TCREUR_Public/170329.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, March 29, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 63


                            Headlines



B U L G A R I A

LITEX MOTORS: "Over-indebtedness" Prompts Bankruptcy Filing


D E N M A R K

NETS A/S: S&P Assigns 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Stable


F R A N C E

ALBEA BEAUTY: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable
LOXAM SAS: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term CCR, Outlook Negative


G E R M A N Y

ALBA GROUP: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+' After Stake Sale


G R E E C E

NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' CCR


I R E L A N D

CA EURO 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes from Ba2
HARVEST CLO XVII: Moody's Assigns (P)B2(sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes
JUBILEE CDO VI: Moody's Affirms Ba3(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
TAURUS 2016-1: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class F Debt


K A Z A K H S T A N

NOSTRUM OIL: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable


L U X E M B O U R G

DANA FINANCING: Moody's Rates Proposed $400MM Sr. Unsec. Notes B1
GAZ CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to Proposed GBP LPNs
GAZ CAPITAL: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Proposed LPNs


N O R W A Y

NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' CCR, Outlook Negative


R U S S I A

VEB-LEASING: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Ratings, Outlook Developing


S P A I N

CAIXABANK RMBS 2: Moody's Assigns Caa1 Rating to Class B Notes
NH HOTEL: Add'l EUR115MM Sr. Notes No Impact on Moody's B2 CFR
SRF 2017-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating to Class D Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

99P STORES: Enters Administration, Shuts Down 60 Stores
DHR GLOBAL: UK Operation Forced Into Liquidation
HIGH NOON: Forecourt Site Acquired by Motor Fuel Group
JONES BOOKMAKER: 25 Stores Shut Down, 262 Jobs Affected
JORDAN TRADING: In Liquidation After Owing Nearly GBP200,000

RADIO ELWY: PPL Files Winding-Up Petition Over Unpaid License Fee
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE: Moody's Rates Class F1 Notes (P)Caa2
RSA INSURANCE: Moody's Rates SEK2.5BB/DKK650MM Tier 1 Notes Ba2
SEADRILL LTD: John Fredriksen Nears Rescue Deal for Business

* Some Euro Zone Banks May Need to Shut Down, ECB Head Says



                            *********


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B U L G A R I A
===============


LITEX MOTORS: "Over-indebtedness" Prompts Bankruptcy Filing
-----------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews, citing filing published on the website of the Bulgaria's
commercial registry, reports that Litex Motors has filed for
bankruptcy with Sofia City Court citing "over-indebtedness".

"Litex Motors is in a state of insolvency (over-indebtedness)
which is a reason for the opening of bankruptcy proceedings,"
SeeNews quotes Litex Motors as saying in its filing with the
court dated February 27, 2017.

According to SeeNews, an injunction issued by the court on
March 2 gives Litex Motors seven days to submit its latest
audited annual financial report along with a statement on the
company's assets and liabilities as at February 27, a list of the
company creditors and loan collaterals as well as evidence that
the National Revenue Agency has been notified before the filing
was submitted.

If the company fails to act upon the court's instructions, the
case will be dropped, SeeNews relays, citing the injunction
posted on the website of the court.

Sofia-based Litex Motors is an automobile manufacturing company
and official partner of China's Great Wall Motors.



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D E N M A R K
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NETS A/S: S&P Assigns 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had assigned its 'BB+' long-term
corporate credit rating to payment processing provider Nets A/S
and its subsidiary, Nassa Topco AS.  S&P views Nassa Topco as
core to the group as it is a wholly-owned financing entity and
intermediate holding company that bears the group's entire senior
debt.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'BB+' issue rating to the
proposed senior unsecured notes to be issued by Nassa Topco.  The
notes have a recovery rating of '3', reflecting S&P's expectation
of meaningful (50%-70%; rounded estimate: 55%) recovery prospects
in the event of a payment default.

The rating on Nets primarily reflects its leading position as a
Nordic payment service provider with a strong presence across the
payment value chain, especially in Denmark and Norway.  However,
it is smaller and has less regional diversification than some of
its global peers.  In addition, Nets' adjusted debt to EBITDA
improved considerably to about 4.7x in 2016 with a strong cash
position supported by an improving operating performance--11.5%
gross revenue growth and a four percentage point rise in adjusted
EBITDA margins to about 20% in 2016.  This is partly offset by
significant outflows for accrued interest on repaid payment-in-
kind debt.  Further significant deleveraging is expected in S&P's
base case for 2017 in the absence of potential major
acquisitions, driven by solid free operating cash flow (FOCF)
generation and lower restructuring costs.

Nets plans to issue EUR350 million (Danish krone [DKK] 2.6
billion) of senior unsecured notes maturing in 2024 to refinance
part of its EUR485 million equivalent term loan maturing in 2019.
This follows the group's successful IPO and refinancing in
September 2016.

S&P's assessment of Nets' satisfactory business risk profile
reflects the group's leading position in the Nordic electronic
payment system.  Nets holds a strong market share as an acquirer
and issuer processor in Nordic countries.  For instance, over 90%
of households in Denmark use its direct debit solutions, while
95% of Danes and 80% of Norwegians use its national e-identity
solutions.  Nets' market share is so significant and its products
so integrated into the Nordic banking systems that S&P considers
that its position within the region's payment system as critical.

Nets also has long-standing experience in the Nordic payment
market and good revenue predictability and customer retention.
It offers a very broad range of products covering the entire
payment value chain: account-based payments, digital identity
solutions, card payments including issuer and acquirer
processing, and financial acquiring.  Nets is the owner of the
Danish national payment card scheme, Dankort, and the processor
of the Norwegian national card scheme, BankAxept, and operates
the national clearing systems in both countries.  It has a
diversified customer base and long-term customer relationships.

Furthermore, S&P thinks barriers to entry are high for card
payment services, due to significant switching costs and a
lengthy process involving operating risks.  In clearing and
direct debit, we think it would be difficult for a competitor to
challenge Nets' dominant position.  S&P also expects the Nordic
electronic payment market to continue growing, given the stable
macroeconomic environment (S&P Global Ratings forecasts real GDP
growth in 2017 of 1.5% in Denmark and 1.3% in Norway), as well as
Nordic banks' willingness to outsource, and a high level of
consumer sophistication, including early adoption of
digitalization and new solutions.

These strengths are constrained by Nets' modest scale and limited
geographic diversification, with 80% of revenues generated in
Denmark and Norway.  As competition from international
competitors could intensify, S&P considers scale to be a key
competitive advantage.  With an adjusted EBITDA margin of around
20% in 2016, Nets' profitability has significantly improved
recently but remains somewhat modest compared with some of its
global peers.

Nets also faces price pressure from customers, primarily banks
but also merchants.  This is set to intensify in coming years as
merchant service contracts are renegotiated to incorporate the
lower interchange fees set by the EU multi-interchange fee (MIF)
regulation in December 2015.  Bank customers of issuer processing
services that are being affected by the MIF regulation may also
seek to reduce costs by reducing their fees.

Other regulatory risks include the introduction of the EU Second
Payment Service Directive (PSD2), which requires making bank
account information available to third-party payment providers
(TPPs) by early 2018.  This could raise competition for card
payment service providers from new account-based payment
providers, while also increasing compliance costs.  In addition
to its existing significant presence in account-based payments,
Nets intends to proactively mitigate the potential revenue impact
by helping bank customers comply with PSD2 and providing TPPs
with access infrastructure.

Nets' financial risk profile has improved considerably following
its IPO.  In addition to the DKK5.5 billion of IPO proceeds used
to repay existing debt, 2016 adjusted leverage benefits from
about DKK1.0 billion of the group's reported cash balance being
treated as surplus cash and netted against gross debt.  This
adjustment is based on S&P's view that Nets is no longer
controlled by its previous financial sponsors because of the
significant reduction in the latter's equity stake by means of
the IPO and expectations of further share sales after the March
22, 2017, expiry of a six-month lockup period.

S&P views Nets' post-IPO financial policy and medium-term targets
as supportive of the deleveraging, in S&P's base-case forecasts,
excluding the allowed scope for sizable acquisitions.  S&P
expects Nets to make initial shareholder distributions in 2018
after the company achieves a stated medium-term target of 2.0x-
2.5x net debt to EBITDA before special items, as defined by the
company.  Capital expenditures are also expected to be 6%-8% of
net revenues (after interchange and processing fees) in the
medium term, after reaching about 9% in 2016.

On the other hand, S&P considers that Nets' financial risk
profile could later become somewhat constrained by the company's
stated medium-term net leverage target, which is equivalent to an
S&P Global Ratings-adjusted leverage ratio of about 2.7x-3.2x
assuming no restructuring costs.  This is because S&P expects
that after this target is reached, FOCF will largely be applied
toward shareholder returns or external growth investments instead
of to further leverage reduction.  S&P continues to view Nets'
acquisitive nature as a potential risk to its base-case
forecasts, especially given its intention to expand further into
Sweden, and also recognize the lack of a track record operating
under this new financial policy.

The stable outlook is based on expectations that Nets will
continue to generate considerable revenue growth without the need
for major acquisitions, while maintaining adjusted EBITDA margins
of above 20%.  Furthermore, over 2017-2018, S&P expects its
adjusted leverage to decline to and then remain below 4x, funds
from operations to debt of at least around 20%, and FOCF to debt
of well above 10%.

S&P could upgrade Nets if it maintained its adjusted leverage so
that it approached 3x and FOCF to debt of at least around 20%.
Assuming there are no significant restructuring or transformation
program costs after 2017, there could be some potential rating
upside in the medium term if the company achieves its' stated
commitment of maintaining net debt to EBITDA (excluding special
items) within 2.0x-2.5x in the absence of major acquisitions
(equivalent to an adjusted leverage range of 2.7x-3.2x) through
continued strong free cash flow generation.

S&P may consider downgrading Nets if S&P no longer expects it to
keep adjusted leverage below 4x on a sustainable basis.  This
could be due to EBITDA margins remaining significantly weaker
than 20% due to much higher than expected costs related to the
group's transformation program that could extend beyond 2017, a
major acquisition funded by debt or the group's cash balance, or
a change in financial policy that results in leverage remaining
at or above 4x.

Ratings List

New Rating; CreditWatch/Outlook Action

NETS A/S
Nassa Topco AS
Corporate Credit Rating                BB+/Stable/--

New Rating

Nassa Topco AS
Senior Unsecured
  EUR350 mil nts                        BB+
   Recovery Rating                      3(55%)


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F R A N C E
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ALBEA BEAUTY: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it has affirmed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on France-based cosmetics packaging
company Albea Beauty Holdings S.A.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' issue rating to the
proposed $816 million term loan B with a recovery rating of '4',
reflecting S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%; rounded
estimate: 45%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

The affirmation reflects S&P's expectation that the proposed
transaction will be largely neutral to the credit quality of
Albea, leading to higher absolute debt which is partially offset
by improved interest coverage ratios.  The refinancing
transaction will also eliminate medium-term refinancing risks by
pushing Albea's nearest debt maturity to 2024, compared with its
existing capital structure where both sets of notes -- EUR245
million senior secured notes and $385 senior secured notes -- are
due in 2019.  As a part of the transaction, the company is paying
a $68 million dividend to its owner Sun Capital Inc.

S&P expects pro forma the proposed transaction leverage to
slightly increase because Albea's absolute reported debt will
increase by about $140 million from the reported year-end 2016 of
$738 million.  However, this will be balanced by a substantially
lower expected interest expense which should boost the funds from
operations (FFO) interest cover from about 2x to an expected 3x
in 2017.  S&P also forecasts that the FFO-to-debt ratio will
improve toward 10% from mid-to-high single-digit levels in 2015-
2016.  S&P also views positively Albea's intention to put in
place a $105 million revolving credit facility (RCF) which will
enhance the company's liquidity position and provide flexibility
for growth. S&P understands that Albea will retain its EUR100
million European factoring facility and its $60 North American
asset-based lending (ABL) facility for working capital management
purposes.

S&P's assessment of Albea's fair business risk profile is
constrained by the company's exposure to what S&P views as more
cyclical end markets, where spending is somewhat discretionary
compared to some other rated peers in the packaging portfolio who
cater, for example, to pharma or food and beverage industries.
S&P's assessment also takes into account the company's relatively
high customer concentration compared with other packaging
companies -- with the top-10 customers accounting for more than
half of its revenues -- and what S&P views as below-industry-
average profitability, with recent EBITDA margins close to 12%.

Partly mitigating these constraints are the company's broad
geographical reach and strong market positions, especially in
higher-growth emerging markets.  The beauty and cosmetics
packaging market has higher barriers to entry than some other
packaging sectors (such as plastic film packaging) as industry
expertise and innovative production are supported by ongoing
research and development efforts.  Beauty packaging remains an
integral part of the end product, especially for high-end
products where Albea has established expertise, and is a key part
of the customer purchasing decision and therefore the company's
marketing efforts.

Albea benefits from long-standing relationships with blue chip
customers such as L'Oreal, Estee Lauder, LVMH, and Procter &
Gamble, and has a high customer retention rate.  Its ability to
pass on volatile raw material costs to customers, paired with its
presence in a market with higher barriers to entry than other
packaging industries, further supports the ratings.

After Albea acquired the cosmetics business from Rexam in 2012, a
lot of work has been done to integrate the business and
rationalize its manufacturing spread.  The company retained a
good grasp over its working capital and a balanced growth path,
in S&P's view.  Going forward, S&P thinks restructuring costs
will decrease over the medium term, resulting in gradually
improving profitability, cash flow generation, and credit metrics
as a result.

In S&P's base case for 2017, it assumes:

   -- Single-digit revenue growth;
   -- Profitability improvement resulting in the reported EBITDA
      margin increasing toward 13% (compared with about 12% for
      2016);
   -- Capital expenditure (capex) of about $75 million; and
   -- No major acquisitions or shareholder distribution.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- FFO to debt of about 10% (compared with about 8% for 2016);
      and
   -- FFO cash interest cover of about 3x (compared with about 2x
      for 2016).

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Albea's
improving operating performance and financial policies will allow
it to maintain credit metrics commensurate with S&P's 'B' rating
in the near term, while liquidity remains adequate.  S&P
anticipates that the company's leverage ratio will stabilize at
about 6x, with FFO to debt improving toward 10% over the next 12
months.

A positive rating action would likely depend on a sustainable
improvement in the company's financial performance above S&P's
expectations for the current ratings, such as an adjusted FFO-to-
debt ratio of about 12% and adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 5x.
These ratios, in conjunction with a financial policy that
supports such levels on a sustainable basis, could trigger an
upgrade. However, S&P considers such a scenario remote at this
stage due to the company's current shareholder structure.

S&P could lower the ratings if Albea's operating performance
weakened materially due to significant input-cost inflation or
weak volume growth, resulting in weakening credit metrics such as
FFO cash interest cover of below 1.5x.  S&P could consider a
downgrade if liquidity becomes tighter than it currently
anticipates, leading S&P to revise its assessment to weak.  This
could result from integration cost overruns or unexpected working
capital constraints.  A substantial return to shareholders or
substantial acquisitions could also trigger a downgrade.


LOXAM SAS: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term CCR, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating on Loxam SAS, a France-based equipment
rental company.  S&P also removed the rating from CreditWatch
with negative implications, where it was placed on Nov. 29, 2016.
The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P assigned a 'BB-' issue rating to the
company's proposed EUR560 million senior secured notes.  The
recovery rating remains '3', indicating S&P's expectation of
meaningful recovery (50%-70%; rounded estimate 50%) in the event
of a payment default.  Additionally, S&P assigned its 'B' issue
rating to the company's proposed EUR250 million senior unsecured
notes.  The recovery rating remains '6', indicating S&P's
expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.  S&P removed the issue ratings from CreditWatch
negative.

S&P also affirmed its issue and recovery ratings on all existing
instruments.

The issue ratings on the proposed senior secured and senior
unsecured notes are based on preliminary information as of
March 28, 2017.  If final documentation departs from materials
S&P has reviewed, S&P reserves the right to withdraw or revise
its ratings.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view of Loxam's weaker credit
metrics as it ramped up leverage while embarking on a
significant, debt-financed acquisition while completing an
additional smaller acquisition, and proceeding with the share
buyback.  These actions led to leverage that is higher than S&P
anticipated in its previous base-case scenario.  S&P now expects
adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 4.3x-4.5x in 2017 along with
adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 15%-16%.
The company will use the proceeds from the proposed debt to
finance the acquisition of Lavendon, refinance its debt, and
cover transaction fees.

The affirmation of the ratings on Loxam mainly reflects S&P's
expectation that management will successfully integrate both Hune
and Lavendon, achieving modest synergies.  This will allow Loxam
to pursue deleveraging towards its target of net debt to EBITDA
of below 4.0x in the next two years.  S&P anticipates that the
company will moderate its appetite to acquisitions and focus on
integrating new businesses.  Combined with favorable market
conditions and sustained profitability, S&P forecasts that its
adjusted credit metrics will further improve in 2018 to debt to
EBITDA of about 4.0x-4.3x and FFO to debt of 16%-18% in 2018.

Lavendon is a U.K.-based equipment rental company specializing in
the access equipment.  S&P considers that the transaction will
have strategic benefits strengthening Loxam's positions in access
equipment and enhancing geographical diversity.  Lavendon has
strong positions in access equipment rental in the U.K. and
Middle East, as well as good positions in Germany, France, and
Belgium. In 2015, Lavendon's consolidated revenue accounted for
EUR344 million and EBITDA of EUR125 million.  Both acquisitions
will allow the company to diversify away from the French market,
which currently represents 80% of Loxam's sales.  After the
transaction, the company will maintain about 60% of sales in
France and about 13% in the U.K. and Ireland.

Although S&P recognizes that Loxam is making a big step to
diversify its business geographically, the company is entering
the rather competitive U.K. market and will compete with larger
players such as Ashtead.  At the same time, Ashtead is an
indirect competitor to Loxam because its focus is general plant
tools and Loxam's is access equipment.  Loxam holds a sizable
market share of the French domestic market of about 20%.  S&P
thinks it will be able to sustain this position thanks to its
longstanding relationships with the main French contractors and
its dense branch network.

Lavendon exhibits slightly higher EBITDA margins than the Loxam
group as a whole, at about 34.5% reported in 2015.  This will
support its profitability along with improved growth prospects in
construction markets, the consolidation of existing branches, and
an increase in utilization rates.  S&P therefore expects reported
EBITDA to be broadly at 34%-35% in 2017.

Loxam has a well-maintained fleet of rental equipment.  Pro forma
acquisitions, Loxam will rank No. 3 in powered access by fleet
size worldwide.  The company has also demonstrated its ability to
reduce fleet investment significantly when earnings growth
subsides, through active fleet management measures.  These
factors support S&P's fair business risk profile assessment.

S&P continues to assess Loxam's financial risk profile as
aggressive, despite increased debt levels.  The company has a
track record of expanding through acquisitions.  Notably, the
Lavendon transaction happened unexpectedly, and S&P views it as
very aggressive, especially in conjunction with the share buyback
and acquisition of Hune.  Although S&P do not incorporate any
further sizable acquisitions in its forecast, given Loxam's
recent track record, S&P cannot fully discount the possibility of
such additional acquisitions over the next two to three years.
Depending on the size and funding, these transactions can elevate
Loxam's leverage outside of S&P's base-case assumptions.

S&P expects no material improvement in free operating cash flow
generation in 2017 on the back of higher capital expenditure
(capex) of about EUR400 million.  The increased capex reflects
the company seeking to expand its fleet and take advantage of
growth opportunities in the construction market as well as
incorporating capex of the acquired entities.  Nevertheless, S&P
notes that Loxam's business model allows for the flexibility to
significantly reduce capex in a downturn and preserve its free
cash flow generation.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- In 2017, Loxam will benefit from the construction market
      rebound.  The residential sector is still the main growth
      driver, while public works and offices should rise at a
      slower pace.  While the U.K.'s referendum decision to leave
      the EU has undermined investment in public works, the
      recovery in France and in the rest of Europe has been
      confirmed.  In France, growth in the construction market
      remains firm and almost unchanged (3.6% in 2017, 3.1% in
      2018).  Loxam will consolidate both Lavendon and Hune,
      which will be reflected in the elevated top line level in
      2017 to about EUR1.3 billion-EUR1.4 billion.  Thereafter,
      S&P expects the company to expand in line with the market,
      at 2%-3% in 2018.

   -- Reported EBITDA margin of about 34%-35% in 2017-2018,
      supported by higher volumes and contribution of Lavendon.

   -- Annual capex of EUR400 million in 2017, and about
      EUR325 million in 2018.

   -- Possible small bolt-on acquisitions of up to EUR70 million
      in 2017, but no major transactions.

   -- A small dividend distribution of about EUR5 million.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 4.3x-4.5x in 2017 and 4.0x-4.3x in
      2018.

   -- FFO to debt of about 15%-16% in 2017 and 16%-18% in 2018.

The negative outlook reflects the moderate chance that S&P could
lower the corporate credit rating in the next 12 months.  Credit
metrics will remain under pressure in pro forma Lavendon amid
increased debt.  S&P's base case assumes that debt to EBITDA will
be about 4.3x-4.5x and FFO to debt about 15%-16% in 2017.

S&P could lower the rating if the company breaches both the debt
to EBITDA ratio of above 4.5x and FFO to debt of lower than 15%.
This could occur if Loxam deviates from S&P's base case through
another debt-financed acquisition or shareholder friendly action,
leading to higher leverage.  Further weakness could arise if the
company fails to successfully integrate Lavendon.  S&P might
consider a negative rating action if Loxam is unable to balance
growth and capex, which could lead to higher debt levels.  The
rating could also come under pressure if, at any time, the
company's liquidity is no longer at least adequate.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Loxam achieved and
sustained stronger credit metrics.  This could result from strong
organic growth across its main geographies combined with
moderation in acquisitions.  If S&P gains more confidence that
the company can execute on its deleveraging plan and adhere to
its public target, leading to leverage sustained under 4.5x and
FFO to debt above 15%, S&P could revise the outlook back to
stable.


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G E R M A N Y
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ALBA GROUP: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+' After Stake Sale
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has raised its long-term
corporate credit rating on Germany-based environmental services
company ALBA Group plc & Co. KG to 'B+' from 'B-'.  The outlook
is positive.

S&P also raised its issue rating on the EUR203 million senior
unsecured notes issued by ALBA Group to 'B-' from 'CCC'.  The
recovery rating is '6', indicating S&P's expectation of
negligible (0%) recovery in the event of a payment default.  S&P
expects the bond will be redeemed shortly, after which S&P will
withdraw the issue rating.

At the same time, S&P removed all the ratings from CreditWatch
with developing implications, where it placed them on Oct. 12,
2016.

The upgrade reflects the successful closing of the sale of 60%
stakes in ALBA Group's service business and high-growth business
in China to the joint venture it set up with Techcent.  S&P
anticipates that the proceeds will be sufficient to repay the
full amount outstanding under the senior secured facilities
(EUR214 million as of Sept. 30, 2016).  S&P also expects the
group will redeem its EUR203 million senior unsecured notes due
in May 2018 with the remaining proceeds and a new EUR80 million
senior term loan.  As a result, S&P anticipates that ALBA Group's
leverage metrics will further improve to about 3.5x for 2017 and
3.0x in 2018, compared with 3.6x at year-end 2016.  Despite a
meaningful reduction in adjusted debt to about EUR300 million at
year-end 2017 from about EUR600 million at year-end 2016, S&P
notes that ALBA Group's consolidated earnings will also decrease
significantly with the sale of the two businesses, given that the
service business has historically contributed about one-third of
the group's earnings.  About half of the forecast adjusted debt
relates to adjustments for off-balance-sheet items, such as
pensions and operating leases.

More importantly, the expected debt repayments will result in a
significantly improved liquidity position.  By repaying the
senior facilities that were to mature later this year and the
bond due in 2018, the group now has in place a long-term
financing agreement with no debt maturing before 2021.

Following the transaction, the group's capital structure will
consist of a term loan of EUR80 million and a EUR160 million
revolving credit facility (that is expected to be largely undrawn
following the bond redemption), which should give the group
considerable financial flexibility.

The positive outlook indicates the possibility of an upgrade if
ALBA Group's EBITDA improves, thanks to implemented cost savings
initiatives amid the broadly stable operating environment, given
the group's significantly reduced exposure to scrap metals prices
over recent years.

S&P could raise the ratings if ALBA Group continues to deleverage
following the transaction, while maintaining positive trends in
operating performance and the financial policy (such as medium-
term planning for capital spending, dividends, and potential
acquisitions).  S&P considers FFO to debt higher than 25% to be
commensurate with a higher rating.

S&P could consider revising the outlook to stable if it saw that
the group's performance was weakening under adverse economic
conditions, or if an unexpected sharp drop in scrap metal prices
weighed on earnings.  Additionally, if adjusted leverage
deteriorated to more than 3.5x or FFO to debt did not remain
close to or above 25%, S&P could revise the outlook to stable.


===========
G R E E C E
===========


NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' CCR
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Marshall Islands-
registered dry-bulk and container shipping company Navios
Maritime Partners L.P. (Navios Partners) to stable from negative
and affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit rating on the
company.

In addition, S&P affirmed its 'B' issue rating on Navios
Partners' $405 million senior secured term loan due 2020.  The
recovery rating remains '3', reflecting S&P's expectation of
meaningful (50%-70%; rounded estimate: 65%) recovery in the event
of a payment default.

At the same time, S&P withdrew its 'B' issue rating on Navios
Partners' senior secured term loan due June 2018 because it has
been repaid.

The outlook revision reflects Navios Partners' improved liquidity
position after it issued: (i) a $405 million term loan B maturing
in 2020, the proceeds of which it used to redeem its existing
$386 million term loan B due June 2018; and (ii) new equity,
which generated net cash proceeds of about $95 million.  S&P
believes that the transactions have increased the company's
liquidity coverage, lengthened its debt maturity profile, and
demonstrated Navios Partner's satisfactory access to capital
markets.

Furthermore, S&P understands that issuance of the term loan B has
allowed Navios Partners to expand headroom under its loan-to-
value (LTV) covenant to about 10% at the transaction's closing,
which S&P continues to classify as tight.  That said, S&P
believes that Navios Partners' enlarged cash position of $120
million pro forma the equity issue, as of Dec. 31, 2016, and its
ability to generate excess cash flows (supported by the suspended
dividend distribution) translate into an ample liquidity cushion.
S&P considers that the company could potentially use this
liquidity for early loan prepayment to ensure compliance if
vessel (collateral) values significantly dwindled, although S&P
considers this unlikely, given the already currently low levels
of vessel valuation.  The LTV covenant headroom will also benefit
from the annual mandatory amortization under the new term loan B
of about $20 million.

Given these improvements, S&P now regards Navios Partners'
liquidity as adequate rather than less than adequate.  That said,
S&P believes that the company might continue facing tight
headroom under the LTV covenant if -- contrary to S&P's
expectations -- asset prices do not rebound in tandem with easing
industry supply pressure and improving charter rates in the dry-
bulk sector.

Although S&P expects a further moderate contraction in absolute
EBITDA to weaken Navios Partners' financial position, S&P
believes that lower debt, in particular, after the January 2017
loan prepayments of about $100 million from the sale proceeds of
the container ship Cristina, will allow the company to maintain
rating-commensurate credit metrics over 2017-2018, such as S&P
Global Ratings' average adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to
debt of about 14%-15%.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that, despite sluggish
short-term prospects for charter rates and vessel values, Navios
Partners will maintain a rating-commensurate credit profile and
liquidity over the next 12-months, underpinned by its medium-term
T/C profile and competitive and predictable cost structure.
Furthermore, S&P believes the company's most recent debt
reduction will support its credit metrics and offset the effect
of lower EBITDA generation.  S&P forecasts that the company will
achieve an average ratio of adjusted FFO to debt of about 14%-15%
in 2017-2018.

Given the inherent volatility of the shipping sector, S&P views
the company's maintenance of adequate liquidity coverage of at
least 1.2x and manageable LTV covenant compliance tests,
supported by available ample cash for early debt prepayments to
ensure compliance if needed, as important contributors to a
stable outlook.

S&P could lower the rating if, unexpectedly, the vessel values
and, therefore, LTV covenant headroom appeared to significantly
diminish, translating into an inevitable, large cash drain on
Navios Partners to prepay the loan and so prevent LTV covenant
breaches.  A downgrade would also be likely if the company made
large debt-funded vessel acquisitions, resulting in adjusted FFO-
to-debt weakening to below 12%.

Rating pressure would also materialize if the company's EBITDA
trends significantly below S&P's base-case forecast.  S&P's
rating incorporates a gradual recovery in dry-bulk rate
conditions and potential moderate amendments to charter
agreements, given that the container-ship rates embedded in
Navios Partners' charter agreements exceed the current market
rates.  This means that Navios Partners' earnings and,
consequently, liquidity would come under pressure if the company
faced a higher-than-anticipated cyclical pressure on dry-bulk and
container-ship charter rates and was forced to make material
amendments to existing charter agreements.

S&P could raise the rating if it observed marked industry
recovery, if the risk of charter amendments materially
diminished, and if the company achieved a more comfortable level
of headroom under its LTV covenant so that the risk of a large
cash drain, and hence the sources-to-uses ratio falling below
1.0x, is remote.  An upgrade would also depend on Navios
Partners' ability to realize EBITDA of at least $90 million,
accompanied by gradual debt amortization, to achieve core credit
ratios commensurate with a 'B+' rating.  Specifically, such
ratios would include adjusted FFO to debt of close to 15% and
adjusted debt to EBITDA below 5.0x on a sustainable basis.

An upgrade would be also predicated on S&P's belief that the
company will pursue a balanced financial policy once it resumes
investment in new/additional tonnage and dividend distribution.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


CA EURO 2007-1: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes from Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the
following notes issued by ACA Euro CLO 2007-1 P.L.C.:

-- EUR25.6M (current outstanding balance of EUR11.3M) Class C
    Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed Aaa
    (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR24M Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
    2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2016
    Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

-- EUR13.6M Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
    2024, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 27, 2016
    Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

ACA Euro CLO 2007-1 P.L.C., issued in June 2007, is a
collateralised loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Avoca Capital Holdings Limited. The transaction's
reinvestment period finished in June 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
deleveraging of the Class C notes following amortisation of the
underlying portfolio since the last rating action in September
2016. On December 2016 payment date, the last 9.03M of the Class
B notes were repaid and the Class C notes repaid 14.32M (55.92%
of the closing balance). As a result of this deleveraging, the OC
ratios have increased. According to the February 2017 trustee
report the OC ratios of Classes C, D and E are 529.49%, 169.34%
and 122.23% compared to 239.30%, 141.40% and 114.70% respectively
in the last rating action.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR321.60 million and principal proceeds
balance of EUR54.11 million, defaulted par of EUR1.13 million, a
weighted average default probability of 9.81% over a 3.32 year
WAL (consistent with a 10 year WARF of 1930), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 42.45% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 7 and a weighted average spread of
3.51%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate of
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it lowered the
weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio by 5%; the model
generated outputs were not different from the base case results
for Classes C and D and within three notches for Class E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

1) Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortisation would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's
overcollateralisation levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analysed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the
portfolio depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a
few large obligors ratings, especially when they default. Because
of the deal's low diversity score and lack of granularity,
Moody's supplemented its typical Binomial Expansion Technique
analysis with a simulated default distribution using Moody's
CDOROMTM software.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


HARVEST CLO XVII: Moody's Assigns (P)B2(sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Harvest
CLO XVII Designated Activity Company:

-- EUR242,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2030, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- EUR43,500,000 Class B1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR10,000,000 Class B2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR21,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

-- EUR20,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR24,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR9,750,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will
endeavour to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if
any) may differ from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the rated notes address the
expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the
notes in 2030. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Investcorp Credit
Management EU Limited ("Investcorp"), has sufficient experience
and operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Harvest CLO XVII DAC is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of
the portfolio must consist of secured senior obligations and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured senior loans,
second lien loans, mezzanine obligations, high yield bonds and/or
partial PIK obligations. The portfolio is expected to be
approximately 75% ramped up as of the closing date and to be
comprised predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled
in Western Europe. The remainder of the portfolio will be
acquired during the six month ramp-up period in compliance with
the portfolio guidelines.

Investcorp will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
impaired obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the seven classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR41,800,000 of subordinated notes. Moody's
will not assign a rating to this class of notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, will divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. Investcorp's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
October 2016. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR400,000,000

Diversity Score: 38

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.65%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.25%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the ratings assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3163 from 2750)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3575 from 2750)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -0

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Further details regarding Moody's analysis of this transaction
may be found in the upcoming pre-sale report, available soon on
Moodys.com.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.


JUBILEE CDO VI: Moody's Affirms Ba3(sf) Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
actions on the following classes of notes issued by Jubilee CDO
VI B.V.:

-- EUR32M (current balance EUR25.54M) Class B Senior Secured
    Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously
    on Apr 5, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR27M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
    due 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2016
    Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

-- EUR21M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
    due 2022, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2016
    Upgraded to A3 (sf)

-- EUR17M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
    due 2022, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2016
    Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

-- EUR3.15M Class Q Combination Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aa1
    (sf); previously on Apr 5, 2016 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Jubilee CDO VI B.V., issued in August 2006, is a collateralised
loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield
senior secured European loans managed by Alcentra Limited. The
transaction's reinvestment period ended in September 2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the upgrade actions taken on the Class C
and Class D notes are the result of deleveraging of the Classes A
and B notes following amortisation of the portfolio since the
last rating action in March 2016.

Classes A-1b, A-2a, A-2b, and A-3 notes paid down their
outstanding balances in full by a total of approximately EUR42.44
million (c 16.1% of combined closing balances) on the September
2016 and March 2017 payment dates, whilst Class B paid down by
EUR6.46 million (3.2% of closing balance) on the March 2017
payment date. As a result of these pay-downs, over-
collateralisation (OC) ratios of all classes of rated notes have
increased. As per the trustee report dated March 2017, Class A/B,
Class C, Class D and Class E OC ratios are reported at 256.43%,
174.07%, 139.27%, and 119.88% compared to March 2016 levels of
194.00%, 150.22%, 127.79% and 114.01% respectively. These OC
ratios do not incorporate the pay-downs in the rated notes on the
March 2016 and March 2017 payment dates.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having
performing par and principal proceeds of EUR132.89 million,
defaulted par of EUR19.68 million, a weighted average default
probability of 21.56% (consistent with a WARF of 3029 over a
weighted average life of 4.38 years), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 45.98% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 13 and a weighted average spread of 3.66%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analysing.

The rating of the combination notes addresses the repayment of
the rated balance on or before the legal final maturity. For the
Class Q notes, the 'rated balance' at any time is equal to the
principal amount of the combination notes on the issue date minus
the sum of all payments made from the issue date to such date, of
either interest or principal. The rated balance will not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
that were unchanged for Classes B and C, and within one notch of
the base-case results for Classes D and E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

1) Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortisation would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

2) Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralisation levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analysed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Around 4% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed large
concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate as
described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates
in Rated Transactions," published in October 2009 and available
at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461.

4) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction
maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend on
the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


TAURUS 2016-1: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed the ratings on the Commercial
Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Due November 2026 issued by
Taurus 2016-1 DEU Designated Activity Company, as follows:

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable. The rating confirmations reflect the
stable performance of the transaction since issuance.

Taurus 2016-1 DEU Designated Activity Company is a securitisation
of one floating-rate senior commercial real estate loan, which
was advanced by Bank of America Merrill Lynch International
Limited (BAML) to fund the acquisition of 55 retail properties in
Germany by certain Blackstone funds. The acquisition funding
provided by BAML consisted of a EUR 333.7 million senior facility
(EUR 317.0 million securitised balance) and a EUR 37.3 million
mezzanine facility, implying a substantial amount of cash
investment in the acquisition of the properties by Blackstone.
The senior loan is 95% hedged with an interest rate cap that has
a strike rate of 3.0%. The cap is provided by Bank of America,
N.A.

As of February 2017, the outstanding securitised balance was EUR
295.5 million, which represents a 6.8% collateral reduction since
issuance. This reduction is primarily attributed to the repayment
of EUR 20.0 million following the sale of the second-largest
property by market value, Am Hagen 20, in December 2016. This
property was operated as a clinic by the single-tenant, Helios
Kliniken and located in Hattingen, Germany.

Following the release of the clinic, the collateral consists of
54 retail properties spread across Germany. The portfolio has
significant exposure to the DIY retail and hypermarket
industries. Seventeen properties within the portfolio are
occupied by DIY retail companies, including Baumarkt (Globus and
Hela), toom Baumarkt and OBI. As of December 2016, the portfolio
was 93.0% occupied, which represents a slight reduction since
issuance and is in line with the DBRS underwritten vacancy rate
of 6.3%. The most recent annual net operating income (NOI) is
approximately EUR 37.8 million, which represents a 1% increase
from the same NOI figure of EUR 37.0 million at the first
quarterly payment date in May 2016 and is 29.4% higher than the
DBRS underwritten net cash flow (NCF) of EUR 26.8 million at
issuance, excluding the sold asset. Jones Lang LaSalle valued the
property portfolio in June 2015 and estimated the portfolio
market value to be EUR 494.4 million. No new valuations have been
performed since issuance. Excluding the sold asset, Am Hagen 20
(EUR 27.1 million), the current portfolio value is EUR 467.3
million, which represents a 66.6% loan-to-value (LTV). Based on
the DBRS stressed value, which represents a 20.8% haircut to the
valuer, the DBRS LTV is 84.0%.

The transaction is supported by a liquidity facility, which is
provided by Bank of America Merrill Lynch N.A. Following the
release of the Am Hagen 20 property and the scheduled
amortisation, the liquidity facility balance declined
proportionally to EUR 16.3 million, which is 6.8% lower than the
original EUR 17.3 million liquidity facility balance at issuance.
The liquidity facility may be used by the issuer to fund expense
shortfalls (including any amounts owing to third-party creditors
and service providers that rank senior to the Notes), property
protection shortfalls and interest shortfalls (including with
respect to deferred interest, but excluding default interest) in
connection with interest due on the Class A, Class B and Class C
Notes in accordance with the relevant waterfall. The liquidity
facility cannot be used to fund shortfalls due to the Class X
Notes.

The final legal maturity of the Notes is in November 2026, five
years beyond the fully extended maturity of the loan. If
necessary, this is believed to be sufficient time, given the
security structure and jurisdiction of the underlying loans, to
enforce on the loan collateral and repay bondholders.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


NOSTRUM OIL: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating on Nostrum Oil and Gas PLC, a hydrocarbons exploration and
production company that operates in Kazakhstan.  The outlook is
stable.

S&P also affirmed its 'B' long-term issue rating on the company's
senior unsecured notes issued by Nostrum's subsidiary Zhaikmunai
LLP, which are guaranteed by all the group's entities.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that Nostrum will be able to
complete its major investment project, the construction of the
GTU3 gas treatment facility, later in 2017 without raising
additional funds or facing liquidity pressure.  S&P thinks that
free operating cash flow (FOCF) will continue to be negative this
year, on the back of these heavy investments, but it might turn
positive as early as 2018, provided that the facility comes
online, thereby increasing production volumes.  The affirmation
also incorporates S&P's view that the company will maintain
adequate credit metrics for the rating in 2017-2018, with funds
from operations (FFO) to debt of 12%-20% and debt to EBITDA of
about 4.0x-4.5x.

The $498 million GTU3 investment project is scheduled to be
completed in the second half of 2017.  This project has already
been fully funded and S&P estimates it will not require
additional borrowings this year.  Once online, the GTU3 facility
will contribute to Nostrum's growth of production to potentially
more than 80,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day (boepd) by
2019, from 40,000 boepd on average in 2016. At the same time, S&P
notes that this project is subject to execution and cost overrun
risks.

S&P's assessment of Nostrum's business risk profile as weak
reflects S&P's view of the company's fairly concentrated asset
base and its dependence on one pipeline for dry gas--the company
uses another pipeline for crude oil and stabilized condensate,
and it could also use trucks as an alternative for oil
transportation. S&P also takes into account its relatively small-
scale operations by international standards and the inherent
risks relating to the oil industry and operating in Kazakhstan,
where S&P assess the country risk to be high.

These factors are mitigated by good profitability (including
S&P's assumption of a continued adjusted EBITDA margin of about
50%-55% in the next two years), with a favorable cost structure
based on a modern asset base, low cash lifting costs, and a
supportive tax regime.  In S&P's view, Nostrum's relatively low
break-even costs, as well as S&P's anticipation that its
production profile will improve materially from the end of 2017,
are important advantages compared with peers.  This is reflected
in S&P's positive comparable ratings analysis score.

The stable outlook on the company reflects S&P's view that
Nostrum will maintain credit measures that are commensurate with
the rating over 2017-2018, with FFO to debt of 12%-20% and debt
to EBITDA of 4.0x-4.5x, thanks to low operating costs, a material
production increase from the second half of 2017 when the GTU3
facility is launched, and prudent financial policies, as well as
the absence of debt maturities until 2019.

Pressure on the ratings might arise if:

   -- Nostrum experiences delays in completion of the GTU3 plant
      or suffers from project cost overruns leading to, for
      instance, raising debt not aimed at refinancing;

   -- The company's cash position deteriorates below $50 million,
      resulting in squeezed liquidity (and also potentially
      indicating higher-than-expected costs to complete the
      GTU3);

   -- There are operating or macroeconomic issues or heightened
      investments or dividend payments, resulting in sustainably
      weakened credit metrics, notably FFO to debt remaining
      below 10% or debt to EBITDA exceeding 5x; or

   -- Nostrum does not have a tangible plan to address the 2019
      maturities (when both bonds totaling $960 million
      representing total Nostrum's debt are due) by the end of
      2017.

S&P might consider a positive rating action if it foresaw an
improvement in credit measures such that Nostrum's FFO to debt
remained comfortably above 20% for a sustained period.  This
could occur on the back of a supportive oil-pricing environment
or quicker GTU3 production ramp-up.  S&P would also have to see
no liquidity issues and have evidence of a plan to address the
2019 maturities.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


DANA FINANCING: Moody's Rates Proposed $400MM Sr. Unsec. Notes B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B1 rating to Dana Financing
Luxembourg S.a r.l.'s (DFLS Notes) proposed $400 million of
senior unsecured notes. Dana Financing Luxemburg S.a r.l., a
subsidiary of Dana Holding Corporation (Dana), is a private
limited liability company establish in Luxembourg. The DFLS Notes
will be fully and unconditionally guaranteed by Dana Holding
Corporation (Dana). There are no operating subsidiaries owned by
the Issuer.

In a related action, Moody's affirmed Dana's Corporate Family
Rating (CFR) at Ba3, its Probability of Default Rating (PDR) at
Ba3-PD, and affirmed B1 ratings on the existing senior unsecured
debt. Moody's affirmed the Speculative Grade Liquidity (SGL)
Rating at SGL-1. The rating outlook is stable.

The proceeds from the proposed notes are expected to be used to
repay certain of Dana' existing Brazilian debt, refinance debt
from newly acquired Brevini Group, S.p.A.(Brevini), refinance a
portion of Dana's existing 5.375% $450 million senior unsecured
notes due 2021, and general corporate purposes. Brevini, acquired
by Dana in February 2017, is a leading global manufacturer of
mechanical and hydraulic off-highway power conveyance systems.

The following rating was assigned:

Assignments:

Issuer: Dana Financing Luxembourg Sarl

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned B1
    (LGD5)

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Dana Financing Luxembourg Sarl

-- Outlook, Remains Stable

Issuer: Dana Holding Corporation

-- Outlook, Remains Stable

Affirmations:

Issuer: Dana Financing Luxembourg Sarl

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1 (LGD5)

Issuer: Dana Holding Corporation

-- Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed Ba3-PD

-- Speculative Grade Liquidity Rating, Affirmed SGL-1

-- Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed Ba3

-- Senior Unsecured Shelf, Affirmed (P)B1

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1 (LGD5)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Dana's Ba3 Corporate Family Rating is supported by the company's
strong competitive position as a diverse axle parts supplier to
the automotive and commercial vehicle end markets. While Dana's
credit metrics have weakened somewhat due to deteriorating demand
in Class 8 commercial vehicle and off-highway markets, the
company's automotive exposure and operating improvement actions
have had a mitigating impact. As a result, Dana's EBITA margin
for 2016 was 7.3% (inclusive of Moody's standard adjustments),
compared to 7.5% in the prior year. Debt/EBITDA deteriorated to
3.7x at year-end 2016 compared to 3.4x for the prior year period.
Pro forma for the Brevini acquisition (and related performance)
and the acquisition of U.S. Manufacturing Corporation's Michigan
Operations (completed in March 2017), debt/EBITDA is estimated at
3.7x. Moody's expects these acquisitions, combined with new
business wins and a second half 2017 recovery in the
commercial vehicle markets, to result in d bt/EBITDA at about
3.7x at year-end.

Dana is expected to maintain a very good liquidity profile over
the next 12-13 months, supported by substantial cash on its
balance sheet, positive free cash flow generation and
availability under its $500 million cash flow revolving credit
facility due June 2021. As of December 31, 2016, Dana had $707
million of cash and equivalents (with $153 million held in the
U.S.) and another $30 million of marketable securities. Pro forma
for the acquisition of Brevini and the U.S. Manufacturing
Corporation's Michigan Operations (in March 2017), cash
balances were about $532 million. Moody's expects Dana's nominal
level of free cash flow generation to continue through 2017 as
working capital is used to support growth in its automotive
business. Dana maintains an extended debt maturity profile, with
each of its four tranches of bonds maturing during the period
from 2021 to 2026. As of December 31, 2016, Dana's cash flow
revolver was unfunded with $22 million of outstanding letters of
credit. The revolver contains a minimum first lien leverage ratio
test, under which were anticipate ample cushion over the near-
term.

Factors that could lead to higher ratings for Dana include
sustained revenue growth leading to improved operating
performance, generating EBITA/interest coverage consistently over
3.5x, debt/EBITDA of 3.0x or lower, and consistent positive free
cash flow generation, while maintaining a very good liquidity
profile. Other factors supporting an upgrade would be cost
structure improvements, better positioning the company to contend
with the cyclicality in its industry, and continued discipline in
return of capital to shareholders.

Future events that have potential to drive Dana's outlook or
ratings lower include the failure to maintain win rates on new
contracts, production volume declines at the company's OEM
customers, or material increases in raw materials costs that
cannot be passed on to customers or mitigated by restructuring
efforts resulting in EBITA/interest coverage approaching 2.0x, or
debt/EBITDA over 4.0x. Other developments that could lead to a
lower outlook or ratings include deteriorating liquidity or
aggressive shareholder return policies resulting in increased
leverage.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Automotive Supplier Industry published in June 2016.

Dana Holdings Corporation, headquartered in Maumee, Ohio, is a
global manufacturer of driveline, sealing and thermal management
products serving OEM customers in the light vehicle, commercial
vehicle and off-highway markets. Revenue for the 2016 was
approximately $5.8 billion.


GAZ CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to Proposed GBP LPNs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba1 rating with a loss
given default assessment of LGD4 to the proposed senior unsecured
GBP loan participation notes (LPNs) to be issued by, but with
limited recourse to, Gaz Capital S.A. (Gaz Capital, Ba1 stable),
a public limited liability company incorporated in Luxembourg.
Gaz Capital will in turn on-lend the proceeds to Gazprom, PJSC
(Gazprom, Ba1 stable) for general corporate purposes. Therefore,
the noteholders will rely solely on Gazprom's credit quality to
service and repay the debt.

"The Ba1 rating assigned to the notes is the same as Gazprom's
corporate family rating because the notes will rank on a par with
the company's other outstanding unsecured debt," says Denis
Perevezentsev, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Credit Officer
and lead analyst for Gazprom.

LPNs will be issued as Series 42 under the existing $40 billion
multicurrency medium-term note programme (rated (P)Ba1) for
issuing loan participation notes. The notes will be issued for
the sole purpose of financing a euro-denominated loan to Gazprom
under the terms of a supplemental loan agreement between Gaz
Capital and Gazprom supplemental to a facility agreement between
the same parties dated 7 December 2005.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba1 rating assigned to the notes is the same as Gazprom's
corporate family rating (CFR), which reflects Moody's view that
the proposed notes will rank pari passu with other outstanding
unsecured debt of Gazprom. The rating is also on par with the
Russian government's foreign-currency bond rating and the
foreign-currency bond country ceiling.

The noteholders will have the benefit of certain covenants made
by Gazprom, including a negative pledge and restrictions on
mergers and disposals. The cross-default clause embedded in the
bond documentation will cover, inter alia, a failure by Gazprom
or any of its principal subsidiaries to pay any of its financial
indebtedness in the amount exceeding $20 million.

Gazprom's Ba1 CFR reflects its strong business profile as
Russia's largest producer and monopoly exporter of pipeline gas,
owner and operator of the world's largest gas transportation and
storage system, and Europe's largest gas supplier. Gazprom's
credit profile benefits from high levels of government support
resulting from economic, political and reputational importance of
the company to the Russian state. The rating also recognizes
Gazprom's strong financial metrics, robust cash flow generation,
underpinned by contracted foreign-currency-denominated revenues,
and modest leverage.

The rating is constrained by Gazprom's exposure to the credit
profile of Russia and is in line with Russia's sovereign rating
and the foreign-currency bond country ceiling of Ba1. The company
remains exposed to the Russian macroeconomic environment, despite
its high volume of exports, given that most of the company's
production facilities are located within Russia.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

We would consider an upgrade of Gazprom's ratings if Moody's was
to upgrade Russia's sovereign rating or raise the foreign-
currency bond country ceiling provided that the company's
operating and financial performance, market position and
liquidity remain commensurate with Moody's current expectations
and there are no adverse changes in the probability of the
Russian government providing extraordinary support to the company
in the event of financial distress.

The ratings are likely to be downgraded if (1) there is a
downgrade of Russia's sovereign rating and/or a lowering of the
foreign-currency bond country ceiling; (2) the company's
operating and financial performance, market position, and/or
liquidity profile deteriorate materially; and/or (3) the risk of
negative government intervention increases/materialises.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Integrated Oil & Gas Industry published in October 2016. Other
methodologies used include the Government-Related Issuers
methodology published in October 2014.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Gazprom is one of the world's
largest integrated oil and gas companies. It is focused on the
exploration, production and refining of gas and oil, as well as
the transportation and distribution of gas to domestic, former
Soviet Union and European markets. Gazprom also owns and operates
the Unified Gas Supply System in Russia, and is the leading
exporter of gas to Western Europe.

As of 31 December 2015, Gazprom had proved total oil and gas
reserves of approximately 122.2 billion barrels of oil
equivalent, with proved gas reserves of approximately 18.8
trillion cubic meters, which are equivalent to more than one
sixth of the world's total. For the last twelve months ended 30
September 2016, Gazprom produced 414.4 billion cubic meters of
natural gas and 53.5 million tonnes of liquid hydrocarbons. For
the same period, Gazprom reported sales of RUB6.2 trillion and
its Moody's-adjusted EBITDA amounted to RUB1.7 trillion.


GAZ CAPITAL: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Proposed LPNs
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has assigned its 'BB+' long-term
debt rating to a proposed issue of loan participation notes
(LPNs) by Gaz Capital S.A., a financing vehicle of Russian state-
controlled gas company Gazprom PJSC (foreign currency
BB+/Positive/B, local currency BBB-/Positive/A-3).

The LPNs are to be issued within the framework of Gazprom's $40
billion European medium-term note program.  The rating on the
LPNs mirrors the long-term foreign currency corporate credit
rating on Gazprom.  S&P understands that LPNs are backed by
senior unsecured obligations of Gazprom with equivalent payment
terms and that Gaz Capital is a strategic financing entity for
Gazprom set up solely to raise debt on behalf of the Gazprom
group.  S&P believes that Gazprom is willing and able to support
Gaz Capital to ensure full and timely payment of interest and
principal when due on the LPNs, including payment of any expenses
of Gaz Capital.



===========
N O R W A Y
===========


NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' CCR, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it revised its outlook on Norway-
based paper producer Norske Skogindustrier ASA (Norske Skog) to
negative from stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC+'
long- and 'C' short-term corporate credit ratings on the company.

S&P also affirmed the 'CCC+' issue rating on the company's senior
secured notes.  The recovery rating of '3' is unchanged
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%; rounded
estimate: 60%) recovery prospects in the event of default.

S&P also affirmed its 'CCC-' issue rating on the company's senior
unsecured notes.  The recovery rating of '6' is unchanged
indicating recovery prospects of 0%-10% in a default scenario.

The outlook revision follows the company's statements that it has
conducted discussions with key investors regarding a refinancing
exercise, which would include debt for equity swaps.  S&P thinks
that such a transaction would constitute a "selective default" as
creditors would receive less than the original promise.  That
said, no transaction has been announced as S&P understands that
specific investor demands could not be met.

Following financial restructurings in 2015 and 2016, Norske Skog
faces a light debt maturity schedule up until December 2019, when
its EUR290 million senior secured notes fall due.  While S&P
acknowledges that the group has plans to increase earnings from
other sources than its core publication paper business, S&P
thinks that these investment plans are uncertain as long as
Norske Skog's capital structure is unsustainable.  For the 2016
financial year, the company's adjusted debt to EBITDA was about
7.8x and S&P do not foresee a stronger ratio in 2017 and 2018 as
the majority of operational cash flow will be consumed by
interest payments and capital expenditures (capex).  S&P also
thinks that prospects are weak for higher earnings in the core
publication paper business as the segment is still exposed to
overcapacity and poor pricing discipline across the sector.
Consequently, S&P thinks that the likelihood of refinancing is
low and that another financial restructuring could occur at some
stage before 2019.

Underlying S&P's assessment of Norske Skog's capital structure as
unsustainable is its high leverage and vulnerable business model,
which is geared toward publication paper.  Demand continues to
slide at around 4% annually in Norske Skog's home markets of
Europe and Australia while the recent demonetization in India
(important export market for Norske Skog) had a clear negative
effect on pricing.  S&P thinks that the market would benefit from
consolidation in Europe, which could yield better capacity
management and stabilize pricing.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- European economic growth of 1.7% in 2017, although this
      will not slow down the structural demand decline for
      publication, which S&P estimates at 3%-5% per year
      depending on grade.

   -- Stable pricing environment for newsprint (around
      EUR430/ton) for 2017 while average light-weight coated
      somewhat lower than the EUR613/ton for 2016.

   -- Capacity utilization at Norske Skog mills to remain above
      90%, compared with 93% in 2016 and 85% in 2015.

   -- Continued cost cutting efforts to largely offset general
      input cost inflation.

   -- S&P thinks that the above will result in sales being
      broadly flat, with a slight improvement of about 1%
      possible in 2017 and Norske Skog reporting an adjusted
      EBITDA margin of about 8.5%-9.0%, resulting in EBITDA of
      EUR1.0 billion.

   -- Capex of around Norwegian krone (NOK) 250 million-NOK300
      million for 2017, which is around the same level as in
      2016, as the company invests into new biogas and pellets
      capacity.

   -- No dividends.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt of around 5%.
   -- Debt to EBITDA of above 7.0x.
   -- EBITDA interest coverage of over 1.5x.

The negative outlook reflects our view that there is a likelihood
S&P could downgrade Norske Skog in the coming 12 months.  This is
as a result of S&P's view that the company is more likely to
carry out a financial restructuring in the near term.

S&P could lower the rating to 'CCC' if it believed Norske Skog
was likely to announce a restructuring within the following 12
months. S&P could also lower the rating if the company's
operating performance deteriorated so that S&P had renewed
concerns over its liquidity.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Norske Skog's operating
performance improved in the coming year and that this increased
the company's prospects for a successful refinancing of the 2019
senior secured notes that did not involve a restructuring of
other parts of the group's capital structure.  S&P thinks that
such a scenario would require additional capacity closures and
possibly consolidation in the European publication paper
industry, something S&P views as unlikely in the coming 12
months.  S&P could also revise the outlook back to stable if the
company received a considerable equity injection from its
shareholders, although S&P views such a scenario as unlikely.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


VEB-LEASING: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Ratings, Outlook Developing
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has revised its outlook on
Russia-based JSC VEB-leasing to developing from negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and short-term
foreign currency and 'BBB-/A-3' long- and short-term local
currency counterparty credit ratings on VEB-leasing.  S&P also
affirmed its 'ruAAA' Russia national scale rating on the company.

The outlook revision follows that on VEB-leasing's 100% owner,
Vnesheconombank (VEB).  S&P regards VEB-leasing as a core
subsidiary of VEB and equalize S&P's ratings on VEB-leasing with
those on its parent.

S&P expects that VEB-leasing will remain highly integrated with
the VEB group, for which it acts as the leasing arm.
Accordingly, S&P expects that VEB-leasing will receive ongoing
and extraordinary support from VEB in the form of capital and
liquidity, if needed.

The developing outlook on VEB-leasing mirrors that on its parent,
VEB.  This means that the ratings and outlook on VEB-leasing will
move in tandem with those on VEB as long as VEB-leasing remains
core to the group.

S&P could revise its view of VEB-leasing's core group status if
VEB were to change its strategy and divest all or part of its
leasing subsidiary, or if the group no longer had the financial
capacity to support VEB-leasing.  Both scenarios currently appear
remote, however.


=========
S P A I N
=========


CAIXABANK RMBS 2: Moody's Assigns Caa1 Rating to Class B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
CAIXABANK RMBS 2, FT's class A and B notes:

Issuer: CAIXABANK RMBS 2, FT

-- EUR2,448M Class A Notes due January 2061, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

-- EUR272M Class B Notes due January 2061, Assigned Caa1 (sf)

CAIXABANK RMBS 2, FT is a static cash securitisation of first-
line prime mortgage loans extended mainly to obligors located in
Spain. 35.14% of the portfolio, consists of flexible mortgages
and 64.86% standard mortgage loans secured on Spanish residential
properties.

RATINGS RATIONALE

CAIXABANK RMBS 2, FT is a securitisation of loans that CaixaBank,
S.A. (Baa2/P-2/ Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr)) granted mainly to Spanish
individuals. CaixaBank, S.A. is acting as the servicer of the
loans, while CaixaBank Titulizaci¢n, S.G.F.T., S.A. is the
management company.

The definitive ratings take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined
the Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement ("MILAN
CE") assumption and the portfolio's expected loss.

The key drivers for the portfolio's expected loss of 3.5% are (i)
benchmarking with comparable transactions in the Spanish market
through the analysis data in CaixaBank, S.A.'s book; (ii) very
good track record of previous Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities ("RMBS") originated by CaixaBank, S.A (the Foncaixa
Hipotecarios series); and (iii) Moody's outlook on Spanish RMBS
in combination with the seller's historic recovery data.

The transaction's 12.3% MILAN CE number is in line with other
Spanish RMBS transactions. The MILAN CE's key drivers are (i) the
current weighted-average loan-to-value ("LTV") ratio of 68.68%
(calculated taking into account the original appraisal value when
the loan was granted), which is lower than the average for
Spanish RMBS transactions; (ii) the well-seasoned portfolio,
which has a weighted-average seasoning of 4.2 years; (iii) the
fact that only 7.4% of the borrowers in the pool are not Spanish
nationals; (iv) the absence of broker-originated loans in the
pool; and (v) the absence of restructured, renegotiated,
refinancing or debt consolidation loans in the pool.

35.14% of the pool consists of flexible mortgage loans, which are
structured like a line of credit. Under these flexible mortgage
loans, borrowers can make additional drawdowns up to a certain
LTV ratio limit, for an amount equal to the amortised principal.
As a result, flexible mortgages lead to a higher expected default
frequency and more severe losses than for traditional mortgage
loans. Additionally, 28.44% of the borrowers have the option to
benefit from payment holiday periods, where principal is not
paid, and 18.93% of the pool can avail of principal and interest
grace periods.

Moody's considers that the deal has the following credit
strengths: (i) the full subordination of the class B notes'
interest and principal to the class A notes; (ii) the notes'
sequential amortisation; and (iii) a fully funded reserve upfront
equal to 4.75% of the notes, which covers potential shortfalls in
the class A notes' interest and principal during the
transaction's life (and subsequently of the class B notes, once
the class A notes have fully amortised).

The portfolio mainly contains floating-rate loans linked to 12-
month Euribor 66.54%, or "Indice de Referencia de Prestamos
Hipotecarios conjunto de entidades de credito" ("IRPH"), whereas
the notes are linked to three-month Euribor and reset every
quarter on the determination dates. This leads to an interest-
rate mismatch in the transaction. 33.46% of the provisional pool
comprises of fixed-rate loans. Therefore, there is a potential
fixed-to-floating-rate risk, whereby the Euribor rate on the
notes increases, while the interest rates on the loans remain
constant until the reset date. There is no interest-rate swap in
place to cover interest-rate risk. Moody's takes into account the
potential interest rate exposure as part of its cash flow
analysis when determining the notes' definitive ratings.

The definitive ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by legal final maturity. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for the timely payment of interest and the
ultimate payment of principal only for the class A notes by the
legal final maturity. Moody's definitive ratings only address the
credit risks associated with the transaction. Other non-credit
risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant effect
on yield to investors.

STRESS SCENARIOS

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. At the
time the definitive ratings were assigned, the model output
indicated that the class A notes would have achieved a A1 rating
if the expected loss was maintained at 3.5% and the MILAN CE
increased to 14.75%, and all other factors were constant.

The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time, but rather how the initial rating of the security
might have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

The Credit Rating for CAIXABANK RMBS 2, FT was assigned in
accordance with Moody's existing Methodology entitled "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework," dated
September 2016. Please note that in March 2017, Moody's released
a Request for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback
on potential revisions to its Methodology for Counterparty Risk
in Structured Finance. If the revised Methodology is implemented
as proposed, the Credit Rating on CAIXABANK RMBS 2, FT may be
affected. Please refer to Moody's Request for Comment, titled
"Moody's Proposes Revisions to Its Approach to Assessing
Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance," for further details
regarding the implications of the proposed Methodology revisions
on certain Credit Ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework," published in
September 2016.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of a
rating for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include a
significantly better-than-expected performance of the pool,
combined with an increase in the notes' credit enhancement and a
change in Spanish Local Currency Ceiling.

Factors that may cause a downgrade of the ratings include
significantly different loss assumptions compared with Moody's
expectations at closing due to either (i) a change in economic
conditions from Moody's central forecast scenario; or (ii)
idiosyncratic performance factors that would lead to rating
actions; or (iii) a change in Spain's sovereign risk, which may
also result in subsequent rating actions on the notes.


NH HOTEL: Add'l EUR115MM Sr. Notes No Impact on Moody's B2 CFR
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service noted that Spanish hotel company NH
Hotel Group S.A.'s proposed additional EUR115 million of senior
secured notes due 2023 will have no impact on the company's
ratings, including its B2 Corporate Family Rating (CFR) and Ba3
instrument rating. The additional notes will be issued under the
indenture dated as of September 29, 2016, pursuant to which NH
Hotels issued EUR285 million of 3.750% Senior Secured Notes due
2023. All notes issued under this indenture will be consolidated
into a single series and will be rated Ba3. The rating outlook is
stable.

"The additional notes will benefit from the same terms as the
3.75% senior secured notes issued in September including the
strong guarantee and security package," says Maria Maslovsky, a
Vice President-Senior Analyst at Moody's and the lead analyst for
NH Hotel Group. "The proceeds of the offering will be used to
repurchase up to EUR150 million of the outstanding 6.875% notes
due 2019, so the transaction is expected to be leverage-neutral,"
adds Maslovsky.

The company's B2 corporate family rating continues to be
underpinned by the consistent performance of NH Hotel Group's
midscale and upscale urban business hotel portfolio including
5.8% RevPAR growth in 2016 and successful implementation of a
comprehensive turnaround plan. In addition, NH Hotels continues
to improve its debt maturity profile, including through this
transaction, as well as its liquidity with the establishment of
the revolving credit facility.

The Ba3 instrument rating assigned to the senior secured notes is
two notches above NH Hotel Group's corporate family rating of B2
and reflects the support from subsidiary guarantors, a security
package including real assets and substantial cushion from the
convertible bond which is unsecured.

The B2 corporate family rating reflects NH Hotel Group's
established position as a top six European hotel operator
focussed on midscale and upscale urban business hotels. The group
operates 379 hotels with 58,472 rooms largely in Europe and Latin
America. NH Hotel's success in implementing a broad turnaround
program encompassing asset enhancement with EUR200 million of
capex investment along with branding re-alignment is also
incorporated into the rating. Also, the rating considers NH's
"asset-lighter" focus and improved liquidity.

The B2 corporate family rating also takes into account remaining
sizeable maturities facing NH: a EUR250 million convertible bond
due 2018 and the remaining high yield bond due 2019. NH Hotel
Group faces an unfavourable foreign exchange environment with
respect to some of its Latin American markets representing 9% of
the total revenues; in 2016, the company's reported revenue
growth of 5.7% was 2.3% lower than it would have been at constant
exchange rates. Repatriation of funds from some of the Latin
American countries could be a challenge in the future, though not
significant for NH Hotel Group at present. In addition, NH's
moderate growth initiatives in Latin America, while limited in
scope, carry a measure of risk. Also, NH is subject to
seasonality which is most pronounced in the first quarter.

Moody's notes that there is an on-going dispute among NH Hotel
Group's shareholders; while Moody's does not currently view it as
a rating driver, it could pose a risk in the future.

NH Hotel Group's leverage measured as debt/EBITDA reduced to 5.0x
at December 2016 from 5.5 the year earlier and Moody's expects it
remain close to this level. The company's coverage
(EBITA/interest) also improved to 1.2x from 1.0x at December 2015
and is likely to strengthen following this transaction. All
metrics include Moody's standard adjustments.

The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's expectation that NH
will continue executing on its strategic plan as outlined to
Moody's and to the market and continue to realize RevPAR gains
similar to its results to date along with maintaining adequate
liquidity.

Positive rating momentum would occur from NH outperforming its
expected results such that its leverage (debt/EBITDA) is reduced
closer to 5.0x, its coverage (EBITA/interest) rises closer to
1.5x, and its retained cash flow to net debt reaches 10%, all on
a sustained basis. In addition, the company would be expected to
maintain adequate liquidity at all times.

Negative rating pressure would be precipitated by any operational
reversals such that leverage (debt/EBITDA) deteriorates to 6.5x,
coverage (EBITA/interest) reverts to 1.0x and retained cash flow
to net debt drops to 5%. Any liquidity challenges would also be
viewed negatively.

NH Hotel Group is a consolidated multinational operator and one
of the world's leading urban hotel groups with 379 hotels and
58,472 rooms in 29 countries across Europe, America, Africa and
Asia. The Company operates under the successful international
brands NH Collection, NH Hotels, NHOW and Hesperia Resorts, each
one with its own differential value proposition.


SRF 2017-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating to Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned provisional ratings of AAA(sf) to
the Class A Notes, A(sf) to the Class B Notes, BBB(sf) to the
Class C Notes and BB(sf) to the Class D Notes of SRF 2017-1 Fondo
de Titulizacion. The Class E Notes are unrated. The ratings on
the Class A Notes address timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal. The ratings on the Class B Notes, Class C
Notes and Class D Notes address ultimate payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal. Credit enhancement is provided in
the form of subordination. The Class A Notes also benefit from an
amortising Reserve Fund which provides liquidity support. The
initial balance of the reserve fund is equal to 2.5% of the Class
A Notes. The Reserve Fund is amortising and is subject to a floor
of 1.75% of the initial Class A Notes balance. The Reserve Fund
also provides liquidity and credit support to all notes on the
earliest of (i) the payment date on which Class A fully amortises
down or (ii) the legal final maturity.

On any interest payment date from closing, the rated notes may be
redeemed in full. The rated notes will be redeemed in full
following a seller portfolio purchase. The rated notes may only
be redeemed provided the Issuer has the necessary funds to pay
all outstanding amounts of the notes and amounts ranking prior.
If the rated notes are redeemed within two years from the closing
date, the repurchase price of the portfolio will include Class A,
Class B, Class C and Class D make-whole amounts. As of the
payment date in April 2022, the interest on the rated notes
increases.

Proceeds from the issuance of the Class A to E Notes will be used
to purchase Spanish residential mortgage loans. The mortgage
loans were originated by Catalunya Banc, S.A. (CX), Caixa
d'Estalvis de Catalunya, Caixa d'Estalvis de Tarragona and Caixa
d'Estalvis de Manresa. The latter three entities were merged into
Caixa d'Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa which was
subsequently transferred to Catalunya Banc, S.A. by virtue of a
spin-off on 27 September 2011. During 2011 and 2012, CX received
capital investment from the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring
(FROB), effectively nationalising the bank.

As part of its divestment in CX, the FROB sold a portfolio of
loans which were transferred to a securitisation fund, FTA 2015,
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos (2015 Fund) via the issuance of
mortgage participation and mortgage transfer certificates, which
represent the legal and economic interest in the mortgage loans.
Following the sale of the mortgage loans in 2015, Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (BBVA) acquired CX on 24 April 2015.
Subsequently CX was absorbed and merged with BBVA. BBVA will act
as Collection Account Bank and Master Servicer with servicing
operations delegated to Anticipa Real Estate, S.L.U. (Anticipa or
Servicer) in its role as Servicer.

The 2015 Fund will sell the mortgage loans to SRF Intermediate
2017-1 S.A.R.L. (Seller), who will subsequently sell and transfer
the mortgage certificates and participations to the Issuer. The
seller is a private limited company incorporated under the laws
of Luxembourg and is a wholly owned subsidiary of the retention
holder, Spain Residential Finance S.A.R.L. The retention holder
will subscribe to the Class E Notes and guarantee the obligation
of the Seller to repurchase ineligible mortgage certificates
resulting from a breach of representation and warranties.
Titulizacion de Activos, S.G.F.T., S.A. (TDA) has been appointed
as the Management Company and back-up servicer facilitator.

The current balance of the provisional portfolio (as of 27
February 2017) is equal to EUR 403,081,272. The Weighted-Average
Current Loan-to-Value (WACLTV) of the mortgage portfolio is
60.9%, with the Indexed WACLTV calculated by DBRS at 84.6%, (INE,
TINSA Q4 2015). The seasoning of the portfolio is 9.3 years, with
the origination vintages concentrated in 2006 to 2009 (63.9%).
4.3% of the portfolio comprises junior liens. All prior liens are
included in the securitsation. DBRS has factored subordinated
ranking of second liens into the loss analysis.

The portfolio is largely concentrated in the autonomous region of
Catalonia (75.7%). CX as originator was headquartered in
Barcelona and focused its lending strategy in Catalonia. The
concentration in a particular region leaves the transaction
exposed to house price fluctuations, economic performance and
changes in regional laws. Although the peak-to-trough house price
decline observed in Catalonia was higher than the national
average at 46.63%, prices have recovered 14.8% (Q4 2016). GDP and
unemployment have also shown improvement, with estimated GDP
figures for 2015 demonstrating an increase of 3.9% compared to a
growth rate of 1.4% at the end of 2014. Unemployment has fallen
to 14.8% as of Q4 2016 from 24.5% in Q1 2013.

51.9% of the pool consists of multi-credit loans which permit the
borrower to make additional drawdowns. The borrower may not draw
down in excess of the amounts stated in the mortgage agreement.
Borrower eligibility for additional drawdowns is subject to key
conditions. Generally, a borrower must not be in default with
restrictions also placed on the debt-to-income ratios. Once
eligibility has been established, drawdown is subject to
additional criteria such as caps on the maximum drawdown amounts,
maturity restrictions and LTV caps. Further drawdowns under the
multi-credit agreement will be funded by the 2015 Fund. The
various drawdowns amongst the multi-credit rank pari passu. Upon
enforcement of a property securing multi-credit loans the
proceeds applied would first repay the fund for any expenses
incurred, with the remainder distributed between the Issuer and
the 2015 Fund on a pro rata basis.

The majority of the pool (79.2%) consists of loans which have
been restructured or have benefitted from a grace period in the
past. DBRS has assessed the historical performance of the
mortgage loans and factored restructuring arrangements into its
default analysis. As of the closing date, the pool will not
contain borrowers who have gone into arrears of more than 35 days
over the previous 24 months. As of the closing pool cut-off date,
0% of the pool is expected to be more than 30 days in arrears.

The transaction is exposed to unhedged basis risk with the assets
linked to 12-month Euribor (83.6%), Mibor (0.2%) and IRPH
(15.7%). The remaining portion (0.5%) pays a fixed rate of
interest. The notes are linked to 3-month Euribor. The weighted
interest rate of the portfolio is calculated at 1.5% with the
weighted-average margin equal to 1.3%. 60.1% of the mortgage
portfolio is eligible to receive reductions on the margin
dependent on the additional products a borrower has with BBVA.
The margin can potentially reduce to 1.2% after reduction.

25.9% of the pool was subject to interest rate floors in the
past. As of 1 July 2016, interest rate floors were no longer
applied. An Interest Rate Floor Clause (IRFC) reserve fund will
be established to mitigate the potential risk of remediation
payments to the borrowers as a consequence of the ruling by
Spanish courts declaring floor clauses abusive. The IRFC reserve
will be funded by the 2015 Fund for potential remediation of
amounts accrued between 31 March 2014 and 1 July 2016. Amounts
payable by the 2015 Fund are guaranteed by the Retention Holder
via the retention holder guarantee. Spain Residential Finance
S.a.r.l. provides a guarantee on the obligation of the seller to
pay the repurchase price of an ineligible mortgage certificate
and the obligation to compensate the fund in respect of
compensation payments due to the issuer, by the 2015 Fund, with
respect to interest rate floors.

On 21 December 2016, the European Court of Justice ruled that
Spanish banks whose interest rate floor clauses in mortgage
contracts are declared to be null and void by a domestic court
must repay the corresponding revenues received since activation
of the floor clause to customers. Procedural guidelines for
customer protection were set out in a Royal Decree law passed on
20 January 2017 allowing lenders one month to inform customers of
their right to compensation and a further three months to reach a
settlement after receiving a claim.

An indirect impact on the transaction may come from retroactive
compensation arrangements starting from the date the interest
rate floor clauses were activated. In DBRS's view, the impact on
securitisations of Spanish mortgages is likely to depend
primarily on the form of compensation implemented by the banking
sector.

Compensating the customer by adjusting the payment schedule of
the loan, either by reducing the interest instalments due or by
writing down the outstanding principal will have the largest
potential impact on the transaction. In the former case, DBRS
expects the special-purpose vehicle (SPV) to be protected by
representations and warranties and, failing that, through the
implementation of minimum interest rate provisions on the
portfolio. Margin reductions, while having a negative impact on
excess spread, may also have the side effect of improving a
borrower's capacity to repay their mortgage, reducing delinquency
levels and potentially translating into decreased portfolio loss
rates. In the latter case, DBRS's baseline scenario is that the
bank would be unable to unilaterally write down the principal of
an asset that has been transferred to an SPV in a "true sale". As
a result, the bank would be obliged to either repurchase the loan
from the pool or to reimburse the SPV for the lost principal.

BBVA is in place as the Master Servicer and Collection Account
Bank. Anticipa, as the servicer of the mortgage loans, will act
in the name of BBVA on behalf of the fund. BBVA will deposit
amounts received which arise from the mortgage loans with the
Issuer Account Bank within two business days. The servicer is
able to renegotiate terms of the loans with borrowers subject to
certain conditions being met. Permitted variations are limited to
5% of the initial pool balance and are limited to margin
reduction and maturity extension.

BNP Paribas Securities Services, Spanish Branch (BNP) is the
Issuer Account Bank and Paying Agent for the transaction. DBRS
privately rates BNP with a Stable trend. DBRS has concluded that
BNP meets DBRS's minimum criteria to act in such capacity. The
transaction contains downgrade provisions relating to the account
bank where, if downgraded below 'A', the Issuer will replace the
account bank or find a guarantor with the minimum DBRS rating of
'A' who will guarantee unconditionally and irrevocably the
obligations of the treasury account agreement. The downgrade
provision is consistent with DBRS's criteria for the initial
rating of AAA (sf) assigned to the Class A Notes.

The interest received on the Issuer Account Bank is equal to
EONIA minus ten basis points (bps) if EONIA is less than or equal
to 0% and EONIA minus 20bps if EONIA is positive. As it is
possible for negative interest rates to accrue, there is a risk
the Issuer will have to pay BNP for depositing cash. To account
for potential negative interest rates, DBRS stressed the cash
flows in the down interest rate scenario.

The ratings are based upon a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:
-- Transaction capital structure and form and sufficiency of
    available credit enhancement. Credit enhancement to the Class
    A Notes (38.00%) is provided by subordination of the Class B
    (10.00%), Class C (4.00%), Class D (3.00%) and the Class E
    Notes (21.00%). Credit Enhancement to the Class B Notes
    (28.00%) is provided by subordination of the Class C (4.00%),
    Class D (3.00%) and the Class E Notes (21.00%). Credit
    Enhancement to the Class C Notes (24.00%) is provided by
    subordination of the Class D (3.00%) and the Class E Notes
    (21.00%). Credit Enhancement to the Class D Notes (21.00%) is
    provided by subordination of the Class E Notes (21.00%).

-- The credit quality of the mortgage loan portfolio and the
    ability of the servicer to perform collection activities.
    DBRS calculated probability of default, loss given default
    and expected loss outputs on the mortgage loan portfolio.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
    flow assumptions and repay the Class A, Class B, Class C and
    Class D Notes according to the terms of the transaction
    documents. The transaction cash flows were modelled using
    portfolio default rates and loss given default outputs
    provided by the European RMBS Insight Model. The portfolio
    was grouped into two sub-portfolios based on historic
    performance. The sub-portfolios were assigned a Spanish
    Underwriting Score of 3 and Spanish Underwriting score of 6,
    respectively. Refer to the presale report for further
    details. Transaction cash flows were modelled using Intex.
    DBRS considered additional sensitivity scenario of 0% CPR
    stress. The Class C Notes and Class D Notes did not pass 0%
    CPR stress in the down interest rate front loaded default
    scenario. DBRS will continue to monitor prepayment rates as
    part its surveillance process.

-- The sovereign rating of the Kingdom of Spain rated A (low) /
    Stable and R-1 (low) / Stable (as of the date of this
    report).

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions addressing
    the assignment of the assets to the issuer and the
    consistency with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European
    Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


99P STORES: Enters Administration, Shuts Down 60 Stores
-------------------------------------------------------
Katy Clifton at getwestlondon reports that high street chain 99p
Stores has fallen into administration and has closed its 60
stores -- with six to shut in West London.

According to getwestlondon, Poundland, which owns the chain of
stores across the UK, said it had difficulties digesting the 99p
Stores acquisition after it bought the company less than two
years ago.

The West London stores which have been closed are located in
Harrow, Wembley, Hayes, Southall, Acton and Brent Park,
getwestlondon discloses.


DHR GLOBAL: UK Operation Forced Into Liquidation
------------------------------------------------
Recruiter reports that executive search firm DHR Global's UK
operation has been forced into liquidation due to being unable to
pay debts of more than GBP2.3 million.

The debts related to GBP1.606 million owed to its parent company
and GBP563k owed to other DHR Group companies, according to
Recruiter.  There were also substantial employment tribunal
compensatory awards made against the operation arising from legal
action brought by a number of former CTPartners employees made
redundant by the global executive search firm, and GBP158,000
owed to lawyers, the report notes.

The report discloses that in June 2015, DHR International, DHR
Global's parent company completed a deal to purchase certain
assets of CTPartners.

The report says ex-CTPartners UK employees subsequently brought a
case for unfair dismissal after being made redundant by DHR
Global in the summer of the acquisition.  They include:

   -- former managing partner for European professional &
      technology services David Burton;
   -- former chief operationg officer (COO) Deirdre Kenny;
   -- former head of CTPartners' UK retail financial services
      practice Adrian Chalkley;
   -- former partner Martin Newman; and
   -- former managing partner, UK CEO & board practice at
      CTPartners Augmentum Andrew Davies.

According to court documents seen by Recruiter, in a case heard
at the London Employment Tribunal on October 13 last year, DHR
Global was found to have failed to comply with TUPE (Transfer of
Undertakings Protection of Employment) rules, the report relays.
These rules govern the preservation of an employee's terms and
conditions when a business transfers employees over to another
employer.

Employment Judge Goodman awarded Burton GBP65,494.52, Kenny
GBP84,747.50, Chalkley GBP55,259.50, Newman GBP56,114.10 and
Davies GBP43,655 for unfair dismissal, the report relays.  And as
the Tribunal was also satisfied that there had been a breach of
redundancy consultation requirements in terms of failing to
consult over redundancy, the judge also made what it is known as
a protective award with Burton being awarded GBP53,747.99, Kenny
GBP43,750, Chalkley GBP27,248, Newman GBP36,749.96 and Davies
GBP36,749.96, the report notes.

The report relays that DHR Global was ordered to pay the claimant
costs of Chalkley (GBP19,630), Burton (GBP19,446), Kenny
(GBP19,487), Davies (GBP20,000) and Newman (GBP20,000).

The report discloses that Judge Goodman also ordered DHR Global
to pay costs plus compensatory awards for unfair dismissal,
failure to consult and unlawful deduction of wages to two further
CTPartners partners, Louisa Perry and Honor Pollok, who
transferred over following the acquisition but subsequently left
due to the changes DHR Global made to their employment terms.

A filing on Companies House confirms CTPartners UK Ltd was
liquidated on 24 November 2016, with DHR Global Ltd liquidated on
February 24, 2017, the report notes.

In a statement, says the report, a spokesperson for DHR Global
told Recruiter:

"Underlying operations have been successful and buoyant, but the
acquisition vehicle formed for the UK CTPartners transaction was
forced into liquidation because of a substantial legal claim
inherited from the transaction with CTPartners. DHR London has
since restructured its operations without service disruption to
any of our clients. We are actively trading in the market and are
committed to the success of our team and operations in London."


HIGH NOON: Forecourt Site Acquired by Motor Fuel Group
------------------------------------------------------
Kam City reports that Motor Fuel Group has acquired a forecourt
site from High Noon Stores, the c-store operator that fell into
administration at the end of last year.

The Symonds Yat Service Station is based on the north bound
carriageway of the A40 near Whitchurch, and currently hosts a
Londis shop and a cafe, according to Kam City.

The report discloses that Jeremy Clarke, MFG's Chief Operating
Officer said: "This site has great potential due to its location,
size and range of services offered. We are going to rebrand the
station to Shell and look forward to growing the potential of
this valuable asset to our network."

High Noon Stores operated 15 sites, including 10 forecourts,
across Wales and Cornwall, the report notes.

Administrators said the company ran out of cash over the New Year
period and has since stopped trading, the report relays.  Euro
Garages has since acquired eight of the forecourt sites, the
report says.

MFG is the largest independent forecourt operator in the UK with
406 stations operating under the BP, Shell, Texaco and JET fuel
brands.


JONES BOOKMAKER: 25 Stores Shut Down, 262 Jobs Affected
-------------------------------------------------------
Coreena Ford at ChronicleLive reports that more than 260 jobs
have been lost after 25 Jones Bookmaker stores brought down the
shutters across the UK, including at its North East stores.

According to ChronicleLive, the footwear retailer, which had more
than 100 branches nationwide, has been sold to Endless LLP, a
private equity firm.

As part of the sales process, Will Wright, Steve Absolom and
Blair Nimmo of KPMG LLP were appointed joint administrators of A
Jones & Sons Limited on March 24, ChronicleLive relates.

Following their appointment, the joint administrators completed
an agreement to sell the majority of the business and assets to
Endless -- a total of 70 stores, securing around 840 jobs in the
UK, ChronicleLive discloses.

However, 25 underperforming stores and six concessions which are
not part of the sale and will close immediately, including the
firm's stores in Newcastle and Durham, ChronicleLive notes.

The closures result in approximately 262 job losses, including a
total of 21 in the region, ChronicleLive relays.


JORDAN TRADING: In Liquidation After Owing Nearly GBP200,000
------------------------------------------------------------
Alex Matthews at Mailonline reports that Katie Price's racy
calendar company has been put into liquidation after owing nearly
GBP200,000 to the taxman.

The ex-glamour model, 38, who lives in a GBP1.4million mansion in
East Sussex, is winding up Jordan Trading Ltd, which controls
sales of her calendars and other merchandise, according to
Mailonline.

It comes after an unpaid debt of GBP902 relating to the firm --
once worth GBP1.3million -- landed the mother-of-five in court
earlier this year, the report notes.

According to the report, the closure also follows years of the
company's profits sliding since its 2008 peak.

The report says records show that its most recent accounts are
overdue, but the company's net worth fell from a healthy
GBP709,745 in 2011 to just GBP1,194 in 2015.

The report notes a winding up order for Jordan Trading Ltd was
presented in October and a meeting of creditors held on February
16.

The report relays an independent surveyor said: 'The cash in the
company has been dwindling over the years.'


RADIO ELWY: PPL Files Winding-Up Petition Over Unpaid License Fee
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Daily Post reports that a radio station has been hit with the
threat of liquidation over claims they have not been paying to
play records.

Community station Radio Elwy Point FM has been broadcasting
across Rhyl, Prestatyn and the Vale of Clwyd for seven years, the
Daily Post discloses.

But they have been slapped with a High Court winding-up petition
from Phonographic Performance Ltd (PPL) over the non-payment of
license fees for playing songs on the radio, the Daily Post
relates.

The radio station told the Daily Post that it was a "genuine
oversight" and that they expected to resolve the issue in the
next few days.

The petition to wind-up the station was made at the High Court of
Justice (Chancery Division) last month, the Daily Post recounts.
This will be heard on April 10 in London, the Daily Post adds.


RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE: Moody's Rates Class F1 Notes (P)Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional credit ratings
to the following notes to be issued by Residential Mortgage
Securities 29 plc:

-- GBP [*] Class A Floating Rate Notes due [December 2046],
    Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- GBP [*] Class B Floating Rate Notes due [December 2046],
    Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- GBP [*] Class C Floating Rate Notes due [December 2046],
    Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

-- GBP [*] Class D Floating Rate Notes due [December 2046],
    Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

-- GBP [*] Class E Floating Rate Notes due [December 2046],
    Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

-- GBP [*] Class F1 Floating Rate Notes due [December 2046],
    Assigned (P)Caa2 (sf)

The GBP [*] Class F2 Notes due [December 2046], the GBP [*] Class
F3 Notes due [December 2046], the GBP [*] Class X1 Notes due
[December 2046], the GBP [*] Class X2 Notes due [December 2046],
the GBP [*] Class Z Notes due [December 2046] and Certificates
have not been rated by Moody's.

The portfolio backing this transaction consists of UK non-
conforming residential loans primarily originated by Money
Partners Loans Limited, Kensington Mortgage Company Limited and
Kensington Personal Loans and their affiliates, which were part
of the Kensington group. A small fraction of the loans in the
portfolio ([2.1]%) were acquired from third party originators,
including DB UK Bank Limited trading as DB Mortgages, Edeus
Mortgage Creators Limited, GMAC-RFC Limited, Infinity Mortgages
Limited, Mortgages PLC, Preferred Mortgages Limited and Southern
Pacific Mortgages Limited. The portfolio will initially be
serviced by Homeloan Management Limited ("HML"), with servicing
of the portfolio expected to move to Acenden Limited shortly
after closing.

On the closing date Kensington Mortgage Company Limited will sell
the portfolio to [Kayl PL S.a.r.l.] (the "Seller", not rated). In
turn the Seller will sell the portfolio to RMS 29.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of the notes take into account, among other factors:
(1) the historical performance of the collateral; (2) the credit
quality of the underlying mortgage loan pool, (3) the level of
arrears in the pool and (4) the initial credit enhancement
provided to the senior notes by the junior notes and the reserve
fund.

-- Expected Loss and MILAN CE Analysis

Moody's determined the MILAN credit enhancement (MILAN CE) and
the portfolio's expected loss (EL) based on the pool's credit
quality. The expected portfolio loss (EL) of [12]% and the MILAN
CE of [33]% serve as input parameters for Moody's cash flow and
tranching model, which is based on a probabilistic lognormal
distribution. The MILAN CE reflects the loss Moody's expects the
portfolio to suffer in the event of a severe recession scenario.

The key drivers for the MILAN CE, which is higher than the UK
non-conforming sector average and is based on Moody's assessment
of the loan-by-loan information are: (i) the high WA current
unindexed LTV of [76.2]%, (ii) the presence of [64.6]% loans
where the borrowers self-certified their income, (iii) borrowers
with adverse credit history with [23.3]% of the pool containing
borrowers with CCJ's, (iv) the weighted average seasoning of the
pool of [10.9] years, (vi) the level of arrears of around [50.7]%
(including all technical arrears) at the end of January 2017, of
which [22.2]% are 90+ days in arrears, and (v) presence of [7.1]%
of second lien loans and [41.6]% of restructured loans in the
portfolio, although these are largely legacy restructurings as
only [1.0]% of the portfolio contains loans which have been
restructured after 2012.

The key drivers for the portfolio's expected loss, which is
higher than the UK non-conforming sector average and is based on
Moody's assessment of the lifetime loss expectation, are: (1)
observed performance of mortgages, from which a substantial
proportion in RMS 29 (about 60.0% by current balance) has been
previously securitised in transactions rated by Moody's including
Residential Mortgage Securities plc 19 ("RMS 19"), Residential
Mortgage Securities plc 20 ("RMS 20"), Money Partners Securities
2 Plc ("MPS 2"), Money Partners Securities 3 Plc ("MPS 3") as
well as about 8.1% by current balance has been previously
securitised in Money Partners Securities 1 Plc ("MPS 1") which
was not rated by Moody's (2) the performance of previous
Kensington originations as well as the performance this
portfolio; (3) benchmarking with comparable transactions in the
UK non-conforming market; (4) the levels of delinquencies in the
pool together with roll rate analysis; and (5) the current
economic conditions in the UK and the potential impact of future
interest rate rises and inflation on the performance of the
mortgage loans.

-- Operational Risk Analysis

Kensington Mortgage Company Limited ("KMC", not rated) will be
acting as servicer. KMC will sub-delegate certain primary
servicing obligations to HML. HML's sub-delegation
responsibilities are expected to move to Acenden shortly after
closing. In order to mitigate the operational risk, Capita Trust
Corporate Limited (not rated) will act as back-up servicer
facilitator, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Aa2/P-1) will be acting
as a back up cash manager from close. To ensure payment
continuity over the transaction's lifetime the transaction
documents incorporate estimation language whereby the cash
manager can use the three most recent servicer reports to
determine the cash allocation in case no servicer report is
available.

-- Transaction structure

At close, a General Reserve Fund will be established, which will
be equal to [3.5]% of the initial portfolio size (around GBP[*]
million) until the June 2019 interest payment date at which point
it will reduce down to [3.0]% of the initial portfolio size
(around GBP[*] million). The reserve fund will be fully funded at
closing, will step down in June 2019 and will then remain at this
amount until the Classes A to F2 have been redeemed in full and
thereafter the reserve fund required amount will fall to GBP0. In
addition the transaction will benefit from a Liquidity Reserve
Fund, which will not be funded at closing, but only if the
General Reserve Fund falls to below 2.0% of the Class A to F3
Outstanding Balance. In that case, the Liquidity Reserve Fund
Required Amount will increase to 4.0% of the Class A aggregate
outstanding balance for the life of the transaction, which will
be funded through the principal waterfall. Drawings on the
Liquidity Reserve Fund to pay interest will create a PDL. The
topping up of the Liquidity Reserve up to the Required Amount
will not create a PDL. In addition, Moody's notes that unpaid
interest on the class B, C, D, E and F1 is deferrable. Non-
payment of interest on the class A notes constitutes an event of
default.

Principal to pay interest mechanism is always available to pay
interest on the Class A notes. After the Class A notes are paid
in full, principal can be used to pay interest on the most senior
note outstanding. The reserve fund is a source of liquidity to
all rated notes (although it may only be used for the F1 notes
after the Class E notes are paid in full). In addition the Class
A notes benefit from a Liquidity Reserve Fund.

-- Interest Rate Risk Analysis

There are two main forms of SVR linked-loans, KVR and MVR. Under
the servicing agreement, the servicer must set SVR at least equal
to LIBOR plus a fixed margin of [2.5]% and [1.5]% for the KVR and
MVR respectively. There are no swaps in the transaction to hedge
these rates to LIBOR. Moody's has modelled the spread taking into
account the minimum margin covenants. However, due to uncertainty
on enforceability of this covenant, Moody's has performed
stressed analysis for the interest rate reset scenario.

-- Parameter Sensitivities

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model. If the portfolio expected loss was increased from
[12.0]% of current balance to [21.0]% of current balance, and the
MILAN Credit Enhancement remained at [33.0]%, the model output
indicates that the class A would still achieve Aaa assuming that
all other factors remained equal.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors that would lead to a downgrade of the ratings include
economic conditions being worse than forecast resulting in worse-
than-expected performance of the underlying collateral,
deterioration in the credit quality of the counterparties and
unforeseen legal or regulatory changes.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade of the ratings include
economic conditions being better than forecast resulting in
better-than-expected performance of the underlying collateral.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's opinion the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal at par on or before the rated final legal
maturity date for all rated notes. Moody's ratings only address
the credit risk associated with the transaction. Other non-credit
risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant effect
on yield to investors.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2016.

Please note that on 21 March 2017, Moody's released a Request for
Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on potential
revisions to its Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in
Structured Finance. If the revised Methodology is implemented as
proposed, the Credit Rating on Residential Mortgage Securities 29
plc may be affected. Please refer to Moody's Request for Comment,
titled "Moody's Proposes Revisions to Its Approach to Assessing
Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance," for further details
regarding the implications of the proposed Methodology revisions
on certain Credit Ratings.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavour
to assign definitive ratings to the Notes. A definitive rating
may differ from a provisional rating. Moody's will disseminate
the assignment of any definitive ratings through its Client
Service Desk. Moody's will monitor this transaction on an ongoing
basis. For updated monitoring information, please contact
monitor.rmbs@moodys.com.


RSA INSURANCE: Moody's Rates SEK2.5BB/DKK650MM Tier 1 Notes Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba2(hyb) rating to the
SEK2.5 billion/DKK650 million perpetual restricted Tier 1
contingent convertible notes to be issued by RSA Insurance Group
plc ("RSA" or "Group"; backed subordinated rating Baa1(hyb),
stable outlook).

Moody's approach to rating "high trigger" contingent capital
securities is described in its Global insurance rating
methodologies (Global Property and Casualty Insurers:
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC
_190302).

The notes rank junior to RSA's senior creditors (including Tier 2
capital) and existing preference shares, but they rank senior to
common shares. Coupons may be cancelled on a non-cumulative basis
at the issuer's option and on a mandatory basis if the Group's
solvency capital requirement is breached. The notes will convert
into ordinary shares if RSA Group's Solvency II ratio falls below
100% and the breach is not remedied within 3 months, or if the
Solvency II ratio falls to 75% or less.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba2(hyb) rating assigned to the notes is based on multiple
risks including the likelihood of RSA Group's Solvency II ratio
reaching the conversion triggers, the likelihood of coupon
suspension on a non-cumulative basis and the probability of
failure and loss severity.

Moody's assesses the probability of a trigger breach using an
approach that is model-based. The outcome of the model is then
supplemented by qualitative considerations which can be insurer
or jurisdictional specific.

The model takes into account the Group's creditworthiness as
captured by Moody's Insurance Financial Strength Rating (IFSR)
and Moody's expectation of the Group's solvency ratio. The
Ba2(hyb) rating assigned to the notes is resilient given RSA
Group's Solvency II ratio (YE16: 158%), its disclosed ratio
sensitivities, and its target range of 130-160%. The Ba2(hyb)
rating is also not constrained by RSA's non-viability security
rating.

According to the terms and conditions of the notes, RSA may
substitute or vary the terms of the notes under certain
circumstances, although Moody's believes that the terms cannot be
changed in a way that is materially adverse to the investor.

The notes, which are to be issued for general corporate purposes
(which may include, without limitation, the repurchase or
refinancing of existing debt), are intended to qualify as
restricted Tier 1 capital under Solvency II. Their hybrid
features will result in some equity credit under Moody's debt
equity continuum based on the notes' maturity, interest deferral
features, and subordination. Moody's expects the issuance in
itself to increase RSA's adjusted financial leverage (YE16:
c.25%) by 1 to 1.5% points based on a pro-forma YE16 basis,
although Moody's expects leverage to benefit in 2017 as a result
of RSA's proposed early debt retirement. Going forward, Moody's
expects adjusted financial leverage to remain below 30%.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

The key drivers of the notes' rating are the level of RSA Group's
Solvency II ratio and the A2 IFSR of Royal & Sun Alliance
Insurance plc ("RSAI"). Negative rating action on the notes could
occur if RSA's Solvency II ratio deteriorates towards the bottom
end of its current target range, and/or if RSAI's A2 IFSR is
downgraded. Factors that could lead to a downgrade of RSAI's IFSR
are: 1) Material deterioration in business profile including
weakening of franchise, and/or 2) inability to further improve
underlying operating and underwriting performance through 2016
and 2017, and/or 3) meaningfully reduced capital adequacy with
gross underwriting leverage of above 5.5x on a sustained basis
and Solvency II coverage below 130%, and/or 4) adjusted financial
leverage consistently above 30% and earnings coverage below 4x.

Conversely, positive rating action on the notes could occur if
RSA's Solvency II ratio is consistently above the top end of its
current target range, and/or if RSAI's A2 IFSR is upgraded.
Factors that could lead to an upgrade of RSAI's IFSR are: 1)
Sustained improvement in profitability with return on capital
(Moody's definition) of at least 8%, and/or 2) meaningfully
enhanced capital adequacy with gross underwriting leverage of
below 4x on a sustained basis and Solvency II coverage of above
180%, and/or 3) adjusted financial leverage consistently below
30% and earnings coverage above 6x.

The following ratings have been assigned:

RSA Insurance Group plc SEK2.5 billion floating rate perpetual
restricted Tier 1 contingent convertible -- rating at Ba2(hyb).

RSA Insurance Group plc DKK650 million floating rate perpetual
restricted Tier 1 contingent convertible -- rating at Ba2(hyb).

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Property
and Casualty Insurers published in June 2016.


SEADRILL LTD: John Fredriksen Nears Rescue Deal for Business
------------------------------------------------------------
Jonas Cho Walsgard at Bloomberg News reports that billionaire
John Fredriksen said he's closer to finding a solution to
rescuing Seadrill Ltd. as hurdles remain amid a weak market.

"We're cleaning it up all the way," Bloomberg quotes
Mr. Fredriksen as saying in an interview after a lunch on the
Oslo waterfront.  "So it's a big job.  There's a lot of stuff
that should have been done differently, especially on the
financial side.  We're closer to the goal than in a long time but
it will still take time before it's solved."

Seadrill, once the crown jewel in Mr. Fredriksen's rig and
shipping fleet, warned last month that it may miss a deadline in
challenging debt-restructuring talks, forcing it to implement
emergency plans that could include filing for bankruptcy
protection, Bloomberg recounts.  It's negotiating with
shareholders and creditors to restructure debt that amounted to
almost US$9 billion at the end of 2016, Bloomberg relates.

But Mr. Fredriksen has now recently started doing deals again in
the market, buying a semi-submersible drilling rig sitting at a
Korean yard and registering a new company called Northern
Drilling as he seeks to take advantage of depressed prices for
the giant machines, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, he said Northern Drilling is the plan "to
clean up after Seadrill" and "get more equity into Seadrill".

Headquartered in London, Seadrill is an offshore drilling
contractor.  It operates from six regional offices around the
world -- Oslo, Dubai, Houston, Singapore, Rio De Janeiro and
Ciudad del Carmen.


* Some Euro Zone Banks May Need to Shut Down, ECB Head Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that some euro zone banks may need to be shut if
they become unviable, the European Central Bank's top supervisor
said on March 23, as the Italian government seeks to bail out two
regional lenders.

Daniele Nouy, the head of the ECB's supervisory arm, told the
European Parliament there were too many banks in the euro zone
and called for Frankfurt to be given greater discretion when
deciding how much capital they must hold, Reuters relates.

As the euro zone's top bank supervisor, the ECB will have to
decide whether Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca are
solvent and how much capital they need, as it did with their
larger peer Monte Paschi late last year, if Italy's planned
rescue is given a preliminary green light, Reuters discloses.

Ms. Nouy did not name any bank or country but stressed European
rules allowed for some banks to be shut down, Reuters notes.

According to Reuters, she told a parliamentary committee "In
specific cases consolidation may also take the form of the
unwinding of banks if they become unviable".

Ms. Nouy, as cited by Reuters, said she welcomed the European
Commission's new proposed rules on bank capital, which introduce
several tweaks to globally agreed standards. But she warned they
constrained supervisors' powers, particularly when it comes to
set capital requirements, known in the industry as Pillar 2.

"Most prominently, the proposal may frame supervisory action too
tightly," the report quoted Ms. Nouy as saying. "It does so by
constraining the flexibility required by the supervisor in taking
action in cases not foreseen in the legislation and in
determining the composition of the Pillar 2 capital
requirements."


                       *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *