.


Rosenergobank's ratings could be downgraded if the bank is unable
to substantially improve its liquidity cushion over the next 6 to
12 months, or if the bank faces material outflows of customer
deposits. Further deterioration of Rosenergobank's asset quality,
resulting in high credit losses and rapid capital erosion, could
be another driver for the bank's ratings downgrade.

Rosenergobank's ratings have low upward potential, given the
negative outlook assigned to the ratings. Revision of the rating
outlook to stable from negative would require a substantial
strengthening of the bank's liquidity position and improved asset
quality metrics.


The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Rosenergobank reported total
assets of RUB55.7 billion under unaudited local GAAP financial
statements as of 1 January 2017. The bank's net local GAAP loss
for 2016 stood at RUB697 million.


ABENGOA SA: S&P Withdraws 'SD' Rating on Insufficient Information
S&P Global Ratings said that it withdrew its 'SD' (selective
default) rating on Spain-based engineering and construction (E&C)
company Abengoa S.A. due to lack of sufficient and timely
information.  At the same time, S&P withdrew its issue and
recovery ratings on the senior unsecured notes issued by Abengoa
S.A., Abengoa Finance S.A.U., and Abengoa Greenfield S.A.

The ratings withdrawal reflects the lack of sufficient and timely
information necessary for S&P to maintain surveillance of the
ratings on Abengoa S.A, in accordance with S&P's criteria and
policies.  The lack of information restricts S&P's ability to
assess the company's liquidity position and business and
financial risk profiles.

Founded in 1941, Spain-based Abengoa S.A. has interests across
industries such as solar power generation, bioenergy, energy
transmission, environmental services, and E&C.

BBVA FINANZIA: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class C Notes
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'D (sf)' credit rating on BBVA
Finanzia Autos 1, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class C

S&P has reviewed BBVA Finanzia Autos 1's collateral performance,
and the transaction's current structural features.

Since S&P's previous review on Feb. 26, 2014, the transaction has
paid down significantly.  The outstanding portfolio balance,
excluding defaulted loans (defined in this transaction as loans
in arrears for more than 12 months), as of the last investor
report, dated Dec. 31, 2016, was 0.3% of the closing balance,
down from 7.3% at S&P's January 2014 review.

Since S&P's previous review, it has continued to observe
stabilizing delinquencies, with slight reductions in some arrears
buckets.  However, long-term delinquencies have continued to roll
into defaults.  Due to the transaction's deteriorating
performance observed so far, the fact that the class C notes have
previously missed interest payments and remain
undercollateralized, and the reserve being fully depleted, S&P
has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class C notes.

S&P's rating on the class C notes addresses the timely payment of
interest due under the rated notes, and ultimate payment of
principal at maturity.

The transaction is exposed to counterparty risk through Societe
Generale S.A. (Madrid Branch) as guarantor of the bank account
provider, and Deutsche Bank AG (London Branch) as a swap
provider. Under S&P's current counterparty criteria, it considers
that the required minimum rating for the supporting entities and
the transaction's replacement mechanisms adequately mitigate its
exposure to counterparty risk.

BBVA Finanzia Autos 1 is backed by a portfolio of Spanish loans
granted to purchase new and used cars. Finanzia Banco de Credito
S.A. -- the consumer finance arm of Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria S.A. -- originated the transaction, which closed in
May 2007.  The revolving period ended in April 2008, one year
ahead of the scheduled date, because the delinquency rate was
higher than the trigger threshold level.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Private Equity, Challengers Eye Acquisition
Emma Dunkley at The Financial Times reports that the Co-operative
Bank has made a last-ditch attempt to salvage its future by
putting itself up for sale after warning that its capital
reserves will fall below a target agreed with regulators.

Institutional investors in the ethically-focused bank are facing
heavy losses on their share of nearly GBP2 billion injected into
the bank in 2013 and 2014 to bring it back from the brink of
collapse, according to bankers who worked with the lender, the FT

But in a stark warning to the market, the lossmaking bank
indicated last month that it still faced capital problems and was
expecting reserves to fall short over the next few years because
of the impact of record-low interest rates on profitability, the
FT notes.

The Co-Op Bank, which is only 20% owned by the Co-Operative
Group, started the sale process on Feb. 13 in an attempt to meet
the Bank of England's capital requirements over the long term and
ultimately avoid being wound down, the FT relates.

According to the FT, a number of "challenger" banks -- small
retail lenders set up to take on the big high-street banks -- and
private equity companies are showing signs of interest in
snapping up parts of the bank.

Andy Golding, chief executive of OneSavings Bank, said he would
"certainly look" at any portfolios that met his selection
criteria, the FT recounts.

TSB, another challenger bank, has said that it is interested in
acquiring assets at the right price and was one of the first-
round bidders for the GBP16 billion loan book backed by the UK
government, the FT relays, citing a banker close to the plan.

People close to the sale process said that Paragon Bank was
interested in working with other possible buyers to acquire
specialist loan portfolios, the FT notes.

The Co-op is aiming to offload the entire business rather than
individual portfolios, the FT discloses.

The Co-operative Bank is a retail and commercial bank in the
United Kingdom, with its headquarters in Balloon Street,

EMERALD 2: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to B3
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Emerald 2 Limited's (a
holding company of Environmental Resources Management) corporate
family rating (CFR) to B3 from B2 and probability of default
rating to B3-PD from B2-PD. At the same time, Moody's has
downgraded Emerald 3 Limited 's first-lien senior secured
facilities instrument ratings to B2 from B1, and second-lien
secured facilities instrument rating to Caa2 from Caa1. The
outlook on all ratings has been changed to stable, from negative.


The rating downgrade reflects ERM's continued soft trading with
pressure on top-line and margins that will result in the
company's financial leverage remaining significantly above 7.0x.

In addition, ERM's CFR of B3 reflects the company's: (1) exposure
to the energy, commodity and mining sector resulting in pressure
on top line and margins; (2) financial covenants restrict access
to Revolving Credit Facility and prohibit Permitted Acquisitions
and (3) reliance to retain key quality staff.

However, the CFR also reflects ERM's (1) adequate liquidity
profile supported by the high cash generative nature of the
capex-lite business model; (2) EBITDA margin supported by active
staff cost management; (3) good geographic and sector revenue
diversification; (4) blue chip client base and some revenue
visibility from repeat business and (5) leading position as pure-
play provider of environmental consulting in fragmented and
highly competitive market.

ERM's liquidity profile remains adequate, despite the full
drawdown of its acquisition facility, with USD100 million
unrestricted cash on balance sheet at December 2016. Only USD3.3
million of the USD50 million Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) is
used for bonds and guarantees (the balance of USD46.7 million is
undrawn). However, with December 2016 management reported Senior
Net Leverage ratio of 6.2x, the springing financial covenant
restricts the drawing of the RCF to less than 30% ($15 million).
The covenanted Senior Net Leverage ratio is 5.6x as of December
2016, dropping to 5.2x as of March 2017 and 4.8x in December

In addition, the company's Senior Facility Agreement allows for
$150 million Additional Facility, currently uncommitted and
undrawn. However, drawings under the Additional Facility are
restricted by a leverage test of 4.5x Net Senior and 6.0x Net
Total Leverage.

On March 31, 2016, ERM's shareholders acquired JSC, a stand-alone
chemical consultancy with an annual EBITDA around $3 million. The
JSC acquisition was made using equity and is currently held
outside the syndicate group, as there is no basket for permitted
acquisitions at the current leverage ratio. Management expects to
make additional acquisitions during the course of FY18. It is
management's intention to bring JSC and future acquisitions into
the syndicate group, subject to agreement of terms with its
lenders, which would lower the pro-forma leverage ratio. However,
until the acquisitions are completed and brought into the
syndicate group, Moody's base case scenario assumes no EBITDA
uplift from any acquisitions.


The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that the company
will report gross leverage above 7.0x in the next 6-12 months,
but maintain an adequate liquidity profile as a result of its
good cash flow conversion and active cost management.


Moody's would consider upgrading the rating if adjusted gross
Debt/EBITDA falls below 7.0x on a sustainable basis and the
company maintains an adequate liquidity profile, including taking
into account any equity-funded acquisition brought into the
restricted group that contributes positively to EBITDA


Downward pressure on the rating could develop if Moody's expects
ERM's Debt/EBITDA to remain above 8.0x for a sustained period of
time, its liquidity position deteriorates or free cash flow
becomes negative.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016.

ERM is a global leading provider of environmental, health,
safety, risk and social consulting services with 150 offices in
40 countries. In July 2015, OMERS Private Equity and the Alberta
Investment Management Corporation completed the acquisition of a
59% stake in ERM as part of a management buy-out from
Charterhouse Capital Partners for an enterprise value of $1.7
billion. The 41% balance of ERM is owned by ERM partners. As of
31 December 2016, the company employed 4,607 people, including
563 partners, and reported LTM net revenue of USD609 million.

