/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/170224.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, February 24, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 40


                            Headlines


B E L G I U M

TELENET GROUP: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB-' on Good Performance


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

NEW WORLD RESOURCES: OKD Has Until April to Propose Rescue Plan


G R E E C E

GREECE: Needs Fourth Bailout, Ex-Finance Minister Says


I R E L A N D

NEWHAVEN CLO DAC: Fitch Corrects February 3 Rating Release
NEWHAVEN CLO DAC: Fitch Corrects February 15 Rating Release
RELATIONSHIPS IRELAND: In Liquidation Due to Decline in Demand


I T A L Y

VENETO BANCA: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings


N O R W A Y

NANNA MIDCO: Moody's Assigns B2 Corporate Family Rating
NANNA BIDCO: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B' CCR on Proposed Refinancing


R U S S I A

HYDROMASHSERVICE JSC: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating to RUB3BB Bonds
KAZANORGSINTEZ PJSC: Fitch Affirms IDR at B, Outlook Positive
TINKOFF BANK: Moody's Hikes Long-Term Deposit Ratings to B1


S P A I N

BANCO DE CASTILLA: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Tranches


S W I T Z E R L A N D

GLOBAL BLUE: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR on Planned Debt Repricing


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS: Liquidator Wades Into Business Rates Row With Refund Demand
BHS GROUP: Administrators' Bid to Take Control of Biz Adjourned
LION HUDSON: In Administration, Taps FRP as Administrators
SCOTSMAN HOTEL: Bought of Liquidation by G1 Group
VAUXHALL: GBP1-Bil. Pension Deficit May Hamper Sale to Peugeot


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS


                            *********



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B E L G I U M
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TELENET GROUP: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB-' on Good Performance
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term corporate credit rating
on Telenet Group Holding N.V., a Belgian provider of
telecommunications and cable TV services, to 'BB-' from 'B+'.
S&P also raised its long-term corporate credit rating on Telenet
International Finance S.a.r.l. and Telenet Financing USD LLC to
'BB-' from 'B+'.  The outlook on all these entities is stable.

In addition, S&P raised its issue ratings on Telenet's senior
secured notes and term loans, and on the EUR120 million senior
secured revolving credit facility (RCF), to 'BB-' from 'B+'.  The
recovery rating on this debt remains at '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of approximately 60% recovery for creditors in the
event of a payment default.

The upgrade reflects S&P's expectation that good operating trends
in Telenet's cable operations, the successful integration of the
mobile telephony subsidiary BASE, which it acquired in February
2016, and the realization of synergies from this acquisition will
support continued low- to mid-single digit EBITDA growth and free
operating cash flow (FOCF) of at least 5% of adjusted debt in
2017-2019, excluding any benefits from vendor financing.  In
S&P's base case, it also expects adjusted leverage to remain at
4.3x-4.5x in 2017 and 2018, compared with about 4.5x at year-end
2016. Nevertheless, S&P thinks possible further acquisitions or
potential future shareholder distributions may prevent a material
reduction in leverage from this level.

In S&P's opinion, the integration of BASE is well on track and
Telenet has started migrating its own mobile customers, for whom
it currently relies on wholesale access to other mobile networks,
to the BASE network.  Telenet plans to complete this process,
which is the single most important source of synergies from the
acquisition of BASE, by mid-2018, and expects to realize further
cost savings from the consolidation of operations this year.  S&P
thinks these measures will support solid FOCF generation, despite
high ongoing spending on mobile and fixed-line network upgrades
and operating and regulatory headwinds at BASE.

S&P's assessment of Telenet's business risk profile is supported
by the company's strong market position as the leading provider
of broadband Internet and cable TV services in its service area,
and by the company's well-invested high-speed fixed-line network.
In addition, S&P thinks Telenet's overall strategy will benefit
from the ownership of BASE's mobile telephony network, as it will
provide the company with greater commercial and technological
flexibility in designing competitive fixed-line and mobile
telephony "convergence" offers in its operating footprint, and
improve the economics of its increasingly data-driven mobile
business.

These strengths are partly offset by S&P's expectation of
continued competitive pressure in the TV segment and ongoing
competition for broadband and telephony services from other
fixed-line and mobile operators, partly fostered by the
regulatory obligation for Telenet to provide wholesale access to
its cable network.  Furthermore, S&P expects that intense
competition in the mobile market and the abolition of EU roaming
charges will strain BASE's mobile service revenues in the near
term, potentially exacerbated by new mandatory registration for
mobile prepaid users by mid-2017.  Telenet also faces the need to
make substantial investments to enhance the quality of BASE's
mobile network, which S&P expects will lead to meaningful accrued
capital expenditures (capex), as defined by Telenet, of 23%-25%
of sales in 2017 and 2018, excluding broadcasting rights.

S&P's assessment of Telenet's financial risk is primarily driven
by S&P's expectation that its controlling shareholder, Liberty
Global, is likely to pursue aggressive financial policies for
Telenet over the next few years, which will prevent meaningful
deleveraging through EBITDA growth.  Telenet's adjusted leverage
remained at or below 4.5x in 2015 and 2016, but S&P considers
further material improvements unlikely, as it thinks the company
may pursue further debt-funded acquisitions or return to more
generous shareholder distributions at some point.  Telenet's FOCF
is currently burdened by significant investments for upgrading
the BASE mobile network and for enhancing speeds in its broadband
network.  Nevertheless, S&P thinks organic EBITDA growth and the
ramp-up of cost savings from the BASE acquisition will enable
Telenet to generate FOCF of 7%-9% of adjusted debt in the next
few years.  S&P acknowledges that its FOCF forecast is enhanced
by Telenet's new vendor-financing program, but even without this
S&P forecast adjusted FOCF to debt will be 5% or more.

The stable outlook expresses S&P's view that Telenet will
continue to show robust performance in its fixed-line and cable
TV business and successfully extract synergies from the
combination with BASE. S&P thinks this will enable Telenet to
moderately improve adjusted EBITDA margins and support adjusted
free operating cash flow of 7%-9% of adjusted debt in 2017.  The
stable outlook also reflects S&P's expectation that adjusted debt
to EBITDA will remain at about 4.5x.

S&P could lower the rating if adjusted debt to EBITDA exceeded 5x
or adjusted FOCF to debt fell below 5% for a prolonged period,
for example due to higher shareholder distributions, debt-funded
acquisitions, or operating weaknesses caused by difficulties with
integrating BASE or by stronger competitive headwinds.

The rating on Telenet is capped by S&P's rating on its parent,
Liberty Global.  S&P could raise the rating on Telenet if S&P
raised its rating on Liberty Global and, at the same time,
Telenet tightened its financial policies so as to target adjusted
debt to EBITDA of about 4x and FOCF to debt of more than 10% on a
sustainable basis.  S&P regards this scenario as unlikely at
present, given its stable outlook on the parent and S&P's
expectation that Liberty Global will likely pursue aggressive
financial policies for Telenet in the future.


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C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


NEW WORLD RESOURCES: OKD Has Until April to Propose Rescue Plan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg News reports that Lee Louda, the insolvency
administrator of Czech coal miner OKD, said in an e-mail that the
company has until April to propose a reorganization plan.  She
said creditors of OKD seek CZK20 billion.

OKD creditors will vote on an overhaul after an April deadline at
a meeting whose date will be set by an insolvency court,
Bloomberg discloses.

According to Bloomberg, if the company's creditors or the court
fail to approve the plan, the court will initiate bankruptcy
proceedings.

OK is a unit of New World Resources.

                   About New World Resources

New World Resources N.V. is owned and controlled by New World
Resources Plc, an English public limited company domiciled in the
Netherlands that is admitted for trading on the London Stock
Exchange, where it maintains a Premium Listing, along with the
Warsaw Stock Exchange and the Prague Stock Exchange.

The ultimate parent and indirect majority owner of NWR is CERCL
Mining B.V., a privately-held Dutch company, which owns a
controlling majority of the shares of NWR Plc.

NWR's primary role in its corporate group has been to issue debt
(primarily in the form of secured and unsecured notes) and to
loan the corresponding proceeds to its wholly-owned operating
subsidiaries.  These operating subsidiaries conduct coal mining
and exploration operations in the Czech Republic and Poland.  The
operating subsidiary conducting mining operations in the Czech
Republic is critical to the local economy in that country.
Collectively, these operating subsidiaries employee over 11,500
workers (and utilize an additional 3,000 contractors), and many
major steel groups -- including some operating in the U.S. -- are
reliant on their coal.

As of July 15, 2014, NWR had outstanding gross external debt of
approximately EUR825 million (exclusive of amounts it owes under
certain intercompany obligations).  Of this debt, EUR500 million
in principal amount plus accrued interest is owed to the
beneficial holders of the 7.875% Senior Secured Notes due May 1,
2018.  NWR also owes EUR275 million in principal amount plus
accrued interest to the beneficial holders of its 7.875% Senior
Unsecured Notes due January 15, 2021.

NWR applied to the Chancery Division (Companies Court) of the
High Court of Justice of England and Wales, on July 28, 2014, for
an order directing it to convene separate meetings for two
classes of creditors only, namely, the existing senior secured
noteholders on the one hand, and the existing senior unsecured
noteholders.

NWR filed a Chapter 15 bankruptcy petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case
No. 14-12226) in Manhattan, New York on July 30, 2014, to seek
recognition of the UK proceeding.

Neither the Debtor's parent nor any of its operating subsidiaries
have commenced insolvency proceedings in the UK Court or any
other court within any jurisdiction.

The U.S. case is assigned to Judge Stuart M. Bernstein.



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G R E E C E
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GREECE: Needs Fourth Bailout, Ex-Finance Minister Says
------------------------------------------------------
Tim Wallace at The Telegraph reports that George
Papaconstantinou, a former Greek finance minister, said Greece
will need a fourth bailout as its debts remain utterly
unsustainable despite years of austerity and attempted reforms.

Mr. Papaconstantinou said a "radical liberalization of the
economy" is also necessary as the country needs to attract
foreign investment because Greece lacks the domestic resources
needed to grow its industries, The Telegraph relates.

Pretty much everyone agrees that Greek debt is not sustainable,"
The Telegraph quotes Mr. Papaconstantinou as saying.  "Is there a
prospect of a fourth bailout? Yes. Even in the best case . . . I
doubt that Greece will be able to stand on its own feet."

According to The Telegraph, Mr. Papaconstantinou, who was
Greece's finance minister from 2009 to 2011, said that these
measures have to be accompanied by serious economic reforms.


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I R E L A N D
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NEWHAVEN CLO DAC: Fitch Corrects February 3 Rating Release
----------------------------------------------------------
This commentary replaces the version published on February 3,
2017 to correct the rating action of the class C to F notes.

Fitch Ratings has assigned Newhaven CLO DAC's refinancing notes
expected ratings:

EUR1.5m class X notes: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR205.9m class A-1R notes: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR10m class A-2R notes: assigned 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR35m class B-R notes: assigned 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR23.5m class C-R: assigned 'A(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR18.6m class D-R: assigned 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR20.4m class E-R: assigned 'BB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR10.0m class F-R: assigned 'B-(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

Newhaven CLO DAC is a cash flow collateralised loan obligation
securitising a portfolio of mainly European leveraged loans and
bonds. Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes will be used
to refinance the current outstanding notes. The portfolio is
managed by Bain Capital Credit Ltd.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
'B' Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch assesses the average credit quality of obligors to be in
the 'B' category. Fitch has public ratings or credit opinions on
106 of 107 obligors in the identified portfolio. The covenanted
maximum The Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the
identified portfolio is 32.97 and the maximum covenanted WARF to
assign expected ratings is 33.0.

High Recovery Expectation
At least 90% of the portfolio comprises senior secured
obligations. Recovery prospects for these assets are typically
more favourable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets. The weighted average recovery rate (WARR) of the
identified portfolio is 67.77%, compared with the minimum
covenanted WARR of 67.0%.

Maturity Extension Risk
The deal deviates from other European CLOs as the collateral
manager has the discretion to vote in favour of maturity
extensions up to a cumulative limit of 25% of the initial target
par balance, with the caveat that the extended maturity is no
later than 18 months before the maturity of the notes.

Fitch believes that limiting the extended maturity to 18 months
before the maturity of the notes would prevent the introduction
of long-dated assets in the portfolio, therefore exposing the
transaction to market value risk. Fitch also got comfort from the
fact that the asset manager will only be allowed to vote in
favour of an amendment to avoid distressed situations in the
manager's judgement, caused by limited access to refinancing by
the obligors in the portfolio.

Exposure to Unhedged Non-Euro Assets
The transaction is allowed to invest up to 5% of the portfolio in
non-euro-denominated assets. Unhedged non-euro-denominated assets
are limited to a maximum exposure of 2.5% of the portfolio
subject to principal haircuts, and any other non-euro-denominated
assets will be hedged with FX forward agreements from settlement
date up to 90 days. The manager can only invest in unhedged or
forward-hedged assets if after the applicable haircuts, the
aggregate balance of the assets is above the reinvestment target
par balance. Investment in non-euro-denominated assets hedged
with perfect asset swaps as of the settlement date is allowed up
to 30% of the portfolio.

Documentation Amendments
The transaction documents may be amended, subject to rating
agency confirmation or noteholder approval. Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyse the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings. Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final
maturity.

If, in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective, Fitch may decline to comment. Noteholders
should be aware that the structure considers a confirmation to be
given if Fitch declines to comment.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY
The issuer has amended the capital structure and extended the
maturity of the notes as well as the reinvestment period. The
transaction features a four-year reinvestment period, which is
scheduled to end in 2021. The maturity has been extended by two
years to 2030.

The issuer has introduced the new class X notes, ranking senior
to the class A notes. Principal on these notes is scheduled to
amortise in equal instalments during the first two payment dates.
Class X notional is excluded from the OC tests calculation, but a
breach of this test will divert interest and principal proceeds
to the repayment of the class X notes. Non-payment of scheduled
principal on the class X notes on the specific dates will not
represent an event of default according to the transaction
documents and unpaid principal will be due at the next payment
date.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
A 25% increase in the obligor default probability could lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes. A 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates could lead to a downgrade of
up to three notches for the rated notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY
The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch and/or other
rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The information below was used in the analysis.
- Loan-by-loan data provided by US Bank Global Corporate Trust
Services as at 6 December 2016.
- Transaction reporting provided by US Bank Global Corporate
Trust Services as at 6 December 2016.
- Supplemental offering circular provided by Morgan Stanley and
Co. International plc as at 1 February 2017.

REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
A description of the transaction's representations, warranties
and enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the
offering document and which relate to the underlying asset pool
was not prepared for this transaction. Offering documents for
EMEA leveraged finance CLO transactions do not typically include
RW&Es that are available to investors and that relate to the
asset pool underlying the security. Therefore, Fitch credit
reports for EMEA leveraged finance CLO transactions will not
typically include descriptions of RW&Es. For further information,
please see Fitch's Special Report titled "Representations,
Warranties and Enforcement Mechanisms in Global Structured
Finance Transactions," dated May 31, 2016.


NEWHAVEN CLO DAC: Fitch Corrects February 15 Rating Release
-----------------------------------------------------------
This commentary replaces the version published on February 15,
2017 to correct the rating action of the class C to F notes.

Fitch Ratings has assigned Newhaven CLO DAC's refinancing notes
final ratings:

EUR1.5m class X notes: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR205.9m class A-1R notes: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR10m class A-2R notes: assigned 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR35m class B-R notes: assigned 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR23.5m class C-R: assigned 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR18.6m class D-R: assigned 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR20.4m class E-R: assigned 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR10m class F-R: assigned 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

Newhaven CLO DAC is a cash flow collateralised loan obligation
securitising a portfolio of mainly European leveraged loans and
bonds. Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes are being used
to refinance the current outstanding notes. The portfolio is
managed by Bain Capital Credit Ltd.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
'B' Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch assesses the average credit quality of obligors to be in
the 'B' category. Fitch has public ratings or credit opinions on
106 of 107 obligors in the identified portfolio. The covenanted
maximum The Fitch weighted average rating factor of the
identified portfolio is 32.97.

High Recovery Expectation
At least 90% of the portfolio comprises senior secured
obligations. Recovery prospects for these assets are typically
more favourable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets. The weighted average recovery rate of the identified
portfolio is 67.77%.

Maturity Extension Risk
The deal deviates from other European CLOs as the collateral
manager has the discretion to vote in favour of maturity
extensions up to a cumulative limit of 25% of the initial target
par balance, with the caveat that the extended maturity is no
later than 18 months before the maturity of the notes.

Fitch believes that limiting the extended maturity to 18 months
before the maturity of the notes would prevent the introduction
of long-dated assets in the portfolio, therefore exposing the
transaction to market value risk. Fitch also got comfort from the
fact that the asset manager will only be allowed to vote in
favour of an amendment to avoid distressed situations in the
manager's judgement, caused by limited access to refinancing by
the obligors in the portfolio.

Exposure to Unhedged Non-Euro Assets
The transaction is allowed to invest up to 5% of the portfolio in
non-euro-denominated assets. Unhedged non-euro-denominated assets
are limited to a maximum exposure of 2.5% of the portfolio
subject to principal haircuts, and any other non-euro-denominated
assets will be hedged with FX forward agreements from settlement
date up to 90 days. The manager can only invest in unhedged or
forward-hedged assets if after the applicable haircuts, the
aggregate balance of the assets is above the reinvestment target
par balance. Investment in non-euro-denominated assets hedged
with perfect asset swaps as of the settlement date is allowed up
to 30% of the portfolio.

Limited Interest Rate Risk Exposure
Between 0% and 15% of the portfolio can be invested in fixed-rate
assets, while 97.2% of liabilities pay a floating-rate coupon. In
addition, the issuer may choose to invest in up to 5% or 10% of
the portfolio in fixed-rate assets by changing to the relevant
matrix. Fitch modelled a maximum of 0%, 5%, 10% and 15% fixed-
rate buckets and found that the rated notes can withstand the
interest rate mismatch associated with each scenario.

From February 2018, the issuer will purchase an interest rate cap
to hedge the transaction against rising interest rates. The
notional of the cap is EUR20m (representing 5.7% of the target
par amount) and the strike rate is 4%. The cap will expire in
November 2025.

Documentation Amendments
The transaction documents may be amended, subject to rating
agency confirmation or noteholder approval. Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyse the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings. Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final
maturity.

If, in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective, Fitch may decline to comment. Noteholders
should be aware that the structure considers a confirmation to be
given if Fitch declines to comment.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY
The issuer has amended the capital structure and extended the
maturity of the notes and the reinvestment period. The
transaction features a four-year reinvestment period, which is
scheduled to end in 2021. The maturity has been extended by two
years to 2030.

The issuer has introduced the new class X notes, ranking senior
to the class A notes. Principal on these notes is scheduled to
amortise in equal instalments during the first two payment dates.
Class X notional is excluded from the OC tests calculation, but a
breach of this test will divert interest and principal proceeds
to the repayment of the class X notes. Non-payment of scheduled
principal on the class X notes on the specific dates will not
represent an event of default according to the transaction
documents and unpaid principal will be due at the next payment
date.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
A 25% increase in the obligor default probability could lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes. A 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates could lead to a downgrade of
up to three notches for the rated notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY
The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch and/or other
rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The information below was used in the analysis.
- Loan-by-loan data provided by US Bank Global Corporate Trust
Services as at 6 December 2016.
- Transaction reporting provided by US Bank Global Corporate
Trust Services as at 6 December 2016.
- Supplemental offering circular provided by Morgan Stanley and
Co. International plc as at 14 February 2017.

REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
A description of the transaction's representations, warranties
and enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the
offering document and which relate to the underlying asset pool
was not prepared for this transaction. Offering documents for
EMEA leveraged finance CLO transactions do not typically include
RW&Es that are available to investors and that relate to the
asset pool underlying the security. Therefore, Fitch credit
reports for EMEA leveraged finance CLO transactions will not
typically include descriptions of RW&Es. For further information,
please see Fitch's Special Report titled "Representations,
Warranties and Enforcement Mechanisms in Global Structured
Finance Transactions," dated 31 May 2016.


RELATIONSHIPS IRELAND: In Liquidation Due to Decline in Demand
--------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Cullen at Irish Times reports Relationships Ireland, one of
the State's oldest marriage counselling agencies, has gone into
liquidation following a decline in demand for its services.
Founded in 1962, the agency informed staff that it is winding up
operations due to financial difficulties caused by funding
challenges and increased operating costs.

"While those challenges have been visible for some time now, and
the board has been working hard to find a basis to overcome them,
matters were brought to a head in recent weeks when it became
clear that a further increase in operating costs was unavoidable
on foot of an upward-only rent review on the RI premises," chief
executive Elfreida Carroll told staff, according to Irish Times.

She said the prudent option was to wind up the company,
officially known as Marriage and Relationships Counselling
Services, and to call a meeting of creditors in two weeks' time,
says the report.

Eighteen staff are being made redundant as a result of the
decision and a further eight contract counsellors have had their
contracts terminated., the report relays.  The agency says those
losing their jobs will receive the statutory redundancy
entitlement, the report notes.  Board members acted on a
voluntary basis.

                      Alternative Arrangements

The report notes that clients, who included adults undergoing
marital difficulties and, sometimes, their teenage children, are
being advised of the decision and of the need to make alternative
arrangements.  Tusla and the Charities Regulator have also been
informed.

About 400 clients a year availed of counselling but this number
was declining and the agency was facing the imminent withdrawal
of Tusla funding for counselling teenagers, the report relays.
It negotiated a low rent on its Fitzwilliam Street, Dublin
premises in 2010 but this was due to rise soon after a review.

The report says the agency was originally established as a
service for non-Catholics in the same year as the Catholic
Marriage Advisory Council was set up.  That agency, now known as
Accord, recently said demand for its service is increasing.

"Clearly this is a difficult day for all concerned," Ms. Carroll
said.  "The board is determined to affect the wind-up in as
efficient and orderly a fashion as possible and with the least
possible disruption or negative impact to all parties."


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I T A L Y
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VENETO BANCA: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'B/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on Italy-based Veneto
Banca SpA. The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P lowered its ratings on the bank's
nondeferrable subordinated debt to 'C' from 'CCC' and preferred
stock to 'C' from 'CC'.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that it has become
increasingly likely that Veneto Banca will make use of the
EUR20 billion fund recently created by the Italian government to
increase its capital in light of its deteriorating asset quality.
The fund aims to provide capital and liquidity support to
troubled domestic financial institutions and protect retail
savers. Conversely, S&P sees an increasing likelihood of the
mandatory conversion of Veneto Banca's subordinated liabilities
into ordinary shares as part of the support package.

S&P expects Veneto Banca will have to strengthen its
capitalization due to asset quality deterioration and a
regulatory request to reduce the very high stock of nonperforming
assets (NPAs) it accumulated during the economic crisis.  As of
June-end 2016, Veneto Banca's NPAs amounted to EUR7.9 billion,
resulting in a ratio of 32.7%.  Of these NPAs, EUR3.9 billion
were bad loans (sofferenze).  To enable the sale of a large
amount of NPAs, Veneto Banca will have to frontload large credit
losses, as the total coverage was limited to a low 38.4% and the
coverage for bad loans was only 52.9%.

Veneto Banca could also book meaningful litigation costs related
to potential claims from shareholders and regulatory issues.  S&P
understands that the bank recently proposed an out-of-court
settlement with some of its shareholders (about 75,000 retail
shareholders), offering a lump sum compensation of 15% of
theoretical losses on shares acquired between January 2007 and
December 2016.  The offer will close on March 15, 2017, and if
accepted, might mitigate the impact of litigation costs on Veneto
Banca's financials.

As S&P expects that any contribution from the Atlante fund, the
bank's major shareholder, would unlikely be sufficient to cover
Veneto Banca's entire capital shortfall, S&P considers it
increasingly likely that Veneto Banca will apply for
precautionary recapitalization from the Italian government.

Similarly, S&P projects that Veneto Banca's risk-adjusted capital
(RAC) ratio will likely fall below 3% due to credit losses and
litigation costs.  At the same time, S&P anticipates that the
bank's RAC ratio will likely return to above 5% over the next 12-
18 months, after the government commits its support.  This is
reflected in S&P's lowering of Veneto Banca's stand-alone credit
profile (SACP) by two notches to 'ccc+'. S&P offset this in the
issuer credit rating by incorporating two notches of temporary
uplift for additional short-term support.  S&P expects to factor
capital support into the SACP once the government commits to it.
The 'ccc+' SACP, absent government support, reflects S&P's view
of Veneto Banca's fragile business and financial profiles.

S&P understands that Veneto Banca is in talks with Banca Popolare
di Vicenza (not rated) for a possible merger.  S&P currently do
not anticipate an immediate impact on the ratings on Veneto Banca
if the merger were to be confirmed, as the ratings hinge on S&P's
expectation that the Italian government will provide sufficient
financial support to Veneto Banca, both as a stand-alone entity
or as a combined entity.

Veneto Banca has already benefited from the government guarantee
available under the fund's liquidity support scheme.  In early
February, the bank issued EUR3.5 billion of government-guaranteed
bonds to be used as either collateral for repo transactions or to
be placed on the market.  In S&P's view, such support alleviates
pressure on Veneto Banca's liquidity profile, which weakened
after the "no" result in the Italian referendum.

S&P lowered its ratings on the bank's nondeferrable subordinated
debt to 'C' from 'CCC' and preferred stock to 'C' from 'CC'.  The
downgrade reflects the increasing likelihood, in S&P's view, that
these instruments would need to be converted into ordinary shares
if Veneto Banca received a precautionary recapitalization from
the Italian government.

The 'C' ratings reflect S&P's view that:

   -- Absent unanticipated, significantly favorable changes in
      Veneto Banca's circumstances over the next six months,
      mandatory burden sharing will be applied on tier 1 and tier
      2 instruments issued by the bank as part of a support
      package.  S&P considers this default risk to be consistent
      with a 'CCC-' scenario.

   -- The notes are subordinated, for which S&P deducts two
      notches.

The outlook on Veneto Banca is negative, reflecting the
possibility that S&P could lower the ratings in the next 6-12
months if the bank fails to strengthen its capital as S&P
currently expects.  This could happen if the bank is not
considered viable by regulators and is therefore resolved
according to the implementation of the European Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive.  S&P could also consider a downgrade if, in
its view, government support was insufficient to enhance Veneto
Banca's combined capital and risk profiles, in line with S&P's
projections.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable over its outlook horizon
if Veneto Banca received sufficient capital support and, at the
same time, successfully reinforced its financial profile.  This
could occur if Veneto Banca achieved a more sustainable funding
and liquidity profile and stabilized its client franchise while
demonstrating a gradual improvement in profitability.


===========
N O R W A Y
===========


NANNA MIDCO: Moody's Assigns B2 Corporate Family Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B2 corporate family
rating (CFR) and B2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to
Nanna Midco II AS. Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a B2
instrument rating to the USD260 million senior secured term loan
due 2024 (the term loan) and a Ba2 instrument rating to the USD25
million super senior revolving credit facility (RCF) maturing in
2023, both issued by Navico Inc., a subsidiary of Nanna Midco II
AS. The outlook on the ratings is stable.

Navico will use the proceeds from the term loan (1) to repay
USD240.5 million outstanding under its existing bank facilities,
(2) to provide an USD8.5 million cash overfund, and (3) to pay
transaction fees.

RATINGS RATIONALE

"Navico's B2 CFR reflects (1) the company's modest scale of
operations with a product offering concentrated in the niche
segment of recreational marine electronics, (2) its high adjusted
leverage (as adjusted by Moody's) in the context of the
cyclicality of its end-markets, and (3) the seasonality of the
business related to the boating season", says Sebastien
Cieniewski, Moody's lead analyst for Navico. However, the rating
is supported by (1) the company's good track record of delivering
market share growth over the last 5 years in a competitive
environment, (2) the relatively large exposure to the replacement
market partly mitigating the higher cyclicality of new boat
build, and (3) its good free cash flow (FCF) generation, part of
which could be used to repay debt.

Navico's rating is constrained by the company's concentration of
operations in the niche and cyclical market of recreational
marine electronics, which accounted for 86% of group sales in
2016.

In that context, Moody's considers that Navico displays a high
pro forma debt-to-EBITDA ratio (as adjusted by Moody's for
operating leases, capitalization of development costs, and non-
recurring transaction fees) at 5.4x as of 31 December 2016.
However, the rating agency expects the company should be able to
reduce leverage towards 4.5x over the next 12 months -- a level
more commensurate with a B2 rating -- driven by revenue growth
partly mitigated by costs related to legal disputes projected to
remain at an elevated level in 2017.

Navico benefits from a good track record of revenue growth at a
9% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) between 2010 and 2016 --
above its key competitors leading to the company increasing its
market share to 26% from 20% during this period. While Navico is
not immune to cyclicality, Moody's positively notes that the
company generates close to 75% of its sales through the
replacement channel, which is expected to be less volatile than
the new-build channel -- a significantly higher level compared to
that pre-crisis.

Navico's liquidity is considered to be adequate. It is supported
by the USD25 million RCF, which is assumed to be undrawn, the
USD8.5 million cash overfund at the closing of the transaction,
and FCF generation. The company should generate good FCF at
between mid- to high-single digit rates as a percentage of total
adjusted debt -- part of which could be used to prepay debt and
accelerate deleveraging. Liquidity is particularly important due
to the seasonality of the company's revenues and working capital.
The seasonality exposes the company to operating risks that could
arise during a period during which the company generates a
significant portion of its sales -- a credit negative.

Navico's PDR at B2-PD, at the same level as the CFR, reflects
Moody's assumptions of a 50% family recovery rate, which is
typical for capital structures including bank facilities with
springing financial maintenance covenants. The RCF will be
subject to a springing financial covenant set with a cushion of
35% at the closing of the transaction tested quarterly only when
drawn more than 35% in cash. The senior secured term loan is
rated B2, at the same level as the CFR, reflecting the relatively
small size of the super senior RCF ranking ahead in the event of
enforcement.

The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that Navico will continue to experience low- to mid-single digit
revenue growth and generate good FCF over the rating horizon
leading to a de-leveraging from the relatively high level at the
closing of the transaction.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - UP/DOWN

Whilst not expected in the near term, upward rating pressure
could develop over time if adjusted leverage decreases to below
4.0x, FCF-to-Debt increases towards 10% on a sustainable basis,
and the company maintains a good liquidity profile. On the other
hand, negative pressure could arise if the company fails to
deleverage from the opening pro-forma leverage of 5.4x over the
next 12 months, while FCF-to-Debt is maintained at below 5%, or
the liquidity position weakens.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Consumer
Durables Industry published in September 2014.

Headquartered in Norway, Navico, which generated revenues of
USD318 million in 2016, is a developer and manufacturer of
specialist marine electronics, including navigation and fish
finding equipment, and value-added applications. The company
splits its operations in three business segments: (1)
recreational marine (86% of 2016 group revenues), (2) commercial
marine (11%), and (3) digital marine (3%). Navico is owned by
private equity sponsors Goldman Sachs' Merchant Banking Division
and Altor Fund IV.


NANNA BIDCO: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B' CCR on Proposed Refinancing
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating to Norwegian-based provider of marine
electronics Nanna Bidco AS (Navico) and its subsidiary Navico
Inc. The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its preliminary 'B' issue rating
to the proposed senior secured loan due 2024 to be issued by
Navico Inc., with a preliminary recovery rating of '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery (around 55%)
in the event of a default.  S&P views Navico Inc. as core to the
group as it is a wholly-owned financing entity that is expected
to bear the entire group's senior debt post refinancing.

S&P's rating on Navico follows its plan to raise $260 million
term loan due 2024 to refinance its outstanding debt.  The rating
primarily reflects Navico's high debt, small scale, and potential
revenue volatility, but also incorporates its leading market
position in the recreational marine electronics market, solid
EBITDA margins of about 16% (as adjusted by S&P Global Ratings),
as well as S&P's anticipation of a solid liquidity profile and
gradually strengthening credit ratios.

S&P's assessment of Navico's business risk profile is constrained
by its small scale, limited diversification outside its niche
market, certain substitution risks given relatively low barriers
to entry, some volatility in demand that could impact its
revenues, and a highly competitive market.  With revenues of
$318 million in 2016, Navico is a small player in the $3.5
billion global marine electronics market; it is mainly focused on
the recreational marine electronics market worth $1 billion, and
holds a less than 2% market share in the larger and more
fragmented commercial marine electronics market.  Navico provides
radars, fish-finders, navigations systems, autopilots, sonars,
and autopilot systems and has a strategy to continuously innovate
and launch new products -- it launches a new product every three
weeks on average.  However, in S&P's view, both the recreational
and commercial markets have relatively low barriers to entry and
S&P thinks Navico is exposed to the potential emergence of new
products or technologies that could replace its products.

Another weakness is the potential revenue volatility due to a
lack of contracted revenues (given that it primarily sells
hardware equipment) and some sensitivity to economic downturns,
as S&P views demand for its products as being somewhat
discretionary. That said, S&P acknowledges that Navico's revenues
are less volatile than previously and only moderately dependent
on the sale of new boats.  More than 70% of revenues come from
replacement and only 30% from new boats.  There is also an
increasing penetration of electronics in boats and gradually
shorter replacement cycles. Furthermore, Navico competes with
many players including Garmin, Raymarine, Furuno, and JRC (the
latter operating in the commercial segment only), which have
greater financial resources as they report a much higher
consolidated turnover.

These weaknesses are partly offset by Navico's global market
leadership, solid and growing margins, growth prospects, and
diversified customer base.  Navico holds a 26% market share of
the recreational marine electronics market and has succeeded in
gradually gaining market shares (from 20% in 2011) but is closely
followed by Garmin (24%); Navico is particularly strong in the
fishing segment with a 45% market share.

Navico's profitability has improved since 2010 after it
rationalized production and shifted to a more flexible cost
structure.  Its profitability is now better than its main
competitors and its S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA margin is
above average relative to consumer electronics companies in
general.  Navico's revenues have grown by 10% annually on average
since 2010, compared with the overall market growth at about 4%
for the same period and S&P thinks revenues could grow further in
the recreational marine electronics market.  In addition, S&P
believes that additional growth for Navico could stem from
gaining shares in the fragmented commercial marine market, as
Navico could leverage on its recreational product platform, and
expanding its digital segment.  Finally, Navico has a global
presence thanks to a wide distribution network with regional
logistics centers and a diversified customer base with more than
2,500 customers and no customer representing more than 5%-6% of
revenues.

S&P's assessment of Navico's financial risk profile is
constrained by the company's high level of debt.  Furthermore,
S&P thinks its credit ratios and free operating cash flow (FOCF)
could potentially be volatile during an economic or industry
downturn. This is somewhat mitigated by Navico's solid interest
coverage and S&P's anticipation of gradually increasing FOCF
generation.  In calculating the company's adjusted credit
metrics, S&P deducts capitalized development costs from EBITDA
and reduce capital expenditure (capex) accordingly.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Recreational marine market growth at about 3%-4% per year
      in 2017-2018.
   -- Navico's recreational segment revenues to grow slightly
      above market given continuous product launches as one third
      of products are renewed each year.  Commercial segment
      revenues to grow stronger as S&P understands Navico is
      making efforts to expand in this segment.
   -- Gradual profitability improvements, with an adjusted EBITDA
      margin of about 17% in 2017, from 14.3% in 2015 and about
      16% in 2016, supported by efficiency initiatives and scale
      effects.
   -- Capex of 7% of revenues in 2017, of which about two-thirds
      is capitalized development costs.
   -- No acquisitions or shareholder returns.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA ratio of about 4.9x at year-end
      2017, improving to about 4.5x in 2018.
   -- Adjusted FFO to debt of about 11% in 2017 and 13% in 2018.
   -- FOCF to debt of about 8% in 2017 and 9% in 2018.
   -- EBITDA interest coverage of 3.5x in 2017 and 3.8x in 2018.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's anticipation of growing
revenues and EBITDA, resulting in an adjusted debt to EBITDA
below 5x, positive FOCF generation, and EBITDA interest coverage
well above 3x.

S&P could lower the rating if FOCF turned negative coupled with
debt to EBITDA deteriorating sustainably above 5x.  This could
happen if operations developed weaker than expected, for instance
in case of market share loss or industry downturn, or if the
group raised debt to fund acquisitions or returns to
shareholders.

S&P could raise the rating if revenues and EBITDA increased
faster than it expects, for instance as a result of a successful
move to the commercial or digital segments, which could result in
adjusted debt to EBITDA approaching 4x and adjusted FOCF to debt
of about 10%.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


HYDROMASHSERVICE JSC: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating to RUB3BB Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned JSC Hydromashservice, a wholly owned
subsidiary of JSC HMS Group (B+/Stable), a final senior unsecured
rating of 'B+'/RR4 for its RUB3bn 10.75% domestic bonds due 2027
with put option in 2020. The rating reflects Hydromashservice's
position as a principal subsidiary of JSC HMS and the cross
guarantees for debt in the group.

The recovery rating is limited to RR4 as the company's principal
operations are in Russia.

The ratings also reflect HMS's weak business profile, with high
geographic concentration and high exposure to investment levels
in the Russian oil and gas (O&G) sectors. The ratings are further
limited by Fitch's expectation of negative free cash flow (FCF)
for the foreseeable future, due to higher capex and continued
dividend outflow.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
High Concentration in Russia: HMS is a market leader in Russia
(BBB-/Stable) in two of its three main business segments -- pumps
(42% market share), and O&G equipment (30%). The company supplies
equipment to all major Russian O&G companies including Rosneft,
Gazprom (BBB-/Stable), Gazprom Neft (BBB-/Stable), Transneft and
Lukoil (BBB-/Stable). HMS also has over 5,000 small and medium-
sized clients that together generate about 75% of its revenues
from standard pumps and compressors, which is the company's
sustainable recurring business. The remaining 25% is generated by
large tailor-made integrated products.

Oil Production Resilience Expected: Fitch's base case assumes
that Russia's high production will be maintained despite price
fluctuations and that Russia will remain a key global exporter of
crude and oil products. Continued high production volumes
underpin Fitch's expectations for continued pump and compressor
sales to replace existing, fully depreciated units. Russia's oil
production is at a record high despite western sectoral and
financial sanctions. It averaged 11.2 million barrels of oil
equivalent per day in October 2016, a post-Soviet record, mainly
supported by ramping up greenfield output.

Share of Aftermarket Services Low: HMS's aftermarket maintenance
services, which typically provide a stable income source in a
cyclical downturn, contribute a low proportion of revenues. This
is because customers usually have their own maintenance service
divisions and aftermarket revenues mainly come from selling spare
parts.

Compressor Business More Volatile: Fitch does not expect the
higher volatility of compressor sales to have a major effect on
the ratings, due to the modest contribution of this segment to
the company's revenues. The company expects the share of large
products in the compressor segment to drive growth. Fitch expects
the volatility of this business to remain high due to a large
exposure to large contracts.

No FX Exposure: HMS is not exposed to exchange rate risk, as
virtually all its debt, revenues and costs are denominated in
Russian rouble. However, the company's operations are
geographically concentrated, with the majority of its products
sold in Russia.

DERIVATION SUMMARY
HMS's 'B+' IDR reflects the company's concentrated geographic and
industry exposure and Fitch expectations that the company will
remain FCF-negative for the foreseeable future. This is offset,
in Fitch's view, by its leading market position in a niche sector
with high barriers to entry, a strong customer base largely
consisting of major Russian O&G companies, a recurring business
and healthy profitability and leverage metrics. Fitch views the
company's liquidity position as adequate.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:
- Moderate revenue growth not exceeding 5% for all segments over
2017-2020
- EBITDA margin below historical levels, capped at 14%
- Capex in line with the company's guidance (about 5% of
revenues)
- Dividend pay-out ratio at 60% of prior-year net income

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to positive rating action:
- Sustained positive free cash flow generation
- FFO adjusted net leverage sustained below 2.5 x (2016E: 3.1x);
- FFO fixed-charge coverage sustained above 3.5x (2016E: 2.4x).

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating action:
- Continuous failure to secure large integrated projects from
major Russian O&G companies
- FFO-adjusted net leverage sustained above 3.5x
- FFO fixed-charge coverage sustained below 2.0x

LIQUIDITY
Adequate Liquidity: As of 1 October 2016, HMS had reported cash
and short-term deposits of RUB3 billion on its balance sheet
against short-term debt of RUB3.2 billion. Almost all the cash is
held in Russian rouble, with only 4% in Ukrainian hryvnia and
Belarusian roubles for use by local subsidiaries. Over 99% of the
debt is held in Russian rouble. HMS also had RUB10 billion in
available undrawn credit lines from major Russian banks.

As of 1 October 2016, RUB10.3 billion maturities peaked within
2017-2018. The recent RUB3 billion bond issuance and the ongoing
negotiation of loan extension will help spread HMS's maturities
more evenly. Fitch conservatively forecast that FCF will be
negative over the next three years due to high capex and
dividends. However, Fitch do not expect the company will have
difficulties refinancing over the medium term.


KAZANORGSINTEZ PJSC: Fitch Affirms IDR at B, Outlook Positive
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed PJSC Kazanorgsintez's IDR at 'B' and
revised the Outlook to Positive from Stable. Fitch has also
affirmed KOS's Short-Term IDR at 'B'.

The Outlook reflects Fitch expectations that KOS will maintain
funds from operations net adjusted leverage (leverage) at a
conservative level of below 2x (2015: -0.1x) as seen since 2014.
The weaker rouble and broadly stable EU polyethylene pricing have
boosted KOS's EBITDA margins to 38%-40% in 2015-2016E from 20%-
22% prior to 2014. Coupled with the absence of significant capex
or dividend outflows, this has allowed KOS to cut debt and
improve liquidity.

The Outlook could be revised back to Stable if KOS's post-2017
investment strategy results in a more leveraged credit profile
with expansion capex materially exceeding Fitch current estimate
of RUB50bn.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Leverage to Remain Low: KOS's deleveraging has been faster than
Fitch previous expectations, as the weak rouble and resilient
global polymer pricing have helped KOS to generate stronger
operational cash flow since 4Q14 from its dollar-denominated
exports (approximately 20% of total sales) as well as from
healthy domestic sales. The company became net cash positive with
leverage at negative 0.1x in 2015 (funds from operations adjusted
gross leverage was at 0.6x). Fitch considers the credit metrics
as strong for the current IDR and Fitch expects the company to
remain net cash positive in 2017 and beyond until well into the
next investment cycle.

Investment Strategy Uncertain: The company's intention to shift
to large-scale expansionary investments from smaller-scale
optimisation capex after 2016 and the current lack of visibility
on the scope and schedule of such investments complicates Fitch
assessment of future FCF and re-leveraging trends. Fitch
currently estimate expansionary capex at around RUB50bn spread
across 2017-2019. This together with the expectation of difficult
market dynamics (which translates into a mid-single-digit
decrease in global polyethylene prices) would lead to negative
FCF of around RUB15bn per annum in 2018 and 2019 and leverage
increasing towards 2x in 2019.

KOS's capex has been low for the past four years allowing the
company to delever and arrive at robust credit metrics. Fitch
currently see a moderate risk from further expansion for KOS's
ratings even in the case of a large project driving leverage up,
as Fitch expects higher leverage to be temporary and to be
mitigated by the enhanced business profile through the resulting
improved scale and product mix. However, there are still risks
from a significant FX mismatch in project financing and/or a long
project implementation period with remote benefits to the
issuer's business profile and cash-flow generation, and at the
same time significant pressure on leverage.

Medium-term Pricing Pressure: Russian polymer market pricing is
moderately linked with European and Asian markets. The export
markets have shown resilience despite cheaper naphtha (direct oil
derivative) input on the back of resilient retail and
transportation end-markets. Coupled with the weaker rouble, this
led to the robust growth of Russian polymer prices in 2015 and
9M16. However, Fitch expects to see intensified polyethylene
capacity additions including those coming from the US and a
gradually strengthening rouble creating double-digit pricing
pressure for polyethylene, leading to a fall in revenue towards
RUB60bn and margin dilution towards 20%-22% by 2019.

Key Supplier Risk Moderate: KOS renewed its ethane supply
contract with PJSC Gazprom (BBB-/Stable) in 4Q15 for another 10
years with comparable terms and conditions. The contract links
the ethane purchasing price with the polyethylene selling price,
resulting in a stabilising effect on KOS's margins, which is
positive as Fitch expects a period of falling polyethylene
prices. The contract secures ethane supply from KOS's key ethane
supplier which lacks immediately available and sufficient
alternatives.

Rating Constraints: The ratings are constrained by KOS's exposure
to commodity chemicals, its small size relative to the global
diversified chemical groups competing in its core polymer
markets, single-site operations and limited product and
geographical diversification. Finally, the ratings are discounted
to reflect higher-than-average legal, business and regulatory
risks in Russia (BBB-/Stable /F3) and a lack of information on
KOS's ultimate beneficiaries.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Kazanorgsintez's rating of 'B' is adequately positioned relative
to its closest EMEA chemical peer Nitrogenmuvek (B+/Stable) on
each major comparative, including moderate scale and product
diversification despite a significant domestic market share, and
single-site operations. These factors differentiate KOS from
higher-rated EMEA players like PAO SIBUR Holding (BB+/Negative).
Although KOS has higher than average risks from the operating
environment with weak systemic governance and a concentrated
ownership structure, Fitch do not apply a corporate governance
discount due to the rating scale contraction in the 'B' rating
category.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:
- Russian polymer prices to undergo a double-digit decline in
2017 and another single-digit drop in 2018;
- Kazanorgsintez's volumes conservatively assumed flat at the
2016E level;
- USD/RUB of 61 in 2017 gradually appreciating towards 58 in
2019;
- capex and dividends to increase to within RUB25bn to RUB30bn
range per annum from 2017 to 2019.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action
- Substantial improvement in business profile, scale of
operations and/or product mix
- Better visibility on the future investment schedule
Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
- (Outlook stabilisation) aggressive capex with remote business
profile improvement leading to FFO adjusted net leverage above 3x
- Liquidity shortfall leading to FFO fixed charge coverage
falling below 3x or liquidity approaching 1x;
- Increasing reliance on FX debt leading to material FX mismatch
between debt and earnings.

LIQUIDITY

Strong Liquidity: Liquidity was strong at end-1H16 as a result of
positive 2015-2016 FCF, with cash and cash deposits covering
RUB8bn outstanding debt. Fitch expects that KOS's cash cushion
will comfortably cover both the negative RUB5bn FCF expected in
2017 as well the remaining debt due in 2017-2018.


TINKOFF BANK: Moody's Hikes Long-Term Deposit Ratings to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Tinkoff Bank's long-term
local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings and local-currency
senior unsecured debt ratings to B1 from B2. The outlook on the
long-term deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings changed to
stable from positive.

Concurrently, the rating agency upgraded the bank's baseline
credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA to b1 from b2, the
subordinated foreign-currency debt rating to B2 from B3, and the
long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessment) to Ba3(cr)
from B1(cr). Moody's affirmed the local- and foreign-currency
short-term deposit ratings at Not-Prime, and the short-term CR
Assessment at Not-Prime(cr).

The rating action primarily reflects Tinkoff Bank's resilient
credit metrics through the credit cycle owing to its more
sustainable business model when compared to most consumer lenders
in Russia. The rating agency expects the bank will report strong
financial results in the next 12-18 months along with robust
capital and liquidity cushions.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of the bank's BCA and long-term ratings is driven by:
(1) proven robust financial performance through the credit cycle
in 2014 -16; (2) material improvements in the bank's
profitability in recent quarters, as a result of reduced funding
and credit costs; and (3) Moody's expectation of strong bottom
line results in 2017. The rating agency expects that the bank
will maintain healthy capital adequacy and liquidity in the next
12 to 18 months.

Unlike other consumer lenders, Tinkoff Bank navigated the recent
difficult years of households' overleverage and interest rate
shock relatively smoothly; it remained profitable in 2014-16 and
has reported improving quarterly net financial results since Q2
2015. The bank reported RUB7.3 billion net income for the nine
months ended 30 September 2016, which translates into annualized
return-on average assets (ROAA) and return-on-average equity
(ROAE) of 6.5% and 38.9%, respectively. Strong profitability was
bolstered by: (1) the decline in credit costs to 8.7% in Q3 2016
from 15.3% in Q3 2015 owing to tight risk controls and continued
consumer deleveraging; and (2) the recovery of net interest
income amid the declining cost of funds. Barring material
external shocks, the rating agency expects the bank to post
strong financial results in the next 12-18 months.

In addition, the bank's asset quality and capital adequacy levels
will likely remain solid in the short term. As of Q3 2016, the
bank reported a non-performing loan ratio of 10.4%, with its
problem loans sufficiently covered by loan loss reserves (over
140%) and healthy capital buffers with a Tier 1 ratio of 15.2%
and a total capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 17.4% under Basel
III. Moody's views these levels as robust, providing it with a
sufficient cushion to absorb potential credit losses. The rating
agency expects the bank's capital adequacy metrics will stabilise
at the current level amid expected growth of risk-weighted assets
and strong bottom line results in 2017.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Given the bank's relatively rapid growth rate and high level of
credit risk, an upgrade is unlikely in the absence of a
transition to a more fully fledged diversified banking model.

The ratings could be downgraded if: (1) material pressure on loan
book quality and profitability resumed; (2) its loss absorption
capacity in terms of its Tier 1 capital or non-performing loan
coverage significantly deteriorated; or (3) the bank experienced
funding or liquidity difficulties.

The rating agency does not expect any upward or downward
movements of the bank's ratings in the next 12-18 months.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCO DE CASTILLA: Fitch Takes Rating Actions on Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed eight tranches, upgraded one and
downgraded three tranches of three AyT RMBS deals.

These transactions comprise Spanish residential mortgage loans
serviced by Banco de Castilla La Mancha S.A. (BB/Stable/B) for
AyT CGH CCM 1 (CCM 1); Abanca Corporacion Bancaria, S.A.
(BB+/Stable/B) for AyT CGH Caixa Galicia II (Galicia II) and
Liberbank, S.A. (BB/Stable/B) for AyT CGH Caja Cantabria I
(Cantabria I).

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Credit Enhancement (CE) to Increase Further
Fitch expects structural CE to continue increasing for the senior
class A notes from currently 22.1%, 25.1% and 28.7% for Cantabria
I, CCM 1 and Galicia II respectively, as the transactions are
expected to maintain sequential paydown over the coming years.
Existing and projected CE levels are sufficient to support the
ratings of Galicia II and Cantabria I, as reflected in the
multiple affirmations, and also to support the upgrade of
Cantabria I class C notes.

Open Interest Rate Risk
The downgrade of CCM 1 class A notes is mainly explained by the
un-hedged nature of the transaction, which pays fixed interest-
rates on the notes and collects floating interest-rate mortgages
(mostly Euribor 12-months plus a margin). Cash flow stresses are
especially intense under a stable or decreasing interest rate
environment. The weighted average margin on the assets is around
0.6%, while the interest rate payable on the notes ranges from
1.3% to 3.5%.

Exposure to Floor Clause
Around 50% of the borrowers in CCM 1 pool have an interest rate
floor clause on their mortgage loans, which could be nullified
following recent court rulings (see Spanish Mortgage Floor Decree
Will Aid RMBS Assessment). The Negative Outlook on CCM 1 class A
notes reflects the likelihood of a downgrade if all affected
loans have the interest rate floor clause removed, thus reducing
the transaction excess spread.

Payment Interruption Risk
CCM 1 and Cantabria 1 transactions have dedicated cash reserves
aimed at mitigating payment interruption risk in the event of
servicer disruption. Fitch believes CCM 1's reserve offers
sufficient protection under a scenario of stress, but Cantabria
1's dynamic reserve as insufficient as it does not account for
replacement servicer fees or net swap payments, and potential
top-ups associated with higher interest rate scenarios depend on
Liberbank's financial ability to implement them. Therefore,
Cantabria 1's class A notes' rating is capped at 'A-sf', five
notches above the rating of the collection account bank.

Fitch believes Galicia II may be exposed to a commingling loss
due to the concentration of cash collections from the borrowers
in one day of every month. The agency has captured this
additional stress in its analysis and found the current CE is
sufficient to mitigate the risk.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
If payment interruption risk is fully mitigated in Cantabria 1,
the class A notes could be upgraded to the 'AAsf' category, all
else being equal. So long this payment interruption risk is not
fully mitigated, class A notes rating is capped at five notches
above the rating of Liberbank as collection account bank.
Consequently, changes to Liberbank rating will result in
equivalent rating impact on the notes.

CCM 1 class A rating is sensitive to the final magnitude of
interest rate floor nullifications, if any. If all interest rate
floors are suspended, a one-notch downgrade on the class A notes
to 'BBBsf' would be possible, all else being equal.

The ratings are also sensitive to changes to Spain's Country
Ceiling of 'AA+' and, consequently, changes to the highest
achievable rating of Spanish structured finance notes of 'AA+sf'.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY
Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The information below was used in the analysis.
Loan level data sourced from the European Data Warehouse with the
following cut-off dates:
- September 2016 for Cantabria I
- October 2016 for Galicia II
- November 2016 for CCM 1

Issuer and servicer reports provided by Haya Titulizacion, SGFT,
SAU since close and until:
- September 2016 for Cantabria I
- October 2016 for Galicia II
- November 2016 for CCM 1

Maturity extensions data provided by Haya Titulizacion, SGFT, SAU
with a cut-off date of December 2016.


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


GLOBAL BLUE: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR on Planned Debt Repricing
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating on Switzerland-headquartered tourist
value-added tax (VAT) refund processor Global Blue Acquisition
B.V.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'BB-' issue rating to the
proposed senior credit facilities, comprising a EUR630 million
term loan D and a EUR80 million revolving credit facility (RCF).
The recovery rating is '4', indicating S&P's expectation of
average recovery prospects of 40% in the event of a payment
default.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB-' issue ratings on the existing senior
credit facilities, comprising a EUR102 million term loan B,
EUR470 million term loan C, and a EUR80 million RCF.  The
recovery rating is '4', indicating S&P's expectation of average
recovery prospects of 40% in the event of a payment default.  S&P
will withdraw the issue and recovery ratings on the existing
senior facilities once the transaction is completed.

The ratings on the proposed senior credit facilities are subject
to the successful completion of the transaction, and to S&P's
review of the final documentation.  If S&P Global Ratings does
not receive the final documentation within a reasonable
timeframe, or if the final documentation departs from the
materials S&P has already reviewed, it reserves the right to
withdraw or revise its ratings.

S&P's affirmation follows Global Blue's announcement that it
plans to replace its senior secured facilities as part of a
repricing transaction on its term loan.

As part of the transaction, the group has decided to partially
redeem EUR56 million of convertible preferred equity certificates
(CPECs) held by financial sponsors Silver Lake and Partners
Group. The proposed partial redemption of the CPECs was announced
one week after the group launched the repricing transaction on
its term loan.

Once the transaction is completed, S&P forecasts that its
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will remain below 4.5x for the
financial year ending March 31, 2017 (FY2017).  This is broadly
similar to the leverage level at the end of FY2016 after the
previous dividend recapitalization in November 2015.  Following
the repricing, S&P also anticipates that the group will benefit
from an interest saving of around EUR3.3 million per year.  S&P
expects this would improve adjusted EBITDA interest coverage
above 4.5x.

Global Blue is a market leader in tourist VAT refund processing
with a market share of over 75% of the third-party serviced
market.  The group has a strong franchise network with about
97,100 merchant contracts covering about 40 countries and
achieves a resilient merchant retention rate of about 98%.  In
S&P's view, its leading market position enables the group to
exhibit a very strong adjusted EBITDA margin above 30% over the
past years.

However, Global Blue's growth prospects are sensitive to changes
in tourists' spending demand.  The group is also exposed to
external shocks in both outbound and inbound countries, such as
exchange rates movement, terrorist attacks, economic downturn,
and changes in taxes and regulations.  These event risks could
drive significant changes in traveling trends and spending
behavior, which could weigh on Global Blue's operating
performance and leverage profile.

Furthermore, S&P sees a degree of concentration risk.  Outbound
travellers from China and Russia--who represent the two largest
groups of international shoppers--generate about 33% and 10% of
Global Blue's net commissions, respectively.  Nevertheless, over
half of the group's net commissions are originated from numerous
other countries, with each representing less than 3%.  Inbound
destinations are concentrated in Western Europe, with Germany,
Italy, the U.K., and France making up over 50% of net
commissions.

S&P's ratings also incorporate its view of Global Blue operating
in a niche VAT refund processing market and the inherent event
risk of the market in which it operates, reflected in S&P's one-
notch downward rating adjustment via S&P's comparable ratings
analysis.

S&P's adjusted debt and ratio calculations exclude the CPECs
issued by the ultimate parent company Global Blue Management & Co
S.C.A.  In S&P's view, the overall terms and conditions of the
CPECs are aligned with equity interest and are favorable to
third-party creditors.  The certificates can only be transferred
proportionally with common equity.  They are contractually and
structurally subordinated to the senior secured credit
facilities, no interest can be paid in cash on these securities
while the senior secured credit facilities are outstanding, there
are no provisions for cross-default or cross-acceleration, and
the instrument is due in 2062.  These characteristics qualify the
CPECs to be treated as equity, in S&P's view.

Nevertheless, any further redemption of the CPECs resulting in
adjusted debt to EBITDA (excluding the CPECs) increasing beyond
4.5x, could lead S&P to reassess the redemption risk associated
with these instruments in the group's capital structure and to
treat these as "debt-like".  This would materially increase S&P's
adjusted leverage calculation to above 7x and will likely result
in S&P's revising down its assessment of the group's financial
policy and therefore lowering its ratings.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Chinese tourists will continue to be the largest
      international shoppers accounting for about 33% of net
      commissions, followed by Russian travellers at about 10%.

   -- A stable VAT regulatory environment in major inbound
      markets.

   -- Revenue growth of 2%-3% for FY2017 and 3%-4% in FY2018,
      primarily supported by higher growth in number of
      transactions despite smaller ticket purchase.

   -- S&P expects Global Blue to maintain an adjusted EBITDA
      margin of about 38%-40% in FY2017 and FY2018 thanks to the
      group's significant cost saving on IT insourcing and
      reducing personnel overheads.

   -- Increased capital expenditure (capex) of about
      EUR15 million-EUR20 million in FY2017 and FY2018,
      increasing from about EUR7 million in FY2016.  The
      additional capex will be used for the integration of the
      Currency Select business (acquired in April 2016) and IT
      systems development.

   -- No further redemptions of CPECs.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- In light of the moderately increased debt levels, S&P
      forecasts that its S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt-to-
      EBITDA ratio will reach around 4.3x for FY2017.

   -- Nevertheless, S&P forecasts that its adjusted EBITDA
      interest coverage ratio will improve to above 4.5x in
      FY2018 due to the benefits of repricing.

The stable outlook on reflects S&P's view that, after the
transaction, Global Blue will continue to post a strong operating
performance and maintain an adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of
below 4.5x and adjusted EBITDA interest coverage of above 4.5x
over the next two years.

S&P could lower the ratings on Global Blue if its operating
performance deteriorates, resulting in adjusted debt to EBITDA
rising toward 5x or weak reported free operating cash flow
generation.  This could occur following an economic downturn,
political instability, threats of terrorism, or changes in taxes
and regulations for both outbound countries, such as China and
Russia, and inbound countries, particularly in Europe.

Any further redemption of the CPECs resulting in adjusted debt to
EBITDA (excluding the CPECs) increasing beyond 4.5x, could lead
S&P to reassess the redemption risk associated with these
instruments in the group's capital structure and to treat these
as debt-like.  This would materially increase S&P's adjusted debt
to EBITDA to above 7x and would likely result in S&P revising
down its assessment of the group's financial policy and therefore
lowering S&P's ratings.

In light of Global Blue's track record of redeeming the CPECs,
S&P considers an upgrade unlikely.  Nevertheless, S&P could
consider raising the rating if the group reduces its leverage on
the back of strong operating performance and cash flow
generation, such that adjusted debt to EBITDA would improve to 4x
on a sustainable basis, without the risk of further releveraging.
An upgrade would also be contingent on S&P's view of the
financial sponsor relinquishing control over the medium term,
while other shareholders hold at least a 20% stake in the group.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BHS: Liquidator Wades Into Business Rates Row With Refund Demand
---------------------------------------------------------------
Eagle radio reports the liquidators of BHS have waded into the
escalating row over business rates by launching a bid to recover
part of the multimillion pound bill incurred by the collapsed
high street chain.

Sky News has obtained a copy of an update to creditors produced
by FRP Advisory which discloses that it has hired an agent --
said to be Hilco Profit Recovery -- to "review the business rates
paid by the company and to ascertain whether there are refunds
available," according to Eagle radio.

The report notes the move comes weeks after BHS was transferred
from administration to liquidation amid expectations that
unsecured creditors will receive just 2p in the pound once its
estate is wound up.

Sources said that the annual business rates bill for BHS, which
traded from 164 stores until its collapse last April, ran to
several million pounds, although they acknowledged that only a
fraction of that sum was likely to be recovered, the report
relays.

"The joint liquidators will continue to co-operate with the
appointed agent and local authorities in order to receive any
refunds due," the FRP report said.

Eagle radio discloses high street retailers have become
increasingly bellicose over the newly calculated rate hikes that
many are now facing, forcing the Government to hint that
concessions could be forthcoming in the Budget of Philip Hammond,
the Chancellor, next month.

Eagle radio relays although far too late to salvage a future for
BHS, the business rates row is being cited by other high street
bosses as a factor in the potential demise of other struggling
retailers.

The report prepared by BHS' liquidators also discloses that FRP
is intensifying the pressure on two of the chain's former
international franchisees -- understood to be its partners in
Gibraltar and Russia, Eagle radio relays.

Eagle radio notes "The joint liquidators are prepared to seek
judgement in the UK (as prescribed by the franchise agreement)
and then enforce this judgement in the relevant overseas
territory," the FRP update said.

Its report outlines progress in a number of investigations
arising from BHS' collapse, including "into the disposal of
certain properties that appear to have advantaged certain parties
at the expense of the company" and "a funds transfer to a related
company within the wider BHS group in respect of a freehold
property purchase that was not recorded appropriately in the
company's internal management accounts," reports Eagle radio.

A spokesman for FRP declined to comment further on the details of
these investigations or other matters contained in the update to
creditors.

Eagle radio relays the latest report comes almost 10 months after
BHS was plunged into administration, little more than a year
after Sir Philip Green, the billionaire tycoon, sold the company
to Dominic Chappell, a former bankrupt.

Eagle radio says nearly 11,000 jobs were lost, with Sir Philip
and Mr. Chappell facing legal action from pension regulators over
a deficit in the retailer's retirement schemes said to have
soared on one basis to more than GBP600 million.

The report notes the TopShop owner was said last month to be on
the brink of agreeing a settlement with watchdogs that would cost
him approximately GBP350 million, and he has since told
associates that a deal is close.

A non-binding vote in the House of Commons last year suggested
that he should be stripped of his knighthood, the report relays.

The report discloses that FRP was drafted in to act as the joint
administrator, and now liquidator, of the high street chain, at
the behest of BHS' largest creditor, the Pension Protection Fund
(PPF), the lifeboat now responsible for retirement payments to
thousands of the chain's former employees.


BHS GROUP: Administrators' Bid to Take Control of Biz Adjourned
---------------------------------------------------------------
Press Association reports that the High Court has adjourned a bid
by BHS administrators to take control of the company Dominic
Chappell used to extract millions of pounds from the dying store
chain.

Duff & Phelps is calling for Retail Acquisitions to be wound up,
Press Association discloses.  Mr. Chappell used the company to
buy BHS for GBP1 from Topshop billionaire Sir Philip Green, Press
Association recounts.

According to Press Association, the administrators argued there
was "overwhelming evidence" that the company was insolvent and
the petition to wind up should proceed.

But, following an application by Mr. Chappell's legal team, a
judge in London ruled there should be an adjournment for further
evidence to be filed, Press Association relates.

                             About BHS

BHS Group was a high street retailer offering fashion for the
whole family, furniture and home accessories.

BHS was put into administration in April 2016 in one of the
U.K.'s largest ever corporate failures, according to The Am Law
Daily.  More than 11,000 jobs were lost and 20,000 pensions (the
U.K. equivalent of a 401k) put at risk after it emerged that the
company, which had more than 160 stores across the U.K., had a
pension deficit of GBP571 million (US$703 million), The Am Law
Daily disclosed.

Sir Philip Green, a retail magnate with a net worth of more than
US$5 billion, has been heavily criticized for his role in the
collapse of BHS, The Am Law Daily said.  Mr. Green and other
shareholders had taken around GBP580 million (US$714 million) out
of the business before selling it for just GBP1 (US$1.23), The Am
Law Daily noted.

Linklaters acted for Green's Arcadia Group on the sale of the
company to Retail Acquisitions, which was advised by London-based
technology, media and telecoms specialist Olswang, The Am Law
Daily added.

Weil Gotshal & Manges and DLA then took the lead roles on the
administration, acting for the company and administrators Duff &
Phelps, respectively, while Jones Day was appointed by the
administrators to investigate the actions of the company's former
directors, The Am Law Daily related.


LION HUDSON: In Administration, Taps FRP as Administrators
----------------------------------------------------------
Katherine Cowdrey at the Book Seller reports Oxford-based
Christian publisher Lion Hudson has gone into administration, it
has been confirmed by the company's appointed administrators,
business advisory firm FRP Advisory.

A spokesperson for FRP advisory told The Bookseller it was now
seeking new investment as part of the new restructuring plans
that "may include a sale of all the parts of the business".

The report notes the news follows 35 redundancies at the
publisher at the end of January -- two thirds of its staff.  Some
of the former employees have launched a new venture spearheaded
by Lion Hudson's former head of European sales, Andrew
Wormleighton, called Lion Sales Services, which is continuing to
represent Lion Hudson's five imprints to the UK Christian and
book trade, according to Book Seller.

The report notes the FRP spokesperson said: "The company is now
in administration. The administrators are working with management
and continue to trade the business as normal. All the staff that
were with Lion Hudson when it went into administration continue
to work for the company. The business continues to liaise with
suppliers, authors, booksellers and other parties while the
administrators market the business for sale, as part of the plans
for seeking new investment.

"Arrangements have been put in place as part of the restructuring
to ensure all the authors and publishing arrangements are
safeguarded in the best interests of all concerned."

The report discloses Suzanne Wilson-Higgins, managing director of
Lion Hudson PLC, commented: "Lion Hudson continues to trade as
normal while work continues with our advisors to focus on the
business, our array of loyal authors, publishing arrangements and
of course staff.  This is a long-standing publishing business
with a unique history and offering and we look forward to working
with our advisors towards the next stage in its evolution to
ensure the best possible outcome for all involved to safeguard
the interests of our authors and another generation of readers
both in Britain and across the world."

The report relays interested parties are invited to make early
contact with FRP at its London office.


SCOTSMAN HOTEL: Bought of Liquidation by G1 Group
-------------------------------------------------
Kristy Dorsey at Daily Record reports that the five-star Scotsman
Hotel in Edinburgh has been bought out of liquidation by one of
Glasgow's best-known nightlife operators.

According to Daily Record, Stefan King's G1 Group has paid an
undisclosed sum for the former newspaper office, which was turned
into a hotel in 2001 and bought over by JJW Hotels for GBP63
million in 2006.

JJW -- a subsidiary of MBI International Holdings, owned by Saudi
tycoon Sheikh Mohamed bin Issa al Jaber -- went into liquidation
in July 2016 after HM Revenue and Customs filed a winding-up
order against its owners, Daily Record relates.

It is thought that about 90 staff at the 69-bedroom hotel will
transfer to G1, Daily Record notes.


VAUXHALL: GBP1-Bil. Pension Deficit May Hamper Sale to Peugeot
--------------------------------------------------------------
Alan Tovey at The Telegraph reports that a funding black hole in
the Vauxhall pension scheme could prove a huge hurdle to General
Motors' hopes of selling its European businesses to Peugeot.

GM is in talks with Peugeot-owner PSA Groupe about a potential
US$2 billion (GBP1.6 billion) sale of the Vauxhall and Opel
brands, with executives from both automotive groups meeting with
government ministers about the deal, The Telegraph relates.

However, an estimated GBP1 billion deficit in the Vauxhall
pension scheme could scupper the sale, The Telegraph discloses.

According to The Telegraph, pensions expert John Ralfe called the
deficit on the 15,000-member retirement scheme a "potential
dealbreaker" with one of the companies having to swallow the
funding gap to get a deal away.

"The last accounts, which are two years old, show the scheme had
GBP1.8 billion of assets but GBP2.6 billion of liabilities, and
with the way the markets have moved since, it's likely that the
deficit has grown," The Telegraph quotes Mr. Ralfe as saying.

There are fears Vauxhall's plants in Ellesmere Port and Luton,
which employ 4,500 staff, could be under threat as a result of a
deal with the French group, The Telegraph states.  PSA is
expected to try to cut production over-capacity and seek cost
savings if it buys GM's European business -- which has not made a
profit since 2009, The Telegraph relays.

If the UK plants were being targeted for closure, Mr. Ralfe, as
cited by The Telegraph, said PSA would not want to take on the
Vauxhall pension scheme with no business behind it to support the
retirement scheme.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS
----------------------------------------
Authors: Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren,
& Jay Westbrook
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 370 Pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by: Susan Pannell

Order your personal copy today at
http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/as_we_forgive_our_debtors.ht
ml

So you think you know the profile of the average consumer
debtor: either deadbeat slouched on a sagging sofa with a
threeday growth on his chin or a crafty lower-middle class type
opting for bankruptcy to avoid both poverty and responsible debt
repayment.

Except that it might be a single or divorced female who's the
one most likely to file for personal bankruptcy protection, and
her petition might be the last stage of a continuum of crises
that began with her job loss or divorce. Moreover, the dilemma
might be attributable in part to consumer credit industry that
has increased its profitability by relaxing its standards and
extending credit to almost anyone who can scribble his or her
name on an application.

Such are among the unexpected findings in this painstaking study
of 2,400 bankruptcy filings in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas
during the seven-year period from 1981 to 1987. Rather than
relying on case counts or gross data collected for a court's
administrative records, as has been done elsewhere, the authors
use data contained in the actual petitions. In so doing, they
offer a unique window into debtors' lives.

The authors conclude that people who file for bankruptcy are, as
a rule, neither impoverished families nor wily manipulators of
the system. Instead, debtors are a cross-section of America. If
one demographic segment can be isolated as particularly
debtprone, it would be women householders, whom the authors found
often live on the edge of financial disaster. Very few debtors
(3.7 percent in the study) were repeat filers who might be
viewed as abusing the system, and most (70 percent in the study)
of Chapter 13 cases fail and become Chapter 7s. Accordingly, the
authors conclude that the economic model of behavior -- which
assumes a petitioner is a "calculating maximizer" in his in his
decision to seek bankruptcy protection and his selection of
chapter to file under, a profile routinely used to justify
changes in the law -- is at variance with the actual debtor
profile derived from this study.

A few stereotypes about debtors are, however, borne out. It is
less than surprising to learn, for example, that most debtors
are simply not as well-off as the average American or that while
bankrupt's mortgage debts are about average, their consumer
debts are off the charts. Petitioners seem particularly
susceptible to the siren song of credit card companies. In the
study sample, creditors were found to have made between 27
percent and 36 percent of their loans to debtors with incomes
below $12,500 (although the loans might have been made before
the debtors' income dropped so low). Of course, the vigor with
which consumer credit lenders pursue their goal of maximizing
profits has a corresponding impact on the number of bankruptcy
filings.

The book won the ABA's 1990 Silver Gavel Award. A special 1999
update by the authors is included exclusively in the Beard Book
reprint edition.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *