TCREUR_Public/170505.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, May 5, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 89


                            Headlines


F R A N C E

LOXAM SAS: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to EUR600MM Sr. Sec. Notes
WHA HOLDING: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corporate Family Rating


G E R M A N Y

AIR BERLIN: Etihad Airways to Inject EUR350MM of New Funds
BILFINGER SE: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' CCRs, Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

BORETS FINANCE: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating to US$330MM Bonds
EUROCREDIT CDO VI: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. E Notes from Ba3


I T A L Y

ALITALIA SPA: To Be Put Up for Sale to Avert Liquidation
SIGNUM FINANCE II: Fitch Cuts Rating on EUR150MM Notes to BB+


L U X E M B O U R G

4FINANCE GROUP: S&P Affirms 'B+' CCR, Outlook Remains Negative


N E T H E R L A N D S

EA PARTNERS: Fitch Lowers Rating on US$700MM Notes to CCC
CADOGAN SQUARE: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F Sr. Notes


R U S S I A

EVRAZ GROUP: Moody's Revises Outlook to Stable, Affirms Ba3 CFR


S W E D E N

HOIST KREDIT: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating on Review for Upgrade
TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM: Moody's Cuts Sr. Unsec. LT Rating to Ba1


U K R A I N E

DIAMANTBANK: Has Potential Investor, Board Chairman Says


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Dominic Chapell's Retail Acquisitions Face Liquidation
ITHACA ENERGY: S&P Raises CCR to 'B' After Takeover Completion
RANGERS FOOTBALL: GBP1 Sale Allowed Owner to Keep Metals Business
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE 29: S&P Rates Class F1-Dfrd Notes BB+ (sf)
SOHO HOUSE: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC+' on Bond Redemption


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History


                            *********


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F R A N C E
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LOXAM SAS: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to EUR600MM Sr. Sec. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB-' issue rating to Loxam SAS'
upsized EUR600 million senior secured notes.  The recovery rating
is '3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-
70%; rounded estimate 50%) in the event of a payment default.

Additionally, S&P assigned its 'B' issue rating to the company's
EUR250 million senior unsecured notes.  The recovery rating is
'6', indicating S&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery
in the event of a payment default.

S&P also affirmed its issue and recovery ratings on all existing
instruments.

                        RECOVERY ANALYSIS

   -- The senior secured notes (EUR410 million notes due 2021,
      EUR250 million notes due 2023, new EUR300 million notes due
      2022, and new EUR300 million notes due 2024) have a
      recovery rating of '3' and an issue rating of 'BB-'.  The
      recovery rating is supported by the company's relatively
      strong asset value but constrained by the existence of
      prior-ranking debt and S&P's view of the relatively weak
      security package, which is limited to trademarks and the
      share pledges in Lavendon Group Plc, together with the
      shares of two French subsidiaries (Loxam Module and Loxam
      Power).  Recovery prospects are expected to be around 50%.

   -- The existing EUR250 million senior unsecured notes and new
      EUR250 million subordinated notes have a recovery rating of
      '6' and an issue rating of 'B'.  The recovery rating
      reflects the notes' subordinated and unguaranteed position
      in the capital structure.

   -- In S&P's hypothetical scenario, a default is triggered by
      revenue deflation due to worsening trading conditions and
      margin pressure from competition through consolidation of
      other similar-size players.

   -- S&P considers that Loxam would be reorganized rather than
      liquidated in the event of default.  S&P values the
      business using a discrete asset valuation method because
      S&P believes that the company's enterprise value would be
      closely correlated to the value of its assets.

Simulated default and valuation assumptions

   -- Year of default: 2021
   -- Jurisdiction: France

Simplified waterfall

   -- Gross enterprise value at default: EUR794 million
   -- Net Enterprise Value after administrative costs (5%:
      EUR755 million
   -- Priority claims: EUR97 million*^
   -- Estimated senior secured debt claims: EUR1,286 million*
   -- Value available for senior secured claims: EUR658 million
   -- Recovery expectations: 50%-70% (rounded estimate: 50%)
   -- Estimated senior unsecured debt claims: EUR657 million*
   -- Value available for senior unsecured claims: Nil

*All debt amounts include six months' prepetition interest.
^Includes EUR75 million RCF assumed 85% drawn.

RATINGS SCORE SNAPSHOT

Corporate Credit Rating: BB-/Negative/--

Business risk: Fair

   -- Country risk: Low
   -- Industry risk: Intermediate
   -- Competitive position: Fair

Financial risk: Aggressive

   -- Cash flow/Leverage: Aggressive

Anchor: bb-

Modifiers

   -- Diversification/Portfolio effect: Neutral (no impact)
   -- Capital structure: Neutral (no impact)
   -- Liquidity: Adequate (no impact)
   -- Financial policy: Neutral (no impact)
   -- Management and governance: Fair (no impact)
   -- Comparable rating analysis: Neutral (no impact)


WHA HOLDING: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corporate Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn WHA Holding SAS's B2
corporate family rating (CFR), the B2-PD probability of default
rating (PDR) and its stable outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.

WHA Holding SAS is the immediate holding company of Winoa S.A.
(Winoa), a leading producer and distributor of steel abrasives
for industrial end markets headquartered in Le Cheylas, France.
In 2015, Winoa generated revenue of EUR318 million and EBITDA of
approximately EUR48 million (as defined by the company, and
excluding one-off costs). Winoa Group was first acquired by LBO
France in 2005 but following a debt-to-equity swap in early 2014,
a consortium of private equity funds led by KKR (c.52% of equity)
took control of the group.


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G E R M A N Y
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AIR BERLIN: Etihad Airways to Inject EUR350MM of New Funds
----------------------------------------------------------
Deena Kamel Yousef and Richard Weiss at Bloomberg News report
that while Etihad Airways PJSC let Alitalia SpA slide into
bankruptcy after workers spurned a restructuring plan, the
Persian Gulf carrier is showing more patience with its other
ailing European asset.

Hidden on page 154 of Air Berlin Plc's annual report, published
hours after Alitalia's insolvency filing, was the revelation that
Abu Dhabi-based Etihad had agreed to provide the German company
with financial support for at least another 18 months, including
EUR350 million (US$382 million) of new funds, Bloomberg relates.

That extra injection takes Etihad's total exposure to Air Berlin
close to EUR2 billion and suggests the Mideast company is not yet
ready to abandon a partner which sits at the heart of a so-called
Equity Alliance strategy that saw it build up minority holdings
in carriers spanning Ireland to Australia, Bloomberg notes.

The fresh funding -- combined with Etihad's assertion that "what
has happened at Alitalia does not affect how we view any of our
other equity investments" -- represent some show of faith in Air
Berlin, which has racked up net losses of EUR2.7 billion in
little over six years and has net debt of EUR1.2 billion,
Bloomberg discloses.

On the face of it the situation at Air Berlin -- in which Etihad
has a 29% stake -- appears particularly dire, with Chief
Financial Officer Dimitri Courtelis resorting to using an April
28 analyst call to reassure passengers that the company remained
liquid and wasn't about to cease flying, Bloomberg relays.

According to Bloomberg, CEO Thomas Winkelmann, though, said on
the same call that there are "fundamental differences" between
Air Berlin and Alitalia, with management, labor unions and
investors all generally "pulling in the same direction."

Air Berlin still has its strategic attractions, continuing to
provide access to a German market which Gulf carriers have found
tough to penetrate due to strict bilateral agreements, Bloomberg
states.  Mr. Winkelmann is working on a new restructuring plan
after taking over on Feb. 1, and WirtschaftsWoche reported May 4
that the company has been in contact with Delta Air Lines
Inc. and China's HNA Group. Co., owner of Hainan Airlines, about
possible partnerships, Bloomberg relates.

Moreover, Air Berlin's assets have already proved saleable,
Bloomberg says.

Air Berlin Plc is a Germany-based airline that is registered in
the United Kingdom.


BILFINGER SE: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' CCRs, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has affirmed its 'BB+/B' long-
and short-term corporate credit ratings on Germany-based
industrial services group Bilfinger SE.  The outlook is stable.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB+' issue ratings on Bilfinger's
outstanding debt.  The recovery rating was revised to '3' from
'4', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-
70%; rounded estimate 50%) in the event of a default.

The affirmation follows Bilfinger's release on March 15, 2017, of
its financial results for the transitional fiscal year ended
Dec. 31, 2016, including the sale of its building and facility
business segment to EQT.  The group also announced its strategy
through 2020, which is to reorganize the remaining business
across two service lines and six industries in order to stabilize
the group and return to profitable growth.

In S&P's view, the asset disposal has increased the group's
business risk because it has reduced diversification and will
likely lead to higher earnings volatility.  S&P assess
Bilfinger's business risk profile as fair because it is still a
leading international industrial services provider focusing on
the European process industries market, with strong technical
capabilities and long-term customer relationships.

S&P considers that the biggest challenge for Bilfinger over the
past few years has been its lack of a concise strategy and its
complex organizational structure, which has led to lengthy
decision-making processes, lack of management control, and subpar
operational and financial performance.  The new management group
has drawn a roadmap to steer the remaining business toward top-
line growth and higher profitability through reorganizing the
corporate structure and streamlining processes and the cost base.
Low profitability, in S&P's view, remains the most pressing
issue, necessitating stronger positive free cash flow generation
for the group's future development.  Overall, the group's credit
profile depends on management's ability to deliver on its
operational and financial targets.

For fiscal 2016, the group reported a cash balance of about
EUR1 billion, financial debt of about EUR500 million, and a
significant reduction of the pension deficit to approximately
EUR300 million.  S&P understands the majority of these funds will
be earmarked for business development through investments and
selective acquisitions, and for permanent strengthening of the
balance sheet.  S&P maintains the view that the company's
financial position offsets its weakened business risk profile and
execution risks for its turnaround plan over the next 12 months.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Bilfinger's key
credit ratios will remain strong despite its currently low
profitability, due to the group's significant cash reserves.
Given S&P's view of the group's business profile, it would regard
FFO to debt at the upper end of the 30% to 45% range over the
longer term as being in line with the current rating.

Furthermore, S&P expects the group will be able to increase its
profitability and cash generation significantly by continuing to
reorganize nonperforming businesses, streamline structures, and
implement measures for organic growth.  S&P expects shareholder
remuneration will remain modest until the group has returned to
profit and positive free cash flow.  S&P do not expect large
acquisitions over its 12-month outlook horizon, but that the
group may seek growth through acquisitions over the longer term.
The impact of such acquisitions on the group's credit profile
would be assessed separately.

S&P would likely lower the rating if the group's operating and
financial performance remained weaker than our expectations, due
to failure of the transformation plan and inability to enhance
growth and profitability.  Rating downside would likely also
develop if the group adopted a more aggressive financial policy
than expected, for instance through the inclusion of material
shareholder distributions without having delivered on plans to
increase profitability and cash flow.

S&P views upside potential for the rating over the next 12 months
as limited, since this would require tangible and sustainable
strengthening of Bilfinger's business risk profile without
weakening key credit ratios, in particular FFO to debt, from the
currently expected levels.


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I R E L A N D
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BORETS FINANCE: Fitch Assigns BB- Rating to US$330MM Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Borets Finance DAC's US$330 million
Eurobond due 2022 a final senior unsecured 'BB-' rating. Borets
Finance is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Borets International
Limited (Borets), which guarantees the Eurobond.

Borets' ratings are supported by the company's high margins,
moderate geographical diversification and good liquidity.
However, a relatively weak business profile due to lack of
product diversification constrains the ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Good Underlying Cash Flows: Borets consistently generates funds
from operations (FFO) above 14% and free cash flow (FCF) margins
above 2%. Fitch considers these good for the rating and broadly
in line with industry peers. The company is vulnerable to the
translation effect of foreign-currency swings, but its revenue
and costs are closely matched by currency, which allows margin
preservation to be maintained.

Solid Liquidity and Moderate Leverage: Borets' liquidity is
adequate, with unrestricted cash at end-2016 of USD23 million and
unused credit facilities of USD5 million, more than sufficient to
cover short-term maturities of USD8 million relating to the
interest payment on the company's Eurobonds. Gross and net
leverage, at around 3x at end-2016, are in line with the present
rating and Fitch expects them to remain broadly stable over the
medium term.

Solid Position in a Niche Market: The market for Borets'
electrical submersible pumps (ESPs) is relatively niche but also
protected from new entrants due to the high technological content
and the need for strong relationships with the key customers.
Borets is the largest producer of ESPs globally by units. The
relatively weak diversity due to its almost exclusive focus on
ESPs is offset by its high portion of services and aftermarket
revenue, strong and long-term relationships with major oil
companies, low-cost production base, high vertical integration
and relatively high barriers to entry.

Limited Product Diversification: Borets' business profile is
restricted by a narrower product and customer range than some of
its major peers. The group's product portfolio is limited to its
ESP systems for the oil and gas industry, with most customers
based in Russia (although this is changing), exposing it to the
fortunes of these companies.

Market Protected from Oil Price Changes: Borets' products are
accounted as operating expenditures for its customers. Oil
production in the existing oilfields would be impossible without
ESPs and therefore expenditures for acquiring them cannot be
postponed. Furthermore, oil companies in Russia (and worldwide)
are focusing more on brownfield projects, requiring more ESPs and
making Borets less vulnerable to oil price shocks

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Borets is moderately well positioned relative to peers. A
relatively weak business profile, exemplified by poor product
diversification, is offset by its strong market position in
Russia and globally, most of the company's customers having good
credit quality. Margins are stable and relatively high owing to
the company's good execution capabilities and low cost position,
while leverage is in line with peers.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:

- Modest revenue growth of 3%-5% annually, slightly below CAGR
growth of 3%-6% for Borets' ESP installed base and ESPs under
service agreements over the last 10 years

- Gradually declining EBITDA margin to around 23%, closer to the
historical average

- No dividend payments over the rating horizon

- Capex at around 4% of revenue over 2017-2020, slightly above
the historical average of 3.5%

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

An upgrade is unlikely if the business profile does not improve
materially, including a major increase in scale and improvement
in the geographical diversification.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- FCF margin below 1% on a sustained basis

- Extensive capital expenditures, acquisition programme or
significant change in dividend policy

- FFO adjusted net leverage above 3.5x on a sustained basis

- FFO fixed charge coverage below 3.0x on a sustained basis

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity: Borets' liquidity is adequate as of end-2016,
with unrestricted cash of USD23 million and unused credit
facilities of USD5 million, more than sufficient to cover short-
term maturities of USD8 million, which relate to the interest
payment on the Eurobonds. Around USD240 million from the
outstanding USD373 million 2013 Eurobond was redeemed during the
tender offer, which was financed by the new Eurobond issuance.

The portion of the newly issued Eurobond that is not used for the
repayment during the tender offer, will be kept as cash in US
dollars with the sole purpose of repayment of the 2013 Eurobond.


EUROCREDIT CDO VI: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. E Notes from Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Eurocredit CDO VI PLC:

-- EUR24M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
    due 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2016
    Upgraded to A3 (sf)

-- EUR20M (current outstanding balance of EUR15.83M) Class E
    Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
    Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2016 Affirmed Ba3
    (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

-- EUR30M (current outstanding balance of EUR20.64M) Class C
    Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
    Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 6, 2016 Upgraded to Aaa
    (sf)

Eurocredit CDO VI PLC, issued in December 2006, is a
collateralised loan obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield European senior secured loans. The portfolio is
managed by Intermediate Capital Managers Limited. The
transaction's reinvestment period ended in January 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades of the notes' ratings are primarily the result of
deleveraging of the transaction since the last rating action in
April 2016. There have been 2 payment dates since the last rating
action. On the most recent payment date, in January 2017, the
Class B Notes were fully repaid and the remaining balance of
principal proceeds was used to begin amortisation of the Class C
Notes. The Class C Notes have been reduced to 68.80% of their
original amount, and note overcollateralisation levels have
increased. As of the April 2017 trustee report, the Class C,
Class D and Class E overcollateralisation ratios are reported at
353.09%, 163.26% and 120.51% respectively compared with 189.30%,
132.28% and 110.35% in April 2016. Following recent repayments
and sales on portfolio collateral, a substantial part of this
overcollateralisation arises from cash, which is sufficient to
entirely repay the Class C Notes on the next note repayment date
and to reduce the Class D Notes to 56.63% of their original
amount.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR74.17
million, defaulted par of EUR1.60 million, a weighted average
default probability of 24.40% over a 3.25 years weighted average
life (consistent with a WARF of 3917), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 48.57% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 9 and a weighted average spread of
4.11%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analysing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed lower weighted average recovery rate for the
portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the weighted
average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs were
unchanged for Classes C and D Notes and within two notches of the
base-case results for Class E Notes.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

* Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortisation would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

* Around 22.15% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed
large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate
as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009 and
available at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461.

* Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralisation levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analysed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

* Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction
maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend on
the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


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ALITALIA SPA: To Be Put Up for Sale to Avert Liquidation
--------------------------------------------------------
James Politi at The Financial Times reports that Carlo Calenda,
Italy's economic development minister, said Alitalia will be put
up for sale starting in two weeks with the aim of finding a buyer
for the entire airline to stave off liquidation.

A day after Alitalia collapsed into administration, Mr. Calenda
set some goals for talks around the airline's future.

"Within 15 days the commissioners will be open to expressions of
interest," the FT quotes Mr. Calenda as saying in a radio
interview on May 2.  "For us the priority is the sale of the
whole company."

In recent days, there has been growing media speculation about
potential buyers, among them Lufthansa, the German flag carrier,
Ferrovie dello Stato, Italy's state-owned railway, and Qatar
Airways, which has invested in Meridiana, another Italian
airline, the FT relates.

According to the FT, finding a buyer will be a challenge, and
acquirers might be scared off by events of recent months.

Alitalia was forced into administration after employees rejected
a deal struck between the unions and management to cut salaries,
personnel and other costs, the FT recounts.

Big investors, including Etihad of the UAE and UniCredit and
Intesa, the Italian banks, then withdrew their support for a EUR2
billion financing package they had put on the table, the FT
discloses.

Without any assurances on Alitalia's commitment to cost cuts and
a path to a profitable business model, it may be hard for any
buyer to put money in, the FT states.

Concerns for a deterioration in the company's health could
continue, particularly if there is a drop-off of bookings from
would-be passengers worried that they may be unable to fly, the
FT notes.

                          About Alitalia

Alitalia-Compagnia Aerea Italiana has navigated its way through
a successful restructuring.  After filing for bankruptcy
protection in 2008, Alitalia found additional investors, acquired
rival airline Air One, and re-emerged as Italy's leading airline
in early 2009.  Operating a fleet of about 150 aircraft, the
airline now serves more than 75 national and international
destinations from hubs in Fiumicino (Rome), Milan, Turin, Venice,
Naples, and Catania.  Alitalia extends its network as a member of
the SkyTeam code-sharing and marketing alliance, which also
includes Air France, Delta Air Lines, and KLM.  An Italian
investor group owns a majority of the company, while Air France-
KLM owns 25%.


SIGNUM FINANCE II: Fitch Cuts Rating on EUR150MM Notes to BB+
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the ratings of eight credit-linked
notes (CLN).

KEY RATING DRIVERS
The downgrade of the CLNs reflects the downgrade on April 21,
2017 of Italy's Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer
Default Rating to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'. Italy is one of the risk-
presenting entities in the transactions.

The Stable Outlooks on the CLNs are in line with the Outlooks on
the risk-presenting entities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch monitors the performance of the underlying risk-presenting
entities and adjusts the rating of each transaction accordingly.
Fitch tested the impact of one and two notch downgrade for the
risk-presenting entities in the CLNs, and found this would lead
to a downgrade of up to three notches.

DATA ADEQUACY

The underlying assets have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch
and/or other Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations and/or European Securities and Markets Authority
registered rating agencies. Fitch has relied on the practices of
the relevant groups within Fitch and/or other rating agencies to
assess the asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable

Fitch has downgraded the following ratings:

EUR100m Aries Capital Series 7 inflation linker asset swap notes
(ISIN: XS0987489209), downgraded to 'BBB-sf' from 'BBBsf';
Outlook Stable

EUR10m CS Argentum Capital BTP CLN series 2014-20 (ISIN
XS1056161471), downgraded to 'BBB-sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
Stable

EUR50m CS Argentum Capital BTP CLN series 2014-37 (ISIN
XS1076509972), downgraded to 'BBB-sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook
Stable

EUR20m Credit Suisse CLN linked to the Republic of Italy due
December 2030 (ISIN XS1289135649), downgraded to 'BB+sf' from
'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

EUR50m Signum Finance II Plc BTPei GSI inflation linked CLN 2019
(ISIN: XS0718227456), downgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'BBB-sf';
Outlook Stable

EUR50m Signum Finance II Plc BTPei GSI inflation linked CLN 2023
(ISIN: XS0854395539), downgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'BBB-sf';
Outlook Stable

EUR150m Signum Finance II plc BTPei GSI inflation linked CLN 2041
(ISIN: XS0659372980), downgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'BBB-sf';
Outlook Stable

EUR111.9m Signum Finance II Plc 2016-01 (ISIN XS1391855795),
downgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable


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L U X E M B O U R G
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4FINANCE GROUP: S&P Affirms 'B+' CCR, Outlook Remains Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' long-term corporate credit
rating on Luxembourg-based 4finance Holding S.A. (4finance).  The
outlook remains negative.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B+' issue rating to the new
$325 million senior unsecured notes due in 2022 issued by
4finance S.A., a wholly-owned subsidiary of 4finance, and
affirmed S&P's 'B+' issue rating on 4finance S.A.'s existing
senior unsecured notes.  S&P also assigned its '3' recovery
rating to the group's new debt while maintaining our '3' recovery
rating on its existing debt, indicating that S&P now expects
recovery for noteholders in the 50%-70% range (rounded estimate
of 50%) in the event of a payment default.

The affirmation reflects S&P's analysis that the new issue of
$325 million senior unsecured notes, which are guaranteed by the
non-operating holding company 4finance, in addition to eight
other major operating subsidiaries, has no meaningful impact on
S&P's debt metrics for the 4finance group.

S&P expects the company will use the net proceeds from the new
issue for general corporate purposes, including acquiring new
clients.  In conjunction with this issue, the 4finance group has
also refinanced some of its current outstanding senior unsecured
debt issued by 4finance S.A.  For the $200 million senior
unsecured bonds due in 2019, the company made a tender offer to
bondholders, and the outstanding volume of the bonds now stands
at $68 million.  Furthermore, 4finance has also called its
Swedish krona (SEK) 375 million (about EUR39 million) senior
unsecured bonds due 2018.  With the new notes issued due in 2022,
and the remaining stock of EUR150 million of senior unsecured
bonds due in 2021, the 4finance group has lengthened the maturity
profile of its outstanding debt.  Furthermore, S&P do not
anticipate any further debt issuance from the group this year.

S&P's assessment of the group credit profile reflects 4finance
group's concentrated product focus on the European unsecured
short-term consumer lending market.  In S&P's opinion, this focus
subjects it to material reputational, regulatory, and operational
risks.  Furthermore, the group acquired the Bulgarian bank TBI
Bank in August 2016, which S&P believes could present additional
operational risk.  S&P expects that managing the integration of a
regulated bank is likely to be more demanding and costly than
previous acquisitions.  S&P continues to expect that the 4finance
group will continue to pursue lending growth to maintain strong
profit growth, which S&P expects will support the group's credit
metrics.  While the new issue has increased consolidated debt,
S&P continues to believe that our ratio of debt to adjusted
EBITDA will remain within the 3x-4x range in 2017-2018, albeit in
the upper end.  Over the next few years, S&P believes that the
4finance group's leverage will likely improve toward the middle
of this range.

The negative outlook represents a one-in-three possibility that
S&P could downgrade 4finance over the next 12 months, reflecting
S&P's view that the transformational acquisition of TBI Bank
could present additional operational risks.  Furthermore,
managing the integration of a regulated bank is likely to be more
demanding and costly than previous acquisitions.  While S&P
generally assumes that 4finance group will continue to improve
internal control functions as it expands, its brisk growth
implies risks if not managed effectively over time.  Still, S&P
believes that the group will maintain strong profit growth,
supporting its credit metrics. However, credit losses are likely
to increase as the loan portfolio expands, leading to some profit
volatility.  Regulatory developments continue to pose obstacles
for the 4finance group as it broadens its geographic reach.

S&P could lower its ratings on 4finance if integration of TBI
Bank increased operational costs and logistical difficulties, and
therefore weighed on 4finance group's profitability.  S&P could
also lower its ratings if asset quality deterioration and
increasing regulatory costs impeded EBITDA growth, such that
S&P's credit metrics for the group weakened, or if the group took
on additional leverage to finance continued volume growth or
other acquisitions, leading to a debt-to-EBITDA ratio markedly
higher than 4.0x.

S&P could consider revising the outlook to stable over the next
12 months if the integration of TBI Bank proceeds smoothly and
the 4finance group's cash flow metrics were not burdened by
additional acquisition-related costs.  S&P would also need
clarity on developments in the group's debt metrics, namely with
debt to EBITDA sustainably moving towards 3.0x, and transparency
on its acquisition strategy before taking a positive rating
action.


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N E T H E R L A N D S
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EA PARTNERS: Fitch Lowers Rating on US$700MM Notes to CCC
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the senior secured rating of
EA Partners I B.V.'s USD700 million 6.875% notes due 2020 to
'CCC' from 'B-' and EA Partners II B.V.'s senior secured USD500
million 6.75% notes due 2021 to 'CCC' from 'B'. The Recovery
Ratings are 'RR1'.

The rating actions come after the filing for administration by
Alitalia, one of the obligors under the transactions. According
to Alitalia, the airline has continued to make all payments under
all its financial obligations. However, Fitch believes Alitalia's
liquidity and credit profiles are very weak and are unsustainable
without additional shareholder support.

Given the transactions' recourse to each obligor on a several
basis, the senior secured ratings are constrained at the level of
obligors of the weakest credit quality. Fitch acknowledge certain
transaction characteristics (eg liquidity pool and the internal
debt assumption by Etihad Investment Holding Company LLC, an
affiliate of Etihad Airways PJSC ('A'/Stable), with respect to
the principal amount of Alitalia's debt under EA Partners I and
II B.V.'s transactions) can provide additional default risk
protection for the notes, but their mechanism is complicated and
is subject to bondholder choices.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Alitalia's Debt Assumption by Etihad
According to the internal debt assumption agreement between
Alitalia and Etihad Investment Holding Company LLC, Etihad
Investment Holding Company has agreed that it would assume
Alitalia's repayment of principal on maturity for EA Partners I
B.V. and EA Partners II B.V. of USD132 million and USD99.5
million, respectively. This means that in case of Alitalia's
default, Etihad will fund Alitalia's principal repayment only if
bondholders choose to wait until the bonds mature. Therefore, the
debt assumption agreement may incentivise the bondholders to wait
until maturity rather than accept the unsuccessful outcome of the
debt obligation remarketing, thus providing additional source of
default risk protection for EA Partners I and II B.V.'s notes.

Liquidity Pool
The transactions contain a liquidity pool, their only cross-
collateralised feature (excluding ratchet account component,
which is not cross-collateralised), which is available to service
the interest or principal on the notes, if an obligor fails to
pay an interest or principal on its respective debt obligation
when due. Contractually, the liquidity pool does not have to be
replenished if it is used to service the notes.

Remarketing Trigger
If the liquidity pool is drawn to cure a default of an obligor to
pay interest on its debt obligation and falls below 75% of the
initial deposits, which account for most of the liquidity pool,
this will trigger the remarketing of the respective debt
obligation. Based on the current amount of the liquidity pool it
is sufficient to cover seven quarters of Alitalia's coupon
payments in case of its default under EA Partners I B.V. (notes
due in September 2020) and five quarters under EA Partners II
B.V. (notes due in June 2021) before the first remarketing event
is triggered. Assuming that all other obligors will remain
performing, the liquidity pool will cover Alitalia's coupon
payments until March 2020 under EA Partners I B.V. and until June
2019 under EA Partners II B.V. before the first remarketing event
is triggered.

The current amount of the total liquidity pool covers Alitalia's
coupon payment through the whole duration of the notes under EA
Partners I B.V. but not EA Partners II B.V. However, the
application of 100% of the liquidity pool is challenging due to a
75% threshold that triggers a remarketing and it is also subject
to bondholders' choices.

Weakest Obligor Credit
The rating of the notes reflects Fitch views of the
creditworthiness, and the senior unsecured ranking, of the
obligors including Fitch assessments of their links with their
respective parents.

Given the transactions' recourse to each obligor on a several
basis, the ratings for the notes are constrained at the 'CCC'
level by obligors of the weakest credit quality. This is due to
the sole cash flow for the service and repayment of the notes
being the individual cash flow streams from the obligors under
their respective loans. Failure of any obligor to make interest
or principal payments under its respective debt obligation, which
remains uncured following the remarketing of the respective debt
obligation and/or through the liquidity pool, may lead to an
event of default under the notes. These transactions' noteholders
are thus exposed to the underlying creditworthiness of each
individual obligor.

Cross Default
The notes do not have a cross-default provision. This means that
a default by one obligor does not constitute an event of default
under other debt obligations incurred under this transaction by
other obligors. However, events of default under each debt
obligation include a customary cross-default provision, which
states that a failure by the respective 'obligor or any of its
material subsidiaries to pay any of its own financial
indebtedness when due' will lead to an event of default under the
debt obligations of this obligor but not of any other obligor
other than in the case of Etihad Airways and Etihad Airport
Services.

Recovery Prospect
We currently assess the recovery (given default) prospect of the
notes as outstanding (91%-100%, 'RR1') based on Alitalia's entry
into administration, the internal debt assumption by Etihad
Investment Holding Company and other features of the
transactions.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

The notes' rating reflects Fitch views of the credit profiles and
recovery assumptions for the obligors and is constrained at 'CCC'
by the obligor of the weakest credit quality for the notes under
EA Partners I B.V. and EA Partners II B.V. The credit quality of
the obligors varies substantially depending on their business
profiles and financial profiles that Fitch generally see as weak
compared with peers. Shareholder support, where relevant,
improves Fitch assessments of the obligors.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:

- The proceeds from the notes' issue will be on-lent to
obligors.

- These transactions' notes are secured over assets that
represent senior unsecured claims to respective obligors.

- The notes do not have a cross-default provision.

- Etihad Airways or any other non-defaulting obligor may provide
support to other obligors by purchasing their debt obligations
through the 'remarketing event', if it takes place upon default
of another obligor on its payments under the debt obligation.
However, this can be exercised at Etihad Airways' or any other
non-defaulting obligor's discretion and is not an obligation
under these transactions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- Fitch believes positive rating action is highly unlikely given
the filing for administration by Alitalia. Nevertheless, the
improvement of the credit quality of the obligors with the
weakest credit profiles may be positive for the notes' ratings.

- Sustained improvement of the recovery prospects for the senior
unsecured creditors of the obligors of the weakest credit
quality, unless there are limitations due to country-specific
treatment of Recovery Ratings, could also be positive for the
notes' ratings.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- Worsening of the recovery prospects for the senior unsecured
creditors of the obligors of the weakest credit quality.

- The deterioration of the credit quality of the obligors.


CADOGAN SQUARE: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F Sr. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
seven classes of debts issued by Cadogan Square CLO V B.V. (the
"Issuer"):

-- EUR181,300,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2031, Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR24,000,000 Class B1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2031, Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR10,000,000 Class B2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2031, Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR17,700,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2031, Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR15,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2031, Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR20,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2031, Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR8,100,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2031, Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive ratings of the rated notes address the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2031. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Credit Suisse
Asset Management Limited ("CSAM"), has sufficient experience and
operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

The Issuer issued the Refinancing Notes in connection with the
refinancing of the following classes of notes: Class A1 Notes,
Class A2 Notes, Class B1 Notes, Class B2 Notes, Class C Notes,
Class D Notes, and Class E Notes due 2025 (the "Original Notes"),
previously issued in August 2013 (the "Original Closing Date").
On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer will use the proceeds from
the issuance of the Refinancing Notes to redeem in full its
respective Original Notes. On the Original Closing Date, the
Issuer also issued the Class M Subordinated Notes, which will
remain outstanding.

Cadogan Square CLO V B.V. is a managed cash flow CLO. At least
90% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and
senior secured bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist
of unsecured senior loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine
obligations and high yield bonds. The portfolio is expected to be
100% ramped up as of the closing date and to be comprised
predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western
Europe.

CSAM will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. CSAM's investment decisions
and management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modelled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published
October 2016. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modelling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR300,000,000

Diversity Score: 40

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 41.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the definitive rating assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3278 from 2850)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031: -1

Class B1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031: -2

Class B2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2031: -2

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2031: -
2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2031: -
2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2031: -
1

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2031: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3705 from 2850)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031: -1

Class B1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031: -4

Class B2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2031: -4

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2031: -
4

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2031: -
2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2031: -
1

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2031: -
1

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.


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R U S S I A
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EVRAZ GROUP: Moody's Revises Outlook to Stable, Affirms Ba3 CFR
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to stable from negative the
outlook on the Ba3 corporate family rating (CFR) and Ba3-PD
probability of default rating (PDR) of Russian vertically
integrated steel and mining company Evraz Group S.A. (Evraz), and
the B1 (LGD 5) senior unsecured ratings assigned to the notes
issued by Evraz. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed all these
ratings.

"Our decision to stabilise the outlook on Evraz's ratings
reflects Moody's expectations that higher average prices for
steel and coking coal, as well as solid positive free cash flow
generation, will allow the company to continue reducing its
leverage safely below the downgrade threshold," says Artem
Frolov, a Vice President -- Senior Credit Officer at Moody's.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The stabilisation of Evraz's outlook and affirmation of its
ratings reflects Moody's expectation that Evraz will (1) maintain
its strategic focus on deleveraging, reducing its reported net
debt/EBITDA towards its internal target of 2.0x and Moody's-
adjusted gross debt/EBITDA to solidly below 4.0x on a sustainable
basis; (2) continue to generate a positive free cash flow; and
(3) retain healthy liquidity.

As of year-end 2016, Evraz's leverage declined to 4.0x from 4.6x
at year-end 2015 and 5.9x at end-June 2016. The decline in
leverage was driven primarily by the rise in the company's last-
12-month Moody's-adjusted EBITDA by $469 million to $1.54
billion, due to higher steel and particularly coking coal prices
in the second half of 2016, as well as some reduction in debt.

Moody's expects that Evraz will be able to reduce its leverage
towards or below 3.5x in 2017, owing to the further increase in
EBITDA on the back of higher average prices for steel and coking
coal and improving demand for the company's steel products both
in Russia and North America. Moody's also expects that Evraz will
continue to generate a solid positive free cash flow, assuming no
major investment projects and shareholder distributions, which
will enable the company to continue to reduce its debt.

In addition to Moody's expectation that the company will improve
its financial metrics and continue to generate a positive free
cash flow, the rating takes into account (1) Evraz's profile as a
low-cost integrated steelmaker, including low cash costs of the
company's coking coal and iron ore production; (2) the company's
product, operational and geographic diversification; (3) its
strong market position in long steel products in Russia,
including leadership in rail manufacturing; (4) the expected
recovery in demand for steel in Russia and growing demand for
rails in Russia and North America; (5) the recent increase in
demand for the company's oil country tubular goods (OCTG) in
North America; (6) the company's moderate capex and financial
policy focus on deleveraging; and (7) its strong liquidity,
including a large cash cushion.

At the same time, Evraz's Ba3 rating factors in (1) the likely
strengthening of the average exchange rate for the rouble in
2017, which would constrain the company's EBITDA growth; (2) the
fragile demand for steel in the Russian construction sector,
which is the major consumer of Evraz's steel products; (3) the
volatility in prices of steel and feedstock; and (4) fairly low
oil prices, which limit the potential for growth in demand for
OCTG in North America.

The B1 rating of Evraz's senior unsecured notes is one notch
below the company's CFR. This differential reflects Moody's
assumption that the notes are structurally subordinated to more
senior obligations of Evraz group, including secured and
unsecured debt at the level of Evraz's operating subsidiaries.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Evraz's
financial metrics, free cash flow generation and liquidity will
be commensurate with its Ba3 rating on a sustainable basis.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Moody's could upgrade Evraz's ratings if the company (1) reduces
its Moody's-adjusted gross debt/EBITDA towards 3.0x on a
sustainable basis; (2) continues to generate a positive free cash
flow; and (3) maintains healthy liquidity.

The rating could be downgraded if the company's (1) Moody's-
adjusted gross debt/EBITDA rises above 4.0x on a sustained basis;
or (2) its liquidity deteriorates materially.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Steel
Industry published in October 2012.

Evraz is one of the largest vertically integrated steel, mining
and vanadium companies in Russia. Evraz's main assets are steel
plants and rolling mills (in Russia, North America, Europe,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine), iron ore and coal mining facilities, as
well as trading assets. In 2016, Evraz generated revenues of $7.7
billion (2015: $8.8 billion) and Moody's-adjusted EBITDA of $1.5
billion (2015: $1.4 billion). EVRAZ plc currently holds 100% of
the company's share capital and is itself jointly controlled by
Mr. Roman Abramovich, Mr. Alexander Abramov, Mr. Alexander Frolov
and Mr. Eugene Shvidler.


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S W E D E N
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HOIST KREDIT: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating on Review for Upgrade
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for upgrade the
ratings of Hoist Kredit AB (publ) (Hoist), including the
company's Ba1/Not Prime long- and short-term issuer and Ba1
senior unsecured ratings, its senior unsecured and subordinated
EMTN programme ratings of (P)Ba1 and (P)B1, as well as the short-
term programme rating (P)NP. Concurrently, the rating agency has
also affirmed Hoist's long- and short-term Counterparty Risk
Assessment (CR Assessment) of Baa3(cr)/P-3(cr) and its ba3
baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA.

The rating action follows an announcement released by Hoist on
April 27, 2017 indicating that the debt purchaser plans to issue
new subordinated debt in the coming weeks. The review for upgrade
reflects the rating agency's assessment of a high likelihood that
the planned debt issuance will be sufficiently substantial to
materially increase the loss absorption cushion available to
creditors in the unlikely event of a failure.

RATINGS RATIONALE

REVIEW FOR UPGRADE

Moody's has placed the issuer and senior unsecured debt ratings
of Hoist on review for upgrade to reflect the announced issuance
of new subordinated debt and its potential impact on Moody's Loss
Given Failure analysis.

While Hoist's funding plan states an intention to replace an
existing subordinated debt with the newly planned issue under its
EMTN programme, Moody's anticipates that the amount that will be
raised in the coming weeks could well exceed the size of the
company's current outstanding junior debt, which would provide a
more substantial cushion of protection for creditors over the
coming years in the event of failure. Hoist, along with other
Swedish financial institutions, is subject to a bail in regime
under Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.

The review process will focus on the specific size of the
placement in the context of Hoist's overall liability structure,
along with the rating agency's assessment of its sustainability
over the longer term, taking into account the pace of growth
anticipated at Hoist over that time horizon.

AFFIRMATION OF BCA AND ADJUSTED BCA

The affirmation of Hoist's ba3 BCA is underpinned by its balanced
fundamental performance, with solid retail deposit-funded
profile, large liquidity base and sound capitalization. However,
this is against the backdrop of a monoline business model, modest
profitability and its inherently risky portfolio of acquired non-
performing loans.

Moody's views Hoist's funding as a key ratings strength, with a
large deposit base, albeit formed by the more risky internet
deposits, forming 62% of the total balance sheet as of March
2017. This compares favourably with other debt purchasers which
are traditionally wholesale funded. In addition, Hoist maintains
a strong and relatively stable liquidity buffer which accounts
for 30% of total assets at the end of the first quarter 2017,
giving Hoist flexibility to acquire debt portfolios without
having to seek additional financing. Hoist's sound capitalization
has been increasing and the company's tangible common equity to
risk-weighted assets reached 16% while leverage (measured by
tangible common equity to total assets) reached 14% as of year-
end 2016 (from 10.8% and 8.1%, respectively in 2014), and is
stronger than both rated Swedish banks and other European debt
purchasers.

These strengths are counterbalanced by Hoist's monoline business
model, where around 90% of the company's revenues are generated
by its debt purchasing business. Although Hoist acquires the non-
performing loan portfolios at a significant discount, allowing
for higher recovery potential, they remain speculative in nature.
The main risks associated with these acquisitions are related to
(1) their valuation and model pricing, (2) concentration of
suppliers (loan originators or vendors), and (3) possible
litigation or other legislative actions. Hoist's profitability
lags behind other debt purchasers, which is party mitigated by
higher earnings stability. Nonetheless, the company's return on
average assets has shown some improvement to 2.3% in 2016,
compared to 1.4% in 2015.

  -- WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Hoist's issuer and senior debt ratings, as well as programme
ratings could be upgraded by one notch if the company
significantly increases the size of its subordinated debt and
Moody's assesses that the significantly enhanced cushion for
creditors will be maintained in a stable way over time. Although
not currently anticipated, Hoist's BCA could be upgraded if the
company: (1) significantly improves its profitability on a
sustained basis without increasing earnings volatility; (2)
increases capital targets and demonstrates ability to maintain
high capital levels; and/or (3) diversifies its business model.

The company's BCA could be downgraded if : (1) Hoist materially
increases its market funding reliance; (2) it experiences a
protracted decrease in profitability or in its solvency ratios;
and/or (3) its asset quality deteriorates. A downward movement in
Hoist's BCA would likely result in a downgrade of all ratings.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Hoist Kredit AB (publ)

Placed on review for upgrade:

-- LT Issuer rating (Foreign Currency), currently Ba1, outlook
    changed to Rating Under Review from Stable

-- ST Issuer rating (Foreign Currency), currently Not Prime

-- Senior Unsecured rating (Foreign Currency), currently Ba1,
    outlook changed to Rating Under Review from Stable

-- Senior Unsecured MTN rating (Foreign Currency), currently
    (P)Ba1

-- Other Short Term rating (Foreign Currency), currently (P)Not
    Prime

-- Subordinated MTN rating (Foreign Currency), currently (P)B1

Affirmed:

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, affirmed ba3

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, affirmed ba3

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed Baa3(cr)

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed Prime-3(cr)

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Rating Under Review from Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM: Moody's Cuts Sr. Unsec. LT Rating to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 the
senior unsecured long-term rating and to (P)Ba1 from (P)Baa3 the
senior unsecured medium term note (MTN) program rating of
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Ericsson), a leading global
provider of telecommunications equipment and related services to
mobile and fixed network operators.

Concurrently, Moody's has assigned Ericsson a Ba1 corporate
family rating (CFR) and a Ba1-PD probability of default rating
(PDR), in line with the rating agency's practice for corporates
with non-investment-grade ratings. The outlook on all ratings is
stable.

"The downgrade of Ericsson's ratings reflects the anticipated
negative impact on the company's operating earnings and cash flow
in 2017 and 2018 due to rising restructuring charges and
provisions, as recently announced by the company, leading to
credit metrics that will no longer be commensurate with
investment-grade ratings," says Alejandro N£nez, a Moody's Vice
President -- Senior Analyst and lead analyst for Ericsson.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings downgrade primarily reflects the negative near- and
medium-term financial implications that Moody's anticipates will
arise in 2017 and 2018 from the company's strategic review
announcement of March 28, 2017 and detailed further in the
company's Q1 2017 results.

For Q1 2017, Ericsson reported a 11% year-on-year revenue decline
and a drop in its gross margin to 13.9% (30.5% adjusted to
exclude restructuring charges, write-down of assets and
provisions related to the strategic review) from 26.1% (29.4%
adjusted) in Q4 2016. In March 2017, the company announced an
acceleration of its existing restructuring program by outlining
estimated restructuring charges of SEK 6 -- SEK 8 billion for
FY2017 (contrasted with SEK3 billion of restructuring charges for
FY2017 announced in January 2017) as well as provisions of SEK8.3
billion related to a revaluation of customers discounts, a
reassessment of the value of trade receivables and certain
transformation projects in the IT & Cloud division.

While Moody's recognizes the strategic review's intention to
increase investment in certain core portfolio areas and that the
company's cost savings initiatives should deliver longer term
operating expense savings (after associated restructuring
charges), the rating agency also highlights that a strategy
premised primarily on cost-cutting is not sustainable over the
long run and could also hamper the company's competitiveness
including its ability to innovate and maintain its historical
technological leadership position.

Moody's notes that the company's declining operating cash flow
and restructuring charges are likely to continue to erode
Ericsson's key credit metrics over the coming year. Ericsson's
materially reduced EBITDA generation alongside elevated levels of
debt led to a significant increase in the company's (Moody's-
adjusted) gross debt/EBITDA ratio to 4.6x for FY2016 compared
with 1.9x at the end of FY2015. Based on the company's revenue
guidance of -2% to -6% in 2017 for its core networking equipment
market and including the effects of the recently announced
restructuring and provisions charges as well as its dividend cut
for 2017, Moody's anticipates that Ericsson's gross debt/EBITDA
ratio (Moody's-adjusted) will trend above 7x for FY2017.

Despite the company's publicly stated financial policies, its
relatively high exposure to the competitive wireless networking
equipment market without sufficiently offsetting earnings
contribution from other market segments, coupled with its revenue
headwinds and uncompetitive cost structure, will continue to
hamper Ericsson's ability to exhibit credit characteristics
consistent with an investment-grade profile over the next two
years.

The Ba1 ratings continue to reflect: (1) Moody's expectation of a
continued negative revenue and earnings growth outlook in 2017
and 2018 driven by softening market demand during a cyclical
trough as well as intense competition amidst gradual structural
shifts in the sector's competitive and technological landscape;
(2) the lack of sufficient growth or earnings contribution from
the company's IT & Cloud or Media divisions to offset weakness in
the Networks division; (3) the structural challenge that Ericsson
faces because of its heavy exposure to the wireless networking
equipment market which is unlikely to see material growth before
2020 as the next technology investment cycle (5G) is expected to
ramp up more significantly from around 2020; and (4) a weakened
financial profile, driven by a relatively high cost base and
declining revenues, leading to significantly reduced operating
earnings and continued negative free cash flow generation.
Furthermore, the unpredictable development of pending questions
from US authorities, regarding Ericsson's anti-corruption program
and specific cases, represents an event risk which further
constrains the ratings in the short to medium term.

These negative considerations are balanced against: (1) Moody's
expectation that the company's cost savings activities begin to
evidence a stabilization of the company's operating earnings
trajectory by the second half of 2018; (2) a maintenance of the
company's good liquidity position; (3) financial policies within
the limits of the company's free cash flow generation and
liquidity resources; and (4) a track record of shareholder
support. Moody's considers Ericsson's solid liquidity and main
shareholders' support to be the company's two principal
supportive credit factors in this period of structural
challenges.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that: (1)
Ericsson's total revenue decline in FY2017 will not be materially
higher than the -2% to -6% range guided by the company for its
core networking equipment market with a subsequent material
improvement in its revenue trajectory in FY2018; (2) the company
will not implement restructuring charges and/or provisions,
beyond those announced to date, that would require further
material cash outflows over the next two years; (3) a modest
improvement in the gross leverage level in FY2018 from the
deterioration in gross leverage Moody's projects for FY2017; (4)
modest progress in FY2018 operating margins from levels that
Moody's anticipates will be near 0% in FY2017; (5) there will be
no material worsening of the company's free cash flow trend
compared with that of FY2016; (6) Ericsson will continue to
maintain a good liquidity profile to buffer its expected negative
free cash flow over at least the next year; and (7) the company
maintains financial policies which balance the interests of
creditors and shareholders. The outlook also reflects Moody's
expectation that Ericsson's adjusted gross debt/EBITDA (Moody's-
adjusted, excluding restructuring charges and provisions) will be
around 7x in FY2017.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given rating action, a rating upgrade over the short term is
unlikely. However, over time, Moody's could upgrade the rating
if: (1) the announced restructuring program starts bearing fruit
leading to a sustainable recovery of the company's operating
performance such that its operating margins returned consistently
into a high single-digit percentage range; (2) the company were
to better diversify its earnings base which is currently highly
exposed to the cyclical and highly competitive wireless
networking equipment market; (3) Ericsson demonstrates a
sustainably robust competitive position and technological
leadership; (4) end-market demand were to rebound quicker than
currently anticipated into positive revenue growth territory over
a 12-month horizon; (5) free cash flow were to be materially and
sustainably positive; and (6) Ericsson's own liquidity sources
were to improve materially from currently projected FY2017-FY2018
levels such that it achieved a net cash position (including the
company's pension deficit) and reduces gross leverage from
currently excessive levels.

Negative pressure could be exerted on Ericsson's ratings in the
case of: (1) negative operating margins in FY2017 with no
expectation of a material margin recovery in FY2018; (2) a
further deterioration of free cash flow (post-dividends) and/or
gross leverage in FY2017, relative to FY2016, without the
prospect of a material recovery in FY2018; (3) a diminished
competitive position, particularly in the core Networking
division as the 5G investment cycle approaches; (4) a further
material decline in the company's own liquidity sources; and/or
(5) the imposition of a material fine resulting from the pending
questions from US authorities.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Assignments:

Issuer: Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson

-- LT Corporate Family Rating, Assigned Ba1

-- Probability of Default Rating, Assigned Ba1-PD

Downgrades:

Issuer: Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba1
    from Baa3

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to
    (P)Ba1 from (P)Baa3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable from Negative

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Diversified
Technology Rating Methodology published in December 2015.

With revenues of SEK222.6 billion in FY2016, Telefonaktiebolaget
LM Ericsson ("Ericsson") is a leading provider of
telecommunications equipment and related services to mobile and
fixed network operators globally. Its equipment is used by over
1,000 networks in more than 180 countries and around 40% of the
global mobile traffic passes through its systems. In FY2016,
Ericsson's Networks division contributed 49%, Global Services
46%, and Support Solutions 5% of group revenues, respectively.
Geographically, revenues are well diversified across all major
regions in North America, Europe, Asia and Rest of the World. The
company's largest shareholders are Investor AB (Aa3 stable) and
AB Industrivarden (unrated), with voting rights of 21.7% and
15.2%, respectively.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


DIAMANTBANK: Has Potential Investor, Board Chairman Says
--------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the transition bank created on the
basis of Diamantbank declared insolvent earlier will have enough
attractive assets, and the bank has a potential investor.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, Diamantbank Board Chairman Oleh
Khodachuk wrote on his Facebook page on April 28 "In four days
after the introduction of interim administration the bank's
employees carried out titanic work resulted in submitting an
application of a qualified investor on the first working day of
[this] week.  This will be done using the creation of a
transition bank that will be sold to the investor with the
transfer of assets and liabilities of the insolvent bank to the
investor and the liquidation of the insolvent bank."

Mr. Khodachuk said that the Individuals Deposit Guarantee Fund
announced the start of an open tender among preliminarily
qualified investors, Interfax-Ukraine relates.

He said that the bank's managers plan to compensate all deposits
to the public and a part of deposits of companies in the
transition bank, Interfax-Ukraine notes.

The National Bank of Ukraine on April 24 recognized Diamantbank
(Kyiv) insolvent, Interfax-Ukraine recounts.

Following the National Bank's decision, the Individuals' Deposit
Guarantee Fund decided to withdraw the bank from the market by
introducing temporary administration for one month -- until
May 23, 2017, Interfax-Ukraine relays.

Diamantbank ranked 24th among 93 operating banks as of January 1,
2017, in terms of total assets worth UAH 7.414 billion, according
to the NBU.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
============================


BHS GROUP: Dominic Chapell's Retail Acquisitions Face Liquidation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ravender Sembhy at The Scotsman reports that former BHS owner
Dominic Chappell's family business has been placed into
liquidation, paving the way for administrators to seek GBP6
million owed to the collapsed retailer.

According to The Scotsman, a court ruled on May 4 that Retail
Acquisitions, which Mr. Chappell used to buy BHS for GBP1 in
2015, could be liquidated after weeks of wrangling.

It means that administrators at Duff & Phelps, who are attempting
to return money to creditors, can access Retail Acquisitions'
financial accounts, The Scotsman states.

Under Mr. Chappell's tenure as owner of BHS, GBP8.4 million was
taken out of the chain by Retail Acquisitions, with GBP6 million
still owed when it collapsed last year, The Scotsman discloses.

The administrators, as cited by The Scotsman, said: "Duff &
Phelps, acting on behalf of BHS Group Ltd, is satisfied that
Retail Acquisitions Limited (RAL) has been put into liquidation.

"The process of realising the assets of RAL can now commence to
the benefit of all the creditors of the BHS companies."

Mr. Chappell had argued against liquidating RAL as it would make
his own potential claim against Sir Philip Green's Arcadia Group
more difficult to pursue, The Scotsman relays.  Sir Philip owned
BHS for 15 years before selling it to Mr. Chappell, The Scotsman
notes.

BHS plunged into administration just over a year ago, impacting
11,000 jobs and around 19,000 pension holders, leaving a GBP571
million pension deficit, The Scotsman recounts.

                           About BHS

BHS Group was a high street retailer offering fashion for the
whole family, furniture and home accessories.

BHS was put into administration in April 2016 in one of the
U.K.'s largest ever corporate failures, according to The Am Law
Daily.  More than 11,000 jobs were lost and 20,000 pensions (the
U.K. equivalent of a 401k) put at risk after it emerged that the
company, which had more than 160 stores across the U.K., had a
pension deficit of GBP571 million (US$703 million), The Am Law
Daily disclosed.

Sir Philip Green, a retail magnate with a net worth of more than
US$5 billion, has been heavily criticized for his role in the
collapse of BHS, The Am Law Daily said.  Mr. Green and other
shareholders had taken around GBP580 million (US$714 million) out
of the business before selling it for just GBP1 (US$1.23), The Am
Law Daily noted.

Linklaters acted for Green's Arcadia Group on the sale of the
company to Retail Acquisitions, which was advised by London-based
technology, media and telecoms specialist Olswang, The Am Law
Daily added.

Weil Gotshal & Manges and DLA then took the lead roles on the
administration, acting for the company and administrators Duff &
Phelps, respectively, while Jones Day was appointed by the
administrators to investigate the actions of the company's former
directors, The Am Law Daily related.


ITHACA ENERGY: S&P Raises CCR to 'B' After Takeover Completion
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term corporate credit rating
on U.K.-based oil and gas development and production company
Ithaca Energy Inc. to 'B' from 'B-'.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P removed the rating from CreditWatch where
it had placed it with positive implications on Feb. 20, 2017.

S&P also raised by one notch to 'CCC+' the issue rating on
Ithaca's $300 million senior unsecured notes due 2019.  The
recovery rating remains '6', indicating S&P's expectation for
negligible recovery prospects in the event of a payment default.

The upgrade follows the completion of the friendly takeover of
Ithaca by the Israel holding company, Delek Group Ltd., which now
owns 76% of Ithaca's shares.  S&P now sees Ithaca as part of a
wider and stronger group and S&P considers it to be a moderately
strategic entity.  S&P continues to assess Ithaca's stand-alone
credit profile at 'b-'.

Delek has a diversified portfolio that includes off-shore natural
gas fields; finance and insurance companies; water distillation
activity; and power plants with a total market cap of about
$2.5 billion.  S&P understands that Delek plans to focus on
upstream energy activities while divesting its financial
activities.  According to Delek's management, Ithaca will expand
the group's footprint outside Israel.  It could become a
meaningful platform for further development in the North Sea and
provide exploration and production industry know-how.

On the other hand, S&P believes that Ithaca can benefit from
being part of Delek's portfolio.  These benefits can include:
reduction in the cost of debt, supporting growth and M&A
activity, and potential financial support if needed.  Notably, as
of May 3, 3017, none of Delek's non-Israeli entities needed a
financial support.  Hence, S&P's assumption cannot be backed by a
previous track-record.

On a stand-alone basis, the start of production from the Greater
Stella Area (GSA) in February 2017 is a game changer for the
company.  S&P expects that the company will almost double its
production to about 19,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day
(boe/d) in 2017, and foresee a reduction in operating costs to
about $18 per barrel (/bbl), from $23/bbl in 2016.  This could
also serve as a platform for future activities within the area,
bringing a further improvement in production capacity.  That
said, while GSA is a highly positive step for the company, S&P
still considers Ithaca's producing assets to be among the
smallest companies within its peer group.

Under S&P's base-case scenario, it projects an adjusted EBITDA of
about $200 million per year in 2017 and 2018, driven by the
increase in production of GSA, compared with $142 million
recorded in 2016.  The relatively strong results in 2016 were
achieved on the back of falling oil prices (average price of
$45.3), thanks to the company's hedging policy (realized gains of
about $80 millions).  S&P understands that the company aims to
further use hedges in the coming years to protect its cash flows.
For example, a change of $5/bbl in the average prices in 2017
will only have a $10 million-$15 million effect on the EBITDA.

These assumption underpins its estimate:

   -- A Brent oil price of $50 per barrel (/bbl) in 2017 and
      2018.  The company has hedges in place creating a floor for
      oil prices at a level of $50/bbl for 60% of the production
      in 2017.   Annual production averaging 19,000 boe/d in 2017
      increasing towards 22,000 in 2018 with a contribution of
      about 50% from GSA.  In 2016, the company produced
      9,300 boe/d;

   -- Opex of $18/bbl for the period 2017-2018, reduced from
      $23/bbl in 2016;

   -- Capex of about $75 million in 2017 increasing to
      $100 million in 2018; and

   -- No dividend payments, as the focus would remain on growth
      rather than returns to shareholders.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
for Ithaca:

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 4.0x-4.5x in 2017; and
   -- Positive free operating cash flow (FOCF) in 2017 of around
      $100 million.

Ithaca's aggressive financial risk profile is based on the
company's ability to improve its credit metrics in 2017 and
maintain adjusted debt to EBITDA of 4.0x-4.5x, compared to more
than 6x in 2016.  According to S&P's calculations, the company
will generate FOCF of about $100 million annually.  S&P will
continue to monitor the cash allocation between further
deleveraging and new growth opportunities, under the ownership of
Delek.

Ithaca's vulnerable business risk reflects S&P's view of the
company's limited and geographically concentrated scale of
production.  This compares negatively with other peers such as
Nostrum and EnQuest, each with a production of about 40,000
boe/d. It operates exclusively on the U.K. Continental Shelf,
with relatively limited diversification of production fields.
S&P therefore sees limited ability for the company to improve its
business risk profile without significant expansion activity.  On
the other hand, Ithaca's business model focuses on production and
development, rather than riskier exploration activities.

The stable outlook balances S&P's expectation for improved
results in the coming 12-18 months following the ramp-up of GSA,
with the limited upside for the rating in this period.

At this stage S&P do not envisage an additional rating action in
the coming 12-18 months.  In S&P's view, a higher rating would
require a stronger link between Delek Group and the company,
including a better understanding of Ithaca's future development.

Negative rating pressure is unlikely for the time being.  That
said, it could materialize under one of these scenarios:

   -- Any issue with GSA's production that will result in the
      impairment of the business, weakening the ties between
      Delek Group and the company.  Embarking on an aggressive
      expansion program or acquisition, resulting in a material
      increase in leverage, without a financial support from
      Delek Group.  Deterioration in the creditworthiness of
      Delek Group.


RANGERS FOOTBALL: GBP1 Sale Allowed Owner to Keep Metals Business
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Grant McCabe at Daily Mail reports that a court heard on May 3
the tycoon owner of Rangers was told by bankers he could keep
another part of his business empire if he sold the club on.

In 2011, Sir David Murray sold the Ibrox side for GBP1 to Craig
Whyte, 46, who now faces fraud allegations at the High Court in
Glasgow, Daily Mail recounts.

It is claimed Mr. Whyte bought the club fraudulently in the deal
before it went into administration in 2012, Daily Mail notes.

On May 3 the court heard how Sir David was told by bankers at
Lloyds that if the sale went through he would be allowed to keep
his Murray Metals firm, Daily Mail relates.

Jurors have previously been told that Sir David's empire owed the
bank hundreds of millions, leading to the restructuring of his
assets, Daily Mail relays.

According to Daily Mail, Mr. Whyte's QC Donald Findlay asked
senior Lloyds banker Ian Shanks if it had been the case that: "If
the Rangers deal is done then the Murray Metals business can be
acquired for GBP1?" The witness agreed that had been the case and
the club's debt had also to be settled in the deal, Daily Mail
notes.

Mr. Findlay then asked whether that had been "an incentive to get
the deal done", which Mr. Shanks confirmed, Daily Mail discloses.
The court also heard allegations that the club was being
"throttled into submission" by its bank at the time of its sale,
Daily Mail recounts.

Club chairman Alastair Johnston made the remark in a letter to
Mr. Shanks in January 2011, months before Craig Whyte took over,
Daily Mail states.

Mr. Johnston, as cited by Daily Mail, said Lloyds intended to
"drain every single penny out of the club" leaving "carnage" as a
result of policies which sought to eliminate debt of GBP18
million.

He insisted Lloyds wanted to drain money from the club "to the
extent Rangers as a thriving concern would be throttled into
submission", Daily Mail relays.

Mr. Findlay asked whether Lloyds wanted the club to go into
administration, which Mr. Shanks denied, Daily Mail states.

The trial, before Judge Lady Stacey, continues, Daily Mail notes.

                   About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC -- http://www.rangers.premiumtv.co.uk/
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.


RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE 29: S&P Rates Class F1-Dfrd Notes BB+ (sf)
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its credit ratings to Residential
Mortgage Securities 29 PLC's (RMS 29) class A to F1 - Dfrd notes.
S&P's ratings address the timely receipt of interest and the
ultimate repayment of principal on the class A notes, and the
ultimate payment of interest and principal on the other rated
classes of notes.  At closing, RMS 29 also issued unrated class
F2, F3, X1, X2, and Z notes.

RMS 29 is a securitization of a pool of buy-to-let and owner-
occupied residential mortgage loans, to nonconforming borrowers,
secured on properties in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern
Ireland.

Of the collateral pool, Kensington Mortgage Co. Ltd. (KMC) and
affiliates originated 45.38%, Kensington Personal Loans Ltd.
(KPL) originated 0.53%, and Money Partners Ltd. originated
52.13%.  The remainder is made up of acquired loans.  At closing,
the issuer purchased the portfolio from the seller (Kayl PL
S.a.r.l) and obtained the beneficial title to the mortgage loans.
The majority (68%) of the initial pool was previously securitized
in earlier Kensington transactions: Residential Mortgage
Securities 19 PLC (7.46%), Residential Mortgage Securities PLC 22
(16.97%), Money Partners Securities 1 PLC (8.07%), Money Partners
Securities 2 PLC (10.60%), and Money Partners Securities 3 PLC
(24.92%).  These transactions are to be called in the coming
months, but the beneficial interest in the mortgage loans
transferred, on the closing date, to the issuer.

At closing, the transaction's reserve fund was funded from the
class Z notes and part of the class X2 notes.  The required
amount of this fund is 3.5% of the class A to F3 notes at
closing.  The required amount of the reserve fund decreases after
two years to 3% (i.e., the class Z notes' closing balance).
There is a liquidity reserve, which is funded if the reserve fund
falls below 2% of the outstanding balance of the class A to F3
notes.  The required balance of the liquidity reserve is 4% of
the class A notes and amortizes in line with the class A notes.

"In our analysis, we considered the potential for setoff arising
from capitalization redress payments required to be made to
borrowers in line with the Oct. 19, 2016 Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) consultation paper (GC16/6 - The fair treatment
of mortgage customers in payment shortfall: Impact of automatic
capitalisations).  The scale of this risk has not yet been
quantified but we expect the FCA to finalize its guidance in
relation to this in Q1 or Q2 2017.  In light of this uncertainty,
we have made some assumptions and performed some sensitivity
analysis around potential setoff by borrowers based on the
guidance on potential costs given by the FCA in its consultation
paper.  We do not expect a change in ratings, but if the level of
redress is greater than expected under the framework put in
place, there may be a negative effect on ratings.  Further
mitigation is provided through the reserve fund, which could be
used to cover this.  We expect this issue to be resolved and all
payments to be made to borrowers by June 2018, in line with the
FCA paper," S&P said.

The notes' interest rate is based on an index of three-month
LIBOR.  Within the mortgage pool, the loans are linked to either
the Bank of England Base Rate, the Money Partners Variable Rate,
the Kensington Variable Rate, or three-month LIBOR.  There is no
swap in the transaction to cover the interest rate mismatches
between the assets and liabilities.

KMC acts as mortgage administrator for all of the loans in the
transaction.  However, it has delegated its functions to Homeloan
Management Ltd.  There is also the intention under the
transaction documents for KMC, in its role as mortgage
administrator, to delegate the servicing function to Acenden
Ltd., which S&P has considered in its analysis.

S&P's ratings reflect its assessment of the transaction's payment
structure, cash flow mechanics, and the results of S&P's cash
flow analysis to assess whether the rated notes would be repaid
under stress test scenarios.  Subordination and the reserve fund
provide credit enhancement to the notes.  Taking these factors
into account, S&P considers the available credit enhancement for
the rated notes to be commensurate with the ratings that S&P has
assigned.

RATINGS LIST

Residential Mortgage Securities 29 PLC
GBP532.50 Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate and Unrated Notes

Class         Rating            Amount
                              (mil. GBP)

A             AAA (sf)          359.43
B - Dfrd      AA (sf)            47.92
C - Dfrd      AA- (sf)           19.96
D - Dfrd      A (sf)             27.95
E - Dfrd      BBB (sf)           21.30
F1 - Dfrd     BB+ (sf)           11.98
F2            NR                 15.97
F3            NR                 27.99
X1            NR                 37.27
X2            NR                  7.99
Z             NR                 15.98

NR--Not rated.


SOHO HOUSE: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC+' on Bond Redemption
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on Soho House & Co Ltd to 'CCC+' from 'CCC'.  S&P
also raised its issue rating on the group's super senior
revolving credit facilities to 'B' from 'B-'.  The recovery
rating is unchanged at '1', indicating S&P's expectation of very
high (90%-100%; rounded estimate: 95%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

S&P subsequently withdrew all the ratings on the group at the
issuer's request.  The outlook was stable at the time of the
withdrawal.

S&P's rating actions follow Soho House's refinancing of its debt
capital structure, including the redemption of its senior secured
notes due 2018 at par.  In S&P's view, the refinancing has
improved the group's liquidity position by terming out its
maturities.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History
----------------------------------------------------
Author: Alfred L. Malabre, Jr.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 256 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry
Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/KNTLyr

Alfred Malabre's personal perspective on the U.S. economy over
the past four decades is firmly grounded in his experience and
knowledge. Economics Editor of The Wall Street Journal from 1969
to 1993 and author of its weekly "Outlook" column, Malabre was in
a singular position to follow the U.S. economy in recent decades,
have access to the major academic and political figures
responsible for economic affairs, and get behind the crucial
economic stories of the day. He brings to this critical overview
of the economy both a lively, often provocative, commentary on
the picture of the turns of the economy. To this he adds sharp
analysis and cogent explanation.

In general, Malabre does not put much stock in economists. "In
sum, the profession's record in the half century since Keynes and
White sat down at Bretton Woods [after World War II] provokes
dismay." Following this sour note, he refers to the belief of a
noted fellow economist that the Nobel Prize in this field should
be discontinued. In doing so, he also points out that the Nobel
for economics was not one originally endowed by Alfred Nobel, but
was one added at a later date funded by the central bank of
Sweden apparently in an effort to give the profession of
economists the prestige and notice of medicine, science,
literature and other Nobel categories.

Malabre's view of economists is widespread, although rarely
expressed in economic circles. It derives from the plain fact
that modern economists, even hugely influential ones such as John
Meynard Keynes, are wrong as many times as they are right. Their
economic theories have proved incomplete or shortsighted, if not
basically wrong-headed. For example, Malabre thinks of the
leading economist Milton Friedman and his "monetarist colleagues"
as "super salespeople, successfully merchandising.an economic
medicine that promised far more than it could deliver" from about
the 1960s through the Reagan years of the 1980s. But the author
not only cites how the economy has again and again disproved the
theories and exposed the irrelevance of wrong-headedness of the
policy recommendations of the most influential economists of the
day. Malabre also lays out abundant economic data and describes
contemporary marketplace and social activities to show how the
economy performs almost independently of the best analyses and
ideas of economists.

Malabre does not engage in his critiques of noted economists and
prevailing economic ideas of recent decades as an end in itself.
What emerges in all of his consistent, clear-eyed, unideological
analysis and commentary is his own broad, seasoned view of
economics-namely, the predominance of the business cycle. He
compares this with human nature, which is after all the substance
of economics often overlooked by professional and academic
economists with their focus on monetary policy, exchange rates,
inflation, and such. "The business cycle, like human nature, is
here to stay" is the lesson Malabre aims to impart to readers
interested in understanding the fundamental, abiding nature of
economics. In Lost Prophets, in language that is accessible and
jargon-free, this author, who has observed, written about, and
explained economics from all angles for several decades,
persuasively makes this point.

In addition to holding a top position at The Wall Street Journal,
Malabre is also the author of the books, Understanding the New
Economy and Beyond Our Means, which received the George S. Eccles
Prize from the Columbia Business School as the best economics
book of 1987.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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