TCREUR_Public/170426.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Wednesday, April 26, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 82


                            Headlines


F R A N C E

CASINO GUICHARD-PERRACHON: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDR to BB+
TECHNICOLOR SA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR on Expected Rebound


G R E E C E

GREECE: Int'l. Monetary Fund Reluctant to Commit New Loans


I R E L A N D

ARBOUR CLO II: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)sf' Rating to Class F Notes
TORO EUROPEAN CLO 3: Fitch Corrects April 12 Rating Release


I T A L Y

ALITALIA SPA: Future Uncertain After Workers Reject Rescue Plan
ITAS MUTUA: Fitch Places BB Sub. Notes Rating on Watch Negative


K A Z A K H S T A N

KAZKOMMERTSBANK: Halyk Bank May Need to Inject KZT230 Billion


N E T H E R L A N D S

ALCOA NEDERLAND: Fitch Assigns BB+ First-Time IDR


R U S S I A

MAGNIT PJSC: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Stable
RAZGULAY GROUP: Declared Bankrupt by Moscow Court
RUSAL CAPITAL: Fitch Assigns Final 'B+' Rating to USD600MM Notes
RUSHYDRO PJSC: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB+', Outlook Positive


S P A I N

GRUPO ISOLUX: Posts Operating Loss of EUR1 Billion


U K R A I N E

PRIVATBANK: Accused of Unprofitable Lending to Related Entities
UKRAINIAN RAILWAY: S&P Affirms 'SD' CCR on Debt Restructuring


T U R K E Y

FIBABANKA AS: Fitch Assigns 'B+(EXP)' Rating to Tier 2 Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

JOHNSTON PRESS: Mulls All-Cash Bonus for Chief Executive


X X X X X X X X

* Senior Debt Holder Losses May Rise on EMEA Spec-Grade Defaults


                            *********



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F R A N C E
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CASINO GUICHARD-PERRACHON: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDR to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Casino Guichard-Perrachon SA's
(Casino) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating IDR and senior unsecured
rating to 'BB+'. The Outlook is Stable.

The downgrade reflects the weaker-than-expected profit growth in
Casino's core French market in 2016 relative to Fitch's
expectations. Furthermore, Fitch forecasts the pace of operating
performance and cash generation improvement for 2017 and 2018
will be weaker than previously envisaged on a proportionally
consolidated basis. This is due to the high weight of France in
the group's results, for which Fitch expects only slow
improvement. Although Fitch continues to expect EBITDA uplift due
to a successful repositioning strategy, Casino's French
operations will continue to face challenging market conditions.
This will delay any meaningful deleveraging with funds from
operations (FFO)-adjusted net leverage (proportionally
consolidated) now expected to stay above 4.0x for a longer
period, which is a level seen as consistent with a 'BB+' rating
relative to rated sector peers.

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch confidence in the company's
self-help measures looking to enhance its market position and
profitability while maintaining adequate financial flexibility
and a conservative financial policy.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

French Results Lower Than Expected: Fitch expects Casino's French
EBITDA to remain below the EUR1 billion mark Fitch was expecting
for 2016, reflecting challenging trading and continuing fierce
competition. Fitch revised forecast has French EBITDA of at least
EUR900 million (4.7% margin) in 2017, up from EUR872 million
(4.6%) in 2016.

Moderate Growth Prospects: French profit growth over the next
three years should remain supported by past gross margin
optimisation through purchasing agreements and cost base
streamlining. Fitch acknowledge Casino's somehow lower presence
in the challenged and low-margin hypermarket format relative to
Carrefour, and its intention to focus efforts on the development
of the higher-margin premium segments. However, EBITDA uplift is
likely to be capped by weak demand and high competition. Since
France represents 71% of proportionally consolidated EBITDA
(2016, continuing activities), there is limited scope to improve
group's proportionally consolidated metrics.

Brazil to Improve: Measures to adapt to Brazil's worsened
consumer environment, including the rapid roll out of its Assai
cash and carry chain and the repositioning of its hypermarket
format, should support top-line growth from 2017. The domestic
consumption outlook in Brazil has brightened by government
initiatives to boost consumer spending, including a reform on
workers' savings funds (FGTS). Any further improvement relies on
a stronger economic recovery and a continued appreciation of the
real against the euro from current levels, which appear
uncertain.

Brazil Recovery Insufficient: EBITDA from Brazilian operations
should be supported by sales growth, lower inflation and an
upside from the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, which put an end
to double taxation on Brazilian corporate sales from mid-March
2017. Fitch expects operating margins to recover, albeit the move
to more discount formats should cap them at lower levels than
pre-crisis (2014 EBITDA margin: 7.5%). Fitch forecasts GPA Food's
EBITDA margin to stabilise around 5% over the next three years.

As Casino's 33.2%-owned Brazilian subsidiary represented only 16%
of proportionally-consolidated EBITDA in 2016 (continuing
activities), this implies only a mild recovery in Brazil's
proportional contribution to group FFO until 2019.

Disposals Positive for Financial Flexibility: The well-executed
disposal of Big C Thailand and Vietnam in 1H16 has allowed net
debt to reduce by EUR4.3 billion at group level and EUR3.9
billion at the Casino holding level. This is a key support for
the group's deleveraging plan and financial flexibility.

Further Deleveraging Challenging: Fitch expects proportionally
consolidated FFO-adjusted net leverage will reduce to around 4.8x
by end-2018. This trend remains positive but the pace of
deleveraging is now slower than in Fitch late 2016 forecasts.
Further improvement in leverage depends on EBITDA and cash flow
performance in France and to a lesser extent in Brazil. Greater-
than-expected operating performance in core markets along with
cash preservation measures, such as further smaller divestments,
would however help strengthen future deleveraging prospects,
making 4.5x net leverage by end-2018 a more achievable target.

Limited Strategic Options: Fitch does not currently expect any
significant transactions that would allow the group's financial
profile to stay within parameters consistent with an investment
grade rating by 2018. The impending disposal of Via Varejo is
more likely to positively affect GPA, its Brazilian holding
owner, as Casino's economic interest in this business is only
14.4%. Conversely, Fitch believes that keeping the stake would
only marginally improve proportionally-consolidated financial
metrics.

Rebalanced Capital Structure Underpins Ratings: Casino's disposal
plan has benefited the holding company, with a large part of
disposal proceeds repaying debt at this level. The gap between
holding and group proportionally consolidated FFO-adjusted net
leverage (continued activities) has fallen to 0.7x in 2016 from
4.4x in 2014 and Fitch expects this to remain around 1.0x-1.2x by
2019. This issue, largely addressed in 2016, follows Casino's
past acquisitive stance, which had created capital structure
imbalances reflected in a significant mismatch between debt
(mostly at holding level) and cash (mostly located in partly
owned subsidiaries) across the group.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Casino is smaller than its European food retail peers and has a
slightly weaker position in its main (French) market. However it
has a higher-than-average EBITDAR margin due to its format mix in
France and strong presence in less mature countries such as
Brazil and Colombia. In comparison to most peers its rating is
weighed down by a more leveraged financial profile. A significant
asset disposal programme allowed it to already significantly
reduce its net debt level, yet its deleveraging process is
hampered by only a slow improvement in FFO generation.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:

- Sales growth to accelerate, supported by further improvement
in top-line growth in France and positive FX impact from the
appreciation of the Brazilian and Colombian currencies against
the euro.

- A moderate improvement in EBITDA margin over the next three
years, from 4.7% in 2016 up to 5.1% in 2019. This should be
driven by limited margin uplift in France and Colombia, and a
slightly more pronounced recovery in Brazil.

- Annual capex around 3% of sales, slightly down from previous
years due to strong discipline cross the group.

- Continued dividend discipline policy with stable payments; the
lower dividend in 2017 results from an interim payment made at
the end of 2016.

- Free cash Flow to turn mildly positive from 2017 driven by
higher EBITDA and decreasing interest payments (lower debt and
decreasing rates in Colombia and Brazil).

- Disposal of GPA's stake in Via Varejo (including Cnova Brazil)
in 2017.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- Group FFO margin consistently above 3.5%, reflecting
sustainable turnaround in France and recovery in Brazil;

- Proportionally consolidated FFO fixed charge cover at or above
2.0x;

- Proportionally consolidated adjusted FFO net leverage below
4.0x on a sustainable basis ;

- Maintenance of a reasonable convergence between proportionally
consolidated and parent company's (including 100%-owned French
entities) leverage metrics, reflecting adequate cash and debt
match across the group.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- Lack of meaningful improvement in both core French and group
like-for-like revenue growth and profits, resulting in group FFO
margin trending to 2% on a sustained basis;

- Proportionally consolidated FFO fixed charge cover
consistently below 2.0x;

- Lack of visibility whereby proportionally consolidated
adjusted FFO net leverage reduces towards 4.5x;

- Evidence of further divergence between proportionally
consolidated and parent company's (including 100%-owned French
entities) leverage metrics, reflecting continuing important
capital structure imbalances.

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity: Both the group and the parent (including
100%-owned entities) have a comfortable liquidity profile. At
end-2016 the parent's (including 100%-owned French entities)
short-term debt maturities of approximately EUR1.3 billion were
well covered by EUR3,464 million readily available cash and
EUR3,759 million available committed credit lines. Parent
liquidity is further supported by the significant asset disposals
completed over 2015-2016 and a well-spread debt maturity profile.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Casino Guichard-Perrachon SA
-- Long-Term IDR: downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-', Stable;
-- Short-Term IDR: downgrade to 'B' from 'F3';
-- Senior unsecured: downgraded to 'BB+'/'B' from 'BBB-'/'F3';
-- EUR600 million perpetual preferred constant maturity swap
    securities and EUR750 million deeply subordinated fixed to
    reset rate (DS) notes: downgrade to 'BB-' from 'BB';

Casino Finance SA
-- Senior unsecured (debt guaranteed by Casino): downgraded to
    'BB+'/'B' from 'BBB-'/'F3'


TECHNICOLOR SA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR on Expected Rebound
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-' long-term and 'B' short-
term corporate credit ratings on France-Based technology company
Technicolor S.A.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' issue rating on
Technicolor's senior secured debt.  The recovery rating remains
at '3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-
70%; rounded estimate: 55%) in the event of default.

The affirmation reflects that S&P continues to forecast that
Technicolor will post flat to low-single-digit revenue growth in
2017-2018, alongside a strong improvement in profitability in
2018, following slightly lower-than-expected EBITDA in 2016 and
temporary deterioration of both EBITDA and cash flow generation
in 2017.  EBITDA in 2016 was somewhat lower than the initial
guidance, mainly because of weaker-than-expected operating
performances of the group's Connected Home segment.  This EBITDA
crunch was also due to Technicolor's Latin American customers
having made substantial cuts in their capital expenditures
(capex); lower revenue bookings on the back of spending cuts at
two of Technicolor's large U.S.-based customers; and more
expensive memory chips.  Furthermore, S&P expects that lower
EBITDA generation from the Connected Home segment, a one-off
EUR82 million cash payment related to the Cathode-Ray Tube final
settlement, and lower licensing revenues due to no further
contribution of MPEG-LA will curb free operating cash flow (FOCF)
generation in 2017.  At the same time, S&P believes that
Technicolor's assets acquired in 2015 have enabled the group to
rebalance its activities following the planned phase-out of MPEG-
LA deriving synergies, in line with S&P's expectations.  In
addition, the group's cash flow generation will benefit from
lower interest cost, following the full refinancing of its senior
secured term loans at lower rates, and S&P understands that
management is committed to further deleveraging.

S&P believes that the Connected Home business has the
capabilities to recover from 2018, leveraging its No. 2 position
worldwide and optimizing its customers' dual vendor approach
strategy.  As such, in 2016, the group saw a record number of new
contract wins, especially with U.S. customers, which will start
to contribute to the topline from the beginning of 2018.  S&P
also thinks that Technicolor will be able to pass-on to its
customers part of the memory chip's price -- which currently
weighs on Connected Home's margins -- as new products are
introduced.  Moreover, S&P believes that the Technology segment
will start growing again in 2018, benefiting from the ramp-up in
licensing agreements based on the group's strong patent
portfolio.  Finally, the sound performance of the group's visual
effect and post-production activities, combined with a better
product mix coming from higher contribution of Blu-ray and gaming
will improve the Entertainment Service segment's profitability
and offset the gradual and structural decline of the DVD
business.

These positive developments lead S&P to anticipate a rebound of
the group's credit metrics in 2018 from a trough in 2017.  During
this low point, S&P expects that Technicolor will temporarily
exceed the thresholds for the current rating, with adjusted debt
to EBITDA of more than 3x and a drop in FOCF to debt to about
10%-15% from 22% in 2016.  This deterioration will partly be due
to a one-off EUR82 million cash payment related to the Cathode-
Ray Tube final settlement.  However, S&P expects both metrics to
bounce back, with adjusted debt to EBITDA improving to about 2.6x
and FOCF to debt to about 20%-25%.

S&P has revised its debt adjustment to correct a misapplication
of its hybrid criteria that occurred on Oct. 28, 2011, when S&P
considered as equity the full amount of Technicolor's EUR500
million subordinated perpetual notes that are reported as equity
in Technicolor's accounts.  While S&P continues to assess
Technicolor's EUR500 million subordinated perpetual notes as
having high equity content -- because of their deep subordination
and the absence of a maturity date and interest payments -- S&P
now adjusts the debt figure by adding to it the amount of the
notes (about EUR270 million as of Dec. 31, 2016) that exceeds 15%
of the group's adjusted capitalization.  As required under S&P's
hybrid criteria, only the remaining amount (about EUR230 million
as of Dec. 31, 2016) is eligible to be treated as equity.  S&P
retroactively corrected this debt adjustment from 2011.  This
correction has had no impact on S&P's ratings on Technicolor.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that, despite its
expectation of deterioration in operating performances in 2017,
Technicolor will leverage on new contracts signed in the
Connected Home segment, a better product mix in the Entertainment
Services business unit, and a ramp-up of certain licensing
agreements by the end of 2017 or the beginning of 2018.  S&P
therefore expects that, after a temporary bow in 2017,
Technicolor will target a return of adjusted debt to EBITDA in
the 2x-3x range and FOCF to debt sustainably above 15%.  The
stable outlook also factors in S&P's assumption that Technicolor
will maintain a strong liquidity position.

S&P could lower the rating if Technicolor's credit metrics
weakened protractedly, with adjusted debt to EBITDA consistently
above 3x and FOCF to debt significantly below 15%, combined with
weaker liquidity.  This could result from EBITDA deterioration
due to additional order cancelations in the Connected Home
segment and high material costs from more expensive memory chips,
or unforeseen difficulties in the integration of acquired assets
resulting in materially lower cost synergies and higher-than-
expected restructuring costs.

S&P could raise the rating once acquired assets are completely
integrated, assuming there is no negative deviation in synergies
achieved or restructuring costs.  A positive rating action would
also hinge on a rebound in operating performance from 2018 once
contracts signed in 2016 in the Connected Home segment start
contributing to the topline.  This could support stronger credit
ratios, such as adjusted debt to EBITDA falling sustainably below
2.0x and FOCF to debt above 25%.


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G R E E C E
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GREECE: Int'l. Monetary Fund Reluctant to Commit New Loans
----------------------------------------------------------
Landon Thomas Jr. at The New York Times reports that as the
International Monetary Fund approaches the seventh anniversary of
the contentious Greek bailout, it is torn over whether to commit
new loans to a nearly bankrupt Greece.

For more than a year, I.M.F. officials have been saying -- loudly
-- that they cannot participate in a new rescue package for
Greece unless Europe agrees to ease Greece's onerous debt burden,
The New York Times notes.

The fund's reluctance to commit additional money to Greece also
highlights a widely held view among I.M.F. officials -- and in
the Trump administration -- that the fund overextended itself in
Greece, The New York Times states.  They also see the
responsibility for restoring the country's economic health as
resting primarily with Europe, which currently holds 80% of Greek
debt, The New York Times says.

At the same time, Greece, which has acceded to demands from the
fund to cut spending and bring in more revenue, faces a EUR7
billion euro debt repayment in July, which it may not be able to
meet if the I.M.F. and Europe cannot reach a new bailout
agreement, The New York Times discloses.

In many ways, the situation in Greece has become an existential
question for the I.M.F., The New York Times notes.

The fund has been criticized for overcommitting financial
resources to the European debt crisis, The New York Times relays.

For example, the EUR30 billion the fund lent to Greece in 2010
was 30 times more than the sum of Greece's financial contribution
to the fund as a member, which is called a quota, The New York
Times states.

Yet the I.M.F. has an obligation to lend to countries that are in
financial need as well as to safeguard global financial
stability, The New York Times says.

"The fund is digging in its heels, but if the pattern of
brinkmanship that the Europeans and the Greeks have practiced in
the past prevails, you will see more instability in the markets,"
The New York Times quotes C. Randall Henning, a specialist on
global financial institutions and governance, as saying.  "This
is definitely creating anxiety -- both within the fund and within
national governments.

Euclid Tsakalotos, the Greek finance minister, met with an array
of officials, as he usually does at I.M.F. meetings, but little
progress was made, The New York Times relays, citing people who
were briefed on the discussions but were not authorized to speak
on the record.

Publicly, the mantra of fund officials, starting with
Christine Lagarde, the managing director, was the same: The
numbers had to add up before the fund could consider disbursing
new cash, The New York Times, states.

"We had constructive discussions in preparation for the return of
the mission to discuss the two legs of the Greece program:
policies and debt relief," Ms. Lagarde, as cited by The New York
Times, said in a statement on April 21 after meeting with
Mr. Tsakalotos.

That means that for the I.M.F. to lend, Greece must prove that it
can be financially responsible over a sustained period, and
Europe must address the country's substantial debt overhang with
some combination of interest rate reductions and maturity
extensions, The New York Times discloses.

Germany and other northern European creditor nations, who are
deeply suspicious of Greece's ability to manage its finances over
the long term, have promised voters that they will only agree to
another Greek bailout if the I.M.F. provides its imprimatur, The
New York Times notes.


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I R E L A N D
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ARBOUR CLO II: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)sf' Rating to Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Arbour CLO II DAC's refinanced notes
expected ratings:

EUR1.75 million Class X notes: 'AAA(EXP)sf': Outlook Stable
EUR235.75 million Class A notes: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR22 million Class B-1 notes: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR21 million Class B-2 notes: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR22.25 million Class C notes: 'A(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR22.75 million Class D notes: 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR26.50 million Class E notes: 'BB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR10.25 million Class F notes: 'B-(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

The proceeds of this issuance will be used to redeem the old
notes. The refinanced CLO envisages a further four-year
replenishment period, with a new identified portfolio comprising
the existing portfolio, as modified by sales and purchases
conducted by the manager in the ramp-up period following the
closing date. The portfolio will be managed by Oaktree Capital
Management (UK) LLP. The reinvestment period is scheduled to end
in May 2021.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B' Category Portfolio Credit Quality
The average credit quality of the identified portfolio is in the
'B' category. Fitch has public ratings or credit opinions on all
obligors in the identified portfolio. The covenanted maximum
Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF) for assigning the
final ratings is 34. The WARF of the current portfolio is 30.8.

High Expected Recoveries
At least 90% of the portfolio comprises senior secured
obligations. Fitch has assigned recovery ratings (RR) to all
assets in the identified portfolio. The covenanted minimum Fitch
weighted average recovery rate (WARR) for assigning the final
ratings is 69.5%. The WARR of the current portfolio is 70.7%.

Above-Average Concentration
Portfolio profile tests limit exposure to the top one Fitch
industry to 20% and the top three Fitch industries to 40%. This
is above the threshold for CLO rated recently by Fitch.

Partial Interest Rate Hedge
Between 5% and 15% of the portfolio may be invested in fixed rate
assets, while fixed rate liabilities account for 6.1% of the
target par amount. If the minimum fixed rate asset test falls
below 5%, the collateral manager will not be able to buy floating
rate assets until the test is satisfied.

Limited FX Risk
The transaction is allowed to invest up to 30% of the portfolio
in non-euro-denominated assets, provided these are hedged with
perfect asset swaps within six months of purchase. Unhedged non-
euro assets must not exceed 2.5% of the portfolio at any time.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Both a 25% increase in the obligor default probability and a 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates could lead to a downgrade of
up to two notches for the rated notes.


TORO EUROPEAN CLO 3: Fitch Corrects April 12 Rating Release
-----------------------------------------------------------
This announcement corrects the version published on April 12,
which incorrectly stated the amount of floating-rate liabilities.

Fitch Ratings has assigned Toro European CLO 3 DAC's notes the
following final ratings:

Class A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B-1: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B-2: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B-3: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C-1: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class C-2: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class D: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class E: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class F: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable
Subordinated notes: not rated

Toro European CLO 3 is a cash flow collateralised loan obligation
(CLO). Net proceeds from the notes issue will be used to purchase
a EUR350 million portfolio of mostly European leveraged loans and
bonds. The portfolio is managed by Chenavari Credit Partners LLP.
The reinvestment period is scheduled to end in 2021.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch places the average credit quality of obligors in the
'B'/'B-' range. The agency has public ratings or credit opinions
on all the obligors in the identified portfolio. The Fitch
weighted average rating factor of the identified portfolio is
33.4, below the covenanted maximum for the base case of 34.

High Expected Recoveries
The portfolio will be at least 90% senior secured obligations.
The weighted average recovery rate of the identified portfolio is
64.3%, below the covenanted minimum for the base case of 64.9% as
the portfolio has not yet been fully ramped up.

Payment Frequency Switch
The notes pay quarterly, while the portfolio assets can be reset
to semi-annual from quarterly or monthly. The transaction has an
interest-smoothing account but no liquidity facility. Liquidity
stress for the non-deferrable class A and B notes, stemming from
a large proportion of assets potentially resetting to semi-annual
in any one quarter, is addressed by switching the payment
frequency of the notes to semi-annual in such a scenario, subject
to certain conditions.

Limited Interest Rate Risk Exposure
Up to 10% of the portfolio can be invested in fixed-rate assets,
while 3.4% liabilities pay a floating-rate coupon. Fitch modelled
both 0% and 10% fixed-rate buckets and found that the rated notes
can withstand the interest rate mismatch associated with each
scenario.

At closing, the issuer purchased an interest rate cap to hedge
the transaction against rising interest rates. The notional of
the cap is EUR10 million (representing 2.86% of the target
paramount); the strike rate is 2%. The cap will expire five years
after the closing date.

Hedged Non-Euro Asset Exposure
The transaction is permitted to invest up to 30% of the portfolio
in non-euro assets, provided perfect asset swaps can be entered
into.

Documentation Amendments
The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency
confirmation or noteholder approval. Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyse the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings. Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final
maturity.

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective Fitch may decline to comment. Noteholders
should be aware that the structure considers the confirmation to
be given if Fitch declines to comment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability could lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes. A 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates could lead to a downgrade of
up to three notches for the rated notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on
the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch and/or other
rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis.
- Loan-by-loan data provided by Barclays Bank PLC as at
   February 1, 2017

- Offering circular provided by Barclays Bank PLC as at
   April 12, 2017

REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties
and enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the
offering document and which relate to the underlying asset pool
was not prepared for this transaction. Offering documents for
EMEA CLO transactions do not typically include RW&Es that are
available to investors and that relate to the asset pool
underlying the security. Therefore, Fitch credit reports for EMEA
CLO transactions will not typically include descriptions of
RW&Es. For further information, please see Fitch's Special Report
titled "Representations, Warranties and Enforcement Mechanisms in
Global Structured Finance Transactions," dated May 31, 2016.


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I T A L Y
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ALITALIA SPA: Future Uncertain After Workers Reject Rescue Plan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Albanese and Tommaso Ebhardt at Bloomberg News report that
Alitalia SpA workers voted against job reductions and pay cuts
touted as the last chance for the cash-strapped Italian flag-
carrier to avoid being placed under administration.

Staff at the airline, which employs 12,500 people, rejected the
steps brokered by management and labor leaders as part of a EUR2
billion (US$2.2 billion) refinancing package, Bloomberg relays,
citing the results of a ballot released by Uiltrasporti.  The USB
union said about 70% of voters opposed the deal, Bloomberg
relates.

According to Bloomberg, among other measures, the plan included
about 1,600 job losses, down from the 2,000 proposed under an
earlier package.

Economic Development Minister Carlo Calenda said earlier that
with Alitalia running out of funds a "no" vote would likely
prompt the Italian government to act as a special administrator
for the company before it was liquidated in about six months,
Bloomberg notes.  Transport Minister Graziano Delrio also
told TG1 television this week that there is no chance of the
carrier being nationalized, Bloomberg relays.

According to Bloomberg, Italian ministers said in a joint
statement on April 25 that the outcome of the ballot is
"regrettable" and puts the restructuring plan for Alitalia at
risk.

They said the government will seek to "minimize the cost to
citizens and travelers" as it awaits the next move from the
company's shareholders, Bloomberg notes.

Those investors include Abu Dhabi-based Etihad Airways PJSC,
which bought a 49% stake in Alitalia in 2014, but which hasn't
been able to effect a turnaround, Bloomberg states.  The Rome-
based company had a net loss of EUR199 million in 2015, the last
year for which it has published figures, Bloomberg discloses.

Alitalia's board was set to meet on April 25 "to evaluate the
negative outcome" of the vote, Bloomberg relays, citing a
statement posted on April 24 after the result became known.  The
carrier could seek bankruptcy protection as early as April 25,
Bloomberg says, citing Il Corriere della Sera.  The daily, as
cited by Bloomberg, said the government would than name a
commissioner to seek a buyer for its assets.

The recapitalization for which the cost cuts were a precondition
included about EUR900 million of new funding, according to
Alitalia's latest business plan, leaving the company facing a
liquidity crunch, Bloomberg notes.  UniCredit Alitalia as it
exists today was created in 2008 after the original airline
entered bankruptcy and its healthier assets were purchased by a
group of investors and combined with another ailing Italian
operator, Air One.

                         About Alitalia

Alitalia-Compagnia Aerea Italiana has navigated its way through
a successful restructuring.  After filing for bankruptcy
protection in 2008, Alitalia found additional investors, acquired
rival airline Air One, and re-emerged as Italy's leading airline
in early 2009.  Operating a fleet of about 150 aircraft, the
airline now serves more than 75 national and international
destinations from hubs in Fiumicino (Rome), Milan, Turin, Venice,
Naples, and Catania.  Alitalia extends its network as a member of
the SkyTeam code-sharing and marketing alliance, which also
includes Air France, Delta Air Lines, and KLM.  An Italian
investor group owns a majority of the company, while Air France-
KLM owns 25%.


ITAS MUTUA: Fitch Places BB Sub. Notes Rating on Watch Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed ITAS Mutua's (ITAS) 'BBB' Insurer
Financial Strength (IFS) rating and Long-Term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) 'BBB-' on Rating Watch Negative (RWN). Fitch has
also placed ITAS's subordinated notes' 'BB' rating on RWN.

The rating actions follow ITAS's announcement that its general
manager resigned on April 12, 2017 and magistrates have as a
precautionary measure pending judicial investigations,
disqualified him from holding office.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The RWN reflects Fitch's view that there are risks around the
effectiveness of ITAS's governance and the potential for a
significant loss of market share. These risks deviate from
Fitch's previous expectations and could negatively impact ITAS's
ratings.

According to Fitch methodology, limited governance practices can
influence the assessment of a company's overall fundamental
credit profile, and can result in lower ratings than typical
quantitative and qualitative credit factors may otherwise imply.

Following this event, ITAS could suffer reputational damage that
could ultimately weaken its franchise and its ability to win new
business. However, this risk is mitigated by the fact that ITAS's
agency network has longstanding relationships with the company
and its agents appear to be loyal to the brand.

Fitch understands that the economic loss related to the potential
fraud should not affect ITAS's capitalisation, as measured by
Fitch risk-adjusted Prism factor-based capital model (Prism FBM).
Based on end-2015 data, Fitch's Prism FBM score for ITAS was
'Strong'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch will resolve the RWN based on a review of the company's
corporate governance, including discussions with ITAS's senior
management. The review will assess any actions carried out by the
company to strengthen corporate governance. Equally,
understanding the foundations of the company's expected financial
performance will be key in determining the future level of ITAS's
ratings.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


KAZKOMMERTSBANK: Halyk Bank May Need to Inject KZT230 Billion
-------------------------------------------------------------
Nariman Gizitdinov at Bloomberg News reports that Kazakhstan's
Halyk Bank may have to inject at least KZT230 billion (US$738
million) into Kazkommertsbank, the troubled lender it's set to
buy for less than US$1 after a state bailout.

According to Bloomberg, two people with knowledge of the matter
said the cash, coming after the government stumps up KZT2.4
trillion to shift off Kazkommertsbank's balance sheet its loans
to BTA Bank, would enable the lender to keep operating.

The Kazakh government is undertaking its biggest bank rescue
since the global financial crisis led to US$20 billion in debt
restructuring by lenders in the Central Asian nation, Bloomberg
notes.

Halyk said last month there is an "80 percent chance" of reaching
a deal to buy Kazkommertsbank after President Nursultan
Nazarbayev, the longest-serving leader in the former Soviet
Union, sanctioned a bailout, Bloomberg recounts.

Kazkommertsbank AO (Kazkommertsbank JSC) is a Kazakhstan-based
commercial bank that is engaged in the provision of financial and
banking services for corporate and individual clients.  The Bank
offers its services through two segments, namely Corporate
banking and Retail banking.  The Corporate banking segment
provides a range of services, including trade and structured
finance products, project finance, e-banking and asset management
services, as well as short-term credit facilities and other
general banking services.  Its Retail banking division offers
banking products include residential mortgages, consumer loans,
debit and credit cards, and deposit and current accounts.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ALCOA NEDERLAND: Fitch Assigns BB+ First-Time IDR
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Alcoa Nederland Holding B.V. a First-
Time Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB+' with a Stable Rating
Outlook. The ratings benefit from an Alcoa Corporation (Alcoa)
guarantee and reflect Alcoa's modest leverage, leading positions
in bauxite, alumina, and aluminum; strong control over costs and
spending; and flexibility afforded by the scope of its
operations. Alcoa was spun-off from Alcoa Inc. (subsequently
renamed Arconic Inc.) on Nov. 1, 2016.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Modest Leverage: At Dec. 31, 2016 Alcoa's total debt of $1.5
billion was 1.6x operating EBITDA after dividends from associates
and net distributions to minority interests. Fitch expects
improved earnings in the company's first full year of stand-alone
operations on improved aluminum industry fundamentals as well as
cost reductions. Management estimates 2017 adjusted EBITDA,
excluding special items, to be $2.1 billion to $2.3 billion
compared to about $1 billion in 2016. Fitch's rating case
projects annual operating EBITDA in the range of $1.6 billion and
$1.9 billion and FFO adjusted leverage ranging between 1.5x and
2x over the rating horizon.

Low Cost Position: Alcoa's bauxite and alumina costs are in the
lowest quartile of global production, and aluminum costs are in
the lowest half of global production. Alcoa's alumina facilities
are located next to its bauxite mines, cutting transportation
costs and allowing consistent feed and quality. Aluminum assets
benefit from prior optimization and smelters co-located with cast
houses to provide value-added products including slab, billet and
alloys.

Improved/Stable Aluminum Fundamentals: Fitch expects global
aluminum demand growth to continue in the low-to mid-single digit
range benefitting from consumer demand and substitution for other
materials. The key to market balance is China's net smelter
capacity additions. Fitch's mid-cycle London Metal Exchange (LME)
aluminum price assumptions are $1,750/tonne in 2017 and 2018 and
$1,800/tonne longer term based on Fitch views that China will
continue to add new net smelter capacity limiting upside to
prices. Very low prices in 2015 and 2016 resulted in smelter
curtailments and closures. The average LME aluminum price
improved from about $1,660/tonne in 2015 and $1,620/tonne in 2016
to about $1,850/tonne in the first quarter of 2017. China's
recent plans to curb pollution during the heating season (October
through March) by curtailing aluminum capacity by 30% in some
cities could result in near-term tightness.

AWAC Considerations: Alcoa's alumina and bauxite operations are
owned through Alcoa World Alumina and Chemicals (AWAC), an
unincorporated joint venture 60% owned by Alcoa and 40% owned by
Alumina Ltd. In 2016 AWAC generated $753 million in operating
EBITDA and paid, net of capital contributions, $392 million in
dividends and return of capital to shareholders. This compares to
Fitch's calculation of $1 billion in EBITDA for Alcoa in 2016.
Alcoa capitalizes AWAC's results, and Fitch expects minority
distributions net of contributions to range from about $200
million to $300 million per year. AWAC currently has scant debt,
and incurrence would fall under the subsidiary debt basket in
Alcoa's revolver equal to the greater of $150 million and 1% of
Alcoa's consolidated tangible assets, thereby limiting the risk
of structural subordination.

Pension Underfunding: At Dec. 31, 2016, estimated minimum
required pension funding through 2021 was estimated at $1.19
billion and the funded status of direct benefit plans less
amounts attributed to joint venture partners was a $1.8 billion
shortfall. Fitch expects Alcoa to manage its contributions
through cash generation and cash on hand.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Alcoa's low debt levels position it well against rated 'BB+'
metals peers. While pension obligations are high, contributions
are expected to be manageable and the company is expected to be
FCF neutral to positive on average. The notes and revolver are
the primary obligation of Alcoa Nederland Holding B.V., an
overseas borrower, (guaranteed by Alcoa) which is consistent with
most earnings coming from outside of the U.S.

Most metals peers are steel companies with a different cycle but
similar operating risks and dynamics. Testing the capital
structure against below marginal cost prices ($1,600/tonne LME
aluminum) results in acceptable metrics for BB+.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:

-- Fitch commodity price assumptions for aluminum;
-- Estimated shipments at guidance;
-- Capital expenditures at guidance;
-- No change in dividend policy; no share repurchases.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action
-- EBIT Margins expected to be sustained above 12%;
-- FFO leverage expected to be sustained below 2.5x;
-- Meaningful and sustainable reduction in unfunded pension
    status.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
-- EBIT margins sustained below 7%;
-- FFO leverage expected to be sustained above 3x;
-- LME aluminum prices expected to be sustained below
    $1,600/tonne.

LIQUIDITY

Strong liquidity: At Dec. 31, 2016 cash on hand was $853 million
of which $818 million was held outside of the U.S. In addition,
the company has an undrawn, $1.5 billion senior secured revolver
due to mature on Nov. 1, 2021. Fitch expects the company to be
free cash flow generating on average.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has assigned the following ratings:

Alcoa Corporation
-- IDR 'BB+'.

Alcoa Nederland Holding B.V.
-- IDR 'BB+';
-- Senior secured revolving credit facility 'BB+/RR4';
-- Senior unsecured notes 'BB+/RR4'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


MAGNIT PJSC: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it has affirmed its long-term corporate
credit rating on Russian retailer PJSC Magnit at 'BB+'.  The
outlook is stable.

The affirmation reflects S&P's expectation that Magnit will
maintain above average profitability, despite the current
slowdown of revenue growth and like-for-like (LFL) performance.
This offsets the moderately weaker cash flow to debt metrics
compared to the previous year, in S&P's view.

Magnit showed lower revenue growth compared with its closest
rated peers in Russia, X5 Retail Group N.V. (X5) and Lenta Ltd.,
with LFL sales marginally negative in 2016 and Q1 2017.  However,
Magnit maintained strong profitability, with a reported EBITDA
margin of 10%, increasing by around 4% in absolute terms in 2016
compared to 2015.

Magnit reported overall revenue growth of 13% in 2016, with
revenues from the largest segment -- convenience stores
(accounting for 74% of revenues) -- growing by 12.7%, mostly
supported by new store openings, with net selling space growth of
10.7%.  Magnit's LFL sales and traffic performance were affected
by a continuing decline in food price inflation, as well as
intensifying competition in the Russian food retail market.
While S&P expects Magnit to continue to grow revenues by 10%-15%
over the next two years, mainly driven by further chain expansion
and the redesign of existing stores, S&P thinks that growth rates
will taper over time due to intense competition and the eventual
saturation of the Russian food retail market.

The rating on Magnit reflects its leading market position, as it
is the largest retailer in Russia in terms of revenues and runs
the country's biggest network of discount grocery stores,
hypermarkets, and cosmetics shops.  Magnit also has demonstrated
a strong track record of sales and profit growth through
successful store development in Russia.

However, in S&P's view, competition has increased in the last few
years.  Other food retailers have improved their merchandising
and customer service, resulting in improving comparable-store
sales at competitors.  Still, S&P thinks that Magnit will
continue to develop its franchise over the next two years,
primarily in the regions where its market positions are the
strongest.  S&P expects Magnit to continue its rapid expansion
through the roll out of its convenience and cosmetics stores, as
well as the refurbishment and redesign of existing stores in
order to keep up with competition.

S&P views Magnit's profitability as supportive, reflected in its
reported EBITDA and net profit margins, which amounted to 10% and
5% in 2016, respectively.  These metrics are stronger than its
closest peer, X5, which has respective margins of 7.4% and 2.2%.
Magnit also has stronger profitability than many European food
retail peers such as Tesco, REWE Group, and Ahold Delhaize N.V.

S&P's assessment of Magnit's business risk also reflects S&P's
view of the company's geographic concentration in the Russian
market and exposure to risks in emerging markets, such as
currency volatility, persistent cost inflation, and political
uncertainty. Unlike many food retailers in developed markets,
Magnit operates in a fragmented, increasingly competitive, and
still-emerging food retail market.  These factors are partly
offset by the intrinsic resilience and predictability of the food
retail industry; the company's strong market presence, with a
leading position in cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants;
and robust profitability.

The group's financial risk profile reflects its continuing growth
strategy, which includes further new store openings.  Therefore,
S&P expects capital expenditures (capex) to continue to weigh on
Magnit's cash flows.  At the same time, S&P expects those
investments to gradually contribute to Magnit's earnings and cash
flows.

S&P has included the net present value of its estimate of future
operating leases in S&P's credit metrics calculations, in line
with other rated companies in the retail sector.  Historically
S&P has not adjusted Magnit's metrics for operating leases due to
the absence of commitments under future lease payments beyond one
year in Magnit's financial statements (under International
Financial Reporting Standards disclosures), owing to the
cancellable nature of these rental contracts.

As a result, S&P's S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA
increased to 2.2x from 1.1x for 2016 and funds from operations
(FFO) to debt decreased to 33% from 71% in 2016.  Both metrics
are well positioned in the intermediate financial risk profile
category.  At the same time, S&P has removed its negative
comparable rating analysis modifier which was previously
assigned, in order to offset the boost to Magnit's credit metrics
and financial risk profile owing to the exclusion of operating
lease adjustments to debt.  Accordingly, there is no impact on
the rating due to these changes.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- A continuously challenging economic environment in Russia
      with real GDP declining by 0.6% in 2017, returning to
      positive growth of 1.3% in 2018;

   -- Broadly flat real wage growth and a further slowdown in
      food price inflation in the next two years will likely
      affect LFL sales growth;

   -- S&P expects Magnit's sales growth to be in the range of
      10%-15% over the next two years, mostly fueled by organic
      expansion;

   -- An adjusted EBITDA margins of about 13% (including
      operating lease adjustment);

   -- Capex of about Russian ruble (RUB) 90 billion-RUB100
      billion; and

   -- Dividends of about RUB30 billion.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
over 2017 and 2018:

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of up to 2.5x;
   -- Adjusted FFO to debt of about 30%; and
   -- Adjusted operating cash flow (OCF) to debt of 25%-30%.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Magnit will defend or
strengthen its already sound position in the Russian food retail
market.  Despite intensified market competition, S&P expects
Magnit's resilient operational performance, with strong
profitability and stable OCF generation, to continue and its
liquidity to remain adequate.  Taking into account Magnit's focus
on the acceleration of growth capex and investment in the
refurbishing and redesign of existing stores, S&P expects
reported free operating cash flows (FOCF) to become negative in
the next year.  S&P considers a ratio of adjusted debt to EBITDA
of below 3x and adjusted OCF to debt of above 25% over the next
few years to be consistent with the current rating.

S&P might consider a negative rating action if Magnit's liquidity
worsens to less than adequate, and if the company increases its
adjusted debt to EBITDA to above 3.0x because of financial policy
decisions.  S&P could also consider a downgrade if there was a
significant decline in operating performance, with profitability
deteriorating substantially because of stiff market competition
or a weaker market environment in Russia.  Deviation from the
company's current financial policy in the form of large-scale,
debt-funded acquisitions might also weigh on the rating, but S&P
don't see this as a near-term risk.

An upgrade is remote at this stage, as S&P do not expect to rate
Magnit above the sovereign rating on Russia.  Over the next 18-24
months, S&P's 'bb+' assessment of Magnit's stand-alone credit
profile (SACP) might benefit from a strengthening of the
company's market position.  This would happen, in S&P's view, if
the Russian retail market consolidated, giving us more visibility
on the largest food retailers' competitive advantages compared to
peers in the same regions.  Additionally, S&P could consider
raising the SACP if the company's debt maturity profile became
predominantly long term, financial policy remained prudent, and
reported FOCF was sustainably positive.


RAZGULAY GROUP: Declared Bankrupt by Moscow Court
-------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the Moscow Arbitration Court has declared
bankruptcy of Razgulay, Interfax news agency reports from the
hearing.

Russian farming conglomerate Rusagro filed a bankruptcy claim
against Razgulay last year, Reuters recounts.

OJSC Razgulay Group is one of Russia's largest agribusiness
companies.  It is based in Moscow.


RUSAL CAPITAL: Fitch Assigns Final 'B+' Rating to USD600MM Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Rusal Capital D.A.C.'s new notes to be
issued in April/May 2017 an expected senior unsecured rating of
'B+(EXP)' and Recovery Rating 'RR4'. Fitch has simultaneously
assigned a final senior unsecured rating of 'B+' to the five-year
USD600 million notes issued in February 2017 with a yearly 5.125%
coupon rate. The assignment of the final rating follows the
receipt of documents conforming to the information previously
received. The final rating is the same as the expected rating
assigned on January 18, 2017.

Rusal Capital D.A.C. is a financing entity of Russia-based
aluminium company United Company RUSAL (Rusal). The new notes
will be guaranteed by the holding company (Rusal), its main
trading company (RTI Limited) and Rusal's key aluminium smelting
companies (Rusal Bratsk, Rusal Krasnoyarsk & Rusal Sayanogorsk),
which together produce 3.0mt of aluminium per year (81% of
Rusal's total annual production). The proceeds from the offering
are expected to be used to repay existing debt.

The notes will rank equally with Rusal's existing and future
unsecured and unsubordinated obligations. The guarantees will
also rank equally with all existing and future unsecured and
unsubordinated obligations of each guarantor. A final rating for
the notes will be assigned upon receipt of final documentation.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Aluminium Prices Remain under Pressure
Smelter capacity in China, and specifically the balance of
smelter additions and curtailments, remains key to the aluminium
market outlook and has led to lower market prices and higher
exports from China in recent periods. While Fitch expects demand
for aluminium to remain sound in 2017, prices will remain under
pressure, with limited upside, as Fitch believes China will
continue to add new net smelter capacity.

Competitive Cost Position
Rusal continues to benefit from highly favourable FX dynamics
following the rouble devaluation, which positively affects the
company's cash costs (around 50% +/-5% of Rusal's cash costs are
rouble-denominated). Additionally, the company still benefits
from the results of its own cost-saving measures (including
idling of 647kt of its least efficient assets in 2013/2014). As a
result, Rusal's cash costs decreased to USD1,334/t in FY16 (-
8%yoy), and are strongly positioned in the first quartile of the
global aluminium cost curve.

Additionally, most of Rusal's smelters, including Bratsk, are
located in Siberia and source 90% of their electricity needs from
the region's hydro power generation assets, benefitting from
lower electricity prices.

Stake in Norilsk Nickel
Rusal effectively owns 27.82% of the world's largest nickel
producer, Norilsk Nickel (NN; BBB-/Stable). The market value of
the stake has recovered to USD7.4 billion as of December 2016
since its lows in January-February 2016, when it had lost nearly
30% of their value following a depressed nickel commodity price
environment. The value of the stake in December 2016 represented
81% of Rusal's total indebtedness, providing significant
coverage.

Additionally, NN has historically paid out significant dividends
to its shareholder. From 2017 a new dividend policy applies with
a variable payout ratio from 30%-60% of EBITDA, depending on
market conditions. However, the total minimum dividend will be no
less than USD1.3bn in 2017 (ie USD362m minimum payable to Rusal)
and USD1 billion from 2018 and onward (USD278 million Rusal
share). Fitch estimates dividends attributable to Rusal to exceed
USD575 million/year on average over the same period, contributing
materially to Rusal's debt service.

High Group Debt Burden
Rusal has been highly leveraged since its purchase of its 25%
stake in NN in 2008. The group has, however, benefitted from
strong support from its bank group (particularly Russian state-
owned Sberbank) and has consistently deleveraged, to an estimated
USD8.2 billion at end-2017 (Fitch-adjusted) from USD9.0 billion
in 2016 and USD14.5 billion in 2009.

Further deleveraging remains a key priority for Rusal but the
pace will depend on the level of dividends paid by NN as well as
on aluminium prices. As of December 2016, funds from operations
(FFO) gross leverage temporarily increased to above 5x from 3.6x
as of end-15. However, under Fitch's aluminium price assumptions,
Fitch expects this ratio to be gradually decreasing to around
3.5x by 2018.

Vertically Integrated Business Model
Rusal operates throughout the aluminium value chain with bauxite
mining, alumina refining and aluminium smelting production. Its
project in Guinea (Dian Dian) will also make Rusal almost 100%
self-sufficient in bauxite. This provides the group with
significant control over its raw material costs, and limits its
exposure to input cost fluctuations.

Leading Market Position
Despite the idling of 650kt of capacity in 2013/2014, Rusal
remains one of the world's largest aluminium producers, with over
3,700kt of aluminium output in 2016.

Corporate Governance
In line with Fitch approach for other Russian corporates, Fitch
has notched the IDRs of Rusal down by two notches to reflect the
weak legal and governance environment and structures present in
Russia.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Comparable peers to Rusal rated by Fitch include Alcoa
(BB+/Stable), Chalco (BBB+/Stable) and China Hongqiao Group
(BB/Negative). Rusal's standalone rating of BB (B+ after notching
down for the operating environment) reflects a comparable
operating profile in most respects (eg, market position, vertical
integration, cost competitiveness), but typically higher leverage
metrics.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Rusal include:

- Fitch aluminium LME base prices: USD1,788/t in 2017,
USD1,750/t and 2018 and USD1,800 in 2019-2020.

- Aluminium premiums earned by Rusal to average USD160/t in 2017
and USD180/t thereafter (across all products produced by the
group).

- RUB/USD exchange rates: 61 in 2017 and 2018, 59 in 2019

- Modestly increasing production volumes (average 2% annual
increase) over the period to 2019

- EBITDA margin to average 19% over 2017-2019

- USD250m dividend payment in 2017-2019

- Sustained dividend received from NN as per NN's new dividend
policy

- Mandatory cash sweep mechanism in place if net debt/EBITDA is
higher than 3x

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- Stabilisation of aluminium market fundamentals as reflected in
a sustained improvement in aluminium prices

- Sale of NN's shares with proceeds used for Rusal's
deleveraging

- Improvement of Rusal's credit metrics on a sustained basis
including FFO gross leverage below 3.5x (2015: 3.6x) and EBITDA
margin of more than 20% (2015: 23%)

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- FFO gross leverage sustained above 4.0x with limited prospects
for deleveraging

- EBITDA margin below 12.5% on a sustained basis

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity
As of end-2016, Rusal had USD9 billion of Fitch-adjusted debt,
including nearly USD0.7 billion short-term debt (post refinancing
of USD600 million with proceeds from January Eurobond) versus
USD231 million of non-restricted cash. Proceeds from the new
Eurobond to be issued in April/May 2017 will be partly directed
to the refinancing of the short-term debt.

Near-term liquidity is also supported by free cash flow (FCF)
generation, which Fitch forecasts to be USD660 million over the
next 12 months.

Rusal will face debt maturities of approximately USD1.2 billion
in 2018 and USD1.2 billion in 2019, compared with USD1.4 billion
of FCF generation over the same period, indicating refinancing
need.


RUSHYDRO PJSC: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB+', Outlook Positive
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has raised its long-term
corporate credit rating on the Russian state-controlled
hydropower company PJSC RusHydro to 'BB+' from 'BB'.  The outlook
is positive.

At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B' short-term corporate
credit rating, and raised S&P's Russia national scale rating on
RusHydro to 'ruAA+' from 'ruAA'.

The upgrade reflects S&P's reassessment of the likelihood of
RusHydro receiving extraordinary state support to high from
moderately high.  This stems from S&P's view that RusHydro's link
with the Russian government is very strong, considering the track
record of support and the government's position as a strong and
stable shareholder without any privatization plans, as is the
case for other large government-related entities in Russia's
energy sector.

In the first quarter of 2017, RusHydro sold 13% of new equity and
treasury shares to state-owned VTB Bank.  S&P understands that,
following this recapitalization, the Russian Federation's share
is not lower than the current 60.5%, meaning that the government
remains a solid and stable controlling shareholder.  S&P also
understands that VTB cannot sell its stake for five years, and
any subsequent sale of VTB's stake is only possible with the
government's explicit approval.

S&P believes the recapitalization shows the government's
commitment to retaining its strategic influence over RusHydro; it
has also strengthened the company's financial metrics, since all
the proceeds have been used to repay legacy debt at RusHydro's
subsidiary RAO ES East.  In addition, RusHydro has been receiving
state funding for a number of capital expenditure (capex)
projects (notably in the Far East), enjoys priority access to the
electricity market, and has access to long-term funding from
state-controlled financial institutions.  Although RusHydro
competes with other commercial electricity generators and its
stake in Russia's overall electricity production is about 12%,
the company plays a very important role for balancing the
country's energy system, and key decisions on RusHydro's capex,
strategy, and financing require the government's approval.

RusHydro's 100% subsidiary RAO ES East is a vertically integrated
electricity monopoly in Russia's Far East district, a very large,
remote, scarcely populated, and politically important region that
covers about 36% of Russia's land mass.  RusHydro is essential
for reliability of electricity supply in that region and for the
region's economic development.  S&P understands that Far East is
among the key priorities for the Russian government, and S&P
notes that the chairman of RusHydro's board Yuri Trutnev is the
Vice Prime Minister, and the President's representative on the
Far East.  In S&P's view, if RusHydro were to default, this could
have consequences for the reputation of the government and other
government-related entities (GREs).

S&P expects RusHydro's financial metrics will be relatively solid
over 2017-2018, with funds from operations (FFO) to debt at
30%-35% and debt to EBITDA at 2.0x-2.3x.  Still, S&P expects free
operating cash flow (FOCF) will remain heavily negative, due to
an expected capex peak during that period.  Therefore, S&P's
assessment of RusHydro's stand-alone credit profile remains at
'bb', even though S&P sees some upside potential if the company
deleverages thanks to its continuing cost and capex optimization.
S&P could revise its assessment of the stand-alone credit profile
to 'bb+' if FFO to debt stays above 30% and FOCF turns at least
neutral, which could happen after the company's key investment
projects are completed in 2017-2018.

S&P factors in both positive and negative aspects of RusHydro's
links with the Russian government and continue to see some risk
that the Russian government could manage RusHydro's strategy with
broader social or political intentions, rather than purely
company-focused economic ones.  In the past, this was illustrated
by RusHydro's acquisition of a controlling stake in RAO ES East,
which was the reason why RusHydro needed to make additional
sizable investments in the region's electricity infrastructure.
S&P understands, however, that RusHydro has subsequently received
equity funding from the state, and recently from state-owned VTB,
to fund part of this capex and repay legacy debt.  In 2016, the
Russian government introduced a 50% dividend payout requirement
for most GREs, including RusHydro, regardless of the size of the
company's investment program.

The positive outlook on RusHydro mirrors that on the sovereign.

S&P would likely raise our rating on RusHydro if S&P was to raise
the sovereign rating on Russia.  A stronger stand-alone credit
profile would not lead to an upgrade absent an upgrade of the
sovereign, because S&P do not expect to rate RusHydro above the
sovereign.

S&P would likely revise its outlook on RusHydro to stable if the
sovereign outlook were revised to stable or if RusHydro's stand-
alone credit profile were to decline to 'bb-'.  The latter could
result from large debt-financed investments that exceed S&P's
current expectations, resulting in FFO to debt below 20% or a
material deterioration in liquidity.  This is far from S&P's base
case scenario, however.



=========
S P A I N
=========

GRUPO ISOLUX: Posts Operating Loss of EUR1 Billion
--------------------------------------------------
Katharina Rosskopf at Bloomberg News, citing El Confidencial,
reports that Isolux informed shareholders and creditors about an
operating loss of EUR1 billion.

According to Bloomberg, the loss is the result of an internal
audit caused by unfinished contracts and devaluation of
concessions portfolio.

The company's board of directors is not expected to approve
accounts before second half of May, Bloomberg notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 3,
2017, Reuters related that Isolux said on March 31 the company
had activated the formal process aimed at avoiding insolvency, as
it battles to secure enough money to remain in business.  Isolux
has over EUR2 billion (US$2.1 billion) in restructured debt,
Reuters disclosed, citing an update on its restructuring
process published in December.

Grupo Isolux Corsan SA is a Spanish construction company.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


PRIVATBANK: Accused of Unprofitable Lending to Related Entities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine, citing the Nashi Hroshi newspaper, reports that
the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine (PGO) suspects the
management of PrivatBank (Dnipro) of deliberate unprofitable
lending to related entities during the period of refinancing the
financial institution by the National Bank of Ukraine.

The publication reported this is confirmed by the ruling of the
Pechersky District Court of Kyiv dated April 5, Interfax-Ukraine
relates.

The investigation into the relevant criminal case revealed loans,
in particular, were issued to Okeanmash LLC, Tylon LLC, LT Group
LLC, Agency Novy Svit LLC, Freeline LLC, Zernopostavka-M LLC,
Kandella LLC, OPF LLC, Elara LLC, Municipal Maintenance of Houses
LLC (all based in Dnipro), Interfax-Ukraine discloses.

The guarantor for the loans was PrivatOffice L LC (Dnipro), which
owned 415 real estate objects, Interfax-Ukraine relays.  At the
same time, none of these facilities was a collateral for the
loans, Interfax-Ukraine notes.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, investigators said PrivatBank
officials, knowing about the ban on conducting active operations
with related persons, continued to issue loans at economically
unfavorable conditions and thus used up funds in especially large
amounts.  This led to a debt to the bank amounting to more than
UAH372.78 million, Interfax-Ukraine states.

                       About PrivatBank

PrivatBank is the largest commercial bank in Ukraine, in terms of
the number of clients, assets value, loan portfolio and taxes
paid to the national budget.  PrivatBank has its headquarters in
Dnipropetrovsk, in central Ukraine.

                          *   *   *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported on April 12, 2017,
that Moody's Investors Service downgraded the long-term foreign-
currency senior unsecured debt rating of Privatbank to C from Ca.
The bank's baseline credit assessment ("BCA"), adjusted BCA, long
and short-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings, and
its long and short-term Counterparty Risk Assessments were
unaffected by rating action.

The downgrade of Privatbank ' senior unsecured debt rating to C
from Ca primarily reflects Moody's expectation that senior debt
holders will sustain material losses as a result of bail-in and
conversion into equity.

The C senior unsecured debt rating does not carry outlooks.
Moody's will then withdraw the C foreign currency senior
unsecured debt rating of Privatbank.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 16,
2017, S&P Global Ratings revised its counterparty credit ratings
on Ukraine-based PrivatBank to 'SD' (selective default) from 'R'.
The rating action follows the Deposit Guarantee Fund's
announcement that PrivatBank's three outstanding loan
participation notes have been bailed in following the placing of
the bank under temporary administration in late December 2016.



UKRAINIAN RAILWAY: S&P Affirms 'SD' CCR on Debt Restructuring
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had affirmed its corporate credit
rating on Ukrainian Railway PJSC (Ukrzaliznytsia) at 'SD'
(selective default).

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC+' issue rating on the
$500 million loan participation notes (LPNs) due 2021 issued by
Ukrzaliznytsia's finance subsidiary, Shortline PLC.

The affirmation reflects the continuing restructuring of
Ukrzaliznytsia's loans. The group remains in default on about
Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH) 4 billion (about US$153 million) owed to
a single bank, representing about 10% of its total debt.
Ukrzaliznytsia is expected to complete its restructuring process
by Dec. 31, 2017, when the cross-default carve-out for the
outstanding US$500 million notes expires.  If Ukrzaliznytsia does
not manage to restructure the loans, it would be considered
default under the terms and conditions of the notes.  Hence, the
completion of the restructuring process is critical to avoid
rating pressure on its 'CCC+' notes.

Ukrzaliznytsia continues to consolidate certain assets and
liabilities of Donetsk Railway, which it does not control.  These
include about UAH4.1 billion of debt, which is under the
government's debt-servicing moratorium since Feb. 17, 2017.
Ukrzaliznytsia is therefore legally prohibited from repaying
these obligations.  S&P also understands that no newly
restructured debt has cross-default with the Donetsk Railway
obligations, including the US$500 million LPNs due 2021.

S&P will review its ratings on Ukrzaliznytsia and its outstanding
notes when the group has finished restructuring its bank debt,
which it has the legal right to repay, or when S&P has better
visibility on whether the restructuring process will be finished
before the Dec. 31, 2017, deadline imposed by the LPNs'
documentation.  S&P will also take into account the implications
of the moratorium on the repayment of Donetsk Railway debt when
assessing S&P's ratings on Ukrzaliznytsia.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


FIBABANKA AS: Fitch Assigns 'B+(EXP)' Rating to Tier 2 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Fibabanka A.S.'s (BB-/Stable/bb-)
planned issue of Basel III-compliant Tier 2 capital notes an
expected rating of 'B+(EXP)'. The size of the issue is not yet
determined but is likely to be up to USD300 million.

The final rating is subject to the receipt of the final
documentation conforming to information already received by
Fitch.

The notes qualify as Basel III-compliant Tier 2 instruments and
contain contractual loss absorption features, which will be
triggered at the point of non-viability of the bank. According to
the draft terms, the notes are subject to permanent partial or
full write-down upon the occurrence of a non-viability event
(NVE). There are no equity conversion provisions in the terms.

An NVE is defined as occurring when the bank has incurred losses
and has become, or is likely to become, non-viable as determined
by the local regulator, the Banking and Regulatory Supervision
Authority (BRSA). The bank will be deemed non-viable when it
reaches the point at which either the BRSA determines that its
operating licence is to be revoked and the bank liquidated, or
the rights of Fibabanka's shareholders (except to dividends), and
the management and supervision of the bank, should be transferred
to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund on the condition that
losses are deducted from the capital of existing shareholders.

The notes have an expected 10-year maturity (November 2027) and a
call option after five years.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The notes are rated one notch below Fibabanka's Viability Rating
(VR) of 'bb-' in accordance with Fitch's "Global Bank Rating
Criteria". The notching includes zero notches for incremental
non-performance risk relative to the VR and one notch for loss
severity.

Fitch has applied zero notches for incremental non-performance
risk, as the agency believes that write-down of the notes will
only occur once the point of non-viability is reached and there
is no coupon flexibility prior to non-viability.

The one notch for loss severity reflects Fitch's view of below-
average recovery prospects for the notes in case of an NVE. Fitch
has applied one notch, rather than two, for loss severity, as
partial, and not solely full, write-down of the notes is
possible. In Fitch's view, there is some uncertainty about the
extent of losses the notes would face in case of an NVE, given
that this would be dependent on the size of the operating losses
incurred by the bank and any measures taken by the authorities to
help restore the bank's viability.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As the notes are notched down from Fibabanka's VR, their rating
is sensitive to a change in this rating. The notes' rating is
also sensitive to a change in notching due to a revision in
Fitch's assessment of the probability of the notes' non-
performance risk relative to the risk captured in Fibabanka's VR,
or in its assessment of loss severity in case of non-performance.

The following ratings are unaffected by the action:

Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs: 'BB-'; Stable Outlook
Short-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs: 'B'
National Long-Term Rating: 'A+(tur)'; Stable Outlook
Viability Rating: 'bb-'
Support Rating: '5'
Support Rating Floor: 'No Floor'


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


JOHNSTON PRESS: Mulls All-Cash Bonus for Chief Executive
--------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Williams at The Telegraph reports that the newspaper
publisher Johnston Press has revealed plans to pay its chief
executive an all-cash bonus this year as it battles to
restructure heavy debts.

According to The Telegraph, the company said it would seek to
introduce a new pay policy at its Annual General Meeting (AGM)
next month that will mean Ashley Highfield will receive up to
GBP774,000 in cash if performance targets are met, to bring his
maximum possible total remuneration to GBP1.3 million.

Johnston Press, which publishes the i national newspaper and more
than 200 regional titles, said it wanted to abandon share-based
awards for at least a year to reflect "the unusual position the
company finds itself in" and the "critical" year facing it, The
Telegraph relates.

It is under heavy pressure from shareholders nursing heavy losses
to restructure its bond debt, which is trading at a steep
discount and has been bought up by aggressive US hedge funds who
may seek control of the 250-year-old publisher, The Telegraph
notes.  The trustees of its pension scheme, which has liabilities
of GBP615.6 million and a deficit of GBP67.7 million, are also
said to be concerned, The Telegraph states.

Kamakura Corporation, a risk management provider, rates Johnston
Press as more likely than any other public company in the EU to
default on its debts in the next 12 months, with a one in three
chance of failing to meet its obligations to lenders, The
Telegraph discloses.

Camilla Rhodes, Johnston Press chairman, said the proposed all-
cash scheme would avoid significant dilution for shareholders and
the risk that Mr. Highfield and other senior executives could
make "excessive" gains based only on volatility in the company's
depressed share price, The Telegraph relays.

It is understood that the proposals have been made against the
wishes of major shareholders, raising the prospect of a protest
at the AGM next month, according to The Telegraph.

However, the focus is likely to be on Johnston Press's debt
restructuring effort, The Telegraph says.  It has enlisted help
from Rothschild bankers and lawyers at Ashurst to seek a
solution, The Telegraph relates.  Frustrated shareholders have
meanwhile already opened talks with bondholders in the hope of
persuading them to participate in a debt-for-equity swap, The
Telegraph notes.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Senior Debt Holder Losses May Rise on EMEA Spec-Grade Defaults
----------------------------------------------------------------
Senior-ranked or first-lien lenders are more likely to incur
greater losses when EMEA high-yield companies default as the
protective debt cushion provided by junior or second-lien
lenders, the first to absorb losses, has shrunk over the past six
months, says Moody's Investors Service in a report published
today. High yield companies have taken advantage of issuer-
friendly markets to increase first-lien debt amounts at low
interest rates, using the proceeds to repay more expensive
second-lien debt.

"This shift has eroded the debt safety cushion that second-lien
lenders provide by 44%, meaning that first-lien lenders are now
more likely to incur meaningful losses in a default. In a third
of the transactions we reviewed, the debt cushion had completely
disappeared," says Tobias Wagner, Vice President at Moody's.

Moody's report, "Speculative-grade Non-financial Corporates -
Europe: Risk of Greater Losses Rising For First Lien Investors,"
is available on www.moodys.com. Moody's subscribers can access
this report via the link provided at the end of this press
release. The rating agency's report is an update to the markets
and does not constitute a rating action.

First-lien leverage rose by 0.8x on average in the 15
transactions Moody's examined between September 2016 and March
2017, rising from 4.4x to 5.2x on average. Total leverage
remained unchanged at 6.3x before and after the refinancing
transaction. In terms of volumes, the incremental first-lien debt
represents $1.8 billion.

Forty percent of transactions resulted in a one-notch rating
downgrade for the first lien or secured instrument rating. The
erosion in the debt cushion in these transactions was greater
than the average at 1.2x, from 2.3x to 1.1x. Other factors such
as the relative strength of the corporate family rating and level
of support for the first lien or secured debt before the
transaction also influence the likelihood of downgrades.

While Moody's sample represents a relatively small subset of
overall leveraged finance transactions, it illustrates the
broader trend of increasing risk appetite, towards recent peak
levels in 2014. After a brief pause in 2015, total leverage is
rising again in 2016 and early signs indicate a further rise in
2017.

In its report, Moody's analysed 15 leveraged loan and high-yield
bond refinancing transactions in which the share of first lien,
or secured debt, rose while overall leverage remained unchanged.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *