TCREUR_Public/170602.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, June 2, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 109


                            Headlines


F R A N C E

CGG SA: May Seek Creditor Protection, Debt Talks Ongoing
SFR GROUP: Moody's Affirms B1 CFR, Outlook Stable


G R E E C E

HELLENIC REPUBLIC: DBRS Confirms CCC(high) Issuer Ratings


I R E L A N D

ARBOUR CLO II: Fitch Corrects May 15 Ratings Release
MOUNT WOLSELEY: CBRE Confirms Sale of Business for EUR14.25-Mil.
ZOO ABS IV: Fitch Corrects May 23 Ratings Release


I T A L Y

EUROHOME MORTGAGES 2007-1: Fitch Affirms C Ratings on 4 Classes
MONTE DEI PASCHI: CEO Says Close to Finalizing Restructuring Plan
* ITALY: Ailing Banks May Incur EUR10BB Losses in Bad Loan Sales


L U X E M B O U R G

ALTICE INT'L: Moody's Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms B1 CFR
ALTICE LUXEMBOURG: Moody's Revises Outlook on B1 CFR to Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

BABSON EURO 2014-2: Fitch Corrects May 25 Rating Release
GREEN STORM 2017: Moody's Assigns Ba1(sf) Rating to Cl. E Notes
SUNGEVITY INC: Engie Agrees to Acquire European Unit
VEON LTD: Moody's Rates New Bonds '(P)Ba2' & Affirms 'Ba2' CFR


R U S S I A

ELEMENT LEASING: Fitch Assigns B+ Long-Term IDRs, Outlook Stable
SAMARA OBLAST: Moody's Rates RUB10BB Senior Unsecured Bonds Ba3


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: Spars with US Energy Dept.'s Bid for Repayment


R U S S I A

METALLINVESTBANK: Moody's Affirms B2 BCA, Outlook Positive


S W I T Z E R L A N D

SYNGENTA AG: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Corporate Family Rating


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ENSCO PLC: Moody's Puts B1 Sr. Rating Under Review for Downgrade
LIFELINE: Jobs at Risk as Administration Looms
PETROFAC LIMITED: Moody's Cuts 2018 Unsec. Bonds Rating to Ba1


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: The Money Wars


                            *********



===========
F R A N C E
===========


CGG SA: May Seek Creditor Protection, Debt Talks Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------

According to Bloomberg News' David Whitehouse, Les Echos, citing
several unidentified people, reports that CGG SA could seek
creditor protection which would mean final agreement on debt
restructuring will be harder to reach.

Les Echos, citing an unnamed person as saying, relays that
creditors are being asked to convert nearly US$2 billion of debt,
Bloomberg notes.

CGG SA is a French offshore oilfield surveyor.

                            *   *   *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 20,
2017, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of CGG SA,
including the Corporate Family Rating (CFR) to Caa3 from Caa1 and
the Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to Ca-PD from Caa1-PD.
Moody's also downgraded the ratings on the outstanding senior
notes to Ca from Caa2.  Moody's said the outlook on all ratings
is negative.


CGG Seeks to Impose 48-Hour Deadline for Creditor Accord: Echos
By David Whitehouse
(Bloomberg) -- CGG could seek creditor protection which would mean
final

agreement harder to reach, Les Echos reports, citing several
unidentified

people.
Creditors are being asked to convert nearly $2b of debt, Les Echos
cites an

unnamed person as saying.
For Related News and Information:



SFR GROUP: Moody's Affirms B1 CFR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B1 corporate family
rating (CFR), B1-PD probability of default rating (PDR) and B1
senior secured debt ratings of SFR Group S.A. (SFR), a Paris-based
cable and fiber optics service provider. The outlook on all the
ratings is stable.

The rating action follows the publication of audited financial
results for the year ended December 31, 2016 and more recent
announcements by SFR of its investment in sports, film and
television rights and content.

The affirmation reflects Moody's views that SFR now has a clear
strategic focus and its long-awaited operational restructuring
will occur in 2017," says Colin Vittery, a Moody's Vice
President -- Senior Credit Officer, and lead analyst for SFR. "Our
stable outlook balances an expectation that revenues in the highly
competitive French telecoms market will improve in 2017 against
free cash flow limitations over the next 18 months as a result of
restructuring costs and content investment."

RATINGS RATIONALE

SFR's B1 CFR reflects the significant challenges facing the
business in the highly competitive French telecoms market.
Specifically, the rating references (1) the need to stabilize
revenues and reduce high levels of customer churn; (2) the need to
deliver the synergies expected from the operational restructuring
in progress; (3) the investment plan to roll-out network
infrastructure, which will lead to a peak in capex in 2017; (4)
the high leverage (Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA of 4.7x) and
expectation that cash flow metrics will remain weak over the next
18 months owing to the restructuring costs; and (5) the potential
impact of the Altice Way management fee and possible future debt
push-down from Altice Luxembourg S.A.

SFR's B1 rating also recognizes (1) the scale of the business and
its number two market position; (2) the high quality asset base
and the success in capex "catch up" in 2016; (3) the convergent
product offer; (4) the group's high margin of 36.0%; and (5) the
stable regulatory environment.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on the rating considers that SFR's leverage is
presently well placed within the rating category but that there is
a high probability that leverage capacity created at SFR would be
used for growth initiatives and/or future debt push-down from the
parent company.

Moody's sees positive momentum regarding revenue stabilization and
the agreed operational restructuring in 2017 should deliver margin
expansion. With elevated capex and significant restructuring
charges, the rating agency does not expect material cash flow
generation in the next 18 months.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Upward pressure on the rating may arise if: (1) Moody's adjusted
leverage is sustained well below 4.5x at SFR Group level; (2)
Moody's adjusted leverage is sustained well below 4.5x at Altice
Luxembourg level; (3) there is demonstrable and sustained success
in the SFR operational restructuring; and (4) there are limited
acquisitions in the Altice NV group, enabling a greater
operational focus. Upward rating pressure is unlikely until there
is a track record of stronger liquidity management and there is
visibility on the impact of the potential push down of debt from
Luxembourg into SFR.

Downward pressure on the rating may develop if; (1) there is a
failure to sustain revenue stability; (2) a failure to deliver
forecast cost synergies; (3) Moody's adjusted leverage increases
towards 5.5x; (4) or there are material new acquisitions,
particularly within the Altice Luxembourg S.A. perimeter.

List of affected ratings:

Affirmations:

Issuer: SFR Group S.A.

-- LT Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed B1

-- Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed B1-PD

-- Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed B1

-- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed B1

-- Backed Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1

-- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: SFR Group S.A.

-- Outlook, Remains Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was
Telecommunications Service Providers published in January 2017.

SFR Group S.A. was formed in November 2014 when Numericable Group
S.A., the only large cable operator in France completed the
acquisition of SFR S.A., France's largest alternative
communications provider.

For the year ending December 31, 2016, SFR reported revenue and
adjusted EBITDA (as defined by the company) of EUR11.0 billion and
EUR3.84 billion respectively.

SFR is indirectly 89.95% owned by Altice NV, an Amsterdam-based
company investing in telecommunications and cable assets. Altice,
which owns its stake in SFR through intermediate holding
companies, including Altice Luxembourg S.A. is ultimately
controlled by French entrepreneur Patrick Drahi.


===========
G R E E C E
===========


HELLENIC REPUBLIC: DBRS Confirms CCC(high) Issuer Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited on May 12, 2017, confirmed the Hellenic
Republic's long-term foreign and local currency issuer ratings at
CCC (high) and its short-term foreign and local currency issuer
ratings at R-5. The trend on all ratings remains Stable.

The CCC (high) rating reflects Greece's very high level of public-
sector debt and the political challenge that the Greek authorities
and the institutional creditors face in placing this debt on a
firm downward path. On the May 2, 2017, the Greek authorities
reached a preliminary agreement with creditors on a policy package
that includes fiscal and structural measures to support economic
recovery. While this agreement is a positive development, its
conclusion has been delayed for months and DBRS remains concerned
about long-term debt sustainability. Furthermore, banks' weak
asset quality and the high level of impaired loans constrain the
banking system's ability to support the economy and employment.

The Stable trend reflects DBRS's view that the current official-
sector financial support programme for Greece has eased the
financial-sector liquidity squeeze and stabilized the economy. The
second review of the Third Economic Adjustment Programme (the
Third Programme), on completion, should release an additional
EUR7.4 billion in funds and prior actions, including fiscal and
structural measures, should provide a stimulus to growth.

Greece's credit strengths include the benefits of euro zone
membership and access to financial support from the European
institutions. Since 2009, the country has implemented a
significant fiscal adjustment. The cyclically adjusted primary
balance has improved by 18% of gross domestic product (GDP; 2009-
2016). In addition, progress has been made with structural
reforms, including improvements in the labour market, reform of
the tax code and streamlining the public administration. The
external sector has also strengthened with the conversion of the
current account into a small surplus +0.1% in 2015 and a small
deficit -0.6% in 2016 from a large deficit of -11.4% of GDP in
2010.

However, credit challenges are considerable as the public debt
ratio is extremely high. Greece's banks have high levels of
impaired assets and firm economic recovery is not yet underway.
Meeting the fiscal and structural reform adjustments of the Third
Programme amid social constraints and the government coalition's
slim three-seat majority in parliament continue to be challenging.
That said, the recent agreement with creditors on fiscal and
structural measures is encouraging in DBRS's opinion.

Following the recapitalization of the banking sector in 2015, bank
balance sheets remain weak and non-performing loans (NPLs) are
high. On the other hand, the persistent withdrawal of bank
deposits has stabilized, although they increased at the start of
the year because of concerns over delays in the second review.
Capital controls introduced in June 2015 have been eased; however,
credit to the domestic private sector is declining and economic
recovery has been delayed.

RATING DRIVERS

Triggers for a rating upgrade could include a combination of: (1)
continued cooperation between Greece and its official creditors to
implement fiscal and structural reforms; (2) a clearer view of
external financing beyond the current Third Programme's completion
in August 2018; (3) clearing of public-sector arrears; and (4)
economic recovery.

For a rating downgrade, drivers would likely be some combination
of: (1) lack of cooperation with the institutional creditors; (2)
external debt service payment arrears; and (3) renewed financial-
sector instability.

Notes: All figures are in Euros unless otherwise noted.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ARBOUR CLO II: Fitch Corrects May 15 Ratings Release
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings issued a commentary on Arbour CLO II DAC replacing
the version published on May 15, 2017 to correct the rating
sensitivity section that mis-stated the number of notches of the
potential downgrade of the class E notes in case of a 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates.

The revised release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has assigned Arbour CLO II DAC's refinanced notes
final ratings:

EUR1.75 million Class X notes: 'AAAsf': Outlook Stable
EUR235.75 million Class A notes: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR22 million Class B-1 notes: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR21 million Class B-2 notes: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR22.25 million Class C notes: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR22.75 million Class D notes: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR26.50 million Class E notes: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR10.25 million Class F notes: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

The proceeds of the issuance have been used to redeem the old
notes. The refinanced CLO envisages a further four-year
replenishment period, with a new identified portfolio comprising
the existing portfolio, as modified by sales and purchases
conducted by the manager in the ramp-up period following the
closing date. The portfolio is managed by Oaktree Capital
Management (UK) LLP. The reinvestment period is scheduled to end
in May 2021.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B' Category Portfolio Credit Quality
The average credit quality of the identified portfolio is in the
'B' category. Fitch has public ratings or credit opinions on all
obligors in the identified portfolio. The covenanted maximum Fitch
weighted average rating factor (WARF) for assigning the final
ratings is 34. The WARF of the current portfolio as of 31 March
2017 is 30.8.

High Expected Recoveries
At least 90% of the portfolio comprises senior secured
obligations. Fitch has assigned recovery ratings to all assets in
the identified portfolio. The covenanted minimum Fitch weighted
average recovery rate (WARR) for assigning the final ratings is
68.9%. The WARR of the current portfolio as of 31 March 2017 was
70.7%.

Above-Average Concentration
Portfolio profile tests limit exposure to the top one Fitch
industry to 20% and the top three Fitch industries to 40%. This is
above the threshold for CLO rated recently by Fitch.

Partial Interest Rate Hedge
The manager has the option to choose between three matrices with a
different maximum fixed rate asset bucket (10%, 12.5%, or 15%).
Fixed rate liabilities account for 6.1% of the target par amount
while the portfolio has a minimum fixed rate asset bucket of 5%.
If the minimum fixed rate asset test falls below 5%, the
collateral manager will not be able to buy floating rate assets
until the test is satisfied.

Limited FX Risk
The transaction is allowed to invest up to 30% of the portfolio in
non-euro-denominated assets, provided these are hedged with
perfect asset swaps within six months of purchase. Unhedged non-
euro assets must not exceed 2.5% of the portfolio at any time.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability could lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes. A 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates could lead to a downgrade of
up to two notches for all rated notes except the class E for which
it could lead to a four-notch downgrade.


MOUNT WOLSELEY: CBRE Confirms Sale of Business for EUR14.25-Mil.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ronald Quinlan at Independent.ie reports that the sale of the
Mount Wolseley Hotel & Golf Resort, Tullow, Co. Carlow has been
confirmed by real estate firm CBRE Group.

According to Independent.ie, the property has been acquired by
Davy Real Estate on behalf of the Strategic Capital Investment
Fund plc.  The fund is owned by Thomas Roggle, a high-net-worth
Austrian investor, who only recently acquired the Farnham Estate
in Cavan, Independent.ie discloses.

Mount Wolseley's former owners, Tetrarch Capital, are understood
to have secured a figure close to the EUR14.25 million guide price
that had been quoted by CBRE when they offered the property to the
market in March, Independent.ie relays.

In 2014, Tetrarch Capital effectively rescued the resort after
investing EUR7.5 million in its operations when taking it out of
examinership, Independent.ie recounts.  The business had entered
examinership in April 2014 with overall debts of EUR60 million
owed to several financial institutions, Independent.ie relates.
Some EUR28 million of that debt had been owed to Bank of Ireland
alone, Independent.ie states.

Mount Wolseley, which is situated on approximately 69 hectares
(170 acres), benefits from multiple revenue generators including
golf, weddings, conferences, functions, spa, leisure breaks and
special events, and is trading exceptionally well.


ZOO ABS IV: Fitch Corrects May 23 Ratings Release
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings issued a correction on a release on Zoo ABS IV plc
published on May 23, 2017, which incorrectly stated the impact of
a 25% increase in the asset default probability under Rating
Sensitivities.

The revised release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has upgraded Zoo ABS IV plc's class A-1A, A-1B, A-
1R, A-2, B, C, and P notes and affirmed the remaining notes:

Class A-1A: upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Positive
Class A-1B: upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Positive
Class A-1R: upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Positive
Class A-2: upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B: upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C: upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
Class D: affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
Class E: affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
Class P: upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable

Zoo ABS IV plc is a cash securitisation of structured finance
assets. The portfolio is managed by P&G SGR SpA.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Deleveraging Accelerated by Sales
The transaction has deleveraged significantly over the last 12
months, distributing EUR156.4 million to noteholders. The upgrade
of the class A-1A, A-1B, A-1R, A-2, B and C notes reflects the
resulting increase in credit enhancement.

A significant portion of these funds was realised in April 2017,
when the collateral manager sold various assets considered credit-
improved or credit-impaired with a total par value of EUR96.8
million and sales proceeds of EUR96.3 million. The remainder of
the note distributions was funded by scheduled and unscheduled
asset amortisations.

The Positive Outlook on the pari passu class A-1A, A-1B and A-1R
notes reflects Fitch's view that continued asset prepayments at
the current pace would put upward pressure on the notes' ratings.

Stable Quality; Rising Concentration
The portfolio's performance has remained stable over the last 12
months. The average credit quality of the portfolio is 'BBB-
'/'BB+'. There have been no reported defaults over the last 12
months. Fitch's expectation of the risk horizon of the portfolio
stands at 12.3 years, compared with 12.5 years one year ago.

Issuer concentration has increased markedly due to the pace of
deleveraging. The 10 largest issuers account for 54.7% of the
performing portfolio, up from 30.1% one year ago.

Combo Notes Linked to Components
The rating of the class P combination notes is linked to the
rating of the class C component. The upgrade of the class P notes
thus follows the upgrade of the class C notes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the asset default probability would lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes. A 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates would not lead to a downgrade
of the rated notes.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


EUROHOME MORTGAGES 2007-1: Fitch Affirms C Ratings on 4 Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Eurohome Mortgages 2007-1 plc's notes:

Class A (ISIN XS0309227279): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 90%

Class B (ISIN XS0309230497): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%

Class C (ISIN XS0309232196): affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%

Class D (ISIN XS0309232600): affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%

Class E (ISIN XS0309233244): affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%

Class X (ISIN XS0309234309): affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%

The transaction is a residential mortgage-backed securitisation of
Italian and German mortgages. The underlying loans were originated
by Deutsche Bank AG via its German platform topimmo and its
Italian platform DB Mutui. Total assets currently consist of
EUR157 million mortgage collateral, comprising EUR125 million for
the Italian sub-pool and EUR32 million for the German sub-pool.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Weak Asset Performance
The performance of the two sub-pools has been weak since closing
in 2007. As of the May 2017 transaction reporting, the portion of
borrowers with three or more missed instalments in the German pool
(including performing, delinquent and defaulted loans) have
increased to 30% from 19% at the same time of last year, driven by
a recent spike in prepayments, which led to a sharp decrease in
collateral in the denominator of the arrears calculation.

In the Italian sub-pool, defaulted loans and loans in arrears by
more than 10 months reached 37% (of the Italian collateral balance
including performing, delinquent and defaulted assets), up from
36% at the same time of last year. The gross cumulative default
rate in Italy is 29%, when basing on the Italian sub-pool assets
at inception.

Limited Recoveries
Recoveries collected by the two servicers to date are fairly low
compared with the large amount of defaulted loans. The timing and
amount of future recoveries remain uncertain; especially for the
Italian sub-pool as the recovery process in Italy is lengthy and
cumbersome.

Principal Deficiency Ledger (PDL) Debited Heavily
The poor performance of the underlying assets - and insufficient
excess spread over time - has meant that the reserve fund, which
was fully utilised in February 2009, remains depleted. In the
recent quarters, the PDL has stopped to accumulate, but it remains
at an elevated level, filling up almost the entire class B PDL
sub-ledger.

Long Remaining Term
Even though the underlying loans are just above 10 years in
seasoning, the weighted average remaining term of two decades for
the aggregate portfolio is long, hence exposing the transaction to
changes in the economic environment and further defaults.

Different Prepayment Speed in the Sub-Pools
While the Italian sub-pool is displaying low prepayments since
inception, the German sub-pool is currently prepaying
significantly, as around 50% of the outstanding German sub-pool
assets in early 2016 have prepaid by now. Fitch expects another
quarter of strong prepayments in the German sub-pool and a further
wave of prepayments in five years' time.

Expected Future Performance
The note ratings are all below 'Bsf' reflecting distress, while
Fitch's Italian and German RMBS criteria do not address these
rating scenarios. Therefore, in line with its Global Structured
Finance Rating Criteria, Fitch has made projections of the
portfolio's expected future performance based on the current
circumstances, without applying additional stress.

Fitch has derived an annual loss expectation of 3.5% and a
remaining lifetime loss assumption, over a weighted average life
(WAL) of 10 years, of 35% for the German sub-pool based on the
last six quarter data history in terms of principal losses. The
WAL estimate is based on the reported remaining term to maturity
of 262 months and an estimate of future prepayments.

For the Italian sub-pool, the estimated annual default rate
average of 4% has been based on the quarterly default history of
the past 36 months. A WAL of 11 years has been estimated based on
the reported remaining term to maturity of 237 months and an
assumption of no future prepayments. Then a remaining lifetime
default rate of 44% was calculated.

A lifetime recovery rate from new defaults of 44% was estimated
based on the servicer loan by loan recovery data on fully resolved
defaulted loans. With an observed recovery rate of 3% per year in
the Italian sub-pool, Fitch has estimated it will take about 15
years to reach a cumulative recovery rate of 44% on new defaults.
For the ongoing foreclosure processes, Fitch has noted that an
average of six years since default has elapsed and 8% recovery
rate has been achieved so far. Further recoveries from outstanding
net defaults have been assumed equal to 36% and occurring in nine
years' time. Recoveries from future defaults have been assumed to
be collected in a six year time (8%) and after 15 years (the 36%).

Fitch has assumed a floating interest rate of 2.5% over the
transaction horizon, when calculating the portfolio excess spread
and the net present value of the recoveries from the Italian sub-
pool. Being excess spread slightly negative, no credit has been
given to the PDL clearance via excess spread trapping.

Under the above assumptions, the class A notes will not be repaid
in full and will suffer a principal loss equal to 10% of their
current balance. This is reflected in the 'CCCsf' rating and in
the 90% Recovery Estimate.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Further debits of the PDL balance so that the class B PDL sub-
ledger reaches 100% of the class B notes amount and the class A
PDL sub-ledger starts to be filled in may lead to negative rating
actions starting from class B.


MONTE DEI PASCHI: CEO Says Close to Finalizing Restructuring Plan
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sonia Sirletti and Lorenzo Totaro at Bloomberg News report that
Monte Paschi Chief Executive Officer Marco Morelli, speaking in an
interview with Bloomberg TV at the Bank of Italy event, said he's
confident the bank is close to finalizing its restructuring plan.

"When the process is over, I'll give my view," Bloomberg quotes
Mr. Morelli as saying.

Italy is seeking approval from the European Commission and the
European Central Bank to inject EUR6.5 billion into Monte Paschi
and to raise the remaining EUR2.3 billion by converting
subordinated bonds into shares, Bloomberg discloses.

According to Bloomberg, Finance Minister Pier Carlo Padoan's chief
of staff, on May 23 said Italy expects to reach an agreement with
European authorities soon, Fabrizio Pagani.

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is an
Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.

                            *   *   *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported on May 23, 2017,
that Fitch Ratings affirmed Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena's
(MPS) Viability Rating (VR) at 'c' and maintained the bank's 'B-'
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) on Rating Watch Evolving
(RWE).  The VR of 'c' indicates that failure of the bank under
Fitch criteria is inevitable because it requires an extraordinary
injection of capital in order to remain viable.  Following the EBA
stress tests in the summer of 2016, the European Central Bank
identified a capital shortfall of EUR8.8 billion arising from its
large volumes of doubtful loans (sofferenze).  The shortfall
arises as a result of the losses the bank will bear once it
deconsolidates the entirety of its sofferenze.


* ITALY: Ailing Banks May Incur EUR10BB Losses in Bad Loan Sales
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sonia Sirletti and Lorenzo Totaro at Bloomberg News report that
Ignazio Visco, Bank of Italy governor and ECB governing council
member, said Italy's troubled banks may suffer an additional EUR10
billion (US$11 billion) in losses from the sale of their bad loans
at current market prices.

"If they were sold at the very low prices offered by the few large
specialist debt collection agencies active in the market today,
which pursue very high returns, the amount of additional
writedowns would be in the order of EUR10 billion," Bloomberg
quotes Mr. Visco as saying on May 31 at the central bank's annual
meeting in Rome.  He pointed out that the country's troubled banks
have EUR20 billion in net bad loans, Bloomberg relays.

Italy is struggling to fix a crisis legacy of about EUR360 billion
of soured loans in its banks' balance sheets that is holding back
credit and weighing on the country's weak recovery, Bloomberg
discloses.  According to Bloomberg, Italian authorities are trying
to prop up Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA and two banks in
the northern region of Veneto, using a provision in the EU's bank-
failure rules that allows governments to provide state aid.

While talks for a state backed recapitalization of Monte Paschi,
Banca Popolare di Vicenza SpA and Veneto Banca SpA are underway,
Mr. Visco urged European authorities to coordinate better and
faster on the banking crisis, Bloomberg notes.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


ALTICE INT'L: Moody's Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms B1 CFR
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to stable from negative the
outlook on the ratings of multi-national fiber,
telecommunications, content and media company, Altice
International S.a.r.l., as well as on the ratings of its
guaranteed finance subsidiaries Altice Financing S.A. (B1 rating
on senior secured debt) and Altice Finco S.A. (B3 rating on senior
unsecured debt). Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the B1
corporate family rating (CFR) and B1-PD probability of default
rating (PDR) of Altice International S.a.r.l., the B1 senior
secured ratings of Altice Financing S.A. and the B3 senior
unsecured ratings of Altice Finco S.A.

"Our stabilization of the outlook on Altice International's
ratings reflects the improved revenue outlook and margin growth
due to cost savings efforts in Portugal, where wholly owned
subsidiary Portugal Telecom is market leader. It also factors in
Altice's improved business mix on the back of investment in fiber
roll-out as well as strong performance in Israel and the Dominican
Republic, both of which are key markets for Altice," says Colin
Vittery, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Credit Officer -- and
lead analyst for Altice International.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Altice International S.a.r.l.'s B1 CFR reflects (1) the rapid pace
of growth by acquisition in recent years in multiple geographical
markets; (2) the all-debt financing of the Portugal Telecom
acquisition in 2015, associated high leverage and the complex
capital structure of the company; (3) the challenging revenue
environment in Portugal; (4) the high capex investment required;
and (4) the need to maintain adequate liquidity given the dividend
payments made to cover interest obligations at Altice Luxembourg
S.A.

More positively, the rating acknowledges the focus in 2016 on the
integration and management of operating assets, as well as the
expected improvement in revenue and margin trends in
International's core markets.

The rating also reflects (1) the scale of the business and its
geographical diversification; (2) strong market-leading positions
with convergent product offer; (3) high quality, fiber-rich
infrastructure; (4) evidence of synergy delivery across the
company and particularly in Portugal; (5) early signs of revenue
growth in Portugal; and (6) the stable regulatory environment in
its main markets.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects the successful integration of
acquisitions, evidenced by improved margins together with an
improved revenue outlook. Management focus on the operation of
underlying assets has intensified.

Moody's expects significant investment in fiber roll-out to limit
free cash flow generation in the next 18 months but this should
create enhanced future returns, given the higher revenues expected
from fiber customers. The stable outlook also assumes no material
debt financed acquisitions and a satisfactory outcome to the
current EU investigation into alleged pre-clearance management at
the time of the Portugal Telecom acquisition.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Upward rating pressure may arise if (1) leverage reduces, such
that Moody's Adjusted Debt/EBITDA is sustained well below 4.0x;
(2) given the close relationship with Altice Luxembourg
("Luxembourg" or "Holdco"), leverage at Holdco to be sustained
well below 4.5x; and (3) there is a general stability in the
activities of the wider Altice group and particularly within the
Luxembourg perimeter. Upward rating pressure is unlikely until
there is a track record of stronger liquidity management and there
is visibility on the impact of the potential push down of debt
from Luxembourg into International.

Downward rating pressure may develop if (1) leverage increases,
such that Moody's Adjusted Debt/EBITDA exceeds 5.25x for a
sustained period; (2) liquidity deteriorates at either Altice
International or Luxembourg; (3) operating performance weakens;
(4) there are further material debt-financed acquisitions; and (5)
there is a material negative outcome to the current EU
investigation on the Portugal Telecom merger pre-clearance .

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Affirmations:

Issuer: Altice International S.a.r.l.

-- Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed B1

-- Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed B1-PD

Issuer: Altice Financing S.A.

-- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed B1

-- Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1

-- Backed Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1

Issuer: Altice Finco S.A.

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B3

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Altice International S.a.r.l.

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: Altice Financing S.A.

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: Altice Finco S.A.

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

The principal methodology used in these ratings was
Telecommunications Service Providers published in January 2017.

Altice International S.a.r.l. is a mulinational fiber,
telecommunications, content and media company, with a presence in
four regions: Dominican Republic, Israel, Western Europe and the
French Overseas Territories. The company's direct corporate parent
is Altice Luxembourg S.A., which itself, through Amsterdam-listed
Altice NV, is controlled by French entrepreneur Patrick Drahi.
Altice NV, through Altice Luxembourg S.A., also owns the French
telecommunications company SFR Group S.A. (B1 stable).

Over the last three years International has grown rapidly through
acquisitions. These include the 2014 acquisitions of telecoms and
cable operations, including Tricom, S.A. and Global Interlinks
Ltd. (together, "Tricom") and Orange Dominicana S.A. ("ODO") as
well as the acquisition of Portugal Telecom's operations
(excluding Africa and Portugal Telecom's Rio Forte debt
securities) concluded in mid-2015.

For the year ended December 31, 2016, International generated
EUR4.5 billion in revenue and EUR2.14billion in management
reported Adjusted EBITDA.


ALTICE LUXEMBOURG: Moody's Revises Outlook on B1 CFR to Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to stable from negative the
outlook on the ratings of Altice Luxembourg S.A., a Luxembourg-
based holding company which, through its subsidiaries in France,
Portugal, Israel and Dominican Republic, provides pay television,
broadband Internet and fixed line telephony, and mobile telephony
services to residential and corporate customers. Concurrently,
Moody's has affirmed Luxembourg's B1 corporate family rating
(CFR), B1-PD probability of default rating (PDR) and its B3 senior
unsecured notes rating.

"Our decision to stabilize the outlook on Altice Luxembourg's
ratings reflects revenue improvements in the companies key markets
in France and Portugal, the strengthening of the management team,
more clearly defined strategic objectives, and anticipated
improvements to company credit metrics in 2018 on the back of
significant investment in fiber and 4G infrastructure," says Colin
Vittery, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Credit Officer -- and
lead analyst for Altice Luxembourg. "However, the rating remains
weakly positioned, with leverage at the higher end of the range
for the category, and limited free cash flow generation over the
next 18 months".

RATINGS RATIONALE

The group has grown rapidly by acquisition in recent years and
Altice employs a complex financial structure with distinct funding
credit pools for its various business units.

SFR Group S.A. is the principal vehicle used to fund the group's
telecom operations in France. Altice International S.a.r.l.,
through its guaranteed subsidiaries Altice Financing S.A. and
Altice Finco S.A., is used to fund the group's non-US
international operations, such as Portugal Telecom, HOT in Israel,
and Orange Dominicana in the Dominican Republic. These units
consolidate up into Altice Luxembourg S.A.  Altice Luxembourg is a
pure holding company, which incorporates all of the group's
operations outside North America, but it also carries considerable
debt. Each of these entities is financed independently from each
other with no cross guarantees, but with limitations on
distributions and related party transactions.

Moody's ratings consider the financial profile of each unit as a
stand-alone enterprise, but also incorporate an overarching
assessment of the risks associated with the aggregate
organization's growing complexity. In particular, these include
managing and controlling a rapidly acquired group of businesses
and executing on the delivery of planned synergies and cost
savings to service the acquisition debt of the group.

These risks are balanced against the company's ownership of well-
established telecom/cable assets and increased geographic
diversification. The ratings also take into account the company's
expressed intent to moderate financial leverage within the group
before making any further acquisitions.

The ratings do recognize entity-specific factors related to their
scale, operating profile, profitability, cash flow generation,
financial leverage and other considerations that warrant different
ratings for the various Altice entities. However, there are
important common risk considerations which have resulted in
Altice's various entities being rated in a relatively narrow
range, largely in the single B category. These common threads
include: (1) rapidly rolled-up acquisitions; (2) high financial
leverage; (3) a need to execute aggressive cost savings
initiatives without compromising the customer service standards
needed to support pricing; and (4) the need to develop managerial
and financial controls to orchestrate the group's integration.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's view that there is evidence of
increased operational focus on underlying assets, particularly in
France. Management has been strengthened, strategic objectives are
now more clearly defined and performance is improving. In both
France and Portugal there are signs of revenue stabilization.

Altice Luxembourg is considered to be weakly positioned in the B1
ratings category. Moody's adjusted leverage remains very high for
the rating and the group maintains an acquisitive strategy and
continues to face significant and complex operational challenges,
particularly in the French market. Moody's expects Altice
Luxembourg to continue to maintain leverage at around 5.5x (using
Moody's standard adjustments) in the next 18 months as high
exceptional restructuring costs in France and elevated capex,
limit free cash flow.

Moreover, the outlook factors in Moody's expectation that Altice
will focus on executing its operational plans for assets owned
within Altice Luxembourg. The outlook does not contemplate any
material new debt-financed acquisitions before (1) Moody's
adjusted leverage reduces to 5.0x; (2) the group has demonstrated
progress with its cost reduction plans in France and; (3) there is
evidence of revenue stabilization / growth in the French telecoms
business.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's sees no near-term upward pressure on the rating, although
such pressure may develop over time should: (1) Moody's adjusted
leverage be sustained below 4.5x; (2) the company reports material
free cash flow generation; and (3) the company demonstrates
sustained revenue and earnings performance from underlying assets,
in particular, the SFR Group in France.

Downward pressure on the rating may develop if; (1) Moody's
adjusted leverage moves materially above the level of 5.5x
reported at December 31, 2016. (2) there is a failure to stabilize
revenues in the French telecoms business; (3) there are material
debt-financed acquisitions at either the Altice Luxembourg or
Altice N.V. level in 2017; (4) there are signs of a deterioration
in liquidity; or (5) there are material setbacks in achievement of
synergies in existing company businesses.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Affirmations:

Issuer: Altice Luxembourg S.A.

-- Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed B1

-- Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed B1-PD

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Altice Luxembourg S.A.

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

PRINCIPAL METHODOLGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was
Telecommunications Service Providers published in January 2017.

Altice Luxembourg S.A is a Luxembourg-based holding company, which
through its subsidiaries Altice International S.a.r.l. and SFR
Group S.A. operates a multinational telecommunications and cable
business. SFR has its operations mainly in France while Altice
International currently has a presence in four regions--Dominican
Republic, Israel, Western Europe and the French Overseas
Territories.

Altice Luxembourg was created in the context of a corporate
reorganization concluded in August 2015, which saw Amsterdam-
listed Altice NV ("Altice" or "the Altice group" ) established as
its corporate parent. The Altice group, which during 2015 also
acquired US cable operators Cequel Communications Holdings I, LLC
("Suddenlink", B2 positive) and Cablevision Systems Corporation
("Cablevision", B1 stable), is ultimately controlled by French
entrepreneur Patrick Drahi. The Suddenlink and Cablevision
acquisitions were financed in credit pools that are separate from
Altice Luxembourg.

Altice Luxembourg generated revenue of EUR 15.4 billion in the
year ended December 31, 2017.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


BABSON EURO 2014-2: Fitch Corrects May 25 Rating Release
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings replaced a commentary on Babson Euro CLO 2014-2 B.V.
published on May 25, 2017 to correct the weighted average rating
factor and the weighted average recovery rate of the current
portfolio.

The revised release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has assigned Babson Euro CLO 2014-2 B.V.'s
refinanced notes final ratings:

EUR297.4 million Class A-1 notes: 'AAAsf': Outlook Stable
EUR31.6 million Class A-2 notes: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR37.9 million Class B-1 notes: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR21.1 million Class B-2 notes: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR35.0 million Class C notes: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR28.5 million Class D notes: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR38.0 million Class E notes: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR16.5 million Class F notes: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

STRUCTURAL HIGHLIGHTS

The weighted average life (WAL) test can be reset to 6.5 years
instead of the then current six years after the end of the non-
call period in May 2019 but only if some conditions are met. All
collateral quality tests and most portfolio tests would need to be
satisfied as of the end date of the non-call period.

In addition, the adjusted collateral principal amount would needs
to be above EUR543 million, ie less than EUR6 million below the
target par of EUR549 million, to preserve the available credit
enhancement at the time of the potential WAL test reset.

The proceeds of this issuance were used to redeem the old notes.
The refinanced CLO envisages a further four-year replenishment
period, with a new identified portfolio comprising the existing
portfolio, as modified by sales and purchases conducted by the
manager in the ramp-up period following the closing date. The
portfolio will be managed by Barings (U.K) Limited. The
reinvestment period will end in May 2021.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B'/'RR2' Average Credit Quality
The average credit quality of the current portfolio is in the 'B'
category, as based on Fitch's ratings and credit opinions on the
obligors currently in the pool. The Fitch weighted average rating
factor of the current portfolio is 33.0. The Fitch weighted
average recovery rate of the current portfolio is 66.0%, which is
in line with an average 'RR2' recovery rating.

Concentration Limits Ensure Diversification
The transaction includes limits to top 10 obligor concentration,
which are in line with recent European CLOs. The transaction also
includes limits to maximum industry exposure based on a different
classification from Fitch industries. The maximum exposure to the
largest, and to each of the next four largest industries is
covenanted at 15% and 12%, respectively.

Market Risk Exposure Mitigated
Between 3% and 16% of the portfolio may be invested in fixed rate
assets, while fixed rate liabilities account for 9.3% of the
target par amount providing a partial interest rate hedge. The
transaction is allowed to invest up to 20% of the portfolio in
non-euro-denominated assets but only if hedged with perfect asset
swaps.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability could lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes. A 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates could lead to a downgrade of
up to two notches for all rated notes except the class E for which
it could lead to a four-notch downgrade.


GREEN STORM 2017: Moody's Assigns Ba1(sf) Rating to Cl. E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
following classes of notes issued by Green STORM 2017 B.V.:

-- EUR550.0 million Senior Class A Mortgage-Backed Notes due
    2064, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR13.7 million Mezzanine Class B Mortgage-Backed Notes due
    2064, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

-- EUR12.2 million Mezzanine Class C Mortgage-Backed Notes due
    2064, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

-- EUR12.3 million Junior Class D Mortgage-Backed Notes due
    2064, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR6.0 million Subordinated Class E Notes due 2064,
    Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Green STORM 2017 B.V. is a revolving securitisation of Dutch prime
residential mortgage loans. The collateral was selected based on
the energy efficiency of the underlying properties. Obvion N.V.
(not rated) is the originator and servicer of the portfolio.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The definitive ratings on the notes take into account, among other
factors: (1) the performance of the previous transactions launched
by Obvion N.V.; (2) the credit quality of the underlying mortgage
loan pool; (3) legal considerations; and (4) the initial credit
enhancement provided to the senior notes by the junior notes and
the reserve fund.

The expected portfolio loss of 0.65% and the MILAN CE of 8.0%
serve as input parameters for Moody's cash flow and tranching
model, which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution,
as described in the report "The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS
Analysis", published in July 2000.

MILAN CE for this pool is 8.0%, which is slightly above preceding
revolving STORM transactions and in line with other prime Dutch
RMBS revolving transactions, owing to: (i) the availability of the
NHG-guarantee for 26.4% of the loan parts in the pool, which can
reduce during the replenishment period to 25%, (ii) the
replenishment period of 5 years where there is a risk of
deteriorating the pool quality through the addition of new loans,
although this is mitigated by replenishment criteria, (iii) the
weighted average loan-to-foreclosure-value (LTFV) of 92.2%, which
is similar to LTFV observed in other Dutch RMBS transactions, (iv)
the proportion of interest-only loan parts (52.5%), (v) the
weighted average seasoning of 5.46 years and (vi) the share of
loans provided to top-20 borrowers in the pool, 2.46%. Moody's
notes that the unadjusted current LTFV is 92.09%. The slight
difference is due to Moody's treatment of the property values that
use valuations provided for tax purposes (the so-called WOZ
valuation).The risk of a deteriorating pool quality through the
addition of loans is partly mitigated by the replenishment
criteria which includes, amongst others, that the weighted average
CLTMV of all the mortgage loans, including those to be purchased
by the Issuer, does not exceed 89% and the minimum weighted
average seasoning is at least 40 months. Further, no new loans can
be added to the pool if there is a PDL outstanding, if loans more
than 3 months in arrears exceeds 1.5% or the cumulative loss
exceeds 0.4%.

The key drivers for the portfolio's expected loss of 0.65%, which
is in line with preceding STORM transactions and with other prime
Dutch RMBS transactions, are: (1) the availability of the NHG-
guarantee for 26.4% of the loan parts in the pool, which can
reduce during the replenishment period to 25%; (2) the performance
of the seller's precedent transactions; (3) benchmarking with
comparable transactions in the Dutch RMBS market; and (4) the
current economic conditions in the Netherlands in combination with
historic recovery data of foreclosures received from the seller.

The transaction benefits from a non-amortising reserve fund,
funded at 1.02% of the total class A to D notes' outstanding
amount at closing, building up to 1.3% by trapping available
excess spread. The initial total credit enhancement for the Aaa
(sf) rated notes is 7.51%, 6.49% through note subordination and
the reserve fund amounting to 1.02%. The transaction also benefits
from an excess margin of 50 bps provided through the swap
agreement. The swap counterparty is Obvion N.V. and the back-up
swap counterparty is Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A. ("Rabobank"; rated
Aa2/P-1). Rabobank is obliged to assume the obligations of Obvion
N.V. under the swap agreement in case of Obvion N.V.'s default.
The transaction also benefits from an amortising cash advance
facility of 2.0% of the outstanding principal amount of the notes
(including the class E notes) with a floor of 1.45% of the
outstanding principal amount of the notes (including the class E
notes) as of closing.

