TCREUR_Public/170322.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Wednesday, March 22, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 58


                            Headlines


F R A N C E

NEXANS SA: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB' on Improved Credit Ratios
TECHNICOLOR SA: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to EUR560MM Sr. Loans


G E R M A N Y

TELE COLUMBUS: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR on Debt Amendment


G R E E C E

GREECE: Misses Bailout Deadline, Urged to Resolve Issues


H U N G A R Y

EST MEDIA: Court Accepts Bankruptcy Protection Application
PALOC WHOLESALE: Faces Liquidation After Creditor Talks Fail


I R E L A N D

AURIUM CLO II: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes
CBOM FINANCE: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating to Subordinated Eurobonds
CBOM FINANCE: Fitch Rates Upcoming USD-Denom. Sub. bond BB-(EXP)


M A C E D O N I A

MACEDONIA: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings


N E T H E R L A N D S

TENNET HOLDING: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Prop. Sub. Security


P O L A N D

GETBACK SA: S&P Assigns 'B' Issuer Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable


P O R T U G A L

PORTUGAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings


R O M A N I A

TEAMNET: Files for Insolvency Amid Corruption Scandal


R U S S I A

RUSSIA: S&P Revises Outlook to Pos.; Affirms 'BB+/B' FC Ratings
ZHILSTROYUPRAVLENIYE LLC: Owner Not Personally Liable for Debts


S E R B I A

BELGRADE: Moody's Ups LT Issuer Rating to Ba3, Outlook Stable
NOVI SAD: Moody's Raises LT Issuer Rating to Ba3; Outlook Stable


T U R K E Y

TC ZIRAAT: Moody's Revises Outlook to Neg., Affirms Ba1 Rating
TURKIYE SINAI: Moody's Rates Tier 2 Bond issuance (P)B1(hyb)


U K R A I N E

UKRAINIAN RAILWAY: Fitch Affirms CCC LT FC Issuer Default Rating


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ABH FINANCIAL: S&P Puts 'B+' Rating to Proposed Euro-Denom. LPNs
AMEC FOSTER: S&P Puts 'BB+' CCR on CreditWatch Developing
ARROW GLOBAL: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Counterparty Credit Rating
BHS GROUP: Green Prioritized Loyal Managers in Pension Settlement
LANDMARK THEATRE: Council Agrees to Spend GBP24,000 on Assets

PROJECT PIE: Reform Street Restaurant to Remain Open
RAPID ENVELOPES: In Administration, Seeks Buyer
TRAIL ADDICTION: Goes Into Administration


                            *********



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F R A N C E
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NEXANS SA: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB' on Improved Credit Ratios
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term corporate credit rating
on French cable company Nexans S.A. to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  The
outlook is stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' short-
term corporate credit rating on the company.

S&P also raised its issue ratings on Nexans' senior unsecured
notes to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  S&P's recovery rating on these notes
remains unchanged at '4', reflecting average recovery prospects
(30%-50%; rounded estimate: 40%).

The upgrade follows the group's better-than-anticipated 2016
full-year results and reflects S&P's expectation that Nexans will
be in a position to maintain FFO to debt at least in line with
the current levels over the next 12 to 18 months.

After three years marked by continuous restructuring measures
that took a toll on the group's profitability and cash flow
generation (given more than EUR360 million of operating expenses
incurred since 2013), Nexans' EBITDA margin reached a high of
about 7% in 2016 (versus an average of 4.2% during 2012-2015).
This was despite revenue falling by almost 7% (of which 1.7% was
organic decline), to about EUR5.7 billion.  The company's
enhanced profitability, alongside management's ability to
maintain the group's net debt broadly unchanged between 2015 and
2016 (despite a cash outflow for restructuring of EUR80 million),
translated into FFO to debt of about 27% at year-end 2016.

"On the strength of its backlog of over EUR2 billion, chiefly
focused on the execution from 2017 of subsea high-voltage
megaprojects (notably Beatrice, NSL, and Nordlink), we think
organic growth should be at least in the low single digits over
the next two years.  When combined with the cost-efficiency plan
that started to bear fruit in 2016, we expect higher cash flows
in 2017, translating into FFO to debt of about 25% at year-end
2017 (well above the 12% achieved in 2015).  Under our revised
forecast, we consider the group will maintain its net debt at
least broadly unchanged at about EUR1 billion on an adjusted
basis (assuming a 10% haircut for the portion of cash either
deemed difficult to repatriate or located in high risk countries,
as well as pension obligations of about EUR340 million, leases
and factoring of about EUR100 million each, and a EUR60 million
provision for litigation)," S&P said.

"At this stage, we lack visibility on management's plans for
growth beyond the execution of contracts already in the backlog.
Nevertheless, we have revised upward our capital spending
assumption to about 3% of sales, at EUR180 million, as we see the
curb in capital expenditure (capex) achieved over the past three
years as unsustainable.  We have assumed bolt-on acquisitions as
the group is considering strengthening its offering, notably in
renewable energy or electrical vehicles.  However, we understand
management could seize larger opportunities with profitability
levels at least in line with Nexans' and solid growth prospects.
Further uncertainties stem from the group's dividend policy.
After a four-year suspension, Nexans is proposing to reinstate a
return to shareholders of EUR0.5 per share, or one-third of its
net income," S&P said.

All in all, S&P believes the strategic growth plan and
shareholder return policies will be undertaken with sufficient
discipline to preserve the group's credit protection measures
while improving its free operating cash flow (FOCF) generation.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Nexans will
deliver FFO to debt of about 24%-25% over the next 12-18 months.
Under S&P's base case, it considers that the bulk of its organic
growth will come from its high-voltage submarine projects, with
the execution of a number of megaprojects to commence from 2017.
This, complimented by the benefits of its significant
restructuring plan and portfolio optimization, should translate
into an EBITDA margin of at least 6% at year-end 2017.  S&P also
expects the company to demonstrate a moderate financial policy
that focuses on further deleveraging, as well as continuous
prudent liquidity management.

S&P could consider a negative rating action if Nexans' EBITDA
margin fell below 6% as a result of further restructuring,
unprofitable contract execution, or the loss of market share,
leading to FFO to debt converging toward 20% for an extended
period.  Large debt-funded acquisitions or aggressive returns to
shareholder, translating into a significant releveraging of the
balance sheet, could also put the ratings under pressure.

An upgrade would be contingent upon Nexans' ability to generate
positive organic growth and restore profitability measures across
all business lines, steering its adjusted EBITDA margin to 8%.
This, complimented by FFO to debt constantly well above 30%, FOCF
well-established in the positive territory, and management's
commitment to strengthen credit metrics and a disciplined
financial policy, could trigger positive rating momentum.  Given
Nexans' business risk profile, which remains weakly positioned
versus its direct peers--despite the clear improvements -- S&P
sees such a scenario as unlikely in the near term.


TECHNICOLOR SA: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to EUR560MM Sr. Loans
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has assigned its 'BB-' issue
rating to the EUR560 million-equivalent senior secured term loans
(made up of a euro-denominated loan and a U.S. dollar-denominated
loan) to be issued by French technology company Technicolor S.A.
(BB-/Stable/B).  The recovery rating is '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-70%; rounded estimate:
55%) in the event of default.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB-' issue rating on the group's existing
EUR450 million senior secured term loan borrowed by Technicolor
and euro- and U.S. dollar-denominated amortizing term loans,
borrowed by orphan special-purpose vehicle, Tech Finance & Co.
The recovery rating remains unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-70%; rounded estimate:
55%) in the event of default.  S&P expects to withdraw the
ratings on Tech Finance & Co.'s senior secured term loans upon
refinancing with the proposed term loans.

The rating action follows Technicolor's proposed full refinancing
of its debt sitting at Tech Finance & Co. and maturing in 2020.
The recovery rating on the existing and proposed senior secured
debt instruments is supported by S&P's valuation of the company
as a going concern.  It is constrained, however, by S&P's view of
the company's weak business risk profile, the removal of the
mandatory amortizations under the former term loans, and the
substantial amount of equally-ranked secured debt.

In S&P's hypothetical default scenario, it assumes weak trading
levels, combined with a failure by the group to achieve an
anticipated return on growth-capital expenditure (capex) to
replace revenues from its MPEG-LA patent pool that was phased out
in 2016, resulting in payment default.

S&P values Technicolor as a going concern, underpinned by S&P's
view of the strength of some of its niche franchises and its
intellectual property, as well as its large customer base.

Simulated default assumptions:

   -- Year of default: 2021
   -- Minimum capex (% last three years' average sales): 1.5%
   -- Cyclicality adjustment factor: +10% (standard sector
      assumption for Technology - Hardware & Semiconductors)
   -- Operational adjustment: +20% (reflecting our assumption
      that on a hypothetical path to default, Technicolor is
      likely to finance itself with higher-interest debt and less
      issuer-friendly documentation terms than the proposed
      refinancing)
   -- Emergence EBITDA after recovery adjustments: about
      EUR190 million
   -- Implied enterprise value (EV) multiple: 5.5x
   -- Jurisdiction: France

Simplified waterfall:

   -- Gross enterprise value at default: about EUR1.0 billion
   -- Tax-adjusted pension deficit adjustment to EV: (EUR165
      million)
   -- Administrative costs: 5%
   -- Net value available to debtors: about EUR825 million
   -- Priority claims(1): about EUR61 million
   -- Secured debt claims(1): about EUR1.4 billion
   -- Recovery expectation(2): 50%-70% (rounded estimate: 55%)

(1) All debt amounts include six months' prepetition interest.
RCF assumed 85% drawn on the path to default.
(2) Rounded down to the nearest 5%.


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G E R M A N Y
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TELE COLUMBUS: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR on Debt Amendment
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating on German cable operator Tele Columbus AG.  The outlook is
stable.

S&P also affirmed its 'B' issue rating on the company's EUR1,380
million senior secured facilities that are being amended.  This
debt includes the company's EUR1,255 million term loan, the
EUR75 million capital expenditure (capex) facility, and the EUR50
million revolving credit facility (RCF).  The recovery rating on
all of Tele Columbus' senior secured facilities is '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%; rounded
estimate: 50%) recovery for creditors in the event of a payment
default.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that, although preliminary
2016 results were modestly below its forecast, Tele Columbus
remains on track to reduce adjusted leverage in 2017 and
successfully execute the transformation of its business.  S&P now
forecasts adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 6x in 2016, compared
with its previous estimate of 5.3x-5.7x, mainly resulting from
less dynamic topline growth combined with moderately higher
integration costs than S&P projected.  In spite of this, S&P
thinks the integration of primacom and pepcom is progressing
according to plan since their acquisition in 2015.  S&P also
believes Tele Columbus will continue increasing revenues and
EBITDA through the successful up-selling of multiple-play
services into its cable TV base, cost savings from the migration
of customers to its own network, and merger synergies.  In S&P's
view, this will enable the company to improve adjusted debt to
EBITDA to well below 6x in 2017 and return to sustainably
positive free operating cash flow (FOCF) from 2018.

S&P's assessment of Tele Columbus' business risk is supported by
the company's enhanced scale and market position as the third-
largest cable TV operator in Germany.  As of December 2016, Tele
Columbus served about 3.6 million homes, compared with about 1.7
million before the acquisitions. Tele Columbus also benefits from
its high-speed broadband offering, in S&P's view.  It offers fast
download speeds of up to 200 megabits per second (Mbps) to the
63% of households that have currently been upgraded for the
provision of internet services.  Furthermore, the company is
planning to move from currently about 39% coverage with 400 Mbps
to full coverage at this speed across its own upgraded network,
and selectively launch plans with speeds of up to one gigabit per
second.  In addition, S&P thinks Tele Columbus will continue to
make good progress with unlocking cost synergies from merging its
operations and overhead functions with primacom and pepcom.

Deutsche Telekom (DT) is presently investing to increase network
speeds, and extended coverage with 100 Mbps or more to 64% of
German households at the end of 2016.  S&P thinks this may
further intensify the competition that Tele Columbus faces in
broadband zrom DT and other players.  At the same time, with its
cable TV and broadband offering, Tele Columbus competes with
other German cable operators, particularly Vodafone, for
customers in the housing association market.  S&P's view of Tele
Columbus' business risk is further constrained by the need for
substantial capex for network migration and upgrades as a
prerequisite for reducing reliance on third-party backbone
networks and to pave the way for increasing the penetration of
bundled services in the customer base.  With internet penetration
in its customer base of about 22% and a blended average revenue
per user of EUR16.3 per month in the third quarter of 2016, Tele
Columbus currently trails European cable peers with respect to
cross- and up-selling of multiple-play products.  In addition,
geographic diversification is low, with Tele Columbus' operations
confined to certain parts of Germany.

Tele Columbus is highly leveraged, largely because of the
additional debt it incurred for the acquisitions of primacom and
pepcom in 2015.  Management is planning to reduce net debt to
EBITDA, as per the company's definition, to 3x-4x in the medium
term compared with about 4.7x as of December 2016 (including 50%
of run-rate synergies).  However, despite solid EBITDA growth,
S&P projects that adjusted leverage is unlikely to decline to
below 5x in the next 18 months.  Another weakness for Tele
Columbus' financial risk is its weak near-term cash flow metrics,
with expected FOCF of about zero in 2017, before negative working
capital effects resulting from deferred payments for capex
incurred in 2016.  S&P's forecast for Tele Columbus' FOCF in 2017
is burdened by high investments in its networks, as well as
remaining integration costs.

S&P's stable outlook reflects its expectation that the company
will continue to successfully integrate primacom and pepcom,
execute its network investment program, and up-sell multiple-play
products into its cable TV customer base, contributing to revenue
growth of about 4%-6% and rising EBITDA margins over the next
12-24 months.  S&P thinks this will allow Tele Columbus to reduce
its S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA to about 5.5x in
2017 and return to sustainably positive FOCF from 2018.

S&P could raise the rating if Tele Columbus manages to strengthen
adjusted debt to EBITDA to about 5x and FOCF to about 5% of
adjusted debt on a sustainable basis, for example due to better-
than-expected operating performance or other leverage-reduction
measures.

S&P could lower the rating if Tele Columbus faced increasing
operating weaknesses accompanied by sustained negative FOCF,
causing adjusted debt to EBITDA to exceed 6.5x on a prolonged
basis, or if the company faced mounting liquidity concerns.


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G R E E C E
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GREECE: Misses Bailout Deadline, Urged to Resolve Issues
--------------------------------------------------------
Nikos Chrysoloras, Corina Ruhe and Rainer Buergin at Bloomberg
News report that the euro area pressured Greece to resolve
outstanding pension and labor-market issues with its bailout
creditors, as the country missed yet another deadline for
unlocking funds this week.

The currency bloc's finance ministers meeting in Brussels on
March 20 said that the government of Alexis Tsipras has yet to
comply with the terms attached to the emergency loans that have
kept the country afloat since 2010, Bloomberg relates.

According to Bloomberg, the ministers' Greek counterpart,
Euclid Tsakalotos, will stay in Brussels through the week to
continue negotiations with representatives of creditor
institutions, in a sign of increasing urgency after months of
talks failed to break the deadlock.

Greece, Bloomberg says, is edging closer to a repeat of the 2015
drama that pushed Europe's most indebted state to the edge of
economic collapse.  A Greek government official in Brussels
declined on March 20 to say whether the country can meet debt
payments due this July, Bloomberg notes.

The Greek government, which has more than EUR7 billion (US$7.5
billion) in bond payments due in July, has balked at implementing
mandated reforms to its energy and labor markets while also
resisting calls for additional pension cuts, Bloomberg discloses.
A meeting between Finance Minister Tsakalotos and representatives
of creditor institutions before the Brussels meeting didn't yield
sufficient progress for bailout auditors to agree to return to
Athens and complete the review, Bloomberg relays, citing an
official, who asked not to be named as negotiations aren't
public.

Greece's creditors "must conclude in its review that the
conditions are met and they're laid down precisely in the
agreement," Bloomberg quotes German Finance Minister Wolfgang
Schaeuble as saying before the meeting.  "Apparently it's still
difficult between the institutions and the Greek government to
put the general agreement in concrete terms."


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H U N G A R Y
=============


EST MEDIA: Court Accepts Bankruptcy Protection Application
----------------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews reports that Est Media, a holding company listed on
the Budapest Stock Exchange, on March 20 said its application for
bankruptcy protection had been accepted by the Budapest Municipal
Court, effective March 18.

Est Media applied for the procedure at the end of February and
said it wished to reach an agreement with its creditors that
would allow the company to continue to operate, while at the same
time allowing it to remedy the position of its net assets,
MTI-Econews relates.

Est Media noted that its net assets had fallen by more than
HUF3.5 billion in the fourth quarter, MTI-Econews discloses.


PALOC WHOLESALE: Faces Liquidation After Creditor Talks Fail
------------------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews reports that Paloc Wholesale, which operates 86 CBA
franchise supermarkets in the north of Hungary, has been ordered
to undergo liquidation after it failed to reach an agreement with
its creditors.

Paloc Wholesale owes its suppliers and lenders "several billion
forints", Laszlo Demeter, the secretary of the Nograd County
chapter of retail trade union KASZ, told MTI-Econews without
being more specific.

Paloc Wholesale went into bankruptcy last September, after CBA
terminated its partnership with the company for breach of
contract, MTI-Econews recounts.

Paloc Wholesale has been lossmaking for the past three years,
MTI-Econews relays.

Paloc Wholesale earlier employed 1,300 people at it shops, making
it Nograd County's biggest employer, MTI-Econews notes.



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I R E L A N D
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AURIUM CLO II: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Aurium CLO
III Designated Activity Company:

-- EUR 220,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- EUR 41,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR 10,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR 25,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

-- EUR 18,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR 22,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR 10,500,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the rated notes address the
expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the
notes in 2030. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the Collateral Manager, Spire Partners LLP
("Spire"), has sufficient experience and operational capacity and
is capable of managing this CLO.

Aurium III is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of secured senior loans or senior secured
bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured
senior loans, second lien loans, high yield bonds and mezzanine
loans. The portfolio is expected to be at least 65% ramped up as
of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly of
corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe. The
remainder of the portfolio will be acquired during the six month
ramp-up period in compliance with the portfolio guidelines.

Spire will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the seven classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR 39,350,000 of subordinated notes. Moody's
will not assign a rating to this class of notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. Spire's investment decisions
and management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
October 2016. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.

Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR 375,000,000

Diversity Score: 36

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.10%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.25%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

As part of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential
exposure to obligors domiciled in countries with local currency
country risk ceiling (LCC) of A1 or below. As per the portfolio
constraints, exposures to countries with local currency country
risk ceiling ratings between A1 to A3 cannot exceed 10%. Given
the current sovereign ratings of eligible countries, there are no
obligors domicile in a country for which the LCC is below A3. The
remainder of the pool will be domiciled in countries which
currently have a LCC of Aa3 and above. Given this portfolio
composition, the model was run without the need to apply
portfolio haircuts as further described in the methodology.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the provisional ratings
assigned to the rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes
increased default probability relative to the base case. Below is
a summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3220 from 2800)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3640 from 2800)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.


CBOM FINANCE: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating to Subordinated Eurobonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch's Ratings has assigned the upcoming issue of dollar-
denominated subordinated bonds CBOM Finance PLC expected rating
BB- (EXP). The final rating is contingent upon receipt of final
documentation on the issue, which should correspond to the
information provided previously.

CBOM Finance PLC, Irish spetsyurlilo, which is the issuer of
bonds will provide funds received from the placement, as a loan
to the Russian Moscow Credit Bank ("ICD") having the following
ratings: long-term Issuer Default ratings ("IDRs") in national
and foreign currencies "bB / forecast" negative", a short-term
IDR at B foreign currency "rating stability 'bb', support '5' and
support rating Floor 'no Floor'.

Key rating factors

Fitch rates subordinated debt MKB "new model", referring to the
additional capital, one level below the bank's stability rating.
This includes (i) lack notchinga for the additional risk of non-
compliance with respect to the sustainability rating as Fitch
believes that these instruments should absorb losses only after
the Bank loses stability or be very close to the loss of
stability; and (ii) notching down one level of the degree of
potential losses to reflect the recoveries lower than the average
level in the event of default.

The bonds provided for cancellation of principal and coupon in
case (i) reducing the regulatory core capital figure to less than
2%, or (ii) in relation to the introduction of the bank's actions
to prevent bankruptcy. Legally, this is possible as soon as the
bank violates the norms of capital adequacy, or any other
requirements for liquidity and capital. At the same time in its
baseline scenario, Fitch assumes that the write-off will not
happen as long as the bank does not lose stability, or will not
be very close to the loss of stability.

FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT FUTURE RATINGS

The expected rating is dependent on the stability of the ICD
rating.

"Negative" outlook on the ratings reflects the potential of IBC
that the bank's stability rating, and as a result, subordinated
debt rating would be downgraded if in the future a significant
deterioration in asset quality will lead to significant pressure
on capital, and it will not be offset by the shareholders. The
potential of increasing the stability of the ICD's rating is
limited because of the "negative" outlook on the ratings.


CBOM FINANCE: Fitch Rates Upcoming USD-Denom. Sub. bond BB-(EXP)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned CBOM Finance PLC's upcoming issue of
USD-denominated subordinated bonds an expected 'BB-(EXP)' rating.
The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of final
documents conforming to information already received.

CBOM Finance PLC, an Irish SPV issuing the bonds, will on-lend
the proceeds to Russia's Credit Bank of Moscow (CBM), rated Long-
Term Local and Foreign Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
'BB'/Negative, Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B', Viability
Rating 'bb', Support Rating '5' and Support Rating Floor 'No
Floor'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch rates CBM's 'new-style' Tier 2 subordinated debt one notch
lower than the bank's 'bb' Viability Rating (VR). This includes
(i) zero notches for additional non-performance risk relative to
the VR, as Fitch believes these instruments should only absorb
losses once a bank reaches, or is very close to, the point of
non-viability (PONV); and (ii) one notch for loss severity,
reflecting below-average recoveries in case of default.

The bonds have a principal and coupon write-down feature
triggered in case of (i) regulatory core capital ratio falling
below 2%; or (ii) bankruptcy prevention measures being introduced
in respect to the bank. Legally the latter is possible as soon as
a bank breaches any of its mandatory capital ratios or is in
breach of certain other liquidity and capital requirements.
However, Fitch's base case assumes the regulator will not trigger
loss absorption until a bank has reached (or is very likely to
reach) PONV.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The expected rating is sensitive to changes to CBM's VR.

The Negative Outlook on CBM's ratings reflects the potential for
the VR, and hence the subordinated debt rating, to be downgraded
if a further significant deterioration of asset quality leads to
material capital erosion without this being promptly cured by
shareholders. Upside potential for CBM's VR is limited given the
Negative Outlook on the ratings.


=================
M A C E D O N I A
=================


MACEDONIA: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Republic of Macedonia.  The outlook is stable.

                            RATIONALE

The ratings on Macedonia reflect S&P's view of the country's
relatively low income levels; weak checks and balances between
state institutions, exacerbated by the prolonged political
crisis; and limited monetary policy flexibility arising from the
country's fixed-exchange-rate regime.  The ratings are primarily
supported by moderate -- albeit rising -- external and public
debt levels.

Macedonia has been locked in a political crisis for the last two
years.  Following a very narrow win in the December 2016 early
general election, VMRO-DPMNE failed to reach an agreement with
its previous coalition partner Democratic Union for Integration
(DUI), which represents the Albanian minority.  Subsequently, the
main opposition party SDSM has secured enough support from
Albanian minority parties on the condition that Albanian language
is recognized across the country.  However, public protests
against the proposal took place and President Gjorge Ivanov
refused to grant SDSM a mandate to form a government.

S&P believes that the current political stalemate portends
heightened uncertainty in the absence of a clear way out.  In
S&P's view, Macedonia's weak institutional arrangements --
characterized by the lack of effective checks and balances
between government bodies and limited independence of the
judiciary -- hamper an effective resolution of the present
impasse.  Another early election remains a possibility but it is
unclear whether it could lead to a conclusive outcome.  Moreover,
absent a grand coalition between VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM -- which
currently seems improbable -- any future government is likely to
have an only narrow majority.  This will diminish its ability to
pass reforms and tackle long-standing issues such as the ongoing
dispute with Greece over Macedonia's constitutional name.

In S&P's view, the protracted political crisis could pose risks
to the country's economic performance.  Although headline growth
appears to have already been affected, it has not been too severe
so far.  S&P estimates that the Macedonian economy grew by 2.5%
in 2016 on the back of strong private consumption and export
performance.  That said, S&P estimates that investment dynamics
were considerably weaker than in 2014-2015.

S&P forecasts headline growth will slow down further to 2% in
2017 before recuperating closer to 3% once the political
uncertainties subside.  However, there are downside risks to
these forecasts. With GDP per capita estimated at just $5,200 in
2016, Macedonia remains a low income economy.  In recent years,
the government has attempted to attract foreign direct investment
(FDI) to special free economic zones, capitalizing on the
country's comparatively favorable tax regime, low labor costs,
and proximity to European markets.  In S&P's view, persisting
political uncertainty could weigh on growth if a substantial
portion of these foreign investments are cancelled or postponed.
So far, net FDI has held up well at around 4% of GDP last year.

Political risks aside, S&P believes there is upside potential for
the economy's long-term growth prospects from the free zones
expansion.  Full benefits to growth would only materialize,
however, if companies within the zones become better integrated
into the local economy by using local suppliers.  S&P notes that
so far most inputs for goods assembled by foreign companies have
been imported.  Consequently, the free zones' impact on the rest
of the economy has been less than might be expected and largely
confined to employment.

Although Macedonia has been running persistent budget deficits,
S&P believes its fiscal profile still leaves some space for
policy flexibility, which supports the ratings.  S&P estimates
that the general government deficit amounted to 2.8% of GDP last
year--lower than the authorities' revised target of 4%.
Importantly, however, this has largely happened against the
background of underspending, partly attributable to the ongoing
political stalemate.  At present, the government targets gradual
consolidation with deficit declining to 2.2% of GDP by 2019.  In
S&P's view, however, the consolidation plan lacks concrete
measures and could fall short of target if growth or revenue
collection underperform.  Consequently, S&P forecasts deficits
averaging 3% of GDP over the next four years.

S&P also believes that while net general government debt remains
comparatively low, it will continue to rise to 47% of GDP in 2020
from an estimated 39% of GDP at end-2016.  S&P's general
government debt calculation includes the increasing debt of The
Public Enterprise for State Roads (PESR).  This is because S&P
believes PESR will need to rely on government transfers to
service its debt in the future.  In particular, a EUR580 million
loan from the Export-Import Bank of China (and for which the
government provided a guarantee), contracted in 2013 for the
construction of two highway sections, will continue to contribute
to the increasing debt burden.

Macedonia has repeatedly been able to tap the Eurobond market.
This has made the government's balance sheet more vulnerable to
potential foreign-exchange movements, as close to 80% of
government debt is denominated in foreign currency (including
part of domestic debt).  The authorities plan to expand their
domestic issuance but also maintain regular foreign capital
market borrowing.

With the public sector increasingly borrowing abroad, the
Macedonian economy's external debt has been rising, despite some
deleveraging in the banking sector.  In 2016, S&P estimates that
gross external debt net of liquid financial and public sector
assets increased to about 35% of current account receipts.  S&P
forecasts that Macedonia's external debt metrics will remain
broadly stable over the next four years.  Last year's current
account deficit turned out to be wider than S&P projected, at
3.1% of GDP.  This is largely explained by the weaker performance
of current transfers and larger primary income deficit.
Nevertheless, S&P anticipates the current account deficit will
gradually tighten and reach 1.2% of GDP in 2020, partly owing to
the positive impact from the expansion of foreign companies in
the free zones.  S&P projects these deficits will be financed by
a combination of borrowing and net FDI inflows.

The Macedonian denar is pegged to the euro and S&P believes the
existing foreign exchange regime restricts monetary policy
flexibility.  However, central bank measures, such as lower
reserve requirements for denar-denominated liabilities, have
lowered overall euroization in Macedonia, with foreign currency-
denominated deposits and loans remaining around 40% of total
deposits and loans in recent years.  This affords the National
Bank of the Republic of Macedonia (NBRM) some room for policy
response.  Rather exceptionally for the region, bank lending in
Macedonia has also continued to increase in recent years.  That
said, even though the overall stock of domestic credit expanded
by an estimated 4% last year, lending to corporates contracted in
year-on-year terms.

Macedonia's banking system has seen several bouts of volatility
in recent years.  For example, political developments caused
deposit outflows from Macedonia's banking sector last April,
although the majority of funds have since flowed back into the
system.  In general, the banking system appears well capitalized
and profitable, and it is largely funded by domestic deposits.
Macedonia's regulatory and supervisory framework under the NBRM
has proven resilient to past episodes of volatility; the NBRM
reacted swiftly to the volatility in April by raising interest
rates and intervening in the foreign exchange market to support
the currency peg as well as deploying several other measures.  In
addition, the NBRM has introduced macroprudential measures such
as higher capital requirements for consumer loans longer than
eight years and is moving ahead with the implementation of Basel
III principles.  At the end of 2016, nonperforming loans in the
system amounted to about 7% of the total.

                             OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects the balance between the risks from
Macedonia's rising public debt and heightened political
uncertainty over the next 12 months, and the country's favorable
economic prospects.

S&P could raise its ratings on Macedonia if reforms directed
toward higher broader-based growth led to a faster increase in
income levels than in S&P's base-case scenario, alongside
improved effectiveness and accountability of public institutions.

S&P could lower the ratings if the protracted political
uncertainty substantially impaired growth and FDI inflows,
undermining the country's longer term prospects.  S&P could also
lower the ratings if large fiscal slippages or off-budget
activities were to call into question the sustainability of
Macedonia's public debt, raise the sovereign's borrowing costs,
and substantially increase its external obligations, given the
constraints of the exchange-rate regime.  In addition, if the
parent companies of systemically important banks operating in
Macedonia were to cut their exposure to subsidiaries, S&P could
consider a negative rating action.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that all key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                        Rating
                                        To            From
Macedonia (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency           BB-/Stable/B   BB-
/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   BB            BB
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign and Local Currency            BB-           BB-


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


TENNET HOLDING: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Prop. Sub. Security
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB+' long-term issue rating to
the proposed perpetual, optionally deferrable, and subordinated
hybrid capital security to be issued by Dutch-based electricity
transmission system operator TenneT Holding B.V. (TenneT; A-
/Stable/A-2).  Under this transaction, TenneT plans to issue an
euro-denominated tranche.  The amount of the hybrid remains
subject to market conditions, but S&P understands that it will be
sized to at least replace the existing EUR500 million hybrid debt
issued in 2010.

S&P considers the proposed security to have intermediate equity
content until its first reset date because it meets S&P's
criteria in terms of subordination, permanence, and deferability
at the company's discretion during this period.

S&P understands that if TenneT successfully issues the new
security, it will redeem the hybrid tranche issued in 2010
(EUR500 million), which contains a first call option in June 1,
2017.  As such, S&P understands the proceeds from the proposed
issuance will be received before June 2017.  TenneT has yet to
make a decision about when or if to call the security, but the
company is prudently raising funds through the hybrid issuance to
meet potential redemption on its first reset date.  Due to the
increased likelihood of TenneT exercising the call option once
the proposed security is issued, S&P will treat the upcoming
reset date of the existing security as the effective maturity
date.  As a result, S&P will revise its assessment of its equity
content to minimal from intermediate due to the lack of
permanence.

In S&P's view, TenneT is committed to maintaining its hybrid
capital as a permanent feature in its capital structure.  The new
issuance has no impact on S&P's assessment of the securities
TenneT issued in 2013 (EUR1.8 million) as having intermediate
equity content.  Furthermore, if S&P treats the new security as
replacement capital, TenneT's total amount of hybrid securities
remains below our upper limit of 15% of its capitalization (less
than 5% at year-end 2016).  If TenneT issues EUR500 million of
new hybrid securities, S&P's calculation of its credit metrics
would remain unchanged because it will deduct the cash proceeds
of the proposed instruments from debt until the 2010 security is
redeemed.

S&P arrives at its 'BB+' issue rating on the proposed security by
notching down from TenneT's 'bbb' stand-alone credit profile
(SACP).  S&P derives its rating on the hybrid instrument from the
SACP as S&P do not think that the Dutch government will support
this instrument in case of financial stress.  This is chiefly
because the hybrid is intended to support TenneT's financial
profile, which will be affected in the coming years by its
substantial capital expenditure on its German operations.  A key
difference with the existing hybrid is that when TenneT issued it
in 2010, the financial markets were still recovering from the
2008 financial crisis.  S&P thinks government support was more
likely at that time.  In S&P's view, financial markets are
currently more mature when it comes to corporate hybrids.  This
approach is in line with S&P's rating of other hybrids issued by
European government-related entities such as EDF, Dong, or
Vattenfall.

The two-notch differential reflects S&P's notching methodology,
which calls for deducting:

   -- One notch for subordination because S&P's long-term
      corporate credit rating on TenneT is investment grade (that
      is, higher than 'BB+'); and

   -- An additional notch for payment flexibility, to reflect
      that the deferral of interest is optional.

The notching to rate the proposed security reflects S&P's view
that there is a relatively low likelihood that the issuer will
defer interest.  Should S&P's view change, it may increase the
number of notches it deducts to derive the issue rating.

In addition, to reflect S&P's view of the intermediate equity
content of the proposed security, S&P allocates 50% of the
related payments on the security as a fixed charge and 50% as
equivalent to a common dividend.  The 50% treatment of principal
and accrued interest also applies to S&P's adjustment of debt.

    KEY FACTORS IN S&P'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITIES' PERMANENCE

Although the proposed security is perpetual, it can be called at
any time for tax, gross-up, rating, accounting, or a change-of-
control event.

TenneT can redeem the security for cash at any time during the 90
days before the first coupon payment date, which S&P understands
will not be earlier than five years, and on every coupon payment
date thereafter.  If any of these events occur, TenneT intends,
but is not obliged, to replace the instruments.  In S&P's view,
this statement of intent mitigates the issuer's ability to
repurchase the notes on the open market.

S&P understands that the interest to be paid on the proposed
security will increase by 25 basis points (bps) no earlier than
12 years from issuance, and by a further 75bps 20 years after its
first reset date.  S&P considers the cumulative 100bps as a
material step-up, which is currently unmitigated by any binding
commitment to replace the instrument at that time.  This step-up
provides an incentive for the issuer to redeem the instrument on
its first reset date.

Consequently, S&P will no longer recognize the instrument as
having intermediate equity content after its first reset date,
because the remaining period until its economic maturity would,
by then, be less than 20 years.  However, S&P classifies the
instrument's equity content as intermediate until its first reset
date, as long as S&P thinks that the loss of the beneficial
intermediate equity content treatment will not cause the issuer
to call the instrument at that point.  TenneT's willingness to
maintain or replace the instrument in the event of a
reclassification of equity content to minimal is underpinned by
its statement of intent.

   KEY FACTORS IN S&P'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITIES'
DEFERABILITY

In S&P's view, TenneT's option to defer payment on the proposed
security is discretionary.  This means that TenneT may elect not
to pay accrued interest on an interest payment date because it
has no obligation to do so.  However, any outstanding deferred
interest payment, plus interest accrued thereafter, will have to
be settled in cash if TenneT declares or pays an equity dividend
or interest on equally-ranking securities, and if TenneT redeems
or repurchases shares or equally-ranking securities.  S&P sees
this as a negative factor.  That said, this condition remains
acceptable under S&P's methodology because, once TenneT has
settled the deferred amount, it can still choose to defer on the
next interest payment date.

  KEY FACTORS IN S&P'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITIES'
SUBORDINATION

The proposed security and coupons are intended to constitute the
issuer's direct, unsecured, and subordinated obligations, ranking
senior to their common shares.  They will rank pari passu with
the existing hybrids issued in 2013.


===========
P O L A N D
===========


GETBACK SA: S&P Assigns 'B' Issuer Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' long-term and 'B' short-term
issuer credit ratings to Poland-based debt purchaser GetBack S.A.
The outlook is stable.

The ratings on GetBack reflect S&P's opinion of the moderately
high country and industry risks to which the company is exposed,
its monoline focus on bad debt collection (including the
management of bad assets securitized funds) in Poland, and its
limited operational track record.  These weaknesses are partly
mitigated by the improving franchise, low leverage, and adequate
cash flow generation capacity.

GetBack has been operating since September 2012, and it is one of
the two largest entities in the Polish debt market in terms of
nominal value of debt portfolios under management.  GetBack's
revenues are largely generated in Poland.  The company mostly
focuses on the collection of nonperforming unsecured consumer
loans at this point, but is increasingly looking to purchase
nonperforming consumer-secured and residential mortgages
(currently 37% of the total portfolio).

GetBack has relatively low existing and prospective leverage.
Nevertheless, S&P takes into account GetBack's shareholder
structure, whereby several private equity funds led by Abris
Capital Partners own the majority shares in GetBack.  S&P
classifies this structure as a financial sponsor ownership, which
drives S&P's assessment of the company's financial policy,
leading S&P to classify the overall financial risk profile as
aggressive. S&P believes that GetBack's financial risk profile
will stay at this level over the medium term, with debt to EBITDA
less than 5x. Furthermore, S&P believes GetBack has adequate
liquidity.  In S&P's opinion, a better assessment is unlikely, as
the financial sponsor is not planning to relinquish control over
the medium term.

S&P's assessment of GetBack's financial risk profile incorporates
these assumptions:

   -- Revenue growth of more than 30% in 2017.
   -- EBITDA margin of above 80% in 2017, versus about 70% in
      March 2017, which is consistent with most peers in the
      industry).
   -- Portfolio purchases amounting to about Polish zloty (PLN)
      750 million (approximately EUR174 million) in 2017.
   -- Debt issuance of approximately PLN530 million in 2017.
      Equity issuance via a potential IPO.  Depending on whether
      or not an IPO materializes, debt to EBITDA between 2.5x and
      3.1x and funds from operations (FFO) to debt in the 25%-34%
      range.

In S&P's view, GetBack faces significant credit risk as a buyer
of overdue secured and unsecured consumer debt.  Even though
receivables are purchased at large discounts to their face value,
there is still a risk that actual collections could be materially
lower than the initial projections incorporated in the purchase
price.  While the performance of the pricing model has so far
been good, S&P still believes it is somewhat untested, as the
full recovery spans a 10-year horizon and the first portfolio was
acquired only in 2012.

S&P factors into the ratings GetBack's short track record of
operations compared with other rated peers by applying a negative
adjustment under S&P's comparable ratings analysis.  S&P sees
GetBack's limited operational history as a key risk given that
the company aims to scale up aggressively over the next two years
by acquiring debt portfolios on its own account and financing its
purchases mainly through debt.  In S&P's view, this rapid
expansion increases the risks associated with changes in the
operating environment that could ultimately put pressure on
collections and credit ratios.

However, S&P believes that GetBack's management is experienced
and boasts deep industry knowledge that should help the company
manage mispricing risk.

The short-term rating is 'B'.  S&P's assessment of GetBack's
liquidity as adequate is based on S&P's estimate that sources of
liquidity should exceed uses over the next 12 months by more than
1.2x, even in the event of a 15% contraction in forecasted
EBITDA.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that GetBack will show
profitable collections performance in 2017 and 2018 and maintain
an adequate liquidity position in the next year, which will help
keep the rating at the current level over the next 12 months.

S&P could lower the ratings if it sees that the company is unable
to grow profitably, while its forecast credit ratios, in
particular FFO to debt and debt to EBITDA, deteriorate to levels
consistent with S&P's highly leveraged financial risk category,
meaning debt to EBITDA exceeding 5x or FFO to debt below 12%.
S&P believes that this could stem from either a material decline
in collections from purchased portfolios, a significant fine
imposed by regulatory authorities, or the inability of the
company to fund its expansion with equity capital issuances.

S&P could raise the ratings if it observes longer track record of
sustained profitability and the company manages to scale up
successfully while keeping leverage consistent with current
levels.  Furthermore, an upgrade would likely hinge on S&P's
assessment of overall stable collection prospects on newly
purchased portfolios.

Although this is not S&P's base case, it could also consider an
upgrade if it observed that, over the course of a potential IPO,
the financial sponsor was considering relinquishing control,
while the company maintains it existing debt metrics.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


PORTUGAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its unsolicited 'BB+/B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
the Republic of Portugal.  The outlook is stable.

                            RATIONALE

The ratings on Portugal are supported by S&P's view of ongoing
budgetary consolidation, improvements in the government debt
maturity profile, and the European Central Bank's (ECB's)
accommodative monetary stance.  The ratings remain constrained by
very high public- and private-sector debt, much of it owed to
nonresidents.  Furthermore, while economic growth firmed in the
second half of 2016, the banking system remains weak, hampering
improvements in monetary policy transmission.

S&P projects real GDP growth in Portugal will accelerate to about
1.6% this year versus 1.4% in 2016, before moderating to about
1.5% over S&P's forecast horizon to 2020.  S&P expects the
moderate economic recovery will be broad based, with positive
contributions from all sectors.

In this context, S&P sees domestic demand recovering from the dip
in the first half of 2016, due to a decline in investment
activity.  This was related to i) discretionary containment of
public investments by the government, ii) the transition to a new
period of the EU funding framework, and iii) temporary private-
sector uncertainty regarding the new government's policies.  S&P
expects investment activity will recover this year, as indicated
by the recent upturn in corporate investment and public
investment activity at the local government level ahead of this
autumn's local elections and the start of the new EU funding
period.  S&P also highlights an improvement in asset-price
developments, particularly in property markets, as an indication
of rising confidence.  Nevertheless, high private-sector debt and
delayed improvement in the credit channel will limit a stronger
contribution of investment to overall economic growth.

In turn, this will likely restrain consumption demand over S&P's
forecast horizon, which has been benefitting from an increase in
real disposable incomes mainly due to lower oil prices,
improvement in the labor market (with unemployment expected to
fall below 10% in 2018), and recent wage increases.  S&P believes
that consecutive increases in the minimum wage, most recently by
5.1% in January 2017, accompanied by measures to offset some of
the additional cost for employers, are unlikely to have weakened
the cost competitiveness of Portuguese goods and services.
However, the higher minimum wage may reduce the pace of hiring in
some parts of the economy, especially by employers who use the
minimum wage as a reference to set a higher wage and are
therefore unable to benefit from the government's offsetting
fiscal measures.  Moreover, S&P considers that Portugal's fragile
demographics, weakened by substantial net emigration and a
declining labor force, exacerbate these challenges.  Low
productivity growth would likely stifle the economy's growth
potential (though this development is not unique to Portugal),
without further improvements in the efficiency of the public
administration, judiciary, and the business environment,
including with respect to barriers in services markets.

S&P expects that, absent external shocks, export growth will pick
up this year.  S&P believes that this, together with a moderation
of consumption given constrained availability of credit, will
help keep the current account in a small surplus position over
the forecast period, thus supporting a gradual decline in
Portugal's gross external financing needs.  A solid external
performance is likely to bring the export of goods and services
to around 42% of GDP in 2017, from below 29% only seven years
ago.  If this continues, it would help reduce the economy's high
net external liabilities as a percentage of current account
receipts (CARs). The substantial reduction in borrowing costs for
the economy's private sector has already eased deleveraging, but
the process is slow.  Estimated at about 260% in 2016, S&P views
Portugal's narrow net external debt to CARs (our preferred
measure of external position) as being one of the highest among
sovereigns S&P rate.  The private-sector debt overhang is, in
S&P's view, a key impediment to a more dynamic recovery, since
resources that would otherwise be spent on consumption or
investment are used to improve households' and companies' balance
sheets.  Data from the Portuguese central bank, Banco de
Portugal, indicate that resident private nonfinancial sector
gross debt on a nonconsolidated basis was still at a high 220% of
GDP in November 2016, albeit down from 260% at end-2012.  In
S&P's view, economic recovery is additionally hindered by the
simultaneous deleveraging of the public sector.

"As such, we view Portugal's economy as still vulnerable to
deterioration of external borrowing conditions, despite the fall
in interest rates following the ECB's monetary policy measures.
For example, in S&P's view, the Portuguese banking sector will
struggle to improve its profitability and efficiency, and banks'
earnings generation capacity remains under significant pressure
given the ultra-low interest rates, muted volume growth, and
large stock of problematic assets that we estimate at about 16%
of gross loans and foreclosed real estate assets.  The majority
of banks are undergoing significant restructuring, including
recapitalizations or management and ownership changes, while many
have yet to tackle the downsizing of their large operating
infrastructures.  In S&P's view, major banks still have
significant issues to be resolved or are undergoing important
changes, although progress is being made.

S&P considers that all these difficulties constrain banks'
ability to tap the wholesale external financial markets for
funding.  The current government has been supporting the
strengthening of financial stability, most recently by committing
to provide EUR2.5 billion of fresh funds to recapitalize state-
owned bank Caixa Geral de Depositos.  In this context, S&P would
view positively further resolute steps by the authorities and
banks toward reducing the high level of nonperforming assets on
banks' balance sheets, which would, in S&P's opinion, improve
credit conditions in the economy and strengthen the monetary
transmission mechanism.

According to S&P's estimate, the government outperformed its
budgetary target of 2.4% of GDP and brought the budget deficit
down to about 2% of GDP in 2016 from 3.2% of GDP in 2015 (or 4.4%
of GDP including the December 2015 bail-out cost of Banif).
Besides lower interest spending, delayed public investment, a
freeze of budgetary appropriations in late 2016, and the
budgetary impact of cyclical recovery, the outcome was aided by
0.25% of GDP in revenues related to the government's tax-debt
settlement program.  Although S&P's gross and net general
government debt projections already incorporate the cost of
recapitalization of Caixa Geral de Depositos, S&P currently don't
include any potential accounting impact on the budget deficit.
The difference between S&P's 2017 budget deficit forecast of 1.8%
of GDP and the government's revised target of 1.6% of GDP is
mainly due to S&P's lower nominal economic growth projections.

Besides reliance on cyclical economic recovery, the government
expects to achieve its target via an increase in revenues from
property tax, additional revenues from the tax-debt settlement
program and sugary-drinks tax, as well as a shift in excise tax
from gasoline to diesel and tax collection.  One-time deficit- or
debt-reducing revenues this year are expected to come from the
recent repayment of a guarantee by Banco Privado Portugues (0.24%
of GDP), redemption of contingent convertible bonds by Banco
Comercial Portugues (0.4%), and higher dividends from Banco de
Portugal (0.16% of GDP).  On the spending side, the budget
includes further progress in attrition in the public sector and
measures implemented in the context of the spending review that
started in education, health care, and state-owned enterprises
and have been expanded to justice and public procurement.
Nevertheless, overall government spending--at 46% of GDP--appears
relatively high, including in comparison to considerably
wealthier eurozone member states like Germany or the Netherlands,
which implies a correspondingly high tax burden, including on
labor incomes.  Looking ahead, S&P expects that the general
government primary surplus (budget balance excluding interest
payments) will strengthen further, exceeding 2.5% of GDP in 2017,
pointing to a significant budgetary consolidation effort since
the start of the decade.

S&P expects Portugal's net general government debt will be about
118% of GDP in 2017 before slowly declining to below 116% of GDP
in 2020.  Given that a European Financial Stability Facility
bond, which was partly guaranteed by Portugal, matured late last
year, that bond no longer represents a contingent liability.  At
the same time, average general government interest payments will
likely represent about 10% of general government revenues in
2017-2020.  S&P expects that Portugal's cash buffer, which we
estimate at about 10.3% of GDP at end-2017, will decline only
gradually over the coming years.  However, S&P do not factor in
future reimbursement of the 2014 government loan to the
resolution fund for the purpose of recapitalizing Novo Banco, or
the government's potential additional costs related to litigation
risk associated with state-owned entities' swap contracts, or
financial sector support.  In recent years, Portugal's public
debt profile has significantly improved, with the average
remaining term of the Portuguese government's debt stock at 8.4
years as of year-end 2016, including the extension of the
European Financial Stability Mechanism loans.  Importantly,
Portugal has already pre-paid 50% of its loan from the
International Monetary Fund, thus improving its debt profile.
Moreover, Portugal's borrowing conditions have been notably
supported by the ECB's Public Sector Purchase Program, which is
currently scheduled to run until January 2018.

                                OUTLOOK

The outlook is stable, balancing S&P's expectation of further
budgetary consolidation and likely receding banking sector risks
over the next two years against the risks of a weakening external
growth environment and vulnerabilities related to high private-
and public-sector debt.

S&P could raise its ratings on Portugal if S&P observed:

   -- Implementation of measures that would lead to a substantial
      decline in nonperforming assets of the banking system and
      improve the effectiveness of the monetary transmission
      mechanism;

   -- Marked improvement in the economic growth outlook,
      exceeding S&P's current expectations;

   -- Acceleration in the economy's external debt or gross
      financing needs reduction; or

   -- Continued budgetary consolidation that would bring the
      general government budget position into surplus or net
      government debt to below 100% of GDP.

S&P could lower the ratings if it saw:

   -- A marked weakening in economic growth, for example due to a
      significant economic policy deviation or absence of further
      growth-enhancing structural reforms;

   -- The government adopting policies that could hurt Portugal's
      access to international financial markets; or

   -- The government's budgetary position deviating considerably
      and negatively from S&P's expectations or Portugal's
      external adjustment being reversed, with the current
      account balance turning into a deficit.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that all key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                  Rating
                                  To              From
Portugal (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency|U^   BB+/Stable/B    BB+/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility
  Assessment|U^                   AAA             AAA
Senior Unsecured
  Local Currency [#1]             BB+             BB+

|U^ Unsolicited ratings with issuer participation and access to
internal documents.

[#1] Issuer: Metropolitano de Lisboa E.P., Guarantor: Portugal
(Republic of)


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


TEAMNET: Files for Insolvency Amid Corruption Scandal
-----------------------------------------------------
SeeNews, citing data posted on the justice ministry's website,
reports that Romania's Teamnet, which has been involved in a
corruption scandal over contracts for IT services, has filed for
insolvency on March 20.

According to SeeNews, data showed the IT company filed for
insolvency at Prahova county court.

"At this moment we are working on a reorganization plan. We made
this decision in order to be able to maintain ourselves as a
business and fulfill commitments to employees, customers,
partners and suppliers," SeeNews quotes Teamnet representatives
as saying in a statement for local news agency Mediafax.

At the beginning of March, the CEO of Teamnet, Bogdan Padiu, was
remanded in judicial custody at the request of Romania's
anti-graft agency DNA in a probe of contracts for IT services
rendered to the public sector, SeeNews recounts.

Initially, Mr. Padiu was detained for 24 hours and although DNA
prosecutors requested a preventive 30-day detention, Prahova
county court ruled that the suspect will be put in judicial
custody for 60 days while investigations continue, SeeNews
relates.

According to SeeNews, Teamnet had paid between EUR3 million
(US$3.17 million) and EUR10 million between 2007 and 2014 to
controversial businessman and ex-MP Sebastian Ghita to secure IT
contracts with some public institutions, SeeNews relays, citing
DNA prosecutors.

Teamnet was established in 2001 and has subsidiaries in Romania,
Turkey, Croatia, Serbia, Belgium, Switzerland and Moldova.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


RUSSIA: S&P Revises Outlook to Pos.; Affirms 'BB+/B' FC Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on the Russian Federation
to positive from stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
'BB+/B' long- and short-term foreign currency and 'BBB-/A-3'
long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Russia.

S&P also affirmed the long-term national scale rating on Russia
at 'ruAAA'.

                             RATIONALE

The revision of the outlook reflects S&P's expectation that GDP
growth will return to positive territory and that the Russian
economy will continue to adapt to the relatively low oil price
environment, while maintaining its strong net external asset
position and comparatively low net general government debt over
2017-2020.  External pressures appear to have abated
significantly over the last 12-18 months.

The ratings are supported by Russia's strong external and fiscal
balance sheets, but remain constrained by S&P's assessment of
Russia's economy, which lacks diversity and has a weak growth
track record, as well as by wider institutional and regulatory
weaknesses.  Further constraints include ongoing structural
issues, such as a weak business environment, geopolitical
tensions, and sanctions, which together act as a drag on Russia's
medium-term economic growth prospects. Russia's growth
performance has been among the weakest of the Group of 20
nations, with only Argentina and Brazil performing more poorly in
2016.

Nevertheless, S&P expects Russia will return to positive economic
growth in 2017 after a two-year recession.  After a contraction
of only 0.2% in 2016 compared with S&P's previous forecast of a
1% decline, S&P expects real GDP will increase by 1.5% in 2017
and by an average of 1.7% in 2017-2020, driven by an increase in
oil and gas prices and improving investor sentiment.  S&P also
forecasts GDP per capita will rise to $11,000 in 2020 from $9,700
in 2017, albeit staying well below the 2013 level of $15,600.

In November/December 2016, in agreement with OPEC, Russia pledged
to cut its oil production by around 300,000 barrels per day (bpd)
by June 2017, from the 11.23 million bpd November average.  To
date, the resulting global oil price increase has more than
compensated for the losses from the reduced production volume,
providing Russia a net gain.  In December 2016, S&P revised its
oil price assumptions (Brent) upward by $5 to $50 in 2017 and
forecast that it will average $55 per barrel from 2018 through
the remainder of this decade.

Over the medium term, S&P expects that the economic recovery will
be driven by the expected modest rise in oil prices, continued
expansion of the oil and, particularly, gas sector in volume
terms, as well as an uptick in household consumption.
Nevertheless, in the short term, the economy will remain
constrained by sanctions that dampen investor interest.
Moreover, structural impediments, such as the state's pervasive
role in the economy and the challenging business and investment
climate, will continue to limit Russia's ability to diversify
away from commodities.

S&P assumes that the current sanctions against Russia, which were
imposed in 2014 by the EU and the U.S. (and some other countries
including Japan) in response to Russia's role in Eastern Ukraine
and Crimea, will remain in place.

Most importantly, the EU's sanctions will likely be extended,
especially in light of renewed hostilities in Eastern Ukraine as
well as allegations that Russian hackers have penetrated Western
political organizations.  Despite the potential for Russia's
relationship with the U.S. to improve following the election of
an ostensibly more Russia-friendly U.S. president, S&P do not
foresee the rapid lifting of U.S. sanctions.  This is largely due
to the U.S. administration and Congress's (but not the
executive's) continued concerns about forging closer ties with a
country traditionally viewed as an adversary.

While investor interest in Russia has risen on the back of the
sale of 19.5% of Rosneft to Qatar Investment Authority and
Glencore, and higher oil prices, S&P believes sanctions will
continue to weigh on foreign investment as well as on medium-term
external financing for banks and corporate entities.  S&P assumes
a net outflow of foreign direct investment through 2020 of around
1% of GDP per year.

Nevertheless, sanctions have not thwarted the Russian federal
government's ability to raise moderate amounts of external debt.
It managed to tap the international debt market in 2016 with two
Eurobonds totalling $3 billion.  Although several government-
related entities are subject to sanctions, the Russian federal
government is not, and S&P understands it plans to issue more
Eurobonds over the next few years.

The official estimate for the general government deficit showed
that it widened slightly to 3.6%in 2016 from 3.4% in 2015.
However, as per S&P's methodology, it excludes the $11.4 billion
one-time receipt from Rosneft's partial privatization from
general government revenues and instead classify it as a
financing item, while the government classifies it as a revenue
item; therefore S&P's calculation shows the reported deficit
figure for 2016 to be higher, at 4.5% of GDP.  Russia's 2016
expenditures included an unplanned (since it was due to be paid
later) loan payment of $11 billion to banks on behalf of state-
owned defense companies.

Looking ahead, Russia's 2017-2019 budget plan is based on a
$40 (Urals) oil price assumption, which S&P views as relatively
prudent, and S&P expects the general government deficit will
narrow to 2.4% by 2019.  However, the government's adjustment
plan is more aggressive than our forecasts.  It plans to freeze
expenditures in nominal terms for 2017-2019, leading to a sharp
reduction of spending in real terms.  As per the government's
plan, the level of expenditure in 2017-2020 is not permitted to
exceed the 2016 level, and the budget deficit will be cut by one
percentage point per year.  Consolidation will depend partly on
the pace of proposed tax, pension, and labor reforms.  However,
since these measures could be unpopular, it is likely that most
of them will be launched after the 2018 presidential elections.
Even if the government will not, in accordance with S&P's current
expectation, fully achieve its ambitious targets, S&P expects
broad control of the fiscal deficit as a result.

Overall, S&P views Russia's low general government net debt as a
rating strength, in addition to the government's relatively low
interest burden.  Over 2017-2020, S&P believes the government
will partly finance its deficits by drawing from its Reserve and
National Wealth Funds, but that much of the financing will come
from domestic market issuance.  At present, the Reserve and
National Wealth Funds account for about 6% of GDP, down from 8.6%
at midyear 2016, with the Reserve Fund likely to be depleted in
2017.  Nevertheless, overall, S&P expects the government will
keep general government debt (net of liquid assets) fairly low,
at below 14% of GDP, until 2020.  While still strong, this metric
constitutes a gradual weakening from the government's net asset
position in 2014.

S&P expects the current account surplus will increase to 3.4% of
GDP in 2017 as the rise in oil prices boosts exports, while
imports increase at a slower pace owing to still relatively weak
domestic consumption.  That said, the recent appreciation of the
ruble could give rise to more dynamic imports than currently
anticipated, leading to a smaller current account surplus than
S&P currently forecast.  The financial account has largely
stabilized and capital flight has stalled, contrasting with
previous years' net capital outflows from the private sector.
External pressures have abated significantly over the last 12-18
months, with net capital outflows at only $15 billion in 2016,
compared with $58 billion in 2015 and $152 billion in 2014.

S&P forecasts Russia's gross external financing requirement for
2017-2020 will average about 66% of current account receipts
(CARs) plus usable reserves.  S&P deducts foreign currency
investments made by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) on behalf of
the government from the central bank's reported foreign currency
reserves.  Like many oil exporters, Russia maintains a net
external asset position, and S&P expects narrow net external debt
(liquid assets minus external debt) will stand at about 50% of
CARs on average over 2017-2020.

The local currency has appreciated by around 22% year on year to
below Russian ruble (RUB) 60 to $1, its strongest level since
midyear 2015, partly owing to the improvement in oil prices and
investor confidence.  The government (via the CBR) has been
purchasing between $55 million and $106 million of foreign
currency daily, which is helping to stem the appreciation of the
ruble and thereby maintain the competitiveness of the economy.

S&P expects a slight easing of monetary policy over the forecast
horizon as consumer price inflation declines.  The CBR cut its
policy rate by 50 basis points to 10% in mid-September 2016 and
has since kept the rate unchanged.  Headline inflation continued
to decelerate in 2016, reaching 5.4% at the end of the year
compared with 12.9% in 2015, helped by the current strength of
the ruble.  S&P expects the inflation rate will only slightly
exceed the central bank's target of 4% in 2017, averaging 4.5% in
2017 and about 4% over 2017-2020.  The monetary policy
transmission mechanism seems to be showing signs of improvement,
although against a favorable backdrop of ample liquidity; after a
wide divergence in 2014-2015, the interest rate on the interbank
market has converged toward the official central bank rate.

The Russian banking sector is improving but remains weak, in
S&P's view, and in its "Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment:
Russia," published July 22, 2016, S&P classifies it in group '8'
on a scale from '1' (strongest) to '10' (weakest).  S&P believes
that the majority of asset-quality issues in the Russian banking
sector were revealed in 2016, and the situation has since
improved, albeit gradually.  At the same time, although S&P's
base-case scenario does not envision further deterioration in the
banking sector environment, S&P takes the view that recovery of
the banking sector will take time and is unlikely to be smooth.
S&P expects strengthening of large state-owned and a few large
private banks' business positions, while smaller private banks
will remain vulnerable to intensifying competition and funding
volatility.  S&P believes that the government will have limited
appetite to provide support to the banking sector and that the
sector therefore represents a limited contingent liability as per
S&P's criteria.  In S&P's view, state support might be available
only for state-owned banks and specialized institutions (like
Vnesheconombank) and possibly a few private systemically
important banks.

Parliamentary elections took place on Sept. 18, 2016, and, as
expected, the ruling United Russia party and its allies, all
largely affiliated with President Putin, won a large majority in
the Duma.  S&P expects that President Vladimir Putin will be re-
elected in 2018.  Political power is highly centralized, with
limited checks and balances, in S&P's opinion.  President Putin's
approval rating is very high at 84%, according to the Levada-
Center (February 2017).  However, in S&P's view, close state
control of civic organizations could make civil society appear
more cohesive than is the case.  Power in Russia's government,
already highly centralized around the presidency, has
increasingly made genuine participation in the political process
more difficult for opposition representatives and movements.  S&P
understands that the operations of nongovernmental organizations
are significantly constrained, and that effective electoral
competition is weak.

S&P understands that President Putin aims to improve Russia's
position in the World Bank's Doing Business ranking to No. 20
from No. 40 (out of 190) in 2017, after it moved down four places
in 2016.  S&P nevertheless remain cautious about prospects for
effective improvement of Russia's business environment.  The
government retains key stakes in many sectors of the economy and,
while privatization was regularly discussed in the past, S&P do
not expect any notable progress on that front, particularly in
the current environment.

                              OUTLOOK

The positive outlook indicates that S&P may raise its ratings on
Russia if the Russian economy continues to adapt to the
relatively low oil price environment while maintaining its strong
net external asset position and comparatively low net general
government debt burden.

S&P could raise the ratings if Russia's economic growth prospects
improved compared with those of other sovereigns at similar
levels of development.  The modest recovery could gain additional
speed should there be a meaningful loosening of sanctions against
Russia or a sharp improvement in prospects for the oil sector.
S&P could also raise the ratings should it observe a sustained
strengthening of the banking sector that would enhance the
effectiveness of monetary policy through a stronger monetary
transmission mechanism.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable or take a negative rating
action should geopolitical events result in foreign governments
significantly tightening their sanctions on Russia, or if Russia'
economic, fiscal, or external performance were weaker than S&P's
projections.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the external assessment had improved.
All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                      Rating
                                      To           From
Russian Federation
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign Currency                BB+/Pos./B        BB+/Stable/B
  Local Currency                  BBB-/Pos./A-3    BBB-/Stable/A-
3
  Russia National Scale                 ruAAA/--/--   ruAAA/--/--
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   BB+           BB+
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign Currency                      BB+           BB+
  Local Currency                        BBB-          BBB-


ZHILSTROYUPRAVLENIYE LLC: Owner Not Personally Liable for Debts
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sergei Blagov at Bloomberg BNA reports that Russia's high court
ruled the CEO and owner of ZhilStroyUpravleniye LLC cannot be
held responsible for the company's debts unless a connection
between their actions and its insolvency is established.

Gazprom Mezhregiongaz Tver, a subsidiary of Russia's natural gas
giant Gazprom, filed a lawsuit to make the CEO and owner of
ZhilStroyUpravleniye LLC, an insolvent company, personally liable
for the company's debts, Bloomberg BNA discloses.

The Tver Arbitration Court ruled in favor of the business July 6,
2016, Bloomberg BNA recounts.

The court held that the company's CEO and owner did not meet
criteria of personal liability for debts of the bankrupt
business, Bloomberg BNA notes.

Gazprom Mezhregiongaz Tver petitioned the Supreme Court to annul
this ruling, Bloomberg BNA relates.

The high court determined that the claimant failed to prove that
wrongdoings of the CEO and owner entailed the company's
insolvency, Bloomberg BNA relays.



===========
S E R B I A
===========


BELGRADE: Moody's Ups LT Issuer Rating to Ba3, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Public Sector Europe (MPSE) has upgraded the City of
Belgrade's long-term issuer rating to Ba3 from B1; the rating's
outlook has been changed to stable from positive.

The rating upgrade and the change in outlook follow similar
actions on Serbia's government bond rating on 17 March 2017.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects the improving operating environment of
Serbia, as reflected by the upgrade on the sovereign rating. The
rating action also reflects Moody's view that the
creditworthiness of the City of Belgrade is closely linked to
that of the sovereign, as Serbian local governments depend on
revenues that are linked to the sovereign's macroeconomic and
fiscal performance.

Institutional framework makes the local governments co-dependent
on the condition of the central budget. In Serbia, half of local
governments' operating revenue is derived from shared taxes
(mostly personal income tax) collected within their jurisdiction,
but is administratively controlled by the central government.

The rating of Belgrade is underpinned by its sound fiscal
performances, with double-digit operating surpluses averaging at
15% of operating revenue over the last five years. Moody's
expects that the resilient national economic growth and
favourable medium-term prospects will translate into rising
receipts from shared taxes and own-source revenues and thus
contribute to an improved credit profile. Thus far Belgrade has
the greatest capacity among Serbian cities to generate own-source
revenues, accounting for additional 45% of its operating revenue.

Belgrade's rating also takes into account the city's strategic
role in the national economy. The larger and more dynamic
economic base of Belgrade gives it a budgetary advantage over its
peers. Belgrade is the country's largest economic hub, accounting
for about 39% of national GDP and the city's relative affluence
is evident in its GDP per capita, which is 70% above the national
average.

The City of Belgrade's rating remains constrained by relatively
higher debt than that of the peers, although the city's net
direct and indirect debt levels declined to 64% of operating
revenue at year-end 2016 from 85% in 2015. However, Moody's
regards Belgrade's debt burden as manageable and expects its debt
service to remain at below 10% of total revenue in 2017-18.
Moody's assumption reflects the city's favourable direct debt
maturity profile, which comprises long-term amortising loans.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on the rating reflects the stable outlook on
the sovereign rating. It also takes into account Moody's
expectations of continued improvement of financial performances
of the City of Belgrade, its adequate liquidity position, and
declining and manageable debt burden.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Any upgrade in the sovereign rating would lead to upward pressure
on Belgrade's rating. Moreover, any improvement in the local
governments' expenditure flexibility and ability to raise
additional own source revenues would be considered positively.

Any deterioration in Serbia's rating would likely lead to a
downgrade of Belgrade's rating, as well as any sustained and
significant financial deterioration driven by systemic or
individual factors or unexpected sharp increase in debt.

The sovereign action required the publication of this credit
rating actions on a date that deviates from the previously
scheduled release date in the sovereign release calendar,
published on www.moodys.com.

The specific economic indicators, as required by EU regulation,
are not available for this entity. The following national
economic indicators are relevant to the sovereign rating, which
was used as an input to this credit rating action.

Sovereign Issuer: Serbia, Government of

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 13,699 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 2.8% (2016 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 1.5% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -1.4% (2016 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -4% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 78.4% (2015 Actual)

Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

SUMMARY OF MINUTES FROM RATING COMMITTEE

On March 16, 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Belgrade, City of. The main points raised during
the discussion were: The systemic risk in which the issuer
operates has materially decreased.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.


NOVI SAD: Moody's Raises LT Issuer Rating to Ba3; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Public Sector Europe (MPSE) has upgraded the City of Novi
Sad's long-term issuer rating to Ba3 from B1 and the City of
Valjevo's issuer rating to B1 from B2. The ratings' outlooks for
both cities have been changed to stable from positive.

The ratings' upgrade and the change in outlook follow similar
actions on Serbia's government bond rating on 17 March 2017.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects the improving operating environment of
Serbia, as reflected by the upgrade on the sovereign rating. The
rating action also reflects Moody's view that the
creditworthiness of both cities is closely linked to that of the
sovereign, as Serbian local governments depend on revenues that
are linked to the sovereign's macroeconomic and fiscal
performance.

The institutional framework makes the cities co-dependent on the
condition of the central budget. In Serbia, half of municipal
operating revenue is derived from shared taxes (mostly personal
income tax) collected within their jurisdiction, but is
administratively controlled by the central government. Novi Sad
and Valjevo derive an additional 8% and 17%, respectively, of
their operating revenue from central government transfers, mostly
non-earmarked. Moody's expects that the resilient national
economic growth and favourable medium-term prospects will
translate into rising receipts from shared taxes and own-source
revenues and thus contribute to an improved credit profile of
both cities.

Novi Sad's and Valjevo's ratings reflect their responsive
budgetary management, particularly the cities' still sound
operating margins. The Novi Sad's and Valjevo's ratings are
underpinned by moderate to low and well manageable debt levels
and adequate liquidity, which in the case of Novi Sad helps to
mitigate foreign currency exposure.

Novi Sad's Ba3 rating also takes into account the city's
important role in the national economy as the second largest city
in the country which supports its revenue base as well as its
greater institutional capacity and its comparatively stronger
fiscal management practices.

The ratings remain constrained by high infrastructure needs,
which in the case of Novi Sad are reflected in financial deficits
in the last two years, and limited expenditure control under the
current evolving framework.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on the ratings reflects the stable outlook on
the sovereign rating.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Any upgrade in the sovereign rating would lead to upward pressure
on Novi Sad and Valjevo's ratings. Moreover, any improvement in
the local governments' expenditure flexibility and ability to
raise additional own source revenues would be considered
positively.

Any deterioration in Serbia's rating would likely lead to a
downgrade of Novi Sad and Valjevo's ratings, as well as any
sustained and significant financial deterioration driven by
systemic or individual factors or unexpected sharp increase in
debt.

The sovereign action required the publication of this credit
rating actions on a date that deviates from the previously
scheduled release date in the sovereign release calendar,
published on www.moodys.com.

The specific economic indicators, as required by EU regulation,
are not available for these entities. The following national
economic indicators are relevant to the sovereign rating, which
was used as an input to this credit rating action.

Sovereign Issuer: Serbia, Government of

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 13,699 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 2.8% (2016 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 1.5% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -1.4% (2016 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -4% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: [not available]

Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

SUMMARY OF MINUTES FROM RATING COMMITTEE

On 16 March 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Novi Sad, City of; Valjevo, City of. The main
points raised during the discussion were: The systemic risk in
which the issuer operates has materially decreased.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


TC ZIRAAT: Moody's Revises Outlook to Neg., Affirms Ba1 Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on 17 Turkish
banks. The long-term debt and deposit ratings of 14 banks were
affirmed and their outlook was changed to negative from stable.
The ratings of one additional bank were downgraded with a
negative outlook, while the ratings of two other banks were
affirmed with outlooks unchanged.

The outlook change was prompted by the deterioration of the
outlook for Turkey's credit profile as captured by Moody's
decision to change the outlook on Turkey's Ba1 government issuer
rating to negative from stable on March 17, 2017.

AFFIRMATION AND OUTLOOK CHANGES

Moody's decision to affirm and change the outlook to negative
from stable on the long-term deposit and debt ratings of 14 banks
reflects Moody's expectation that these banks' ratings will come
under pressure from a combination of: 1) the weakening capacity
of the government of Turkey to provide support in case of need,
as implied by the negative outlook on the sovereign rating; and
2) the increasingly adverse macroeconomic environment in Turkey.
Economic prospects have worsened significantly since Moody's last
rating action on Turkish banks in September, and the rating
agency expects this will negatively affect the banks' asset
quality, earnings generation and capital and may lead to
heightened foreign currency refinancing risk.

The affected institutions are: Akbank TAS, Alternatifbank A.S.,
HSBC Bank A.S. (Turkey), ING Bank A.S. (Turkey), Finansbank AS,
T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S., Turkiye Vakiflar
Bankasi TAO, Turk Ekonomi Bankasi A.S., Turkiye Garanti Bankasi
A.S., Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi A.S., Turkiye IS Bankasi A.S.,
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi A.S., and the GRI Export Credit
Bank of Turkey A.S..

RATING DOWNGRADE

Moody's has downgraded Sekerbank T.A.S. long-term deposit ratings
to B2 from B1 and standalone Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) to
b2 from b1, and assigned a negative outlook to the long-term
deposit ratings. The action captures Moody's expectations that
the financial fundamentals of this bank will deteriorate more in
the adverse operating environment than other rated Turkish peers.

AFFIRMATIONS WITH OUTLOOK UNCHANGED

Moody's has affirmed Burgan Bank A.S's local and foreign currency
deposit ratings at Ba3, and its BCA at b2. The outlook on the
long-term deposit ratings remains stable, given the expected
resilience of the bank's financial fundamentals, despite the
challenging environment.

Moody's also affirmed Denizbank A.S.'s local and foreign currency
deposit ratings at Ba2, and its BCA at ba3. The long-term deposit
ratings continue to have a negative outlook. The outlook reflects
Moody's expectation that while the bank's fundamentals remain
compatible with the current rating level, Denizbank shows some
vulnerability to further deterioration amid the current operating
environment.

Details of the rationales for individual bank rating actions are
provided later in this Press Release.

RATINGS RATIONALE

WEAKENING GOVERNMENT CREDITWORTHINESS AFFECTS CAPACITY TO SUPPORT

Although Moody's continues to incorporate one notch of government
support for government-owned and systemically important banks,
corresponding outlooks have been changed to negative from stable,
in line with the negative outlook on the Ba1 sovereign rating.
This reflects the potential weakening of the government's
capacity to provide support to banks in case of need.
Additionally, the negative outlook takes into account the
government's limited foreign currency resources, with the Central
Bank's net foreign currency reserves amounting to USD34 billion
as at January 2017, which may result in the country's authorities
becoming more selective in providing support to the banking
system.

DETERIORATING DOMESTIC OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AFFECTING BANKS'
STANDALONE CREDIT PROFILES

Another key driver for the negative outlook of the Turkish
financial institutions' ratings is the increasingly adverse
operating environment, which has emerged since the last rating
action on Turkish banks taken in September 2016. Specifically,
the operating environment has been characterised by particularly
poor economic performance in the third quarter of 2016, the
sudden and steep depreciation of the Turkish lira, as well as
rapid inflation, which will suppress growth in the near-term.
According to Moody's, these factors will exert pressure on the
financial performance of Turkish banks' funding, capital, asset
quality and profitability.

While Turkish banks continue to fund themselves in international
markets, Moody's expects the cost of such funding sources to
increase as US interest rates rise and heightened geopolitical
risk in the region affects investor sentiment, which represents a
key downside risk as the banks have a high dependence on foreign
currency funding. Moody's estimates that the banking system's
foreign currency borrowings are around USD 145 billion, just
below 20% of the system's total liabilities at year-end 2016.
Despite recent issuances of longer-term bonds by leading Turkish
banks, up to 50% of the system's wholesale market borrowing
remains short-term (less than one year). This makes the banking
system particularly sensitive to a deterioration in investor
sentiment, as these foreign currency liabilities must be
refinanced on an ongoing basis.

Capital ratios have also been negatively affected by the Turkish
lira's depreciation and remain vulnerable to: 1) further currency
depreciation, as up to 40% of the institutions' assets are in
foreign currencies, while Tier 1 capital buffers held against
these assets are in Turkish liras; and 2) a weakening in the
credit quality of the banks' Turkish sovereign exposures, which
could trigger higher risk-weights for the purpose of calculating
capital ratios as per international regulatory guidelines on
capital requirements.

Moody's also considers that asset quality ratios will deteriorate
at a faster pace than previously expected, as the economic
slowdown and weakening creditor profiles will likely lead to
higher levels of restructured and non-performing loans,
especially from highly leveraged corporates and households.
Moody's also notes that various regulatory measures (including
restructuring of potential non-performing assets in the tourism
and energy sectors) may result in under-reporting of the
riskiness of banks' portfolios, reducing transparency and
comparability to past data.

Profitability and, therefore, the internal capital generation
capacity of the institutions are also likely to be affected by
deteriorating asset quality and adverse economic conditions. In
turn, this may reduce the institutions' credit growth and
revenues, while higher funding and credit costs could exacerbate
pressure on net earnings.

FOREIGN BANKS' AFFILIATE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

Moody's considers that, despite the adverse operating
environment, existing support assumptions regarding parent
companies' capacity and willingness to provide support remain
correctly positioned and are unaffected by this rating action. As
a result, nine Turkish subsidiaries of foreign banks continue to
benefit from an uplift above their BCA in the range of 1-3
notches.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Given the mostly negative outlooks on the long-term deposit and
debt ratings of Turkish banks, upgrades are unlikely in the near
future. There is also limited upside potential for the standalone
BCAs of the banks given the recent rating actions. For banks with
potentially weaker BCAs, standalone ratings could be downgraded
if the deterioration in the operating environment leads to a
significant weakening in refinancing capability, profitability
and asset quality of the banks.

Long-term deposit or debt ratings, which incorporate an uplift
from government support, could be affected by changes in the
sovereign rating, Moody's views on the government's willingness
to provide support, or sovereign ceilings.

Similarly, long-term deposit and debt ratings incorporating
uplift from affiliate support could also be affected if Moody's
views of parental rating and/or support incorporated into the
ratings change. This could reflect a deterioration of operating
conditions in Turkey leading to a parent having a lower incentive
to provide support to subsidiaries in the country.

T.C. Ziraat Bankasi (Ziraat)

The long-term foreign currency debt and local currency deposit
ratings of Ziraat Bank were affirmed at Ba1, and the outlook
changed to negative from stable. The bank's foreign currency
deposit rating was affirmed at Ba2 (constrained by the sovereign
ceiling at Ba2), and the outlook changed to negative from stable.
The BCA was affirmed at ba2.

The principal driver for the negative outlook is the change in
the outlook of the Turkish government's Ba1 debt rating to
negative from stable. While Moody's continues to assume a very
high probability of support for this fully government-owned bank,
the rating action reflects a potential weakening in the
government's capacity to provide support in case of need, as
signalled by the negative outlook on the Ba1 sovereign rating.

Although Moody's has affirmed Ziraat's standalone BCA given its
current resilience, the rating agency expects that Ziraat's
standalone credit profile will come under further pressure from
the weakening economy, particularly its asset quality and
capitalisation. Moody's expects the bank's asset quality to
deteriorate gradually, albeit from a low level of problem loans
at 1.8% of total loans at Q3 2016, putting pressure on its
currently strong net profitability. The bank's loss absorption
capacity is supported by high provisioning coverage and still
adequate capitalisation. Ziraat's capitalisation has weakened for
the last three years (Moody's adjusted Tier 1 ratio has declined
from 12.3%% at end-2015 to 11.5% as of Q3 2016) and may decline
further due to fast loan growth and/or foreign currency
volatility. Ziraat's dependence on wholesale funding, although
increasing in recent years (market funds at 25.6% of tangible
banking assets as at Q3 2016) is moderate compared with other
Turkish banks, with manageable refinancing risk.

Akbank TAS (Akbank)

The long-term foreign and local currency debt and local currency
deposit ratings of Akbank were affirmed at Ba1 and the outlook
changed to negative from stable. The bank's foreign currency
deposit rating was affirmed at Ba2 (constrained by the sovereign
ceiling at Ba2), and the outlook changed to negative from stable.
The BCA was affirmed at ba2.

The principal driver for the negative outlook is the change in
the outlook of the Turkish government's Ba1 debt rating to
negative from stable. While Moody's continues to assume a high
probability of support for this systemically important bank,
leading to one notch of uplift for the debt and local currency
deposit ratings, the rating action reflects a potential weakening
in the government's capacity to provide support in case of need,
as signaled by the negative outlook on the Ba1 sovereign rating.

Moody's has affirmed Akbank's standalone BCA and expects that
this will remain resilient to the weakening economy. Moody's
expects the bank's asset quality to weaken only gradually from a
low level of problem loans (at 2.3% of gross loans at end-2016),
somewhat dampening its currently strong net profitability. The
bank's loss absorption capacity is supported by high provisioning
coverage and strong capitalisation. Akbank's capitalisation has
weakened for the last three years (Moody's adjusted Tier 1 ratio
has declined from 12.9% at end-2014 to 11.9% at end-2016) and may
decline further due to fast loan growth and/or foreign currency
volatility. Akbank's dependence on wholesale funding, although
reducing in recent years, remains significant, with market funds
at 29% of tangible banking assets, but with manageable
refinancing risk.

Turkiye IS Bankasi A.S. (Isbank)

The long-term foreign currency debt and local currency deposit
ratings of Isbank were affirmed at Ba1, and the outlook changed
to negative from stable. The bank's foreign currency deposit
rating was affirmed at Ba2 (constrained by the sovereign ceiling
at Ba2), and the outlook changed to negative from stable. The BCA
was affirmed at ba2.

The principal driver for the negative outlook is the change in
the outlook of the Turkish government's Ba1 debt rating to
negative from stable. While Moody's continues to incorporate one
notch of uplift due to government support assumptions, given the
systemic importance of Isbank as Turkey's largest private-sector
institution, the rating action reflects a potential weakening in
the government's capacity to provide support in case of need, as
signalled by the negative outlook on the Ba1 sovereign rating.

Although Moody's has affirmed Isbank's standalone BCA given its
resilience, the agency expects the bank's standalone credit
profile to come under pressure from the weakening economy.
Moody's expects the bank's asset quality to come under further
pressure with problem loans currently at 2.3% as at end-2016. The
bank's capitalisation has declined for the last three years
(Moody's adjusted Tier 1 capital ratio has declined from 12% as
at end-2015 to 10.8% as at end-2016). At the same time, the bank
maintains a high level of provisioning coverage and,
consequently, risk absorption capacity, which is in line with
other leading Turkish banks. The bank has a proven track-record
of refinancing its wholesale liabilities (market funds at 30% of
tangible banking assets as at end-2016) during challenging
periods and large holdings of liquid assets also mitigate the
bank's refinancing risk while its profitability remains adequate.

Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S. (Garanti)

The long-term foreign and local currency debt and local currency
deposit ratings of Garanti were affirmed at Ba1, and the outlook
changed to negative from stable. The bank's foreign currency
deposit rating was affirmed at Ba2 (constrained by the sovereign
ceiling at Ba2), and the outlook changed to negative from stable.
The BCA was affirmed at ba2.

The principal driver for the negative outlook of the bank's
ratings is the impact of the weakening operating environment on
Garanti's standalone BCA. Moody's expects the bank's asset
quality to weaken gradually in line with the market average. At
the same time, Moody's acknowledges that the bank's profitability
remains strong despite economic slow-down and headwinds from the
operating environment. Although the bank's capitalisation is also
one of the strongest among similarly-rated peers, with Moody's
adjusted Tier 1 ratio at 12.2% as at end-2016, these buffers
remain exposed to currency depreciation. Garanti's loan-to-
deposit ratio is broadly in line with the Turkish system average
of about 120% and the bank is exposed to volatility in investor
sentiment. However, Moody's notes that the bank has demonstrated
its ability to refinance its wholesale liabilities (market funds
at 27% of tangible banking assets as at end-2016) during
challenging periods.

Garanti's ratings continue to incorporate a moderate probability
of affiliate support from Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.
(BBVA) (BCA baa2/LT Bank Deposits A3 Stable ) leading to a one
notch uplift from its standalone BCA. The current government
support assumptions do not result in any additional uplift for
the bank's long-term ratings.

Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. (Halkbank)

The long-term foreign currency debt and local currency deposit
ratings of Halkbank were affirmed at Ba1, and the outlook changed
to negative from stable. The bank's foreign currency deposit
rating was affirmed at Ba2 (constrained by the sovereign ceiling
at Ba2), and the outlook changed to negative from stable. The BCA
was affirmed at ba2.

The principal driver for the negative outlook is the change in
the outlook of the Turkish government's Ba1 debt rating to
negative from stable. While Moody's continues to assume a very
high probability of support for this majority government-owned
bank, the rating action reflects a potential weakening in the
government's capacity to provide support in case of need, as
signalled by the negative outlook on the Ba1 sovereign rating.

Although Moody's has affirmed Halkbank's standalone BCA given its
resilience, the agency expects Halkbank's credit profile will
come under pressure due to the impact of the weakening economy.
Moody's expects the bank's asset quality to weaken gradually with
problem loans at 3.2% as at end-2016, in line with the market
average. The bank's total capitalisation is somewhat weaker than
for similarly-rated banks, with Moody's adjusted Tier 1 ratio
declining to 10% as at end-2016 from 11.5% as at end-2015. At the
same time, the bank's profitability is comparable with the
highest rated peers in Turkey. Moody's notes that Halkbank
successfully raised long-term funds in 2016 and lengthened its
funding profile.

Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi A.S. (YapiKredi)

The foreign currency long-term debt and local currency deposit
ratings of YapiKredi were affirmed at Ba1, and the outlook
changed to negative from stable. The bank's foreign currency
deposit rating was affirmed at Ba2 (constrained by the sovereign
ceiling at Ba2), and the outlook changed to negative from stable.
The BCA was affirmed at ba2.

The principal driver for the negative outlook is the impact of
the weakening operating environment on YapiKredi's standalone
BCA. Moody's expects the bank's asset quality to weaken further.
With problem loans as percentage of total loans at 4.55% as at
end-2016, it remains weaker compared with the leading Turkish
banks. The bank's capitalisation (Moody's adjusted total Tier 1
ratio at 8.8% as at end-2016) compares unfavorably to similarly-
rated peers, although Moody's notes that the bank's risk-
absorption capacity was improved by about 6% with the issuance of
USD500mn Basel III compliant Tier 2 instruments in March 2016.
YapiKredi's dependence on the wholesale funding market with
market funds (at 25% of tangible banking assets as at end-2016,
which is in line with the system average), exposes it to shifts
in investor sentiment. At the same time, Moody's notes that the
bank's refinancing needs are relatively low given the longer
average duration of its debt.

YapiKredi's ratings continue to incorporate a moderate
probability of affiliate support from UniCredit S.p.A. (BCA
ba1/LT Bank Deposits Baa1 Stable ) leading to a one notch uplift
from its standalone BCA. The current government support
assumptions do not result in an additional uplift for the bank's
long-term ratings.

Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi TAO (VakifBank)

The long-term foreign currency debt and local currency deposit
ratings of VakifBank were affirmed at Ba1 and the outlook changed
to negative from stable. The bank's foreign currency deposit
rating was affirmed at Ba2 (constrained by the sovereign ceiling
at Ba2), and the outlook changed to negative from stable. The BCA
was affirmed at ba2.

The principal driver for the negative outlook is the change in
the outlook of the Turkish government's Ba1 debt rating to
negative from stable. While Moody's continues to assume a very
high probability of support for this government-owned bank,
leading to one notch of uplift for the debt and local currency
deposit ratings, the rating action reflects a potential weakening
in the government's capacity to provide support in case of need,
as signaled by the negative outlook on the Ba1 sovereign rating.

Although Moody's has affirmed VakifBank's standalone BCA given
its current resilience, Moody's expects that VakifBank's
standalone credit profile will come under further pressure from
the weakening economy. Moody's expects the bank's asset quality
to deteriorate from a relatively high level of problem loans
(4.3% of gross loans at end-2016), dampening its currently
adequate net profitability. The bank's loss absorption capacity
is constrained by moderate capitalisation, albeit accompanied by
adequate provisioning coverage. VakifBank's capitalisation has
remained broadly stable for the last three years (Moody's
adjusted Tier 1 ratio has declined from 10.3% at end-2014 to 10%
at end-2016) but may come under pressure from fast loan growth
and/or further foreign currency volatility. VakifBank's
dependence on wholesale funding, although slightly declining in
recent years, remains significant, with market funds at 28% of
tangible banking assets, but with manageable refinancing risk.

Turk Ekonomi Bankasi A.S. (TEB)

The long-term local currency deposit rating of TEB was affirmed
at Ba1 and the outlook changed to negative from stable. The
bank's foreign currency deposit rating was affirmed at Ba2
(constrained by the sovereign ceiling at Ba2) and the outlook
changed to negative from stable. The BCA was affirmed at ba3.

The principal driver for the negative outlook on the foreign
currency deposit rating is the change in the outlook of the
Turkish government's Ba1 debt rating to negative from stable. The
government's own foreign currency deposit ceiling of Ba2
constrains the bank's long-term foreign currency deposit rating.

The principal driver for the negative outlook on the local
currency deposit rating is Moody's view on the possible evolution
of affiliate support. While Moody's continues to assume a high
probability of affiliate support from BNP Paribas (BCA baa1/LT
Bank Deposits A1 Stable), over the next 12-18 months the rating
agency could lower its assumptions in this regard in the event
that the operating environment deteriorates to such an extent
that the parent reconsiders its support for TEB. This could
reduce the current two-notch uplift from TEB's standalone BCA.

Moody's has affirmed TEB's standalone BCA given its resilience.
Moody's expects that TEB's standalone credit profile will remain
compatible with its ba3 level despite the weakening economy.
Moody's expects the bank's asset quality to deteriorate only
gradually, from a low level of problem loans (3% of gross loans
as at end-2016), dampening its currently satisfactory net
profitability. The bank's loss absorption capacity is constrained
by modest provisioning coverage and weak capitalisation. TEB's
capitalisation has remained broadly stable for the last three
years (Moody's adjusted Tier 1 ratio increased from 9.9% at end-
2014 to 10% at end-2016) but may decline due to foreign currency
volatility. TEB's dependence on wholesale funding, broadly
unchanged in recent years, remains at an acceptable level, with
market funds at 22% of tangible banking assets, and refinancing
risk further mitigated by some parent funding.

Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi A.S. (TSKB)

The long-term foreign currency debt ratings of TSKB were affirmed
at Ba1 and the outlook changed to negative from stable. The
bank's BCA was affirmed at ba2.

The principal driver for the negative outlook is the change in
the outlook of the Turkish government's Ba1 debt rating to
negative from stable. While Moody's continues to assume a very
high probability of support for this development bank, leading to
one notch of uplift for the debt ratings, the rating action
reflects a potential weakening in the government's capacity to
provide support in case of need, as signaled by the negative
outlook on the Ba1 sovereign rating.

Moody's has affirmed TSKB's standalone BCA given its resilience.
Moody's expects that TSKB's standalone credit profile will remain
resilient to the weakening economy. The rating agency expects the
bank's asset quality to deteriorate only marginally, from the
lowest level of problem loans among Turkish rated banks (0.3% of
gross loans at September 2016), somewhat dampening its currently
strong net profitability. The bank's loss absorption capacity is
also supported by full provisioning coverage and strong
capitalisation. TSKB's capitalisation has, however, weakened for
the last three years (Moody's adjusted Tier 1 ratio has declined
from 16% at end-2014 to 13.1% at September 2016) and may decline
further due to foreign currency volatility. As a non-deposit
taking institution, TSKB is fully dependent on wholesale funding,
however, its refinancing risk is mitigated by access to long-term
supranational funding sources, largely under government
guarantees.

Sekerbank T.A.S.

The long-term foreign and local currency deposit ratings of
Sekerbank were downgraded to B2 from B1. The outlook remains
negative. The BCA was downgraded to b2 from b1.

The principal driver for the downgrade is Moody's view that
Sekerbank's fundamentals are in line with a b2 BCA. Sekerbank
continues to have one of the highest levels of problem loans
amongst Turkish rated banks (6.1% of gross loans at September
2016), exacerbated by concentration towards the real estate
sector, and very low net profitability. The bank's loss
absorption capacity is also severely constrained by weak and
declining provisioning coverage and one of the weakest
capitalisations among rated Turkish banks. Sekerbank's
capitalisation has weakened over the last three years (Moody's
adjusted Tier 1 ratio declined from 11.2% at end-2014 to 10.5% at
September 2016). Sekerbank's dependence on wholesale funding,
stable in recent years, remains significant, with market funds at
26% of tangible banking assets at September 2016, with high
refinancing risk because liquid assets continue to be
insufficient to cover wholesale funding.

The principal driver for the negative outlook is Sekerbank's
sensitivity to the deteriorating operating environment. Moody's
expects that Sekerbank's standalone credit profile will come
under further pressure from the adverse economic conditions, with
asset quality in particular likely to deteriorate, impairing the
bank's net profitability. The bank's capitalisation may also
decline further due to net losses or foreign currency volatility

Export Credit Bank of Turkey A.S. (Turk Eximbank)

The long-term foreign currency debt rating of Turk Eximbank was
affirmed at Ba1 and the outlook changed to negative from stable.
The bank's BCA was affirmed at ba2.

The principal driver for the negative outlook is the change in
the outlook of the Turkish government's Ba1 debt rating to
negative from stable. While Moody's continues to assume a very
high probability of support for this government-related
institution, leading to one notch of uplift for the debt rating,
the rating action reflects a potential weakening in the
government's capacity to provide support in case of need, as
signalled by the negative outlook on the Ba1 sovereign rating.

Moody's has affirmed Turk Eximbank's standalone BCA given its
resilience. Moody's expects Turk Eximbank's standalone credit
profile to remain resilient to the weakening economy. Moody's
expects the bank's asset quality to deteriorate only marginally,
and from a negligible level of problem loans (0.4% of gross loans
at June 2016), somewhat dampening its currently adequate net
profitability. The bank's loss absorption capacity is also
supported by extremely strong provisioning coverage and the
strongest capitalisation among rated Turkish banks. Turk
Eximbank's capitalisation has, however, declined for the last
three years (Moody's adjusted Tier 1 ratio has declined from 23%
at end-2014 to 16.3% at June 2016) and may decline further due to
foreign currency volatility. Turk Eximbank is fully dependent on
wholesale funding, consistent with the bank's wholesale profile
and public policy mission. However, its refinancing risk is
mitigated by funding provided by the central bank or the
treasury.

Alternatifbank A.S. (ABank)

The long-term local currency deposit rating of ABank was affirmed
at Ba1 and the outlook changed to negative from stable. The
bank's long-term foreign currency deposit rating (constrained by
the sovereign ceiling at Ba2) was affirmed at Ba2 and the outlook
changed to negative from stable. The BCA was affirmed at b1.

The principal driver for the negative outlook on the foreign
currency deposit rating is the change in the outlook of the
Turkish government's Ba1 debt rating to negative from stable. The
government's own foreign currency deposit ceiling of Ba2
constrains the bank's long-term foreign currency deposit rating.

The principal driver for the negative outlook on the local
currency deposit rating is the potential weakening of the BCA.
While Moody's assumes a very high probability of affiliate
support from Qatar's The Commercial Bank (Q.S.C.) (BCA baa3/LT
Bank Deposits A2 stable), resulting in a three-notch uplift from
ABank's standalone BCA, a lowering of the BCA would result in a
downgrade of the local currency deposit rating.

Although Moody's has affirmed ABank's standalone BCA given its
current resilience, Moody's expects that ABank's standalone
credit profile will come under pressure from the weakening
economy. Moody's expects the bank's asset quality to deteriorate,
from a relatively high level of problem loans (5.6% of gross
loans at end-2016), impairing its currently low net
profitability. The bank's loss absorption capacity is also
constrained by adequate provisioning coverage but one of the
weakest capitalisations among rated Turkish banks. ABank's
capitalisation has declined for the last three years (Moody's
adjusted Tier 1 ratio has declined from 9.6% at end-2014 to 7.6%
at June 2016) and despite the strengthening at end-2016 may
decline further due to foreign currency volatility. ABank's
dependence on wholesale funding, although decreasing in recent
years, remains significant, with market funds at 32% of tangible
banking assets at June 2016, with high refinancing risk offset by
some parental funding.

Finansbank AS (Finansbank)

The foreign currency long-term debt and local currency deposit
ratings of Finansbank were affirmed at Ba1, and the outlook
changed to negative from stable. The bank's foreign currency
deposit rating was affirmed at Ba2 (constrained by the sovereign
ceiling at Ba2), and the outlook changed to negative from stable.
The BCA was affirmed at ba3.

The principal driver of the negative outlook is the impact of the
weakening operating environment on Finansbank's standalone BCA.
Moody's expects the bank's asset quality to weaken gradually in
line with the market average. With problem loans as percentage of
total loans at 5.8% as at end-2016, it remains weaker compared
with the leading Turkish banks. At the same time the bank
maintains its solid capital ratios and risk-absorption capacity
despite a relatively weak asset quality ratios. The bank's
Moody's adjusted Tier 1 capital ratio at 11.3% as at end-2016 has
declined for the past two years remains sensitive to foreign
currency devaluation. Moody's expect the bank's profitability to
stabilise, given that the recent change in the ownership is
likely to benefit its funding costs.

Finansbank's ratings continue to incorporate a high probability
of affiliate support from its 99% shareholder Qatar National Bank
(QNB) (BCA baa1; LT Bank Deposits Aa3 Negative) leading to two
notches of uplift from its standalone BCA.

Denizbank A.S. (Denizbank)

The local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Denizbank were
affirmed at Ba2, and continue to have a negative outlook. The BCA
was affirmed at ba3.

Denizbank's deposit ratings continue to benefit from a high
probability of affiliate support from its 99% shareholder,
Russia's Sberbank (BCA ba1/LT Bank Deposits Ba1 Stable), leading
to one notch of uplift from its standalone BCA (ba3).

The principal driver for maintaining the negative outlook on the
ratings is the impact of the weakening operating environment on
Denizbank's standalone BCA. Moody's expects the bank's asset
quality to weaken given the headwinds in the operating
environment and the relatively high concentration in the bank's
loan portfolio. With problem loans as percentage of total loans
at 3.9% as at Q3-2016, it remains weaker compared with the
leading Turkish banks. At the same time the bank's risk
absorption capacity was enhanced with its improved
capitalisation, with Moody's adjusted Tier 1 ratio at 9.1% as at
Q3-2016, benefitting from an injection of Tier 1 capital in June
2016. The bank's refinancing risk is relatively low with market
funds at 18% of tangible banking assets as at Q3 2016.

ING Bank A.S. (Turkey) (ING-TR)

The local currency deposit rating of ING-TR's was affirmed at
Ba1, and the outlook changed to negative from stable. The bank's
foreign currency deposit was affirmed at Ba2 (constrained by the
sovereign ceiling at Ba2), and the outlook changed to negative
from stable. The BCA was affirmed at b1.

The principal driver for the negative outlook is the impact of
the weakening operating environment on ING-TR's standalone BCA.
Moody's expects the bank's asset quality to weaken further,
albeit from low levels of non-performing loans. With problem
loans as percentage of total loans at 3.4% as at Q3-2016, it is
comparable with its peer group. Moody's adjusted Tier 1 capital
at 9.5% as at Q3-2016 is comparable to its peer group, although
the bank is dependent on the parent for its capital needs given
the bank's low, albeit improving, profitability. The bank's
internal capital creation may come under further pressure due to
the economic slow-down and headwinds in the operating
environment. Moody's notes that ING-TR's market funds at 42% of
tangible banking assets as at Q3 2016 is one of the highest among
its peers, indicating its dependence on market funding. However,
a significant portion of market funding is obtained from the
parent.

ING-TR's deposit ratings continue to incorporate a very high
probability of affiliate support from its 100% shareholder ING
Bank N.V. (LT Bank Deposits A1 Positive, ST Bank Deposits Prime-
1; BCA baa1) leading to three notches of uplift.

HSBC Bank A.S. (Turkey) (HSBC-TR)

The foreign and local currency long-term deposit ratings of HSBC-
TR's were affirmed at Ba3, and the outlook changed to negative
from stable. The BCA was affirmed at b2.

The principal driver for the negative outlook is the impact of
the weakening operating environment on HSBC-TR's standalone
financial fundamentals. Moody's expects the bank's asset quality
to weaken further. With problem loans as percentage of total
loans at 7.8% as at Q3-2016, it is one of the weakest within its
peer group. The bank's total capitalization, with Moody's
adjusted Tier 1 ratio at 9% as at Q3 2016 is relatively weak and
has declined over the past years due to on-going losses. The
bank's refinancing risk remains manageable with the loan-to-
deposit ratio at 114% as at Q3 2016 somewhat better than the
market average. In Moody's view its affiliation with the HSBC
group further reduces its refinancing risk in case of need.

HSBC-TR's deposit ratings continue to incorporate a high
probability of affiliate support from its 100% shareholder HSBC
Holdings plc (Senior Unsecured A1 Negative) leading to two
notches of uplift.

Burgan Bank A.S. (Burgan)

The local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Burgan were
affirmed at Ba3, with a stable outlook. The BCA was affirmed at
b2. Burgan's deposit ratings continue to incorporate a very high
probability of affiliate support from its 99% shareholder,
Kuwait's Burgan Bank K.P.S.C. (BCA ba2/LT Bank Deposits A3
Stable) leading to two notches of uplift from its standalone BCA.

The affirmation of the bank's ratings with a stable outlook is
driven by the resilience of the bank's standalone BCA at the
current b2 level. The affirmation takes into account improving
profitability metrics, the low level of problem loans at 2.3% of
total loans as at Q3 2016 and low refinancing risk given its
affiliation with its parent. At the same time the rating is
constrained by the bank's high loan book concentrations,
dependence on the wholesale market and pressure on its weak Tier
1 capitalisation, which stood at 8.15% as at Q3-2016. Moody's
notes that the bank's total capitalisation, however, is supported
by long-term subordinated debt provided by the parent, which
improves the bank's loss-absorption capacity.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in rating Akbank TAS, Turkiye
Vakiflar Bankasi TAO, Turkiye Is Bankasi A.S., Turkiye Halk
Bankasi A.S., Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S., T.C. Ziraat Bankasi,
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi A.S., Turk Ekonomi Bankasi A.S., Finansbank
AS, Denizbank A.S., Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi A.S., HSBC
Bank A.S. (Turkey), Sekerbank T.A.S., Burgan Bank A.S., ING Bank
A.S. (Turkey), and Alternatifbank A.S. was Banks published in
January 2016

The principal methodology used in rating Export Credit Bank of
Turkey A.S. was Government-Related Issuers published in October
2014.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa.
For further information on Moody's approach to national scale
credit ratings, please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology
published in May 2016 entitled "Mapping National Scale Ratings
from Global Scale Ratings". While NSRs have no inherent absolute
meaning in terms of default risk or expected loss, a historical
probability of default consistent with a given NSR can be
inferred from the GSR to which it maps back at that particular
point in time. For information on the historical default rates
associated with different global scale rating categories over
different investment horizons.


TURKIYE SINAI: Moody's Rates Tier 2 Bond issuance (P)B1(hyb)
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)B1(hyb)
long-term foreign-currency subordinated debt rating to Turkiye
Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi A.S.'s (TSKB -- long term foreign-currency
issuer rating of Ba1 with a negative outlook, short term foreign-
currency issuer rating of NP and BCA of ba2) planned USD-
denominated contractual non-viability Tier 2 bond issuance (the
notes).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional rating assigned to the subordinated debt
obligations of TSKB is positioned two notches below the bank's
adjusted baseline credit assessment (BCA) of ba2, in line with
Moody's standard notching guidance for subordinated debt with
loss triggered at the point of non-viability, on a contractual
basis. The provisional rating does not incorporate any uplift
from government support.

The planned subordinated debt issuance is expected to be Basel
III-compliant and eligible for Tier 2 capital treatment under
Turkish law. The positioning of TSKB's provisional rating two
notches below the bank's adjusted BCA reflects the potential for
greater uncertainty associated with the timing of a principal
write-down compared to "plain vanilla" (i.e. generally absorbing
losses only in liquidation and without coupon-skip mechanism)
subordinated debt. In this respect, Moody's highlights that - as
a way for the bank to avoid a bank-wide resolution - the notes
may be forced to absorb losses ahead of "plain vanilla"
subordinated debt, if any exists.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of the securities. The ratings, however, only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinion. Upon conclusive review of all
transaction and associated documents, Moody's will endeavour to
assign definitive ratings to the notes. A definitive rating may
differ from a provisional rating if the terms and conditions of
the issuance are materially different from those of the
preliminary prospectus reviewed.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The assigned rating is notched from the adjusted BCA of TSKB and
further movements will be contingent on the changes in this
reference point.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in January 2016.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKRAINIAN RAILWAY: Fitch Affirms CCC LT FC Issuer Default Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ukrainian Railway's Long-Term Foreign
Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'CCC', Long-Term Local
Currency IDR at 'RD', Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'C' and
National Long-Term rating at 'RD(ukr)'.

The Long-term foreign currency rating on Shortline Plc's USD500
million loan participation notes (LPNs) has also affirmed at
'CCC'.

Fitch views Ukrainian Railway as a credit-linked entity under its
"Rating of Public-Sector Entities Criteria", reflecting the
entity's 100% state ownership, strong legal linkage with the
state, strategically important role as the largest natural
monopoly and tight state control over company's operations.
Ukrainian Railway's ratings are one notch below the Ukraine's
sovereign ratings (B-/Stable), which reflects mid-range
integration with government finance evidenced by reduced state
support over last few years.

The 'Restricted Default' Local Currency IDR and National Long-
Term rating reflect a failure to make principal payments under
certain bilateral loan agreements with Ukrainian lenders and that
the company is currently restructuring these domestic
liabilities.

Shortline Plc's notes' rating is equalised with Ukrainian
Railway's Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR, reflecting Fitch's view
that the notes constitute direct, unconditional senior unsecured
obligations of Ukrainian Railway and rank pari passu with all its
other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated
obligations.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Legal Status Assessed as Mid-range
Fitch considers the Ukrainian Railway's legal links with the
state to be moderate as the company lost its state administration
status in recent railway sector restructuring. Ukrainian Railway
was established as 100% state-owned public joint stock company by
the resolution of the Ukraine's cabinet of ministers. The company
is a legal successor of the State Administration of Railways
Transport of Ukraine, the six regional railway enterprises and
other railway transport enterprises, which were combined with
effect from 1 December 2015. There is no plan for company
privatisation.

Strategic Importance Assessed as Stronger
Ukrainian Railway will remain a strategically important
transportation company and will continue to manage the national
railway infrastructure, and provide dispatching, passenger
transportation (long-distance and suburban), and dominant freight
services. The company is recognised as a natural monopoly in the
area of access to public service infrastructure for railway
transportation and controlling maintenance of railway
transportation.

Control Assessed as Stronger
Ukrainian Railway operates under strong control and oversight
from the state. Since January 2017 the company reports directly
to cabinet of ministers of Ukraine. This has increased the
state's involvement in the company's operating activity and
strengthened state control over its performance. The national
government approves the company's strategic objectives, including
tariff settings, debt and investment planning and appoints
members of the board of directors and supervisory board. The
latter has seven members, and is headed by the first deputy head
of the ministry of infrastructure. Other members are top
government officials from ministries of finance, economy and
infrastructure.

Integration Assessed as Mid-range
Fitch considers the entity's integration into the general
government sector as moderate. The company's accounts are not
consolidated in the central government's budget. The company
receives annual, albeit very modest, transfers from the national
and local budgets, which partly cover cost of public
transportation for certain group of population. During the
January-June 2016 these subsidies totalled UAH10 million (2015:
UAH182 million). This was a low 0.3% of total revenue and usually
the company cross-subsidises the loss-making passenger sector
with profit from cargo transportation. The state did not provide
a capital injection in 2016.

The company's debt is not consolidated with state debt. However,
part of the company's foreign debt owed to international
financial organisation (13.8% of total debt) is guaranteed by the
state. In addition, the government treats Ukrainian Railway's
foreign debt as quasi-sovereign debt, which was evidenced in
2016, when the company's foreign debt (structured via Shortline
LPNs) was included into the restructuring negotiations being
pursued by the national government with respect to the state
debt. This highlights the interconnected credit quality between
Ukrainian Railway and the sovereign.

Ongoing Debt Restructuring
The company is under ongoing restructuring of its domestic debt
(unaudited 2016: UAH21.5 billion), of which 44% was restructured
as of March 2017 and another 21% of outstanding domestic debt
should be restructured by end-2017. The company remains current
on 15% of outstanding domestic debt, which consequently was not
subject to restructuring. The remaining 20% domestic debt was
originally contracted by Donetsk Railway and is not part of the
debt restructuring, or part of Fitch's calculation of the
issuer's debt, as the company lost access to assets in the
Donetsk and Lugansk territory due to armed conflict in the east
of the country.

In March 2016 Ukrainian Railway successfully completed the
restructuring of USD500 million of Shortline's LPNs, including an
extension of the maturity to 15 September 2021 and an increase in
the interest rate to 9.875% (original maturity was 2018 and
coupon rate was 9.5%).

Distressed Macroeconomic Environment
Ukrainian Railway has been negatively affected by the large scale
economic crisis and subdued economic activities in the country
since end-2014. This was due to long-lasting political
instability, local currency devaluation, amid sharply contracted
manufacturing and the weak financial sector.

According to Fitch's estimates, the Ukraine economy returned to
growth in 2016 after severe contractions in 2014-2015 and will
grow 2.5%-3.0% in 2017-2018. The recovery of economic activity is
likely to be gradual, in Fitch's view, led by construction and
agriculture, and some manufacturing rebound from the previous
years' collapse. The unresolved conflict in eastern Ukraine will
continue to weigh on the recovery prospects, while lack of access
to Donetsk and Lugansk's assets will impact Ukrainian Railway's
financials.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As Ukrainian Railway's Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR is credit-
linked with that of Ukraine, it will likely mirror any rating
action on the sovereign's Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR. Any
weakening of the linkage with the government could result in a
wider notching down from the sovereign ratings.

Fitch will also review and re-rate the company's Local Currency
IDR and National Long-Term rating once the company has completed
its domestic debt restructuring and information is available on
its post-restructuring credit profile.

The rating on Shortline Plc's LPNs is equalised with Ukrainian
Railway's Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR and therefore will move
in tandem with Ukrainian Railway's Long-Term Foreign Currency
IDR.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch considers that non-payment on domestic debt originally
contracted by Donetsk Railway does not affect the company's other
debt service.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ABH FINANCIAL: S&P Puts 'B+' Rating to Proposed Euro-Denom. LPNs
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has assigned its 'B+' long-term
issue rating to the proposed euro-denominated senior unsecured
loan participation notes (LPNs) to be issued by ABH Financial
Ltd. (B+/Positive/B) via its special-purpose vehicle (SPV), Alfa
Holding Issuance PLC.  ABH Financial Ltd. is a nonoperating
holding company and the parent of Russia-based Alfa-Bank.

Alfa Holding Issuance PLC will issue the notes under the
EUR1.2 billion program that finances loans to ABH Financial Ltd.
The rating is subject to S&P's analysis of the notes' final
documentation.

S&P currently understands that the targeted amount of the
proposed issue is subject to market interest, within the
unutilized program limit.  The maturity of the issue is to be up
to five years, subject to market conditions.  The final terms of
the notes are to be defined at the time of their placement.

Subject to certain conditions, S&P rates LPNs issued by an SPV at
the level S&P would rate equivalent-ranking debt of the
underlying borrower (the sponsor) and S&P treats the contractual
obligations of the SPV as financial obligations of the sponsor.
The relevant conditions are:

   -- All of the SPV's debt obligations are backed by equivalent-
      ranking obligations with equivalent payment terms issued by
      the sponsor;

   -- The SPV is a strategic financing entity for the sponsor set
      up solely to raise debt on behalf of the sponsor's group;
      and

   -- S&P believes the sponsor is willing and able to support the
      SPV to ensure full and timely payment of interest and
      principal when due on the debt issued by the SPV, including
      payment of any of the SPV's expenses.

S&P considers that the proposed LPNs to be issued by the SPV,
Alfa Holding Issuance PLC, meet all these conditions.  The rating
on the proposed notes is therefore 'B+', the level S&P would rate
equivalent-ranking debt of the underlying borrower, ABH Financial
Ltd.  The rating is subject to S&P's analysis of the final
documentation on the notes.


AMEC FOSTER: S&P Puts 'BB+' CCR on CreditWatch Developing
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'BB+' long-term corporate credit
rating on U.K.-based engineering, project management, and
consultancy company Amec Foster Wheeler PLC (AMFW) on CreditWatch
with developing implications.

U.K.-based John Wood Group, alongside AMFW, recently announced a
recommended all-share offer for AMFW's entire share capital and
indicated that opportunities for cost and revenue synergies had
been identified.  The combination will result in AMFW's
shareholders owning approximately 44% of the share capital of the
enlarged group.  The combined group will have pro forma net debt
of $1.6 billion, equating to 1.9x pro forma 2016 presynergy
EBITDA.  In S&P's view, the joint announcement regarding the
possible merger does not currently affect the rating on AMFW.
This is because the companies plan to complete the process only
in late 2017 and because some execution risks exist.  S&P
recognizes, however, that a successful merger could enhance
AMFW's credit profile, all else remaining equal, particularly if
S&P anticipates that the new group's future leverage will be
materially lower than currently at AMFW (with reported net debt
at about 3.3x EBITDA at end-2016, before S&P's adjustments and by
its estimate).  This should result in rating upside for AMFW.

In addition to the announced merger, S&P continues to see a tough
environment for AMFW, which will likely trigger deterioration in
EBITDA.

S&P considers that the company's stand-alone credit measures
should remain fairly stable in 2016-2018, underpinned by some
planned large disposals and despite prolonged challenging market
conditions in AMFW's key end markets.  S&P believes its ratio of
adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt for AMFW will be
about 15% in 2016-2018, which is in line with the current rating.

S&P thinks that the company's liquidity position has
deteriorated, factoring in S&P's now more pessimistic EBITDA
projections.  This weakening could result in a covenant breach on
AMFW's leverage covenants at the end of June 2017.  Still, S&P
considers that the company should obtain waivers in a timely
manner, independent of the completion of the possible merger with
John Wood Group.

S&P also takes into consideration AMFW's sizable albeit reducing
order book, which represents more than one year of operations and
provides some visibility on the company's medium-term
performance. S&P notes that the order book had declined to GBP5.8
billion at end-2016 from GBP6.2 billion at midyear.  Moreover,
70%-80% of the backlog is "cost plus," which should mitigate
potential cost overruns.  Further major declines in the backlog
or an increase in fixed-price contracts in the portfolio could,
however, weigh on the rating.

Under S&P's base-case scenario, it expects adjusted EBITDA of
between GBP350 million and GBP400 million annually on average in
2016-2018, with reported EBITDA at approximately GBP300 million
in the same period.

The CreditWatch developing reflects the possibility that S&P
could raise, affirm, or lower its rating on AMFW:

   -- Over the short term, S&P foresees the possibility of rating
      downside if AMFW fails to obtain waivers for its leverage
      covenants by the end of June.  Downside could also occur if
      its business performance continues to deteriorate, leading
      FFO to debt to fall sustainably below 12%, absent any
      measures to counteract the ensuing pressure on the rating
      (such as completing the already announced divestments or a
      capital increase).

   -- In the longer term, S&P could affirm or raise its ratings
      on AMFW if it merges with John Wood Group.  At this stage,
      based on S&P's preliminary analysis, it sees possible
      upside to the company's business risk and financial risk
      profiles, potentially leading to an upgrade to the low
      'BBB' category.

S&P aims to update the CreditWatch over the coming months, as S&P
get better visibility on AMFW's performance in 2017, including
how it addresses liquidity issues.  S&P intends to resolve the
CreditWatch when the merger closes, probably in late 2017.


ARROW GLOBAL: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Counterparty Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
counterparty credit rating on U.K.-based debt collection company
Arrow Global Group PLC.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'BB' issue rating and recovery
rating of '2' to the senior secured notes issued by Arrow Global
Finance PLC, indicating S&P's expectation of substantial recovery
(70%-90%; rounded estimate: 70%) in the event of payment default.
The rating on the proposed refinancing is subject to S&P's review
of the notes' final documentation.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB' issue ratings on the existing senior
secured notes.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view that the proposed
refinancing of Arrow Global's EUR335 million senior secured
floating rate notes does not affect S&P's rating on the group or
its financial risk profile.  S&P notes that Arrow Global is
refinancing the notes prior to the call date, which S&P views as
an opportunistic exchange.  S&P's view is supported by the 'BB-'
rating on Arrow Global and the existing security's trading price,
which is above par at the time of publication.  As part of the
transaction, Arrow Global also expects to extend the maturity of
its GBP215 million revolving credit facility (RCF) to 2022.  S&P
expects the company's credit metrics to remain in line with S&P's
existing expectations despite the potential for a slight
incremental increase in debt and a modest reduction in its
interest expense on the back of lower debt repayments.  S&P
projects these:

   -- Gross debt to S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA of 3x-4x
      (adjusted EBITDA is gross of portfolio amortization);
   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to total debt of 20%-30%; and
   -- Adjusted EBITDA coverage of interest expense of 3x-6x.

S&P expects these metrics to remain within these ranges over its
one-year outlook horizon, albeit with slight deleveraging and
improving debt-servicing capabilities.  These are on the back of
increased earnings capacity, improving collection capabilities
that will assist with organic growth objectives and alternative
avenues for revenue generation following Arrow Global's expansion
into Portugal, The Netherlands, and the more recently proposed,
relatively small expansion into Italy through its planned
acquisition of Zenith Service SpA.  S&P's forward-looking
analysis of the company's financial risk profile applies a 20%
weight to year-end 2016 and 40% weights to year-end projections
for both 2017 and 2018.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that the organic growth of
Arrow Global's debt portfolios and recent acquisitions and
partnerships will lead to stable credit metrics over the next 12-
18 months.  This scenario is predicated on continued controlled
growth in parts of mainland Europe, the increasing proportion of
revenue from third-party servicing fee income, and the successful
integration of Netherlands-based receivables manager InVesting
B.V.

S&P could lower the ratings if it saw a material increase in
management's leverage tolerance, a failure in Arrow Global's
control framework, or adverse changes in its operating
environment leading to an erosion of the company's profitability
or operational efficiency.

S&P considers an upgrade to be unlikely over the next 12-18
months.  S&P could raise the ratings if it saw materially greater
diversification in the franchise that supported the future
stability of earnings, for instance, a material increase in fee
income generated in collection services for third parties to
levels similar to more diversified peers.  S&P could also raise
the ratings if it believed Arrow Global's credit metrics were
likely to remain within the following ranges on a sustainable
basis:

   -- Gross debt to adjusted EBITDA of 2x-3x;
   -- FFO to total debt of 30%-45%; and
   -- Adjusted EBITDA coverage of interest expense of 6x-10x.


BHS GROUP: Green Prioritized Loyal Managers in Pension Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Martin at The Telegraph reports that Sir Philip Green
"prioritized his loyal senior managers" with his GBP363 million
deal to help plug the BHS pension black hole, MPs scrutinizing
the agreement have concluded.

According to The Telegraph, MPs on the Work and Pensions
Committee said the settlement with The Pensions Regulator (TPR),
which was struck last month after the billionaire faced intense
political pressure, favors the 16 people who have the most
generous pensions with the now-collapsed retailer.

The retirement scheme has about 19,000 members but BHS's former
top managers benefit the most from Sir Philip's deal because the
retirement scheme lifeboat the Pension Protection Fund's (PPF)
cap -- which would have limited payouts to those with the biggest
pensions -- has been removed, The Telegraph discloses.

According to The Telegraph, Sir Philip has also been urged by MPs
to give the GBP15 million rebate he potentially stands to receive
from the settlement back to pensioners, who are still set to
receive lower retirement payments than their original benefits.

The MPs said that some members will receive less than 80pc of the
value of their full scheme benefits under the settlement, The
Telegraph relays.  Although this is better than the 69pc on
average they would have received in the PPF, it is less than 88pc
average that was trumpeted last month when the deal was
announced, The Telegraph notes.

BHS imploded last year, resulting in the loss of 11,000 jobs and
scathing criticism of Sir Philip, who had owned the retailer for
15 years and sold the business to Dominic Chappell -- a thrice-
bankrupt, retailing novice -- just 13 months before its collapse,
The Telegraph recounts.  It had a GBP571 million pension deficit,
The Telegraph states.

                             About BHS

BHS Group was a high street retailer offering fashion for the
whole family, furniture and home accessories.

BHS was put into administration in April 2016 in one of the
U.K.'s largest ever corporate failures, according to The Am Law
Daily.  More than 11,000 jobs were lost and 20,000 pensions (the
U.K. equivalent of a 401k) put at risk after it emerged that the
company, which had more than 160 stores across the U.K., had a
pension deficit of GBP571 million (US$703 million), The Am Law
Daily disclosed.

Sir Philip Green, a retail magnate with a net worth of more than
US$5 billion, has been heavily criticized for his role in the
collapse of BHS, The Am Law Daily said.  Mr. Green and other
shareholders had taken around GBP580 million (US$714 million) out
of the business before selling it for just GBP1 (US$1.23), The Am
Law Daily noted.

Linklaters acted for Green's Arcadia Group on the sale of the
company to Retail Acquisitions, which was advised by London-based
technology, media and telecoms specialist Olswang, The Am Law
Daily added.

Weil Gotshal & Manges and DLA then took the lead roles on the
administration, acting for the company and administrators Duff &
Phelps, respectively, while Jones Day was appointed by the
administrators to investigate the actions of the company's former
directors, The Am Law Daily related.


LANDMARK THEATRE: Council Agrees to Spend GBP24,000 on Assets
-------------------------------------------------------------
Joel Cooper at Devon Live reports that North Devon Council has
agreed to spend GBP24,000 on assets belonging to North Devon
Theatres and could take hold of the keys to the buildings within
a week.

Administrators Bishop Fleming LLP released a 'joint
administrators report and statement of proposals' which showed
that roughly 7,500 tickets had been purchased in advance by
around 3,500 'individuals or organizations' -- with claims to the
administrators totaling more than GBP37,000, according to Devon
Live. The webpage telling people how to claim back money for
tickets had been visited more than 10,000 times.

The report notes that accounts from October 2016 showed the
theatres made a loss of GBP118,000 in that year to date, with
audiences decreasing and seat sales reportedly down by 20%.  A
"poor pantomime season" also saw ticket sales slump by 8%, with
the theatres budgeting to produce a further loss of around
GBP175,000, the report relays.

The report notes in January the shock news broke that both the
Landmark Theatre in Ilfracombe and the Queen's Theatre in
Barnstaple had suddenly closed.  This was followed by an
announcement that the Trust which ran the theatres had gone into
administration.

The news prompted a huge response from the community with the
#SaveNDTheatres campaign quickly attracting support.

The report discloses the next progress report on the
Administration will be published in September 2017.


PROJECT PIE: Reform Street Restaurant to Remain Open
----------------------------------------------------
Evening Telegraph reports that the owner of a Dundee restaurant
has promised that the city eatery is safe, despite part of its
parent group going into liquidation.

John Canavan, who owns Project Pie, told Evening Telegraph that
there were no plans to close the restaurant in Reform Street.

He was speaking after the Evening Telegraph learned that the
company had registered to be formally wound up and for
liquidators to be appointed.

A petition seeking liquidation was presented to Edinburgh Sheriff
Court by Mr. Canavan and Susan Canavan of Beckenham on January
31, according to the report.

The report says the company's registered address was given as
Redheugh Rigg, Edinburgh.

The report discloses when contacted by Evening Telegraph, Mr.
Canavan said the restaurant in Dundee was to remain open.

It is understood, the report relays, that only the Bromley branch
of Project Pie will be liquidated and the premises in Dundee will
not be affected.

According to the report, Mr. Canavan said: "At this stage only
one restaurant in the London borough of Bromley will close.

"Those premises were in the wrong position and that is why that
restaurant will close. There are no plans to close the Dundee
restaurant and it remains open for business."

When contacted by Evening Telegraph, a spokesman at the Dundee
restaurant said he knew nothing about the liquidation.

"I have heard nothing about this and am not in a position to
comment.  "We are still open and operating."

The report notes that City center councilor Lynne Short said she
was keen that any business that operated in Dundee and had issues
would go to their local elected member to ask for help if needed,
the report relays.

Project Pie was launched in Las Vegas in 2012. The company went
on to open a number of outlets in America and the Philippines
before choosing the premises in Dundee's Reform Street as its
first European venture.


RAPID ENVELOPES: In Administration, Seeks Buyer
-----------------------------------------------
Mark Malone at Begbies Traynor reports that administrators at
Begbies Traynor have been appointed to seek the sale of a
Shrewsbury-based envelope manufacturing company which has been
placed into administration after being affected by tough market
conditions.

Rapid Envelopes Ltd, which was established almost 18 years ago,
is based at Atcham Business Park, Shrewsbury and is continuing to
trade whilst a buyer is sought, notes the report.

Joint administrators Mark Malone and John Kelly, from Begbies
Traynor's Birmingham office, were appointed on March 8, the
report relates.  Mr. Malone confirmed that they had managed to
secure the immediate future of five employees at the company,
according to Begbies Traynor.  Regrettably, 19 people had been
made redundant as a consequence of the administration process.

According to the report, Mr. Malone said: "We have had to act
quickly to ensure the company can continue to service the needs
of its customers, and we have retained a small number of
employees to do this whilst a buyer is sought.

"Sadly, market conditions have proven very challenging and there
has been a build-up of legacy debt that has created supply
issues," he added.

The report discloses that Mr. Malone said interested parties were
being encouraged to come forward as quickly as possible by
contacting him at the Begbies Traynor's Birmingham office.


TRAIL ADDICTION: Goes Into Administration
-----------------------------------------
Hannah Dobson at Single Track World reports that Trail Addiction,
the holiday and guiding company behind Trans Savoie and Enduro2
has gone into administration.

The report relays a notice on their website states:

"Gerald M Krasner and Gillian M Sayburn were appointed joint
administrators of Trailaddiction Ltd and Trans Savoie Ltd on 6
March 2017.

"The affairs, business and property of the companies are being
managed by the joint administrators, who act as the companies
agents and without personal liability.

"The joint administrators will shortly be writing to all known
creditors. If you believe you are a creditor and wish to register
your claim please send your name, address, telephone number and
email along with details of your claim, and which company your
claim is against, to the following email address trans-savoie-
creditors@begbies-traynor.com"

Trail Addiction offers both package holidays and events. The
website contains specific advice for those who have booked
holidays, none of which will be going ahead. Check the site for
how to claim for a refund, as it depends on your method of
payment as to how you should proceed, notes the report.

The report discloses that Enduro2 in Les Arcs will not be going
ahead. Neither will Trans Savoie.  These are not covered in the
same way as holidays, although some refunds may be possible.
Again, check the website for details, the report relays.

The report notes that Enduro2 in Davos is still under discussion
-- it is hoped that other providers may be able to deliver this
race.

The report adds that as to what has led to this sudden and
surprise situation, Single Track World sais it will let readers
know once it establishes the facts.  It's certainly sad news, as
these were a big name operator putting on well known events, the
report adds.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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