TCREUR_Public/170411.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Tuesday, April 11, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 72


                            Headlines


C R O A T I A

AGROKOR DD: State Takeover to Create Big Problems for Croatia


G E R M A N Y

RWE AG: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Subordinated Notes Rating


I R E L A N D

CORNERSTONE TITAN 2007-1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. A2 Debt to Dsf
CVC CORDATUS: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Class F Sr. Notes


I T A L Y

BANCA NAZIONALE: Fitch Affirms 'bb+' Viability Rating


K A Z A K H S T A N

BANK OF ASTANA: Fitch Lowers IDRs to B-; Outlook Stable


L U X E M B O U R G

MAUSER HOLDING: Moody's Withdraws B3 Corporate Family Rating
MAUSER HOLDING: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-' on BWAY Acquisition


M O N A C O

DYNAGAS LNG: Moody's Assigns B3 Corporate Family Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

ARES EUROPEAN VI: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating to Cl. F-R Notes
JUBILEE CDO VII: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'B'
PATHEON HOLDINGS I: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to Proposed Sr. Debt


R O M A N I A

* ROMANIA: Almost Half of 50 Top Companies in 2009 Insolvent


R U S S I A

ROSENERGOBANK JSC: Put on Provisional Administration
TATAGROPROMBANK LLC: Put on Provisional Administration
TEMPBANK PJSC: DIA to Oversee Provisional Administration
VTB BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings


S P A I N

ENCE ENERGIA: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB-' CCR
GRUPO ISOLUX: Taps Alvarez & Marzal to Explore Alternatives
OBRASCON HUARTE: Fitch Says Successful Plan Execution Credit Pos.


U K R A I N E

METINVEST BV: Fitch Raises LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'B'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ANGLO AMERICAN: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Corp. Credit Ratings
BAKKAVOR FINANCE: Moody's Withdraws B1 Corporate Family Rating
EUROHOME UK 2007-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class B2 Notes to B+
MORPHEUS PLC: Fitch Lowers Rating on Loan E Notes to 'Dsf'


                            *********


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C R O A T I A
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AGROKOR DD: State Takeover to Create Big Problems for Croatia
-------------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that the takeover of Croatia's troubled concern
Agrokor by the state, under new emergency legislation that aims
to shield the country's economy from big corporate bankruptcies,
could lead to big problems for Croatia.

Agrokor is too big for the Croatian government to handle and the
situation could turn dramatic, Guste Santini, an independent
Zagreb-based economic analyst, said in response to a SeeNews
inquiry.

"Although Agrokor is a system of medium size on a European scale,
it is too big for Croatia. The multiplicative effects of Agrokor
are an unavoidable fact, which must be respected both in Croatia
and in the other countries where Agrokor operates," SeeNews
quotes Mr. Santini as saying.  "The potential domino effect that
can be caused by Agrokor is dramatic".

Speaking to SeeNews on April 6, Mr. Santini could not foresee
that as soon as April 7, the owner of Agrokor, Ivica Todoric,
would decide to hand control over Croatia's biggest private
concern to the state.

Mr. Todoric announced on April 7 he is activating the emergency
legislation drafted by Croatia's government in response to
financial troubles that emerged at the food and retail group
earlier this year, SeeNews relays.  The law, which was passed by
parliament on Thursday, allows the government to appoint
temporary administrators to lead a restructuring process at the
request of the company's creditors or the debtor itself, SeeNews
states.

Mr. Santini instead praised Agrokor's chief restructuring
officer, Antonio Alvarez III, who on his first day in office
earlier two weeks ago addressed the public and, in doing so,
relieved the built up stress, SeeNews recounts.

Mr. Alvarez was appointed to lead the concern's restructuring
process following the initialing of a standstill agreement
between Agrokor and its six largest debtors, which promised to
refrain from forcibly seeking payment of money owed to them
during the defined period, SeeNews relates.

Mr. Santini pointed out that that the standstill arrangement was
essential in preventing the bankruptcy of Agrokor, SeeNews notes.

"The standstill is a necessary break which allows the leading
team to identify the true state of the company, make a diagnosis
and take action.  Otherwise, bankruptcy would have ensued,"
SeeNews quotes Mr. Santini as saying.

According to SeeNews, Mr. Santini opined that a whole range of
companies are likely to be excluded from the ailing concern under
the restructuring process which aims to restore its liquidity and
ensure business continuity.

Although he was on board with the goings-on in Agorkor,
Mr. Santini warned that Croatia's neighbors, economies where the
concern operates, should be included in the restructuring
process, SeeNews relays.

Zagreb-based Agrokor is the biggest food producer and retailer in
the Balkans, employing almost 60,000 people across the region
with annual revenue of some HRK50 billion (US$7billion).

                            *   *   *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported on April 10, 2017,
that S&P Global Ratings said it lowered its long- and short-term
corporate credit ratings on Croatian retailer Agrokor d.d. to
'CC/C' from 'B-/B'.  The outlook is negative.  At the same time,
S&P lowered the issue rating on the senior unsecured notes to
'CC' from 'B-'.

On April 2, 2017, a spokesperson for the Agrokor group said that
the company reached an agreement with its bank creditors to
freeze debt payments.  The creditor group includes Sberbank, VTB,
and Erste Bank, which together account for most of the EUR2.5
billion loan debt for the Agrokor group, as of Sept. 30, 2016.

The TCR-Europe on March 31, 2017, reported that Moody's Investors
Service downgraded the Croatian retailer and food manufacturer
Agrokor D.D.'s corporate family rating (CFR) to Caa1 from B3 and
its probability of default rating (PDR) to Caa1-PD from B3-PD.
Moody's has also downgraded the senior unsecured rating assigned
to the notes issued by Agrokor and due in 2019 and 2020 to Caa1
from B3. The outlook on the company's ratings remains negative.

"Our downgrade of Agrokor's rating reflects Moody's views that
the company is no longer able to sustain its high level of trade
payables, which may constrain its liquidity position," says
Vincent Gusdorf, a Vice President -- Senior Analyst at Moody's.
"This comes at a time when the company has limited means to raise
additional sources of liquidity owing to its restricted access to
credit markets and its reliance on a limited number of banks."


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G E R M A N Y
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RWE AG: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Subordinated Notes Rating
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed RWE AG's Long-Term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'BBB', the Short-Term IDR at 'F3' and the
subordinated notes' rating at 'BB+' and removed these ratings
from Rating Watch Negative. The Outlook on the Long-Term IDR is
Stable. Fitch has also affirmed the senior unsecured rating of
RWE AG at 'BBB' and removed it from Rating Watch Positive.

The affirmation follows the restructuring of RWE, including the
partial sale of innogy SE (BBB+/Stable) and the recent strategy
update. Fitch considers 'BBB' to be the maximum rating level for
RWE, taking into consideration that a large proportion of its
cash flows consist of dividends from innogy, but also from
nuclear and lignite generation (the capacity of which is expected
to decline due to closures), from a European generation business
consisting of hard coal, gas and hydro (which have been impacted
by declining spreads) and from a volatile trading business.

RWE intends to maintain a conservative balance sheet, with no
significant financial debt than the already existing hybrids of
approximately EUR3.7 billion, of which EUR2.7 billion are backed
by intercompany loans from innogy and about EUR500 million of
commercial paper. Fitch expects RWE to retain available cash of
around EUR3 billion at the end of 2017.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Independent Profile: Fitch evaluates the parent-subsidiary
linkage between RWE and innogy to be weak and assesses RWE's
rating on a stand-alone basis, taking into consideration features
such as independent supervisory boards, separate financing
(including separate treasury teams, plans for independent
liquidity arrangements, the lack of cross guarantees or cross
defaults between innogy and RWE) and RWE's intention to manage
all intercompany agreements at arm's length and not to impose any
strategic and financial targets on innogy.

Volatile Cash Flows: With over 42GW of generation capacity and
about 200TWh of electricity volumes produced, RWE remains one of
the largest power generators in Europe. RWE's carbon dioxide
intensity was 686g/kWh in 2016; however, the company is targeting
significant emission reductions by 40-50% by 2030. RWE intends to
compensate for lost volumes due to capacity shut downs
(approximately 8GW expected by 2022) through cost cutting,
efficiency improvements and asset optimization; however, its cash
flows are volatile due to power price and commodity price
exposure. The trading business adds additional uncertainty to the
mix and it requires efficient liquidity management due to
material swings in working capital from margin calls.

Long-Term Hybrid Capital: RWE has stated its intention to commit
to about EUR2 billion of hybrid capital in the long term out of
current EUR3.7 billion. From these, the 2017, 2019 and 2020
hybrids with an outstanding amount of EUR2.7 billion are backed
by innogy loans, which will be paid regardless of the instruments
being called or replaced. RWE's choice of financing is justified
by the long-term maturity of the instruments which matches assets
with similar life spans and by the flexibility of such
instruments, which the company considers appropriate for the more
volatile trading businesses. Fitch continues to assign 50% equity
credit to the 2025 and 2026 hybrids. The 2017, 2019 and 2020
hybrids are currently treated as 100% debt due to the
corresponding innogy loans; however, Fitch may re-evaluate the
treatment of the instruments or their replacement closer to their
first call dates, depending on RWE's capital structure strategy
at that time.

Treatment of Nuclear Provisions: On July 1, 2017 RWE will
transfer approximately EUR7 billion of liquid assets into a
state-run nuclear fund in exchange for transferring EUR5.1
billion of long-term nuclear provisions and EUR 1.9 billion of
risk premium and interest to the state. The remaining provisions
will be evaluated on a quarterly basis, and the outstanding
amount is EUR5.7 billion. This amount is calculated using a -0.9%
net discount rate over a shorter period of 10-15 years and it
incorporates the release of EUR0.5 billion of provisions thanks
to lower decommissioning costs. Fitch will evaluate nuclear
provisions at face value using a stable annual discount rate of
0%. While this reduces the current provision estimate by
approximately EUR0.45 billion, it also provides near-term
stability to Fitch estimates.

Fitch's nuclear and lease adjusted ratio previously used for RWE
took into account net nuclear provisions, which were added to net
debt. However, with the current group structure, RWE can net the
EUR5.2 billion of provisions (at 0% discount rate) against the
77% innogy stake, which at current market value covers the
remaining nuclear provisions by more than 250%. As such, Fitch
will evaluate RWE's credit profile through the funds from
operations (FFO) lease adjusted ratio, which takes into account
net financial debt adjusted for operating leases, while the FFO
is reduced by the utilization of pension, nuclear and mining
provisions.

Long-Term Financial Strategy: Fitch expects RWE to adopt a
conservative dividend policy and a minimum cash balance of at
least EUR2 billion, with a broadly neutral net debt position.
Fitch expects EBITDA from generation to decline to around EUR750
million - EUR800 million in 2019-2021, while the trading business
is volatile and working capital-intensive. The utilization of
provisions is expected to materially increase post 2022, putting
pressure on the company's FFO, and, if not mitigated, ratings in
the long term. Fitch expects any decision on capital allocation
to take into account these aspects. Consistently negative free
cash flows throughout the cycle may lead to a revision of the
rating.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

The stand-alone RWE is more volatile than most peers, as the
majority of its earnings come from power generation and trading.
The dividends received from innogy, of which RWE remains a
majority shareholder with 77% of total shares, represent a large
part of the company's FFO and offer some visibility; however,
these cash flows are subordinated to those of innogy's creditors.
Similar to E.ON (BBB+/Stable) and EnBW (A-/Stable), RWE continues
to be responsible for near- and medium-term nuclear
decommissioning provisions after the long-term provisions will be
transferred to a state-run fund in July 2017.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:

- Stable capital expenditure of about EUR300 million per year.
- No dividend growth until 2019.
- About EUR2 billion of hybrids to be part of the long-term
   capital structure.
- Slightly negative changes in working capital throughout the
   cycle.
- Utilization of mining, pension and nuclear provisions of
   around EUR500 million/year.
- innogy dividends in line with the publicly stated policy of
   70-80% payout ratio from adjusted net income.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- Due to RWE's volatile earnings profile, declining volumes due
   to generation capacity shut-down and the high percentage of
   earnings coming from innogy dividends, Fitch currently see an
   upgrade of the rating unlikely.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- FFO adjusted net leverage consistently higher than 1.0x, FFO
   fixed charge cover below 4.5x.
- Neutral to negative FCF through the cycle.
- Minimum cash balance consistently below EUR2 billion.
- Downgrade of innogy.

LIQUIDITY

Strong Liquidity: At the end of 2016, RWE had EUR4.9 billion of
financial debt, which included EUR4 billion of hybrids, EUR500
million of commercial paper and EIB loans not yet transferred to
innogy. On top of this there were EUR1.2 billion of other
financial liabilities which included EUR0.6 billion margin calls
received and financial leasing. Cash and cash equivalents were
EUR10.3 billion, of which EUR7 billion will be transferred to the
state-run nuclear fund. Fitch expects neutral to slightly
positive free cash flow (FCF) and Fitch expects RWE to maintain a
minimum liquidity cushion of at least EUR2 billion, which should
mitigate some volatility from earnings.


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I R E L A N D
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CORNERSTONE TITAN 2007-1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. A2 Debt to Dsf
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Cornerstone Titan 2007-1 plc's class
A2 notes, affirmed the others and withdrawn all ratings:

EUR18.9 million class A2 (XS0288055600) downgraded to 'Dsf' from
'Csf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) 80%, withdrawn
EUR36.4 million class B (XS0288056673) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%,
withdrawn
EUR0 class C (XS0288057218) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%, withdrawn
EUR0 class D (XS0288057648) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%, withdrawn
EUR0 class E (XS0288058885) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%, withdrawn
EUR0 class F (XS0288059420) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%, withdrawn
EUR0 class G (XS0288060196) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%, withdrawn

Cornerstone Titan 2007-1 plc is a CMBS transaction secured by one
loan backed by commercial real estate assets in Germany (two
other borrowers are in the process of being wound up).

KEY RATING DRIVERS
The class A2 and B notes remained outstanding at their legal
final maturity in January prompting the downgrade of the class A2
notes. Fitch expects eventual losses to entirely write down the
class B notes' balance and part of the class A2 notes' balance.
Some recoveries from the defaulted GRP II loan are projected in
Fitch's analysis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Not applicable.


CVC CORDATUS: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Class F Sr. Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to five
classes of notes ("Refinancing Notes") issued by CVC Cordatus
Loan Fund IV Designated Activity Company:

-- EUR225,400,000 Refinancing Class A Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR22,600,000 Refinancing Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating
Rate Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR24,000,000 Refinancing Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate
Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR24,900,000 Refinancing Class C Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR18,600,000 Refinancing Class D Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
(sf)

-- EUR27,600,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2028, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR12,900,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2028, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive ratings of the notes address the loss posed to
noteholders. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying
assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes in connection with
the refinancing of the following classes of original notes:
Original Class A Notes, Original Class B-1 Notes, Original Class
B-2 Notes, Original Class C Notes, Original Class D Notes due
24th January 2028 (the "Original Notes"), previously issued on
17th December 2014 (the "Original Closing Date"). On the
refinancing date, the Issuer will use the proceeds from the
issuance of the Refinancing Notes to redeem in full its
respective Original Notes that will be refinanced. On the
Original Closing Date, the Issuer also issued the Class E Notes
and the Class F Notes as well as one class of Subordinated Notes,
which will remain outstanding.

In addition to the refinancing of the notes, the Issuer also
amended the Moody's test matrix including the minimum Weighted
Average Floating Spread, which have been considered as part of
Moody's analysis when assigning definitive ratings to the
Refinancing Notes and affirming the ratings of the class E and F
notes.

CVC Cordatus Loan Fund IV DAC is a managed cash flow CLO. The
issued notes are collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated
first lien senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and eligible
investments, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second
lien loans and unsecured loans. The underlying portfolio is 100%
ramped as of the refinancing closing date.

CVC Credit Partners Group Limited (the "Manager") manages the
CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading
activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's reinvestment period. After the reinvestment period,
which ends in January 2019, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled
principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk
obligations, subject to certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the binomial
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: EUR388,600,000

Defaulted par: EUR0

Diversity Score: 38

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3516

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.49% (before accounting for LIBOR
floors)

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.2%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 5.80 years

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the notes is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the notes.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a
component in determining the definitive ratings assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal.

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3516 to 4043)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Refinancing Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Refinancing Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Refinancing Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Refinancing Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -2

Refinancing Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 3516 to 4571)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Refinancing Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Refinancing Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Refinancing Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

Refinancing Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -3

Refinancing Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -2

Further details regarding Moody's analysis of this transaction
may be found in the related new issue report published after the
Closing Date in December 2014 and available on Moodys.com.


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BANCA NAZIONALE: Fitch Affirms 'bb+' Viability Rating
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banca Nazionale del Lavoro's (BNL)
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'A-' and Viability
Rating (VR) at 'bb+'. The Outlook on the Long-Term IDR is
Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRS, SENIOR DEBT AND SUPPORT RATING

The IDRs and Support Rating (SR) reflect institutional support
from BNL's parent, BNP Paribas (BNPP, A+/Stable), as Fitch
considers BNL core to BNPP's strategy and Italy a home market for
the French group. Nonetheless, BNL's IDRs are capped at one notch
above Italy's sovereign rating since in Fitch's view BNPP's
propensity to support BNL is linked to Italy's operating
environment. The operating environment in Italy affects the
attractiveness of BNL to the group and the Italian subsidiary's
impact on the French group's financial profile.

The Negative Outlook hence primarily reflects Fitch's view that
BNL's Long-Term IDR is likely to be downgraded if Italy's Long-
Term IDR (BBB+/Negative) was downgraded.

BNL's Short-Term IDR is rated 'F1' - the higher of the two
possibilities for a 'A-' support driven Long-Term IDR under Fitch
criteria - reflecting that support from BNPP is more certain in
the near term.

VR
BNL's VR primarily reflects its weak asset quality, which weighs
on capitalisation but also liquidity and funding that benefit
from ordinary support from its parent and are consistently sound.

Gross impaired loans still accounted for a high 19% of gross
loans at year-end. During 2016, asset quality stabilised in line
with the average for the domestic sector.

BNL's capitalisation is only acceptable. Fitch's assessment of
the bank's capitalisation incorporates Fitch views that capital
is burdened by a high level of unreserved impaired loans, despite
its 12% fully loaded Common Equity Tier 1 ratio and 5.8% leverage
ratio being well above regulatory requirements. Additionally,
capital generation is weak as it is eroded by high operating
costs and loan impairment charges.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS, SENIOR DEBT AND SR

BNL's IDRs and Support Rating (SR) are primarily sensitive to a
change in Italy's sovereign rating and would likely be downgraded
if Italy was downgraded. The IDRs and SR are also sensitive to a
change in Fitch's assessment of BNPP's propensity and ability to
provide support to its subsidiary. A downgrade of BNPP's IDRs
will only affect BNL's IDRs and SR if the parent's Long-Term IDR
is downgraded by more than two notches. The Short-Term IDR may
come under pressure if short-term liquidity support from its
parent weakens, which Fitch currently does not expect.
VR
BNL's VR is primarily sensitive to asset quality and the high
level of unreserved impaired loans in relation to capital. An
upgrade of BNL's VR is contingent on a material reduction in the
stock of impaired loans and lower capital encumbrance. A material
increase in impaired loans could put pressure on the VR if
resulting losses were to erode capitalisation significantly.

The rating actions are:

Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Negative
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: affirmed 'bb+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Senior debt and EMTN programme: affirmed at 'A-'


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K A Z A K H S T A N
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BANK OF ASTANA: Fitch Lowers IDRs to B-; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of Bank of Astana JSC (BoA) and AsiaCredit Bank JSC (ACB)
to 'B-' from 'B'. Fitch has also placed Eximbank Kazakhstan's
(Exim) Long-Term IDRs of 'B-' on Rating Watch Negative (RWN). The
Outlooks on BoA and ACB are Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, VRS, NATIONAL RATINGS
ACB

The downgrade of ACB's IDRs to 'B-' from 'B' reflects the
persistently high amount of high-risk/impaired loans and the
modest capital buffer relative to potential problems. The ratings
also capture the bank's limited franchise and high concentrations
on both sides of the balance sheet. However, the ratings are
supported by the still reasonable liquidity position after some
tightening in the last few months.

ACB reported moderate non-performing loans (NPLs) of 9% (reserved
by only 33%) and a low 1% restructured loans (unreserved) at end-
2016. However, Fitch's review of the 25 largest borrowers
revealed that in addition about 22% of gross loans (1x Fitch core
capital (FCC) net of reserves and cash collateral at end-2016)
were potentially high-risk, mainly due to high accrued
interest/grace periods. An additional 9% of gross loans (53% of
FCC) were represented by receivables from debt collection
companies, which Fitch also views as high-risk. In 2016, 25% of
interest income on loans was accrued but not received in cash,
suggesting underlying weakness in loan performance. Positively,
foreign currency (FC) lending is low (6%).

Reported profitability was modest, with return on equity (ROE)
and return on assets (ROA) of 8% and 0.7%, respectively, in 2016.
However, adjusting for uncollected accrued interest, the core
pre-impairment result was negative (equal to about 3% of average
gross loans in 2016).

ACB's reported FCC was a moderate 13.6% at end-2016. The
regulatory Tier 1 ratio at end-1M17 was at a similar level and
significantly above the 8.5% minimum (including 2% conservation
buffer). Fitch, however, views ACB's capitalisation as vulnerable
given the aforementioned significant high-risk exposures.

The deposit base stabilised in March 2017 after a sizable 40%
outflow of customer funding (mainly due to withdrawals of state
companies) in 4Q16-2M17, driven by negative market sentiment.
These outflows were covered by a reduction in liquidity reserves
and some loan book deleveraging. The bank manages liquidity
reasonably conservatively, and at end-1Q17 the liquidity buffer
still covered total deposits by 33%.

BoA
The downgrade of BoA's IDRs, which are driven by the bank's
Viability Rating, reflects primarily the recent weakening of
asset quality and profitability. The ratings also reflect the
bank's moderate capital ratios and limited liquidity buffer.

BoA's end-2016 NPLs remained broadly at the level of end-2015, at
around 4.5% of gross loans, although their coverage by reserves
decreased to 0.7x from 1.2x. However, the bank's restructured
loans increased significantly to a high 44% of gross loans at
end-2016 from 19% at end-2015.

Of these restructured loans, around 26% of gross loans were
reportedly amortising in lighter schedules, while the other 18%
had grace periods for both interest and principal payments. The
latter category represents impaired loans as these borrowers
currently cannot service their debt due to significant financial
difficulties. Fitch estimates that, at end-2016, BoA's total
problem loans (NPLs plus impaired restructured) were covered by
reserves at a low 14%, representing a significant contingent
provisioning liability for the bank; net problem loans were equal
to 1.1x FCC.

The loan book is highly concentrated, with the 25 largest
exposures comprising around 54% of gross loans (3.2x FCC) at end-
2016. The higher-risk ones are those issued for project finance
and construction purposes (at least 30% of gross loans or 1.8x
FCC) and loans to collectors (including receivables booked
outside of the loan book equal to 0.6x FCC).

BoA's end-2016 FCC ratio remained broadly at the level of end-
2015, at around 11%, while its total regulatory capital ratio
decreased to 10.9% at end-2016 from 13.9% at end-2015, mainly due
to the repayment of KZT7 billion subordinated debt and 33% growth
of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) in 2016. At end-2016, BoA's
capitalisation allowed the bank to reserve an additional 6% of
gross loans, up to 9% in total (down from 7% and 12%,
respectively, at end-2015) before breaching minimum capital
requirements. BoA's loss absorption capacity is also undermined
by the bank's high loan book concentrations and significant
unreserved high-risk loans.

BoA's profitability continued to weaken, with a reported 0.6%
return on average assets (ROAA) and 6% return on average equity
(ROAE) in 2016 after 1% and 7.6%, respectively, in 2015 (2014:
1.3% and 9.4%). The bank's cash-based pre-impairment
profitability turned negative in 2016, with pre-provision results
adjusted for uncollected interest equalling a negative 0.5% of
average total assets.

Fitch views the bank's liquidity as moderate due to high and
increased concentrations in the bank's deposit base. At end-2016,
the 20 largest customers provided around 69% of customer funding
(end-2015: 57%) or around 62% of liabilities (41%). The largest
depositor alone provided around 30% of customer funding or around
27% of liabilities at the date, but its balance should reportedly
remain stable at least in the near term. At end-2M17, BoA's total
available liquidity, net of potential debt repayments in the next
12 months, moderately exceeded funds from the largest depositor.

EXIM

The placement of Exim's IDRs on RWN reflects continued pressure
on the bank's asset quality and capitalisation and the
deterioration in the bank's liquidity position.

NPL and restructured loan ratios remained high and unchanged in
2016, at around 3% and 57%, respectively. However, these grew in
absolute terms, as the loan book increased by about 18%, partly
due to interest accruals, as most restructured loans have grace
periods on interest and principal repayments. About 34% of
accrued interest was not received in cash in 2016, and Exim has
by far the highest accrued interest-to-gross loans ratio in the
system, at 36% at end-2016 compared with the 8% average.

Most restructured loans are related either to energy
infrastructure projects developed by the bank's shareholders or
to legacy construction projects. Given the multiple delays in
completion of these projects, loan recovery prospects are very
uncertain. Reserves covered only 28% (end-2015: 34%) of NPLs and
restructured loans, while the unreserved part was equal to a high
2.9x of FCC (2.2x) at end-2016. Additionally, at least 10% of
Exim's end-2016 gross corporate book (equal to 66% of FCC)
comprised exposures that Fitch views as high-risk, but which were
not classified as overdue or restructured.

Reported profitability weakened further, with ROAA and ROAE for
2016 of 0.3% and 1.5%, respectively, down from 0.5% and 2.5% in
2015. Fitch calculates that, net of accrued interest, the bank
has been making pre-impairment losses for several years.

Reported capital ratios are relatively high (Basel Tier 1 and
total were 17.2% and 20.1%, respectively, at end-2016), but
should be viewed together with the high-risk and under-
provisioned loan book. At end-2016, Exim's capital buffer allowed
the bank to create additional reserves equal to only about 11% of
the loan book (potentially bringing provisions up to 27% of the
portfolio) before breaching minimum regulatory capital adequacy
requirements.

Exim's liquidity tightened sharply in mid-2016 as a result of
related parties' deposits withdrawals, and the bank required
significant funding support from the National Bank of Kazakhstan
(NBK) to strengthen its liquidity. At end-1Q17, Exim's liquidity
buffer was insufficient to repay the first maturing NBK facility
(KZT10.2 billion in November 2017), underlining the necessity to
attract new funding or refinance maturing obligations. Management
plans to strengthen liquidity through the sale of a bond in 2Q17.

SUPPORT RATING FLOORS AND SUPPORT RATINGS
The banks' Support Ratings of '5' reflect Fitch's view that
support from the banks' private shareholders, although possible,
cannot be relied upon. The Support Rating Floors of 'No Floor'
are based on the banks' low systemic importance.

SENIOR UNSECURED DEBT RATINGS (ACB, EXIM)

The banks' senior unsecured local debt ratings are aligned with
their Long-Term Local- Currency IDRs and National Long-Term
ratings and reflect Fitch's assessment that recoveries are likely
to be average in the event of any default.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

A strengthening of asset quality and core profitability would be
credit-positive for BoA and ACB. Conversely, a continued
weakening of these banks' performance, increasing pressure on
capitalisation, could lead to further downgrades.

Fitch plans to resolve the RWN on Exim's ratings based on (i)
realisation of the bank's plans to strengthen liquidity in 2Q17;
and (ii) further review of the ability and propensity of sister
company Central-Asian Electric-Power Corporation (CAEPCo,
B+/Stable) to provide solvency or liquidity support in case of
need.

Debt ratings would likely change in line with their respective
anchor ratings.

The rating actions are:

ACB:
Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs: downgraded to 'B-'
from 'B'; Outlooks Stable
Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
National Long-Term Rating: downgraded to 'BB-(kaz)' from
'BB(kaz)'; Outlook Stable
Viability Rating: downgraded to 'b-' from 'b'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Senior unsecured debt: downgraded to 'B-' from 'B', Recovery
Rating 'RR4'
National senior unsecured debt rating: downgraded to 'BB-(kaz)'
from 'BB(kaz)'

BoA:
Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs: downgraded to 'B-'
from 'B', Outlooks Stable
Short-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B'
National Long Term Rating: downgraded to 'BB-(kaz)' from
'BB(kaz)', Outlook Stable
Viability Rating: downgraded to 'b-' from 'b'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

Exim:
Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs: 'B-', placed on RWN
Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR: 'B', placed on RWN
National Long-Term Rating: 'B+(kaz) ', placed on RWN
Viability Rating: 'b-', placed on RWN
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Senior unsecured debt ratings: 'B-'/'B+(kaz)'; Recovery Rating at
'RR4', placed on RWN
Senior unsecured debt ratings: 'B-(EXP)'/'B+(kaz)(EXP)', placed
on RWN

In accordance with Fitch's policies Eximbank Kazakhstan appealed
and provided additional information to Fitch that resulted in a
rating action that is different than the original rating
committee outcome.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


MAUSER HOLDING: Moody's Withdraws B3 Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the B3 corporate family
rating (CFR) and B3-PD probability of default rating (PDR) of
Mauser Holding S.a r.l., the top-entity of the restricted group
of Mauser (the company). The company has been acquired by Stone
Canyon Industries, LLC ("SCI" - unrated), which is a leading
North American manufacturer of rigid metal and plastic containers
through its subsidiary BWAY Holding Company, Inc. (B3, Negative).
The rating action follows the repayment of Mauser's rated debts.

Concurrently Moody's has withdrawn the B2 ratings on Mauser
Holding S.a r.l's senior secured first lien term loans due 2021
and revolving credit facility due 2019, and the Caa2 rating on
the senior secured second lien term loan due 2022.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for reorganisation purposes.

List of affected ratings

Withdrawals:

Issuer: Mauser Holding S.a r.l.

-- LT Corporate Family Rating, Withdrawn , previously rated B3

-- Probability of Default Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated
    B3-PD

-- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Withdrawn, previously
    rated B2

-- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Withdrawn, previously
    rated Caa2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Mauser Holding S.a r.l.

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From Stable

Mauser Group is a worldwide leading producer of industrial
packaging products with over 5,000 employees and consolidated
revenue of over EUR1.5 billion. Mauser is a portfolio company of
Clayton, Dubilier & Rice.


MAUSER HOLDING: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B-' on BWAY Acquisition
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit rating on
Germany-based industrial rigid packaging group Mauser Holding S.a
r.l. to 'B-' from 'B' and removed the ratings from CreditWatch,
where they were placed with negative implications on Feb. 13,
2017.  S&P subsequently withdrew the corporate credit rating on
Mauser.  The outlook was stable at the time of the withdrawal.

At the same time, S&P withdrew the 'B' issue-level rating on
Mauser's EUR150 million revolving credit facility, its
EUR50 million acquisition facility, the $420 million and
EUR537 million first-lien term loans, as well as the 'CCC+'
rating on the $402 million second-lien term loan.

Following the completion of Mauser's acquisition by U.S.-based
rigid plastic and metal container manufacturer BWAY Holding Co.,
S&P lowered the rating on Mauser to align it with that on the
group's new parent.  As a result of the change of control,
Mauser's revolving facilities and term loans have been called and
fully redeemed.  S&P has therefore withdrawn the ratings on
Mauser's outstanding rated debt.  Subsequently, S&P also withdrew
its corporate credit rating on Mauser, at the company's request.


===========
M O N A C O
===========


DYNAGAS LNG: Moody's Assigns B3 Corporate Family Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a corporate family rating of
B3 and a probability of default rating of B3-PD to Dynagas LNG
Partners LP, an LNG shipping company operating a fleet of six
vessels. Concurrently, Moody's assigned a (P)B1 instrument rating
to Dynagas Partners' proposed senior secured $480 million Term
Loan B currently being marketed, to be borrowed by Arctic LNG
Carriers Ltd. The rating outlook is stable. This is the first
time Moody's has rated Dynagas Partners.

"Dynagas Partners' B3 rating reflects the unique niche with
limited competition the company occupies in operating ice class
vessels, as well as significant visibility of revenues from its
long-term charters with Gazprom, PJSC (Gazprom, Ba1 stable),
Statoil ASA (Aa3 stable) and Yamal LNG (a joint venture of PAO
Novatek (Ba1 stable), Total S.A. (Aa3 stable), China National
Petroleum Corporation (Aa3 negative) and Silk Road Fund (Chinese
state owned investment fund, unrated), " says Maria Maslovsky, a
Vice President-Senior Analyst at Moody's and the lead analyst for
Dynagas LNG Partners LP. "These strengths are counterbalanced by
Dynagas Partners' small fleet of six vessels resulting in
customer and asset concentration, as well as material leverage
and high dividend payout," adds Maslovsky.

The instrument rating of (P)B1 assigned to the proposed Term Loan
B is two notches above Dynagas Partner's corporate family rating
of B3 and reflects a security package including first priority
liens on all six vessels owned by the company and substantial
cushion from existing senior unsecured bond. The Term Loan B will
also benefit from covenants that limit the group's debt, through
specific debt service coverage and loan-to-value covenants.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Dynagas Partners' B3 corporate family rating primarily reflects
its (i) long-term charter agreements with counterparties with
good credit standing; (ii) competitive advantage in owning and
operating ice class vessels and (iii) adequate liquidity.

Partly offsetting these strengths are Dynagas Partners' (i) asset
and customer concentration as a result of its small fleet; (ii)
significant operational reliance on its sponsor and manager, both
of which are related entities; (iii) expected temporary increase
in leverage in 2018/19 because of some vessels coming off-charter
prior to being deployed in the Yamal project; and (iv) high
dividend payout.

Dynagas Partners operates six LNG vessels only one of which
currently does not have a long-term charter agreed. Its fleet is
new with an average age of 6.6 years and has the capacity to
operate in ice bound areas that allows it to use the Northern Sea
Route to transport LNG from Europe to Japan reducing the length
of the way by almost a half.

Two of Dynagas' vessels, Ob River and Amur River, are currently
chartered to Gazprom through 2028 and the third, Clean Energy,
will start its charter with Gazprom in 2018 (its current charter
with Shell expires in 2017). Two more ships, Yenisei River and
Lena River are currently chartered to Gazprom until 2018 and will
enter into charters with Yamal LNG during 12 month delivery
windows commencing on 1 January 2019 and 1 July 2019,
respectively. These charters will run through 2033 -- 2035
leaving only one vessel, Arctic Aurora, off charter in late 2018.
Dynagas expects to find a suitable contract closer to the date of
availability. These long-term contracts result in stable cash
flows and high EBIT margins: approximately 60% in 2016, higher
than other shipping peers.

Dynagas Partners relies on the management services of Dynagas
Ltd, a related entity which is its fleet manager. The company is
also 44% owned by Dynagas Holdings Ltd., a private company which
is its sponsor. While the sponsor's long track record in the
shipping industry and expertise in the highly technical LNG space
are assets for Dynagas Partners, its credit profile is unknown
due to its private status. Positively, the sponsor wholly owns
four additional vessels, as well as a 49% minority interest in
five more vessels that it could contribute to Dynagas Partners to
grow the business further. Of these nine additional vessels one
is currently on a charter with an initial term of five years and
the remaining vessels will commence charters between 2017 and
2020. Five of these vessels are the latest type of ice class
ships known as ARC-7 that can traverse ice-bound waters without
an icebreaker.

Pro forma for the proposed Term Loan B and based on year-end 2017
EBITDA of $108 million, Dynagas Partners' debt to EBITDA is
expected to be 6.7x which is a significant increase from 5.4x in
2016 owing to at least one of the vessels being off-charter
beginning in mid-2017. Moody's projects the leverage rising to
almost 8.0x by 2018 before reducing closer to 7.0x in 2019.

Dynagas Partners' liquidity is adequate following the proposed
refinancing. It has limited capex needs (dry-docking) but its
dividend burden is material reflecting both its status as an MLP
and the $75 mm perpetual preferred shares. In addition, its $30
million undrawn revolving credit facility provided by the sponsor
is expiring in 2018, although the company expects to refinance it
in due course, and its $250 million senior unsecured bond is due
in 2019.

Rating Outlook

The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's expectations that
Dynagas Partners will maintain its strong contract coverage and
adequate liquidity. Moody's also anticipate sustained demand for
the ice class LNG vessels.

What Could Change the Rating Up

Positive rating momentum could result from leverage declining to
below 6.0x on a sustained basis and the successful refinancing of
the senior unsecured bond in 2019, as well as chartering the
remaining vessel.

What Could Change the Rating Down

Negative rating pressure could be precipitated by any additional
increase in leverage beyond current expectations, and any
liquidity challenges.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Shipping Industry published in February 2014.

Dynagas LNG Partners LP is a master limited partnership (MLP)
formed by its sponsor, Dynagas Holding Ltd, to own and operate
LNG vessels under long-term charters. Currently, Dynagas Partners
owns six vessels, five of which are under long-term contracts to
strong counterparties. For 2016, Dynagas reported $170 million of
revenue and $1.1 billion of total assets.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ARES EUROPEAN VI: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating to Cl. F-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary credit ratings to
Ares European CLO VI B.V.'s class A-1-R, B-1-R, B-2-R, C-R, D-R,
E-R, and F-R notes.  An unrated subordinated class of notes
initially issued in 2013 will not be redeemed and will remain
outstanding with an extended maturity to match the newly issued
notes.

The transaction is a reset of the already existing transaction,
which closed in 2013.

The proceeds from the issuance of these notes will be used to
redeem the existing rated notes.  In addition to the redemption
of the existing notes, the issuer will use the remaining funds to
purchase additional collateral and to cover fees and expenses
incurred during the reset period.  The issuer will also reset key
transactional features, such as the weighted-average life and the
reinvestment period.

The preliminary ratings assigned to the notes reflect S&P's
assessment of:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily
      of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans and bonds that are governed by collateral quality
      tests.

   -- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination
      of cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which is expected to be
      bankruptcy remote.

"We consider that the transaction's documented counterparty
replacement and remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate its
exposure to counterparty risk under our current counterparty
criteria," S&P said.

Following the application of S&P's structured finance ratings
above the sovereign criteria, it considers the transaction's
exposure to country risk to be limited at the assigned
preliminary rating levels, as the exposure to individual
sovereigns does not exceed the diversification thresholds
outlined in S&P's criteria.

At closing, S&P considers that the transaction's legal structure
will be bankruptcy remote, in line with S&P's European legal
criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, S&P believes that its preliminary
ratings are commensurate with the available credit enhancement
for each class of notes.

Ares VI European CLO VI is a European cash flow corporate loan
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) securitization of a
revolving pool, comprising euro-denominated senior secured loans
and bonds issued mainly by European borrowers.  Investcorp Credit
Management EU Ltd. is the collateral manager.

RATINGS LIST

Ares European CLO VI B.V.
EUR362.5 Million Floating-Rate Notes Including EUR46 Million
Subordinated Notes

Class                   Prelim.         Prelim.
                        rating           amount
                                       (mil. EUR)
A-1-R                  AAA (sf)          208.15
B-1-R                   AA (sf)           39.25
B-2-R                   AA (sf)            5.00
C-R                      A (sf)           21.70
D-R                    BBB (sf)           17.30
E-R                     BB (sf)           20.40
F-R                     B- (sf)            4.70
Subordinated                NR            46.00

NR--Not rated.


JUBILEE CDO VII: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its credit rating on Jubilee CDO VII
B.V.'s class E notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its
ratings on the class B, C, and D notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction using data from the February payment date report
and the application of its relevant criteria.

Since S&P's previous review, the transaction has experienced
repayments in the underlying portfolio, which were offset by the
default of the Novartex and Van Gansewinkle assets.  As a
consequence, credit enhancement has increased for the class B and
C notes, but has decreased for the class D and E notes.  The
remaining portfolio has somewhat improved in quality.  Assets
rated in the 'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-') have
decreased to 4.60% from 9.04%, despite a decreasing portfolio
balance.

The portfolio contains one British pound sterling-denominated
asset, hedged with an asset-specific currency swap with Barclays
Bank PLC.  In S&P's opinion, the swap documentation does not
fully reflect its current counterparty criteria.  Therefore, in
S&P's cash flow analysis, for ratings above its long-term issuer
credit rating on Barclays Bank, S&P has not given any credit to
this swap.

S&P conducted its standard cash flow analysis to determine the
break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes at
each rating level.  The BDR represents S&P's estimate of the
maximum level of gross defaults, based on its stress assumptions,
that a tranche can withstand and still pay interest and fully
repay principal to the noteholders.  S&P used the portfolio
balance that it considers to be performing, the reported
weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates
that S&P considered to be appropriate.  Notably, S&P excluded the
Van Gansewinkel assets from our cash flow analysis, treating the
operating company debt as cash and the holding company debt as
equity.  In S&P's analysis, it therefore gives no benefit to the
holding company debt.  S&P incorporated various cash flow stress
scenarios using its standard default patterns and timings for
each rating category assumed for each class of notes, combined
with different interest stress scenarios as outlined in S&P's
criteria. The results of S&P's modeling showed an improvement in
the cash flow results for every class of notes.

S&P's credit analysis and cash flow modeling for the class B
notes indicates that its credit enhancement is sufficient to
support its current 'AAA (sf)' rating.  S&P has therefore
affirmed its rating on this class of notes.

S&P's supplemental tests include the largest obligor test, which
measures the risk of several of the largest obligors within the
portfolio defaulting simultaneously.  Despite the increased
credit enhancement for the class C notes, the increased
concentration in the portfolio and the effect of the defaults
have led to deterioration in the supplemental test results.  The
results of this test imply a ratings cap on the class C notes at
their current rating level, while the class D notes fail their
supplemental test at their current rating level by approximately
EUR125,000.

However, under S&P's cash flow analysis, the class D notes could
potentially support the same or higher ratings than those
currently assigned.  Accordingly, taking into account the results
of our cash flow modeling and the supplemental tests, along with
qualitative factors such as the improved portfolio profile and
increased credit enhancement, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the
class C and D notes.

For the class E notes, while S&P's credit and cash flow analysis
indicates that the notes may support their current rating,
applying S&P's largest obligor default test potentially
constrains its rating on this class of notes at 'CCC+ (sf)'.  In
S&P's view, the increase in the pool concentration and losses in
the overall portfolio have affected the results of this test.
However, S&P recognizes the transaction's overall improved credit
metrics, including the notable reduction in 'CCC' category
assets.  S&P also notes that the cash flow results for the class
E notes pass at a rating level considerably higher than 'CCC+'.
Taking this into account, S&P has lowered to 'B (sf)' from 'BB+
(sf)' its rating on the class E notes.

Jubilee CDO VII is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
November 2006 and is managed by Alcentra Ltd.  Its reinvestment
period ended in November 2012 and the issuer has used all
scheduled principal proceeds to redeem the notes in the
transaction's documented priority of payments.

RATINGS LIST

Class            Rating
          To               From

Jubilee CDO VII B.V.
EUR500 Million Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

B         AAA (sf)
C         AA+ (sf)
D         BBB+ (sf)

Rating Lowered

E         B (sf)           BB+ (sf)


PATHEON HOLDINGS I: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to Proposed Sr. Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' issue-level rating to Patheon
Holdings I B.V.'s proposed senior secured debt, which consists of
a new revolver tranche, a $1,136 million first-lien term loan due
2024, and a EUR465 million first-lien term loan due 2024.  S&P
assigned a '3' recovery rating to this secured debt, indicating
its expectation for meaningful (50%-70%; rounded estimate: 65%)
recovery in the event of payment default.

The transaction extends the maturity of the term loans and lowers
the applicable margins.  In addition, the transaction slightly
improves liquidity, assuming the revolving credit facility is
increased.

S&P's 'B' corporate credit ratings with positive outlooks on the
parent company Patheon N.V. and borrower Patheon Holdings I B.V.
are unchanged.  The existing 'B' issue-level rating on the senior
secured debt with a recovery rating of '3' is unchanged.  In
addition, the 'B-' issue-level rating on the senior unsecured
notes due 2022 with a recovery rating of '5' is unchanged.

S&P's ratings on Patheon continue to reflect S&P's view that the
contract development and manufacturing organization (CDMO)
industry is capital intensive, competitive, and fragmented.  In
addition, Patheon is much smaller than its large pharmaceutical
customers, limiting its negotiation power.  This is partially
offset by Patheon's position as one of the largest CDMOs and its
predictable revenue stream from long-term contracts with minimum
volumes and high regulatory switching costs for customers.  S&P's
ratings also reflect the controlling ownership position of JLL
Partners and Koninklijke DSK N.V. and our expectation that
Patheon will sustain leverage above 5x.

The entity Patheon Holdings I B.V. was formerly known as DPx
Holdings B.V. and JLL/Delta Dutch Pledgeco B.V.  S&P views the
credit risk of debt-issuing subsidiary Patheon Holdings I B.V.
and parent company Patheon N.V. as the same because Patheon
Holdings I B.V. represents 100% of the operating results of
Patheon N.V. and Patheon N.V. guarantees the debt.

RATINGS LIST

Patheon N.V.
Corporate Credit Rating                     B/Positive/--

Patheon Holdings I B.V.
Corporate Credit Rating                     B/Positive/--

New Rating

Patheon Holdings I B.V.
Senior Secured
  Tranche B Revolver                         B
   Recovery Rating                           3 (65%)
  $1,136 Mil. First-Lien Term Loan Due 2024  B
   Recovery Rating                           3 (65%)
  EUR465 Mil. First-Lien Term Loan Due 2024    B
   Recovery Rating                           3 (65%)


=============
R O M A N I A
=============



* ROMANIA: Almost Half of 50 Top Companies in 2009 Insolvent
------------------------------------------------------------
Dana Ciriperu at Ziarul Financiar reports that only 28 of the 50
largest entrepreneurial companies in 2009, the year the crisis
hit Romania's economy, are still standing, and the other 22 are
either insolvent, bankrupt or deregistered.

This is one of the most dramatic overviews of the Romanian
private capital in the past decade, Ziarul Financiar notes.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


ROSENERGOBANK JSC: Put on Provisional Administration
----------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-942, dated April 10,
2017, revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit
institution Commercial Bank ROSENERGOBANK (joint-stock company)
or CB REB (JSC) from April 10, 2017, according to the press
service of the Central Bank of Russia.

The credit institution failed to honor its liabilities to
creditors due to which the Bank of Russia had to revoke its
banking license.  CB REB (JSC) violated the Bank of Russia's
instruction and recorded unreliable information about outstanding
liabilities to creditors in its statements to be submitted to the
supervisor.  The regulator has repeatedly applied supervisory
measures to the credit institution, including restrictions on
household deposit taking.

CB REB (JSC) faced problems due to the use of high-risk business
model, low quality of management and assets.  The bank's activity
displays misconduct of the management and owner in terms of asset
diversion (primarily through the issue of loans to legal entities
which were found to be shell companies) to the detriment of
creditors and depositors, and misreporting.

The management and owners of CB REB (JSC) have not taken
effective measures to bring its activities back to normal.  Under
these circumstances, the Bank of Russia performed its duty on the
revocation of the banking license of the credit institution in
accordance with Article 20 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".

Given that the license has been revoked from CB REB (JSC) after
its statements were found considerably unreliable, in compliance
with Part 1.2 of Article 140 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
the Russian Federation and Article 75.1 of the Federal Law "On
the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)" the
Bank of Russia will submit the related materials to the
Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for it to
decide on the opening of a criminal case for an offence under
Article 172.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-943, dated April 10,
2017, appointed a provisional administration to CB REB (JSC) for
the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator
under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the
credit institution's executive bodies are suspended.

CB REB (JSC) is a member of the deposit insurance system. The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than a total of 1.4
million rubles per depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of March 1, 2017, CB
REB (JSC) ranked 92th by assets in the Russian banking system.


TATAGROPROMBANK LLC: Put on Provisional Administration
------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-872, dated April 5, 2017,
revoked the banking license of Kazan-based credit institution
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY TATARSTAN AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK or LLC TATAGROPROMBANK from April 5, 2017.

The decision was made following the complete loss of capital by
LLC TATAGROPROMBANK, due to which the Bank of Russia had to
revoke the license from the credit institution.  The supervisor
has repeatedly applied supervisory measures to the bank,
including restrictions on household deposit taking.

LLC TATAGROPROMBANK carried out operations aimed at financing
credit institutions participating in the informal banking group
to which PJSC Tatfondbank was a parent company.  Following the
creation of additional provisions for liabilities to PJSC
Tatfondbank and PJSC Intechbank due to the revocation of their
banking licenses, the bank's capital took on a negative value of
roughly RUR0.6 billion.  Besides, LLC TATAGROPROMBANK failed to
comply with legislative requirements on countering the
legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained incomes and the
financing of terrorism with regard to submitting information to
the authorized body on time and in full.

The management and participants of the credit institution have
not taken effective measures to bring its activities bank to
normal.  Under these circumstances, the Bank of Russia performed
its duty on the revocation of the banking license of the credit
institution in accordance with Article 20 of the Federal Law "On
Banks and Banking Activities".

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-873, dated April 5, 2017,
appointed a provisional administration to LLC TATAGROPROMBANK for
the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)' or a liquidator
under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the
credit institution's executive bodies are suspended.

LLC TATAGROPROMBANK is a member of the deposit insurance system.
The revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than a total of RUR1.4
million per one depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of March 1, 2017, LLC
TATAGROPROMBANK ranked 400th by assets in the Russian banking
system.


TEMPBANK PJSC: DIA to Oversee Provisional Administration
--------------------------------------------------------
Due to the unstable financial position of the public joint stock
company Moscow Joint Stock Bank Tempbank and a threat to the
interests of creditors and depositors, by its Order No. OD-870,
dated April 5, 2017, the Bank of Russia appointed the state
corporation Deposit Insurance Agency to perform the functions of
provisional administration of the bank for a period of six
months, according to the press service of the Central Bank of
Russia.

The powers of shareholders connected with participation in the
authorised capital and the powers of managing bodies of PJSC MJSB
Tempbank are suspended for the period of provisional
administration activity.

The key objective of the provisional administration is to carry
out an inspection of the bank's financial position.

At the same time, due to the failure to meet creditors' claims on
monetary obligations within seven days from their maturity date
and guided by Article 18938 of Federal Law No. 127-FZ, dated 26
October 2002, "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", by its Order No.
OD-871, dated April 5, 2017, the Bank of Russia imposed a
moratorium on meeting creditors' claims with respect to PJSC MJSB
Tempbank for a three-month term starting April 5, 2017.

Pursuant to Federal Law No. 177-FZ, dated 23 December 2003 "On
the Insurance of Household Deposits with Russian Banks" the
moratorium on meeting bank creditors' claims is an insured event.
Payments to PJSC MJSB Tempbank depositors, including individual
entrepreneurs, will start no later than 14 days since the date
the moratorium has been imposed.  The state corporation Deposit
Insurance Agency will determine the procedure for paying
indemnities.


VTB BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had affirmed its 'BB+/B' long-
and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Russia-based VTB
Bank JSC.  The outlook is stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed
the 'ruAA+' Russia national scale rating.

VTB Bank is a government-related entity (GRE) and its
creditworthiness is highly influenced by that of its 60.9% owner,
the Russian government.  The government's majority ownership is a
crucial factor underpinning S&P's assessment that there is a very
high likelihood the government would provide support to VTB Bank
in a stress situation.  The long-term rating on VTB Bank
incorporates a two-notch uplift above its stand-alone credit
profile (SACP), which S&P continues to view at 'bb-', based on
this expectation of support.  S&P continues to anticipate that
the Russian government will maintain majority ownership and
control over the bank for several years.

VTB Bank's SACP benefits from its position as the second-largest
financial group in Russia, with reported consolidated assets of
Russian ruble (RUB) 12.6 trillion (about $206 billion) on Dec.
31, 2016, and a market share of 17% in terms of assets and 11% in
terms of retail deposits.  S&P understands that, after years of
higher-than-average growth, the group will focus more on
operational efficiency over 2017-2019, including a planned merger
of its retail and commercial banks in Russia and consolidation of
its subsidiaries in Europe.

Although S&P thinks the after-shock that followed the 2014 drop
in oil prices is likely to recede somewhat this year, initiating
a slow recovery in the Russian economy, S&P believes that VTB
Bank still faces challenges as a result of the continuing
difficult operating environment, notably for its profitability
and risk profile.  In particular, S&P notes that while VTB Bank's
profitability will gradually rebound on the back of recovering
margins and reduced credit losses, S&P believes it will still
remain subdued over the next 12-18 months.  According to S&P's
criteria, the bank's capital remains in a weak category, with
S&P's risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio likely to remain at 4.5%-
5% over the next 12 months.  The bank's internal capital
generation capacity is also likely to remain under pressure,
given that the group will likely pay out over 60% of 2017 in
profits reported under International Financial Accounting
Standards as dividends on common and preferred shares.  The
quality of capital will also continue to remain lower than that
of peers, as common equity represented only around 42% of total
adjusted capital at year-end 2016.

Despite a curb on foreign currency lending, the restructuring or
write-off of many problem assets over 2015-2016, and the
stabilization of the volume of problem assets, S&P believes that
the group retains much of its existing high-risk appetite.  For
instance, the largest 20 borrowers exceed 220% of the bank's
total adjusted capital.  S&P notes that the volatility of the
bank's cost of risk in 2016 was, to a large extent, driven by
elevated provisions on credit-related commitments, including
those to associated entities that represented over 25% of total
credit losses.

At the same time, S&P notes that, in line with its earlier
expectations, VTB Bank will likely gradually reduce its
dependence on short-term wholesale funding, substituting it with
customer deposits, and this should result in an improved stable
funding ratio, to 91.8% at year-end 2016 from just 81.5% at year-
end 2014. S&P anticipates this trend will continue because the
group intends for 72% of its funding base to be formed by
customer funds by year-end 2017, compared with 65% as of year-end
2016.  The liquidity position remains adequate, supported by the
bank's large number of unencumbered assets.

The stable outlook balances the risks S&P continues to see in VTB
Bank's risk profile against the improving economy and
creditworthiness of the Russian Federation, the bank's majority
owner.  S&P anticipates that the Russian government will maintain
majority ownership and control over the bank for several years to
come.

S&P may take a positive rating action if it sees that continued
improvement in Russia's credit profile is matched by an easing of
pressure on VTB Bank's SACP.  In particular, a reduction in VTB
Bank's risk appetite and credit costs, including those linked to
credit-related commitments, as well as a positive track record of
recoveries from its largest borrowers, would be strong indicators
for a positive rating action.

A negative rating action may follow if S&P sees VTB Bank's risk
appetite increasing and affecting the bank's risk profile
significantly.  This could come either from an increase in
concentrations on the balance sheet (for example, if the 20
largest borrowers exceed 300% of total adjusted capital), or if
higher-than-expected credit losses drive the RAC ratio to less
than 3.25%.  While privatization of the bank is not S&P's base-
case scenario for the next 12-18 months, it could also lead to a
negative rating action.


=========
S P A I N
=========


ENCE ENERGIA: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB-' CCR
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it revised its outlook on Spanish
pulp and electricity producer ENCE Energia y Celulosa S.A. to
stable from positive.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term corporate credit rating on Ence.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB-' issue rating on the group's
EUR250 million senior unsecured debt, in line with the corporate
credit rating.  The recovery rating on the senior unsecured debt
remains at '4', indicating average recovery prospects (30%-50%;
rounded estimate: 35%) in the event of default.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's expectation that Ence's
profitability and credit metrics will likely remain close to
current levels in the coming years, and S&P's view that the
likelihood of an upgrade has diminished.  Credit measures in 2016
were below S&P's expectations, primarily due to lower-than-
expected profitability in the pulp business as a result of lower
realized prices, a turbine breakdown at one of its pulp mills,
acquisitions in the energy business, and somewhat higher
shareholder returns.  As a result, in 2016 the company's funds
from operations (FFO) to debt stood at 25% and debt to EBITDA at
2.9x, compared with our expectation of about 33% and about 2.5x,
respectively.

Despite S&P's forecast of lower leverage for 2017 as a result of
an improving cost structure and higher pulp and energy volumes,
S&P now anticipates a weaker development of credit metrics in the
coming years.  This is mainly the result of S&P's revised pulp
price assumptions, which are now an annual average price of
$670 per ton compared with $700 previously, although this will be
partly balanced by Ence's cost-cutting efforts.  While Ence's
ambitious investment program is positive for its long-term
competitive position, S&P thinks that the group's investment
strategy will constrain its financial risk profile in the coming
years, especially if the company goes ahead with several new
projects in biomass energy generation.  If the company maintains
shareholder distributions at recent levels, S&P thinks it is
likely that credit metrics will deteriorate from 2018 onward,
although remain in line with the 'BB-' rating.

S&P still considers Ence's financial risk profile to be
constrained by its volatile cash flow generation, which is highly
dependent on the market price for pulp.  After benefiting from
high pulp prices in 2015, the market price for bleached hardwood
kraft pulp (BHKP) dropped by around 10% in 2016.  Despite recent
price hikes from Ence and its peers, S&P thinks that prices could
decline in the second half of 2017 as new capacity comes online.

Although the pulp business leverage remains relatively contained,
S&P consolidates Ence's project finance debt (EUR108 million as
of Dec. 31, 2016,) and EUR15 million ring-fenced loans in the
energy business in S&P's calculation of adjusted debt because,
although it is non-recourse, S&P assess the energy operations as
core to the group.  S&P also includes Ence's utilization under
its factoring arrangements of about EUR104 million and operating
lease liabilities of approximately EUR14 million, but deduct
EUR190 million of surplus cash.  This results in adjusted debt of
EUR373 million as of year-end 2016.  S&P thinks that Ence's
relatively high leverage and volatile cash flow generation is
partly balanced by its long-dated debt maturity profile and its
flexible investment program.

"We think that Ence's business risk profile is constrained by its
inherent exposure to volatile pulp prices and limited size and
scope, with only two pulp mills and a few stand-alone biomass
energy plants, all of which are located in Spain.  We think that
profitability will continue to be volatile but that EBITDA
margins will stay above 20%.  This is still strong for the
broader European paper and forest products sector, but lower than
peers based in Brazil and Uruguay.  We take a positive view of
Ence's efficient logistics, with pulp mills located close to port
terminals and just-in-time delivery to clients in Europe, as well
as its exposure to growing end-markets, with tissue companies
accounting for about 60% of pulp sales.  We think that an
increasing share of high-margin energy business is supportive of
the company's business risk as the energy business is more stable
over time than the pulp business.  Although we cannot exclude
regulatory risk at some point in the future, we think that the
risk of a regulatory reform similar to the one in 2014 is
currently remote as there is no imbalance in the Spanish energy
system," S&P said.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- A BHKP list price (for delivery in Europe) of $670 per ton
      over the next three years, which is somewhat conservative
      taking current spot levels (around $730 per ton) recent
      market announcements of reduced supply into account.  S&P
      thinks that this will result in a realized net price of
      about EUR460 per ton with an exchange rate of US$1.06 to
      EUR1 and an average discount of 27%;

   -- Higher pulp volumes of about 0.97 million tons in 2017,
      reaching about 1 million tons over the next few years as a
      result of the ongoing capacity expansions at Navia and
      Pontevedra;

   -- Higher volumes for the energy business as result of recent
      acquisitions of biomass plants at the end of 2016;

   -- As a result of the considerations related to pulp and
      energy business volumes, S&P expects 8%-10% sales growth in
      2017 and normalized growth of 0%-3% for the next three
      years;

   -- Adjusted EBITDA margin of about 23% for 2017 (compared with
      21% in 2016), set to improve marginally thereafter due to
      lower cash costs in the pulp business as a result of
      ongoing efficiency investments and improving margins in the
      energy business;

   -- Capital expenditures (capex) of about EUR80 million in
      2017, including maintenance capex of about EUR25 million.
      Thereafter, S&P assumes higher annual capex of around
      EUR135 million for 2018 and 2019, including about
      EUR70 million-EUR80 million toward expansion at its
      existing pulp mills and EUR30 million-EUR40 million toward
      the new biomass plant at Huelva;

   -- Shareholder returns of around EUR30 million-EUR35 million
      per year; and

   -- Divestment proceeds of about EUR6 million in 2017 from the
      sale of industrial assets; thereafter increasing to about
      EUR30 million annually until 2020, from the divestment
      plans of its noncore eucalyptus plantations.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- FFO to debt of 33% in 2017 and around 30% in 2018.
   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 2.4x in 2017 and about 2.6x in
      2018.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Ence's operating
performance will improve slightly over the next 12-18 months,
driven by volume increases, improving cash costs, and the growing
energy business.  S&P expects credit measures to remain
commensurate with the rating, with FFO to debt of about 30% and
debt to EBITDA of about 2.5x, leaving some headroom within the
financial risk profile to take into account the inherent
volatility in pulp prices and expansionary investment or
acquisition plans.

Although unlikely in the coming 12 months, S&P could raise the
rating if it assessed that Ence's financial risk profile has
permanently strengthened and that the company's financial policy
will support a higher rating.  An upgrade would hinge on Ence
maintaining adjusted FFO to debt of more than 35% and debt to
EBITDA of below 2.5x on a sustained basis, even during periods of
low pulp prices.

S&P could consider a negative rating action if Ence's
profitability deteriorates meaningfully or if the group's
financial policy becomes more aggressive, resulting in FFO to
debt of below 20% and debt to EBITDA of above 4x.  This could
materialize in a prolonged period of supply-demand imbalances,
for instance, resulting in depressed pulp prices and lower pulp
volumes.  A downgrade could also be the result of an unfavorable
development of the euro/dollar exchange rate, coupled with an
increase in the group's cash costs, or if the company embarks on
substantially heavier investments or acquisitions than in S&P's
base-case scenario.


GRUPO ISOLUX: Taps Alvarez & Marzal to Explore Alternatives
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tim Barwell at Bloomberg News reports that Alvarez & Marsal "will
help Isolux analyze the situation and to study the different
alternatives and possible scenarios" for the company.

According to Bloomberg, the statement said using the "rule 5 bis"
clause of Spanish insolvency law protects the company from
creditor claims for four months.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 3,
2017, Reuters related that Isolux said on March 31 the company
had activated the formal process aimed at avoiding insolvency, as
it battles to secure enough money to remain in business.  Isolux
has over EUR2 billion (US$2.1 billion) in restructured debt,
Reuters disclosed, citing an update on its restructuring
process published in December.

Grupo Isolux Corsan SA is a Spanish construction company.


OBRASCON HUARTE: Fitch Says Successful Plan Execution Credit Pos.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says that the successful execution by Spanish
construction company Obrascon Huarte Lain SA (OHL) (B+/Negative)
of its strategic plan would be credit positive. The management of
the company is taking measures to mitigate legacy operational
issues and to alleviate associated financial stress, targeting a
recourse net debt/EBITDA of around 1x by end-2017. Fitch
downgraded OHL's rating in November 2016.

Starting in 2016, OHL disposed of significant shareholdings in
Abertis (EUR1.3 billion) and in the Metro Ligero Oeste (EUR100
million), continuing in 2017 with the sale of the remaining stake
in the Spanish toll road operator (sold for around EUR330
million) and different stakes in the Mayakoba and Canalejas
developments.

Disposals are helping to sustain metrics in the absence of
positive cash-flow generation from construction activity.
However, while the disposal of matured assets developed by OHL
can be viewed as part of its recycling strategy, the sale of
Abertis means giving up the largest dividend contributor to
recourse cash-flow. Hence, the importance of a strategic plan
aimed at restoring operational sustainability of the construction
division.

Although the turnaround plan is in its early stage, Fitch views
positively the renewed focus towards strict risk management
leading to more stringent bidding criteria in construction
activity. Also, the cost saving plan at the corporate level and
the planned reduction in capex paired with limited equity
contribution, would be beneficial for overall cash generation.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


METINVEST BV: Fitch Raises LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the Long-Term Local-Currency and
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) ratings of
Metinvest B.V., parent of the Ukrainian vertically integrated
steel and mining group, to 'B' from 'Restricted Default' (RD).
Its senior secured rating has also been upgraded to 'B'/Recovery
Rating 'RR4' from 'RD'/'RR6'. The Outlook is Stable. A full list
of rating actions is at the end of the commentary.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Local-Currency IDR Upgrade: Fitch upgraded Metinvest's Local-
Currency IDR to 'B' due to enhanced financial flexibility
resulting from the successful restructuring of the company's
debt, the abatement of the conflict in the Donbas region and the
resilient operations throughout the crisis in Ukraine.

The rating was previously set at 'RD' due to an uncured payment
default under the company's PXF facility that caused a series of
cross defaults to the company's various debt instruments. While a
scheme of arrangement had been quickly reached between the
company and its creditors, risks had remained that the completion
of a comprehensive restructuring would be considerably delayed,
further increasing the detrimental impact on the company's
business profile. Those risks are now mitigated.

Resilient Operations Despite Conflict: Metinvest has been able to
maintain market share and supply to domestic and foreign
customers despite Ukraine's conflict. Also, despite the recent
seizure of assets located within the non-controlled areas and
representing 5% of the company's 2016 EBITDA, the detrimental
effects of the conflict have materially reduced since the Minsk
II protocol, particularly over the past 12 to 15 months.

This improvement has translated into a gradual recovery of the
Ukraine's economy, with 2017 and 2018 GDP growth now expected at
2.5% and 3% respectively. Foreign capital is flowing back into
the country, as illustrated by the company's successful
restructuring.

Foreign-Currency IDR Above Country Ceiling: Fitch also upgraded
Metinvest's Foreign-Currency IDR to 'B', one notch above
Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'B-' due to the issuer's ability to
service hard currency external debt service from recurring hard
currency cash flow generation and available liquidity. Fitch
expects Metinvest's hard-currency external debt service ratio to
remain above 1x for at least the next three years.

Rating Sustainability Above Country Ceiling: Fitch expects that
Metinvest will continue to maintain substantial offshore cash
balances, as well as a comfortable schedule of repayments for its
foreign-currency debt over 2017-2020. Under Fitch base case, the
company is expected to approach its lenders by 2020 to refinance
its bond and the bulk of its PXF maturities that are expiring in
2021.

Improved Liquidity and Debt Maturity: The debt restructuring
comes with a two-year quasi-grace period, during which the
company will only be liable for approximately 30% of its interest
charge in cash, the rest being subject to a capitalisation
option, and no principal repayment. Both instruments maturities
have been pushed to 2021 with amortisation on the PXF starting in
2019. This development is a positive change to the company's
credit profile, improving significantly its short- and medium-
term liquidity.

Low-Cost Producer: Metinvest's ratings continue to reflect the
company's scale as one of the largest Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) producers of steel and iron ore, with a low-cost
production base, more than 276% self-sufficiency in iron ore and
30% in coking coal (vs. 55% before the conflict). The ratings
also factor in Metinvest's favourable location with close
proximity to raw material sources, to Black Sea and Azov Sea
ports and to key end-markets.

Hryvna Depreciation Benefits: Fitch believes that Metinvest's
financial profile should remain largely stable over the rating
period (2017-19) despite the slow recovery in steel market
conditions since 2Q16, and assuming no further operational
disruptions. This is in part due to the company's currency
exposure supporting profitability with a largely foreign
currency-denominated revenue base and a mostly local currency-
denominated cost structure.

Overall, Fitch assesses Metinvest's steel and mining segments as
being able to generate a 15% EBITDA margin over the rating
period, and positive cash flows. This is estimated to have led to
a 3.5x gross funds from operations (FFO) adjusted leverage in
2016, before gradually decreasing below 2.5x over the rating
period.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Metinvest has a weaker competitive position than major CIS steel
peers, notably NLMK (BBB-/Stable) or Severstal (BBB-/Stable) due
to a lower value-added product base, lower self-sufficiency than
its peers and under-invested assets located in Ukraine. The
ratings, however, incorporate the low cost position of the
company's assets and improved credit profile compared with recent
years. No country-ceiling, parent/subsidiary or operating
environment aspects impact the ratings.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:

- Fitch iron ore price deck: USD55/t in 2017 and USD45/t onward;
- USD/UAH 28 in 2017, 29 in 2018 and 30 in 2019;
- Production volumes in line with 2015 results, loss of
   Yenakiive steel production volumes in March 2017 (the plant
   contributed to 5% of EBITDA) is expected to be partly offset
   by increased production at Azovstal and Ilyich steel plants.
   The excess of iron ore not used in the steel production
   process will be exported;
- No dividend payments;
- Capex of USD566 million in 2017 and USD500 million in 2018-
   2019;
- Should the EU adopt anti-dumping measures, tariffs on
   Ukrainian hot-rolled (HRC) steel may be implemented in October
   2017, affecting hot rolled steel volumes exported by Metinvest
   to Europe. Fitch doesn't expect any significant impact on the
   company's profitability.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- Strengthening of liquidity position due to new sources of
    financing and a sustainable renegotiated debt maturity
profile

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- Inability to refinance bond and bank debt maturities by 2020
- Development of the conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine,
   affecting the company's operations and reducing the company's
   profitability
- FFO gross leverage sustained above 3.5x

LIQUIDITY

Fitch expects the company's cash balance to have reached USD352
million at end-2016, of which USD123 million would be restricted
for operating expenditure- and capex-related bank guarantees and
letters of credit, leaving USD229 million of free available cash.
In addition, Fitch expects Metinvest to generate approximately
USD250 million per year of free cash flow over the rating period.

Metinvest's recent restructuring has largely smoothed out the
company's near-term maturities. No principal repayment will be
due in the first two years (2017-2018). Also, mandatory interest
payments will only apply to a fraction of the interest charge
(around 30%), the rest being subject to a capitalisation option.
This translates into a mandatory debt service of around USD52
million in 2017 and USD64 million in 2018, which is manageable in
Fitch views.

From 2019 onward, the PXF will start amortising with a USD231
million principal repayment. In addition, interest on all
instruments will be fully payable in cash, bringing total debt
service up to USD420 million in 2019. The same goes for 2020 with
a total debt service of USD501 million. The balance of the bond
and PXF will be payable in 2021, for a total debt service of
approximately USD1.6 billion. Fitch believes that the company
will have sufficient liquidity to service its debt over the
rating period but believe that a refinancing of both the bond and
the remaining PXF maturities will be required in 2020. Fitch
believes that the company's stand-alone credit profile will be
strong enough to ensure a successful refinancing of those
maturities, subject to the conflict in Ukraine remaining at a
standstill.


FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Metinvest B.V.
-- Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR upgraded to 'B'/Stable from
    'RD'
-- Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR upgraded to 'B' from 'RD'
-- Long-Term Local-Currency IDR upgraded to 'B'/Stable from 'RD'
-- Short-Term Local-Currency IDR upgraded to 'B' from 'RD'
-- Senior secured long-term rating upgraded to 'B'/'RR4' from
    'RD'/'RR6'
-- National Long-Term Rating upgraded to 'AA+(ukr)'/Stable from
    'RD(ukr)'
-- National Short-Term Rating upgraded to 'F1+(ukr)' from
    'RD(ukr)'


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ANGLO AMERICAN: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Corp. Credit Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and short-term
corporate credit ratings and 'zaA+' South Africa national scale
rating on the global mining company Anglo American PLC.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB+' ratings on Anglo's revolving credit
facility (RCF) and unsecured notes.  The recovery rating on the
debt is unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's expectation of
meaningful (65%) recovery prospects for creditors in the event of
default.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that if the sovereign rating
were to be lowered further in the coming quarters, the ratings on
Anglo would not be capped by the sovereign rating.  Indeed, the
current 'BB+' sovereign credit rating on South Africa would not
cap the rating on Anglo if S&P was to upgrade Anglo to 'BBB-' in
the next 12 months.

On April 3, 2017, S&P lowered its foreign currency sovereign
credit rating on South Africa to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  The outlook
is negative.  The rating action follows changes to the country's
executive leadership, which S&P considers may increase the
likelihood that economic growth and fiscal outcomes could suffer.
The rating action also reflects S&P's view that contingent
liabilities to the state, particularly in the energy sector, are
on the rise, and that previous plans to improve the underlying
financial position of Eskom may not be implemented in a
comprehensive and timely manner.

Historically, S&P viewed Anglo's country risk exposure as higher
than that of its peers because its operations are concentrated in
South Africa, which accounted for about 40% of EBITDA in 2016.
Anglo's activities in South Africa include: iron ore mines (Kumba
Iron Ore); platinum mines; thermal coal mines; and some diamond
mines.  South Africa country risks remain significant and have
intensified, in S&P's view, following a series of strikes in 2012
and further strikes in the platinum industry in 2014.  In S&P's
view, the increased underlying social tensions and inequalities
translate into weaker business and investment conditions.  In the
past, pressure from higher costs has been mitigated by a
substantial weakening of the South African rand.

That said, contributions from Anglo's activities in other parts
of the world, together with strong liquidity outside of South
Africa, offset some of the domestic risks.  In S&P's view, Anglo
could be rated above the sovereign rating on South Africa.  Some
of the offsetting factors include:

   -- The company's access to its $5 billion RCF at the parent
      level and sizable cash balance outside South Africa.
   -- Other cash streams originating outside of South Africa.
   -- Limited debt in South Africa (about $1.2 billion) and
      limited maturities in the coming 12 months.

The positive outlook reflects a one-in-three probability that S&P
will raise the ratings on Anglo to 'BBB-' from 'BB+' in the next
12 months.

S&P would consider revising the outlook to stable if the FFO-to-
debt ratio using S&P's proportional consolidation approach fell
below 40% on average through the cycle.  This could occur if the
Chinese economy experienced a more pronounced slowdown, compared
with S&P's base case, and this had a direct impact on the prices
of key commodities such as iron ore, diamonds, and coal.

In addition, the divestment of key assets from Anglo's portfolio,
if not accompanied by improved credit metrics, could make an
upgrade less likely.  S&P would assess the impact of any such
sale on Anglo's business risk profile and the potential
volatility of cash flows.  S&P would likely consider it
detrimental to the ratings on Anglo in this respect if the
company decided to spin off the Kumba Iron Ore assets to its
shareholders without a proportional decrease in debt.

An upgrade is contingent on Anglo establishing a longer track
record consistent with its recent decisions, notably expanding
its core portfolio to include the iron ore and coking coal
assets.  It also depends on the implementation of its financial
policy, including targeting net debt to EBITDA for the group
between 1.0x-1.5x and establishing a new dividend policy.

In S&P's view, an upgrade should also be supported by one of
these:

   -- FFO-to-debt ratio above 45% (using proportional
      consolidation) on average through the cycle.  Based on
      S&P's base-case scenario, the company is on track to meet
      this condition in 2017.  An improvement in the competitive
      position of the mining assets, reflected in EBITDA margins
      that are more comparable with its stronger peers.


BAKKAVOR FINANCE: Moody's Withdraws B1 Corporate Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Bakkavor Finance (2)
plc's corporate family rating (CFR) of B1 and probability of
default rating (PDR) of B1-PD. At the time of withdrawal, there
was no instrument rating outstanding.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.

Headquartered in London, Bakkavor is a leading producer of
private label fresh prepared foods in the UK.


EUROHOME UK 2007-1: S&P Raises Rating on Class B2 Notes to B+
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings took various credit rating actions in Eurohome
UK Mortgages 2007-1 PLC and Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-2 PLC.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised its ratings on Eurohome 2007-1's class A, M2, B1,
      and B2 notes, and on Eurohome 2007-2's class A2, A3, M2,
      and B1 notes;

   -- Raised and removed from CreditWatch positive its ratings on
      the class M1 notes in both transactions; and

   -- Affirmed its rating on Eurohome 2007-2's class B2 notes.

The rating actions follow the application of S&P's relevant
criteria and its credit and cash flow analysis of the
transactions.

The weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) has decreased
in both transactions since our previous reviews.  The decrease is
primarily due to the transactions' increased seasoning and our
assessment of capitalized arrears as more granular data is
provided.  Since S&P's previous reviews, the performing loans'
weighted-average seasoning has increased to 106 months from 100
months in Eurohome 2007-1 and to 90 months from 83 months in
Eurohome 2007-2.

S&P's weighted-average loss severity (WALS) calculations have
increased at the 'AAA' level in both transactions.  Although the
transactions have benefitted from the decreases in the weighted-
average current loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, this has been offset
by the increases in our repossession market-value decline
assumptions, which have been greater at the 'AAA' level.

Eurohome 2007-1

Rating        WAFF     WALS
level          (%)      (%)
AAA          47.86    52.38
AA           36.88    44.38
A            29.83    31.21
BBB          22.58    23.13
BB           15.53    17.30
B            13.09    12.35

Eurohome 2007-2

Rating        WAFF     WALS
level          (%)      (%)
AAA          54.46    53.63
AA           44.75    45.56
A            37.41    32.38
BBB          29.98    24.39
BB           22.56    18.61
B            19.63    13.60

The reserve fund is at its required level in both the
transactions and cannot amortize because the transactions have
breached their cumulative net loss triggers.  Due to these
trigger breaches, the transactions do not meet the pro rata
repayment conditions set out in the transaction documents, so
they will be paying sequentially for the remainder of their life.
S&P has modeled it as such in its analysis.

On Jan. 16, 2016, S&P placed on CreditWatch positive its ratings
on the class M1 notes in both transactions following S&P's rating
actions on the counterparty to which its ratings on these classes
of notes are weak-linked.

In each transaction, the liquidity facility has not been drawn.
The size of the liquidity facilities were reduced in June 2016,
and S&P has considered this in its cash flow analysis.  The
liquidity facility agreements held with Deutsche Bank AG do not
comply with S&P's current counterparty criteria.  The transaction
documents do not include a strong commitment of the liquidity
provider to replace itself or draw to cash its obligation if S&P
downgrades it to below 'A-1'.  In fact, following S&P's June 9,
2015 downgrade of Deutsche Bank, it failed to take any remedial
actions.  Therefore, in the scenarios where S&P gives benefit to
the liquidity facility, its current counterparty criteria cap the
maximum achievable ratings at the long-term issuer credit rating
(ICR) on Deutsche Bank, 'A- (sf)'.

The swap documents in both transactions are not in line with
S&P's current counterparty criteria, but they comply with a
previous version.  As a result, in the scenarios where S&P gives
benefit to the swap, its current counterparty criteria cap the
rating on the notes at S&P's long-term issuer credit rating (ICR)
plus one notch on the swap provider, Barclays Bank PLC.

The bank account documents in both transactions are not in line
with S&P's current counterparty criteria.  As a result, S&P's
current counterparty criteria cap the rating on the notes at its
long-term ICR on the bank account provider, Elavon Financial
Services DAC.

In Eurohome 2007-1, our analysis indicates that the class A, M1,
M2, B1, and B2 notes pass S&P's cash flow stresses at higher
rating levels than those currently assigned.  S&P has therefore
raised its ratings on the class A, M2, B1, and B2 notes.  At the
same time, S&P has raised and removed from CreditWatch positive
its rating on the class M1 notes as this rating is linked to
S&P's long-term ICR on Deutsche Bank, which S&P raised to 'A-' on
March 28, 2017.  The class A notes are able to withstand S&P's
cash flow stresses at the 'A+' rating level, even without the
benefit of the liquidity facility and swap.  S&P has therefore
raised to 'A+ (sf)' from 'A (sf)' its rating on the class A notes
and delinked them from S&P's long-term ICR on Barclays Bank.
S&P's ratings on the class M1 and M2 notes are linked to its
long-term ICR on Deutsche Bank.

In Eurohome 2007-2, S&P's analysis indicates that the class A2,
A3, M1, M2, and B1 notes pass its cash flow stresses at higher
rating levels than those currently assigned.  S&P has therefore
raised its ratings on the class A2, A3, M2, and B1 notes.  At the
same time, S&P has raised and removed from CreditWatch positive
its rating on the class M1 notes as this rating is linked to
S&P's long-term ICR on Deutsche Bank, which S&P raised to 'A-' on
March 28, 2017.  The class A2 and A3 notes are able to withstand
S&P's cash flow stresses at higher rating levels than those
currently assigned, even without the benefit of the liquidity
facility and swap.  However, the maximum potential ratings that
this transaction can achieve are capped at our long-term ICR on
Elavon Financial Services, at 'AA-'.  S&P has therefore raised to
'AA- (sf)' from 'A (sf)' its ratings on the class A2 and A3 notes
and delinked them from S&P's long-term ICR on Barclays Bank.
S&P's ratings on class M1 and M2 notes are linked to its long-
term ICR on Deutsche Bank.

S&P has also affirmed its 'B- (sf)' rating on Eurohome 2007-2's
class B2 notes as S&P do not expect these notes to suffer
interest shortfalls in the next one to two years.  In addition,
the class B2 notes have 3.81% of available credit enhancement and
are supported by a fully funded reserve fund.

S&P's credit stability analysis indicates that the maximum
projected deterioration that it would expect at each rating level
for the one- and three-year horizons, under moderate stress
conditions, is in line with S&P's credit stability criteria.

Eurohome 2007-1 and Eurohome 2007-2 are U.K. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions originated by
Deutsche Bank's U.K. mortgage origination arm, DB UK Bank Ltd.

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
            To              From

Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-1 PLC
GBP354.725 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Plus an
Overissuance Of Excess-Spread-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A           A+ (sf)         A (sf)
M2          A- (sf)         BBB- (sf)
B1          BB (sf)         B+ (sf)
B2          B+ (sf)         B- (sf)

Rating Raised And Removed From CreditWatch Positive

M1          A- (sf)         BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-2 PLC
EUR70 Million, GBP460.5 Million Mortgage-Backed and Excess-
Spread-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A2           AA- (sf)        A (sf)
A3           AA- (sf)        A (sf)
M2           A- (sf)         BBB- (sf)
B1           BB- (sf)        B+ (sf)

Rating Raised And Removed From CreditWatch Positive

M1           A- (sf)         BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos

Rating Affirmed

B2           B- (sf)


MORPHEUS PLC: Fitch Lowers Rating on Loan E Notes to 'Dsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Morpheus (European Loan Conduit No.
19) plc's (Morpheus) loan E and affirmed loan D due 2029:

- GBP8 million loan D affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
- GBP6.9 million loan E downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; Recovery
   Estimate revised to 50% from 90%

The transaction originated as a securitisation of 443 loans
secured by 901 commercial properties in England, Scotland and
Wales. Since the last rating action in May 2016, seven loans have
been repaid in full and one with a loss, generating GBP6.6
million of principal proceeds. This resulted in the full
redemption of class C notes and the partial repayment of loan D.
Only 20 loans remain outstanding.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of the loan D reflects solid performance of the
loans over the last 12 months. As with the loan E, the loan D is
deferring interest (GBP0.8 million had been deferred as of
January 2017). This caps its rating below investment grade,
despite the deferral not arising from any credit
underperformance. Instead, it results from the depressive effect
on issuer available interest funds (net of largely fixed senior
costs) of extraordinarily low interest rates acting on a
diminished interest-bearing loan balance, which has significantly
paid down since closing in August 2004.

In Fitch understanding of the documents, the deferred interest
will only fall due when the loan D is due to be redeemed. Like an
available funds cap (AFC), interest postponed because of
prepayments is permitted under the terms and conditions of the
instrument. But unlike an AFC the amount postponed will become
due for payment, and so Fitch's ratings address the likelihood of
full repayment along with principal by legal maturity. Postponed
loan D interest ranks after loan D principal, and as interest and
principal are payable via a single combined waterfall, loan D
interest should be repaid at the expense of loan E principal.

With all but three underlying loans benefitting from scheduled
amortisation, maturity dates ranging from now through to October
2026, and most redemptions having occurred at or ahead of
maturity, Fitch projects loan D repayment by 2021. Fitch expects
that three relatively large loans due by 2021 will cover the loan
D principal and postponed interest, which Fitch has tested for
under 'BBsf' rating stresses. Coverage for the loan D is solid,
with all remaining loans current and making full debt service
payments. In at least four loans, non-charged borrower resources
are partly being used, reflecting sponsors' likely commitment to
their equity.

The downgrade of loan E reflects an already-incurred GBP86,424
loss, with the recovery estimate indicating Fitch expectations of
further losses, including after diversion of collateral proceeds
to cover loan D interest.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch does not envisage upgrading the loan D due to interest
being deferred until full redemption. A downgrade may occur if
the loan pool suffers serious underperformance.

Fitch expects 'Bsf' recoveries of GBP12.9 million.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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