TCREUR_Public/170321.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, March 21, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 57


                            Headlines


G E R M A N Y

DVB BANK: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Subordinated Debt Rating
KUBLER & NIETHAMMER: Court Opens Insolvency Proceedings


G R E E C E

GREECE: Troika of Lenders to Be Broken Up Under ESM Head Proposal


I R E L A N D

BOSPHORUS CLO II: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class F Notes


I T A L Y

BANCA POPOLARE: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Rating to 'CCC'
DIAPHORA 3: April 7 Calcinato Property Bid Deadline Set
DIAPHORA 3: April 3 Cento Vetrine Property Bid Deadline Set
INNSE CILINDRI: April 3 Expressions of Interest Deadline Set


L A T V I A

LIEPAJAS METALURGS: Assets Sale Deadline Extended Until June 16


L U X E M B O U R G

COSAN LUXEMBOURG: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Ratings on Senior Notes


R O M A N I A

* ROMANIA: Industrial Sector Has Highest Insolvency Risk in 2017


R U S S I A

BANK METROPOL: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
CB FINANCIAL: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
KAMSKIY GORIZONT: Faces Probe Following License Revocation
NENETS AUTONOMOUS: Fitch Assigns 'BB-/B' Issuer Default Ratings


S E R B I A

SERBIA: Moody's Raises Issuer Rating to Ba3, Outlook Stable


S P A I N

CAIXABANK RMBS: Moody's Assigns (P)Caa1 Rating to Cl. B Notes
PYME BANCAJA 5: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class D Notes
SRF 2017-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating to Class D Notes
TDA 29: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class D Notes


T U R K E Y

TURKEY: Moody's Affirms (P)Ba1 Debt, Issuer Ratings, Outlook Neg.


U K R A I N E

IMEXBANK: At Least $11MM Withdrawn Before Bank Declared Insolvent
UKRAINE: NBU Council Wants Bank Bankruptcy Losses Calculated


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CITYWING: Goes Into Liquidation
CITYWING: Gov't Agencies Try to Minimize Impact of Liquidation
CROWDMIX: Owner Deemed Delusional Due to Incorrect Valuation
HANDSWORTH CHRISTIAN: Students to Take GCSE in Hope House School
JONES BOOTMAKER: Teeters on Brink of Administration

KING & WOOD: Unsecured Creditors Expected to Lose GBP33.5MM
MAGYAR TELECOM: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B-' CCR
PLANT AND CONSUMABLE: In Administration, Cuts 40 Jobs
TURNSTONE MIDCO: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Rating to B3


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G E R M A N Y
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DVB BANK: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Subordinated Debt Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed DVB Bank S.E.'s (DVB) Baa1
long-term senior unsecured debt rating, the A2 long-term deposit
ratings, the Ba1 subordinated debt rating and the Prime-1 short-
term deposit and (P)Prime-1 other short-term ratings. At the same
time, Moody's has downgraded the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to b1 from ba3, and placed the b1 BCA on review
for downgrade. Concurrently, Moody's affirmed the baa3 adjusted
BCA and the A2(cr)/P-1(cr) Counterparty Risk Assessments.

The affirmation of DVB's long-term ratings, in combination with
the downgrade and initiated review for downgrade of its BCA,
illustrates Moody's view that DVB remains vulnerable to renewed
capital pressures, but that the bank will remain firmly supported
by its parent bank DZ BANK AG Deutsche Zentral-
Genossenschaftsbank (DZ BANK, deposits Aa1 stable, senior
unsecured debt Aa3 positive, BCA baa2). DZ BANK owns 95.47% of
DVB shares, and plans a squeeze-out of the remaining listed
shares in order to obtain full ownership of DVB within the next
few months. Ultimately, DVB is also supported by the cross-sector
support mechanism of Germany's group of cooperative banks, of
which DVB is a member.

The review for downgrade of DVB's b1 BCA will focus on the bank's
latest asset risk parameters, developments in the ship and
offshore finance sectors, and the potential impact of industry-
related pressures on DVB's profits and capital.

The positive outlook on DVB's Baa1 long-term debt rating and the
stable outlook on the A2 deposit rating were maintained, as these
outlooks continue to mirror the rating outlooks on the debt and
deposit ratings of DVB's parent bank, DZ BANK.

RATINGS RATIONALE

THE REVIEW FOR DOWNGRADE OF DVB's BCA REFLECTS ELEVATED RISKS TO
CAPITAL AT THE STANDALONE LEVEL

The one-notch downgrade of the BCA to b1 and the subsequent
review for downgrade of DVB's BCA reflect Moody's view that,
despite support measures taken by its parent bank in Q4 2016, DVB
remains vulnerable to rising credit losses and continued erosion
of its capital in the face of persistent weakness in the global
shipping and offshore sectors.

Moody's said that, notwithstanding the adequate 13.2% Common
Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio reported as of year-end 2016, DVB's
capitalisation could face considerable pressure owing to the
bank's large exposure to ship and offshore finance which stood at
EUR14.3 billion as of December 2016. This exposure represents a
high multiple of DVB's EUR 1.0 billion CET1 capital. As Moody's
forecasts that operating conditions in both sectors will remain
challenging during 2017, DVB remains vulnerable, and may require
additional support measures this year. DVB's reported CET1
capital and the respective ratio are based on reported
preliminary unaudited financials as of December 2016.

Moody's recognises DVB's: (i) above-average asset quality
compared with other ship lenders; (ii) its resilient pre-
provision income; and (iii) some buffer that is represented by
its 13.2% CET1 ratio. However, DVB's loss absorption buffers
would be materially depleted if the amount of risk charges taken
last year are reiterated in 2017, which Moody's considers likely.
DVB made gross risk provisions of EUR524 million in 2016, EUR345
million of which was on its ship finance exposure. Even the lower
net risk provision (after releases) of EUR381 million, albeit
considerably lower compared with other ship lenders, was
substantial relative to its capital. Moody's said that the risk
of sustained risk charges at this level in 2017 is considerable,
and that DVB's risk profile is therefore better reflected by a
BCA in the single b category.

DVB's 13.2% CET1 ratio as of December 2016 benefitted from a
EUR150 million contribution to profits from DZ BANK and compares
with 16.3% as of year-end 2015, marking a considerable 310 basis
point erosion of this ratio during the year. Moody's also
estimates that DVB's preliminary 20.7% total capital ratio as of
December 2016 does not offer much room above the regulatory
minimum, because the continued application of Basel I floors
regarding the calculation of risk-weighted assets by the
regulator requires DVB to maintain considerably higher total
capital resources than prescribed under the Basel III rules.

DVB's BCA will remain underpinned by DVB's adequate funding
structure, which benefits from access to funding from both DZ
BANK and the cooperative sector, including for subordinated
instruments.

AFFIRMATION OF LONG-TERM DEBT AND DEPOSIT RATINGS REFLECT VERY
HIGH SUPPORT ASSUMPTIONS

The affirmation of DVB's long-term senior unsecured debt and
deposit ratings reflects Moody's expectation to leave DVB's baa3
adjusted BCA unchanged, taking into account the potential for a
downgrade of DVB's b1 BCA by up to two notches. The stability of
DVB's adjusted BCA reflects Moody's view of a very high
probability of affiliate support, recognising the dual safety net
of likely support being available from its parent bank and,
ultimately, from the German cooperative banking sector's central
association Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und
Raiffeisenbanken (BVR, unrated).

In particular, Moody's recognises DZ BANK's commitment to
supporting its subsidiary which DZ BANK confirmed in a written
statement last November, which coincided with DVB's second profit
warning for the year 2016. Moody's therefore expects that a
downgrade of DVB's BCA will be offset by higher rating uplift for
affiliate support in DVB's ratings. Currently the rating uplift
is four notches.

DVB's long-term ratings further incorporate the benefits from the
assumed combined resolution perimeter with its parent DZ Bank and
reflect:

(1) The result of Moody's Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis
applied at the DZ BANK Group level, which takes into account the
severity of loss faced by the different liability classes in
resolution, providing three notches of uplift from the bank's
adjusted BCA for the deposit ratings and one notch of uplift for
the senior unsecured debt rating; and

(2) A moderate probability of DZ Bank receiving government
support as a member of the systemically-relevant cooperative
banking sector, resulting in one notch of rating uplift.

WHAT COULD CHANGE RATING -- UP

Upward pressure on DVB's long-term ratings could be exerted by:
(1) a higher BCA; (2) an explicit commitment of DZ BANK to
maintaining its current ownership of and providing capital
support to DVB in the long-term, which could result in additional
rating uplift for affiliate support, i.e., beyond the envisaged
offsetting effect for a potential BCA downgrade by up to two
notches; and/or (3) higher volumes of senior unsecured debt
and/or instruments subordinated to senior unsecured debt relative
to total banking assets within DZ Group, which could lead to
additional rating uplift from Moody's LGF analysis for senior
debt instruments. The potential for a higher LGF result does not
apply to DZ BANK's (nor DVB's) deposit ratings because, with
three notches of rating uplift from the adjusted BCA, the deposit
ratings already benefit from the highest possible LGF result.

Upward pressure on DVB's BCA would be subject to a substantial
capital increase and/or improving prospects in the shipping
sector, or a material reduction in risk concentrations relative
to capital, in particular of DVB's large ship finance portfolio.

WHAT COULD CHANGE RATING -- DOWN

Negative pressure on the bank's debt and deposit ratings could
arise: (1) from a BCA downgrade, to the extent that a potential
multi-notch downgrade is not offset by additional benefits from
affiliate support; (2) from any efforts of DZ BANK to reduce its
stake in DVB or otherwise de-link the subsidiary from its
operations, or in the unlikely event that the cooperative
sector's financial strength comes under pressure, or that the
commitment of the sector to support its members shows signs of
deterioration; and/or (3) in the unlikely event that DZ BANK
displays a liability structure with a materially lower volume of
senior debt relative to its total banking assets.

DVB's b1 BCA currently faces downward pressure, as illustrated by
the review for downgrade, because the bank may not be in a
position to halt the recent trend of erosion of its capital
ratios, in the context of a depressed operating environment for
the shipping as well as the oil and gas sectors.

RATING LIST - DVB BANK S.E.

Rating Actions:

-- LT Bank Deposits, Affirmed A2 , Stable

-- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed P-1

-- Senior Unsecured, Affirmed Baa1, Positive

-- Senior Unsecured MTN, Affirmed (P)Baa1,

-- Subordinate, Affirmed Ba1

-- Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)Ba1

-- Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)P-1

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed baa3

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, Downgrade to b1 from ba3, placed
on Review for Downgrade

-- LT Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed A2(cr)

-- ST Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed P-1(cr)

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable(m)

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


KUBLER & NIETHAMMER: Court Opens Insolvency Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------------
EUWID Pulp and Paper reports that the Chemnitz District Court has
opened preliminary insolvency proceedings upon Kubler &
Niethammer Papierfabrik Kriebstein (K&N Paper). Production
operations at the mill, e.g. production of recycled lightweight
coated (LWC) magazine paper and white-top coated testliner are
continuing and customers' supplies are reportedly not affected.
However, the company's diversification process towards label
paper has come to a halt due to financial issues.

Last September, K&N Paper and five private investors have taken
over the former Stora Enso Kabel LWC paper mill in Germany and
renamed the company to Kabel Premium Pulp & Paper, EUWID recalls.
Citing information from the preliminary administrator's office,
the report says Kabel Premium Pulp & Paper is not affected by the
insolvency proceedings of K&N Paper.

Kubler & Niethammer Papierfabrik Kriebstein is a recycled
magazine and packaging paper manufacturer based in Germany.  K&N
Paper employs 130 people at the mill in Kriebstein.


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G R E E C E
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GREECE: Troika of Lenders to Be Broken Up Under ESM Head Proposal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Martin and Paul Carrel at Reuters report that the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) -- the euro zone's bailout
fund -- should ultimately be turned into a European version of
the International Monetary Fund.

"I think it would make a lot of sense for the euro zone bailout
fund ESM to be developed into a European IMF in the medium to
long term," Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the head of euro zone finance
ministers, told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ).

Mr. Dijsselbloem, as cited by Reuters, said that would also mean
that Greece's current "troika" of lenders -- the European
Commission, European Central Bank and the IMF -- would need to be
broken up in the longer term.

German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble has also proposed
turning the ESM into a European monetary fund to improve the
management of crises in Europe, Reuters relates.

"With the approval of an ESM program, the participation of
creditors in the restructuring of debt could in future be
anchored in accordance with clear and predictable principles,"
Reuters quotes Mr. Schaeuble as saying in an opinion piece for
the FAZ.

Mr. Schaeuble did not mention Greece in conjunction with the ESM
and debt restructuring, Reuters states.

Mr. Dijsselbloem, as cited by Reuters, said the institutions
should maintain their roles in Greece's current bailout and said
he still expected the IMF to decide on a new program, adding that
it would be "most welcome" if this happened by the summer.

Germany, which holds elections in September, wants the IMF on
board before new money is lent to Athens, Reuters discloses.  But
it disagrees with the IMF over debt relief and the fiscal targets
that Greece should maintain after the bailout program ends in
2018, Reuters states.

Mr. Dijsselbloem said he did not expect the current review of
Greece's bailout program to be concluded quickly, adding that he
did not think the institutions will complete it before a
Eurogroup meeting in Malta in April, Reuters relays.

The IMF believes Greece's debt load is unsustainable, according
to Reuters.

Greece and its international creditors remain divided over the
terms of a review, a senior euro zone official said on March 16,
a gap that will prevent Athens from getting fresh financial
support, Reuters notes.


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I R E L A N D
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BOSPHORUS CLO II: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its credit ratings on Bosphorus CLO
II DAC's class A, B, C, D, E, and F notes.

The affirmations follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the January 2017 trustee report and
the application of its relevant criteria, in particular its
corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

Since S&P's review at the transaction's closing date in April
2016, the class A notes have amortized by approximately
EUR637,500.  Due to the turbo feature of class F notes, in which
25% of excess spread can be used to redeem the class F notes, the
class F notes' current outstanding balance has reduced to
EUR7.48 million from EUR8.00 million at closing.

Although the transaction remains in its reinvestment period, the
collateral manager can only reinvest unscheduled prepayments
received.  The transaction manager has confirmed that they intend
to reinvest all proceeds received in this manner, and S&P has
therefore modeled the reported cash balance as if it were fully
reinvested.

The portfolio is highly diversified with 54 distinct obligors in
25 distinct industries and 13 distinct countries.  The weighted-
average spread is 4.20%, which is below the covenant of 4.41%.
The weighted-average life is currently 4.81 years, down from 5.27
years at closing.  The average rating in the portfolio has
improved since closing, with a minimum rating of 'B-' and no
defaulted assets.

S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios, using
various default patterns, levels, and timings for each liability
rating category, in conjunction with different interest rate
stress scenarios.

Taking into account S&P's observations outlined above, it
considers the available credit enhancement for all classes of
notes to be commensurate with the ratings currently assigned.
S&P has therefore affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, C, D,
E, and F notes.

Bosphorus CLO II is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction securitizing a portfolio of senior secured
loans and bonds granted to speculative-grade European corporates.
The transaction closed in April 2016, and the manager is able to
reinvestment prepayments received up until April 2017.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Bosphorus CLO II DAC
EUR277.7 Million Secured Deferrable and Non-Deferrable Floating-
Rate Notes

Class        Rating

A            AAA (sf)
B            AA+ (sf)
C            A+ (sf)
D            BBB+ (sf)
E            BB (sf)
F            B (sf)


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I T A L Y
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BANCA POPOLARE: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Rating to 'CCC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Banca Popolare di Vicenza's
(Vicenza) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CCC' from 'B-
' and Viability Rating (VR) to 'cc' from 'b-'. The Long-Term IDR
has been placed on Rating Watch Evolving (RWE).

The downgrade of Vicenza's VR to 'cc' reflects Fitch's view that
it is probable that the bank will require fresh capital to
address a material capital shortfall, which under Fitch's
criteria would be a failure.

The downgrade of the Long-Term IDR to 'CCC' reflects Fitch's view
that there is a real possibility that losses could be imposed on
senior bondholders if a conversion or write-down of junior debt
is not sufficient to strengthen capitalisation and if the bank
does not receive fresh capital in a precautionary
recapitalisation.

The RWE reflects the possibility that the Long-Term IDR could be
further downgraded if Fitch concludes that losses to senior
creditors are probable. Conversely, if the bank receives a
precautionary recapitalisation without any senior creditor
suffering a loss, the Long-Term IDR could be upgraded.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

Vicenza's Long-Term IDR is one notch above the VR to reflect
Fitch's view that the probability that senior creditors will have
to bear losses is lower than the probability of the bank's
failure. This is primarily because if there is a precautionary
recapitalisation senior creditors will not suffer losses.

Vicenza's VR primarily reflects Fitch's view that capitalisation
has clear deficiencies. In Fitch's opinion, the bank will have to
dispose of a significant portion of its impaired exposures to
restore viability, which will likely require material additional
provisions to align doubtful loan coverage levels to current
market valuations for large non-performing loan portfolios. These
provisions would lead to material losses that would hit the
bank's capital.

Vicenza's net impaired loans represented a high 150% of its Fitch
Core Capital based on pro-forma end-1H16 data. This includes a
EUR310m capital injection received in late 2016 from its main
shareholder, the Italian rescue fund Atlante. Fitch does not
believe that Atlante has sufficient resources to inject material
further capital into the bank. To be eligible for a precautionary
recapitalisation from the Italian state, Vicenza has to be deemed
solvent and to meet Pillar 1 regulatory capital requirements by
the supervisory authorities. The authorities will also determine
the amount of any capital shortfall, and any precautionary
recapitalisation is subject to approval by the European
Commission under state aid rules. If it is ineligible for a
precautionary recapitalisation, Fitch believes that Vicenza might
be subject to resolution.

In addition to substantial impaired loans, an important
consideration for the bank's solvency assessment is its material
litigation risk from its shareholders related to past capital
increases. Vicenza is facing challenges in concluding a potential
settlement with shareholders.

Vicenza's VR also reflects its weak asset quality, earnings and
funding. Its deposit base remains highly vulnerable to market
sentiment around the bank and the broader Italian banking sector.
Vicenza's liquidity ratios are highly volatile and balance sheet
encumbrance is at historical highs. The bank recently issued
EUR3bn state-guaranteed senior notes, partly sold to the market
and partly retained to pledge with market counterparties to
generate liquidity.

Vicenza's senior unsecured bonds are rated in line with the
bank's IDR. The Recovery Rating of '4' (RR4) reflects Fitch's
expectation of average recovery prospects in the event of a
default of these instruments.

The Short-term IDR is mapped from the Long-Term IDR.

SUPPORT RATING (SR) AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR (SRF)
The SR and SRF reflect Fitch's view that although external
support is possible, including through a precautionary
recapitalisation, it cannot be relied upon. Senior creditors can
no longer expect to receive full extraordinary support from the
sovereign in the event that the bank becomes non-viable. The EU's
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for eurozone banks provide a framework
for the resolution of banks that requires senior creditors to
participate in losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a
bank receiving sovereign support.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES
Subordinated Tier 2 debt issued by Vicenza is rated 'CC' and
reflects Fitch views that these instruments could be vulnerable
to write down or conversion in the context of a precautionary
recapitalisation or in a resolution scenario. Their Recovery
Rating of '5' (RR5) reflects below average recovery prospects for
subordinated bondholders.

SENIOR STATE-GUARANTEED SECURITIES

The Long-term rating of Vicenza's state-guaranteed debt is based
on Italy's direct, unconditional and irrevocable guarantee for
the issues, which covers payments of both principal and interest.
Italy's guarantee was issued by the Ministry of Economy and
Finance under Law Decree 23 December 2016, n. 237, subsequently
converted into law 15/2017.The ratings reflect Fitch's
expectation that Italy will honour the guarantee provided to the
noteholders in a full and timely manner. The state guarantee
ranks pari passu with Italy's other unsecured and unguaranteed
senior obligations. As a result, the notes' Long-Term ratings are
in line with Italy's 'BBB+' Long-Term IDR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

Vicenza's VR is primarily sensitive to the size of any capital
shortfall at the bank and how this shortfall will be addressed.
The VR would likely be downgraded to 'c' if Vicenza requires an
extraordinary intervention to cover a material capital shortfall.
After the receipt of fresh capital, Vicenza's VR would be
downgraded to 'f' before being upgraded to a level commensurate
with the bank's subsequent risk profile and capitalisation. The
VR would also be downgraded to 'f' in the event of resolution.

Vicenza's IDRs would be upgraded if its capitalisation improves
materially to strengthen its viability without any losses for
senior creditors, which could be achieved, for example, through a
precautionary recapitalisation and settlement of outstanding
litigation risk from shareholders. Conversely, if in Fitch's
opinion a resolution of the bank that could involve losses for
senior creditors become more likely the Long-Term IDR would be
downgraded further.

Fitch expects to resolve the RWE on the IDRs when there is
further clarity on how any capital shortfall at the bank will be
addressed. Vicenza will publish its 2016 annual results in late
March, when additional information regarding a restructuring of
the bank and its recapitalisation could become available. The
resolution of the RWE could take longer than the typical six-
month period if the bank's plans and authorisations are delayed.

SR AND SRF
An upgrade of the SR and any upward revision of the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support Italian banks. While not impossible, this is highly
unlikely, in Fitch's view.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings of the subordinated securities could be downgraded if
recovery prospects for bondholders deteriorate, which would also
be reflected in a lower recovery rating.

SENIOR STATE-GUARANTEED SECURITIES

The notes' ratings are sensitive to changes in Italy's rating.
Any downgrade or upgrade of Italy's Long-Term IDR would be
reflected on the notes' ratings. Italy's rating was last reviewed
on 21 October 2016 (see: Fitch Revises Italy's Outlook to
Negative; Affirms at 'BBB+' available at www.fitchratings.com).
The next scheduled review of Italy's sovereign rating is due on
21 April 2017.

The rating actions are as follows:

Long-Term IDR: downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B-'; placed on RWE
Short-Term IDR: downgraded to 'C' from 'B'; placed on RWE
Viability Rating: downgraded to 'cc' from 'b-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Long-term senior unsecured notes and EMTN programme: downgraded
to 'CCC/RR4' from 'B-/RR4'; placed on RWE
Short-term rating on EMTN programme: downgraded to 'C' from 'B';
placed on RWE
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'CC'/'RR5'
State-guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'BBB+'


DIAPHORA 3: April 7 Calcinato Property Bid Deadline Set
-------------------------------------------------------
Diaphora 3 Fund, in liquidation pursuant to Art. 57 TUF, is
putting up for sale Calcinato (BS), a property unit comprising of
three residential complexes, a building plot, a private road and
parking lots developed as town-planning work, an electrical
substation, and a further area currently covered by natural
vegetation, as described in the appraisal reports dated July 1,
2016 drawn up by Ing. Alberto Marinelli.

Starting price: EUR3,726,600.00 in addition to applicable tax.

Bid deadline: 12:00 a.m. on April 7, 2017.  Bids are to be
submitted at the office of Notary Marianna Rega in Via Giacomo,
Matteotti 57, Calcinato (BS).

Date of sale: 5:00 p.m. on April 10, 2017, at the office of the
Notary.

Details, procedures and sale regulations are available on
www.liquidagest.it


DIAPHORA 3: April 3 Cento Vetrine Property Bid Deadline Set
-----------------------------------------------------------
Diaphora 3 Fund, in liquidation pursuant to Art. 57 TUF, is
putting up for sale the following properties:


D3-24: "Cento Vetrine", a commercial property complex located in
the municipality of Mazzanno (BS), Strada Padana Superiore,
consisting of no. 34 stores, no. 19 offices, no. 7 warehouses, an
unroofed area and a basement garage, as described in the
appraisal report dated May 6, 2016, drawn up by Surveyor Roberto
Cirelli.

Starting price: EUR3,400,000.00 in addition to applicable tax.

D3-25: Polpenazze del Garda (BS), exclusive residential complex
composed of three property units as described in the appraisal
report dated May 2, 2016, drawn up by Surveyor Roberto Cirelli.

Starting price: EUR5,525,000.00 in addition to applicable tax

D3-27: Exclusive residential and shopping center located in the
municipality of Toscolano Maderno (BS), opposite the Brescia side
of Lake Garda, consisting of five buildings, situated around the
common central pool, hosting: no. 5 stores, no. 34 apartments,
no. 30 garages, no. 11` cellars, as  described in the appraisal
report dated June 1, 2016, drawn up by Surveyor Rita Stancari.

Bid deadline: 12:00 a.m. on April 3, 2017, bids to be
submitted at the office of Notary Pietro Barziza in Piazza Duomo
17, Desenzano del Garda (BS).

Date of sale: 5:00 p.m. on April 4, 2017, at the office of the
Notary.

Details, procedures and sale regulations are available on
www.liquidagest.it


INNSE CILINDRI: April 3 Expressions of Interest Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------------
With reference to the "Call for expression of interest for the
purchase of businesses owned by Innse Cilindri S.r.l. in
Extraordinary Administration" published on December the 21, 2016
on the websites www.gruppoilva.com, www.gruppoilvainas.it, and
www.innsecilindri.com, as well as on the newspapers Il Sole 24
Ore and Financial Times (hereafter, the 'Call for Expression').
The terms with initial capital letter not differently defined
under this notice (hereafter, 'Notice') have the significance
attributed to them in the Call for Expression.

With this Notice, Avv. Corrado Carrubba, Dott. Piero Gnudi and
Prof. Enrico Laghi, the Official Receivers of Innse Cilindri,
announced the reopening of the terms for the submission of the
Expressions of interest for the participation to the Procedure,
with effect from March 17, 2017, up until 6:00 p.m. (CET) of
April 3, 2017.

Reference is made, for the methods of submission of the
expressions of interest and for everything not explicitly ruled
under this Notice, to the provisions provided for by the Call for
Expression.

The expressions of interest, submitted in accordance with the
provisions of the Call for Expression and received within the
term specified in the paragraph 3.1 of the same Call for
Expression, are going to be valid in their entirety.

The applicant entities who have submitted the expressions of
interest in accordance with the terms provided for by the
paragraph 3.1 of the Call for Expression have the right to
submit, no later than the deadline referred to in this Notice, a
new expression of interest that will render void and fully
invalid the previous one.

Any potential clarifications and/or information with regard to
this Notice and/or the Call for Expression can be requested by
sending proper communication in Italian to the financial advisor
of the Official Receivers, Rothschild S.p.A., exclusively by e-
mail, to the following address: ProjectCilindri@Rothschild.com,
including as object "Project Cilindri".


===========
L A T V I A
===========


LIEPAJAS METALURGS: Assets Sale Deadline Extended Until June 16
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Baltic Course reports that the deadline for sale of the
assets of insolvent KVV Liepajas Metalurgs, a steel plant based
in Liepaja port city in south-western Latvia, has been extended
till June 16, Dzintars Hmielevskis, a spokesman for the company's
insolvency administrator said.

The Baltic Course relates that adjustments have been made to the
timetable for sale of the assets, considering the vast efforts
required for communication with investors and preparation of
information for them," he said, adding that the deadline had been
extended from March 16 to June 16.

He said so far several investors had already showed interest in
acquiring the steel plant's assets, the report relays.

According to The Baltic Course, the overall approach to the asset
disposal has not changed, and the insolvency administrator still
recommends to sell the assets as a whole because only that way it
will be possible to resume production at the steel plant.

Creditor claims to KVV Liepajas Metalurgs submitted to the
insolvency administrator total more than EUR116.587 million. The
total amount of secured creditor claims is EUR86.935 million, and
the claims by unsecured creditors add up to EUR 29.652 million,
The Baltic Course discloses.

                   About KVV Liepajas Metalurgs

AS KVV Liepajas Metalurgs manufactures, markets, and exports
steel products in Latvia and internationally. The Company was
founded in 1882 and is based in Liepaja, Latvia. As of October
31, 2014, AS KVV Liepajas Metalurgs operates as a subsidiary of
KVV Group.

As of September 16, 2016, AS KVV Liepajas Metalurgs is in
reorganization, with proceedings in the Liepaja Court.  Guntars
Koris serves as insolvency administrator for the Company.

The insolvency case against KVV Liepajas Metalurgs started as two
companies -- JSC G4S Latvia and TKB Lizings -- filed complaints
to the court over the company's debts.  Both cases have been
combined into a single civil process.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


COSAN LUXEMBOURG: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Ratings on Senior Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of the notes
issued by Cosan Overseas Limited and Cosan Luxembourg S.A and
guaranteed by Cosan at Ba3. At the same time, Moody's America
Latina has affirmed Cosan S.A. Industria e Comercio ("Cosan")'s
corporate family ratings at Ba2 (global scale) and upgraded the
national scale (NSR) rating to Aa1.br from Aa2.br. The outlook
was revised to stable from negative.

The action mirrors the change in outlook to stable from negative,
on March 17, of the ratings of its subsidiaries Raizen (Ba1
stable) and Comgas (Ba2 stable), both of which are constrained by
Brazil's sovereign bond ratings. On March 15, Moody's changed
Brazil's outlook to stable from negative and affirmed its issuer
rating, senior unsecured at Ba2 and shelf ratings at (P)Ba2.

Ratings affirmed:

Issuer: Cosan Luxembourg SA

- USD 51 million equivalent senior unsecured notes due 2018: Ba3
- USD 121 million senior unsecured notes due 2023: Ba3
- USD 650 million senior unsecured notes due 2027: Ba3

Issuer: Cosan Overseas Limited

- USD 500 million perpetual bonds: Ba3

Outlook actions:

Revised to stable from negative

RATING RATIONALE

Cosan's Ba2 corporate family rating reflects the group's
aggregate credit risk, and is supported by the company's
diversified portfolio of businesses, including the entire sugar-
ethanol chain, fuel and gas distribution, and lubes in Brazil,
and its adequate liquidity profile. The company's
diversification, especially towards resilient businesses such as
the fuel and gas distribution, translates into a stable cash
source over the long-term. Moody's expects Raizen and Comgas to
distribute a significant amount of dividends over the next
several years, which will be the primarily liquidity source to
service Cosan's obligations.

Constraining the ratings is Cosan's ongoing corporate
restructure, likely high dividend upstream to Cosan Limited --
although the company is expected to generate enough cash to fund
those dividends and reduce leverage -- and an acquisitive growth
history. Still, the company has not made any significant
acquisitions over the past few years and entered a deleveraging
path with strong dividends from Comgas and Raizen. Cosan no
longer proportionally consolidates its stake in Raizen,
but`continues to incorporate Raizen's strengths, including its
strong cash generation, and risks, such as the exposure to the
underlying volatility of the sugar-ethanol business, in Cosan's
ratings.

The bulk of Cosan's cash generation comes from dividends from
Raizen and Comgas and, consequently, Moody's see the debt at
Cosan S.A.'s level as structured subordinated to the debt at the
operating companies. The recent rating action affirming Raizen
and Comgas ratings and outlook change to stable from negative
followed the action that affirmed Brazil's government bond rating
to Ba2 and changed the outlook to stable from negative. Although
Moody's believes a significant portion of Cosan's cash flows,
represented by Raizen Combustiveis and Comgas, is more resilient
than the overall economy in Brazil, these entities are not fully
insulated from the deterioration in the domestic environment.

The stable outlook on Cosan's ratings mirrors the stable outlook
on its two main subsidiaries, Raizen and Comgas.

A downgrade of Cosan's ratings could result from further negative
rating actions on Comgas or Raizen or if liquidity deteriorates.
In addition, the ratings could be downgraded if total adjusted
debt to EBITDA is sustained above 4.0x.

An upgrade of Cosan's ratings could result from positive rating
actions on Comgas or Raizen. In addition, the company would have
to maintain an adequate liquidity and gross leverage below 3.2x
(All pro-forma ratios including Raizen figures)

Headquartered in Sao Paulo, Cosan S.A. Industria e Comercio has a
50% stake in Raizen (Ba1/Aaa.br stable) and a 62.6% stake in
Comgas (Ba2/Aa1.br stable). With annual revenue of BRL 81.2
billion (approximately USD 24.9 billion) as of December 2016,
Raizen is one of the global leading players in the sugar-ethanol
segment with an installed crushing capacity of 68 million tons
and also the third largest Brazilian fuel distributor, operating
6,027 gas stations, mainly under the Shell brand name. Comgas,
with annual net revenues of approximately BRL 7.0 billion
(approximately USD 2.1 billion) in the same period, is Brazil's
largest gas distributor, providing natural gas to industrial,
residential, commercial, automotive, thermal-power generation and
co-generation consumers. The company benefits from an attractive
concession area strategically located in one of the most densely
populated and economically robust regions in the country.
Additionally, Cosan produces and distributes automotive
lubricants and base oil under the Mobil brand name with net
revenues of BRL 1.9 billion (USD 0.5 billion) as of December
2016. In the fiscal year 2016 Cosan's net sales reached BRL 7.5
billion (approximately USD 2.3 billion).

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Protein and Agriculture Industry published in May 2013.


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


* ROMANIA: Industrial Sector Has Highest Insolvency Risk in 2017
----------------------------------------------------------------
Business Review reports that the industrial sector has the
highest insolvency risk in 2017, an analysis of CITR, the
Romanian insolvency administration company, said. Out of industry
and constructions sectors, there are already 54%, respectively
15% of the total fixed assets of the companies with insolvency
requests in 2017, the report relays.

At the end of February, 120 companies, each with assets with over
EUR1 million, have already recorded insolvency requests,
according to Business Review. The number of cumulated of
employees of these companies reached 20,000 and their turnovers
account over EUR1.5 billion. Out of these, most of them are in
the industry sector, Business Review notes.

This field currently owns 54% of the fixed assets of the 120
companies, 48% of their total number of employees and a quarter
of the cumulated turnover, Business Review relates.

"The state of this sectors strongly influenced by the alternative
energy producers market, which is still in difficulty: its
vulnerability level is correlated with the legislative regulation
and the quotas of the green certificates," the report quotes
Andreea Cionca-Anghelof, coordinator associate at CITR, as
saying.

The constructions sector rings the alarm bell, as out of the 120
of the companies with insolvency requests, the constructions
represent 15% of the fixed assets, 38% of the cumulated turnover
and 15% of the total number of employees, the report discloses.

The banking sector also faces difficulties due to market
agglomeration, the similar operations types that they offer and
the low market shares to be profitable at competitive level.
While strong banks will continue their consolidation, especially
through mergers and acquisitions, those who cannot implement this
solution and cannot support the continuation of the activities
can try the assets transfer and the bankruptcy of the residual
party, the banking resolution or the banking insolvency in the
last phase, says CITR.

The CITR specialists estimate that the state companies will
increase their vulnerability level in 2017.

The number of insolvencies has fallen compared with 2016, but the
companies with impact on the economy continue to face financial
difficulties, adds Business Review.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK METROPOL: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
----------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration to manage Bank Metropol Limited,
further referred to as the Bank, as appointed by Bank of Russia
Order No. OD-4013, dated November 18, 2016, following banking
license revocation, has been faced up with obstruction since day
one of its operations, which the Bank of Russia believes to be an
attempt at concealing the facts of bank asset embezzlement,
according to the press service of the Central Bank of Russia.  In
this way, the Bank's executives failed to provide documents of
title on the Bank's real estate of over RUR550 million of
carrying value.

In the course of the provisional administration-conducted cash
revision, a shortage of cash to a total of RUR21.4 million was
established.  The financial assessment of the Bank also revealed
transactions consisting in extension of loans to legal entities
and individuals of doubtful solvency.

The provisional administration estimates the value of the Bank
assets to be RUR1,130.9 million, vers. RUR2,413.8 million of its
liabilities to creditors.

On February 7, 217, the Arbitration Court of the City of Moscow
recognized the Bank as insolvent (bankrupt) and initiated
bankruptcy proceedings.  The State Corporation Deposit Insurance
Agency was approved to act as its bankruptcy receiver.

The information on financial transactions indicative of criminal
acts as carried out by the Bank's former executives and owners
was submitted by the Bank of Russia to the Office for Prosecutor
General of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Investigative Committee
of the Russian Federation, to be reviewed and to enable the
appropriate procedural decisions to be made.


CB FINANCIAL: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
---------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration of LLC CB Financial Capital
appointed by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-3646, dated October 25,
2016, following the revocation of its banking license, in the
course of examination of the bank's financial standing has
revealed that during the period when the bank experienced
solvency problems the bank's owners executed transactions aimed
at moving out liquid assets and at preferential honoring
liabilities to certain creditors to the detriment of others, and
also transactions to assign receivables on outstanding loans to
the total amount of about RUR380 million, according to the press
service of the Central Bank of Russia.
.
Besides, the analysis of the bank's credit portfolio has
established facts of underestimated credit exposure on
outstanding loans issued to the bank's borrowers to the total
amount exceeding RUR300 million.

According to estimates by the provisional administration, the
bank's asset value does not exceed RUR355 million, whereas its
liabilities to creditors amount to RUR460 million.

On December 12, 2016, the Saint Petersburg Arbitration Court
decided to recognize the bank insolvent (bankrupt), with the
state corporation Deposit Insurance Agency appointed as a
receiver.

The Bank of Russia submitted information on financial operations
bearing the evidence of criminal offence conducted by the bank's
former management and owners to the Prosecutor General's Office
of the Russian Federation, the Russian Ministry of Internal
Affairs and the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation
for consideration and procedural decision making.


KAMSKIY GORIZONT: Faces Probe Following License Revocation
----------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration to manage Commercial Bank Kamskiy
Gorizont (Limited Liability Company), further referred to as the
Bank, as appointed by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-3777, dated
November 3, 2016, following banking license revocation, has
conducted a probe into the financial state of the Bank, according
to the press service of the Central Bank of Russia.

The probe found the quality of the Bank's loan portfolio to be
low, which comes as a result of loans it extended to entities
which appear to be shell companies; the probe also established a
shortage of cash.

On January 11, 2017, the Court of Arbitration of the Republic of
Tatarstan recognized the Bank as insolvent.  The State
Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency was approved to act as its
bankruptcy receiver.

The information on financial transactions indicative of criminal
acts as carried out by the Bank's former executives and owners
was submitted by the Bank of Russia to the Office for Prosecutor
General of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Investigative Committee
of the Russian Federation, to be reviewed and to enable the
appropriate procedural decisions to be made.


NENETS AUTONOMOUS: Fitch Assigns 'BB-/B' Issuer Default Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia's Nenets Autonomous District
(NAD) Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of 'BB-' and a Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR of 'B'. The
Outlook on the Long-Term IDRs is Stable.

The ratings reflect the district's weakened budgetary
performance, concentrated economy, large capital expenditure
needs and a weak institutional framework for Russian sub-
nationals. The ratings also take into account the district's
moderate debt and strong per capita wealth metrics.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating action reflects the following rating drivers and their
relative weights:

HIGH

Weaker Fiscal Performance
We expect NAD's operating margin to remain negative in 2017, and
turn positive at around 1.2%-3.0% in 2018-2019, but remaining
insufficient to cover expected interest expenses. A restoration
of margins will be supported by an expected reduction in
operating and capital expenditure and a steady inflow of taxes
and fees, driven by stable output in the oil and gas sector. The
region is likely to post an ongoing deficit of about 10% of total
revenue in 2017, reducing to about 4% in 2018-2019 (2016: 22%).

NAD's operating performance deteriorated in 2015-2016, due to
prolonged structural imbalances. Its operating margin turned
negative in 2015 from a sound average of 23.5% in 2012-2014. In
2016, operating revenue declined by 23% yoy, after its growth
rate decelerated in 2014-2015 (by 9.7% and 5.1%, respectively).
The trend was exacerbated by an increase in opex, by 22.2% yoy in
2014 (2013: 16.9%), and 30.7% yoy in 2015. In 2016, despite a
15.3% annual cut in opex the district could not reverse the
negative trend and posted a negative margin and wider deficit.

In Fitch's view, the significant deterioration of NAD's fiscal
performance in recent years is attributable to the low absolute
volume of its budget, concentration and reallocation of revenue
and expenditure responsibilities with Arkhangelsk region. This
volatility is mitigated by the high share of property tax in its
total revenue base (2016: 43%), as this tax is more predictable
and steadily growing than other sources. Property tax will
increase in the near future as a range of new oil fields become
operational.

Moderate Debt
Fitch projects that the district's direct debt will further
increase to 40%-45% of current revenue in 2017-2019 (2016:
29.5%), which is commensurate with the ratings. Before 2015, the
district was free of debt; relying on access cash reserves,
stemming from a strong tax capacity. The debt started
accumulating in 2015 when the district contracted short-term bank
loans of RUB1bn. In 2016 the contracted short-term bank loans
increased to RUB3.6bn, or 29.5% of current revenue.

As the loans are short term in nature, the district bears
refinancing risk on its debt, having to roll-over entire debt
stock every year. To mitigate this risk, NAD's administration
intends to switch to debt instruments with longer maturity in
2017-2018, replacing bank loans with either medium-term domestic
bonds or bank loans, subject to market conditions.

MEDIUM

Weak Institutional Framework
Fitch views the district's credit profile as being constrained by
the weak Russian institutional framework for sub-nationals, which
has a shorter record of stable development than many of its
international peers. The predictability of Russian local and
regional governments' budgetary policy is hampered by the
frequent reallocation of revenue and expenditure responsibilities
within government tiers.

Concentrated Economy
NAD's economic profile is strong, accounting for about 2% of
Russia's 2016 crude oil output, but concentrated in the prime
sector -- oil and gas. Oil and gas companies comprise the
district's list of top 10 taxpayers and accounted for 76% of 2016
budget tax revenue (2015: 85.9%). The concentration of the tax
base in the oil and gas sector exposes the district's revenue to
volatility through commodity price and FX fluctuations and
changes to the national fiscal regime.

Strong Wealth Metrics
With about 44,000 residents, the district is the smallest region
in Russia measured by population. Its rich deposits of oil and
natural gas make NAD one of the wealthiest Russian regions by per
capita metrics. In 2014 gross regional product per capita almost
15x exceeded the national median, while the 2015 average salary
was 285% of the national median.
The ratings also consider the following rating factors:

High Infrastructure Needs
Historically, NAD relied on strong current balances to invest in
infrastructure development projects needed due to counter harsh
climate and underdeveloped territories. In 2012-2014 NAD
maintained a sound level of capex, averaging 23.2%.

In response to the worsened fiscal performance NAD's
administration had to cut capital expenditure in 2015-2016; to
13.7% of total spending in 2015 (2014: 20.3%) and down to 10.8%
in 2016. Fitch expects the administration will be further curbing
capex to 5%-7% of total projected expenditure in 2017-2019, to
support its commitment on deficit reduction.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

An improvement in the operating balance towards 10% of operating
revenue, coupled with debt coverage ratio (direct risk to current
balance) at around 10 years for a sustained period could lead to
an upgrade.

Inability to restore a positive current balance and to narrow the
deficit to below 10% of total revenue could lead to a downgrade
of NAD's ratings.


===========
S E R B I A
===========


SERBIA: Moody's Raises Issuer Rating to Ba3, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Government of Serbia's
long-term issuer and senior unsecured ratings to Ba3 from B1. The
outlook has been moved to stable (from positive).

The key drivers of the upgrade in Serbia's senior unsecured and
long-term issuer ratings are:

(1) Serbia's notable fiscal consolidation which has halted the
increase in its debt burden and reduces risks to the fiscal
position; and

(2) Recent structural reforms which have increased the resilience
of Serbia's economy, supporting potential growth.

The stable outlook reflects the balanced risks to Serbia's credit
profile at the Ba3 rating level. While the pace of reforms may
slow following the significant gains achieved in 2016, Moody's
expects that Serbia's continued progress with the European Union
(EU) accession process and likely further engagement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) will help to limit the risk of
a reversal of the reform progress achieved to date.

Concurrent with rating action, Moody's has also raised Serbia's
long-term foreign-currency bond ceiling to Ba1 from Ba2, and the
long-term foreign-currency bank deposit ceiling to B1 from B2.
The short-term foreign-currency deposit and bond ceilings remain
unchanged at NP. Finally, the long-term local-currency bond and
deposit ceilings have been raised to Baa2 from Baa3.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR UPGRADE

-- FIRST DRIVER: FISCAL CONSOLIDATION HAS HALTED RISE IN DEBT
BURDEN

The first driver of the upgrade is Serbia's notable fiscal
consolidation which has halted the increase in its debt burden
and reduces fiscal risks.

The Serbian authorities have executed a highly successful fiscal
consolidation which has led to a marked improvement in its 2016
fiscal performance, with the first primary budget surplus since
2005 supporting a fall in the general government debt to GDP
ratio to 74% of GDP at the end of 2016 after years of increases.
Furthermore, fiscal reforms undertaken in conjunction with the
IMF's 3-year Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) have improved the
structure of the budget helping to limit fiscal risks in the
future.

Serbia's strong budget execution has been supported by
improvements in revenue generation, with general government
revenue as a share of GDP rising by 2 percentage points to around
44%, the highest level since 2007 and above the median of Ba-
rated peers (27.9%). Furthermore, the sharp reduction in
permanent public sector employees by around 22,000 relative to
end 2014, while slower than the targets set out in the
government's rightsizing plan, has helped reduce expenditure on
public wages to below 10% of GDP, in line with the EU average.

As a result, Serbia has met the conditionality set out in the IMF
SBA by a significant margin, with the general government deficit
reaching an estimated 1.4% of GDP in 2016, far exceeding the 4%
target in the original budget for 2016. Moody's expects the
deficit to decline moderately to 1.2% in 2017, benefitting from
the recent improvements in revenue generation and a continued
reduction in the public wage bill as a percent of GDP, despite
budgeted wage increases in selected sectors. The debt burden will
continue to gradually decline reaching just below 70% in 2018,
although it will still remain above the median of Ba-rated peers
(41.1% in 2015).

Improvements to the fiscal framework in Serbia will also support
a conservative budgetary stance in the coming years. Moody's
expects that continued progress on the restructuring of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), such as those which have improved the
financial viability of the Serbian railways company, will help to
reduce the fiscal costs associated with subsidies, unpaid taxes
and guarantees for the sector.

Total state aid paid from the budget, while still sizeable, has
fallen in each of the last two years, reaching 3.7% of GDP in
2016 (from 5.2% of GDP in 2014) after direct subsidies declined
by around 16% relative to 2015, and Moody's expects these costs
to continue to decline. Furthermore, future demands on the budget
from SOEs will be reduced by the commitment of the authorities,
as part of the IMF agreement, to strictly limit the issuance of
state guarantees since 2015 and steps to prepay or refinance
government guaranteed debt in 2017 on more favourable terms,
given that activated guarantees accounted for a sizeable share of
total state aid over the past three years.

-- SECOND DRIVER: STRUCTURAL REFORMS INCREASE ECONOMIC
RESILIENCE TO SHOCKS

The second driver is Moody's view that recent structural reforms
have increased the resilience of Serbia's economy to shocks.

The Serbian economy recovered strongly in 2016, growing by an
estimated 2.8% of GDP, the highest rate of growth over the past 8
years. Notably, the economy is now less dependent on final
consumption with a reorientation towards exports driven by strong
foreign investment into the tradeable sector. Moody's expects
economic growth will rise to 3.0% this year and reach 3.3% in
2018, noting that the diversity of growth drivers together with
improvements to price stability will support potential growth in
Serbia of between 3.5%-4%.

Moody's expects the wide-ranging labour market reform undertaken
in 2014 will help sustain private consumption, reflecting the
improvement in labour participation to 65.6% in 2016 from 63.3%
in 2014 and recent strong employment growth driven by the private
sector. Furthermore, consumer spending will be supported by the
sharp drop in the Labour Force Survey unemployment rate to 13.0%
in Q4 2016, one of the lowest rates in the Western Balkans, and
the recent pick-up in consumer lending.

Furthermore, investment activity will benefit from improvements
in Serbia's business environment (Serbia's ranking on the World
Bank Doing Business Report reached 47th in 2017) and an easing of
financing conditions. Notably, implementation of the Non-
Performing Loan (NPL) action plan and the completion of the
Special Diagnostic Studies has helped contribute to stronger
financial sector soundness and confidence. Moody's expects
strategically important infrastructure projects, such as Corridor
11, will also underpin investment activity.

Moreover, the recent broad-based recovery in exports, with almost
all export sectors contributing to strong real growth in 2016,
support the resilience of Serbia's relatively open economy. While
Serbia remains reliant on the EU market for its exports,
particularly Italy (Baa2 negative) and Germany (Aaa stable), it
has also grown its exports to neighbouring countries such as
Bosnia and Herzegovina (B3 stable), Montenegro (B1 negative) and
Macedonia.

In addition, Moody's expects Serbia's achievements in maintaining
price stability will be preserved. The decision by the National
Bank of Serbia to reduce the inflation target by 1pp to 3% (with
a 1.5pp tolerance band) reflects the improved macro fundamentals,
reduced inflation expectations and stronger credibility of the
central bank. Moody's expect an anchoring of inflation
expectations at lower levels will help reduce longer-term
interest rates and support potential growth.

Finally, improvements in external vulnerability help increase the
resilience of the Serbian economy to external shocks. Moody's
expects the current account deficit, which narrowed further in
2016 to an estimated 4.0% of GDP compared to around 6% of GDP in
2013/14, will continue to be broadly covered by foreign direct
investment (FDI) which has become more diversified in recent
years.

As a result, Moody's estimate of Serbia's external vulnerability
index is expected to remain low at around 40% of foreign exchange
reserves. Furthermore, lower inflation will continue to support
the authorities' dinarisation strategy, which has seen the share
of private sector deposits in local currency increasing to around
30% in 2016, improving resilience to exchange rate shocks.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects the balanced risks to Serbia's credit
profile at the Ba3 rating level. While the pace of reforms may
slow following the significant gains achieved in 2016, Moody's
expects that Serbia's continued progress with the EU accession
process and likely further engagement with the IMF will help to
limit the risk of a reversal of the reform progress achieved to
date.

Increased resistance to further reforms from vested interests,
particularly those aimed at reducing fiscal risks from SOEs,
could impact on the gradual reduction in Serbia's debt burden.
Furthermore, Serbia's record of frequent elections, including
snap parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2016, increases
implementation risks, although Moody's considers it unlikely that
the forthcoming presidential elections will significantly delay
the reform agenda. Serbia's sizeable share of general government
debt denominated in foreign currency poses a credit risk,
particularly in the event of a sharp deterioration in the Serbian
dinar, as does the high degree of euroisation in the banking
sector. However, Moody's notes that the authorities have been
able to increase the role of local currency in the economy
through its dinarisation strategy.

In contrast, Serbia could benefit from continued institutional
improvements as part of the EU accession process. Progress on EU
accession, which has continued through successive governments,
has allowed Serbia to formally open 8 chapters out of a total of
35 since the formal start of accession negotiations in January
2014. The experience of other Accession Countries suggests that
continued adoption of EU reforms will yield a number of
enhancements to the quality of Serbia's institutions, which has
been recognized in improvements to Serbia's Worldwide Governance
Indicators on government effectiveness, rule of law and control
of corruption relative to 2013. Furthermore, the economic
recovery and fiscal consolidation could continue to surprise to
the upside, as stronger confidence reinforces the fiscal and
economic improvements made in 2016, and increased interest from
foreign investors helps to accelerate the privatisation process.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Upward pressure on Serbia's rating could arise if progress on
structural reforms led to a notable improvement in the country's
economic and fiscal metrics, resulting in a faster than expected
reduction in the public debt burden closer to the median of
similarly rated peers. Furthermore, structural reforms, including
those to stimulate private investment through improvements in the
business environment which in turn help to further boost
potential growth in the economy, would be credit positive.

Conversely, downward pressure on Serbia's issuer rating could
arise if a reduced commitment by policymakers to the reform
agenda, particularly in relation to addressing budget risks from
the SOE sector, leads to a markedly weaker growth outlook and a
deterioration in fiscal metrics. Moreover, the emergence of
structural imbalances in the form of a large and increasingly
difficult-to-finance current account deficit could also trigger a
rating downgrade.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 13,699 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 2.8% (2016 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 1.5% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -1.4% (2016 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -4% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 78.4% (2015 Actual)

Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On 14 March 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Government of Serbia. The main points raised during
the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have materially increased. The
issuer's institutional strength/framework, have materially
increased. The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including
its debt profile, has materially increased.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Bond Ratings published in December 2016.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.


=========
S P A I N
=========


CAIXABANK RMBS: Moody's Assigns (P)Caa1 Rating to Cl. B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
CAIXABANK RMBS 2, FT's class A and B notes:

Issuer: CAIXABANK RMBS 2, FT

-- EUR2,448M Class A Notes due January 2061, Assigned
(P)Aa3 (sf)

-- EUR272M Class B Notes due January 2061, Assigned (P)Caa1 (sf)

CAIXABANK RMBS 2, FT is a static cash securitisation of first-
line prime mortgage loans extended mainly to obligors located in
Spain. [35.14%] of the portfolio, consists of flexible mortgages
and [64.86%] standard mortgage loans secured on Spanish
residential properties.

RATINGS RATIONALE

CAIXABANK RMBS 2, FT is a securitisation of loans that CaixaBank,
S.A. (Baa2/P-2/ Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr)) granted mainly to Spanish
individuals. CaixaBank, S.A. (Baa2/P-2/ Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr)) is
acting as the servicer of the loans, while CaixaBank
Titulizacion, S.G.F.T., S.A. is the management company.

The provisional ratings take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement ("MILAN
CE") assumption and the portfolio's expected loss.

The key drivers for the portfolio's expected loss of [3.5%] are
(i) benchmarking with comparable transactions in the Spanish
market through the analysis data in CaixaBank, S.A.'s (Baa2/P-2/
Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr)) book; (ii) very good track record of previous
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities ("RMBS") originated by
CaixaBank, S.A. (Baa2/P-2/ Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr)) (the Foncaixa
Hipotecarios series); and (iii) Moody's outlook on Spanish RMBS
in combination with the seller's historic recovery data.

The transaction's [12.3%] MILAN CE number is in line with other
Spanish RMBS transactions. The MILAN CE's key drivers are (i) the
current weighted-average loan-to-value ("LTV") ratio of [68.68%]
(calculated taking into account the original appraisal value when
the loan was granted), which is lower than the average for
Spanish RMBS transactions; (ii) the well-seasoned portfolio,
which has a weighted-average seasoning of [4.2] years; (iii) the
fact that only [7.4%] of the borrowers in the pool are not
Spanish nationals; (iv) the absence of broker-originated loans in
the pool; and (v) the absence of restructured, renegotiated,
refinancing or debt consolidation loans in the pool.

[35.14%] of the pool consists of flexible mortgage loans, which
are structured like a line of credit. Under these flexible
mortgage loans, borrowers can make additional drawdowns up to a
certain LTV ratio limit, for an amount equal to the amortised
principal. As a result, flexible mortgages lead to a higher
expected default frequency and more severe losses than for
traditional mortgage loans. Additionally, [28.44%] of the
borrowers have the option to benefit from payment holiday
periods, where principal is not paid, and [18.93%] of the pool
can avail of principal and interest grace periods.

Moody's considers that the deal has the following credit
strengths: (i) the full subordination of the class B notes'
interest and principal to the class A notes; (ii) the notes'
sequential amortisation; and (iii) a fully funded reserve upfront
equal to [4.75%] of the notes, which covers potential shortfalls
in the class A notes' interest and principal during the
transaction's life (and subsequently of the class B notes, once
the class A notes have fully amortised).

The portfolio mainly contains floating-rate loans linked to 12-
month Euribor [66.54%], or "Indice de Referencia de Prestamos
Hipotecarios conjunto de entidades de credito" ("IRPH"), whereas
the notes are linked to three-month Euribor and reset every
quarter on the determination dates. This leads to an interest-
rate mismatch in the transaction. [33.46%] of the provisional
pool comprises of fixed-rate loans. Therefore, there is a
potential fixed-to-floating-rate risk, whereby the Euribor rate
on the notes increases, while the interest rates on the loans
remain constant until the reset date. There is no interest-rate
swap in place to cover interest-rate risk. Moody's takes into
account the potential interest rate exposure as part of its cash
flow analysis when determining the notes' provisional ratings.

The provisional ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by legal final maturity. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for the timely payment of interest and the
ultimate payment of principal for the class A notes and the
ultimate payment of principal for the class B notes by legal
final maturity. Moody's provisional ratings only address the
credit risks associated with the transaction. Other non-credit
risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant effect
on yield to investors.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavour
to assign definitive ratings to the notes. A definitive rating
may differ from a provisional rating. Moody's will disseminate
the assignment of any definitive ratings through its Client
Service Desk. Moody's will monitor this transaction on an ongoing
basis. For updated monitoring information, please contact
monitor.rmbs@moodys.com

STRESS SCENARIOS

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. At the
time the provisional ratings were assigned, the model output
indicated that the class A notes would have achieved a A1 rating
if the expected loss was maintained at 3.5% and the MILAN CE
increased to 14.75%, and all other factors were constant.

The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time, but rather how the initial rating of the security
might have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework," published in
September 2016.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of a
rating for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significantly better-than-expected performance of the pool,
combined with an increase in the notes' credit enhancement and a
change in Spanish Local Currency Ceiling .

Factors that may cause a downgrade of the ratings include
significantly different loss assumptions compared with Moody's
expectations at closing due to either (i) a change in economic
conditions from Moody's central forecast scenario; or (ii)
idiosyncratic performance factors that would lead to rating
actions; or (iii) a change in Spain's sovereign risk, which may
also result in subsequent rating actions on the notes.


PYME BANCAJA 5: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded PYME Bancaja 5's class B notes and
affirmed the others, as follows:

Class B (ISIN ES0372259038): upgraded to 'BBB+sf' from 'BBsf';
Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN ES0372259046): affirmed at 'CCsf; Recovery Estimate
65% revised from 50%
Class D (ISIN ES0372259053): affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Estimate
0%

PYME Bancaja 5, FTA is a static cash flow SME CLO originated by
Caja de Ahorros de Valencia, Castellon y Alicante (Bancaja), now
part of Bankia S.A. (BBB-/Stable/F3). The note proceeds were used
to purchase a EUR1.15bn portfolio of secured and unsecured loans
granted to Spanish small and medium enterprises.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance, Increased Credit Enhancement
Delinquencies have remained at low levels during the past year.
Obligors more than 90 days past due remained consistently below
1% since January 2016 and were 0.47% of the portfolio as at 31
January 2017. There are no loans delinquent over 180 days,
improved from the levels at the last transaction's annual review.
Cumulative defaults increased by EUR385,889, below Fitch's
expectations. As a result, Fitch has revised the annual average
expected probability of default to 4% from 6.5%.

The deleveraging of the portfolio and stable performance, allowed
the class B notes to repay by EUR21.4 million while the PDL
balance decreased to EUR2.2 million from EUR8.5 million.
Consequently credit enhancement available for the class B notes
increased to 67.7% from 32.9% as at the last review, allowing the
notes to pass ratings above 'BBB+sf' however the sensitivity to
increased recovery lag constrained the upgrade as per below.

Low Recoveries so Far
The weighted average recovery rate for the transaction remained
low at 40.7%. Recoveries are coming through slower than expected
and since the last review. The transaction collected EUR1.2
million in the past 12 months. Fitch tested the sensitivity of
the notes to the recovery lag and under a scenario of increased
time to recovery of up to 10 years, the class B notes cannot
withstand rating stresses above 'BBB+sf'.

High Obligor Concentration
Obligor concentration in the portfolio is high and has increased
since the last annual review, as the transaction deleverages. The
largest performing obligor in the portfolio represents 4.8% of
the performing portfolio balance and the largest 10 obligors
30.4%, increased from 4.1% and 28.2% at the last review,
respectively. In addition, obligors accounting for more than 0.5%
each represent 80.1% of the performing balance. Fitch tested the
sensitivity of the ratings to the default of the largest five
obligors in the portfolio, with no impact on the ratings.

Under-collateralised Junior Notes
The class C notes have been affirmed at 'CCsf' with a Recovery
Estimate of 65% as the notes are only partially backed by
performing collateral and will otherwise rely on recoveries. The
class D notes are affirmed at 'Csf' as these notes are backed by
the reserve fund, which has been fully depleted since November
2013.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Increasing the default probabilities assigned to the underlying
obligors by 25%, or decreasing the recovery rates assigned, would
not impact the rating of any of the notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis.

- Loan-by-loan data provided by Europea de Titulizacion as of 31
   December 2016
- Transaction reporting provided by Europea de Titulizacion as
   of 31 January 2016


SRF 2017-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba2 Rating to Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to SRF
2017-1, Fondo de Titulizacion's Class A, B, C and D notes:

-- EUR [248] million Class A Notes due April 2063, Assigned
   (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR [40] million Class B Notes due April 2063, Assigned (P)A2
   (sf)

-- EUR [16] million Class C Notes due April 2063, Assigned
   (P)Baa3 (sf)

-- EUR [12] million Class D Notes due April 2063, Assigned
   (P)Ba2 (sf)

Moody's has not assigned rating to EUR [84] million Class E Notes
due April 2063.

SRF 2017-1, Fondo de Titulizacion is a static cash securitisation
largely consisting of seasoned re-performing residential mortgage
loans extended to borrowers located in Spain, originated by Caixa
d'Estalvis de Catalunya ("Caixa Catalunya"), Caixa d'Estalvis de
Tarragona ("Caixa Tarragona") and Caixa d'Estalvis de Manresa
("Caixa Manresa"), which were merged into Caixa d'Estalvis de
Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa. The banking business of Caixa
d'Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa was transferred (as
a whole) to Catalunya Banc, S.A. by virtue of a spin-off on 27
September 2011. On 24 April 2015, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria, S.A. ("BBVA") acquired 98.4% of the share capital of
Catalunya Banc, S.A. and, as of 9 September 2016, Catalunya Banc,
S.A. was absorbed by and merged with BBVA. BBVA is currently
rated Baa1 Senior Unsecured / A3 Deposit Rating / Baa1 (cr). The
servicing will be undertaken by BBVA, on behalf of the fund, and
through Anticipa Real Estate, S.L.U. (N.R) ("Anticipa"). In April
2015, Catalunya Banc, S.A sold a EUR 6bn portfolio consisting of
mainly residential mortgage loans to a Spanish securitisation
fund (FTA2015, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos) set-up for the
benefit of an entity controlled by Spain Residential Finance S.A
R.L. Some of these mortgage loans in FTA 2015 will be securitized
in SRF 2017-1 FT. Furthermore, Spain Residential S.A R.L is
expected to subscribe to the Class E Note and the Subordinated
Loans in SRF 2017-1.

The portfolio consists of first lien (or subsequent lien,
provided that the first lien mortgage will also be assigned to
SRF 2017-1) mortgages on residential properties extended to
[3,307] borrowers residents in Spain, and the provisional pool
balance is approximately equal to EUR[403.1] million with a
weighted average current loan-to-value ("WA CLTV") of [60.88%].
[79.16%] of the loans in the pool have been previously
restructured and are now re-performing loans. [20.84%] of the
loans have not been restructured. The purchase price of the
mortgage loans payable by the fund to the seller is expected to
be below par value.

The provisional ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal with respect to the Class A notes by the
legal final maturity date, and ultimate payment of interest and
principal with respect to Classes B, C and D by legal final
maturity. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavour
to assign definitive ratings to the notes. A definitive rating
may differ from a provisional rating. Moody's will disseminate
the assignment of any definitive ratings through its Client
Service Desk. Moody's will monitor this transaction on an ongoing
basis. For updated monitoring information, please contact
monitor.rmbs@moodys.com.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The first step in the analysis of the credit quality of the pool
is to determine a loss distribution of the mortgages to be
securitised. In order to determine the shape of the curve, two
parameters are needed: the expected loss and the volatility
around this expected loss. Securitisation of re-performing loans
have characteristics similar to those of seasoned RMBS
transactions. Both types of securitisations have seasoned
collateral in various stages of payment and distress. For that
reason, Moody's analysis of re-performing transactions typically
follows Moody's methodology for analysing the underlying asset
type (e.g., residential mortgage loans in this case). The two
main parameters needed to determine the loss distribution
(expected loss and volatility around it) of the pool are derived
from two important sources: historical loss data and the MILAN
loan-by-loan model.

The key drivers for the portfolio's expected loss of [11.0%] are
(i) historical data provided previously by Catalunya Banc, S.A.
on their mortgage portfolio, (ii) performance data from previous
deals originated by Catalunya Banc, S.A. (Hipocat and MBSCAT),
(iii) market and sector wide performance data, (iv) performance
of other securitisations with similar loan characteristics, and
(v) the outlook on Spanish RMBS. The two factors that mainly
influence the likelihood that a re-performing mortgage loan will
re-default are how long the loan has performed since its last
modification, and the magnitude of reduction in the monthly
mortgage payment as a result of modification. The longer a
borrower has been current on a re-performing loan, the lower the
likelihood of re-default. All the instalments accrued since 1
February 2015 under the mortgage loans of the provisional pool
have been paid with no more than 35 calendar days in arrears for
each instalment.

The transaction's [32.0%] MILAN CE number is higher than other
Spanish RMBS transactions owing to [51.93]% of the pool
consisting of flexible mortgage products which lead to a higher
expected default frequency and more severe losses than
traditional mortgage loans. The MILAN CE also reflects other
characteristics of the pool that are specific to re-performing
loans. [79.16%] of the loans in the pool have been restructured
and are now paying under modified terms. If the loans are
currently in arrears or the terms of the loan have been modified
since closing, Moody's does not consider LTV to be the only major
driver for losses. Therefore, the MILAN CE number has been
adjusted to account for a higher likelihood of re-default of the
re-performing loans compared to loans that have never been
restructured. This results in a loss distribution with higher
probability of "fat tail" events with respect to the expected
loss.

Moody's considers that the deal has the following credit
strengths: (i) availability of payment histories on the mortgage
loans in the collateral pool. The default propensity on seasoned
re-performing modified loans is largely driven by the
demonstrated payment history on the loans. As borrowers continue
to make payments on a mortgage loan, they progressively become
less likely to default. All the instalments accrued since 1
February 2015 under the mortgage loans of the provisional pool
have been paid with no more than 35 calendar days in arrears for
each instalment. Additionally, during that period, none of the
loans has benefited from a contractual grace period; (ii) the WA
CLTV ratio of [60.88%] (calculated taking into account the
original appraisal value when the loan was granted) is lower than
the average for Spanish transactions; (iii) the portfolio is well
seasoned, with a weighted average seasoning of [9.25] years and
(iv) the credit enhancement provided by an amortising reserve
fund equal to [2.5]% of Class A notes at closing and the
subordination of the notes. The reserve fund will be established
as a credit enhancement mechanism for the purpose of providing
liquidity to cover senior fees and interest on the Class A notes
for as long as these notes remain outstanding. The reserve fund
is also available to cover principal on Class A notes at the
legal final maturity. Accordingly, on the payment date on which
the Class A notes are redeemed in full, the reserve fund required
amount will be equal to zero.

Moody's also notes the following credit weaknesses of the
transaction: (i) no interest rate swap is in place to cover
interest rate risk. Moreover, [60.05%] of the pool has the option
of an automatic discount on the loan margin depending on the
cross-selling of other products to the borrower, (ii) [79.16%] of
the loans in the pool have been restructured and are now paying
under modified terms, (iii) historical performance of previous
Catalunya Banc, S.A. deals. Previous transactions originated by
Catalunya Banc, S.A. (Hipocat and MBSCAT series) display a weaker
performance than the market and (iv) weaker than standard
representations & warranties (R&W) framework: Moody's considers
the R&W weaker than the standard in the Spanish market for the
following reasons: (1) the representation provider is an unrated
private limited liability company, and (2) the obligation to
repurchase or replace loans in breach of R&Ws would only be
activated upon the earlier of (i) the aggregate ineligible
mortgage amount is higher than EUR 2,500,000, and (ii) the fifth
anniversary of the transaction's closing date. Moody's has
factored all of these weaknesses in the analysis/modeling.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significantly better-than-expected performance of the pool,
combined with an increase in the notes' credit enhancement and a
decline in Spain's sovereign risk.

Factors that may cause a downgrade of the ratings include (i)
significantly different loss assumptions compared with Moody's
expectations at closing, due to a change in economic conditions
from Moody's central forecast scenario or idiosyncratic
performance factors; or (ii) an increase in Spain's sovereign
risk.

Stress Scenarios:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

At the time the provisional ratings were assigned, the model
output indicated that the Class A notes would have achieved an
Aa2 if the expected loss was as high as 13.75%, if the MILAN CE
was 32%, and all other factors were constant. The model output
further indicated that the Class A notes would not have been
assigned an Aa2 rating with a MILAN CE of 38.4%, and an expected
loss of 11.0%.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and
Re-Performing Loans" published in August 2016.

Moody's will monitor this transaction on an ongoing basis. For
updated monitoring information, please contact
monitor.rmbs@moodys.com.


TDA 29: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded two tranches of TDA 29, FTA and
affirmed two others as follows:

Class A2 notes (ISIN ES0377931011): upgraded to 'A-sf' from
'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B notes (ISIN ES0377931029): upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable
Class C notes (ISIN ES0377931037): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
Estimate revised to 85% from 65%
Class D notes (ISIN ES0377931045): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate revised to 50% from 0%

The Spanish RMBS transaction comprises residential mortgages
serviced by Banco de Sabadell S.A. and Banca March.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Credit Enhancement (CE)
Fitch anticipates structural CE to remain stable as the
transaction is expected to maintain pro-rata paydown of the rated
notes over the coming years. Existing and projected CE is
sufficient to support higher stresses as reflected in the
upgrades.

Stable Asset Performance
TDA 29 has shown sound asset performance compared with the
average Fitch-rated Spanish RMBS. Three-months plus arrears
(excluding defaults) as a percentage of the current pool balance
of 0.26% for TDA 29 remains below Fitch's index of 0.9%.
Cumulative defaults, defined as mortgages in arrears by more than
12 months, of 4.7% also remain below the 5.6% observed on Fitch's
index. Fitch believes that these levels are likely to remain
stable as the stock of late stage arrears is low. Given the
improved performance, Fitch has revised the Recovery Estimate on
the junior notes

Payment Interruption Risk
Fitch views TDA 29 as exposed to payment interruption risk as the
available structural mitigant - the reserve fund (reduced by the
expected loss) - remains insufficient to fully cover stressed
senior fees, net swap payments and stressed note interests in the
event of a servicer disruption. As a result, Fitch has capped the
notes at 'Asf' unless payment interruption risk is sufficiently
mitigated. This constitutes a variation from Fitch Counterparty
Criteria for Structure Finance and Covered Bonds, as the
collection account banks (and servicers) are not rated by Fitch.

VARIATION FROM CRITERIA

Rating Cap Due to Payment Interruption Risk
According to Fitch's Counterparty Criteria for Structure Finance
and Covered Bonds, the maximum achievable rating for transactions
exposed to payment interruption risk is five notches above the
rating of the collection account bank, so long as the bank is a
regulated institution in a developed market. Even though the
collection account banks in TDA 29 are not rated by Fitch, the
maximum achievable rating for TDA 29 of 'Asf' is substantiated by
the established retail franchise of both institutions and the
robust banking sector supervision in Spain.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As long as payment interruption risk is not fully mitigated; the
maximum achievable rating of the notes will remain capped at
'Asf'.

A worsening of the Spanish macroeconomic environment especially
employment conditions, or an abrupt shift of interest rates could
jeopardise the underlying borrowers' affordability. This could
have negative rating implications, especially for junior tranches
that are less protected by structural CE.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to or reviewed by
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY
Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable. Overall, Fitch's assessment of
the information relied upon for the agency's rating analysis
according to its applicable rating methodologies indicates that
it is adequately reliable.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


TURKEY: Moody's Affirms (P)Ba1 Debt, Issuer Ratings, Outlook Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed Turkey's rating outlook to
negative from stable. Moody's has also affirmed Turkey's
government debt and issuer ratings at Ba1 and shelf ratings at
(P)Ba1.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The change in the rating outlook to negative captures a
combination of inter-related drivers:

- The continuing erosion of Turkey's institutional strength;

- Its weaker growth outlook;

- Heightened pressures on Turkey's public and external accounts;

- And in consequence, the increased risk of a credit shock.

The affirmation of Turkey's Ba1 rating reflects the government's
high economic and fiscal strength, which continues to provide a
buffer against the risks posed by its diminished institutional
strength and high external vulnerability; and the economy's
intrinsic dynamism, which Moody's would expect to be revitalized
if structural reforms were enacted as intended and political
uncertainty was reduced.

Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the Ba1 senior unsecured bond
rating of Hazine Mustesarligi Varlik Kiralama A.S., a special
purpose vehicle wholly owned by the Republic of Turkey. The
outlook was changed to negative from stable.

Turkey's country ceilings remain unchanged at Baa2/Prime-3
(foreign currency bonds), Ba2/NP (foreign currency bank deposits)
and Baa1 (local currency debt and deposits).

RATIONALE FOR CHANGING TURKEY'S RATING OUTLOOK TO NEGATIVE FROM
STABLE

Since Moody's last rating action in September, domestic and
external pressures on Turkey's credit profile have risen
materially.

The tense domestic political environment following last July's
failed coup has persisted for longer than expected, a situation
that the referendum on April 16 to centralize executive powers
within the presidency is unlikely to alter given the large divide
between the ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party and the
opposition over the proposed constitutional changes. The actions
taken to reduce various forms of opposition to the government
since July last year have undermined the country's administrative
capacity and damaged private sector confidence.

Partly as a consequence, Turkey has experienced a further
slowdown in growth. While Moody's expects the particularly poor
economic performance registered in the third quarter of 2016 to
be temporary, the impact of ongoing political and geopolitical
tensions on domestic confidence, and the heightened external
pressures that led to a steep depreciation of the lira and high
inflation, will suppress growth in the near-term relative to
expectations last year. Over the longer term, potential growth
will remain relatively low by historical standards in the
continued absence of the structural economic reforms originally
planned, such as in the labor market, to boost sagging
productivity.

The authorities' policy response has focused primarily on
supporting short-term economic activity and has increased moral
hazard. The central bank has relaxed macro-prudential rules in
order to stimulate credit growth, reversing measures undertaken
in 2012-2014 to restrain growth in household debt. The
authorities have encouraged banks to increase lending, to
restructure payment schedules and to allow companies to repay
foreign currency-denominated loans in Turkish lira at a favorable
exchange rate. And the central bank has held its key policy
interest rate negative in real terms in the face of rising
inflationary pressures (with inflation exceeding the 5%Ò2%
target), primarily it seems to avoid increasing financing
pressures on domestic firms. Moody's believes that such measures
risk increasing macro-economic imbalances, while failing to
address the fundamental structural issues impeding growth.

According to Moody's, weaker growth is negatively impacting
Turkey's key credit anchor -- its healthy public finances and low
government debt. The government has taken a range of measures to
mitigate the domestic impact of the sluggish economy, including
providing wage subsidies to firms and postponing the due dates
for their tax and social security payments. Stopping such support
will be difficult since the factors weighing on consumption and
investment, such as higher inflation and interest rates and
declining productivity, are structural rather than cyclical.
Moody's expects the increase in government spending to continue
into 2018, the fiscal deficit to widen and bond yields to
continue to rise, with adverse implications for Turkey's debt
metrics.

Turkey's external vulnerability is a long-standing credit
weakness, but has been accentuated in recent months by a number
of factors. While some, such as rising US interest rates, are
external to Turkey, most reflect domestic developments that have
undermined domestic and foreign investor confidence, or
geopolitical considerations, such as terrorist attacks, that have
had significant adverse consequences for tourism. The lira has
weakened sharply, with capital inflows intermittently
insufficient to finance the current account, eroding the central
bank's already weak foreign exchange reserve buffer. As a
consequence, Turkey's External Vulnerability Indicator remains
elevated at an estimated 202% in 2017, well above the 50% level
seen in most of Turkey's emerging market peers. The depreciation
has exacerbated the corporate sector's already large foreign
currency debt service costs at a time when profitability is being
squeezed by high inflation and rising interest rates. With a
sizeable share of banking system loans denominated in foreign
currency, domestic banks' asset quality is also under pressure,
although the banks' capital buffers remain relatively healthy.

RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMING TURKEY'S Ba1 ISSUER RATING

In all of these respects, the pressures on Turkey's credit
profile have risen since the last rating action. However, the
sovereign retains some important credit strengths that mitigate
these pressures and that continue to support a Ba1 rating.

Turkey's key strengths include its large size and its flexible,
middle-income economy, which benefits from favorable
demographics, specifically its relatively young population, and
diverse trade linkages. These factors continue to support a
potential growth rate of about 3.3%, according to the IMF. The
government's fiscal deficit, debt and debt affordability metrics
remain materially stronger than most similarly-rated peers.
Furthermore, as a result of a proactive debt-management strategy,
debt maturities have been lengthened and debt is largely issued
at fixed rates. This structure has helped to soften the pass-
through of the lira weakness to the government's debt metrics and
debt affordability.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Potential upward movement in Turkey's issuer rating is
constrained by balance-of-payments pressures as long as external
imbalances and refinancing requirements remain large. However,
upward rating pressure could materialize in the event of
structural reductions in these vulnerabilities or material
improvements in Turkey's institutional environment or
competitiveness. Reductions in political risk emanating either
from the geopolitical or domestic political environment, while
credit positive, would not result in upward rating actions in the
absence of sustainable improvements in external vulnerability
although such developments could lead to a stabilization of the
rating outlook.

Turkey's sovereign rating would likely be downgraded if there is
a material increase in the probability of a balance of payments
crisis. Such an event would likely be associated with some
combination of a rapidly falling exchange rate, a sharp further
reduction in reserves or sustained capital outflows. Sustained
lower growth and a related worsening in the government's fiscal
strength could also precipitate a downgrade, as could a further
erosion of institutional strength.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 20,420 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 2% (2016 Estimate) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 8.5% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -1.2% (2016 Estimate) (also
known as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -3.8% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 49.8% (2016 Estimate)

Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On 14 March 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Turkey, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, are weakening. The issuer's
fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile, has not
materially decreased. The issuer has become increasingly
susceptible to event risks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Bond Ratings published in December 2016.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


IMEXBANK: At Least $11MM Withdrawn Before Bank Declared Insolvent
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Interfax-Ukraine News Agency, citing the Individuals' Deposit
Guarantee Fund, reports that individuals' loans, liquidity
provision worth at least $11 million had been withdrawn from
Imexbank (Odesa) a month before the bank was declared insolvent.

According to the report, the fund's data showed the estimated
value of the bank's assets is less than 15% of the amount
recorded in financial statements. Thus, the value of assets
included in the liquidation mass "on paper" is UAH14.952 billion,
while four independent appraisers estimated them at UAH2.082
billion.

"The analysis of operations conducted by the bank shortly before
the introduction of temporary administration shows: the schemes,
manipulations and withdrawal of liquid assets were applied," the
fund, as cited by Interfax-Ukraine, said.

Interfax-Ukraine relates that the fund said a few weeks before
the introduction of temporary administration pursuant to the
decision of the Economic Court of Odesa region the bank
transferred $10.925 million to a resident company in the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This amount was
transferred for the software allegedly installed by the company
in the bank office in Crimea in January 2013. At the same time,
these assets were not mentioned in the bank's balance sheet, the
report adds.

Imexbank is one of the largest commercial banks in Ukraine and is
based in the city of Odessa.  The liquidation of Imexbank was
prolonged by two years into May 26, 2018. The liquidator of
Imexbank is Serhii Hadzhiyev, according to Interfax-Ukraine.


UKRAINE: NBU Council Wants Bank Bankruptcy Losses Calculated
------------------------------------------------------------
Ukrainian News Agency reports that the Council of the National
Bank of Ukraine urges the NBU Board to calculate losses of the
state budget, companies, and population as a result of bankruptcy
of 80 banks in 2014-2016.

This is said in the resolution of the NBU Council No. 5-rd of
February 28, Ukrainian News Agency reports.

According to Ukrainian News Agency, the NBU Council says the
banking crisis continued into 2016, with the number of operating
banks shrinking from 117 to 96.

The NBU Council believes that the nationalization of CB
PRIVATBANK PJSC in late 2016 allowed for a quick containment of
the problems faced by the country's largest bank but fell short
in finally resolving them and identifying all the factors that
drove the largest systemic bank into insolvency, Ukrainian News
Agency states.

A total of UAH82 billion had been paid to depositors of insolvent
banks as at February 1, 2017, Ukrainian News Agency recounts.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

CITYWING: Goes Into Liquidation
-------------------------------
Madeline Patrick at Normangee Star reports that passengers who
were booked on flights across the United Kingdom and from the
Isle of Man have been asked not to turn up at airports for booked
flights, as there will be no one to assist.

Citywing was formerly known as Manx2; it rebranded in 2013.

Being a virtual airline, Citywing had no aircraft, according to
Normangee Star. The chosen carrier was Van Air Europe, based in
the Czech Republic.

The report says Mr. Skates said: "I am grateful to Eastern
Airways, the Civil Aviation Authority, Cardiff and Anglesey
airports and the RAF at Valley for their support and help in
making sure this necessary transition between providers has
happened so quickly".

The report discloses it is thought that the regulator questioned
the decision to depart when extreme winds made a return to the
Isle of Man uncertain.

The report relays so far there has been no announcement on the
future of the Gloucester, Glasgow and Blackpool services, which
were also operated by CityWing.

The withdrawal of a route license following an incident involving
a Belfast-bound Citywing flight during Storm Doris last month has
prompted the airline's liquidation, with all flights grounded
permanently, the report relays.

In a statement, the company said that they had found it hard to
source suitable viable aircraft to fulfill their contract, the
report notes.

The report discloses that Citywing released a statement on March
10 saying: "The company has tried to offer a service while
suffering considerable losses but these have proved unfortunately
to be commercially unsustainable". This decision has not been
taken lightly and has been made to protect creditors. Affected
passengers have been asked to bring proof of their Citywing
booking ahead of departure.

Passengers have been told not to go to the airport as "there will
be no one to assist".

A liquidator will be appointed and they will advise in due course
on how to get a refund on your tickets".


CITYWING: Gov't Agencies Try to Minimize Impact of Liquidation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Manx Radio reports that the Department of Economic Development is
working with the Department of Infrastructure to try and minimise
the impact of Citywing going into liquidation.

Economic Development Minister Laurence Skelly says that's in
terms of helping both staff and passengers who are affected,
according to Manx Radio.

The report notes the ticket seller's collapse has meant the loss
of five routes -- Belfast, Blackpool, Glasgow, Gloucester and
Newcastle.

Mr. Skelly says the departments are in the early stages of talks
with other operator, the report notes.


CROWDMIX: Owner Deemed Delusional Due to Incorrect Valuation
------------------------------------------------------------
Shona Ghosh at Business Insider UK reports that Nick Candy, the
property tycoon who invested almost GBP10 million in failed
startup Crowdmix, described the company's former CEO as
"delusional" about its GBP120 million valuation in the High Court
on March 13.

Mr. Candy was giving evidence in the unrelated GBP132 million
legal battle he is fighting with his brother, Christian Candy,
against their former friend Mark Holyoake, according to Business
Insider UK.  Mr. Holyoake has accused the pair of blackmail,
extortion, and threats in relation to a property deal turned
sour, the report relays.

The Candys deny the allegations.

The report notes Candy talked about his 2015 investment in music
startup Crowdmix while under cross-examination from Holyoake's
barrister, Roger Stewart.

The report notes that he said Crowdmix had wanted to raise funds
in 2016 at a valuation of GBP120-GBP130 million, "when there
[was] no product, there [was] no revenue, the cashflow [burn
rate] was over 2 million -- I think it was GBP2.5 million a
month."  He added that then-CEO Ian Roberts "was delusional" to
try and raise funding at that valuation.

"It is one of the worst deals I have ever done. I have lost
GBP9.25 million from it," he said, notes the report.  Mr. Candy
had invested through his company Candy Capital.

The report relays that Ian Roberts had appeared earlier in the
trial to give evidence in support of Mark Holyoake.  Mr. Roberts
claimed he saw similarities between Nick Candy's alleged behavior
towards Holyoake, and his alleged pattern of behaviors as a
Crowdmix investor. During his evidence, he said Candy had
pressured him to hand over his shares in the startup in exchange
for funding, the report notes.

On March 13, Mr. Candy denied this in court. He said:

"We did speak about those shares . . .  but it was not a
condition of more money coming in. What we were trying to do is
get the company into a shape where it had new equity coming in,
not just from Candy Capital, Candy Capital were willing to put
some more money in and were by far the largest shareholder of
this company - well, not the largest shareholder, we had put the
most amount of money in but in terms of shareholding, my Lord, we
had not got a huge shareholding so we asked them to take some of
the pain with us by giving us some of their shares."

He added that he had injected GBP750,000 into Crowdmix just
before it went into administration, the report relays.

"[If] you think that being unfair is someone investing GBP750,000
two weeks before a company goes into administration, I would love
to have those people around me every day because I think I was
more than generous and more than kind," he said, the report
notes.

The report notes that Ian Roberts left Crowdmix last May, leaving
cofounder Gareth Ingham to take control of the business.
Crowdmix went into administration in the summer, and Nick Candy
eventually acquired the bulk of the company.

The report discloses he told the court that Candy Capital had
"not decided what we want to do with Crowdmix."

The report notes he also revealed that Gareth Ingham had been in
touch "recently" about the company.

"Gareth Ingham reached out to say could he do something with it
and take some profit from it. And we haven't returned his call
and got back to him yet because we have not decided what we want
to do with Crowdmix," he added, says the report.


HANDSWORTH CHRISTIAN: Students to Take GCSE in Hope House School
----------------------------------------------------------------
George Torr at The Star reports that Sheffield pupils have been
handed an exams lifeline after their school closed down just
weeks ago.

Pupils at the GBP5,000-a-year Handsworth Christian School have
been allowed to sit their GCSE exams at Hope House School in
Barnsley, according to The Star.

The report notes four Year 11 pupils faced an uncertain situation
as with their summer exams on the horizon.  The closure has been
heavily criticised by parents with school bosses citing a 'fall
in numbers' leading to financial problems, the report relays.

The report notes that Hope House School Principal Su Wood, said:
Hope House School is a registered test centre and already offers
a high quality of GCSEs. This has allowed us to provide a base
for the Sheffield pupils to sit their exams and to rescue their
education when the Sheffield Local Authority was unable to offer
places the parents felt were appropriate. "Serving the wider
community and its children sits right at the heart of our values
as a school so we were more than happy to find a way to help out
these young people."

Hope House School is a private Christian school in the centre of
Barnsley.


JONES BOOTMAKER: Teeters on Brink of Administration
---------------------------------------------------
The Guardian reports hundreds of high street jobs are at risk at
Jones Bootmaker as the retailer teeters on the brink of
administration.

The 160-year-old chain, which is owned by private equity firm
Alteri, has filed a notice of intention to appoint administrators
as it seeks a buyer, according to The Guardian.

The report notes that Alteri has been in negotiations to sell the
business and is understood to have received credible offers.
However, filing the administration notice protects the retailer
from creditors looking to recover debts.

There is no certainty that Jones Bootmaker will fall into
administration.  It could still be sold as a going concern or
through a pre-pack administration whereby the company goes into
insolvency proceedings but its assets are immediately bought by a
new owner, the report relays.

Jones Bootmaker has about 100 shops and 800 employees in the UK.

The report discloses the problems for the retailer come as the
high street battles against the rise of online shopping and
business rates.  Despite Philip Hammond's attempt to heed
concerns about business rates with a GBP435m relief package in
the budget, retailers have warned that their bill will still rise
from April due to a revaluation of Britain's property, the report
relays.  The British Retail Consortium, the industry trade body,
has warned that more than 8,000 shops and 80,000 jobs could be
lost by 2020 due to the pressure on the retail industry, the
report notes.

The report says Agent Provocateur, the upmarket lingerie
retailer, was bought earlier this month by Mike Ashley through a
pre-pack administration.  Pre-packs have been heavily criticised
because they allow businesses to shed debts to creditors, which
can include suppliers and the taxman, the report notes.

Alteri bought Jones two years ago in a GBP12 million deal which
included the rival shoe retailer Brantano.  Six months ago it
appointed David Riddiford -- a retail veteran who has had roles
at Links of London and Ireland's largest department store Arnotts
-- as executive chairman, the report notes.

After starting with one store in Bayswater, London, in 1857 Jones
Bootmaker has expanded across the UK.  The business had humble
beginnings.  It was opened by Alfred Jones and his wife Emma who
kept the story open from 8am to 8pm, and midnight on Saturdays,
while looking after 11 sons and three daughters.


KING & WOOD: Unsecured Creditors Expected to Lose GBP33.5MM
-----------------------------------------------------------
Georgiana Tudor at Legal Business UK reports an initial report
into King & Wood Mallesons' now defunct European arm states
unsecured creditors are expected to lose GBP33.5 million as
administrators Quantuma continue to sift through the affairs of
legacy SJ Berwin.

The firm was moved into administration in mid-January, in what
was Europe's largest ever legal collapse, according to Legal
Business UK.  The report says GBP37 million is owed to unsecured
creditors, but only GBP3.5 million was available at January 17.

The report notes that Barclays, which is listed as having both
secured and unsecured debt, has GBP13 million of debt which is
unsecured.

The report relates that of its total debt, Barclays has a valid
security over GBP16.5 million, which the joint administrators'
lawyers are reviewing as per standard procedure.  It is not yet
clear how much of this money will be recovered.

The unsecured creditors, GBP6.8 million is owed to trade
creditors, just over GBP3 million for premises and GBP985,000 to
Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs.  Former members of the LLP are
also still owed GBP12.6 million, the report relays.

The report says that Quantuma has recovered GBP6.7 million m from
sales of parts of the business, such as to DLA Piper, Reed Smith,
Greenberg Traurig and other purchasers, and made payments from
this of about GBP1.6 million to pay for the administration.  This
means about GBP5.02 million has been recovered for Barclays as at
March 10, 2017, the report notes.

The report discloses in the five months to September 30, 2016,
KWM's European arm had an operating profit of GBP9.3 million,
while it profit had stood at GBP52.3 million for the 12 months to
April that year, a fall from GBP63.8 million in April 2015.

The report relays while in early 2016 legacy SJ Berwin had more
than 160 partners and 900 staff in Europe, its collapse meant its
partnership headed to more than 20 firms by January 2017.


MAGYAR TELECOM: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B-' CCR
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' long-term corporate credit
rating on U.K.-based holding company Magyar Telecom B.V.  S&P
subsequently withdrew the rating at the issuer's request and due
to lack of sufficient information on its future capital structure
and financial reporting.  At the time of withdrawal, the outlook
was stable.

At the same time, S&P withdrew its 'B-' long-term issue rating on
the company's senior secured notes due 2018.

The affirmation follows Magyar Telecom's sale of all of its
subsidiaries, namely INVITEL GROUP's operating entities, to the
CHINA-CEE FUND, an investment vehicle managed by CEE Equity
Partners and partially funded by Chinese capital, announced in
January 2017.

At the time of the withdrawal, the ratings reflected Magyar
Telecom's small scale, limited geographic diversification, the
fiercely competitive Hungarian telecommunications market, and a
continuing decline in the group's profitable core voice business.

These risks are partly offset by Magyar Telecom's recently
stabilizing operating performance, with slightly improving EBITDA
margins following cost-cutting.  S&P expects this trend to
continue supported by the company's investments in its fiber
networks.

S&P's view of Magyar Telecom's financial risk profile reflected
its only break-even free operating cash flow (FOCF) generation,
resulting from high investment requirements.

At the time of the withdrawal, the stable outlook reflected S&P's
view that Magyar Telecom would report at least stable revenues
and margins in 2017.

Magyar Telecom repaid all its outstanding debt with a new capital
structure in place.  S&P has therefor withdrawn its issue rating
on the company's senior secured notes.


PLANT AND CONSUMABLE: In Administration, Cuts 40 Jobs
-----------------------------------------------------
Dan Robinson at Nottingham Post reports that more than 40 jobs
have been lost after a Castle Donington business with a multi-
million pound turnover went into administration.

Administrators were called into Plant and Consumable Services
(PACS) Limited as a result of "cash flow" issues, according to
Nottingham Post.

Some 44 out of the total staff of 68 have been made redundant.

The report notes that it is understood that the managing director
and financial director are among those who have left the
business.

The report discloses most of its clients are in the power sector
-- in areas such as power utility and petro-chemical as well as
companies involved in "major industrial construction sites"
throughout the UK and Europe.

Despite strong growth in that sector in recent years, the firm
reported a big drop in pre-tax profits last year from almost GBP1
million to GBP330,000, the report relays.

The report notes that turnover for the year to March 31, 2016,
was less than GBP21.2 million, compared to almost GBP24.5 million
a year earlier.

Tony Barrell -- tony.barrell@uk.pwc.com -- and Toby Underwood --
tony.underwood@uk.pwc.com -- at accountancy and business
specialist firm PricewaterhouseCoopers have been appointed as the
joint administrators.

The report notes that a statement from PWC said: "The company had
experienced significant cash flow issues as a result of falling
turnover, which has resulted in the business being placed into
administration.

"On appointment the company had 68 employees and given the issues
facing the business 44 have been made redundant."

Services offered by PACS range from the supply of safety
equipment, tools, janitorial equipment and welding materials
through to the hire of industrial plant including lifting
equipment, cranes, site accommodation and power tools.

It also supplies project management teams and on-site stores
facilities and has worked with clients outside the UK in markets
such as Germany, France, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Italy and
Belgium.

Plant and Consumable Services (PACS) Limited -- based at the
Willow Farm Business Park -- specializes in the rental and sale
of industrial plant and equipment to "prestigious blue chip
companies and their contractors" mainly in the UK.


TURNSTONE MIDCO: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Rating to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Corporate Family
Rating (CFR) and Probability of Default rating (PDR) of Turnstone
Midco 2 Limited ('IDH' or the 'Company') to B3 and B3-PD from B2
and B2-PD, respectively.

The rating action primarily reflects the following drivers:

* IDH's increasing financial leverage, which is stemming
predominately from a contraction in Unit of Dental Activity
('UDA') delivery rates that has persisted for 2 years, offset by

* The Company's scale, together with its good revenue and cash
flow generation visibility.

Concurrently, Moody's has downgraded to B3 from B2 the ratings of
the GBP275 million Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes and the GBP150
million Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes (together the 'Senior
Secured Notes'), due 2022, and to Caa2 from Caa1the rating of the
GBP130 million Second Lien Notes, due 2023, all of which are
issued by IDH Finance plc. The outlook on all ratings is
negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action was prompted by an increase in Moody's adjusted
leverage to 6.9x for the 12 months to 31 December and the
expectation that this will trend above 7.5x over the coming 12
months. Financial performance over the last three to four
quarters has been negatively affected by a continuing contraction
in UDA delivery rates that has in part resulted from a market
shortage in dental clinicians, which is not expected to reverse
in the short term. While Moody's understands that the Company has
implemented a number of remedial actions, Moody's expects that
EBITDA will remain constrained and free cash flow generation will
be reduced, such that Moody's adjusted leverage will remain at
above 7.5x for the foreseeable future. Previously, Moody's
downward rating pressure guidance included Moody's adjusted
debt/EBITDA being sustained at above 6.5x for a prolonged period
of time. The rating was also weakly positioned in the B2
category.

IDH's B3 CFR reflects: 1) its small, albeit leading position in
the fragmented UK dental healthcare market, with revenues of
GBP565.9 million for the year ending 31 March 2016 ("FY2016"); 2)
a persistent contraction in the UDA delivery rate that has been
seen in FY2016 and for the first 3 quarters of FY2017, for which
Moody's does not expect meaningful short term recovery; 3) a
market imbalance in which the demand for dentists is outstripping
supply, which, as stated, in part explains pressures in the
delivery of UDAs, and is driving the use of locum clinicians at
increased cost; and 4) increasing financial leverage associated
with EBITDA contraction that is resulting primarily from the
trends described above, albeit that Moody's recognises that this
is partially mitigated by growing private and practice services
revenues. Additional risk factors include the risk of personnel
expenses, which comprise the bulk of IDH's overall costs, rising
more strongly than adjustments in NHS fees, or budget cuts within
the NHS itself.

The CFR also factors in: 1) IDH's scale and good revenue
visibility, with around 93% of NHS contracts being 'evergreen'
(c.59% of consolidated revenues in FY2016); 2) the Company's
predictable cash flows and limited underlying working capital
requirements, as one twelfth of NHS funding is received at the
beginning of each month; 3) the potential for NHS revenues to
show stable long term growth at a modest pace, supported by the
NHS's stated intention to increase access to dental care in the
UK; and 4) the discretionary nature of IDH's acquisition
strategy, which has been scaled back to preserve financial
flexibility and which supports liquidity. In addition, Moody's
considers that private sector funding offers higher growth
potential, albeit that in Moody's views it also increases
exposure to economic cycles.

Moody's expects that IDH will maintain adequate liquidity over
the next 12-18 months. In addition to predictable and generally
stable cash flow with minimal underlying working capital
requirements, the Company's liquidity profile is supported by
GBP98.2 million of availability under its GBP100 million RCF
maturing in 2022. The Company's only debt obligations are the
GBP555 million Notes maturing in 2022 and 2023 such that it
reports no short term debt, albeit that at the end of a contract
year NHS England may seek to reclaim UDAs paid for but not
performed (Moody's understands that at 31 December 2016 c.GBP45
million was held within accruals and deferred income on the
balance sheet in respect of UDA receipts which were not delivered
during Q3 2017 year to date trading). The profile for any
repayment of these accruals, which is decided on a contract by
contract basis, is also highly predictable and 'back-ended', with
prior year repayments due typically being paid in the second half
of the following year. IDH tends to hold modest levels of cash on
its balance sheet (GBP9.9 million at 31 December 2016). While the
discretionary nature of the Company's acquisition capex has been
significant historically, IDH has curtailed such activity
significantly in the first 3 quarters of 2017. The RCF contains
one financial covenant for total drawings under the RCF not to
exceed 2.3x EBITDA. Moody's expects headroom under this covenant
to remain strong.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects Moody's view that UDA delivery
rates will remain under pressure for the foreseeable future, with
the related under supply of dentists also increasing reliance on
the usage of locum clinicians at higher cost. Together, Moody's
expects these features to continue to place pressure on EBITDA
and cash flow generation, such that Moody's measure of leverage,
which is already high, will increase further above 7.5x over the
coming quarters. However, the outlook could stabilise in the
event that remedial actions being implemented reverse these
trends.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Positive ratings pressure is unlikely currently though could be
exerted if Moody's adjusted leverage reduces to below 6.5x, with
a sustained recovery in the delivery of UDAs and margin
performance being evidenced, and an adequate liquidity profile
being maintained.

Conversely, negative pressure on the ratings would likely occur
if Moody's adjusted leverage remains significantly above 7.5x for
a prolonged period of time, or if there is either negative free
cash flow, or concerns surrounding liquidity.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016.

Turnstone Midco 2 Limited, the parent company for IDH, is the
largest provider of NHS (UK National Health Service) dental
services in the fragmented UK dental market, operating around 677
dental practices in this jurisdiction. For the year ending 31
March 2016, IDH generated GBP565.9 million of revenues. At the
same date, the Company estimated its UK market share at 6% in
terms of dental practices and 8.2% in terms of revenues.

Following the acquisition of DBG in April 2013, the Dental
Directory in April 2014, and Med-FX, PDS Dental Laboratories and
Dolby Medical, all in FY2016, the Company is organised into two
distinct business units. The patient services division offers a
wide range of NHS and private dentistry services to patients and
the practice services division provides a range of products and
services to the dental and wider healthcare sectors, including to
the patient services division. In Q3 of FY2017 NHS revenues
accounted for 64.9% of the total, private revenues accounted for
16.3% (patient services total 81.2%) and practice services
accounted for 18.8%.

IDH, in its current form, is the result of a merger of its
predecessor Pearl Topco Limited with Associated Dental Practices,
which was completed in May 2011. The Group is majority owned by
private equity firms The Carlyle Group and Palamon Capital
Partners.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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