/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/170215.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R E U R O P E Wednesday, February 15, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 33 Headlines G E R M A N Y UNICREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on Hybrid Capital Notes G R E E C E GREECE: Plans to Tap Rotschild to Advise on Debts Amid Talks * Fitch Says Program Review Underpins Greek Sovereign Assessment I T A L Y BANCA POPOLARE: Submits Draft Merger Plan to EU Central Bank CREDITO VALTELLINESE: Fitch Withdraws 'BB-(EXP)' Sub. Debt Rating L U X E M B O U R G MAUSER HOLDING: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative N E T H E R L A N D S E-MAC DE 2006-I: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on EUR7MM E Notes LEVERAGED FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'D' WOOD STREET CLO 1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba3 P O L A N D ALMA MARKET: Files Motion to Commence Bankruptcy Proceedings INTERBUD LUBLIN: Court Opens Arrangement Proceedings P O R T U G A L BANCO BPI: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'BB+' R U S S I A ROSENERGOBANK: Moody's Cuts Deposit Rating to Caa2, Outlook Neg. S P A I N ABENGOA SA: S&P Withdraws 'SD' Rating on Insufficient Information BBVA FINANZIA: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class C Notes U N I T E D K I N G D O M CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Private Equity, Challengers Eye Acquisition EMERALD 2: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to B3 JERROLD FINCO: Fitch Rates GBP200MM Sec. Notes Issue BB-(EXP) KING & WOOD MALLESONS: Business Failure Investigation Started MARRACHE & CO: Jyske Bank's Handling of Accounts Scrutinized MIDLAND EXPRESSWAY: Owners Mull Refinancing of M6 Toll Road PURBROOKS: Latest London Print House to Enter Liquidation TATA STEEL UK: Sells Speciality Steel Business to Liberty House ********* ============= G E R M A N Y ============= UNICREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating on Hybrid Capital Notes ---------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has affirmed Unicredit Bank AG's (HVB) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'A-' and its Viability Rating (VR) at 'a-'. The Outlook on the Long-Term IDR is Negative. KEY RATING DRIVERS IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT HVB's IDRs and senior debt ratings reflect the bank's standalone credit strength, as expressed by its VR. The bank's strong capitalisation has a high influence on its VR. Capital ratios remain well above peers even after the planned one-off dividend payment to its parent, UniCredit S.p.A. (UC; BBB+/Negative). The VR also reflects HVB's largely wholesale business model based on a well-established domestic corporate and investment banking franchise, its solid asset quality, which benefits from the resilient German economy and its moderate profitability with some volatility. HVB's VR reflects Fitch's assumption that UC's strategic plan announced in December 2016 will not have a material impact on HVB's standalone strength. The measures, which include the payment of a EUR3bn special dividend from HVB to UC in May 2017, confirm Fitch's expectation that capital is increasingly managed across the UC group. However, Fitch expects HVB's capitalisation to remain in line with its VR, which is one notch above UC's VR. In Fitch's view, intragroup contagion risk means that a subsidiary's VR would not typically be rated more than a notch above its parent's within the eurozone. HVB's fully loaded common equity Tier 1 ratio (CET1) is likely to drop to about 19% at end-2Q17 from 22.3% at end-1H16 as a direct effect of the special dividend payment. Therefore, Fitch expects HVB to remain strongly capitalised and comfortably exceed current and future regulatory requirements. In addition, UC and HVB have agreed with their respective national regulators that HVB's own funds ratio will not fall below 13%. HVB's relatively stable profits in commercial banking mitigate its more volatile earnings from corporate and investment banking (CIB). Fitch expects the bank's disciplined pricing of corporate loans and the cost-cutting measures already implemented to continue to mitigate the prevailing regulatory cost pressure. However, low interest rates and intense competition in German corporate banking put pressure on interest margins and commission income in all segments. Moreover, Fitch believes that HVB faces somewhat limited growth prospects in corporate banking and CIB in Germany's saturated market. In addition, the relatively modest contribution of household clients to the commercial banking segment's performance reflects the fact that the bank's retail presence is limited to selected German regions. HVB's asset quality benefits from its primary focus on Germany, and to a lesser extent, on other countries with strong economic environments. Net writedowns remain low, but Fitch expects a normalisation of risk charges in the medium term. The bank has gradually run down non-performing loans (NPLs), although less actively than peers, and it continues to work out higher-risk non-strategic assets. While this could trigger a further modest improvement of its NPL ratio, HVB remains vulnerable to a deterioration of its sizeable loan exposure to the troubled shipping sector. The Negative Outlook on HVB's Long-Term IDR mirrors that on UC and reflects the potential pressure on HVB's capitalisation and financial flexibility from a deterioration of UC's financial strength. Such deterioration could, in Fitch's opinion, result in a need to upstream further capital from HVB to UC. Moreover, under its assumed single-point-of-entry resolution model, UC would continue to operate under its current parent bank structure. Fitch believes that the higher fungibility of capital and liquidity within the UC group that would result from this approach makes material capital upstreaming more likely. This could constrain HVB's financial flexibility. DERIVATIVE COUNTERPARTY RATING (DCR) AND DEPOSIT RATINGS HVB's DCR and Deposit Ratings are aligned with its IDRs. The bank's qualifying junior and vanilla senior debt buffers are large, but Fitch believes that their sustainability is not yet clear. This is because there are still some uncertainties on the timing of UC's plans to allocate total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) within the group, which could change HVB's liabilities structure over the medium term. SUPPORT RATING HVB's Support Rating (SR) indicates a 'BB' Long-Term rating floor based on institutional support. It reflects Fitch's opinion that despite UC's strong propensity to support HVB, its constrained ability to do so results in a moderate likelihood of extraordinary support. This is because of the large solvency support that HVB would be likely to require relative to the capital available in the rest of the group, given that a large share of UC's consolidated equity is in HVB. Fitch's view that UC's propensity to support is strong is primarily based on HVB's role as the group's investment banking hub and sizeable corporate banking operations in Europe's largest economy. SUBORDINATED DEBT AND HYBRID SECURITIES HVB's hybrid capital notes issued through HVB Funding Trusts I and II are rated four notches below the bank's VR: two notches for loss severity and two notches for incremental non-performance risk. While the regulator could order a coupon deferral in line with the terms and conditions of these profit-linked instruments, Fitch views such intervention as unlikely in light of HVB's solid standalone financial profile. RATING SENSITIVITIES IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT HVB's IDRs and VR are primarily sensitive to a change in UC's IDRs. A downgrade of UC's ratings would lead to a downgrade of HVB's ratings because Fitch believes that a weakening of UC's financial strength would increase the risk of upstreaming further capital from HVB. Fitch could affirm HVB's ratings if UC's ratings are affirmed and if HVB demonstrates that it can maintain strong capitalisation despite its stated intention to distribute the vast majority of its profits to UC in the next few years, which should result in minimal internal capital generation at HVB. HVB has considerably reduced its funding exposure to UC group entities and Fitch understands that it has no plans for further extraordinary dividend payments exceeding HVB's annual profit. HVB's VR and IDR are also sensitive to rising integration and fungibility of capital and funding within the UC group, which Fitch views as likely under the European Single Supervision and Single Resolution Mechanisms. Under Fitch's criteria, a highly integrated bank that accounts for a large share of its parent's consolidated assets and overall credit profile can be assigned a common VR with its parent. Therefore, Fitch would likely assign common VRs to UC and HVB if Fitch conclude that lower restrictions to capital movements within the UC group make it impossible to separate the credit profiles of its largest subsidiaries. HVB's VR, and therefore IDR, would then converge toward UC's ratings, which are currently a notch below HVB's. Apart from UC's influence, HVB's VR and IDRs are also sensitive to a decline in HVB's recurring operating profitability. RATING SENSITIVITIES - DCR AND DEPOSIT RATINGS HVB's DCR and Deposit Ratings are primarily sensitive to changes in its IDRs. The DCR and Deposit Ratings could be notched above HVB's IDRs if Fitch conclude that the bank's qualifying junior and vanilla senior debt buffers are sustainably sufficient to restore viability and prevent a default on derivative obligations and deposits after a failure. Fitch believes that further clarity on the sustainability of these buffers should become available when UC starts to downstream internal TLAC into HVB. The DCR and Deposit Ratings are also sensitive to future changes to the resolution regime, which may alter the hierarchy of the various instruments in resolution, although this is not Fitch's current expectation in Germany. SUPPORT RATING The SR is sensitive to significant changes to UC's ability to support HVB, which could be indicated by a change to UC's ratings. It is also sensitive to any negative changes to Fitch's view of UC's propensity to provide support, which Fitch currently does not expect. Fitch would withdraw HVB's SR if it decides to assign a common VR to UC and HVB. SUBORDINATED DEBT AND HYBRID SECURITIES HVB's subordinated debt and hybrid securities' ratings are sensitive to changes in the bank's VR or to a change in the securities' notching, which could arise if Fitch changes its assessment of the notes' loss severity or relative non- performance risk. The rating actions are: UniCredit Bank AG Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Negative Outlook Short-Term IDR affirmed at 'F2' Viability Rating affirmed at 'a-' Derivative Counterparty Rating affirmed at 'A-(dcr)' Deposit Ratings affirmed at 'A-'/'F2' Support Rating affirmed at '3' Senior unsecured certificates of deposit affirmed at 'F2' Senior unsecured debt issuance programme affirmed at 'A-'/'F2' Senior unsecured MTN programme affirmed at 'A-' Senior unsecured EMTN programme affirmed at 'A-'/'F2' Senior unsecured notes affirmed at 'A-' Tier 2 subordinated notes affirmed at 'BBB+' HVB Funding Trusts I and II hybrid capital notes affirmed at 'BB+ =========== G R E E C E =========== GREECE: Plans to Tap Rotschild to Advise on Debts Amid Talks ------------------------------------------------------------ Elaine Moore and Anne-Sylvaine Chassany at The Financial Times report that Greece is planning to appoint Rothschild to advise on its debts as the country attempts to end a long-running creditor stand-off and avert default. According to the FT, government officials hope to finalize the appointment before a gathering of eurozone finance ministers on Feb. 20 that has been described as the last chance for Greece's lenders to overcome their differences before European attention shifts to general elections in eurozone countries. Unless Greece receives fresh funds it will not be able to make EUR7 billion of debt payments due this July, including EUR2.1 billion to private sector creditors, the FT says. Under the plan, Rothschild will advise the country on all areas connected to its debt, including negotiations with creditors, potential inclusion in the European Central Bank's EUR80 billion-a-month bond-buying program and the resumption of Greek government bond sales, the FT relays, citing two people with direct knowledge of the matter. They said it is expected to be paid a bonus when Greece regains access to global debt markets, the FT notes. * Fitch Says Program Review Underpins Greek Sovereign Assessment ---------------------------------------------------------------- Recurrent tensions between Greece and its official sector creditors are already reflected in Greece's sovereign rating, which has been at or below 'CCC' for nearly two years, Fitch Ratings says. Fitch's sovereign credit assessment is underpinned by its assumption that the second review of Greece's third bailout programme will be completed well ahead of July, maintaining access to official funding. The IMF executive board last week reiterated its view that Greece's debt is "unsustainable". It said that "[m]ost Directors consider that . . . further [debt] relief may well be required to restore debt sustainability". This has highlighted disagreement with some of Greece's European creditors, who oppose further upfront debt relief, but see the IMF's financial involvement alongside the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as important for the programme's credibility. The IMF is not currently lending to Greece under the EUR86bn ESM programme. The Greek government agrees with the IMF that debt relief is needed, but has objected to the Fund's position that the government should pre-legislate for specific automatic fiscal correction measures if it misses future primary surplus targets. Even so, the current stand-off appears to be driven more by the inter-creditor disagreement. Press reports suggest that the IMF and the Europeans have taken a common position on the size of the automatic measures, but details remain unclear, as does the Greek government's response. Relations between the Greek government and official creditors have stayed on a relatively firm footing since the current ESM programme was agreed. Greece has broadly met programme conditions and recorded a primary surplus of EUR4.4bn in 2016 thanks to higher-than-budgeted revenues. GDP rose 1.8% yoy in 3Q16, the largest annual increase in over eight years. This progress is one reason that Fitch thinks Greece's European creditors would be prepared to proceed with the second review and to disburse funds without IMF involvement. Another reason is their desire to avoid a Greek political crisis during an already congested election year in Europe. Completing the second programme review and disbursing the associated ESM funds would enable Greece to meet its July maturities, which total more than EUR6bn (including EUR3.9bn to the European Central Bank). Doing so in a timely fashion and avoiding the level of brinksmanship of the first half of 2015 would reduce the risk that Greece's economic recovery is undermined by a hit to confidence or by the Greek government building up arrears to conserve liquidity. Recent events highlight that political risk remains a sovereign rating weakness for Greece, despite positive economic and fiscal developments. Fitch affirmed Greece's 'CCC' sovereign rating in September, and its next scheduled review is due on February 24. ========= I T A L Y ========= BANCA POPOLARE: Submits Draft Merger Plan to EU Central Bank ------------------------------------------------------------ Valentina Za at Reuters, citing Il Messaggero, reports that Italian banks Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca have submitted a draft merger plan to the European Central Bank that includes a new capital injection of between EUR4 billion and EUR5 billion (US$4.3-5.3 billion). According to Reuters, the paper said the draft plan had been submitted also to European Union's competition authorities to clear the way for an expected investment by the Italian state in the two ailing regional banks. The paper said the plan prepared by Popolare di Vicenza CEO Fabrizio Viola also envisages the creation of a bad bank where the two bank's EUR9 billion of bad loans would be transferred, Reuters relates. Italy could tap the EUR20 billion bank aid fund it introduced in December which it used to bail out Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Reuters discloses. Banca Popolare di Vicenza (BPVi) is an Italian bank. The bank was the 13th largest retail and corporate bank of Italy by total assets, according to Mediobanca. CREDITO VALTELLINESE: Fitch Withdraws 'BB-(EXP)' Sub. Debt Rating ----------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Credito Valtellinese's planned issue of subordinated Tier 2 debt 'BB-(EXP)' expected rating as the issuance is no longer expected to convert to a final rating in the near term. Fitch may assign the issue an expected rating again if the transaction proceeds. KEY RATING DRIVERS SUBORDINATED DEBT The expected rating was initially assigned on Sept. 30, 2016 and was notched once from Creval's 'bb' Viability Rating to reflect below-average recovery prospects for the notes in case of the bank's failure. =================== L U X E M B O U R G =================== MAUSER HOLDING: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative -------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings placed its 'B' long-term corporate credit rating on Luxembourg-registered rigid packaging group Mauser Holding S.a.r.l. on CreditWatch with negative implications. The CreditWatch placement follows the announcement that U.S.- based private equity firm Stone Canyon Industries, through rigid plastic and metal container manufacturer BWAY Holding Co. (BWAY), has agreed to acquire Mauser Holding. At this stage limited details have been disclosed regarding the transaction, although S&P believes there could be negative repercussions for the credit quality of Mauser Holding, given the higher leverage of BWAY and its lower corporate credit rating of 'B-'. S&P expects to analyze the implications of the acquisition within the next three months, by which time S&P would resolve the CreditWatch placement. The outcome of the CreditWatch placement will depend on the materialization of the transaction, as well as the impact of the acquisition on the combined entity's capital structure. The negative CreditWatch placement reflects that S&P could consider downgrading Mauser Holding once the transaction has finally materialized. At this stage, S&P expects the credit quality of the combined group to be weaker than that of Mauser Holding on a stand-alone basis, due to S&P's expectation of considerably higher leverage. S&P could lower the ratings to 'B-' if the acquisition went through and the combined entity's credit metrics did not show significant improvement from the leverage levels currently exhibited by the parent company. S&P could reassess the outlook on Mauser as stable if the transaction did not materialize, or if S&P thought that the credit quality of the combined group showed significant improvement from that currently exhibited by BWAY, for example, as a result of a significant equity injection. ===================== N E T H E R L A N D S ===================== E-MAC DE 2006-I: Moody's Affirms C(sf) Rating on EUR7MM E Notes --------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of the B note and affirmed the ratings of the A, C, D and E notes in E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V. The upgrade of note B in E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V. reflects the better than expected collateral performance and increased level of credit enhancement. Moody's affirmed the ratings of the notes that had sufficient credit enhancement to maintain current rating on the affected notes. LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS Issuer: E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V. -- EUR437M A Notes, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Affirmed Baa1 (sf) -- EUR27M B Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf) -- EUR17.5M C Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 22, 2016 Affirmed Caa3 (sf) -- EUR11.5M D Notes, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2013 Affirmed Ca (sf) -- EUR7M E Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011 Downgraded to C (sf) RATINGS RATIONALE The rating action of note B in E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V. is prompted by a decrease in key collateral assumptions, namely the portfolio Expected Loss (EL) assumptions due to better than expected collateral performance. Moody's decreased the expected loss assumption to 12.66% as a percentage of original pool balance from 13.25% in E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V. The upgrade of note B in E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V. is also prompted by deal deleveraging resulting in an increase in credit enhancement for the affected tranche. Sequential amortization led to the increase in the credit enhancement available in the transaction. The rating action took into consideration the notes' exposure to relevant counterparties, such as servicer, account banks or swap providers. Moody's considered how the liquidity available in the transaction and other mitigants support continuity of note payments, in case of servicer default, using the CR Assessment as a reference point for servicers. The ratings of the senior notes in E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V. is constrained by operational risk. The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in September 2016. The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of these ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance stage. Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings: Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings include (1) performance of the underlying collateral that is better than Moody's expected, (2) deleveraging of the capital structure and (3) improvements in the credit quality of the transaction counterparties. Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk (2) performance of the underlying collateral that is worse than Moody's expected, (3) deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement and (4) deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction counterparties. LEVERAGED FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'D' ------------------------------------------------------------ S&P Global Ratings lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' and to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its credit ratings on Leveraged Finance Europe Capital III B.V. (LFEC III)'s class D and E notes, respectively. According to the latest trustee report from Jan. 20, 2017, the portfolio currently comprises EUR9.45 million in loans to distinct European obligors with 'B+' ratings and below. The amount of defaulted loans, considering current market prices, totals EUR1.78 million and the cash in the transaction's principal account is EUR68,580. Since S&P's previous review on June 10, 2014, trading losses have affected the transaction's principal balance. On the Aug. 30, 2016 measurement date, the aggregate sum of the principal balances of collateral debt obligations and the balance in the principal account was less than 100% of the aggregate principal amount outstanding of the class D notes. On Sept. 1, 2016, LFEC III communicated to the trustee, the investment manager, and to S&P the occurrence of an event of default. After being notified by the trustee, noteholders have to date not given notice to the issuer to accelerate the outstanding balance of the notes. Although the overcollateralization event of default was triggered on Sept. 1, 2016, with the relevant notice from the trustee, as the noteholders did not accelerate the transaction no change in the priority of payments has taken place. The class A, B, and C notes have been fully repaid. On LFEC III's latest payment date (Jan. 20, 2017), the interest due on class D notes was EUR62,291.51, but LFEC III was only able to pay EUR44,017.89, which resulted in EUR18,273.62 of defaulted interest. Following the application of S&P's timeliness of payments criteria, it has lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' S&P's rating on the class D notes. The aggregate principal amount outstanding of the class E notes is EUR2.43 million, plus an outstanding amount of EUR1.11 million of deferred interest. S&P estimates that in order to fully repay the class E notes at maturity including deferred interest, the portfolio would need to be liquidated at an average price of about 135% of their par amount. In S&P's opinion, the class E notes are highly vulnerable to nonpayment. Following the application of S&P's criteria for assigning 'CCC' category ratings, it has lowered to 'CC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on the class E notes. LFEC III is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to European speculative-grade corporate firms and is managed by BNP Paribas Asset Management. The transaction closed in October 2004 and its reinvestment period ended in October 2009. RATINGS LIST Class Rating To From Leverage Finance Europe Capital III B.V. EUR306.5 Million Floating-Rate Notes Ratings Lowered D D (sf) CCC- (sf) E CC (sf) CCC- (sf) WOOD STREET CLO 1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba3 --------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following notes issued by Wood Street CLO 1 B.V.: -- EUR27.75M Class D1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf) -- EUR1.50M Class D2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf) -- EUR10.575M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Affirmed B1 (sf) Moody's also affirmed the following notes issued by Wood Street CLO 1 B.V.: -- EUR36M (outstanding balance EUR 19.73M) Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf) -- EUR29.925M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2016 Upgraded to Aaa (sf) Wood Street CLO 1 B.V., issued in September 2005, is a collateralised loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is managed by Alcentra Limited. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in November 2011. RATINGS RATIONALE The rating upgrades of the notes are primarily a result of the deleveraging of the senior notes on the last two payment dates and subsequent increases of the overcollateralization ratios (the "OC ratios") of the remaining classes of notes. Moody's notes that following the November 2016 payment date the class A notes have fully redeemed and that the Class B Notes have partially redeemed by 16.27M. As a result of the deleveraging, the OC ratios of the notes have increased significantly. According to the January 2017 trustee report, the classes A/B, C, D and E OC ratios are 545.06%, 216.55%, 136.27% and 120.16% respectively compared to the levels one year ago, in January 2016 of 227.80%, 158.10%, 121.70% and 112.35%. The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a cash and performing par balance of EUR 90.46 million, a weighted average default probability of 24.14% (consistent with a WARF of 3723 and a weighted average life of 3.54 years), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 47.55% for a Aaa liability target rating and a diversity score of 12. The default probability derives from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing. Methodology Underlying the Rating Action: The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in October 2016. Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings: In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes, for which it lowered the weighted average recovery rate by 5 percentage points; the model generated outputs that were unchanged for classes B and C and within two notches of the base case results for classes D and E. This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the notes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in the legal interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional parties because of embedded ambiguities. * Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings. Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings. Fast amortisation would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority. * Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over- collateralisation levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's analysed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on the notes' ratings. * Around 24.39% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009 and available at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461. * Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend on the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on the notes' ratings. In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can influence the final rating decision. =========== P O L A N D =========== ALMA MARKET: Files Motion to Commence Bankruptcy Proceedings ------------------------------------------------------------ Reuters reports that the Krakow court decided to discontinue the rehabilitation proceedings of Alma Market SA on Feb. 10. According to Reuters, Alma Market decided to file a motion for opening of bankruptcy proceedings with liquidation of assets. Alma Market Spolka Akcyjna, together with its subsidiaries, engages in the retail of fast moving consumer goods in Poland. INTERBUD LUBLIN: Court Opens Arrangement Proceedings ---------------------------------------------------- Reuters reports that the court in Lublin opened arrangement proceedings for Interbud Lublin SA. Interbud Lublin SA is a Poland-based company active in construction and engineering. =============== P O R T U G A L =============== BANCO BPI: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'BB+' ---------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings raised to 'BB+' from 'BB-' the long-term counterparty credit ratings on Portugal-based Banco BPI S.A. and its core subsidiary Banco Portugues de Investimento S.A. At the same time, S&P removed the long-term ratings on the two banks from CreditWatch with positive implications, where it placed them on Jan. 18, 2017. S&P also affirmed its 'B' short-term ratings on both banks. The outlook is stable. On Feb. 8, 2017, Caixabank S.A. announced that, following its takeover offer, the bank increased its stake in Portugal-based Banco BPI's share capital to 84.52% from 45.5%, giving it management control. S&P now views Banco BPI as a strategically important subsidiary of Caixabank and we expect it to benefit from parental support if needed. S&P also raised its issue ratings on BPI's senior unsecured debt to 'BB+' from 'BB-', its subordinated debt to 'B+' from 'B-', its preference shares to 'B-' from 'CCC', and removed all the ratings from CreditWatch positive. The upgrade follows Caixabank's announcement on Feb. 8 that, as a result of the takeover offer, it increased its stake in BPI's share capital to 84.52% from 45.5%, thereby giving it management control. S&P considers that BPI is now a strategically important subsidiary of Caixabank. After years of holding a strong minority stake in BPI, Caixabank has now acquired a large majority of the shares and gained management control, making BPI an important asset for the group's long-term strategy. S&P therefore expects BPI to benefit from parental support, including financial support, if needed. That said, the long-term rating is capped by the long-term sovereign credit rating on Portugal, which limits the rating uplift to two notches from BPI's stand- alone credit profile (SACP). This reflects S&P's view that Caixabank would be unlikely to sufficiently support BPI during stress associated with a hypothetical sovereign default. BPI shares the same business focus on retail banking as Caixabank and S&P expects BPI to leverage on economies of scale with the group to improve its operating efficiency and explore cross- selling opportunities by enhancing the asset management business. Caixabank has gained significant expertise in integrating acquired entities into the group, and has prior knowledge of BPI as it has been part of its shareholder structure for many years. However, improving BPI's profitability represents a managerial challenge for Caixabank, especially if BPI's participation in BFA, its Angolan subsidiary, is to reduce further. BFA has been consistently profitable and has compensated for low domestic earnings generation throughout the crisis. S&P raised the issue ratings on BPI's subordinated debt and preference shares because S&P expects the group to support the subsidiary's hybrid capital instruments and to maintain payments on the subsidiary's hybrids. As a result, the issue credit ratings are notched down from the issuer credit rating on BPI. The stable outlook on the long-term rating on BPI mirrors that on Portugal and reflects S&P's view that it do not expect a rating change over the next 12 months. Given that S&P's ratings on BPI are constrained by the long-term rating on the sovereign, S&P would expect any rating action on the long-term sovereign credit rating on Portugal to lead to a similar action on the ratings on BPI. A negative rating action triggered by a deterioration of BPI's stand-alone creditworthiness is unlikely at this stage. Should BPI's SACP weaken by only one notch, the issuer credit rating on BPI would be cushioned by an additional notch of uplift for extraordinary parental support, as long as the bank remains a strategically important subsidiary of Caixabank. =========== R U S S I A =========== ROSENERGOBANK: Moody's Cuts Deposit Rating to Caa2, Outlook Neg. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Rosenergobank's long- term local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings to Caa2 from B3 and assigned negative outlook to these ratings. Concurrently, the bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA were downgraded to caa2 from b3, and its long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessment) was downgraded to Caa1(cr) from B2(cr). Simultaneously, Moody's has affirmed Rosenergobank's Not Prime short-term local-currency and foreign-currency deposit ratings, as well as its short-term CR Assessment of Not Prime(cr). Moody's rating action concludes the review of Rosenergobank's ratings initiated on 9 December 2016. The rating action is primarily based on Rosenergobank's audited financial statements for 2015 prepared under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), its unaudited financial statements for 2016 and 2017 year to date prepared under local GAAP, as well as information received from the bank management. RATINGS RATIONALE The downgrade of Rosenergobank's ratings is primarily driven by the bank's deteriorated liquidity position. Moody's also takes into account the bank's weakened asset quality. The negative outlook assigned to the ratings reflects the bank's unsustainable liquidity profile and its high vulnerability to retail deposit withdrawals and/or departure of any sizeable large corporate deposits. Rosenergobank's liquidity cushion (mainly formed by cash and cash equivalents and accounts "due from banks") has been on a gradual declining trend over the 2016 and 2017 year to date and, according to Moody's estimate, stood well below 10% of the bank's total assets at 1 February 2017. Although in late 2016, Rosenergobank's management announced that the bank was contemplating expansion of its liquidity cushion through attraction of more corporate deposits, these plans have not materialised over the review period. The bank management's plans to replenish liquidity cushion through borrowers' earlier repayments of some of their loans bear a considerable element of uncertainty, in Moody's opinion. Rosenergobank's asset quality is weak. According to the bank's local GAAP financial statements as of 1 October 2016, the aggregate proportion of group 4 and group 5 loans ("problem" and "uncollectable" loans, under the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) classification), increased to 13.9% from 10.3% over the first nine months of 2016. Correspondingly, the loan loss reserves accumulated under local GAAP increased to 12.2% from 9.5% over the same period. Moody's expects that the heightened provisioning charges will protract into 2017, because a large proportion of Rosenergobank's loans have been renegotiated. The latest publicly reported proportion of renegotiated loans stood at 26.9% of the bank's total gross loans at 1 January 2016, whilst in absence of renegotiation these loans would have fallen overdue. Rosenergobank's loss-absorbing capital buffer has somewhat improved following the conversion -- in October 2016 -- of subordinated loans for the total amount of RUB1.5 billion into common equity Tier 1 (CET1). As a result, at 1 February 2017, the bank's regulatory CET 1 and total capital adequacy ratios stood at 6.2% and 14.2%, whereas the regulatory minimum levels are 4.5% and 8%, respectively. The above being said, the rating agency expectation is that credit losses will continue to erode Rosenergobank's capital going forward. WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS DOWN / UP Rosenergobank's ratings could be downgraded if the bank is unable to substantially improve its liquidity cushion over the next 6 to 12 months, or if the bank faces material outflows of customer deposits. Further deterioration of Rosenergobank's asset quality, resulting in high credit losses and rapid capital erosion, could be another driver for the bank's ratings downgrade. Rosenergobank's ratings have low upward potential, given the negative outlook assigned to the ratings. Revision of the rating outlook to stable from negative would require a substantial strengthening of the bank's liquidity position and improved asset quality metrics. PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published in January 2016. Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Rosenergobank reported total assets of RUB55.7 billion under unaudited local GAAP financial statements as of 1 January 2017. The bank's net local GAAP loss for 2016 stood at RUB697 million. ========= S P A I N ========= ABENGOA SA: S&P Withdraws 'SD' Rating on Insufficient Information ----------------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings said that it withdrew its 'SD' (selective default) rating on Spain-based engineering and construction (E&C) company Abengoa S.A. due to lack of sufficient and timely information. At the same time, S&P withdrew its issue and recovery ratings on the senior unsecured notes issued by Abengoa S.A., Abengoa Finance S.A.U., and Abengoa Greenfield S.A. The ratings withdrawal reflects the lack of sufficient and timely information necessary for S&P to maintain surveillance of the ratings on Abengoa S.A, in accordance with S&P's criteria and policies. The lack of information restricts S&P's ability to assess the company's liquidity position and business and financial risk profiles. Founded in 1941, Spain-based Abengoa S.A. has interests across industries such as solar power generation, bioenergy, energy transmission, environmental services, and E&C. BBVA FINANZIA: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class C Notes ------------------------------------------------------ S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'D (sf)' credit rating on BBVA Finanzia Autos 1, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class C notes. S&P has reviewed BBVA Finanzia Autos 1's collateral performance, and the transaction's current structural features. Since S&P's previous review on Feb. 26, 2014, the transaction has paid down significantly. The outstanding portfolio balance, excluding defaulted loans (defined in this transaction as loans in arrears for more than 12 months), as of the last investor report, dated Dec. 31, 2016, was 0.3% of the closing balance, down from 7.3% at S&P's January 2014 review. Since S&P's previous review, it has continued to observe stabilizing delinquencies, with slight reductions in some arrears buckets. However, long-term delinquencies have continued to roll into defaults. Due to the transaction's deteriorating performance observed so far, the fact that the class C notes have previously missed interest payments and remain undercollateralized, and the reserve being fully depleted, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class C notes. S&P's rating on the class C notes addresses the timely payment of interest due under the rated notes, and ultimate payment of principal at maturity. The transaction is exposed to counterparty risk through Societe Generale S.A. (Madrid Branch) as guarantor of the bank account provider, and Deutsche Bank AG (London Branch) as a swap provider. Under S&P's current counterparty criteria, it considers that the required minimum rating for the supporting entities and the transaction's replacement mechanisms adequately mitigate its exposure to counterparty risk. BBVA Finanzia Autos 1 is backed by a portfolio of Spanish loans granted to purchase new and used cars. Finanzia Banco de Credito S.A. -- the consumer finance arm of Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. -- originated the transaction, which closed in May 2007. The revolving period ended in April 2008, one year ahead of the scheduled date, because the delinquency rate was higher than the trigger threshold level. =========================== U N I T E D K I N G D O M =========================== CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Private Equity, Challengers Eye Acquisition -------------------------------------------------------------- Emma Dunkley at The Financial Times reports that the Co-operative Bank has made a last-ditch attempt to salvage its future by putting itself up for sale after warning that its capital reserves will fall below a target agreed with regulators. Institutional investors in the ethically-focused bank are facing heavy losses on their share of nearly GBP2 billion injected into the bank in 2013 and 2014 to bring it back from the brink of collapse, according to bankers who worked with the lender, the FT discloses. But in a stark warning to the market, the lossmaking bank indicated last month that it still faced capital problems and was expecting reserves to fall short over the next few years because of the impact of record-low interest rates on profitability, the FT notes. The Co-Op Bank, which is only 20% owned by the Co-Operative Group, started the sale process on Feb. 13 in an attempt to meet the Bank of England's capital requirements over the long term and ultimately avoid being wound down, the FT relates. According to the FT, a number of "challenger" banks -- small retail lenders set up to take on the big high-street banks -- and private equity companies are showing signs of interest in snapping up parts of the bank. Andy Golding, chief executive of OneSavings Bank, said he would "certainly look" at any portfolios that met his selection criteria, the FT recounts. TSB, another challenger bank, has said that it is interested in acquiring assets at the right price and was one of the first- round bidders for the GBP16 billion loan book backed by the UK government, the FT relays, citing a banker close to the plan. People close to the sale process said that Paragon Bank was interested in working with other possible buyers to acquire specialist loan portfolios, the FT notes. The Co-op is aiming to offload the entire business rather than individual portfolios, the FT discloses. The Co-operative Bank is a retail and commercial bank in the United Kingdom, with its headquarters in Balloon Street, Manchester. EMERALD 2: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to B3 ------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Emerald 2 Limited's (a holding company of Environmental Resources Management) corporate family rating (CFR) to B3 from B2 and probability of default rating to B3-PD from B2-PD. At the same time, Moody's has downgraded Emerald 3 Limited 's first-lien senior secured facilities instrument ratings to B2 from B1, and second-lien secured facilities instrument rating to Caa2 from Caa1. The outlook on all ratings has been changed to stable, from negative. RATINGS RATIONALE The rating downgrade reflects ERM's continued soft trading with pressure on top-line and margins that will result in the company's financial leverage remaining significantly above 7.0x. In addition, ERM's CFR of B3 reflects the company's: (1) exposure to the energy, commodity and mining sector resulting in pressure on top line and margins; (2) financial covenants restrict access to Revolving Credit Facility and prohibit Permitted Acquisitions and (3) reliance to retain key quality staff. However, the CFR also reflects ERM's (1) adequate liquidity profile supported by the high cash generative nature of the capex-lite business model; (2) EBITDA margin supported by active staff cost management; (3) good geographic and sector revenue diversification; (4) blue chip client base and some revenue visibility from repeat business and (5) leading position as pure- play provider of environmental consulting in fragmented and highly competitive market. ERM's liquidity profile remains adequate, despite the full drawdown of its acquisition facility, with USD100 million unrestricted cash on balance sheet at December 2016. Only USD3.3 million of the USD50 million Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) is used for bonds and guarantees (the balance of USD46.7 million is undrawn). However, with December 2016 management reported Senior Net Leverage ratio of 6.2x, the springing financial covenant restricts the drawing of the RCF to less than 30% ($15 million). The covenanted Senior Net Leverage ratio is 5.6x as of December 2016, dropping to 5.2x as of March 2017 and 4.8x in December 2017. In addition, the company's Senior Facility Agreement allows for $150 million Additional Facility, currently uncommitted and undrawn. However, drawings under the Additional Facility are restricted by a leverage test of 4.5x Net Senior and 6.0x Net Total Leverage. On March 31, 2016, ERM's shareholders acquired JSC, a stand-alone chemical consultancy with an annual EBITDA around $3 million. The JSC acquisition was made using equity and is currently held outside the syndicate group, as there is no basket for permitted acquisitions at the current leverage ratio. Management expects to make additional acquisitions during the course of FY18. It is management's intention to bring JSC and future acquisitions into the syndicate group, subject to agreement of terms with its lenders, which would lower the pro-forma leverage ratio. However, until the acquisitions are completed and brought into the syndicate group, Moody's base case scenario assumes no EBITDA uplift from any acquisitions. RATING OUTLOOK The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that the company will report gross leverage above 7.0x in the next 6-12 months, but maintain an adequate liquidity profile as a result of its good cash flow conversion and active cost management. WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP Moody's would consider upgrading the rating if adjusted gross Debt/EBITDA falls below 7.0x on a sustainable basis and the company maintains an adequate liquidity profile, including taking into account any equity-funded acquisition brought into the restricted group that contributes positively to EBITDA generation. WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS DOWN Downward pressure on the rating could develop if Moody's expects ERM's Debt/EBITDA to remain above 8.0x for a sustained period of time, its liquidity position deteriorates or free cash flow becomes negative. The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016. ERM is a global leading provider of environmental, health, safety, risk and social consulting services with 150 offices in 40 countries. In July 2015, OMERS Private Equity and the Alberta Investment Management Corporation completed the acquisition of a 59% stake in ERM as part of a management buy-out from Charterhouse Capital Partners for an enterprise value of $1.7 billion. The 41% balance of ERM is owned by ERM partners. As of 31 December 2016, the company employed 4,607 people, including 563 partners, and reported LTM net revenue of USD609 million. JERROLD FINCO: Fitch Rates GBP200MM Sec. Notes Issue BB-(EXP) ------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has assigned Jerrold FinCo plc's GBP200 million senior secured notes issue an expected rating of 'BB-(EXP)'. The assignment of the final rating is contingent on the receipt of final documents conforming to information already received. Jerrold FinCo plc is a finance subsidiary of Together Financial Services Ltd (Together; rated BB-/Stable; formerly Jerrold Holdings Ltd). Fitch expects the notes, which are guaranteed by Together and by other key group operating entities, to be used to reduce drawings under the Together group's securitisation structures. Consequently, the issue should increase Together's overall funding capacity and slightly broaden the group's funding diversification. Fitch does not expect the notes issue to lead to an increase in Together's overall drawn leverage in the near term. KEY RATING DRIVERS The senior secured notes are rated in line with Together's Long- Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) as Fitch views the probability of default on the notes as the same as the probability of default of Together. The notes' rating is therefore driven by the same considerations that drive Together's Long-Term IDR. (See Fitch's 27 October 2016 commentary for a summary of Together's key rating drivers). RATING SENSITIVITIES The rating of the senior secured notes is primarily sensitive to changes in Together's Long-Term IDR. Fitch's 27 October 2016 commentary noted that near-term upside for Together's ratings is limited by additional debt taken on at that time by Bracken MidCo1 Plc, a holding company recently established above Together, and that a significant further increase in drawn leverage, among other factors, could lead to a downgrade. KING & WOOD MALLESONS: Business Failure Investigation Started ------------------------------------------------------------- Max Walters at The Law Society Gazette reports the administrators of the now defunct European arm of King & Wood Mallesons have confirmed that investigations into the failure of the business are underway. Restructuring outfit Quantuma took over KWM in January this year after the European arm of the firm collapsed into administration, according to The Law Society Gazette. Andy Hosking -- andrew.hosking@quantuma.com -- and Sean Bucknall -- sean.buckhall@quantuma.com -- were named joint administrators. In a statement released on January 9, the pair said they were 'conducting investigations into the failure of the firm which is typical with any insolvency in order to understand how this came about and the circumstances that led to the failure,' the report relays. It added that a final verdict was a 'long way down the line'. The statement follows reports that Quantuma was considering launching an investigation into the conduct of the firm's management, the report notes. Earlier this month, the Gazette reported that KWM had retained a 'strategic presence' in the UK, Europe and the Middle East following the European arm collapse, the report discloses. The new business, based near St Paul's, will focus on corporate M&A, finance, competition and dispute resolution, the report notes. The report relays more than 30 partners together with their associates and support staff will make up the business, the report adds. MARRACHE & CO: Jyske Bank's Handling of Accounts Scrutinized ------------------------------------------------------------ Gabriella Peralta at Gibraltar Chronicle reports that Jyske Bank's handling of the accounts of Marrache & Co in the run-up to the law firm's collapse continued to be put under scrutiny in court on Feb. 10. According to Gibraltar Chronicle, liquidators for Marrache & Co are suing Jyske and insist the bank should have asked more questions of Marrache & Co and been more suspicious of the actions of its three senior partners, Benjamin, Isaac and Solomon Marrache, all of whom were later convicted of fraud. The bank insists that it acted properly throughout and in compliance with the law, adding that the liquidator's case is "coloured by hindsight", Gibraltar Chronicle notes. But on the third day of hearings in the Supreme Court, liquidator Adrian Hyde took the witness stand and insisted the bank and its employees dishonestly assisted the three brothers as they defrauded clients of Marrache & Co., Gibraltar Chronicle relates. The claim against Jyske Bank was lodged by liquidators in 2014 and alleges that as a consequence of Jyske's conduct, some clients of Marrache & Co suffered substantial loss and damage, Gibraltar Chronicle recounts. Mr. Hyde and fellow liquidator Edgar Lavarello expect to recover US$995,000, GBP2.7 million and EUR3.8 million from Jyske Bank, Gibraltar Chronicle discloses. Millions more is sought in interest, Gibraltar Chronicle states. MIDLAND EXPRESSWAY: Owners Mull Refinancing of M6 Toll Road ----------------------------------------------------------- Gill Plimmer at The Financial Times reports that the banks that own Britain's only pay-to-use motorway, the M6 Toll, are considering refinancing the business after struggling to secure a GBP1.9 billion sale price. Bidders, including a consortium formed by Spanish toll-road operator Abertis and IFM Investors, are unwilling to meet the price, forcing the sellers to reconsider, the FT relays, citing people close to the vendors. According to the FT, Abertis said it understood that an offer it made had not been accepted but that it had not yet been officially notified. The toll road is owned by a group of 27 lenders including Credit Agricole, Commerzbank and Novo Banco, which took control of the asset from infrastructure group Macquarie in December 2013 following a debt restructuring, the FT discloses. A spokesperson for the lenders said the sales process was continuing and that other unnamed bidders remained in the frame, according to the FT. But people involved in the sale process said they were assessing whether to sell the company at a lower price -- or refinance the debt to make it cheaper to hold on to while they tried to secure a higher offer, the FT notes. The toll, a 27-mile stretch of road designed to ease congestion on the main M6 in the West Midlands, has not lived up to expectations since it opened in 2003, the FT states. The problems facing the toll road, operated by Midland Expressway, a subsidiary of Macquarie, have been compounded by its GBP1.9 billion debt, the FT says. The sale, which has already been delayed by the UK's Brexit vote, is intended to generate enough money to fully recover that debt, the FT relays. The price tag represents a multiple of about 27 times the company's earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation in 2015, the FT notes. PURBROOKS: Latest London Print House to Enter Liquidation --------------------------------------------------------- Max Goldbart at Print Week reports South London-based corporate print specialist Purbrooks has become the latest London print house to enter liquidation. Purbrooks is one of a string of London printers to have recently gone bust. At a meeting of creditors on 30 January 2016, Paul Appleton and Paul Cooper -- paul@drpartners.com -- of London-based insolvency practitioner David Rubin & Partners were appointed as joint liquidators for the purposes of winding up the company voluntarily, says the report. Founded in 1896, Purbrooks, of Gresham Way Industrial Estate, Wimbledon Park, is the latest in a string of London printers to enter liquidation. In a statement, director Martin Stern confirmed that Purbrooks had gone into a Creditors' Voluntary Liquidation (CVL), the report relays. The statement said: "There is a general lack of demand for quality print at realistic margins and increasingly tight timescales had necessitated the need to retain a certain level of capacity. Brexit and an exceptionally long Christmas break created acute demand downturns and we realised that we could no longer fulfill our obligations to our staff and creditors. "Longer term we were unlikely to be viable given the cost of maintaining a production plant in London and an imminent rise in business rates. "The directors are saddened by resulting loss of jobs and are assisting our very loyal staff to find jobs elsewhere in the industry." Purbrooks had a second director, Jan Prokop, who is also assisting Stern with helping the 18 affected staff find new jobs and with the sale of equipment, the report relays. Mr. Stern added that he had remained on site to assist with supplier retention of title and the sale of equipment owned by finance providers, as well as the sale by liquidation of unencumbered equipment and other assets. "Much of our work was based on framework agreements and this will pass to other suppliers on the rosters. I have assisted in the transfer of artwork files and stock so that clients have not been unduly inconvenienced," he added. The report discloses in its most recent accounts for the year ended August 31, 2015, Purbrooks had sales of GBP2,124,487, an 8.7% decrease on the previous year. It had an operating loss of GBP47,006 and a pre-tax loss of GBP95,562. It had fixed assets of GBP794,205 and owed creditors GBP635,685 within the year. The report relays Purbrook's liquidation follows a spate of London printers going under, including Clicks Print last week, Face Creative Services in late 2016, which was then acquired by Hobs Repro, and 1st Byte in October 2015, the report adds. TATA STEEL UK: Sells Speciality Steel Business to Liberty House --------------------------------------------------------------- Devidutta Tripathy at Reuters reports that India's Tata Steel Ltd. said on Feb. 9 its British arm has signed a definitive agreement to sell its speciality steel business to Liberty House Group for GBP100 million ($125.55 million). According to Reuters, the deal covers several South Yorkshire- based assets including the electric arc steelworks and bar mill at Rotherham, Tata Steel said in a filing to Indian stock exchanges. Tata and Liberty House had entered into exclusive talks in November as the Indian group seeks to offload its money-losing assets and restructure European operations, Reuters recounts. Tata Steel is the UK's biggest steel company. ********* Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today. ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co- published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. 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