JERROLD FINCO: Fitch Rates GBP200MM Sec. Notes Issue BB-(EXP)
Fitch Ratings has assigned Jerrold FinCo plc's GBP200 million
senior secured notes issue an expected rating of 'BB-(EXP)'. The
assignment of the final rating is contingent on the receipt of
final documents conforming to information already received.

Jerrold FinCo plc is a finance subsidiary of Together Financial
Services Ltd (Together; rated BB-/Stable; formerly Jerrold
Holdings Ltd). Fitch expects the notes, which are guaranteed by
Together and by other key group operating entities, to be used to
reduce drawings under the Together group's securitisation
structures. Consequently, the issue should increase Together's
overall funding capacity and slightly broaden the group's funding
diversification.  Fitch does not expect the notes issue to lead
to an increase in Together's overall drawn leverage in the near

The senior secured notes are rated in line with Together's Long-
Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) as Fitch views the probability
of default on the notes as the same as the probability of default
of Together. The notes' rating is therefore driven by the same
considerations that drive Together's Long-Term IDR. (See Fitch's
27 October 2016 commentary for a summary of Together's key rating

The rating of the senior secured notes is primarily sensitive to
changes in Together's Long-Term IDR. Fitch's 27 October 2016
commentary noted that near-term upside for Together's ratings is
limited by additional debt taken on at that time by Bracken
MidCo1 Plc, a holding company recently established above
Together, and that a significant further increase in drawn
leverage, among other factors, could lead to a downgrade.

KING & WOOD MALLESONS: Business Failure Investigation Started
Max Walters at The Law Society Gazette reports the administrators
of the now defunct European arm of King & Wood Mallesons have
confirmed that investigations into the failure of the business
are underway.

Restructuring outfit Quantuma took over KWM in January this year
after the European arm of the firm collapsed into administration,
according to The Law Society Gazette.  Andy Hosking -- -- and Sean Bucknall -- -- were named joint administrators.

In a statement released on January 9, the pair said they were
'conducting investigations into the failure of the firm which is
typical with any insolvency in order to understand how this came
about and the circumstances that led to the failure,' the report
relays.  It added that a final verdict was a 'long way down the

The statement follows reports that Quantuma was considering
launching an investigation into the conduct of the firm's
management, the report notes.

Earlier this month, the Gazette reported that KWM had retained a
'strategic presence' in the UK, Europe and the Middle East
following the European arm collapse, the report discloses.

The new business, based near St Paul's, will focus on corporate
M&A, finance, competition and dispute resolution, the report

The report relays more than 30 partners together with their
associates and support staff will make up the business, the
report adds.

MARRACHE & CO: Jyske Bank's Handling of Accounts Scrutinized
Gabriella Peralta at Gibraltar Chronicle reports that Jyske
Bank's handling of the accounts of Marrache & Co in the run-up to
the law firm's collapse continued to be put under scrutiny in
court on Feb. 10.

According to Gibraltar Chronicle, liquidators for Marrache & Co
are suing Jyske and insist the bank should have asked more
questions of Marrache & Co and been more suspicious of the
actions of its three senior partners, Benjamin, Isaac and Solomon
Marrache, all of whom were later convicted of fraud.

The bank insists that it acted properly throughout and in
compliance with the law, adding that the liquidator's case is
"coloured by hindsight", Gibraltar Chronicle notes.

But on the third day of hearings in the Supreme Court, liquidator
Adrian Hyde took the witness stand and insisted the bank and its
employees dishonestly assisted the three brothers as they
defrauded clients of Marrache & Co., Gibraltar Chronicle relates.

The claim against Jyske Bank was lodged by liquidators in 2014
and alleges that as a consequence of Jyske's conduct, some
clients of Marrache & Co suffered substantial loss and damage,
Gibraltar Chronicle recounts.

Mr. Hyde and fellow liquidator Edgar Lavarello expect to recover
US$995,000, GBP2.7 million and EUR3.8 million from Jyske Bank,
Gibraltar Chronicle discloses.  Millions more is sought in
interest, Gibraltar Chronicle states.

MIDLAND EXPRESSWAY: Owners Mull Refinancing of M6 Toll Road
Gill Plimmer at The Financial Times reports that the banks that
own Britain's only pay-to-use motorway, the M6 Toll, are
considering refinancing the business after struggling to secure a
GBP1.9 billion sale price.

Bidders, including a consortium formed by Spanish toll-road
operator Abertis and IFM Investors, are unwilling to meet the
price, forcing the sellers to reconsider, the FT relays, citing
people close to the vendors.

According to the FT, Abertis said it understood that an offer it
made had not been accepted but that it had not yet been
officially notified.

The toll road is owned by a group of 27 lenders including Credit
Agricole, Commerzbank and Novo Banco, which took control of the
asset from infrastructure group Macquarie in December 2013
following a debt restructuring, the FT discloses.

A spokesperson for the lenders said the sales process was
continuing and that other unnamed bidders remained in the frame,
according to the FT.

But people involved in the sale process said they were assessing
whether to sell the company at a lower price -- or refinance the
debt to make it cheaper to hold on to while they tried to secure
a higher offer, the FT notes.

The toll, a 27-mile stretch of road designed to ease congestion
on the main M6 in the West Midlands, has not lived up to
expectations since it opened in 2003, the FT states.

The problems facing the toll road, operated by Midland
Expressway, a subsidiary of Macquarie, have been compounded by
its GBP1.9 billion debt, the FT says.

The sale, which has already been delayed by the UK's Brexit vote,
is intended to generate enough money to fully recover that debt,
the FT relays.  The price tag represents a multiple of about 27
times the company's earnings before interest, tax, depreciation
and amortisation in 2015, the FT notes.

PURBROOKS: Latest London Print House to Enter Liquidation
Max Goldbart at Print Week reports South London-based corporate
print specialist Purbrooks has become the latest London print
house to enter liquidation.

Purbrooks is one of a string of London printers to have recently
gone bust.

At a meeting of creditors on 30 January 2016, Paul Appleton and
Paul Cooper -- -- of London-based insolvency
practitioner David Rubin & Partners were appointed as joint
liquidators for the purposes of winding up the company
voluntarily, says the report.

Founded in 1896, Purbrooks, of Gresham Way Industrial Estate,
Wimbledon Park, is the latest in a string of London printers to
enter liquidation.

In a statement, director Martin Stern confirmed that Purbrooks
had gone into a Creditors' Voluntary Liquidation (CVL), the
report relays.

The statement said: "There is a general lack of demand for
quality print at realistic margins and increasingly tight
timescales had necessitated the need to retain a certain level of
capacity. Brexit and an exceptionally long Christmas break
created acute demand downturns and we realised that we could no
longer fulfill our obligations to our staff and creditors.

"Longer term we were unlikely to be viable given the cost of
maintaining a production plant in London and an imminent rise in
business rates.

"The directors are saddened by resulting loss of jobs and are
assisting our very loyal staff to find jobs elsewhere in the

Purbrooks had a second director, Jan Prokop, who is also
assisting Stern with helping the 18 affected staff find new jobs
and with the sale of equipment, the report relays.

Mr. Stern added that he had remained on site to assist with
supplier retention of title and the sale of equipment owned by
finance providers, as well as the sale by liquidation of
unencumbered equipment and other assets.

"Much of our work was based on framework agreements and this will
pass to other suppliers on the rosters. I have assisted in the
transfer of artwork files and stock so that clients have not been
unduly inconvenienced," he added.

The report discloses in its most recent accounts for the year
ended August 31, 2015, Purbrooks had sales of GBP2,124,487, an
8.7% decrease on the previous year.  It had an operating loss of
GBP47,006 and a pre-tax loss of GBP95,562. It had fixed assets of
GBP794,205 and owed creditors GBP635,685 within the year.

The report relays Purbrook's liquidation follows a spate of
London printers going under, including Clicks Print last week,
Face Creative Services in late 2016, which was then acquired by
Hobs Repro, and 1st Byte in October 2015, the report adds.

TATA STEEL UK: Sells Speciality Steel Business to Liberty House
Devidutta Tripathy at Reuters reports that India's Tata Steel
Ltd. said on Feb. 9 its British arm has signed a definitive
agreement to sell its speciality steel business to Liberty House
Group for GBP100 million ($125.55 million).

According to Reuters, the deal covers several South Yorkshire-
based assets including the electric arc steelworks and bar mill
at Rotherham, Tata Steel said in a filing to Indian stock

Tata and Liberty House had entered into exclusive talks in
November as the Indian group seeks to offload its money-losing
assets and restructure European operations, Reuters recounts.

Tata Steel is the UK's biggest steel company.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
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