TCREUR_Public/170509.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Tuesday, May 9, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 91


                            Headlines


F R A N C E

BOUYGUES SA: Egan-Jones Upgrades Sr. Unsecured Debt Ratings to BB


G E R M A N Y

RICKMERS HOLDING: Bondholders Criticize Restructuring Scheme


I R E L A N D

HOUSE OF EUROPE: S&P Affirms 'CC' Ratings on 7 Note Classes
IRISH BANK: Creditors Have to Wait Years to Recover Claims


I T A L Y

ALITALIA: KBRA Comments on Impact of Administration on Lessors


M A L T A

VISTAJET GROUP: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC+' on Weaker Liquidity


N E T H E R L A N D S

WOOD STREET CLO V: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to BB-


N O R W A Y

NORWEGIAN AIR: Egan-Jones Cuts Commercial Paper Ratings to C


R U S S I A

BALTIC FINANCIAL: S&P Discontinues 'B-' Ratings Ff. Merger
ER-TELECOM: S&P Puts 'B+' CCR on CreditWatch Negative


S P A I N

REPSOL SA: Egan-Jones Raises Sr. Unsecured Ratings to BB-


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AMIGO LOANS: S&P Affirms 'B+' Issuer Rating, Outlook Stable
TOREX RETAIL: High Court Tosses Suit v. RBS Restructuring Unit
TRYDAN RETAIL: Sales Decline Prompts Liquidation
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC: Bankruptcy May Impact Moorside Project


                            *********



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F R A N C E
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BOUYGUES SA: Egan-Jones Upgrades Sr. Unsecured Debt Ratings to BB
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings, on April 18, 2017, raised the local currency
and foreign currency senior unsecured ratings on debt issued by
Bouygues SA to BB from BB-.

Bouygues SA is a France-based group that operates in two sectors:
Telecommunications and Media, and Construction.


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G E R M A N Y
=============


RICKMERS HOLDING: Bondholders Criticize Restructuring Scheme
------------------------------------------------------------
The financially troubled Rickmers Holding AG tries to convince
its creditors to consent to an extensive restructuring scheme in
order to save the group from potential insolvency.  Bondholders
are requested to participate in a voting without meeting about
this scheme from May 8, until May 10.

Unfortunately, many aspects of the proposed restructuring scheme
remain uncertain or proof to be a disadvantage, especially for
bondholders.

Key Aspects for Bondholders of Rickmers Holding AG

   -- Rickmers Holding AG intends to pay interests of 8.875% due
June 11 -- but only if bondholders consent to the proposed
restructuring scheme.

   -- All other claims of bondholders -- especially the claim for
repaying the capital -- will be transferred by Rickmers Holding
AG to a Luxembourgian corporation (LuxCo), which will be founded
for this purpose only. LuxCo will then be the sole contracting
party and the bondholders' only debtor.

   -- In return LuxCo will acquire 75.1% of the shares in
Rickmers Holding AG. Therefore Rickmers Holding AG will increase
its capital.  LuxCo is supposed to sell the acquired shares
within three years.  Of the proceeds it will repay bondholders
(after paying other costs, taxes etc.) As there are other
creditors besides the bondholders (e.g. HSH Nordbank),
bondholders will get only 57.6% of the proceeds.

Julia Breier-Struss, Schirp Neusel & Partner said: "Bondholders
can't be certain that Rickmers Holding AG really pays the
interests of 8.875% in June.  It may very well be the intention
of Rickmers Holding AG, but bondholders are supposed to advance
their trust.  Especially because the restructuring scheme is not
bound to the condition that interests will really be paid, even
though it would be easy to declare that."

Election of Joint Representative and Accreditation

A joint representative of bondholders should not be nominated by
the issuer as he is obliged to exclusively represent their
interests and has to analyze the concept critically before
joining negotiations.  It is also advantageous to choose somebody
who is well experienced and has filled this position before.
With the candidates presented so far, that is not the case.
Therefore we have been asked by bondholders to candidate as well
and countermotions have been submitted referring to our
candidature.

But the joint representative should not be empowered to decide
all by himself whether he, as the bondholders' representation,
consents to the scheme or not. Instead, the bondholders' meeting
should vote on the final scheme and give voting instructions to
the joint representative.

Ms. Breier-Struss said: "At present, bondholders do not have
enough information to come to a well informed decision regarding
the proposed restructuring scheme.  Therefore we call on the
issuer to provide more information. Until this will have been
effected, we do not suggest to consent."

In the event that the voting without meeting lacks the quorum of
at least 50% of participating bondholders, a second voting is to
be called where bondholders will be able to meet in person.
Right now, this would be the most favorable option.

                    About the Rickmers Group

The Rickmers Group is an international service provider in the
maritime transport sector and a vessel owner, based in Hamburg.
In the Maritime Assets segment the Rickmers Group is active as
Asset Manager for its own vessels and also for those of third
parties.  The Group initiates and coordinates shipping
projects, organizes financing and acquires, charters and sells
ships.  In the Maritime Services business segment the Rickmers
Group provides ship management services for its own vessels as
well as for those owned by third parties; these services comprise
technical and operational management, crewing, newbuild
supervision, consultancy and insurance-related services.


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I R E L A N D
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HOUSE OF EUROPE: S&P Affirms 'CC' Ratings on 7 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit rating on House of Europe
Funding V PLC's class A1 notes.  At the same time, S&P has
affirmed its ratings on the class A2, A3a, A3b, B, C, D, E1, and
E2 notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction using data from the February 2017 trustee report,
and the application of S&P's relevant criteria.

Since S&P's Feb. 19, 2016 review, it has observed several changes
to key performance indicators in this transaction.  These changes
include:

   -- Due to portfolio amortization, the exposure to assets rated
      in the 'CCC category' ('CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-') has
      increased in percentage terms (up to 20% from 15%).

   -- Defaulted assets (assets rated below 'CCC-') have increased
      to 17.9% from 10.6%, resulting in further par losses in the
      transaction.

   -- The weighted-average spread is in the same range, but with
      a small improvement (currently 0.69%, up from 0.62%).

   -- All par coverage tests continue to be below the required
      thresholds.  The breaches of coverage tests have resulted
      in an increase in the outstanding balance of the deferrable
      notes (classes C, D, and E).  The interest due on these
      notes is used to cure the coverage tests.

   -- According to S&P's analysis, deleveraging has increased the
      concentration risk in the portfolio, which S&P has captured
      in its supplemental tests.  The number of obligors in the
      pool has decreased to 34 from 42.

S&P determined the scenario default rates (SDRs) by running the
portfolio data (from February 2017) through the CDO Evaluator
model, which is an integral part of S&P's methodology for rating
and monitoring collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions.
Through a Monte Carlo simulation, the CDO Evaluator assesses a
portfolio's credit quality, taking into consideration each
asset's credit rating, size, and maturity, the estimated
correlation between each pair of assets, and any bivariate
emerging market risk.  The portfolio's credit quality is
presented in terms of a probability distribution for potential
portfolio default rates. From this probability distribution, the
CDO Evaluator derives a set of SDRs, each of which identifies the
minimum level of portfolio defaults each CLO tranche is expected
to be able to withstand to support a specific rating level.  S&P
then compare the SDRs to the results generated in our cash flow
analysis for each rated tranche within the CLO transaction.

Although the SDRs generally reflect the amount of credit support
required at each rating level based on the credit characteristics
of the portfolio, S&P uses its proprietary cash flow model to
determine the applicable percentile break-even default rate (BDR)
for each tranche, given the stresses specified by S&P's criteria
for generating cash flow analysis at various rating levels.  The
cash flow analysis and BDRs take into account the transaction's
capital structure, interest and principal diversion mechanisms,
payment mechanics, and general characteristics of the portfolio
collateral.  For each rated tranche, the BDRs represent an
estimate of the maximum level of gross defaults--based on S&P's
cash flow stress assumptions--that a tranche can withstand and
still fully repay the noteholders.

S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using its
shortened and additional default patterns and levels for each
rating category assumed for each class of notes, combined with
different interest stress scenarios as outlined in S&P's
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) of asset-backed securities
(ABS) criteria.

With just over 6% of the class A1 notes' original principal
balance remaining outstanding, the available credit enhancement
for the class A1 notes has increased since S&P's previous review.

S&P has therefore raised to 'A (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' its rating
on the class A1 notes.

S&P also applied supplemental tests outlined in its CDO of ABS
criteria (the largest obligor default test and the largest
industry default test).  These supplemental tests are additional
quantitative elements in S&P's analysis that are separate and
distinct from the Monte Carlo default simulations S&P run in the
CDO Evaluator and the cash flow analysis generated for each
transaction.  S&P considers that adding these tests to its
simulation model enhances its overall analysis because the tests
are intended to address both event and model risks that may be
present in rated transactions.  S&P's ratings on the notes are
not capped by the supplemental tests.

Although the class A1 notes could achieve a rating above 'A (sf)'
based on S&P's cash flow analysis and the supplemental test
analysis, the rating action is based on the maximum achievable
rating following the application of S&P's current counterparty
criteria.  BNP Paribas Securities Services (London Branch) is the
account bank for this transaction.  The downgrade provisions in
the transaction documents require the account bank to be replaced
with another financial institution having a minimum eligible
short-term rating of at least 'A-1+'.  As S&P's current short-
term rating on BNP Paribas Securities Services (London Branch) is
lower, at 'A-1', than the required trigger under S&P's
counterparty criteria, the maximum rating on the notes in this
transaction can be no higher than our 'A' long-term rating on the
counterparty.

S&P has affirmed its ratings on all other classes of notes based
on its credit and cash flow analysis.

House of Europe Funding V is a cash flow mezzanine structured
finance CDO transaction that closed in October 2006.

RATINGS LIST

House of Europe Funding V PLC
EUR1 bil fixed- and floating-rate notes and annuity notes
                                         Rating
Class            Identifier              To          From
A1               XS0272910661            A (sf)      BBB+ (sf)
A2               XS0272911479            B+ (sf)     B+ (sf)
A3a              XS0272911552            CC (sf)     CC (sf)
A3b              XS0272911982            CC (sf)     CC (sf)
B                XS0272912287            CC (sf)     CC (sf)
C                XS0272912873            CC (sf)     CC (sf)
D                XS0272913095            CC (sf)     CC (sf)
E1               XS0272913335            CC (sf)     CC (sf)
E2               XS0272913764            CC (sf)     CC (sf)


IRISH BANK: Creditors Have to Wait Years to Recover Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
Joe Brennan at The Irish Times reports that creditors of Anglo
Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide will have to wait years to find
out whether they will recover all that they are owed, as the cost
of liquidating the institution that was established to wind down
the failed lenders has soared to EUR222.6 million.

The liquidators of Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) said
on May 5 that they held EUR1.919 billion of net cash as of
Feb. 6, the fourth anniversary of the Government's decision to
liquidate the company, The Irish Times relates.  However, they
said the exact dividend for "unsecured creditors will not be
known for a number of years, primarily as a result of the large
level of litigation outstanding", The Irish Times notes.

This follows a move last year to return 25% of what was owed to
unsecured creditors, led by the State, which has a claim in for
EUR1.1 billion, The Irish Times states.

According to The Irish Times, unsecured creditors' final recovery
depends largely on the outcome of a legal case between the family
of businessman Sean Quinn and IBRC, which is not expected to be
heard until next year at the earliest, but more likely in 2019 or
2020.  The Quinns claim Anglo Irish lent them billions of euro
illegally in 2008 to shore up their investment in the bank, The
Irish Times discloses.

The liquidators currently estimate that unsecured creditors will
receive between 75% and 100% of what they are owed, The Irish
Times states.

However, at the back of the queue are a group of junior
bondholders, owed EUR285 million, who refused to share in Anglo
Irish's and Irish Nationwide's losses at the height of the
crisis, The Irish Times says.

All told, the liquidators received 3,000 claims from creditors
last year, of which 2,100 have been reviewed and adjudicated,
with the remaining either being considered or queried, The Irish
Times recounts.

IBRC is a defendant in 143 legal cases, The Irish Times
discloses.  It has a remaining loan book of EUR3.7 billion, The
Irish Times relays, citing the latest liquidation progress
report.

                 About Irish Bank Resolution

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.  Irish Bank Resolution sought assistance
from the U.S. court in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and
Irish Nationwide Building Society.  The two banks failed and were
merged into IBRC in July 2011.  IBRC is tasked with winding them
down and liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish
lawmakers adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was
placed into a special liquidation in the Irish High Court to
complete liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some EUR25 billion (US$33.5 billion).  About 70 percent
of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the
portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.  Total
liabilities in June 2012 were about EUR50 billion, according
to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

IBRC was granted protection under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code in December 2013.

Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson of KPMG have been named the
special liquidators.


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I T A L Y
=========


ALITALIA: KBRA Comments on Impact of Administration on Lessors
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kroll Bond Rating Agency on May 5 disclosed that on May 2, 2017,
the shareholders of Italy's flag carrier, Alitalia, voted
unanimously to file for extraordinary administration in Italy, a
form of creditor protection under Italian law that is similar to
U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy-code protection.  An extraordinary
administration typically seeks to restructure large-scale
organizations burdened with significant debt and other
liabilities.  Under Italian law, administrators will be appointed
to determine whether the airline should reorganize or be
liquidated for the benefit of creditors.

Alitalia was the subject of a bail-out in 2014 by means of a
significant capital injection from Etihad Airways, with goals of
achieving profitability during 2017.  However, increased
competition on routes operated by U.K.-based carriers and
significantly higher labor costs led to the ultimate failure of
Etihad Airways' profitability goals for Alitalia.  During late
April 2017, labor unions representing Alitalia workers rejected a
plan that called for job reductions and pay cuts for workers.
Following the failure of these negotiations, Etihad Airways
signaled an unwillingness to invest additional capital into the
company and shareholders ultimately agreed to file for
extraordinary administration proceedings on May 2, 2017.

Over the past year, Kroll Bond Rating Agency (KBRA) has closely
monitored the developments relating to Alitalia through
discussions with aircraft lessors/servicers and industry
participants as well aircraft manufacturers and has published a
comment with respect to the impact on its rated ABS transactions.

KBRA rates a number of aircraft lessors and is also following the
developments with Alitalia's restructuring and its impact on the
lessors, some of whom have notable exposure to the airline.  KBRA
is also considering the potential effects of this filing with
respect to certain aircraft types that may be under more
pressure, given the airline's potential plans for decreasing
participation in certain markets.  As such, KBRA will publish a
more comprehensive commentary on the aircraft lessors and the
market as a whole once more data is gathered from relevant market
participants.

                 About Kroll Bond Rating Agency

KBRA is registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organization (NRSRO). In addition, KBRA is recognized by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) as a
Credit Rating Provider (CRP).

                      About Alitalia

Alitalia-Compagnia Aerea Italiana has navigated its way through
a successful restructuring.  After filing for bankruptcy
protection in 2008, Alitalia found additional investors, acquired
rival airline Air One, and re-emerged as Italy's leading airline
in early 2009.  Operating a fleet of about 150 aircraft, the
airline now serves more than 75 national and international
destinations from hubs in Fiumicino (Rome), Milan, Turin, Venice,
Naples, and Catania.  Alitalia extends its network as a member of
the SkyTeam code-sharing and marketing alliance, which also
includes Air France, Delta Air Lines, and KLM.  An Italian
investor group owns a majority of the company, while Air France-
KLM owns 25%.


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M A L T A
=========


VISTAJET GROUP: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC+' on Weaker Liquidity
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had lowered its corporate credit
rating on the private jet services operator VistaJet Group
Holding Ltd. and its core subsidiaries VistaJet Malta Finance
P.L.C. and VistaJet Co Finance LLC to 'CCC+' from 'B-'.  The
outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P lowered the issue rating to 'CCC-' on the
$300 million notes issued by VistaJet Malta Finance P.L.C. and
VistaJet Co Finance LLC and guaranteed by VistaJet.

The downgrade to 'CCC+' and negative outlook follows S&P's view
that VistaJet will likely default on its debt obligations or seek
material modification to its financial leasing obligations,
absent significant improvement of its operational performance in
line with management expectations and external measures that
would materially improve its liquidity.

S&P estimates the company's financial leasing and interest
obligations for the 18 months until Sept. 30, 2018, to be
$575 million (including bullet repayments in the third quarter of
2018 for five aircraft) and believes that these can be fully
served only if the company receives a material equity injection
or if the company renegotiates its repayment profile, which S&P
might consider as a distressed restructuring.  S&P thinks that
the company's current capital structure, with an actual adjusted
debt to EBITDA of about 12x as of the end of 2016, is
unsustainable because the improving operational performance still
does not keep up with the agreed aggressive debt amortization
schedule.

S&P understands that VistaJet raised $31.5 million in primary
nonvoting equity in the first quarter of 2017, which was below
S&P's expectations and which was not sufficient to ease its
constrained liquidity position, in S&P's view.  The company had
only two aircraft on order in December 2016, to be delivered by
September 2017.  However, it decided to take one additional
aircraft in 2017, which exacerbates the liquidity position.

As of Dec. 31, 2016, the group has eight firm aircraft orders
with Bombardier and with related parties, which are controlled by
the founder but not consolidated with the group.  According to
the company the group has engaged in discussions to remarket
certain positions, including those with related parties and could
reduce its commitments to three aircrafts and $140 million
capital commitments.  The company also confirmed that it can
cancel the three remaining aircraft deliveries to VistaJet at no
cash cost to the group, if needed.

VistaJet announced that it had sold 2,500 new subscription based
annual flight hours (FSP) in the first quarter of 2017, which is
a significant improvement over the 1,400 sold in the first
quarter of 2016, and is slightly above the quarterly average new
FSP hours sold in 2016.  Furthermore, S&P understands that the
company entered into a deferral agreement with one of its lenders
related to an aircraft financing facility.  The deferral
agreement postponed $10.2 million of amortization payments
originally scheduled for March 2017 until June 2017.  The
deferred amount will accrue interest at an increased rate until
it is repaid in June.  In addition, an administrative fee was
paid so that the investor received adequate offsetting
compensation for the three months deferral in S&P's view.

Over the last three years, VistaJet has increased its fleet size
from 31 aircraft (in fiscal 2013) to 71 (fiscal 2016).
VistaJet's rapid growth and expansion in new markets has affected
the average utilization per aircraft, which remains below
historic figures. However, VistaJet is making progress in ramping
up its customer base although this does not keep up with the
fleet size and the company's original expectations.  The critical
customer base necessary to efficiently operate the fleet network
and utilize the planes has not been reached, in S&P's view.
Operating efficiency is, therefore, below S&P's expectations and
threatens the company's competitive advantage as the ramp-up of
new customers lags original targets.

S&P's issue ratings incorporate the material number of aircraft
and key operating entities that are mainly domiciled in Malta.
Because S&P has not performed a jurisdictional survey of Malta,
S&P do not apply a recovery analysis.  Instead, S&P determines
the difference between the corporate credit rating and the issue
rating by considering the amount of priority obligations ranking
ahead of the senior unsecured bondholders.  Because VistaJet's
current capital structure mainly consists of finance leases and
all the aircraft are secured, it has a very limited number of
unencumbered assets.  S&P calculates that priority obligations
would take up more than 70% of the group's total assets, and
therefore S&P's issue rating is two notches below the corporate
credit rating, at 'CCC-'.

S&P has revised down its assessment of VistaJet's liquidity (to
weak from less than adequate) based on S&P's belief that the
ratio of liquidity sources to uses for the upcoming 12 months
reflects a material deficit.

The negative outlook reflects the probability that S&P could
lower the ratings further if VistaJet's high expansion rate does
not translate into stronger cash flow generation over the next
few quarters and that the absence of additional equity injections
would lead to a further deteriorating liquidity profile.  S&P
could also lower the ratings if it believes the company will seek
restructuring or miss interest payments on its debt, resulting in
a default on its debt obligations.  This could include changing
its existing debt terms such that its lenders would receive less
than the original promise of the security.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable or raise the rating if
VistaJet's liquidity position stabilizes, thanks to measures to
boost liquidity sources, or significant improvement to cash flow
generation.


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N E T H E R L A N D S
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WOOD STREET CLO V: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to BB-
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' its
credit rating on Wood Street CLO V B.V.'s class B notes.  At the
same time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class A-T, A-D, A-
R, A-2, C-1, C-2, D, and Combo P notes, and have lowered S&P's
ratings on the class E-1 and E-2 notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction's
performance and the application of its relevant criteria.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for analyzing foreign
exchange risk in global structured finance transactions, it
placed those ratings that could potentially be affected under
criteria observation.  Following S&P's review of this
transaction, its ratings that could potentially be affected by
the criteria change are no longer under criteria observation.

Since S&P's Dec. 1, 2016 review, on aggregate the class A-T, A-R,
and A-D notes have amortized by a euro equivalent of
approximately EUR70.33 million, which represents nearly a 60%
reduction in the principal amount outstanding of these notes.

Taking into account the notes' amortization and the evolution of
the total collateral amount, overcollateralization has increased
for all of the rated classes of notes since S&P's previous
review.

However, asset amortization and defaults in the portfolio have
caused the portfolio's aggregate collateral balance to decrease
further, and the portfolio has therefore become more concentrated
than it was at S&P's previous review.

S&P subjected the capital structure to our cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each class of
notes at each rating level.  The BDRs represent S&P's estimate of
the level of asset defaults that the notes can withstand and
still fully pay interest and principal to the noteholders.

S&P has estimated future defaults in the portfolio in each rating
scenario by applying its updated corporate collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) criteria.

S&P's review of the transaction highlights that the available
credit enhancement for the class B notes is commensurate with a
higher rating than that currently assigned.  Therefore, S&P has
raised to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' its rating on the class B
notes.

While the available credit enhancement for all other classes of
notes has also increased since S&P's previous review, the
increase is insufficient to pass S&P's credit and cash flows at
higher rating levels.  S&P has therefore affirmed its ratings on
the class A-T, A-D, A-R, A-2, C-1, C-2, D, and P Combo notes.

For the class E-1 and E-2 notes (the most junior in the capital
structure), both the results from S&P's largest obligor default
supplemental test and credit and cash flow analysis are
commensurate with lower ratings than those currently assigned.
In S&P's view, the increase in the pool concentration and losses
in the overall portfolio have affected the results under S&P's
analysis.  As a result, S&P has lowered to 'BB- (sf)' from 'BB+
(sf)' its ratings on the class E-1 and E-2 notes.

Wood Street CLO V is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans granted to primarily
European speculative-grade corporate firms.  Alcentra Ltd.
manages the transaction.  The transaction closed in June 2007 and
entered its amortization period in November 2014.

RATINGS LIST

Class                Rating
              To               From

Wood Street CLO V B.V.
EUR515 Million Senior Secured And Subordinated Floating-Rate
Notes

Rating Raised

B             AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)

Ratings Lowered

E-1           BB- (sf)         BB+ (sf)
E-2           BB- (sf)         BB+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A-T           AAA (sf)
A-D           AAA (sf)
A-R           AAA (sf)
A-2           AAA (sf)
C-1           AA- (sf)
C-2           AA- (sf)
D             BBB+ (sf)
P Combo       AA+ (sf)


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N O R W A Y
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NORWEGIAN AIR: Egan-Jones Cuts Commercial Paper Ratings to C
------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings, on April 6, 2017, downgraded the local
currency and foreign currency commercial paper ratings on debt
issued by Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA to C from B.

Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA is a Norway-based company engaged in
the passenger transportation service industry.  The Company
operates scheduled services with additional charter services.


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R U S S I A
===========


BALTIC FINANCIAL: S&P Discontinues 'B-' Ratings Ff. Merger
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had discontinued its 'B-'
long-term and 'B' short-term counterparty credit ratings, as well
as its 'ruBBB' Russia national scale rating on Baltic Financial
Agency Bank (BFA).  This follows the completion of BFA's
reorganization in the form of a merger with BANK URALSIB (PJSC)
(B-/Positive/B).

On May 2, 2017, BFA announced that its reorganization in the form
of the merger with BANK URALSIB was complete and that BANK
URALSIB had taken on the legal responsibility of all BFA's
previously contracted obligations.


ER-TELECOM: S&P Puts 'B+' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has placed its 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating and 'ruA' Russia national scale rating on
Russia-based Er-Telecom on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The CreditWatch placement stems from Er-Telecom's more
acquisitive growth strategy than S&P previously expected, which
S&P thinks could result in its leverage ratio remaining higher
than 3.5x in 2017-2018, compared with around 3.8x at year-end
2016.  In particular, in first-quarter 2017, Er-Telecom made a
debt-financed acquisition for Russian ruble (RUB) 4.2 billion
(about US$75 million), and is currently placing a new RUB3
billion domestic bond that S&P understands will only partly be
used to refinance outstanding debt.  S&P assumes that the company
could somewhat reduce its leverage through contributions from
newly acquired entities and potential synergies.  However, S&P
currently has very limited visibility regarding the company's
targets, the expected EBITDA from the newly acquired assets, or
the potential integration costs.

In particular, S&P is concerned about the company's headroom
under the covenant on its RUB27 billion facility from VTB Bank
(RUB4.9 billion available at the moment), which limits leverage
(net debt to EBITDA) to 4.0x.  The already limited headroom could
tighten following significant debt-funded acquisitions and
increasing cash burn after capital expenditures.

However, S&P understands that this facility, which is the key
source of Er-Telecom's financing of further growth, alongside
domestic bond issuances, will remain available to Er-Telecom
until the end of 2017.  This is because VTB Bank has approved an
extension of this facility's availability period; S&P expects the
extension agreement will be signed soon.  This, along with the
proposed bond issuance, significantly mitigates the short-term
liquidity pressure resulting from Er-Telecom's high expansionary
spending, in S&P's view.

S&P's rating on Er-Telecom factors in the company's position as
Russia's second largest broadband operator after the incumbent
Rostelecom, offering internet, pay-TV, and fixed telephony
services under the DOM.RU brand.  This is balanced by exposure to
the competitive and saturated Russian broadband market, and by
the high country risks of operating in Russia, where all of Er-
Telecom's assets are located.

S&P also takes into account fierce competition, which, in its
view, will continue to put pressure on Er-Telecom's margins.  Er-
Telecom's adjusted EBITDA margin fell below 30% in 2016 from
34.6% in 2015 and 40.6% in 2014.  S&P expects that it will remain
under pressure in 2017.

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch within the next few weeks,
after receiving more information on Er-Telecom's use of the
proceeds from its proposed bond issuance, as well as its updated
budget and strategy, including recently acquired and potential
new assets.

S&P could lower the ratings by one notch if it forecasts that the
leverage ratio will remain higher than 3.5x in 2017-2018, without
any short-term recovery prospects.  S&P could also lower the
ratings if the company does not succeed in extending the
availability of the existing RUB27 billion facility.


=========
S P A I N
=========


REPSOL SA: Egan-Jones Raises Sr. Unsecured Ratings to BB-
---------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings, on April 11, 2017, upgraded the local
currency and foreign currency senior unsecured ratings on debt
issued by Repsol SA to BB- from B+.

Based in Madrid, Spain, Repsol S.A., through subsidiaries,
explores for and produces crude oil and natural gas, refines
petroleum, and transports petroleum products and liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG).  The Company retails gasoline and other
products through its chain of gasoline filling stations.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AMIGO LOANS: S&P Affirms 'B+' Issuer Rating, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' long-term issuer credit
rating on U.K.-based guarantor lender Amigo Loans Ltd.  The
outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B+' issue rating on the
senior secured notes issued by wholly owned subsidiary Amigo
Luxembourg S.A.  S&P also revised its recovery rating on these
notes to '4' from '3'.  The '4' recovery rating indicates S&P's
expectation of meaningful (30%-50%; rounded estimate 40%)
recovery in the event of a payment default.

Amigo maintains a leading position in the U.K. guarantor lending
market, a relatively new sector for the nonstandard lending
market.  Via its direct subsidiary Amigo Luxembourg, the company
has announced plans to raise a further GBP50 million from a tap
of its GBP275 million senior secured notes maturing in 2024,
leading to a decline in recovery prospects on these notes.  S&P
understands that the company intends to use the proceeds from the
issue for general corporate purposes, including financing growth
in the U.K. market.

S&P's assessment of Amigo's financial risk profile incorporates
approximately GBP162 million in shareholder loan notes, which
were partially paid down using proceeds from the company's
inaugural issuance.  Given the increased amount of senior secured
notes and an upsized super senior revolving credit facility
(RCF), coupled with S&P's anticipated revenue growth of 30%-35%
per year, S&P continues to expect that Amigo will gradually
reduce its leverage (debt to EBITDA) over the next few years.
This is in part due to our expectation that its debt will remain
relatively stable, in addition to EBITDA margins remaining
comparatively high as a result of Amigo's strong market position.
S&P expects gross debt to EBITDA will stay above 5.0x over the
next 12 months, while remaining on a declining trend overall,
owing to the company's cash-flow-generative business model.

S&P's recovery analysis takes into account Amigo's GBP57 million
super senior RCF, in addition to the senior secured notes that
will now total GBP325 million.  The increased amount of claims at
the senior secured creditor level lowers the recovery prospects,
given that S&P views Amigo's net enterprise value as broadly
unchanged.  With S&P's recovery expectations now at approximately
40%, versus 50% previously, S&P has revised its recovery rating
to '4' from '3'.

The notes continue to be guaranteed by the non-operating holding
company Amigo Holdings Ltd.  S&P's rating on Amigo is based on
the credit profile of the consolidated Amigo group, as S&P
foresees no material barriers to cash flows circulating within
the group.

The stable outlook on Amigo reflects S&P's expectation that the
company will steadily reduce its leverage over S&P's one-year
outlook horizon.  Specifically, S&P anticipates the company's
debt-to-EBITDA ratio will trend toward the middle of the 5.0x-
6.0x range.  S&P assumes that Amigo will maintain strong EBITDA
margins relative to peers, which should enable sustained revenue
growth. S&P anticipates that the company will continue to swiftly
expand its loan book.

"We could lower our rating on Amigo if our credit metrics did not
indicate a meaningful reduction in leverage, if its EBITDA growth
stagnated, or if we saw the company take on additional debt to
finance future growth.  Such developments would likely be
evidenced by a debt-to-EBITDA ratio not moving toward 5.0x and
would affect our assessment of Amigo's financial risk profile.
We could also lower the rating if we saw a marked increase in
impairments, or a rise in operational risks, which could dent
Amigo's cash flow generation and weaken its strength relative to
peers.  Lastly, we could also take a negative rating action if
the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority implemented regulatory
changes that limited Amigo's ability to grow with its current
business model," S&P said.

An upgrade of Amigo is not likely over S&P's one-year outlook
horizon, given the pace of the company's credit growth, its
leverage, and S&P's comparison of the company with peers.  A
positive rating action, if one were to occur, would likely result
from a marked improvement in Amigo's underlying financial metrics
beyond S&P's current base-case assumptions.


TOREX RETAIL: High Court Tosses Suit v. RBS Restructuring Unit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Oliver Gill at City A.M. reports that a High Court judge has
branded a case brought against Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) by a
customer of its restructuring division a "confusing mish mash" of
evidence and thrown it out before it even went to trial.

Neil Mitchell was hoping to bring legal action against the bank,
as well as KPMG and Cerberus, over the way his company, Torex
Retail, was treated by RBS' Global Restructuring Group (GRG),
City A.M. relates.

According to City A.M., Mr. Mitchell, the former chief executive
of Torex, claimed the three defendants conspired to push the firm
into an insolvency process and flog the assets for less than they
were worth.

The court started considering the evidence in March and on May 5
made its ruling on whether there was a case to be heard, City
A.M. discloses.

The May 5 ruling by Judge Malcolm Davis-White QC said he was
"extremely concerned" about Mr. Mitchell's representations to the
court, adding "I have serious doubts as to truth of the witness
statement," City A.M relays.

He also said the alleged conspiracy "makes little sense" and
called some of the details presented to him a "confusing mish
mash", City A.M. notes.

The case has been closely followed by other parties lining up
their own claims against RBS' GRG division, City A.M. states.

The bank has already set up a GBP400 million compensation pot for
small businesses treated unfairly by the firm's restructuring
team, according to City A.M.

Torex Retail develops software solutions for the retail; grocery,
petrol, and convenience stores; and hospitality sectors in the
United Kingdom and internationally.


TRYDAN RETAIL: Sales Decline Prompts Liquidation
------------------------------------------------
Owen Hughes at the Daily Post reports that Trydan Retail Ltd. has
called in liquidators.

The company went into voluntary liquidation and this month Nick
West and Phil Wood of BCR were appointed joint liquidators, the
Daily Post relates.

Mr. West on May 8 told the Daily Post that the directors took the
decision after a considerable decline in sales during the last
quarter and the "deficiency to creditors" exceeding GBP50,000.

Trydan Retail Ltd. is a bed and furniture retailer in Wrexham.


WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC: Bankruptcy May Impact Moorside Project
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Marlow and Jillian Ambrose at The Telegraph report that
Toshiba's bankrupt nuclear arm may be prevented from providing
any emergency funds to its overseas interests, throwing the
future of the Moorside nuclear plant in Cumbria into fresh doubt.

It has emerged that Westinghouse, the Toshiba-owned American
nuclear reactor developer, faces orders not to prop up any joint
venture agreements that it entered into before the company filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in March, The Telegraph relates.

Wall Street private equity giant Apollo has pledged an US$800
million (GB617 million) rescue loan to the Pennsylvania-based
company, which is awaiting court approval, while a group of hedge
funds is also interested in providing emergency financing, The
Telegraph discloses.

However, it is understood that many of these prospective new
investors want to see any fresh funds funnelled into Westinghouse
and its main subsidiaries, not foreign joint venture projects
like Moorside, The Telegraph notes.  They are calling for
partners involved in Toshiba's overseas interests to also step in
and provide support, The Telegraph relays.

The GBP18 billion Moorside project is a central pillar of the
UK's atomic energy program, The Telegraph states.  The 3.4
gigawatt plant will power up to 6m homes but it has been thrown
into doubt by Toshiba's financial crisis and the bankruptcy of
Westinghouse, according to The Telegraph.

                  About Westinghouse Electric

Westinghouse Electric Company LLC --
http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/-- is a U.S. based nuclear
power company founded in 1999 that provides design work and
start-up help for new nuclear power plants and makes many of the
components.  Westinghouse manufactures and supplies the
commercial fuel products needed to run the plants, and it offers
training, engineering, maintenance, and quality management
services.  Almost 50% of nuclear power plants around the world
and about 60% of U.S. plants are based on Westinghouse's
technology.  Westinghouse's world headquarters are located in the
Pittsburgh suburb of Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania.

On Oct. 16, 2006, Westinghouse Electric was sold for $5.4 billion
to a group comprising of Toshiba (77% share), partners The Shaw
Group (20% share), and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co.
Ltd. (3% share).  After purchasing part of Shaw's stake in 2013,
Japan-based conglomerate Toshiba obtained ownership of 87% of
Westinghouse.

Amid cost overruns at U.S. nuclear reactors it was building,
Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, along with 29 affiliates,
filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 17-10751)
on March 29, 2017.

In their petition, the Debtors listed total assets of $4.32
billion and total liabilities of $9.39 billion as of Feb. 28,
2017.

The petitions were signed by AlixPartners' Lisa J. Donahue, chief
transition and development officer.

The Hon. Michael E. Wiles presides over the cases.

Gary T. Holtzer, Esq., Robert J. Lemons, Esq., Garrett A. Fail,
Esq., and David N. Griffiths, Esq., at Weil, Gotshal & Manges
LLP, serve as counsel to the Debtors.  AlixPartners LLP serves as
the Debtors' financial advisor.  The Debtors' investment banker
is PJT Partners Inc.  Their claims and noticing agent is Kurtzman
Carson Consultants LLC.

Toshiba Nuclear Energy Holdings (UK) Ltd. is represented by
Albert Togut, Esq., Brian F. Moore, Esq., and Kyle J. Ortiz,
Esq., at Togut, Segal & Segal LLP.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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