TCREUR_Public/170510.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, May 10, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 92


                            Headlines


C R O A T I A

AGROKOR DD: HANFA Suspends ZSE Trading of 8 Units Until May 15
AGROKOR: S&P Lowers CCR to 'SD' on Missed Coupon Payment


F R A N C E

LABEYRIE FINE: Moody's Lowers LT Issuer Default Rating to B-


G E O R G I A

GEORGIA: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
GEORGIAN OIL: Fitch Affirms BB- LT Issuer Default Rating


G R E E C E

GREECE: Agreement a Pos. Step to Review Completion, Fitch Says


H U N G A R Y

FHB MORTGAGE: Moody's Raises Long Term Deposit Ratings to B2


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO IV: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to Caa3(sf)


L U X E M B O U R G

FLY FUNDING II: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on $448MM Term Loan B


N E T H E R L A N D S

QUEEN STREET CLO II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes


R O M A N I A

PIC SA: Saint-Gobain Acquires Hypermarket in Calarasi


R U S S I A

YUKOS OIL: Liquidation Deliberate Action Taken by Russia


S W E D E N

OVAKO GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B-' CCR


S W I T Z E R L A N D

SWISSPORT GROUP: Moody's Affirms B3 Corporate Family Rating


T U R K E Y

TURKEY: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Neg.


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

HONOURS PLC: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCsf'
IHS MARKIT: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR & Revises Outlook to Positive
TRANSLINE: Files Extension to NOI to go Into Administration
TULLOW OIL: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' CCR

* UK: BoE Publishes Special Debt of Banks Under Bailout Rules


                            *********



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C R O A T I A
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AGROKOR DD: HANFA Suspends ZSE Trading of 8 Units Until May 15
--------------------------------------------------------------
bne IntelliNews reports that the Croatian Financial Supervisory
Agency (HANFA) decided on May 2 to suspend all eight of
struggling Agrokor's subsidiaries listed on the Zagreb Stock
Exchange (ZSE) from trading until May 15.

On April 27, Agrokor said in a press release that restructuring
advisors have identified in preliminary investigations that there
could be potential errors in the group's accounts, bne
IntelliNews relates.  Agrokor intends to appoint
PricewaterhouseCoopers to perform an audit of its 2016
financials, and expects to issue a further announcement on
financials within next 30 days, bne IntelliNews discloses.
Agrokor also called its subsidiaries to hold general assemblies
within 15 days to appoint PwC to audit their 2016 financials, bne
IntelliNews relays.

According to bne IntelliNews, the ZSE suspended trading in
Agrokor's subsidiaries on April 27, until they publish their
audited financials.  Two of the eight subsidiaries, namely
tobacco retail chain Tisak and agricultural producer Vupik, have
already called general assembly meetings to be held on May 15 to
appoint PwC as the new auditor, bne IntelliNews says, citing
Vecernji List.

The other temporarily suspended companies are frozen foods
producer Ledo, agricultural producers Belje and PIK Vinkovci,
edible oils company Zvijezda, retail and wholesale company
Zitnjak and water bottler Jamnica, bne IntelliNews states.

Croatia's largest employer, Agrokor has accumulated debts of
HRK16 billion (EUR2.2 billion) to its suppliers in addition to
loans of around EUR2.5 billion used to finance its expansion,
bne IntelliNews discloses.  The government stepped in earlier
this year as the heavily-indebted company was struggling to stay
afloat and has appointed interim management led by emergency
officer Ante Ramljak, bne IntelliNews recounts.

Zagreb-based Agrokor is the biggest food producer and retailer in
the Balkans, employing almost 60,000 people across the region
with annual revenue of some HRK50 billion (US$7 billion).

                            *   *   *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported on April 10, 2017,
that S&P Global Ratings said it lowered its long- and short-term
corporate credit ratings on Croatian retailer Agrokor d.d. to
'CC/C' from 'B-/B'.  The outlook is negative.  At the same time,
S&P lowered the issue rating on the senior unsecured notes to
'CC' from 'B-'.

On April 2, 2017, a spokesperson for the Agrokor group said that
the company reached an agreement with its bank creditors to
freeze debt payments.  The creditor group includes Sberbank, VTB,
and Erste Bank, which together account for most of the EUR2.5
billion loan debt for the Agrokor group, as of Sept. 30, 2016.

The TCR-Europe on March 31, 2017, reported that Moody's Investors
Service downgraded the Croatian retailer and food manufacturer
Agrokor D.D.'s corporate family rating (CFR) to Caa1 from B3 and
its probability of default rating (PDR) to Caa1-PD from B3-PD.
Moody's has also downgraded the senior unsecured rating assigned
to the notes issued by Agrokor and due in 2019 and 2020 to Caa1
from B3. The outlook on the company's ratings remains negative.

"Our downgrade of Agrokor's rating reflects Moody's views that
the company is no longer able to sustain its high level of trade
payables, which may constrain its liquidity position," says
Vincent Gusdorf, a Vice President -- Senior Analyst at Moody's.
"This comes at a time when the company has limited means to raise
additional sources of liquidity owing to its restricted access to
credit markets and its reliance on a limited number of banks."


AGROKOR: S&P Lowers CCR to 'SD' on Missed Coupon Payment
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit rating on
Croatian retailer Agrokor d.d. to SD/--/SD (SD: selective
default) from CC/Negative/C.

At the same time, S&P lowered its issue rating on the three
series of senior unsecured notes to 'D' from 'CC'.

S&P understands that, on May 1, 2017, Agrokor missed a coupon
payment on its EUR300 million senior secured notes due 2019.  On
April 6, 2017, Croatia enacted a law -- "Law on Procedures for
Extraordinary Management in Companies of Systematic
Significance" -- that restricts Agrokor from making any interest
or principal payments on its debt over the next 12 months.  Under
the standstill agreement Agrokor signed with its main lenders,
its bank debt payments are currently frozen.  Under S&P's
criteria, it considers all the above to be tantamount to a
default, because S&P do not expect Agrokor to be able to make a
payment within the grace period of 30 days.

For the $300 million senior notes due 2020 and the EUR325 million
senior notes due 2020, S&P notes that payment default on senior
debt above EUR20 million at Agrokor constitutes an event of
default under the documentation.  In addition, given the new law
in Croatia, S&P do not expect Agrokor to be able to make a
payment on these notes over the next 12 months.

S&P lowered its corporate credit rating on Agrokor to 'SD',
rather than 'D', because S&P understands that Slovenia-based
retail subsidiary Mercator (whose assets are outside the
restricted group) has received a waiver from its lenders and
continues to meet its financial obligations.


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F R A N C E
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LABEYRIE FINE: Moody's Lowers LT Issuer Default Rating to B-
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded French packaged food group Labeyrie
Fine Foods SAS's (LFF) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
'B-' from 'B' following news of an ongoing refinancing process of
the company's debt and increase in its leverage profile. The
proceeds will be used to repay shareholder loans and refinance
LFF's EUR355 million senior secured notes due 2021 and currently
rated 'B+'/'RR3'. Fitch therefore expects to withdraw the
instrument ratings on refinancing completion.

The downgrade by one notch reflects Fitch's belief that LFF's
refinancing process will lead to higher total leverage and slower
de-leveraging profile. Despite a good operational profile, LFF's
rating headroom has been tight under its 'B' IDR as a result of
comparatively weak liquidity position and net free cash flow
generation, driven by largely debt-funded acquisitions made in
the financial year ended June 2016 (FY16).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Planned Changes to Capital Structure: According to newswire
sources, LFF has completed the syndication of a new bank debt
facility of EUR455 million, which will be used to repay its
EUR355 million senior secured notes and fund the repayment of up
to EUR100 million shareholder loans. Completion of this
refinancing will add EUR100 million to LFF's balance sheet.

Leverage Increase: The addition of EUR100 million derails the de-
leveraging trajectory that Fitch had previously seen as
achievable for LFF. Compared to the assumptions that underpinned
Fitch's February 2017 rating affirmations, whereby LFF's funds
from operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage had scope to fall to
4.7x by FY19, Fitch now projects net leverage of approximately
6.5x in FY18 and 5.7x in FY19. LFF's FY16 debt-funded
acquisitions resulted in FFO adjusted net leverage increasing to
5.5x in FY16.

Ongoing Operational Challenges: LLF maintains a strong business
model but its operations are currently challenged by another
avian flu outbreak and the generation of close to 30% of EBITDA
in the UK with imported products that may suffer from GBP
volatility and trade restrictions in the context of Brexit. LLF
proved to be able to manage the effect of avian flu despite its
recurrence and to mitigate the transactional and translational
negative effect from the depreciation of the pound by passing a
large part of the cost increases on to its retail customers in
UK.

Diversification Strategy: LFF's acquisition strategy and its
record of innovation help reduce its business risk profile
through diversification by product range, raw materials and
geography, and lower sales seasonality. The companies acquired in
FY16, including Pere Olive, King Cuisine and Aqualande, clearly
help mitigate the supply and raw materials difficulties of the
French premium and UK businesses. They are also less seasonal and
benefit from higher margins. Pere Olive and King Cuisine
reinforce growth prospects and enhance geographical
diversification, due to their location and as they provide export
opportunities, notably to Germany and Scandinavia.

Resilient Profitability: Fitch expects the EBITDA margin to
slightly decrease by 10bp to 7.9.7% in FY17 due to the
combination of the second avian flu outbreak, the depreciation of
sterling and record-high salmon prices. However, Fitch expects a
recovery to above 8% in FY19. This should be driven by the
group's ability to offset, albeit with delays, lower production
volumes and higher raw material prices through selling price
increases and the positive impact of the integration of the FY16
acquisitions, which provide better organic growth prospects and
have less volatile margin profiles.

Fitch also expects greater resilience in profitability to arise
from medium-term cost synergies resulting from management's focus
on better integrating the group's various businesses.

M&A Absorbs Free Cash Flow: Fitch expects LFF's free cash flow
(FCF) generation to remain positive, despite some volatility in
operating margins over the next three years. Fitch however expect
the company to continue its strategy of diversification by
acquisitions and the approximately EUR15 to 20 million per annum
FCF to be utilized for bolt on M&A.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

LFF has narrower margins than most food manufacturing peers due
to the high share of raw materials in its cost structure.
Moreover, it benefits from low raw-material and geographical
diversification, although this is improving. The volatility in
performance is mitigated by the company's high market shares
(allowing strong bargaining power with client retailers), high
brand reputation and the price inelasticity of demand, especially
in its premium segments. In addition, compared to other food
manufacturers sharing the same operating margin profile and size,
Labeyrie benefits from a stronger financial structure and
financial flexibility.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for LFF include:

- annual sales growth in mid-single digits;
- in FY17 and FY18, the full contribution of the FY16
   acquisitions should be significantly offset by the second
   avian flu outbreak and the depreciation of the pound;
- thereafter, Fitch assumes stable organic growth of around 3%
   per annum;
- EBITDA margin down to 7.9% in FY17 and FY18, with the impact
   of avian flu and the Brexit vote being mitigated by the full-
   year integration of higher-margin Pere Olive, King Cuisine and
   Aqualande;
- working-capital needs development in line with sales and raw
   materials (both prices and volumes);
- capex stable at 2.8% of sales;
- completion of the planned refinancing with an extra EUR100
   million of debt raised and used to return a total of EUR100
   million to shareholders over FY18 and FY19 and a new EUR65m
   RCF;
- no acquisitions in FY17, internally generated cash-funded
   acquisition spending of EUR15-20 million per annum from FY18.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action:

- EBITDA margin maintaining a recovery trajectory towards 8%
   together with higher cash-flow generation and strong liquidity

- Adjusted FFO net leverage maintaining a trajectory of
   consistent decline below 5.5x

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- EBITDA margin below 6% on a sustained basis
- Neutral to negative FCF margin for two consecutive years
- FFO adjusted leverage consistently above 7x, due to either
   aggressive financial policy or sustained operating
    underperformance

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity: At FYE16, LFF's readily available cash on
balance sheet was low at EUR2 million (Fitch-adjusted), but
liquidity was supported both by its undrawn EUR45 million
revolving credit facility (RCF) maturing in 2020 and by its EUR80
million factoring facility maturing in 2017, which Fitch expects
will be renewed. Fitch expects liquidity to remain adequate after
FY16, supported by positive FCF generation, the forecast renewal
of its factoring facility and an increase to EUR65m of the RCF
included in the refinancing package. Furthermore, post
refinancing the group faces only minor scheduled debt repayments
before 2023.


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G E O R G I A
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GEORGIA: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Government of Georgia.  The outlook is stable.

                            RATIONALE

The affirmation reflects S&P's expectation that our ratings on
Georgia will continue to be supported by the country's relatively
strong institutional arrangements and fiscal position, with net
general government debt below 40% of GDP for 2017-2020.  The
ratings are primarily constrained by income levels -- which
remain low in a global comparison -- and balance of payments
vulnerabilities, including Georgia's import dependence, high
current account deficits, and sizable external debt.  S&P also
believes that the ratings remain constrained by the limited
monetary policy flexibility, owing to Georgia's shallow domestic
capital markets and high levels of dollarization.

In S&P's view, Georgia's economic policies and institutional
arrangements remain among the strongest in the region.
Historically, the Georgian authorities have largely maintained
reform focus and prudent public finances despite considerable
challenges at times, including a brief war with Russia in 2008
and the transition of power in 2012.  S&P believes the recent
signing of an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) bodes well for the continuation
of these arrangements.

The governing Georgian Dream (GD) party's parliamentary majority
should help facilitate the passage of important reforms.  S&P
also expects the focus on closer cooperation with the EU to
continue.  A number of milestones have already being achieved,
including the signature of a Georgia-EU free-trade agreement that
entered into force last year and the waving of visa requirements
for Georgians wishing to travel to Schengen area that took place
at the beginning of 2017.  At the same time, there remain
downside risks in Georgia's relations with Russia given the
disputed status of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions.  A
secondary risk is the possibility of erosion in institutional
settings were the GD to use its majority to marginalize domestic
political opposition.

Following the government's request, the IMF approved an EFF
arrangement for Georgia in mid-April.  Under the EFF, Georgia
will have access to special drawing rights (SDR) 210.4 million
(about $285 million) over the next three years.  Although the
economy's current account deficit and external liabilities remain
high, S&P believes the country is not in acute need of external
support.  In fact, S&P sees net foreign direct investment (FDI)
inflows, which have consistently been in excess of 8% of GDP
since 2014, and multilateral lending for infrastructure projects
as the drivers of the current account gap, rather than the other
way around.  S&P understands that the government views the EFF as
a means to anchor the existing reform agenda.  Still, the
financing available will certainly provide an additional external
buffer should that be required.

The program goals include bolstering Georgia's fiscal position in
conjunction with creating space for increased public investment,
strengthening the financial sector, and implementing a number of
structural reforms.  It is closely aligned with the authorities'
so-called four-point plan, which also focuses on improving
education and governance reforms.

Although Georgia's economic growth has remained comparatively
resilient, given the difficult regional economic environment, it
amounted to 2.7% last year--among the highest in the region but
still the weakest Georgia's annual performance since 2009.  S&P
expects that the planned implementation of reforms, recent
signature of free-trade agreements with the EU and China, and the
strengthening of growth of Georgia's key trading partners
(including Russia and Azerbaijan) should support economic
acceleration.  S&P expects headline growth of 3.5% this year,
followed by gradual improvement toward a 5.0% growth rate in
2019. Other factors supporting growth include:

   -- Strong investment dynamics expected over the next two
      years, underpinned by a number of public and private
      projects, including in the energy and tourism sectors; and

   -- Recovering consumption supported by moderate inflation
      levels, more stable Georgian lari exchange rate, and
      domestic credit growth.

At the same time, S&P expects Georgia's per capita income levels
will remain modest throughout S&P's four-year forecast horizon,
largely reflecting the country's narrow economic base and the
prevalence of exporting low value-added goods.  This continues to
constrain the sovereign ratings.  The authorities' reform and
development plans aim to capitalize on Georgia's strategic
location to promote a regional transport and logistics hub as
well as develop the country's agricultural potential and tourism.
Nevertheless, most benefits would likely be only felt over the
longer run.

S&P expects Georgia's fiscal policy to stay broadly in line with
historical trends through 2020.  The general government deficits
averaged close to 2.5% of GDP over the last five years.  As S&P
anticipated, the deficit widened slightly last year to 2.8% of
GDP reflecting higher current government spending in an election
year as well as some capital expenditures on specific projects.
Nevertheless, S&P forecasts the deficits will fall back to
average 2.5% of GDP over the next four years.

S&P previously highlighted the fiscal risk from the introduction
of the so-called Estonian model from the beginning of 2017
whereby only distributed corporate profits are taxed.  S&P
believes this has now reduced as the government increased a
number of excise taxes to offset the impact on revenues.  S&P
also thinks that the recently agreed arrangement with the IMF
will help keep public finances in order.

Even so, downside risks to fiscal performance remain.  In S&P's
view, budget deficits could widen if the projected pick-up in
growth is derailed.  Moreover, the public balance sheet remains
exposed to foreign exchange risk, given that around 80% of
government debt is in foreign currency.  Consequently, several
factors largely outside of government's control could raise the
leverage level in the event of the lari exchange rate weakening.
These include a weaker-than-projected trading partner growth or
an increase in regional geopolitical tensions, for example, due
to a deterioration of relations between Georgia and Russia or a
worsening domestic political environment in Turkey.

Given S&P's baseline expectation of a relatively modest
depreciation of the lari over 2018-2020, S&P believes the annual
rise in general government debt will slightly exceed the headline
annual deficit.  Overall, gross leverage will remain broadly
stable with general government debt at about 43% of GDP over the
next three years.  S&P currently considers that the contingent
fiscal liabilities stemming from the public enterprises and the
domestic banking system are limited.

Georgia's weak external position remains one of the primary
constraints on the ratings.  The country's external current
account deficit has remained persistently wide and reached an
eight-year high in 2016 of over 13% of GDP.  This has taken place
against the background of still weak export and remittances
performance.  In S&P's view, external risks are partly mitigated
by a substantial portion of foreign debt pertaining to the public
sector and benefitting from favorable terms and long repayment
periods.

S&P also believes that the headline current account deficits
somewhat overestimate Georgia's external vulnerabilities, given
that they have been predominantly financed by FDI inflows in
recent years.  During 2013-2016, net FDI financed close to four-
fifths of Georgia's current account deficit.  FDI has been
sizable in the transportation sector, reflecting several
projects, including the expansion of the South Caucasus Pipeline
(SCP) intended to bring gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey via
Georgia.  There are also several hotels being constructed in
central Tbilisi.  Most of these FDI-related projects are heavily
import-intensive, contributing to Georgia's wide trade deficits.

However, there are still significant vulnerabilities.
Specifically, while a hypothetical sizable reduction in FDI
inflows may not necessarily lead to a disorderly adjustment
involving an abrupt depreciation of the lari (due to a
simultaneous corresponding sizable contraction in FDI-related
imports), it will likely have implications for Georgia's growth
and employment.  The accumulated stock of inward FDI also remains
substantial at about 170% of the country's generated current
account receipts, exposing the sovereign to risks should foreign
investors decide to leave, for example, due to changes in
business environment or a deterioration in Georgia's economic
outlook.

In S&P's view, the ratings on Georgia also remain constrained by
the limited flexibility of the National Bank of Georgia's (NBG)
monetary policy. In particular, S&P believes the shallow domestic
capital markets, as well as relatively high resident deposit and
loan dollarization, hamper the NBG's ability to influence
domestic monetary conditions through local currency liquidity.
Nevertheless, S&P thinks there is potential for Georgia's
monetary policy effectiveness to improve given the government's
extensive focus on de-dollarization, promotion of local currency
debt capital markets, and enhanced liquidity provision to the
domestic banking system.

S&P considers that the more flexible exchange rate arrangement
maintained by the central bank has largely facilitated Georgia's
speedy adjustment to the evolving external environment.  The NBG
allowed the lari to depreciate by about 30% against the U.S.
dollar in 2015, with only occasional interventions to smooth
volatility.  As a result, the NBG's foreign exchange reserves
have been quite stable in the last few years, unlike some other
regional sovereigns that have attempted to defend more rigid
foreign exchange regimes.  NBG's reserves have grown to $2.75
billion at end-2016 from $2.5 billion at end-2015.  S&P projects
reserves to strengthen further over the next few years, partly
owing to the EFF arrangement with the IMF.

In S&P's view, the Georgian banking system has remained resilient
over the last two years. Nonperforming loans have largely
remained unchanged (in the 7%-8% range in 2014-2016) against the
background of local currency depreciation, even though a
substantial proportion of loans are in foreign currency.  This is
in contrast to developments in other regional economies, such as
Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan, where vulnerabilities in the banking
system have risen.

                              OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Georgia's
fiscal and external performance will not deviate materially from
our baseline forecasts over the next 12 months.

S&P could raise the ratings if growth materially exceeds its
current forecasts or if S&P sees significant improvements in the
effectiveness of monetary policy that allows authorities a wider
arsenal of tools to smoothen cyclical economic shocks over the
next 12 months.  S&P could also raise the ratings if Georgia's
institutional settings and policymaking effectiveness improved.

S&P could lower the ratings if Georgia's external performance
deteriorated over the next 12 months, in contrast to S&P's
current forecasts.  S&P could also lower the ratings if fiscal
performance weakened materially.


GEORGIAN OIL: Fitch Affirms BB- LT Issuer Default Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed JSC Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation's
(GOGC) Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at
'BB-' with a Stable Outlook and senior unsecured ratings on its
bonds maturing in 2017 and 2021 at 'BB-'.

GOGC is a state company that is involved in gas supply, pipeline
rental, electricity generation, upstream oil and transportation
activities. The ratings of GOGC are aligned with the sovereign's,
as the government of Georgia considers it critical to the
national energy policy. Fitch Ratings views GOGC's standalone
profile as commensurate with a 'BB-' rating, up from its previous
assessment of 'B+'. The improvement in the standalone profile
stems from the positive impact of GOGC's recently launched
electricity generation business which will provide a significant
and predictable contribution to its cash flows. The standalone
rating is negatively affected by the company's small size and
limited operations.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

First Power Plant Fully Operational:  The construction of the
first gas-fired power plant in Gardabani was completed in
September 2015. The plant generated 43% of GOGC's total revenues
in 2016, according to preliminary 2016 figures. It operates as a
guaranteed electricity provider receiving a capacity fee, while
electricity sales in its domestic market will be provided at
cost. The government guarantees a 12.5% internal rate of return
(IRR) over the asset's life, with sales of electricity for export
providing possible upside to Fitch's forecasts. A guaranteed IRR
further underlines the strength of the ties with the government,
underpinning the rating alignment.

Stronger Business and Financial Profile: We expect GOGC to report
a 79% yoy increase in EBITDA in 2016 following the commissioning
and first full year of operations of the first power plant in
Gardabani. GOGC's reported net debt to EBITDA is estimated to
drop to 2.0x in 2016 from 3.3x in 2015 and to be maintained at
below 3.0x over the rating horizon. The improvement in the
financial profile and the additional revenue stream is positive
for GOGC's standalone credit profile, which we view as
commensurate with low 'BB' rating category, compared with Fitch's
earlier assessment of 'B+'.

GOGC owns 51% of the plant, while the remaining stake is owned by
the Partnership Fund (PF, BB-/Stable). GOGC extended a USD120
million loan to the plant's SPV. We fully consolidate the power
plant's cash flows but do not include the proceeds from loan
repayments in Fitch's forecasts.

Second Power Plant Planned: GOGC plans to begin construction of
the second gas-fired power plant in Gardabani in 2017, which will
have a design similar to the first plant and cost around USD180
million (down from over USD220 million invested in the first
plant). GOGC expects to commission the plant in 2019. The state
will guarantee a minimum electricity sale tariff of USD0.055/kWh,
1,200 kWh of annual power purchases for 15 years, and a fixed gas
price, instead of the project's IRR.

The second plant is expected to be project-financed. If the
project debt is non-recourse to GOGC, Fitch will deconsolidate
cash flows and debt related to the plant and factor into its
forecasts only the dividend stream (not expected in the medium
term) once terms of the funding are confirmed. Currently, cash
flows and debt related to the projected are fully reflected in
Fitch's projections.

Volatile Capex Plans: GOGC also considered constructing an
underground gas storage facility estimated to cost USD250
million. The plan was put on hold pending additional analysis,
but we conservatively assume construction will start in 2019 in
Fitch's forecasts.

Fitch views the relatively large size and high frequency of the
new investment projects entrusted to GOGC by the government as a
risk factor due to the significant spending required and related
completion risk. However, the projects discussed or completed so
far have either good economics (low-cost power generation from
Namakhvani hydro power plant with export potential to Turkey) or
their returns have been guaranteed by the government (guaranteed
return or profitability for the gas fired-power plants), which
decreases these projects' negative affect on GOGC's credit
profile.

Size, Receivable Concentration Still a Risk: GOGC's standalone
credit profile is constrained by its relatively small size of
operations, pressure on profitability of the gas supply segment
and sizeable receivables from a single counterparty SOCAR Gas
Export and Import. According to preliminary 2016 financials,
GOGC's sales after gas purchase costs rose to USD97 million in
2016 from USD70 million in 2015 driven by the additional revenue
stream from electricity generation.

The fall in GOGC's gas supply segment's profitability has been
reversed in 2016, its gross profit was 28% lower in lari terms
(52% lower in US dollars) compared to 2012 due to the decrease in
gas sales prices imposed by the government and the increase in
the average purchase price of gas. We believe those risks are
reflected in Fitch's assessment of the standalone rating.
Potential government support, which we view as highly likely for
GOGC, acts as an additional offsetting mechanism.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

GOGC is one of several corporations in Georgia viewed by the
government as critical to national energy policy. GOGC's rating
alignment is supported by 100% indirect state ownership via JSC
Partnership Fund (PF, 'BB-'/Stable) and by strong management and
governance links with the sovereign. Key peers include the State
Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR, BB+/Negative, rating
aligned with Azerbaijan) and JSC Atomic Energy Power Corporation
(Atomenergoprom, BBB-/Stable, rating aligned with Russia).

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

- no cash income tax payments starting from 2018;
- stable dollar-denominated revenues and EBITDA from core
   pipeline rental, oil transportation and power generation
   operations;
- gas supply obligations of GOGC for households and power
   generation will not exceed the amount of gas available to the
   company through existing contracts;.
- average gas sale price equal to USD121/mcm in 2017-2020;
- investments in the second gas-fired power plant amounting to
   USD180 million in 2017-2019; the plant will start operations
   in mid-2019;
- total capex averaging GEL217 million in 2017-2020.
- USD/GEL 2.25 in 2017 and 2.2 thereafter;
- dividend payout ratio equal to 35%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- A positive rating action for Georgia

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- A negative rating action for Georgia
- Weakening state support and/or an aggressive investment
   programme resulting in a significant deterioration of
   standalone credit metrics, eg net debt/EBITDA above 3.5x on a
   sustained basis (end-2016: 2.0x)
- Unexpected changes in the contractual frameworks governing
   GOGC's midstream activities

The following factors, individually or collectively, could result
in positive rating action:

- a revival of strong and sustainable GDP growth accompanied by
   fiscal discipline;
- a decline in net external indebtedness.

The following risk factors individually, or collectively, could
trigger negative rating action:

- a loosening of the government's commitment to fiscal
   discipline, leading to further rises in budget deficits and
   public debt;
- a decline in foreign exchange reserves, for example by a
   widening of the current account deficit not financed by
   foreign direct investment;
- deterioration in either the domestic or regional political
   environment that affects economic policy making or regional
   growth and stability.

LIQUIDITY

Strong Liquidity: GOGC's cash and short-term deposits equalled
GEL413 million, while its short-term debt repayments were GEL140
million at end-2016. GOGC's next large debt maturity will only be
in 2022 when its second USD250 million Eurobond is due. Fitch
estimates that the company will be able to finance its negative
2017 free cash flow of around GEL90 million using its cash
reserves. At end-2016, most of GOGC's cash and deposits were held
with the local banks currently rated 'BB-' or 'B+' by Fitch. GOGC
did not have undrawn committed credit lines as of December 31,
2016.

GOGC lent USD28.5 million short term to the State Service Bureau
LLC, the state property management agency, in 2013. The repayment
of this loan was initially extended from 2014 to 2017, and was
transferred to a different state entity in 2016 without any
compensation received by GOGC. We estimate that GOGC has limited
exposure to FX risk as its revenues, debt and around 83% of its
costs are denominated in US dollars.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

JSC Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation

Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BB-';
Outlook Stable;

Short-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B';

Foreign-currency senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'BB-'.


===========
G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: Agreement a Pos. Step to Review Completion, Fitch Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
The preliminary agreement between Greece and its international
creditors is a positive step towards unlocking funds to enable
the country to meet its July debt maturities, Fitch Ratings says.
It is also a prerequisite for discussions on longer-term debt
relief but the eventual timing and outcome of these remains
uncertain.

The Greek government and the country's international creditors
said on May 2 that they had reached a preliminary agreement on
the second review of Greece's third bailout programme. Greece has
committed to further cut pensions, raise some taxes, and reform
labour and energy markets. If the Greek parliament approves these
measures, eurozone finance ministers could approve the release of
around EUR7 billion of European Stability Mechanism (ESM) funds
when they meet on 22 May. The funds will be partly used for
clearance of general government arrears with the private sector
as well as for covering EUR6.3 billion of debt due for repayment
in July.

Fitch said, "This would be consistent with our baseline
assumption when we affirmed Greece's 'CCC' sovereign rating in
February. We took into account Greece's broad programme
compliance and the eurozone authorities' desire to avoid a fresh
Greek crisis. We also acknowledged that popular and political
opposition in Greece to elements of the programme remains high,
which create substantial implementation risk. But we think
government MPs are more likely to approve the reforms than reject
them."

Greece's European creditors and the IMF said in a joint statement
that talks on "a credible strategy for ensuring that Greece's
debt is sustainable" would take place "in the coming weeks". It
is not clear how close the IMF and some European creditors are to
agreeing on the timing and nature of potential debt relief that
could enable the IMF to join the third bailout programme as a
lender. And there is now a very tight timetable for securing such
agreement and completing the processes that would underpin IMF
participation before July.

Fitch added, "As we noted in February, we think Greece's European
creditors would be prepared to disburse funds without IMF
involvement, partly because Greece has exceeded programme targets
(the general government recorded a primary surplus of 3.7% of GDP
in 2016, well above the 0.5% target). Nevertheless, a decision by
the IMF not to participate could still complicate the programme
review and disbursement."

While Greece has exceeded fiscal targets, the macroeconomic
picture is more mixed, partly reflecting the impact of programme
delays on confidence and payments to the private sector. Some
data suggest that the pace of the economic recovery has slowed in
2017. General government arrears with the private sector rose to
EUR5 billion at end-February, and manufacturing PMIs indicate a
contraction in activity in 1Q17, although industrial production
has performed well.



=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


FHB MORTGAGE: Moody's Raises Long Term Deposit Ratings to B2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to B2 from B3 the long-
term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings of FHB Mortgage
Bank Co. Plc. (FHB). Concurrently, the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) was upgraded to caa1 from caa2, its adjusted BCA
was upgraded to b3 from caa1 and its long-term Counterparty Risk
Assessment (CRA) was upgraded to Ba3(cr) from B1(cr). The bank's
long-term ratings and rating inputs are placed on review for
further upgrade. FHB's short-term Not Prime deposit ratings and
Not Prime(cr) CRA are unaffected.

According to Moody's, the upgrade of FHB's ratings primarily
reflects the closer integration of the bank into Hungary's
savings cooperatives sector which has reduced previous corporate
governance risks under its former ownership and has also led the
rating agency to increase its assumptions for sector support to
high from moderate previously. The review for upgrade of the
bank's ratings is driven by the expectation for further gradual
improvements in FHB's standalone financial metrics, which
together with affiliate support from the sector will likely
result in a further rating upgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATINGS UPGRADE REFLECTS PROGRESSIVE INTEGRATION INTO THE SECTOR

The upgrade of FHB's long-term deposit ratings to B2 from B3 was
driven by: (1) the upgrade of the bank's BCA to caa1 from caa2;
(2) maintaining the current one-notch rating uplift for affiliate
support from the Integration Organization of Hungary's Saving
Cooperatives (SZHISZ or Integration Organization; unrated) based
on an increase of support assumptions to high from moderate
previously; (3) an unchanged one-notch rating uplift for deposit
ratings from Moody's Advanced LGF analysis; and (3) no rating
uplift from government support.

The upgrade of FHB's BCA reflects the reduced level of corporate
governance risks at the bank following increased ownership by
Hungary's saving cooperatives sector since late 2016 and the
progressive closer integration and higher degree of oversight on
the bank's operations by the Integration Organization. According
to FHB, the combined stake of members of the Integration
Organization in FHB's capital equaled 68.24% as of year-end 2016.
FHB became a member of the Integration Organization in September
2015, with Takarekbank Zrt. (unrated) as its central institution
being in charge of managing liquidity and solvency of all sector
members and consolidating them in its financial statements. The
closer ties with the Integration Organization as well as the
statutory sector support scheme has led Moody's to increase its
affiliate support assumptions for FHB to high from moderate,
which, however, does not change the current one-notch of rating
uplift from affiliate support from the standalone BCA.

RATINGS REVIEW FOR UPGRADE WILL FOCUS ON THE POTENTIAL FOR
CONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF FINANCIAL FUNDAMENTALS

By placing FHB's BCA as well as its long-term deposit ratings and
CRA on review for upgrade, the rating agency reflects the
expectation that the bank's financial fundamentals and in
particular its solvency will gradually improve following a year
of sizable loss. FHB reported a net loss of HUF15.5 billion in
2016, up from a net loss of HUF10.55 billion in 2015. This
sizable loss was driven by rising loan loss provisions and a
moderately lower net interest income. FHB's non-performing loans
(NPL) ratio declined to 10.6% as of year-end 2016 from 14.7% as
of year-end 2015, whereas the NPL coverage ratio improved
materially during the same period to 70.4% from 57.4%. The bank's
Tier1 ratio was 13.71% as of year-end 2016, declining from 20.13%
as of year-end 2015 mainly owing to the repayment of additional
Tier 1 instruments.

During the review, Moody's will assess the following credit
factors and their impact on FHB's credit profile: (1) the bank's
strategy and potential for gradually stabilising financial
fundamentals that diminishes solvency risks in an overall
supportive operating environment in Hungary; (2) the credit
strength of the Integration Organisation as a support provider
for FHB; and (3) the interlinkages between FHB and the
Integration Organisation on the back of their closer ties and
therefore higher degree of risk correlation between them. The
upward pressure on FHB's credit profile could result in a one-
notch upgrade for the bank's BCA, long-term deposit ratings and
CRA.

  -- WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

A considerable reduction in FHB's solvency risk together with
evidence of strong support from the Integration Organisation will
result in ratings upgrade.

Ratings downgrades are unlikely in the short-term given the
bank's improving credit profile. However, a deterioration in
FHB's financial metrics may have negative rating implications in
the medium-term.

A change in the bank's liability structure may change the uplift
provided by Moody's Advanced LGF analysis and lead to a higher or
lower notching from the bank's adjusted BCAs, thereby affecting
deposit ratings.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: FHB Mortgage Bank Co. Plc.

Upgraded and placed on review for further upgrade:

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to b3 from
    caa1;

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to caa1 from caa2;

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to Ba3(cr)
    from B1(cr);

-- Long-term Bank Deposits (Local & Foreign Currency), upgraded
    to B2 from B3 Stable

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Rating Under Review from Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


AVOCA CLO IV: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to Caa3(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken a variety of rating actions
on the following notes issued by Avoca CLO IV plc:

-- EUR20,500,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

-- EUR20,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2022, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 21,
2016 Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

-- EUR27,000,000 (current outstanding balance of EUR5.75M) Class
C1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR5,000,000 (current outstanding Balance of EUR1.06M) Class
C2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 21, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Avoca CLO IV plc, issued in January 2006, is a collateralised
loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of high-yield senior
secured European loans managed by Avoca Capital Holdings Limited.
The transaction's reinvestment period ended in August 2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade on the Class D notes is primarily a result of the
deleveraging of the senior notes following amortisation of the
underlying portfolio since the last rating action in July 2016.
In the last two payment dates the Class B Notes have been fully
redeemed and Class C Notes were paid down by EUR25.1 million or
78% of their original balance. As a result of this deleveraging,
the OC ratios have increased for Classes C and D Notes. According
to the March 2017 trustee report, the OC ratios of Classes C and
D are 646.7% and 161.4% compared to 206.3% and 129.1%,
respectively in June 2016.

The downgrade on Class E Notes rating is a result of the
worsening credit quality of the portfolio. The credit quality has
deteriorated as reflected in the deterioration in the average
credit rating of the portfolio (measured by the weighted average
rating factor, or WARF). According to the trustee report dated
March 2017, the WARF was 3204, compared with 3078 as of June
2016. In addition to it, Moody's understands that Avoca Capital
Holdings Limited is seeking noteholders' acceptance to liquidate
the transaction, which will additionally expose the Class E Notes
to market value risk.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR44.0 million,
defaulted par of EUR2.4 million, a weighted average default
probability of 19.5% over a 3.1 weighted average life (consistent
with a WARF of 3222), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 50.4% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity
score of 6 and a weighted average spread of 3.9%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analysing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed lower weighted average recovery rate for the
portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the weighted
average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs were
unchanged for Classes C and D and within two notches of the base-
case results for Class E.

In the case of liquidation of the portfolio, the severity of
losses will depend on the market value that can be realized.
Moody's conducted sensitivity analysis on the possible
liquidation proceeds received pursuant to such sales. The losses
generated outputs that were consistent with rating actions.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

* Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortisation would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

* Around 12% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed large
concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate as
described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates
in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009 and available at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461.

* Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralisation levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analysed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

* Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors, especially when they default. Because of the deal's low
diversity score and lack of granularity, Moody's supplemented its
typical Binomial Expansion Technique analysis with a simulated
default distribution using Moody's CDOROMTM software.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


FLY FUNDING II: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on $448MM Term Loan B
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+' issue-level rating on San
Francisco-based Fly Funding II S.a.r.l.'s outstanding $448
million secured term loan B after the company upsized it by $50
million, extended its maturity to February 2023 from February
2022, and reduced its pricing.  The '1' recovery rating remains
unchanged, indicating S&P's expectation that lenders would
receive very high recovery (90%-100%; rounded estimate: 95%) of
their principal in zhe event of a payment default.  The company
will use the proceeds from this loan to repay its debt.  All of
other ratings on Fly Funding and its parent Fly Leasing Ltd.
remain unchanged.

The corporate credit rating on Fly Leasing Ltd. reflects S&P's
assessment of the company's relatively small size and weak credit
metrics relative to those at most of its rated aircraft leasing
peers.  We assess Fly's business risk profile as fair, its
financial risk profile as aggressive, and its liquidity as
adequate.

The outlook on Fly Leasing is stable.  The company has reduced
the size of its portfolio by selling aircraft, which somewhat
weakened its credit metrics in 2016.  However, S&P expects the
company's metrics to improve in 2017 as it rebuilds its
portfolio, with EBIT interest coverage in the 1.4x-1.5x area and
a funds from operations (FFO)-to-debt ratio of around 8%.

Although unlikely, S&P could lower its ratings on Fly over the
next year if aircraft lease rates deteriorate or the company adds
a significant amount of debt to its balance sheet, causing its
EBIT interest coverage to decline below 1.3x and its FFO-to-debt
ratio to fall below 6% for a sustained period.

Alternatively, S&P could raise its ratings on Fly over the next
year if aircraft lease rates improve significantly from their
current levels due to stronger demand, causing the company's EBIT
interest coverage to increase to at least 1.7x or its FFO-to-debt
ratio to rise to at least 9% for a sustained period.

RATINGS LIST

Fly Leasing Ltd.
Corporate Credit Rating                BB-/Stable/--

Ratings Affirmed

Fly Funding II S.a.r.l
Secured Term Loan B                    BB+
  Recovery Rating                       1(95%)


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


QUEEN STREET CLO II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Cl. E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Queen Street CLO II B.V:

-- EUR38.25M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2015
Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR16.875M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2024, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2015
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

-- EUR59.85M (current outstanding balance of EUR18.13M) Class A2
Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on Dec 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR34.875M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2015 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

-- EUR18M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2024, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 3, 2015 Affirmed
Ba3 (sf)

Queen Street CLO II B.V., issued in June 2007, is a
collateralised loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Ares Management Limited. The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in August 2013 and the issued notes are
now amortising.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades of the notes are primarily the result of
deleveraging of the transaction. The notes have paid down by
approximately EUR48.1M in the last 12 months: EUR69.9M since the
last rating action in December 2015 and EUR280.4M since closing.
As a result of the deleveraging of the transaction, note
overcollateralisation levels have increased. As of the March 2017
trustee report, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralisation ratios are reported at 264.27%, 153.50%,
129.54% and 111.05% respectively compared with 190.62%, 138.30%,
123.36% and 110.61% as of the March 2016 trustee report. Around
8% of the March 2017 collateral balance is comprised of cash
which will be used to further delever the transaction on the next
payment date in August 2017.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR138.30M,
defaulted par of EUR3.01M, a weighted average default probability
of 18.93% over a 4.38 years weighted average life (consistent
with a WARF of 2721), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 44.01% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity
score of 19 and a weighted average spread of 3.33%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analysing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed lower weighted average recovery rate for the
portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the weighted
average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs were
unchanged for Classes A2 and B and within one notch of the base-
case results for Classes C, D and E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

* Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortisation would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

* Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralisation levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analysed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

* Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction
maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend on
the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


PIC SA: Saint-Gobain Acquires Hypermarket in Calarasi
-----------------------------------------------------
Ecaterina Craciun at Ziarul Financiar reports that French
building materials producer Saint-Gobain, which operates several
factories on the Romanian market, acquired the hypermarket in
Calarasi and the corresponding land of bankrupt PIC SA, according
to existing data.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 2,
2012, the Pic hypermarkets entered insolvency in November 2009,
after acquiring debts worth EUR76 million.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


YUKOS OIL: Liquidation Deliberate Action Taken by Russia
--------------------------------------------------------
Deutsche Presse-Agentur reports that an Amsterdam court said on
May 9 the liquidation of Yukos, Russia's one-time largest oil
company, was an unlawful and deliberate action taken by the
Russian government.

The judge's decision sided with the former proprietors of the
foreign Yukos subsidiaries, DPA relates.

The Russian government dismantled Yukos in 2006 after the
company's chief, Mikhail Khodorkovsky -- one of President
Vladimir Putin's political rivals -- allegedly failed to pay
billions of euros in taxes, DPA recounts.

After the company was broken up, foreign daughter companies
associated with Yukos Finance registered their holdings as a
Dutch foundation and filed suit against the forced sale, DPA
relays.

The court, as cited by DPA, said the Russian state unlawfully
imposed taxes on Yukos that were too high.  The court said the
trustee of Yukos Finance never allowed the sale, DPA notes.



===========
S W E D E N
===========


OVAKO GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B-' CCR
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Swedish engineering
steel producer Ovako Group AB to stable from negative. S&P also
affirmed its 'B-' long-term corporate credit rating on the
company.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B-' issue rating on Ovako's
EUR300 million senior secured notes maturing 2019.  The recovery
rating of '4' indicates S&P's expectations for average recovery
prospects (30%-50%; rounded estimate: 45%) in the event of a
payment default.

The outlook revision reflects Ovako's moderately improved S&P
Global Ratings' adjusted EBITDA at EUR57 million and slightly
positive free operating cash flow generation (FOCF) in 2016, both
of which compared favorably with 2015 figures.  S&P also notes
Ovako's successful implementation of the cost-savings program so
far, which was ahead of schedule in 2016, as well as lower
adjusted debt to EBITDA (leverage) and stable liquidity
characteristics.  Adjusted debt to EBITDA came to 11.0x as of
end-2016 (or 6.7x excluding the shareholder loan), but S&P
expects it will come down to 8.5x-9.0x by end-2017.

S&P expects improved credit metrics for Ovako to emanate from a
continued increase in demand for Ovako's long steel products
through 2017.  Volumes were up by 4% in 2016 and 11% in the first
quarter of 2017 along with a stronger order book, which could
mean improved results in 2017 compared with 2016, provided the
sales mix is also supportive and contributive to margins.  Base
prices, however, dragged revenues down last year and may fail to
improve in line with S&P's expectations this year.  S&P expects
the cost-savings program to at least partly mitigate this risk,
as the company has already achieved EUR23 million of cost
efficiencies from EUR18 million initially targeted, hence
expanding the three-year program to EUR50 million from EUR45
million and continuing into 2018.  Restructuring costs incurred
in connection to the program amounted to EUR4 million in 2015 and
EUR7 million in 2016, and will likely continue into 2017 and
2018, but at lower levels.

Under S&P's current base case, it assumes that the industry's key
drivers will moderately improve following meagre recovery for
Ovako in 2016.  Last year, weakness in Ovako's historically
important Nordic markets was offset by growth stemming from
Eastern European and Asian clients, while markets for high-end
steel, such as oil and gas remained weak in 2016, impacting
revenues negatively.  Nevertheless, Ovako's order intake has
improved considerably over the last quarter of 2016 and into the
first quarter of this year, up 35% year on year, which should
support earnings in the near to medium term, as customers are
booking for deliveries farther into the future.  S&P expects that
the company's restructuring program will bear fruit in 2017 and
2018, mitigating at least somewhat any risk of potential market
weakening or risks from a weak product mix.  Therefore, S&P
assumes a significant improvement in EBITDA in 2017, with
positive FOCF generation, provided working capital remains cash
neutral or cash generative.

S&P continues to view the group's financial risk profile as
highly leveraged (adjusted debt to EBITDA above 5.0x), despite
the adjusted leverage ratio declining to about 6.7x in 2016 from
7.5x (excluding the shareholder loan) in 2015.  S&P assumes a
decline in leverage to about 6.0x under midcycle market
conditions.  S&P adjusts reported figures for operating leases
and unfunded pension liabilities, while S&P adds the sizable
shareholder loan granted by Triton (EUR242 million in 2016,
increasing by 12% payment-in-kind [PIK] interest each year) to
adjusted debt, arriving at 11.0x leverage in 2016 on a fully
adjusted basis.  As such, on this basis, the shareholder loan
constrains any material deleveraging prospects due to the
capitalizing PIK interest that S&P sees as ultimately supported
only by Ovako's cash flows.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation of somewhat
improved steel market conditions and cost savings efforts
positively impacting operating results and ratios so that FFO
cash interest coverage remains at about 4x and adjusted debt to
EBITDA reduces to below 11.0x (6.0x excluding the shareholder
loan).  S&P also expects stable liquidity metrics and at least
neutral FOCF.

S&P could raise the rating if FFO cash interest coverage was
maintained at well above 4.0x and adjusted debt to EBITDA were to
be sustainably maintained at about 8.0x, including the
shareholder loan (4.0x excluding the shareholder loan).  The
revision would also require sustained positive free cash flow
generation and at least adequate liquidity.

S&P would consider lowering the rating if FFO cash interest
coverage fell significantly below 4.0x and adjusted debt to
EBITDA including the shareholder loan materially exceeded 11.0x
(or 6.0x excluding the shareholder loan) to the extent that S&P
could view leverage as unsustainable.  Rating pressure would
arise if liquidity weakened or FOCF turned negative, which could
stem from EBITDA being hit by weaker market conditions or cash
consuming working capital.


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


SWISSPORT GROUP: Moody's Affirms B3 Corporate Family Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B3 corporate family
rating ("CFR") and B3-PD probability of default rating of
Swissport Group S.A.R.L. Additionally, Moody's has affirmed the
B1 rating of the EUR660 million term loan B ("TLB"), the B1
rating of the EUR400 million senior secured notes ("SSN"), and
the Caa1 rating of the EUR290 million senior unsecured notes
("SN") issued by Swissport Investments S.A.. Moody's has also
affirmed the B1 rating of the CHF150 million revolving credit
facility (RCF) issued by Swissport International AG.

Concurrently, Moody's has changed the outlook on the ratings to
developing from stable.

The change in outlook to developing follows the announcement by
the company on May 3, 2017 of a technical breach of covenant in
the TLB/RCF credit facility agreement (the "Credit Agreement").
The covenant breach emerged as part of a process by HNA Group to
inject a large amount of equity into Swissport in excess of
EUR700 million. Moody's understands that the two events are
unrelated and that the covenant breach preceded the equity
injection.

"While Moody's considers the equity injection to be credit
positive if used to improve the company's capital structure,
Moody's does not has sufficient visibility at this point in time
on the use of the cash proceeds, as well as on the outcome of the
debt restructuring that will likely be necessary to cure the
covenant default," says Emmanuel Savoye, a Moody's Assistant Vice
President and lead analyst for Swissport.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The developing outlook reflects positive credit considerations
around the announced material equity injection if used to repay
debt or make acquisitions that would reduce pro-forma leverage
offset by the uncertainty regarding the outcome of the debt
restructuring aimed at curing the technical breach of certain
covenants, lack of clarity on the transaction that has led to the
share pledge in breach of the lien covenant provisions contained
in the Credit Agreement and the announced delay in the
publication of the 2016 audited accounts.

The Credit Agreement contains a negative pledge that prevents
granting pledges on shares of Swissport Group S.A.R.L. and
Swissport Investments S.A.. However, it recently emerged that
shares of these entities had previously been pledged as security
for a debt facility (the "Sponsor Facility") incurred by a
subsidiary of HNA Group that is a parent company of Swissport
(the "Parent Company"). Moody's does not have detailed
information on the entity that provided the Sponsor Facility to
the Parent Company, as well as the amount and terms of the
Sponsor Facility. As a result, although Moody's believes a
positive outcome is likely, it is too early at this stage to
foresee how the restructuring will be implemented and how it will
impact the TLB lenders and the bondholders.

Following the equity injection, Swissport benefits from excellent
liquidity with available cash in excess of EUR700 million.
Despite the current inability to access the RCF due to the
covenant breach under the Credit Agreement, Moody's expects debt
service and day to day operations to remain unaffected. Moody's
also expects the considerable cash position to give options to
the company in order to reach a positive agreement with creditors
with regards to the covenant breach, as well as to invest in new
growth opportunities or acquisitions. Proceeds from the equity
injection leave room for substantial deleveraging, if used to
repay debt.

The B3 corporate family rating (CFR) assigned to Swissport
reflects the company's leading market positions in ground
handling and cargo, its geographical diversification, and the
growth opportunities from more profitable emerging markets,
particularly China, following the acquisition by HNA Group in
2016.

However, the B3 CFR also takes into account the limited free cash
flow generation because of pressure on profitability from
airlines, and the high Moody's adjusted leverage of 6.7x as of
September 2016. Moody's adjusted debt-to-EBITDA increased to 6.7x
as of September 30, 2016 compared to 6.3x in YE2015, but remains
within expectations for the B3 rating. The increase in leverage
was primarily due to a drop in EBITDA driven by a low de-icing
activity in Q1 2016, a difficult trading environment in ground
handling in Europe, a modest growth in cargo traffic, and start-
up costs for international expansion in particular in Saudi
Arabia.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN / UP

Upward pressure on the ratings would develop if Moody's adjusted
debt to EBITDA falls sustainably below 5.5x and Moody's
EBITA/Interest increases above 1.5x. A positive rating action
could also result from a successful solution to the covenants
breach that would improve the company's capital structure and
credit profile.

Downward pressure on the ratings would develop in case of a
deterioration in liquidity or substantially negative free cash
flows. A failure to resolve the covenant breach would also result
in negative rating pressure.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Affirmations:

Issuer: Swissport Group S.A.R.L.

-- LT Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed B3

-- Probability of Default, Affirmed B3-PD

Issuer: Swissport Investments S.A.

-- Senior Secured Term Loan, Affirmed B1

-- Backed Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Caa1

Issuer: Swissport International AG

-- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed B1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Swissport Group S.A.R.L.

-- Outlook, Changed to Developing from Stable

Issuer: Swissport Investments S.A.

-- Outlook, Changed to Developing from Stable

Issuer: Swissport International AG

-- Outlook, Changed to Developing from Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016.

Headquartered in Zurich, Swissport is the world's largest
independent ground handling services company, based on revenue
and number of ground handling stations, and ranks first globally
in terms of metric tonnes of cargo handled. In 2015, Swissport
handled approximately 3.9 million flights and around 4.1 million
tonnes of cargo, for approximately 800 passenger airlines and
freight carriers.

Ground handling represented 82% of Swissport's 2015 revenue, with
cargo revenues contributing the remainder. For the 12 months
period ended September 30, 2016, Swissport generated revenues and
management adjusted EBITDA of EUR2.7 billion and EUR188 million,
respectively.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


TURKEY: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its unsolicited 'BB/B' foreign
currency long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings and its
unsolicited 'BB+/B' local currency long- and short-term sovereign
credit ratings on the Republic of Turkey.  The outlook remains
negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its unsolicited Turkey national
scale 'trAA+/trA-1' long- and short-term ratings.

                             RATIONALE

S&P's ratings on Turkey are supported by the government's low
debt burden and our expectation of an only modest accumulation of
further liabilities on the government's balance sheet, relative
to GDP.  S&P expects Turkey's flexible exchange rate regime will
enable the economy to adjust to external shocks, although high
dollarization, especially in the corporate sector, limits the
benefits of a weaker Turkish lira to the economy as a whole.
Turkey's persistent current account deficit and its high external
financing needs constrain the ratings, because they make economic
growth vulnerable to external refinancing risks.  S&P also
considers Turkey's institutional settings to be weak.  In S&P's
view, this is characterized by increasingly centralized decision-
making processes with weakening checks and balances and impaired
transparency, owing to significant interference by political
institutions in the free dissemination of information.

The recent constitutional referendum regarding an executive
presidency took place under a state of emergency, which looks set
to remain in place until at least mid-July 2017 and was initially
declared following the failed military coup attempt in July 2016.
The official results of the referendum will likely be declared in
early May 2017.  S&P do not expect any significant change from
the initial count, which indicated that a majority of voters
(51.4%, turnout ratio was around 85%) supported the move to an
executive presidency.  As a result of the referendum, the office
of the prime minister will be abolished and the president will be
given significantly enhanced powers to appoint cabinet ministers,
issue decrees, choose senior judges, and dissolve parliament.
S&P expects the constitutional reform will limit parliamentary
and, potentially also judicial, oversight of government
decisions.  S&P anticipates that presidential and parliamentary
elections will take place in November 2019, in line with
government statements, at which time the transition to an
executive presidency will occur.

In the meantime, legislation supporting the move to an executive
presidency islikely to dominate the government's agenda over the
coming months.  In S&P's view, this could delay the
implementation of further structural reforms--including labor,
educational, severance pay, and energy reforms--to wean the
economy off its dependence on foreign financing.  In S&P's view,
the possible postponement of reforms opens Turkey up to risks
regarding the reversal of capital inflows.  Rising unemployment
and modest economic growth may temper the government's appetite
for structural reforms and could lead to a sharper deterioration
of Turkey's fiscal position than S&P currently projects, as the
government shies away from retracting fiscal stimulus and
indirect tax receipts under-perform.

The annual change in the general government debt stock
accelerated to 3.5% of GDP in 2016, owing to expansionary fiscal
policy and the impact of lira depreciation on the government's
foreign currency debt, which stood at just over 40% of the total
at end January 2017, compared with 35% in 2015.  This occurred
despite substantial revenues from a tax amnesty announced after
the July 2016 coup.  During the first three months of 2017,
value-added tax (VAT) and other tax payments were markedly lower
than the expected rate of nominal GDP growth.  However, this may
reflect the government's decision to back-date the timing of
large VAT payments, as well as reductions in VAT on white goods
and lower value property sales that were introduced in the run-up
to the referendum and that now remain in place.  The government
is also attempting to stimulate corporate sector loan activity to
the tune of Turkish lira (TRY) 250 billion (8.6% of GDP) by
extending state guarantees through the public-private KGF credit
guarantee fund. It is unclear how strong demand will be for the
program.  S&P currently expects the program will generate about
1% of GDP in contingent liabilities for the government.

In S&P's view, fiscal risk remains on the revenue side, if
domestic demand--and particularly tax-rich imports--falter.
Turkey's tax base is skewed toward indirect rather than direct
taxes, and the former are highly sensitive to import demand.  S&P
foresees the general government's interest burden at about 6% of
revenues and net general government debt at approximately 26% of
GDP in 2017-2020.  Nonresidents hold about 17% of government
debt. Since 2009, the weighted average maturity of Turkish
government domestic borrowing has more than doubled, to about six
years.

S&P expects Turkey's real GDP growth rate will almost halve,
averaging 3% over 2017-2020, compared with about 6% in 2013-2016.
S&P expects consumption will remain the main growth driver, but
at a slower pace, partly due to the impact on real wages of the
lira's sharp depreciation against the U.S. dollar (21%, year-end
data) and the euro (17%) in 2016.  S&P expects a further 6% slide
against the dollar in 2017.  Alongside a weaker contribution to
growth from investment, S&P also expects net exports will remain
a marginal drag on economic activity, with the benefits to
competitiveness of a weaker lira largely lost because of rising
inflation.  S&P estimates trend growth in real per-capita GDP
(which we proxy by using 10-year weighted-average growth) of 2%
in 2011-2020, which is in line with peers that have similar
wealth levels.

S&P notes that the lira has remained broadly flat since the
beginning of 2017, supported by the Central Bank of the Republic
of Turkey's (CBRT's) monetary policy.  The weighted average cost
of CBRT funding to domestic banks increased to 11.8% in early May
from 8.3% at beginning of 2017, with the CBRT indirectly
tightening policy through increasing the lending rate on its late
liquidity window, rather than the more direct method of changing
its policy rate.  The reversion to a multirate interest-rate
framework, in S&P's view, represents a reversal from the previous
plan to simplify the monetary arrangement.

S&P expects inflation will moderate over its forecast horizon
through year-end 2020, but given the lira's volatility, risks
remain that the Turkish central bank's monetary policy response
may prove insufficient to anchor its inflation targeting regime,
particularly if domestic or geopolitical instability were to
flare up in the coming months. Inflation was 11.9% in April 2017,
well above the CBRT's inflation target of 5%.

Notwithstanding the potential negative repercussions for the
sovereign ratings from emerging monetary and fiscal policy
weaknesses, Turkey's external position remains its key structural
weakness, owing to the substantial net external liability
position and related high external financing needs.  S&P
estimates the country must roll over about 40% of its total
external debt in 2017--amounting to about US$165 billion (4x
usable reserves; 21% of GDP).  In S&P's view, the risk of a
marked deterioration in the availability of external financing
for Turkey would result in financial sector stress, increased
governmental contingent liabilities, and a sharp economic
slowdown.  To the extent that domestic tensions also raise
questions about property rights, foreign direct investment's role
in financing Turkey's large current account deficit is likely to
remain well below the highs of the ruling AKP party's first term
in office (3.5% of GDP in 2006).

Turkey's net foreign exchange reserves--which S&P estimates at
US$39 billion in 2017--provide coverage for about two months of
current account payments, suggesting relatively limited buffers
to offset external pressures.  S&P estimates Turkey's gross
external financing requirement will average 170% of current
account receipts (CARs) plus usable reserves for 2017-2020.  S&P
projects the current account deficit will average 4.3% of GDP
over 2017-2020.  S&P anticipates that oil prices will gradually
rise to US$55 per barrel by 2019.  S&P expects the country's
external debt will exceed liquid external assets held by the
public and banking sectors by about 145% of CARs, on average over
2017-2020.  S&P notes that the latest quarterly gross external
debt data shows close to 100% rollover of external debt in the
third quarter of 2016, compared with the previous quarter.  The
large net open foreign currency position of corporate borrowers
(26% of GDP) indirectly exposes banking system asset quality to
risks related to a steep depreciation of the lira.  Although the
banking sector hedges against foreign currency risk, its foreign
currency funding could represent a risk for banks if their hedges
do not hold, due to counterparty risk.

S&P considers that Turkey's domestic banks--the largest
intermediators of the country's external deficit--will remain
well regulated and amply capitalized.  S&P's Banking Industry
Country Risk Assessment for Turkey is '6', with '10' being the
lowest assessment on our 1-10 scale.  S&P notes the size of
state-owned banks is relatively large, representing about one-
third of total banking system assets.  Still, S&P expects banks'
asset quality will gradually deteriorate.  Their stock of
outstanding nonperforming loans (NPLs) is at about 3.3%.  S&P
expects the sharp decline in tourism receipts in 2016 and the
lira's depreciation will result in higher, but manageable, NPLs
for the banks.  S&P understands that systemwide NPLs could be
about two percentage points higher, when including large Turkish
banks' sales of NPLs and large restructurings of closely
monitored credits that are not included in NPLs.

                              OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on Turkey reflects risks that weak growth
and exchange rate volatility could lead to fiscal deterioration
or inflationary pressures beyond what S&P currently projects.  In
S&P's view, Turkey's high external financing needs may prove
difficult to finance under this alternative scenario.  A
sustained annual increase in general government debt by over 3%
of GDP or inflation above 10%, could lead to a lower rating.  S&P
expects to assess these risks over the next 12 months.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Turkey's fiscal
position remained in line with a moderating government debt-to-
GDP ratio and inflationary pressures abate, likely reflecting a
stabilization in the lira exchange rate and a gradually improving
external and domestic growth scenario.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and
explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating
factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant
criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were
considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that all key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                  Rating
                                  To                From
Turkey (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating
  Foreign Currency|U            BB/Neg./B        BB/Neg./B
  Local Currency|U              BB+/Neg./B       BB+/Neg./B
  Turkey National Scale|U       trAA+/--/trA-1   trAA+/--/trA-1
Transfer & Convertibility
  Assessment|U                  BBB-              BBB-

* U - Unsolicited ratings with no issuer participation and/or no
access to internal documents.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


HONOURS PLC: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Honours Plc's class B to D notes and
maintained the class A1, A2 and B notes on Rating Watch Negative
(RWN) as follows:

GBP52.6 million Class A1 notes: 'AAsf'; maintained on RWN
GBP54.2 million Class A2 notes: 'AAsf'; maintained on RWN
GBP26.0 million Class B notes: downgraded to 'BB+sf' from
'BBBsf'; maintained on RWN
GBP14.1 million Class C notes: downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
RE 40%
GBP9.3 million Class D notes: downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';
RE 0%

This transaction is a refinancing of the previous Honours Plc
transaction that closed in 1999, a securitisation of student
loans originated in the UK by the Student Loans Company Limited.

In February 2016, the issuer notified noteholders that prior to
the issuer entering into the Link Administration Agreement,
Capita (the former servicer) informed that particular arrears
notices sent to certain borrowers may not have been in compliance
with the consumer credit legislation. Later in October 2016, the
issuer provided an estimate of GBP22.5 million for interests and
charges that had been charged to affected accounts.

Meanwhile, Fitch placed Honours' notes on RWN in September 2016.
The transaction was further reviewed in November 2016 with
downgrades of the class B to D notes, while maintaining the class
A to C notes on RWN.

In March 2017, the servicer Link Financial Outsourcing Limited
provided Fitch with a loan-by-loan file that includes information
of loans in the remediation plan with a 31 December 2016 cut-off
date. Fitch understands that interests and charges will need to
be refunded either as cash or as a book adjustment, from the time
the loans entered arrears for the first time until corrective
notices and corrective annual statements have been sent to the
relevant borrowers.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Remediation Plan Still Uncertain
Using the loan-by-loan file received from the servicer, Fitch has
estimated GBP122.1 million of the outstanding balance (including
24+ delinquent loans) is in the remediation plan, of which 48% is
non-defaulted loans, 51% defaulted loans and 1% cancelled loans.
The agency considers remedial actions for defaulted loans are
unlikely to be detrimental since they would likely be offset
against the default amount. For the non-defaulted and cancelled
loans, Fitch estimates a liability of GBP12.5 million based on
the remaining share outlined above. GBP7.5 million is also added
to account for all external costs including legal and remediation
costs.

The estimate is therefore in line with our previous estimate.
However, substantial uncertainty about the final remediation
amount has led Fitch to maintain the class A1, A2 and B notes on
RWN. Fitch's ratings do not include a view on the timing of any
cash payouts following a final remediation plan.

Higher Than Expected Deferred Loans With Arrears
The technical issue around the calculation of deferred loans with
arrears in 2016 has reportedly been resolved, but their current
balance of GBP4.7 million is still above the historical average
of GBP2.7 million from 2010 to 2015. Fitch applies a 100% stress
to loans deferred with arrears, as they are not eligible for
government cancellation payments.

Rating Cap
The transaction is strongly reliant on the UK government to make
cancellation payments on deferred loans as well as interest
subsidy on the qualifying loan balance, hence the rating of the
notes is capped at that of the UK government (AA/Negative).

Revised Asset Assumptions
Fitch assumes a remaining life default base case of 9.9%, up from
the previous estimate of 8.7%, and a base recovery rate of 25%.

The portfolio of loans in deferment status is otherwise assumed
to exit deferment (or "restate") at an annual rate of 4%,
decreasing by a factor of 0.95 year on year. Fitch has estimated
excess spread for the remaining life for the transaction of 7.4%,
down from the previous estimate of 9.7%. Fitch has applied a
default rate multiples of 4x and recovery haircuts of 40% from
the base assumptions. In addition, Fitch incorporated a GBP1.9
million principal deficiency ledger and an additional loss of
GBP20 million into the model to reflect the non-compliance
liability.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The outcome of the non-compliance investigation is yet to be
confirmed and Fitch has modelled various liability scenarios,
which potentially lead to downgrade of at least two notches for
the class A and B notes if liability is increased by GBP5
million, and one notch for the class A and B notes if liability
is increased by GBP2.5 million. The RWN represents the potential
for this to be resolved in the next six months.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY
Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Prior to the transaction closing, Fitch did not review the
results of a third party assessment conducted on the asset
portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


IHS MARKIT: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR & Revises Outlook to Positive
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+' corporate credit rating on
London-based IHS Markit Ltd. and revised the outlook to positive
from stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+' issue-level ratings on
its unsecured debt.

"The outlook revision reflects IHS Markit's improved business
diversity over the past several years, with the growth of its
transportation segment, the addition of the financial services
segment, and the dilution of its resources segment to 25% of
revenues, down from about half in 2013," said S&P Global Ratings
credit analyst, Christian Frank.  During that time, the company
delivered good operating performance despite headwinds in the
energy market and it has executed its financial policy
consistently, maintaining leverage below 3x with only temporary
spikes to 4x for acquisitions followed by a period of rapid
leverage reduction.

The positive outlook reflects S&P's assessment of the company's
improved business diversity and good operating performance, as
well as its track record of executing its financial policy
consistently.

S&P could raise the rating if the company avoids meaningful
business disruptions from integrating Markit, and continues
delivering good operating performance roughly in line with S&P's
expectations and manages its share buybacks and acquisitions
consistent with its financial policy of managing leverage in the
2x-3x range with only temporary spikes for acquisitions followed
by a period of rapid leverage reduction.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it pursues a large,
debt-financed acquisition or increases share buybacks such that
it sustains leverage above the low-3x area, or if integration
missteps cause meaningful damage to the franchise.


TRANSLINE: Files Extension to NOI to go Into Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------
Alan Jones at Press Association reports that employment agency
Transline has filed an extension to its notice of intention to go
into administration after making progress in negotiations with an
unnamed party.

The company has been embroiled in the controversy over working
conditions at retail giant Sports Direct, one of its main
clients, Press Association relates.  It filed a notice of
intention (NOI) to appoint administrators last month, Press
Association recounts.

According to Press Association, a spokesman for Transline, based
in Brighouse, Yorkshire, said: "We have been involved in a number
of negotiations, and are now at an advanced stage with one of the
parties we have engaged with.

"Given this progress, we have filed a fresh extension of our NOI,
which will extend this period for a further 10 days.

"We have a clear timeline to complete the agreement with the
party in question within the 10 days.

"We continue to keep our customers and employees regularly
updated."


TULLOW OIL: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' CCR
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised to stable from negative its outlook on
U.K.-based oil and gas exploration and production company Tullow
Oil.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate
credit rating on Tullow.

The outlook revision follows the completion of a $724 million
(net) equity injection which has improved the company's liquidity
and credit metrics.  S&P has therefore revised its assessment of
Tullow's liquidity to adequate from less than adequate.  In S&P's
view, the equity injection and the projected free operating cash
flows in the coming 12-18 months will give Tullow some leeway,
allowing it to absorb some of the uncertainty in the market or to
manage the potential execution risk related to the ramp-up of the
Tweneboa-Enyenra-Ntomme (TEN) oilfield project, and the return of
the Jubilee oilfield to full production.  Under S&P's base-case
scenario, it expects an S&P Global Ratings-adjusted funds from
operations (FFO)-to-debt ratio of 15%-20% in 2017 and 2018.  S&P
views an adjusted FFO to debt ratio of about 12% as commensurate
with the rating.

The recent equity injection follows the farm down of Tullow's
project in Uganda; it reduced its stake in the project to 10%
from 33% in exchange for $900 million, comprising $200 million in
cash to be paid at certain milestones and $700 million in the
form of development consideration.  In addition, Tullow signed an
agreement to divest its Dutch assets, which represented about 4%
of its overall production in 2016.  These different actions
should accelerate the company's objective to reduce net debt to
EBITDA to less than 2.5x.  Following the equity injection, the
company's net debt was reduced to about $3.9 billion (pro forma)
from $4.8 billion on Dec. 31, 2016.

Although the company has made progress with the ramp-up of the
TEN project and the Jubilee project remediation works, which will
contribute about 60% to the overall production, it remains
exposed to operational risks.  For example, production at the
Jubilee field has been disrupted due to a faulty turret bearing
which was found in 2016, and volumes from the TEN field have also
been lower than S&P previously assumed.  That said, S&P
understands that the loss f production and the related cost of
repair are covered under existing insurance policies.

S&P understands that Tullow aims to implement a long-term
solution to the floating production storage and offloading (FPSO)
unit at the Jubilee field in the second half of the year, for
which the works required will include a shutdown of up to 12
weeks, and to continue with the ramp up of TEN. Tullow also hopes
to see a resolution to the offshore maritime boundary dispute
between Ghana and C├Čte d'Ivoire, which has delayed some of
Tullow's drilling plans.

Under S&P's base-case scenario, it projects that Tullow's
adjusted EBITDA will be $1.2 billion-$1.3 billion in 2017 and
$1.0 billion-$1.1 billion in 2018, compared with adjusted EBITDA
of $890 million in 2016.  The improvement reflects the expected
ramp up of the TEN project and the company's long-term hedging
policy.  These assumptions underpin S&P's base-case scenario:

   -- Brent oil prices of $50 per barrel (/bbl) for the remainder
      of 2017 and $50/bbl in 2018.  S&P understands that about
      60% of production in 2017 and about 30% of production in
      2018 have been locked in at higher prices.  For example,
      under S&P's price deck, it expects the Tullow's realized
      price for 2017 would be above $55/bbl.

   -- Production of about 77,000 barrels of oil equivalent per
      day (boepd) in 2017, in line with the company's guidance.
      S&P assumes that the company will produce 84,000 boepd-
      88,000 boepd in 2018.  These figures exclude any insurance
      compensation related to the loss of production arising from
      the faulty turret at Jubilee.  A reduction in the average
      operating costs per barrel, reflecting the company's very
      attractive cost structure in Ghana (below $10/bbl).
      Insurance proceeds covering a production loss equivalent to
      12,000 boepd in 2017, and other related costs.  Capital
      expenditure (including exploration) of about $500 million
      in 2017.  S&P understands that the capex budget in 2018
      will include some amounts to support a sustainable
      production level from the Ghanaian assets.  The company
      will have considerable flexibility to reduce its capex in
      the coming years without immediately affecting production.
      However, it is likely to make use of this flexibility only
      if prices drop materially.

   -- Some proceeds from the farm down of the company's project
      in Uganda.

   -- No dividends payouts in 2017 and 2018.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit metrics:

   -- Adjusted FFO to debt of about 15%-20% in 2017 and 2018.

   -- Reported net debt to EBITDA slightly below 4.0x in 2017 and
      in 2018.  S&P notes that the company's objective of
      reducing the net debt to EBITDA of 2.5x over the medium
      term. According to S&P's calculation, a recovery in oil
      prices to $60/bbl would allow the company to achieve its
      objective already in 2018.

   -- Improved free operating cash flows (FOCF) of about
      $300 million in 2017 and breakeven FOCF in 2018.

As of Dec. 31, 2016, the company had adjusted debt of $6.4
billion comprising:

   -- $5.0 billion of financial debt;
   -- $0.7 billion of operating leases;
   -- $0.8 billion of asset retirement obligations; and
   -- A deduction of $0.1 billion of unrestricted excess cash.

S&P expects the adjusted debt to reach a level of slightly above
$5.0 billion by the end of 2017.

The stable outlook reflects the expected improvement in Tullow's
credit metrics in the coming 12-18 months, following the recent
$724 million (net) equity injection and further progress with the
ramp-up of the TEN and Jubilee oilfields.

Under S&P's base-case scenario, it expects the company to
generate free positive cash flows in 2017, and an adjusted FFO-
to-debt ratio of 15%-20%.  S&P views an FFO-to-debt ratio of
about 12% as commensurate with the rating.  S&P views the
headroom under the credit metrics as appropriate, given the
current difficult industry conditions, and while exposure to
operational risks (stemming from the ramp up of the TEN project
and the return of the Jubilee project to full production) remains
high.

Although the improved liquidity makes the downside case less
likely over the next 12 months, S&P could lower the ratings if it
saw:

   -- Delays at the TEN project or issues at the Jubilee field
      that hampered production growth; or

   -- A material decline in oil prices (for example, below
      $40/bbl) for a sustainable period.  In this scenario, the
      hedges currently in place will provide only a temporary
      relief.

In S&P's view, each of these scenarios could lead to weaker-than-
anticipated credit metrics and delay the company's ability to
reduce its leverage.  They could also mean the company has a
less-favorable starting position when it negotiates the
refinancing of its existing credit facilities.

S&P considers an FFO-to-debt ratio approaching 20% and FOCF
projected to be at least neutral as commensurate with a higher
rating.

Additional factors to support a higher rating include:

   -- Further progress with the ramp up of the TEN project and
      Jubilee turret remediation.  This includes a resolution of
      the dispute between the governments of Ghana and Cote
      d'Ivoire, which currently limits Tullow's ability to drill
      further in Ghana;

   -- Proactive refinancing of the RBL, extending the maturity
      profile.

Although Ghana's current 'B' transfer & convertibility (T&C)
assessment would not prevent us from raising the rating on Tullow
to 'B+', if S&P revised Ghana's T&C assessment down by one or
more notches, S&P would have to reassess the effect on its rating
on Tullow.


* UK: BoE Publishes Special Debt of Banks Under Bailout Rules
-------------------------------------------------------------
Caroline Binham at The Financial Times reports that the Bank of
England has taken the unprecedented step of publishing how much
special debt each big bank must issue as part of rules to prevent
taxpayer bailouts of lenders.

The special debt is known as MREL -- or minimum requirements for
own funds and eligible liabilities -- and covers losses that
would "bail in" creditors rather than relying on taxpayer funds,
the FT discloses.

The total requirements set by the Bank of England are made up of
banks' going concern capital that they already must hold, plus
this special "gone concern" debt that triggers once a bank is
deemed by regulators to be failing, the FT states.

The BoE said in November that lenders would have until 2022 to
meet the full requirements, which would see the gone concern
levels match the going concern ones, and with a 2020 deadline for
interim levels, the FT recounts.

Until 2020, the six big UK lenders -- Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds
Banking Group, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander and Standard
Chartered -- will have special gone concern requirements set at 8
per cent of assets when weighted for risk, the FT notes.

By 2020, Lloyds and Santander will have the highest interim MREL
requirements at 20.5% and 20.9% of risk-weighted assets (RWAs),
respectively, the FT relays.

But once extra buffers are included for the most systemically
important lenders, Barclays will have the highest overall
requirements by 2020, set at 24.5%, according to the FT.

However, by 2022 when the full requirements come into force,
Santander will have the highest overall requirement, including
the buffers, at 29.3% of RWAs, according to the FT.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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