TCREUR_Public/170518.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, May 18, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 098


                            Headlines


A Z E R B A I J A N

INTERNATIONAL BANK: Moody's Cuts Sr. Unsec. Debt Rating to Caa3


C R O A T I A

ZAGREBACKI HOLDING: Moody's Hikes Sr. Unsec. Debt Rating to Ba2


G E R M A N Y

DUFRY AG: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba2, Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

ARBOUR CLO II: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class F Sr. Notes
ASSET-BACKED EUROPEAN: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to Cl. E Notes
SORRENTO PARK: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on EUR17.5MM Cl. E Notes


I T A L Y

ALITALIA SPA: Air-France KLM Rules Out Rescue Plan
CARISMI FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+sf' Rating on Class M Debt


K A Z A K H S T A N

EXIMBANK: S&P Keeps 'B-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
URANIUM ONE: Moody's Withdraws Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
URANIUM ONE: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws BB- Long-Term IDR


L U X E M B O U R G

CNH INDUSTRIAL: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Sr. Unsecured Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

GREEN STORM 2017: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba1 Rating to Class E Notes
LEOPARD III: S&P Withdraws 'B+' Rating Following Repayment
PATHEON NV: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Positive


R U S S I A

STATE TRANSPORT: Fitch Upgrades Long-Term IDRs to 'BB'


S P A I N

BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL: Receives Merger Interest From Rivals
RURAL HIPOTECARIO XVI: Fitch Raises Rating on Class B Notes to BB
SANTANDER EMPRESAS 1: Fitch Raises Rating on EUR123MM Notes to B+


S W I T Z E R L A N D

VAT GROUP: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable


T U R K E Y

TOPLU KONUT: Moody's Affirms Ba1 LT Issuer Rating, Outlook Neg.


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Dominic Chappell Fails to Rescue Business
LEHMAN BROTHERS: Elliott in Better Position to Pursue Claims
PRESTWICK AIRPORT: Will Take 20 Years to Repay Rescue Loans


                            *********



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A Z E R B A I J A N
===================


INTERNATIONAL BANK: Moody's Cuts Sr. Unsec. Debt Rating to Caa3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the foreign-currency
senior unsecured debt rating of International Bank of Azerbaijan
(IBA) to Caa3 from B1 and placed it on review for downgrade
following its announced debt restructuring. The bank's long-term
foreign- and local-currency deposit ratings at B1, and long-term
Counterparty Risk Assessment (CRA) at Ba3(cr) have been also
placed on review for possible downgrade. In addition, Moody's has
affirmed IBA's ca Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA), Not prime
short-term deposit and Not Prime(cr) short-term CRA ratings.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects the announced restructuring of IBA's
senior and junior foreign currency debt through an exchange to
sovereign debt obligations of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The
total foreign debt affected by the restructuring amounts to $3.3
billion (AZN5.6 billion). The details of the debt exchange are
not available yet and will be announced on May 23. The
announcement notes that IBA's individual and corporate deposits
are not affected by this restructuring and that IBA will continue
its operations and services as per the normal course of business.
The plan will come into force if approved by two-thirds of the
affected creditors.

Pending the implementation of the planned restructuring process,
and to ensure equal treatment of all affected creditors, IBA has
suspended payments of principal and interest with respect to all
foreign debt included in the operation (other than interest under
trade finance facilities). Consequently, on 10 May 2017, IBA
defaulted on the $100 million subordinated loan owed to Rubrika
Finance Company Limited.

Moody's expects the announced foreign debt restructuring plan to
result in credit losses for creditors in excess of 20%.

The placement of all long-term ratings on review for downgrade
reflects uncertainty regarding the bank's future financial
standing and government support.

The rating agency will resolve the review for downgrade following
the finalization of the restructuring plan and upon receipt of
details of possible further government support for the bank.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS DOWN / UP

Moody's would further downgrade the foreign debt ratings if final
losses for the creditors were to exceed the rating agency's
current expectations.

A negative rating action could occur if support from the
government is not provided timely and in the full anticipated
amount, leading Moody's to reassess its government support
assumptions.

There is limited upside to IBA ratings as reflected in the
current review for downgrade. The ratings confirmation and
upgrade of BCA could occur if, following the restructuring and
receipt of government support, IBA improves its solvency metrics
with recovery of capital adequacy above minimum requirements.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: International Bank of Azerbaijan

Downgrades:

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Caa3
    from B1; Outlook Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

Placed On Review for Downgrade:

-- LT Bank Deposits (Local & Foreign Currency), currently B1,
    Outlook Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

-- LT Counterparty Risk Assessment, currently Ba3(cr)

Affirmations:

-- ST Bank Deposits (Local & Foreign Currency), Affirmed NP

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed ca

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed ca

-- ST Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Outlook Actions:

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.



=============
C R O A T I A
=============


ZAGREBACKI HOLDING: Moody's Hikes Sr. Unsec. Debt Rating to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Public Sector Europe (MPSE) has upgraded to Ba2 from Ba3
the senior unsecured debt rating of the Zagrebacki Holding
D.O.O., a 100%-owned utility company of the City of Zagreb.
Outlook remains stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of the rating reflects Moody's opinion that the
credit quality of the Zagrebacki Holding D.O.O. (the Holding) is
closely linked to the credit quality of the City of Zagreb (Ba2,
stable), highlighting the city's increasingly supportive policy
stance towards the Holding, which culminated with a guarantee
provided on a new bond issue in 2016, significantly increasing
the share of debt guaranteed by the city. Moreover, the Holding
benefits from its strong institutional and financial linkage with
the City of Zagreb as its sole owner, either in the form of
subsidies or regulated tariffs in most businesses. The rating
also incorporates the strong oversight exercised by the City of
Zagreb as well as the Holding's monopolistic status and strategic
role for the city's utilities sector. As a result, Moody's
believes that Zagrebacki Holding D.O.O.'s credit quality
ultimately aligns with the City of Zagreb's credit rating. While
Moody's will continue to monitor the financial health of the
Holding, Moody's will no longer assign a Baseline Credit
Assessment (BCA) to Zagrebacki Holding D.O.O.

The Holding's rating remains underpinned by the company's
stabilized financial performance, improved debt maturity profile
and boosted liquidity position. While the Holding's debt-to-
operating-revenue ratio remains high, it decreased to 109% in
2016 from 114% in 2013 and Moody's expects further debt reduction
below 100% by 2019.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

An upgrade of Zagrebacki Holding D.O.O.'s rating would result
from a similar action on the City of Zagreb's rating, given their
close financial and operational linkages.

A downgrade of the Holding's rating would result from a downgrade
of the City of Zagreb's rating. In addition, negative changes in
the institutional and financial framework under which the Holding
operates could also exert downward pressure on the company's
rating.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Government-
Related Issuers published in October 2014.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


DUFRY AG: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba2, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Dufry AG Corporate Family
Rating (CFR) to Ba2 from Ba3. Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded
the company's Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to Ba2-PD from
Ba3-PD and the backed senior unsecured ratings of Dufry Finance
S.C.A. to Ba2 from Ba3. The outlook on all ratings is stable.

The upgrade reflects Moody's views that Dufry's credit metrics
will continue to improve over 2017-18 driven by stronger EBITDA
and positive free cash flow generation", says Ernesto Bisagno, a
Moody's Vice President - Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst
for Dufry. "The upgrade also reflects the improved business
profile reflecting the successful integration of World Duty Free,
added Mr Bisagno.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's expects organic growth to accelerate in 2017 to 5% and to
remain around 4.0%-5.0% in 2018-19, in line with the low end of
the 5%-7% range, as guided by Dufry's management.

Moody's expects profitability to improve with reported EBITDA
margin (according the management definition) to increase towards
13.0% by 2018, in line with the company's guidance. The
improvements in margins would reflect (1) additional synergies of
CHF62 million from the integration of WDF bringing the total to
CHF125 million (CHF63 million already achieved in 2015),
marginally higher than the CHF105 million guided in 2015; (2)
positive contribution from the implementation of the new business
model, which aims to standardize/unify processes and share best
practices, leading to additional efficiencies.

Regarding Dufry's financial policy, Moody's assumes that
management will remain focused on deleveraging towards 2.5x-3.0x
(reported net debt to EBITDA), with most of the free cash flow
generation to be utilized to prepay the existing debt. As a
result, the rating agency assumes (1) modest shareholder
distributions; and (2) no significant M&A activity. In addition,
Moody's expects Dufry to manage the refinancing of the 2019 debt
maturities in a timely manner, or in any case, at least 12 months
in advance.

Despite the positive free cash flow, the rating agency expects
gross adjusted debt to continue to increase modestly as a result
of higher concession costs going forward which Moody's assumes to
increase in line with sales growth. Capitalized concession fees
adjustment, adds approximately CHF11 billion to Dufry's gross
debt of CHF 4.2 billion in 2016 and will increase to around CHF13
billion (using a 5x multiple) by 2019. Relatively higher level of
adjusted debt will be offset by of higher EBITDA and therefore
Moody's expects leverage (adjusted gross debt to EBITDA) to
continue to decrease towards 4.5x by 2018.

Dufry's Ba2 CFR reflects Dufry's (1) leading market position with
around 24% market share of the airport travel retail spending
according to the company (2) strong geographical footprint; (3)
track record and know-how in operating a travel retail business;
(4) expectation of long term positive organic sales growth in
line with growth of passenger air traffic. The rating is however
constrained by the (1) high leverage reflecting Dufry's
aggressive acquisition strategy combined with the adjustments for
concessions; (2) the cyclical nature of the company's travel
retail business, which is tied to international passenger
traffic, with an exposure to certain discretionary items (e.g.,
perfumes and cosmetics, confectionary and luxury goods); (4)
risks associated with the renewal of concession contracts as well
as to certain event risks that would have implications on global
travel behaviour.

Dufry's liquidity is good, underpinned by cash balances of CHF
502.8 million (31 March 2017) and a CHF900 million revolving
credit facility (RCF unrated) maturing in July 2019 (CHF 528
million undrawn at 31 December 2016); and Moody's expectation of
ongoing positive free cash flow generation. Moody's note that the
first quarter is seasonally the weakest for the company with
Dufry having its strongest season of turnover and EBITDA between
July and September corresponding to the summer time in the
northern hemisphere. In July 2019, the company has material
refinancing needs of around CHF 2.4 billion related to the
acquisitions facilities (term loans of $1,010 million, EUR800
million and EUR500 million) which were put in place over 2014-15,
plus the CHF 900 million RCF. Moody's assumes that Dufry will
address the refinancing of the 2019 debt maturities in a timely
manner, or in any case, at least 12 months in advance.

Existing financial covenants after the company triggering the
temporary "permitted ratio increase", include a max net debt/
Adj. EBITDA threshold of 4.50x (to return to 3.75x in December
2017), and Adj. EBITDA / Adj. interest expenses interest
threshold of 3.5x. Moody's expects the company to maintain
sufficient headroom with 2017 being the tightest for the leverage
covenant around 8% (more than 60% for the interest coverage).

Dufry's Ba2 senior unsecured instrument ratings are in line with
the corporate family rating (CFR). This reflects the lack of
significant subordination with all the obligations benefiting
from a guarantee from Dufry AG, Dufry Financial Services B.V. and
the subsidiaries that collectively represent 100% of the
consolidated net assets and EBITDA of the company. These
instruments rank behind a small amount of a secured debt which is
not material to create subordination, which is located at the
operating subsidiaries' level.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that Dufry's
credit metrics will improve driven by stronger EBITDA and
positive free cash flow generation thanks to the successful
integration of WDF and better market conditions for the travel
industry. The stable outlook also reflects Moody's expectations
that management will remain focused on deleveraging towards 2.5x-
3.0x on a reported basis, a level that would more firmly support
the Ba2 rating.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

An upgrade is unlikely in the near term given the high adjusted
leverage. However, upgrade pressure on the ratings would reflect
further deleverage below 4.0x (adjusted debt to EBITDA), combined
with positive organic growth and additional margins strengthening
in line with Dufry's strategy.

Conversely, downward pressure on the rating would reflects
operational weakness combined with negative organic growth.
Quantitatively, downward pressure could be exerted on the ratings
as a combination of leverage not returning towards 4.5x by 2018
and adjusted RCF / net debt to remain below 15%.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Upgrades:

Issuer: Dufry AG

-- LT Corporate Family Rating (Local Currency), Upgraded to Ba2
    from Ba3

-- Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to Ba2-PD from Ba3-PD

Issuer: DUFRY FINANCE S.C.A.

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to
    Ba2 from Ba3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Dufry AG

-- Outlook, Remains Stable

Issuer: DUFRY FINANCE S.C.A.

-- Outlook, Remains Stable

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Retail
Industry published in October 2015.



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I R E L A N D
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ARBOUR CLO II: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class F Sr. Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
eight classes of notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by Arbour
CLO II Designated Activity Company ("Arbour II" or the "Issuer"):

-- EUR 1,750,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR 235,750,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR 22,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR 21,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR 22,250,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR 22,750,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR 26,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR 10,250,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the Notes address the expected loss posed to
noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes in connection with
the refinancing of the following classes of notes: Class A Notes,
Class B Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and
Class F Notes due 2028 (the "Original Notes"), previously issued
on January 15, 2015 (the "Original Closing Date"). On the
Refinancing Date, the Issuer will use the proceeds from the
issuance of the Refinancing Notes to redeem in full its
respective Original Notes. On the Original Closing Date, the
Issuer also issued one class of subordinated notes, which will
remain outstanding.

Arbour II is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes are
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans,
unsecured loans, mezzanine obligations and high yield bonds.

Oaktree Capital Management (UK) LLP (the "Manager") manages the
CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer. After the reinvestment
period, which ends in May 2021, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk obligations, subject to certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the binomial
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: EUR389,750,000

Diversity Score: 35

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2740

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.50%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Moody's has analysed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries. As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling of A1 or below. Following the effective date, and given
the portfolio constraints, only up to 10% of the pool can be
domiciled in countries with local currency country risk ceiling
below Aa3 with a further constraint of 0% to exposures with local
currency country risk ceiling below A3. Given this portfolio
composition, there were no adjustments to the target par amount,
as further described in the methodology.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the notes is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the notes.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a
component in determining the provisional rating assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal.

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2740 to 3151)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C Notes: -2

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2740 to 3562)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C Notes: -4

Class D Notes: -3

Class E Notes: -2

Class F Notes: -3


ASSET-BACKED EUROPEAN: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive long-term
credit ratings to notes issued by ASSET-BACKED EUROPEAN
SECURITISATION TRANSACTION FIFTEEN S.r.l.:

-- EUR911,000,000 Class A Asset-Backed Fixed Rate Notes due
    April 2031, Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR5,000,000 Class B Asset-Backed Fixed Rate Notes due April
    2031, Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR43,000,000 Class C Asset-Backed Fixed Rate Notes due April
    2031, Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR15,000,000 Class D Asset-Backed Fixed Rate Notes due April
    2031, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

-- EUR10,000,000 Class E Asset-Backed Fixed Rate Notes due April
    2031, Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Moody's has also assigned a Baa2(sf) Counterparty Instrument
Rating to the EUR 35 million Commingling Reserve Facility.

Moody's has not assigned any rating to the EUR 30.9 million Class
M1 Asset-Backed Fixed Rate Notes due April 2031 or the EUR 100
thousand Class M2 Asset-Backed Fixed Rate and Variable Return
Note due April 2031.

This transaction represents the third public securitisation
transaction rated by Moody's backed by Italian auto loans
originated by FCA Bank S.p.A (A3/P-2/Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr)), ("FCA
Bank"). The assets supporting the notes, which amount to EUR
1,001 million, consist of auto loans extended to individuals and
small businesses/commercial customers. All the auto loans have a
fixed rate until maturity and are fully amortising without any
balloon payment.

The portfolio will be serviced by FCA Bank. Securitisation
Services S.p.A, the back-up servicer facilitator, will facilitate
the search for a substitute servicer in case the FCA Bank's
rating falls below Ba2. In case the servicer report is not
available at any payment date continuity of payments for the
rated notes will be assured by the calculation agent based on
estimates.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of the notes are based on an analysis of the
characteristics of the underlying pool of auto loans, sector wide
and originator specific performance data, protection provided by
credit enhancement, the cash reserve, the roles of external
counterparties and the structural integrity of the transaction.

Moody's notes that the transaction benefits from credit strengths
such as: (i) the granular portfolio composition with the Top 20
borrowers only representing 0.20% of the pool balance; (ii) the
fact that all loans are fixed rate loans until maturity; (iii)
the fact that all loans are fully amortising according to an
annuity schedule with equal instalments without any balloon
payments; (iv) the strong historical performance data with
regards to defaults and arrears presented by the originator; and
(v) the natural hedge coming from the loans paying a fixed
interest rate for life and the notes paying a fixed interest
rate.

Moody's notes that the transaction also features some credit
weaknesses such as: (i) the fact that the pool is revolving for
the initial 24 months which could lead to an asset quality drift
although this is mitigated to some extent by the portfolio
concentration limits; (ii) the weighted average asset yield can
decrease by around 1.15% during the revolving period and this has
been considered in the cash flow modelling of the transaction;
(iii) in order to calculate the assignment price for the pool all
loans' cash flows have been discounted with one discount rate
which could lead to prepayment losses in case loans with a higher
contractual yield repay, this has been considered in the sizing
of Moody's portfolio loss assumptions.

Counterparty Instrument Ratings ("CIR") measure the risk posed to
a counterparty arising from a SPV's inability to honour its
obligations under the referenced financial contract. The ratings
do not address potential losses in relation to any market risk
associated with the transaction.

The assigned CIR measures the risk posed to the Commingling
Reserve Facility provider on an expected loss basis. Given the
contingent nature of the Commingling Reserve Facility, the
expected loss is calculated based on: (i) the probability of a
drawn on the commingling reserve; and (ii) the severity posed to
the Commingling Reserve Facility provider in scenarios where the
commingling reserve has been drawn and the Commingling Reserve
Facility is not fully repaid at the final maturity date.

The Commingling Reserve Facility is used at closing to fill up
the commingling reserve and the Commingling Reserve Facility is
repaid with the funds released from the commingling reserve once
the latter starts to amortise 24 months after closing. The
commingling reserve will be fully amortised when the Class C
notes are fully repaid and if the commingling reserve has not
been drawn then the Commingling Reserve Facility will be repaid
at the same moment. The Issuer can only use the funds released
from the commingling reserve to repay the Commingling Reserve
Facility. The repayment of the Commingling Reserve Facility is
therefore driven by the probability of the commingling reserve
being drawn or not and the severity depends on how much of the
commingling reserve has been drawn.

The CIR on the Commingling Reserve Facility Rating is strongly
linked to the counterparty risk assessment of FCA Bank as in case
FCA Bank would become insolvent then the commingling reserve
could be drawn to cover collections not transferred to the Issuer
and in that case the Commingling Reserve Facility would not be
repaid in full.

The interest payable on the Commingling Reserve Facility, a fixed
rate of 1% p.a., are placed junior to the interest payments on
the Class C notes and senior to the interest payments on the
Class D notes and the cash reserve can also be drawn to pay the
interest amounts on the Commingling Reserve Facility. As a
consequence the interest payments on the Commingling Reserve
Facility are dependent on the performance of the underlying loans
in the pool.

MAIN MODEL ASSUMPTIONS

Moody's determined the portfolio lifetime expected defaults of
2.0%, Aa2 portfolio credit enhancement ("PCE") of 10.0% and mean
recoveries of 15%. The expected defaults and recoveries captures
Moody's expectations of performance considering the current
economic outlook, while the PCE captures the loss Moody's expects
the portfolio to suffer in the event of a severe recession
scenario and also the potential prepayment losses from loans with
a higher contract rate than the discount rate used when
calculating the present value of the portfolio. Expected
defaults, recoveries and PCE are parameters used by Moody's to
calibrate its lognormal portfolio loss distribution curve and to
associate a probability with each potential future loss scenario
in its ABSROM cash flow model used to rate Auto ABS.

Portfolio expected defaults of 2.0% are lower than the EMEA Auto
ABS average, and are based on Moody's assessment of the lifetime
expectation for the pool taking into account (i) the historical
default rates of the originator's loan book split by new and used
cars and also by individuals and small businesses; (ii)
benchmarking with other similar transactions; and (iii) the fact
that the transaction is revolving for 24 months and the portfolio
concentration limits during that period.

Portfolio expected recoveries of 15% are lower than the EMEA Auto
ABS average and it takes into account (i) the historical recovery
rates from the originator's loan book split by new and used cars;
(ii) the fact that the security package in Italy is weaker than
in many other EMEA markets means that the servicer's right to
repossess the vehicle is limited and therefore virtually all
recoveries are expected to come from the borrowers and not the
sale of repossessed vehicles; and (iii) benchmarking with other
similar transactions.

The PCE is lower than the EMEA Auto ABS average although it also
considers the fact that there could be some prepayment losses
from auto loans with a higher contractual interest rate than the
discount rate used to calculate the assignment price of the pool.
The PCE of 10% results in an implied coefficient of variation
("CoV") of approximately 72%.

METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease Backed ABS" published in
October 2016.

Please note that on 22 March 2017, Moody's released a Request for
Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on potential
revisions to its Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in
Structured Finance. If the revised Methodology is implemented as
proposed, the Credit Ratings on ABEST 15 are not expected to be
affected. Please refer to Moody's Request for Comment, titled
"Moody's Proposes Revisions to Its Approach to Assessing
Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance," for further details
regarding the implications of the proposed Methodology revisions
on certain Credit Ratings.

The definitive ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal with respect to the Class A, B, C,
D and E notes and the Commingling Reserve Facility by legal final
maturity. Moody's definitive ratings address only the credit risk
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have significant effect on yield to
investors.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Factors that may lead to and upgrade of the ratings of the notes
include significantly better than expected performance of the
pool and an increase in credit enhancement of the notes due to
deleveraging.

Factors that may lead to a downgrade of the ratings of the notes
include (i) a decline in the overall performance of the pool (ii)
a significant deterioration of the credit profile of the
originator/servicer or other key transaction counterparties.

The CIR on the Commingling Reserve Facility is strongly linked to
the counterparty risk assessment of the Servicer FCA Bank and
upgrades or downgrades in the Servicer's counterparty risk
assessment could therefore lead to both upgrades and downgrades
even in case the transaction's performance is as expected.

Finally, unforeseen regulatory changes or significant changes in
the legal environment may also result in changes of the ratings.

LOSS AND CASH FLOW ANALYSIS:

Moody's uses its cash flow model ABSROM as part of its
quantitative analysis of the transaction. Moody's ABSROM model
enables users to model various features of a standard European
ABS transaction -- including the specifics of the loss
distribution of the assets, their portfolio amortisation profile,
yield as well as the specific priority of payments, hedging and
cash reserves on the liability side of the ABS structure.

STRESS SCENARIOS:

In rating auto loan ABS, default rate and recovery rate are two
key inputs that determine the transaction cash flows in the cash
flows model.

If the expected default rate increased to 2.25% from 2.0% and the
recovery rate decreased to 10% from 15% the model output
indicates that the Class A notes would achieve Aa3 assuming that
all other factors remained unchanged. Moody's Parameter
Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-indicated calculation
of the number of rating notches that a Moody's structured finance
security may vary if certain input parameters used in the initial
rating process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has
not aged and is not intended to measure how the rating of the
security might migrate over time, but rather how the initial
rating of the security might have differed if key rating input
parameters were varied. Parameter Sensitivities for the typical
EMEA ABS Auto loan transaction are calculated by stressing key
variable inputs in Moody's cash flow model.


SORRENTO PARK: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on EUR17.5MM Cl. E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Sorrento Park CLO Designated Activity
Company's refinancing notes final ratings and affirmed the junior
notes as follows:

EUR290 million Class A-1A notes: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR5.0 million Class A-1B notes: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR28.8 million Class A-2A notes: 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR30 million Class A-2B notes: 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR30 million Class B notes: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR28.8 million Class C notes: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR30 million Class D notes: affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR17.5 million Class E notes: affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

The transaction is a cash flow collateralised loan obligation
securitising a portfolio of mainly European leveraged loans and
bonds. The portfolio is managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds
Management Europe Limited

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sorrento Park CLO closed in October 2014 and is still in its
reinvestment period, which is set to expire in November 2018. The
issuer has issued new notes to refinance part of the original
liabilities. The original notes have been redeemed in full as a
consequence of the refinancing.

The refinancing notes bear interest at a lower margin over
EURIBOR than the notes being refinanced. The remaining terms and
conditions of the refinancing notes (including seniority) will be
the same as the refinanced notes.

The final ratings assigned to the refinancing notes reflect
Fitch's view that the credit risk of the refinancing notes is
substantially similar to the notes being refinanced. The
affirmation of the junior notes follows their stable performance
during the review period and updated cash flow model analysis of
the updated Fitch Test Matrix.

'B' Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch assesses the average credit quality of obligors in the 'B'
category. The agency has public ratings or credit opinions on all
the obligors in the current portfolio. The weighted average
rating factor of the current portfolio is 34.65.

High Recovery Expectation
At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured loans
and senior secured bonds. Recovery prospects for these assets are
typically more favourable than for second-lien, unsecured, and
mezzanine assets. The weighted average recovery rate of the
current portfolio is 65.7%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As the loss rates for the current portfolio are below those
modelled for the stress portfolio, the sensitivities shown in the
new issue report still apply.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


ALITALIA SPA: Air-France KLM Rules Out Rescue Plan
--------------------------------------------------
Cyril Altmeyer at Reuters reports that Air France-KLM has ruled
out stepping in to save near-bankrupt Alitalia, with its chief
executive, Jean-Marc Janaillac, telling shareholders on May 16
that its past experience of cross-shareholdings and a failed
merger plan would discourage it from investing directly in Italy
again.

In 2008, Air France-KLM walked away from a planned takeover of
Alitalia after talks with the Italian carrier's unions broke
down, Reuters recounts.

Earlier this month, Alitalia went into administration for the
second time in less than a decade after workers rejected a
restructuring plan, Reuters relates.

Alitalia remains a partner in the Franco-Dutch group's North
Atlantic joint venture with Delta Air Lines, Reuters notes.

                        About Alitalia

Alitalia-Compagnia Aerea Italiana has navigated its way through
a successful restructuring.  After filing for bankruptcy
protection in 2008, Alitalia found additional investors, acquired
rival airline Air One, and re-emerged as Italy's leading airline
in early 2009.  Operating a fleet of about 150 aircraft, the
airline now serves more than 75 national and international
destinations from hubs in Fiumicino (Rome), Milan, Turin, Venice,
Naples, and Catania.  Alitalia extends its network as a member of
the SkyTeam code-sharing and marketing alliance, which also
includes Air France, Delta Air Lines, and KLM.  An Italian
investor group owns a majority of the company, while Air France-
KLM owns 25%.

                      *     *     *

Alitalia was the subject of a bail-out in 2014 by means of a
significant capital injection from Etihad Airways, with goals of
achieving profitability during 2017.  However, increased
competition on routes operated by U.K.-based carriers and
significantly higher labor costs led to the ultimate failure of
Etihad Airways' profitability goals for Alitalia.  During late
April 2017, labor unions representing Alitalia workers rejected a
plan that called for job reductions and pay cuts for workers.
Following the failure of these negotiations, Etihad Airways
signaled an unwillingness to invest additional capital into the
company and shareholders ultimately agreed to file for
extraordinary administration proceedings on May 2, 2017.


CARISMI FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+sf' Rating on Class M Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Carismi Finance S.r.l., as follows:

Class A2: affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A3: affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class M: affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable

The prime Italian RMBS transaction is backed by mortgage loans
originated and serviced by Cassa di Risparmio di San Miniato
(Carismi).

KEY RATING DRIVERS
High Regional Concentration
About 93.3% of the pool is concentrated in Tuscany, Carismi's
business region. Fitch has applied a flat 30% increase across the
rating scenarios to the foreclosure frequency of borrowers
located in this region, in accordance with its Italian RMBS
criteria.

Short Transaction Seasoning
The majority of the pool, about 60% of the loans by current
balance, was added to the collateral pool as part of the
transaction restructuring in May 2016. The performance history of
these newly added loans is limited, especially considering the
transaction's long default definition of at least 12 months.

Given the short transaction seasoning, Fitch has applied a
standard performance adjustment factor of 1 as according to its
EMEA RMBS criteria, the performance of a transaction is not
considered in the first three years from closing. For a
restructured transaction, the effective date of the restructuring
counts as the closing date.

Class M Rating Constrained
Interest payments on the class M notes rank junior to the
provisioning for defaults and are deferrable according to the
terms and conditions of the notes. Fitch expects interest
deferment to occur during the life of the transaction and in
accordance with its Global Structured Finance Rating criteria,
has capped the rating of this class at 'BB+sf', below investment
grade. The rating of the class M notes addresses ultimate payment
of interest and full repayment of principal by the notes' legal
maturity date.

Sovereign Cap
Italian securitisations can achieve a maximum rating of 'AAsf',
six notches above Italy's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR;
BBB/Stable/F2).

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Changes to Italy's Long-Term IDR and the rating cap for Italian
structured finance transactions, currently 'AAsf', could trigger
rating action on the class A notes.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


EXIMBANK: S&P Keeps 'B-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it is keeping its 'B-' long-term
counterparty credit rating and 'kzB+' Kazakhstan national scale
rating on EximBank Kazakhstan JSC (KazExim) on CreditWatch with
negative implications, where S&P placed them on Feb. 20, 2017.

S&P also raised its short-term rating to 'B' from 'C', removed
the UCO designation from it, and placed it on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The continued CreditWatch negative status reflects the only
partial progress that KazExim has made in the past three months
to address what S&P sees as an unsustainable weakness in its
funding and liquidity profiles.  S&P expects further material
progress through the end of the second quarter, specifically in
rolling over its loans from the National Bank of Kazakhstan
(NBK).  If it fails to do this, S&P envisage lowering our ratings
on the bank by end-July.

S&P continues to view KazExim's liquidity profile as only
moderate.  This reflects S&P's view that despite an increase in
the first four months of 2017, the bank's liquid assets remain
weaker than those S&P observes at peers. Liquid assets increased
to Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) 7.7 billion or 9.5% of total assets as
of end-April 2017 from KZT4.1 billion or 5.2% at year-end 2016.
This leaves the bank with little flexibility to react to
unplanned outflows.

Although the bank is currently in compliance with all regulatory
liquidity ratios, its regulatory coefficient of current liquidity
was 0.5x as of end-April 2017, only slightly above the minimum of
0.3x.  Small Kazakh peers are currently reporting a typical ratio
of at least 0.7x and larger Kazakh banks of at least 1.0x.  S&P
notes that small banks, such as KazExim, and certainly those with
high funding concentrations, tend to maintain solid liquidity
cushions in order to bolster the confidence of their creditors
and other customers.

Through the end of the second quarter of 2017, the bank plans to
replace a KZT10 billion loan from the NBK due in November 2017,
which accounted for about 15% of its liabilities as of April 30,
2017, with long-term related-party deposits.  While less urgent,
the bank also plans to replace another KZT10 billion loan from
the NBK due in February 2020 with five-year domestic bonds to be
issued in May-June 2017.  These actions should lengthen the
maturity of its liabilities.

In addition, KazExim has KZT5.3 billion of deposits from
government-related entities (GREs) due in the rest of 2017.  S&P
has seen some GREs withdraw deposits from some small Kazakh banks
over the past few months, but so far KazExim has not been
affected by this development.  The bank expects all GRE deposits
to be rolled over for another year, which we regard as a credible
assumption.  Nevertheless, a further strengthening of its funding
profile would help to retain the confidence of these GREs, as
well as of its other depositors.

S&P's raising of the short-term rating to 'B' from 'C' follows
the publication of its revised criteria "General Criteria:
Methodology For Linking Long-Term And Short-Term Ratings."  S&P's
base-case scenario does not envision that KazExim will be unable
to meet its obligations due within the next 12 months.

The long-term rating on KazExim reflects the 'bb-' anchor that is
the starting point for S&P's ratings on commercial banks
operating in Kazakhstan and S&P's 'ccc+' assessment of the bank's
stand-alone credit profile.  S&P's long-term issuer credit rating
on the bank remains at 'B-', in line with its "General Criteria:
Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings,"
as S&P sees no clear scenarios of default within the next 12
months, not least given the funding support of the NBK.
Nevertheless, the CreditWatch placement reflects our view that,
if sustained, KazExim's current modest liquidity buffer and below
average funding profile could mean that the bank eventually fails
to retain the support of its creditors.  This suggests a possible
challenge to its sustainability in the longer term.

KazExim has a modest franchise in the Kazakh banking sector and
concentrates on companies in the energy, real estate, and
construction sectors.  S&P expects the bank to show moderate
planned growth and marginal profitability in the next 18 months,
thus maintaining capital at adequate levels.  S&P notes that the
bank's profitability substantially declined in the first quarter
of 2017, with a return on assets of 0.09% compared with 0.26% at
year-end 2016, but S&P expects some rebound over the rest of
2017. S&P observes that the bank's profitability has been
significantly lower than the system average in the past.

S&P is keeping its ratings on CreditWatch, given its uncertainty
that KazExim will be able to lengthen the maturity of its
wholesale funding and bolster its liquid assets further, thus
strengthening its funding and liquidity profiles to the levels
that S&P sees as typical among Kazakh peers.  S&P plans to
resolve the CreditWatch by end-July 2017.

S&P will lower the ratings on KazExim if the bank:

   -- Is unable to execute its plans to replace funding from the
      NBK due in November 2017,
   -- Is unable to roll over the majority of its GRE deposits due
      in 2017,
   -- Experiences unplanned material customer funds outflows,
   -- Reduces the current amount of liquid assets materially, or
   -- Approaches the minimum regulatory liquidity coefficients.

S&P will remove the ratings from CreditWatch and affirm them if
KazExim substantially lengthens the maturity of its wholesale
funding due in 2017, so demonstrating that it retains the support
of creditors, while committing to maintain its liquidity close to
system-average levels.


URANIUM ONE: Moody's Withdraws Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the Ba3 corporate family
rating (CFR) and the Ba3-PD probability of default rating (PDR)
of Uranium One Inc. (Uranium One), as well as the stable outlook
on the ratings. At the same time, Moody's has withdrawn the SGL-2
speculative grade liquidity rating of Uranium One.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for business reasons since
Uranium One fully repaid the entire outstanding balance of its
rated debt.

Headquartered in Toronto, Canada, Uranium One Inc. is one of
major uranium producers in the world controlled by the Russian
government through Russia's State Atomic Energy Company (Rosatom,
not rated). The company's major mines in Kazakhstan are owned
through five joint ventures, in which the company's interest
varies between 30% and 70%. These mines collectively contribute
around 95% of the company's attributable production, which
totalled 13.5 million pounds (lbs) of uranium (U3O8) in 2016. In
the same period, attributable annual revenues totalled
approximately $406 million based on an average realized uranium
price of $27/lb.


URANIUM ONE: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws BB- Long-Term IDR
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Uranium One Inc.'s Long-Term Foreign-
Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' with a Stable
Outlook. The agency has simultaneously withdrawn the ratings of
Uranium One for commercial reasons.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strategic Uranium Mining Asset: Uranium One's low-cost triuranium
octoxide (U3O8) production is important for its Russian state-
owned parent, JSC Atomic Energy Power Corporation
(Atomenergoprom, BBB-/Stable), the world's leader in uranium fuel
production, nuclear power plant engineering, fabrication and
construction, a top nuclear power utility and an integral part of
State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom. A major global company
in uranium enrichment, Rosatom needs low-cost feedstock to
maintain enrichment margins and requires contracted uranium
supply to attract reactor customers.

Uranium One is one of the lowest-cost uranium producers globally
and the fourth-largest by attributable production volumes. Its
production comes from joint ventures (JVs) in Kazakhstan with JSC
National Atomic Company Kazatomprom (BBB-/Stable). Uranium One
has an off-take agreement with Rosatom for over half its
production, predominantly at spot-based prices. Acting as
Rosatom's international uranium marketing arm, it also has long-
term off-take agreements with customers worldwide. Atomenergoprom
has significantly increased its support to the company, mainly
through inter-group loans, which accounted for nearly half of the
latter's debt at end-2016.

'B-' Standalone Profile: Uranium One's standalone
creditworthiness is constrained by its small size, dependence on
production and dividends from its JVs, single-commodity exposure,
and high current FFO adjusted gross leverage. Uranium One depends
almost exclusively on dividends from JVs to service debt. From
2016, the company has consolidated the 70%-owned SMCC and Betpak
Dala JVs instead of using the equity method. However, dividend
payouts from the JVs should still be approved by both the company
and Kazatomprom, as with other JVs. Fitch therefore
deconsolidates Uranium One's JVs in its analysis.

In 2016, Uranium One had total attributable production of 12.7
million lbs of U3O8, up 2% yoy. In 2016, the company received
USD61 million in dividends from JVs, down 32% from USD90 million
a year ago. Fitch expects a modest fall in Uranium One's
attributable production after the target production volume cut
announced by Kazatomprom.

Weak Prices Delay Deleveraging: Soft uranium prices have delayed
Uranium One's deleveraging beyond the originally anticipated
date. The company is well placed to withstand the current low
price environment, as one of the lowest-cost producers globally.
Uranium One mines nearly all its uranium using the in situ
leaching or recovery method. In 2016, the company reported cash
costs of USD9/lb, down from USD11/lb in 2015, due to the weaker
tenge and cost optimisation.

Fitch expects Uranium One to generate increasing FFO and positive
free cash flow in 2017-2020 and its FFO adjusted gross leverage
to decline below 5x by end-2017 and below 3.5x by end-2019 as a
result.

Contract Pricing Supports Revenue: In recent years, the company's
average realised uranium prices closely matched spot price,
distinguishing it from some other miners such as Kazatomprom,
which sell their uranium at a mix of long-term and spot prices.
However, fixed contract prices and price floors have had a more
pronounced impact in the depressed price environment. The
company's average realised price in 2016 was USD27/lb, USD1.5
higher than the average spot price.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Canada-incorporated Uranium One operates in one commodity,
uranium, and largely in one country, Kazakhstan. This
distinguishes it from more diversified, larger peers in EMEA. Its
standalone 'B-' assessment reflects weakened financial
performance due to weak spot uranium prices that reached multi-
year lows in 2016. Uranium One's rating includes a three-notch
uplift from its IDR for support from its state-owned Russian
parent, Atomenergoprom, due to their strong strategic and
operational ties but lack of robust legal ties, such as
guarantees for a large portion of Uranium One's debt that could
result in closer rating alignment. No Country Ceiling or
operating environment aspects affect the rating.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for Uranium One
include:

- attributable uranium production increasing from 12 million
   lbs in 2017 lbs to 13 million lbs in 2020;
- U3O8 spot prices of USD28/lb in 2016, USD24/lb in 2017-2018,
   USD25/lb in 2019 and USD28/lb in 2020;
- broadly stable USD/KZT exchange rate in 2016-2020 averaging
   1/330;
- no dividend distributions to shareholders.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Not applicable.

LIQUIDITY

Parent Funding Strengthens Liquidity: At end-2016, Uranium One
had USD128 million of unrestricted cash, while its short-term
debt comprised a USD55 million long-term amortising loan payment.
In December 2016, the company redeemed its USD210 million
Eurobond due 2018. Atomenergoprom provided a three-year
amortising USD165 million loan and a USD50 million short-term
loan at interest rates materially lower than the Eurobond's
coupon to fund the transaction. Uranium One's debt from the
parent made up 45% of the total at end-2016. Uranium One's
remaining third-party debt consists of a rouble bond due in 2020
with a swap-adjusted principal equal to USD390 million.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Uranium One Inc.
- Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB-'/Outlook
   Stable and withdrawn
- Long-Term Local-Currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB-'/Outlook
   Stable and withdrawn
- Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B' and withdrawn
- Short-Term Local-Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B' and withdrawn
- Senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'BB-' and withdrawn



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


CNH INDUSTRIAL: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Sr. Unsecured Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB+' issue-level rating and '4'
recovery rating to Luxembourg-based CNH Industrial Finance Europe
S.A.'s proposed euro-denominated senior unsecured notes.  The '4'
recovery rating indicates S&P's expectation for average (30%-50%;
rounded estimate: 45%) recovery in the event of a payment
default.

CNH Industrial Finance Europe S.A. is a subsidiary of
Netherlands-based CNH Industrial N.V. (CNHI), which will act as
the guarantor for the notes.  The company expects to use the
proceeds from this issuance for general corporate purposes.

All of S&P's other ratings on CNHI remain unchanged.

S&P believes that CNHI will maintain its position as the second-
largest agricultural equipment manufacturer globally and remain a
well-established global player in the truck, construction
equipment, and powertrain markets.  In S&P's view, the ability of
CNHI's captive finance subsidiaries to offer seamless financing
to the company's customers strengthens its competitive advantage
compared with its peers who do not have similar operations.
These factors are tempered by the highly competitive and cyclical
individual markets that the company participates in, its
moderately high fixed costs, and its high working-capital
intensity.  S&P forecasts that CNHI will maintain a leverage
metric of less than 4x through the current downturn in the
agricultural equipment market.

                         RECOVERY ANALYSIS

   -- S&P's recovery analysis focuses on the recovery prospects
      of the debt at the company's industrial operations and
      excludes the debt at its financial services business.

   -- S&P believes that the group would reorganize as a going
      concern because, in S&P's view, it has strong brands, a
      good distribution network, and viable cash flow generation.

   -- S&P's simulated default scenario envisions a prolonged
      economic downturn that leads to significantly lower
      agricultural and construction equipment sales and steep
      margin contraction.  Ultimately, these factors lead to a
      payment default in 2022.

   -- S&P's recovery analysis assumes that in a simulated default
      scenario, after satisfying priority liabilities including
      administrative costs and debt at certain subsidiaries, the
      unsecured debt and nondebt claim recoveries would be in the
      30%-50% range (rounded estimate: 45%).

Simulated default assumptions

   -- Simulated year of default: 2022
   -- EBITDA at emergence: $925 million
   -- EBITDA multiple: 6x
   -- The EUR1.75 billion revolving credit facility and other
      revolving lines of credit are 85% drawn at default

Simplified waterfall

   -- Gross enterprise value: $5.55 billion
   -- Net enterprise value (after 5% administrative costs and
      pension-related adjustments): $4.91 billion
   -- Valuation split (obligors/nonobligors): 100%/0%
   -- Priority claims: $1.13 billion
   -- Value available to unsecured claims: $4.14 billion
   -- Senior unsecured debt/pari passu unsecured claims:
      $8.52 billion/$1.26 billion
      -- Recovery expectations: 30%-50% (rounded estimate: 45%)

Note: All amounts include six months of prepetition interest.

RATINGS LIST

CNH Industrial N.V.
Corporate Credit Rating             BB+/Stable/B

New Ratings

CNH Industrial Finance Europe S.A.
Euro-Denominated Snr Unscd Nts      BB+
  Recovery Rating                    4(45%)


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


GREEN STORM 2017: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba1 Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
following classes of notes to be issued by Green STORM 2017 B.V.:

-- EUR [*] Million Senior Class A Mortgage-Backed Notes due
    2064, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- EUR [*] Million Mezzanine Class B Mortgage-Backed notes due
    2064, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

-- EUR [*] Million Mezzanine Class C Mortgage-Backed notes due
    2064, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

-- EUR [*] Million Junior Class D Mortgage-Backed Notes due
    2064, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

-- EUR [*] Million Subordinated Class E Mortgage-Backed Notes
    due 2064, Assigned (P)Ba1 (sf)

Green STORM 2017 B.V. is a revolving securitisation of Dutch
prime residential mortgage loans. The collateral was selected
based on the energy efficiency of the underlying properties.
Obvion N.V. (not rated) is the originator and servicer of the
portfolio.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings on the notes take into account, among
other factors: (1) the performance of the previous transactions
launched by Obvion N.V.; (2) the credit quality of the underlying
mortgage loan pool; (3) legal considerations; and (4) the initial
credit enhancement provided to the senior notes by the junior
notes and the reserve fund.

The expected portfolio loss of [0.65]% and the MILAN CE of [8.3]%
serve as input parameters for Moody's cash flow and tranching
model, which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution,
as described in the report "The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS
Analysis", published in July 2000.

MILAN CE for this pool is [8.3]%, which is slightly above
preceding revolving STORM transactions and in line with other
prime Dutch RMBS revolving transactions, owing to: (i) the
availability of the NHG-guarantee for [27.7]% of the loan parts
in the pool, which can reduce during the replenishment period to
[25]%, (ii) the replenishment period of 5 years where there is a
risk of deteriorating the pool quality through the addition of
new loans, although this is mitigated by replenishment criteria,
(iii) the weighted average loan-to-foreclosure-value (LTFV) of
[92.62]%, which is similar to LTFV observed in other Dutch RMBS
transactions, (iv) the proportion of interest-only loan parts
([52.1]%), (v) the weighted average seasoning of [5.34] years and
(vi) the share of loans provided to top-20 borrowers in the pool,
[3.63]%. Moody's notes that the unadjusted current LTFV is
[92.53]%. The slight difference is due to Moody's treatment of
the property values that use valuations provided for tax purposes
(the so-called WOZ valuation).The risk of a deteriorating pool
quality through the addition of loans is partly mitigated by the
replenishment criteria which includes, amongst others, that the
weighted average CLTMV of all the mortgage loans, including those
to be purchased by the Issuer, does not exceed [89]% and the
minimum weighted average seasoning is at least [40] months.
Further, no new loans can be added to the pool if there is a PDL
outstanding, if loans more than 3 months in arrears exceeds
[1.5]% or the cumulative loss exceeds [0.4]%.

The key drivers for the portfolio's expected loss of [0.65]%,
which is in line with preceding STORM transactions and with other
prime Dutch RMBS transactions, are: (1) the availability of the
NHG-guarantee for [27.7]% of the loan parts in the pool, which
can reduce during the replenishment period to [25]%; (2) the
performance of the seller's precedent transactions; (3)
benchmarking with comparable transactions in the Dutch RMBS
market; and (4) the current economic conditions in the
Netherlands in combination with historic recovery data of
foreclosures received from the seller.

The transaction benefits from a non-amortising reserve fund,
funded at [1.02]% of the total class A to D notes' outstanding
amount at closing, building up to [1.3]% by trapping available
excess spread. The initial total credit enhancement for the Aaa
(sf) provisionally rated notes is [7.5]%, [6.48]% through note
subordination and the reserve fund amounting to [1.02]%. The
transaction also benefits from an excess margin of [50] bps
provided through the swap agreement. The swap counterparty is
Obvion N.V. and the back-up swap counterparty is Cooperatieve
Rabobank U.A. ("Rabobank"; rated Aa2/P-1). Rabobank is obliged to
assume the obligations of Obvion N.V. under the swap agreement in
case of Obvion N.V.'s default. The transaction also benefits from
an amortising cash advance facility of [2.0]% of the outstanding
principal amount of the notes (including the class E notes) with
a floor of [1.45]% of the outstanding principal amount of the
notes (including the class E notes) as of closing.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2016.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Please note that on March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request
for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on
potential revisions to its Approach to Assessing Counterparty
Risks in Structured Finance. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, the credit ratings of the notes issued
by Green STORM 2017 B.V. may be affected. Please refer to Moody's
Request for Comment, titled "Moody's Proposes Revisions to Its
Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance",
for further details regarding the implications of the proposed
Methodology revisions on certain Credit Ratings.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with Moody's
expectations at close due to either a change in economic
conditions from Moody's central scenario forecast or
idiosyncratic performance factors would lead to rating actions.

For instance, should economic conditions be worse than forecast,
the higher defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in a downgrade of the ratings.
Downward pressure on the ratings could also stem from (1)
deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement; or (2)
counterparty risk, based on a weakening of a counterparty's
credit profile, particularly Obvion N.V. and Rabobank, which
perform numerous roles in the transaction.

Conversely, the ratings could be upgraded: (1) if economic
conditions are significantly better than forecasted; or (2) upon
deleveraging of the capital structure.

STRESS SCENARIOS:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: At the time the ratings were
assigned, the model output indicated that class A notes would
have achieved Aaa (sf), even if MILAN CE was increased to
[11.62]% from [8.3]% and the portfolio expected loss was
increased to [1.3]% from [0.65]% and all other factors remained
the same.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

The provisional ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal with respect to the notes by the
legal final maturity. Moody's ratings only address the credit
risk associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have
not been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavour
to assign definitive ratings to the Notes. A definitive rating
may differ from a provisional rating. Moody's will disseminate
the assignment of any definitive ratings through its Client
Service Desk. Moody's will monitor this transaction on an ongoing
basis. For updated monitoring information, please contact
monitor.rmbs@moodys.com.


LEOPARD III: S&P Withdraws 'B+' Rating Following Repayment
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings withdrew its 'B+ (sf)' credit rating on
Leopard CLO III B.V.'s class D notes following their full
repayment.  At the same time, S&P lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)' its ratings on the class E1 and E2 notes.  S&P has
subsequently withdrawn its ratings on these classes of notes,
effective in 30 days' time.

The notes' legal final maturity date is in April 2020.  S&P
previously reviewed this transaction on June 26, 2015.  At that
time, S&P noted the increased concentration in the transaction
and the relatively high proportion of assets maturing after the
transaction's legal final maturity.

According to the March 2017 trustee report, the transaction had
EUR7.89 million in cash and EUR7.67 million of assets.  Since
then, the remaining portfolio assets were sold and the proceeds
used to repay the outstanding notes, to the extent possible.

The total amount distributed was EUR14.5 million, of which
EUR0.9 million was used to repay deferred interest on the class
E1 and E2 notes.  The proceeds of the sale were sufficient to
fully repay the class D notes, and so S&P has withdrawn its
rating on this class of notes.  However, the proceeds of the sale
were insufficient to fully repay the class E1 and E2 notes, with
EUR779,000 and EUR499,000 left outstanding from the original
balances of EUR6.25 million and EUR4.00 million, respectively.

S&P understands that certain amounts have been reserved to pay
costs associated with winding up the transaction.  Should any
excess remain, it will be released to noteholders as and when
available.  However, S&P is not able to quantify the amount or
likelihood of payment of these amounts, and have therefore not
considered them in S&P's analysis.

S&P also understands that interest will no longer accrue on the
remaining classes of notes.  Taking all of these factors into
account, S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its ratings
on the class E1 and E2 notes.  The ratings will remain at 'D
(sf)' for a period of 30 days before the withdrawals become
effective.

Leopard CLO III is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to speculative-grade
corporate firms.  The transaction closed in April 2005 and is
managed by M&G Investment Management Ltd.

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
            To             From

Leopard CLO III B.V.
EUR350 Million Floating- And Fixed-Rate Notes

Rating Withdrawn

D           NR             B+ (sf)

Ratings Lowered And Withdrawn[1]

E1          D (sf)         CCC- (sf)
E2          D (sf)         CCC- (sf)

NR--Not rated.
[1]These ratings will remain at 'D (sf)' for a period of 30 days
before the withdrawals become effective.


PATHEON NV: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Positive
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its ratings on Netherlands-based
Patheon N.V, including the 'B' long-term corporate credit rating,
on CreditWatch with positive implications following the proposed
acquisition by Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.

The rating action follows the announcement that Thermo Fisher
intends to acquire Patheon for an enterprise value of
approximately $7.2 billion.  The transaction is subject to
regulatory and other customary closing conditions.

"Thermo Fisher has a stronger credit profile than Patheon, and we
could potentially raise the corporate credit rating on Patheon by
several notches at the close of the transaction," said S&P Global
Ratings credit analyst Matthew Todd.

S&P intends to resolve our CreditWatch listing upon completion of
the acquisition.  S&P could raise the corporate credit rating on
Patheon N.V. by several notches at the close of the transaction,
pending final details on the capital structure and after
determining the status of Patheon as part of the consolidated
entity.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


STATE TRANSPORT: Fitch Upgrades Long-Term IDRs to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded PJSC State Transport Leasing Company's
(STLC) Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'BB' from
'BB-'. The Outlooks are Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
STLC's Long-Term IDRs of 'BB', Support Rating of '3' and Support
Rating Floor (SRF) of 'BB' reflect the moderate probability of
support, in case of need, the company could receive from the
Russian sovereign (BBB-/Stable), its ultimate shareholder. The
upgrade of STLC's Long-Term IDR reflects Fitch's view that the
likelihood of support that the company may receive from the
Russian sovereign, represented by the Ministry of Transport of
the Russian Federation, has moderately increased.

In particular, in Fitch's view the sovereign's propensity to
support STLC has increased due to (i) STLC's increasing role in
state programmes to support the transport sector and domestic
aircraft and watercraft manufacturing; (ii) a prolonged record of
equity injections as evidenced by RUB12.4 billion of equity
received in December 2016 and a further RUB2 billion in March
2017 and anticipated further injections; (iii) more moderate
growth plans, limiting the potential cost of support; and (iv)
deeper integration of the company with the Ministry of Transport.

However, the timing and the amount of support (especially
capital) could be constrained by a potentially lengthy and
onerous budgetary process (unplanned capital injections would
need to be approved as amendments to the federal budget).

STLC was the largest Russian leasing company by volume of new
business in 2016 and the fourth-largest by total lease portfolio
at end-2016. It has been under the direct oversight of the
Ministry of Transport since 2009. STLC's participation in state
programmes for the development of the Russian transportation
industry was extended in 2016 to several new programmes.

Existing programmes (the major one is providing lease financing
for Russian-built Sukhoi Superjet 100 aircraft) have continued to
be carried out, and STLC anticipates receiving further capital
injections to support them.

Fitch views STLC's intrinsic creditworthiness as modest given the
company's asset quality deficiencies, large balance sheet
concentrations, considerable exposure to residual value risk and
limited liquidity of the company's assets, only break-even
profitability to date and significant, albeit manageable, short-
term refinancing needs.

STLC's lease book is concentrated, which is typical of Russian
state-owned leasing companies. At end-2016, the largest exposure
(24% of total earning assets) was represented by operating lease
contracts with the Russian state-controlled airline, Aeroflot
(B+/Stable).

The amount of problem exposures (net investments in lease and
other receivables on terminated contracts overdue by 90+ days
plus foreclosed assets) declined to a moderate 5% of total
earning assets at end-2016 from 8% at end-2015 due to
restructuring of the two largest problems.

STLC's financial leverage (debt/equity) has been comfortable at
around 3x since end-2015 due to several equity injections made in
2015-1Q17, which outpaced asset growth. Management expects annual
growth of around 20%-30% in 2017-2020, which could increase
leverage up to a still reasonable 4x, given the planned equity
injections to support this.

During 2017, STLC has to repay RUB37 billion of debt which
equalled 21% of total liabilities at end-2016. In addition, STLC
aims to attract at least a further RUB47 billion to finance lease
commitments. Fitch views these borrowing plans as feasible due to
the company's track record and close ties with Russian state
banks. STLC's available liquidity buffer at end-2016 was RUB9
billion, while proceeds from outstanding lease contracts are
expected at RUB37 billion (net of VAT). A further RUB50 billion
has subsequently been raised in 2017, including a RUB30 billion
syndicated loan arranged by Russian Gazprombank (BB+/Stable) and
RUB20 billion domestic bonds issuances.

STLC's rouble-denominated senior unsecured debt ratings are
aligned with the company's Long-Term Local-Currency IDR. US
dollar-denominated notes issued by its Ireland-based subsidiary
GTLK Europe DAC are rated in line with STLC's Foreign-Currency
IDR as they benefit from an unconditional and irrevocable
guarantee from STLC.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

STLC's Long-Term IDRs are primarily sensitive to a change in
Russia's sovereign ratings. A weakening of the ability or
propensity of the Russian authorities to provide support to STLC
could lead to a downward revision of its SRF and downgrade of its
Long-Term IDR. In addition, rapid growth leading to a sharp
increase in STLC's leverage beyond Fitch's current expectations,
or significant corporate governance risks, could also be credit-
negative.

A further upgrade of STLC's ratings, although unlikely in the
near term, would be primarily contingent on an upgrade of the
Russian sovereign rating. In addition, a more significant policy
role for STLC with respect to implementation of state programmes
to support the Russian transportation sector, underpinned by
sufficient capital provided by the authorities, could be positive
for the ratings.

STLC's and GTLK Europe's senior debt ratings are likely to move
in tandem with the company's Long-Term IDRs.

The rating actions are as follows:

PJSC State Transport Leasing Company
Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs: upgraded to 'BB' from
'BB-', Outlooks Stable
Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'BB' from 'BB-'
Senior unsecured debt rating: upgraded to 'BB' from 'BB-'

GTLK Europe DAC
Guaranteed notes long-term rating: upgraded to 'BB' from 'BB-'



=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL: Receives Merger Interest From Rivals
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ian Mount and Martin Arnold at The Financial Times report that
Banco Popular said it had received interest from several rivals
about a potential merger with the lossmaking lender, raising the
prospect for further consolidation in Spain's banking system.

In a filing with Spain's stock market regulator, Popular said it
had been approached by "various entities" after chairman
Emilio Saracho said last month that it would consider a merger
among its strategic options, the FT relates.  The Spanish lender,
which is the sixth largest in Spain, needs to raise billions of
euros in extra capital, the FT discloses.

According to the FT, a Popular spokesman said the bank had hired
JPMorgan and Lazard -- and several other groups that he would not
name -- to advise it on strategic options.  The bank is
considering the sale of non-strategic assets, a capital raise or
a merger, the FT states.

After being contacted by possible merger partners, Popular had
set the end of Tuesday, May 16, as the deadline for expressing
formal but non-binding interest, the FT states.  The bank noted
in its filing that it had "made no commitment, and received no
concrete offers".

Santander and BBVA, the two biggest banks in Spain, are widely
seen by analysts as the most likely acquirers of Popular, not
least because they are the only ones with the size to absorb its
EUR147 billion of total assets, of which EUR36.8 billion are non-
performing real estate and other loans, the FT says.

The bank sank to another loss in the first quarter and there are
signs that negative publicity is starting to hit customer
confidence after total deposits fell 5% to EUR78.9 billion in the
first three months of the year, eroding its cheapest source of
funding, the FT relays.

Banco Popular Espanol SA is a Spain-based commercial bank. The
Bank divides its business into four segments: Commercial Banking,
Corporate and Markets; Insurance Activity, and Asset Management.
The Bank's services and products include saving and current
accounts, fixed-term deposits, investment funds, commercial and
consumer loans, mortgages, cash management, financial assessment
and other banking operations aimed at individuals and small and
medium enterprises (SMEs). The Bank is a parent company of Grupo
Banco Popular, a group which comprises a number of controlled
entities, such as Targobank SA, GAT FTGENCAT 2005 FTA, Inverlur
Aguilas I SL, Platja Amplaries SL, and Targoinmuebles SA, among
others. In January 2014, the Company sold its entire 4.6% stake
in Inmobiliaria Colonial SA during a restructuring of the
property firm's capital.


RURAL HIPOTECARIO XVI: Fitch Raises Rating on Class B Notes to BB
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Rural Hipotecario XVI, FTA's class B
notes and affirmed the class A notes. Fitch has also affirmed
Rural Hipotecario XVII, as follows:

Rural Hipotecario XVI, FTA
Class A (ES0323978009); affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ES0323978017); upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook
Stable

Rural Hipotecario XVII, FTA
Bond A (ES0305033005): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable

The transactions comprise residential mortgage loans originated
and serviced by multiple rural saving banks in Spain, including
Caja Rural de Navarra (BBB+) and Caja Rural de Soria. The
transactions are the most recent in the Rural Hipotecario RMBS
series rated by Fitch, closed in 2013 and 2014, with weighted
average seasoning of approximately nine years for both
portfolios.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Rating Cap

The class A notes' ratings in both transactions are capped at
'A+sf' as the account bank replacement trigger is set at
'BBB+'/'F2'. In line with Fitch's counterparty criteria,
according to which direct support counterparties rated
'BBB+'/'F2' can support a note rating up to the 'Asf' category.

Credit Enhancement (CE) Trends

Both class A tranches are protected with significant CE, at 21.9%
at the last payment date for Rural Hipotecario XVI (Rural XVI)
and 32.7% for Rural Hipotecario XVII (Rural XVII).

Stable Asset Performance

The transactions' asset performance remains sound compared with
the average Fitch-rated Spanish RMBS. Three-month plus arrears
(excluding defaults) as a percentage of the current pool balance
are at 1.2% for both transactions, broadly in line with Fitch's
index of three-months-plus arrears of 0.9%.

Gross cumulative defaults remain significantly below the average
for Spain of 5.6%, at 0.20%, for Rural XVI and 0% for Rural XVII.

The stable asset performance and CE drove the upgrade of Rural
XVI's class B notes.

Portfolio Risky Attributes

Both portfolios are exposed to substantial geographical
concentration. Rural XVI is exposed 60% to properties located in
Castilla Leon and 30% in Aragon, while Rural XVII is exposed 50%
to Aragon and 20% to Andalucia.

Fitch has applied a 15% increase to the base foreclosure
frequency assumption for loans located in regions that represent
each more than 35% of the portfolio balance. Additionally, both
transactions have a significant exposure to self-employed
borrowers, which are deemed to be risky and are thus subject to
an increased foreclosure frequency of 60%.

Unhedged Transactions

These transactions are exposed to basis and reset risk, as all
assets pay 12-month EURIBOR and reset annually, while the notes
pay three-month EURIBOR with a quarterly reset frequency. Fitch's
analysis has accommodated cash flow stress sensitivities and
concluded that the current and projected levels of CE are
sufficient to absorb these stresses.

Interest Rate Floors

Around 20% of the borrowers in both transactions have interest
rate floor clauses on their mortgage loans, which could be
nullified following recent court rulings. Fitch has not given any
credit to the interest rate floors in the cash flow modelling.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The class A notes' ratings in both transactions could be upgraded
to the maximum achievable rating for Spanish structured finance
transactions of 'AA+sf' if the account bank replacement triggers
were defined at the 'A- or F1' level as specified in Fitch's
counterparty criteria, all else being equal.

A worsening of the Spanish macroeconomic environment, especially
employment conditions or an abrupt shift of interest rates could
jeopardise the underlying borrowers' affordability. This could
have negative rating implications, especially for junior tranches
that are less protected by structural CE.


SANTANDER EMPRESAS 1: Fitch Raises Rating on EUR123MM Notes to B+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded FTA, Santander Empresas 1's class D
notes as follows:

EUR123 million Class D (ISIN ES0382041046): upgraded to 'B+sf'
from 'B-sf'; Outlook Positive

FTA Santander Empresas 1 is a granular cash flow securitisation
of a static portfolio of secured and unsecured loans granted to
Spanish small- and medium-sized enterprises by Banco Santander
S.A.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement
The class D notes have been paid down by EUR25.3 million in the
year since Fitch previous reviews and EUR2 million has been paid
towards the reserve fund, which is now almost at the required
level. As a result credit enhancement for the notes has increased
by 5% to 20.6%. The Outlook on the notes is Positive, reflecting
upgrade potential if amortisation continues at the current rate.

Falling Delinquency Rate
90-365 delinquencies have risen as of the latest trustee report
dated February 6, 2017 but the three-year average, based on a
percentage of the outstanding balance, is lower than Fitch
previous review as the higher delinquency rates in 2014 are not
included. This has resulted in a lower transaction probability of
default benchmark of 3.41% compared with 3.52% at last review.

Reduced Obligor Concentration
The continued amortisation of the portfolio means obligor
concentration has fallen. However, it remains a key risk. The
notes' rating remains sensitive to the default of large obligors
albeit to a lesser extent than at Fitch last reviews.

Low Observed Recoveries
Since Fitch last reviews, the transaction has received EUR815,347
of recoveries, marginally increasing the weighted average
recovery rate to 31.96% from 29.93%. Fitch has analysed the
underlying portfolio on an unsecured basis due to the low
observed recovery rate.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Increasing the default probabilities assigned to the underlying
obligors by 25%, or decreasing the recovery rates assigned by the
same amount, would not impact the rating of the notes.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


VAT GROUP: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating on Switzerland-based vacuum valve
manufacturer VAT Group AG.  The outlook is stable.

VAT Group delivered better annual operating results than S&P had
forecast, chiefly boosted by favorable demand in the
semiconductors, displays, and general vacuum valve end markets.
Gross sales increased by 24% to Swiss franc (CHF) 508 million
(approximately US$503 million).  This was slightly offset by an
unfavorable product mix and expansion of capacities, leading to
an adjusted EBITDA margin of 30%.

In S&P's view, technology disruptions, digitalization across
various industries, and continuous demand growth in OLED, NAND,
and 3D NAND should translate into solid revenue growth at least
within the next 12 months.  To capture such a positive trend, VAT
Group will need to adjust its capacities and resources
accordingly, which S&P expects will translate into a drop in
EBITDA to around 28%-29%, nevertheless remaining well above the
average levels for capital goods producers.

VAT Group is the global leading manufacturer of high-end vacuum
valves, multivalve modules, and edge-welded bellows, and the
group provides related value-added services.  These products are
used in a fairly wide range of industries that employ vacuum-
based manufacturing processes, but are predominantly used in
semiconductor, displays, solar, and other technology-related
industries.  With the IPO in April 2016, VAT Group evolved from a
family-owned business to a listed company featuring:

   -- Modest indebtedness of CHF179 million at year-end 2016
      versus CHF729 million at year-end 2015 (given the existence
      at that time of a shareholder loan).  This compared well in
      S&P's view with adjusted EBITDA of about CHF156 million.
      On the strength of its cash flow generation, VAT Group
      repaid more than one-third of its senior secured facility
      within 12 months.  With the refinancing signed in September
      2016, the group negotiated better pricing conditions,
      allowing CHF5 million savings in interest expense.  All in
      all funds from operations (FFO) to debt significantly
      improved to about 60% at year-end 2016 from 7% at year-end
      2015.  Because of this and alongside S&P's expectations of
      a supportive operating environment in the near term, S&P
      has revised its assessment of the group's financial risk
      profile to intermediate from aggressive.  Commitment to
      return the company's entire free operating cash flow (FOCF)
      to shareholders as long as the group's reported net debt
      does not exceed 1x.  With such a level achieved at year-end
      2016, S&P would expect adjusted net debt to remain broadly
      unchanged, especially since the magnitude of the dividend
      payments was revised upward a few months after the IPO.  A
      shareholding structure that has evolved from being majority
      financial sponsor owned to more diversified, although
      Partners Group and Capvis Equity Partners retained an
      aggregate 37% at year-end 2016 after relinquishing much of
      their stake.  A still-limited track record and presence
      within a niche market.  The global market for vacuum valves
      and related equipment was estimated at about US$27 billion
      in 2016 according to VAT Group.  While the group delivered
      in line with its stated objectives, S&P still considers
      that it was only recently that the management team took the
      helm and its commitment to adhering to conservative
      financial targets throughout the cycle remains untested.
      Moreover, VAT Group is in terms of size and scale the
      smallest among those capital goods companies that went
      through a similar IPO path recently.

VAT Group's market leadership and edge in technology continue to
support S&P's assessment of the business risk profile.  This
advantage reportedly translated into a 2% gain in global market
share to about 49% at year-end 2016.  Given its inherent exposure
to Asian markets and its willingness to be closer to its
customers, as reflected in the new Malaysian manufacturing unit,
S&P expects some progressive asset reallocation to these
geographic areas.  Because of S&P's current country risk
assessments for these areas, it do not see an impact on the
ratings.  Furthermore, with its focus on premium vacuum valves,
the group has delivered sustainably healthy EBITDA margins
averaging 28% over the past three years.

Nevertheless, VAT Group remains chiefly exposed to the investment
level in the semiconductor industry, which is inherently volatile
and features some customer concentration.  Over the medium to
long term, S&P also sees technology risk attached to VAT Group's
products, if competing products emerge.

The sound improvement in its credit metrics following the
deleveraging of the balance sheet underpins S&P's revised
assessment of the financial risk profile.  Given VAT Group's
healthy profitability, limited capital expenditures (capex), and
tight working capital management, S&P would expect FOCF to debt
to remain in the robust area of about 45% by year-end 2017.
However, S&P do not rule out that such a cushion could be rapidly
eroded should there be a shift in the semiconductor cycle, such
as happened in 2011-2013 when EBITDA was slashed by 28% to
CHF86 million.  Furthermore, S&P sees the group's dividend policy
as very aggressive, with the whole FOCF generation promised to
shareholders, leading to an anticipated ratio of discretionary
cash flow (DCF) to debt of zero by year-end 2017.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that VAT Group will
retain its technological edge in high-end vacuum valve, while
maintaining its healthy profitability.  Under S&P's base-case
scenario, it forecasts an erosion in its EBITDA margin, although
it should remain at 28%-29%, owing to the ongoing ramp-up in
resources and capacities to address significant order intake.
Given the achievement of a reported net debt of less than 1x at
year-end 2016, in line with management's stated commitment, S&P
anticipates unchanged net debt by year-end 2017.  The group's
FOCF generation is earmarked for return to shareholders.  This
will translate into FFO to debt of about 45% and DCF to debt of
about zero in 2017.

A positive rating action would hinge on a longer track record
showing management's commitment to a conservative financial
policy throughout the cycle, alongside its willingness to lower
its dividend policy should credit measure protection deviate from
the stated policy of net debt to EBITDA of less than 1x.  Net
debt sustainably below 2x for a prolonged period of time,
combined with FOCF to debt maintained in the robust area of more
than 25% could prompt rating upside.

Given the robust order intake built over the course of 2016,
combined with solid prospect for growth in the vacuum valve
sector for the next 12-18 months, S&P considers rating downside
as limited.  Yet S&P could lower the rating if material short-
term capacity adjustments lead to cost overruns that resulted in
the EBITDA margin dropping to less than 20% for a prolonged time.
Moreover, if rapid growth occurs that is difficult to contain,
and which impairs cash flow generation and translates into FOCF
to debt of less than 25%, it could trigger a negative rating
action. Likewise, a shift in market conditions or the loss of
significant market share that affects credit ratio protection
could pressure the rating.  Finally, an even more aggressive
dividend policy resulting in a significantly negative DCF could
also prompt rating pressure.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


TOPLU KONUT: Moody's Affirms Ba1 LT Issuer Rating, Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Public Sector Europe (MPSE) has affirmed the Ba1/Aaa.tr
long-term issuer ratings (global and Turkish national scale) of
the HOUSING DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION OF TURKEY (Toplu Konut
Idaresi Baskanligi, TOKI). The outlook remains negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of the rating reflects Moody's opinion that the
credit quality of TOKI is closely linked to the credit quality of
the Government of Turkey (Ba1, negative) highlighting TOKI's
strong institutional, operational and financial linkage with the
Turkish government, reflecting its public-statute entity and
operations under a mandate of the central government.

Furthermore, TOKI acts as the Turkish government's vehicle for
implementing the national Urbanization and Housing Production
Plan. In line with its constitutionally declared responsibility
to meet social housing needs in the country, the Turkish
government maintains strong strategic oversight over TOKI's
management to ensure that targets set in the national housing and
urbanisation policies are met. Historically, TOKI's financial
performance and balance sheets were influenced by the
government's decision on land allocations and investment targets.
As a result, Moody's believes that TOKI's credit quality
ultimately aligns with the Government of Turkey's credit rating.
While Moody's will continue to monitor the financial health of
the company, Moody's will no longer assign a Baseline Credit
Assessment (BCA) to TOKI.

Moody's notes that TOKI's credit profile is underpinned by its
historically strong operating performance and positive financial
results, benefitting from substantial asset expansion as well as
its low debt levels. The ratings also take into account TOKI's
ambitious growth strategy, which might put pressure on its
finances.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

A downgrade of Turkey's sovereign rating would lead to a
downgrade of TOKI's ratings.

Conversely, a stabilisation of the outlook or an upgrade of
TOKI's ratings would follow a similar action on Turkey's
sovereign rating, given their close institutional, financial and
operational linkages.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Government-
Related Issuers published in October 2014.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BHS GROUP: Dominic Chappell Fails to Rescue Business
----------------------------------------------------
Mark Vandevelde at The Financial Times reports that Dominic
Chappell, a former bankrupt who bought BHS for GBP1 and received
millions of pounds while presiding over the retailer's collapse,
has lost a bid to keep his company afloat after a judge
questioned the value of its recent investment in Portuguese
property.

Administrators for BHS Group have been granted a winding-up order
for Retail Acquisitions, a company owned by Mr. Chappell, after
it failed to keep up with repayments on a GBP6 million loan it
received from BHS shortly after buying the doomed chain from Sir
Philip Green in 2015, the FT relates.

According to the FT, Retail Acquisitions contended that it had
kept up to date with payments by setting them off against money
it was owed for providing "management services" to the defunct
chain, under a deal to provide support in areas such as payroll
and marketing.

But the High Court rejected that argument, citing evidence from
Philip Duffy, the administrator, that no services had been
provided since BHS collapsed last April, the FT notes.

Finding that Retail Acquisitions did not have enough assets to
repay the BHS debt, Mr. Registrar Briggs, as cited by the FT,
said he had "serious doubt" about Mr. Chappell's contention that
the company could recover GBP5.5 million by bringing legal action
against Sir Philip.

He said that any recovery in the dispute surrounding the sale of
Marylebone House, the former BHS headquarters building, was
"uncertain in value, and dependent on many contingencies", and
ascribed it a value of just GBP1.

"The appointment of a liquidator will result in a closer scrutiny
of RAL's [Retail Acquisitions'] current, and previous, asset
position and dealings," the FT quotes Lance Ashworth QC, an
insolvency specialist at Serle Court Chambers, as saying.  "No
doubt the liquidator will seek to establish precisely what
occurred within RAL following its acquisition of BHS, and what
became of the monies RAL received from BHS."

Insolvency proceedings were launched against Retail Acquisitions
last October as part of a wider attempt to track the assets of
the failed high-street group, but had stalled amid appeals from
Mr Chappell, the FT recounts.

The High Court on May 16 lifted a temporary stay on its order to
wind up Retail Acquisitions, and denied Mr. Chappell permission
to appeal, the FT relays.  He has 21 days to renew his
application to a High Court judge, the FT discloses.

                            About BHS

BHS Group was a high street retailer offering fashion for the
whole family, furniture and home accessories.

BHS was put into administration in April 2016 in one of the
U.K.'s largest ever corporate failures, according to The Am Law
Daily.  More than 11,000 jobs were lost and 20,000 pensions (the
U.K. equivalent of a 401k) put at risk after it emerged that the
company, which had more than 160 stores across the U.K., had a
pension deficit of GBP571 million (US$703 million), The Am Law
Daily disclosed.

Sir Philip Green, a retail magnate with a net worth of more than
US$5 billion, has been heavily criticized for his role in the
collapse of BHS, The Am Law Daily said.  Mr. Green and other
shareholders had taken around GBP580 million (US$714 million) out
of the business before selling it for just GBP1 (US$1.23), The Am
Law Daily noted.

Linklaters acted for Green's Arcadia Group on the sale of the
company to Retail Acquisitions, which was advised by London-based
technology, media and telecoms specialist Olswang, The Am Law
Daily added.

Weil Gotshal & Manges and DLA then took the lead roles on the
administration, acting for the company and administrators Duff &
Phelps, respectively, while Jones Day was appointed by the
administrators to investigate the actions of the company's former
directors, The Am Law Daily related.


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Elliott in Better Position to Pursue Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Martin at The Telegraph reports that activist investor
Elliott Management moved a step closer to securing its share of a
GBP1.2 billion claim against Lehman Brothers' European arm after
scoring a partial victory in London's Supreme Court almost nine
years after the failure of the Wall Street giant.

Elliott is among a host of hedge funds that have bought up
creditor claims against the collapsed investment bank to generate
billions of dollars in profit, The Telegraph discloses.  Lehman
fell into administration in 2008 at the height of the financial
crisis but the winding up of its European business by PwC is
still dragging on, The Telegraph notes.

PwC has already distributed over GBP35 billion to senior
unsecured creditors and now has between GBP7 billion and GBP8
billion in surplus to hand out, The Telegraph discloses.  That
distribution, however, has been held up by funds fighting over
the cash, The Telegraph notes.

A complicated ruling by Britain's highest court -- part of a
series of ongoing legal feuds over Lehman's remains -- on May 17
appeared to boost Elliott's overall position in the long running
battle, The Telegraph relates.

The US fund, which is one of the world's most aggressive activist
investors, and King Street, another hedge fund, have an interest
in a GBP1.2 billion claim against Lehman's European business, The
Telegraph says.

The court decided that at least GBP5 billion of the surplus
should be paid out to Lehman claimants in statutory interest
before junior creditors, which include Elliott, receive any
money, The Telegraph relays.

According to The Telegraph, in a decision that was detrimental to
Elliott's chances of receiving some of the remaining GBP2 billion
to GBP3 billion surplus, the court ruled that its claim should
fall behind those of all other creditors, putting the fund at the
bottom of the so-called "waterfall" of money when it is paid out.

At the same time, however, the court dismissed a GBP2 billion
currency claim that some creditors had been pursuing, to
compensate them for sterling's plunge in value since Lehman's
collapse, The Telegraph discloses.

Lawyers, as cited by The Telegraph, said its dismissal more than
offset the impact of the other ruling, meaning overall Elliott
was now in a better position to pursue its claim against Lehman's
European division.

                    About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- http://www.lehman.com/-- was
the fourth largest investment bank in the United States.  For
more than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in the
global financial markets by serving the financial needs of
corporations, governmental units, institutional clients and
individuals worldwide.

Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy Sept. 15, 2008
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 08-13555).  Lehman's bankruptcy
petition disclosed US$639 billion in assets and US$613 billion in
debts, effectively making the firm's bankruptcy filing the
largest in U.S. history.  Several other affiliates followed
thereafter.

Affiliates Merit LLC, LB Somerset LLC and LB Preferred Somerset
LLC sought for bankruptcy protection in December 2009.

The Debtors' bankruptcy cases were assigned to Judge James M.
Peck.  Judge Shelley Chapman took over the case after Judge Peck
retired from the bench to join Morrison & Foerster.

A team of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, lawyers led by the late
Harvey R. Miller, Esq., serve as counsel to Lehman.  Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions serves as claims and noticing agent.

Dennis F. Dunne, Esq., Evan Fleck, Esq., and Dennis O'Donnell,
Esq., at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, in New York, served
as counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital, Inc., served as the
Committee's  investment banker.

On Sept. 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered an
order commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuant
to the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (Case
No. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)).  James W. Giddens was appointed as
trustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI.  He is
represented by Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP.

The Bankruptcy Court approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase of
Lehman Brothers' North American investment banking and capital
markets operations and supporting infrastructure for US$1.75
billion.  Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage house in
Japan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2 plus the
retention of most of employees.  Nomura also bought Lehman's
operations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

Lehman emerged from bankruptcy protection on March 6, 2012, more
than three years after it filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S.
history.  The Chapter 11 plan for the Lehman companies other than
the broker was confirmed in December 2011.


PRESTWICK AIRPORT: Will Take 20 Years to Repay Rescue Loans
-----------------------------------------------------------
Alastair Dalton at The Scotsman reports that Prestwick Airport
will take nearly 20 years to repay taxpayer loans, which have
kept it from closure, MSPs were told on May 17.

According to The Scotsman, the South Ayrshire site, which was
rescued by the Scottish Government in 2013 for GBP1, will take
until 2032 to refund nearly GBP40 million it has borrowed to stay
in business.

Finance and commercial director Derek Banks told Holyrood's rural
affairs and connectivity committee that repayments were not
expected to start until 2022, The Scotsman discloses.

That is when the airport is projected to break even and return to
private ownership, but the payments -- including interest -- are
expected to take ten years to complete, The Scotsman notes.  Mr.
Banks admitted the airport's current value was "very low" but
declined to provide a figure, The Scotsman states.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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