STRESS SCENARIOS:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: At the time the ratings were
assigned, the model output indicated that class A notes would have
achieved Aaa (sf), even if MILAN CE was increased to 11.2% from
8.0% and the portfolio expected loss was increased to 1.3% from
0.65% and all other factors remained the same.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended to
measure how the rating of the security might migrate over time,
but rather how the initial rating of the security might have
differed if key rating input parameters were varied. Parameter
Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are calculated
by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary rating model.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2016.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Please note that on March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request for
Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on potential
revisions to its Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in
Structured Finance. If the revised Methodology is implemented as
proposed, the credit ratings of the notes issued by Green STORM
2017 B.V. may be affected. Please refer to Moody's Request for
Comment, titled "Moody's Proposes Revisions to Its Approach to
Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance", for further
details regarding the implications of the proposed Methodology
revisions on certain Credit Ratings.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with Moody's
expectations at close due to either a change in economic
conditions from Moody's central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic
performance factors would lead to rating actions.

For instance, should economic conditions be worse than forecast,
the higher defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in a downgrade of the ratings.
Downward pressure on the ratings could also stem from (1)
deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement; or (2)
counterparty risk, based on a weakening of a counterparty's credit
profile, particularly Obvion N.V. and Rabobank, which perform
numerous roles in the transaction.

Conversely, the ratings could be upgraded: (1) if economic
conditions are significantly better than forecasted; or (2) upon
deleveraging of the capital structure.

The definitive ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal with respect to the notes by the
legal final maturity. Moody's ratings only address the credit risk
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.


SUNGEVITY INC: Engie Agrees to Acquire European Unit
----------------------------------------------------
Emiliano Bellini at PV Magazine reports that French energy group
Engie has agreed to acquire Netherlands-based Sungevity
International, the European unit of U.S. residential solar company
Sungevity, which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United
States in mid-March.

The financial terms of the transaction were not revealed, PV
Magazine notes.

Engie said that Sungevity International is active in Belgium,
Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom, and that its
subsidiary Engie Electrabel had begun to cooperate with the
company on the Belgian residential solar market last summer, PV
Magazine relates.

All 90 workers of Sungevity International will now be integrated
into Engie's staff, the company, as cited by PV Magazine, said in
its press release.  The unit of the U.S. company has been active
in the European solar market since 2012, PV Magazine states.

In mid-April, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved the sale of
Sungevity's U.S. assets to Northern Pacific Group for US$50
million, PV Magazine recounts.  In its initial filings, Sungevity
reported its assets and liabilities as being somewhere between
US$100 million to US$500 million, PV Magazine discloses.
According to PV Magazine, the asset sale to Northern Pacific will
allow the company to invest US$20 million in the company
immediately.

                         About Sungevity

Sungevity, Inc, Sungevity SD, LLC, Sungevity Development, LLC,
Sungevity International Holdings, LLC and their subsidiaries and
affiliates -- http://www.sungevity.com/-- provide sales,
marketing, system design, installation, maintenance, financing
services, and post-installation services for solar energy systems
in the U.S., the U.K., and Europe.  Sungevity is a privately-held
technology company that, until relatively recently, was
successfully pursuing growth strategies.

Sungevity Inc. and three of its affiliates filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection (Bankr. D. Del., Case No. 17-10561) on
March 13, 2017.  The petitions were signed by Andrew Birch,
chief executive officer.  The Debtors estimated $100 million to
$500 million in both assets and debts.  Hon. Laurie Selber
Silverstein presides over the case.

The Debtors have tapped Morrison & Foerster LLP as general
counsel; Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP as local counsel;
AlixPartners LLC as financial advisor; Ducera Securities LLC as
investment banker; and Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC as claims
and noticing agent.

Andrew Vara, acting U.S. trustee for Region 3, on March 22, 2017,
appointed five creditors to serve on the official committee of
unsecured creditors in the Chapter 11 cases of Sungevity, Inc.,
and its affiliates.


VEON LTD: Moody's Rates New Bonds '(P)Ba2' & Affirms 'Ba2' CFR
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba2 senior
unsecured rating and LGD4 to the new bonds to be issued by
VimpelCom Holdings B.V, a 100% indirectly-owned subsidiary of VEON
Ltd. (Ba2 stable).

Moody's has also placed the Ba3 senior unsecured rating of the
outstanding bonds of GTH Finance B.V. guaranteed by VimpelCom
Holdings B.V. on review for upgrade.

Concurrently, Moody's affirmed VEON Ltd.'s Ba2 corporate family
(CFR) and Ba2-PD probability of default (PDR) ratings, the Ba2
issuer rating of VimpelCom PJSC, the Ba2 senior unsecured ratings
of VIP Finance Ireland Limited and the Ba2 senior unsecured
ratings of the outstanding bond instruments issued by VimpelCom
Holdings B.V. and guaranteed by VEON's operating subsidiary
VimpelCom PJSC.

The outlook on all ratings is stable except for GTH Finance B.V.
which is on review.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The action reflects Moody's expectation that within the next 9-12
months VEON will complete the transformation of its debt/capital
structure -- moving to a predominantly unsecured and unguaranteed
centralised group-financed model from the current subsidiary-
financed model. VimpelCom Holdings B.V will act as the main
borrower for the VEON group of companies, and manage liquidity
within the group by orchestrating distribution of proceeds and
managing group's repayments from diversified cash flow sources
including dividends, proceeds from the sale of assets and
intracompany loans. Debt investors will have a single credit
reference and benefit from pari passu credit ranking of the
majority of the group's obligations. As part of the process, VEON
will also reduce its currently significant foreign exchange risks
associated with debt/cash flow currency mismatch.

As the first step, in April-May 2017, VEON refinanced
approximately $1.1 billion worth of subsidiary RUB-denominated
bank debt at VimpelCom Holdings B.V level, and repaid $600 million
of subsidiary/ guaranteed debt. Next, VEON will consider a
voluntary "any and all" offer to holders of USD bonds issued or
guaranteed by PJSC VimpelCom to tender their holdings. VEON
expects to fund the tender offer predominantly via issuance of new
debt at VimpelCom Holdings B.V., including the new bond. Further
steps, such as repayment and prepayment of upcoming maturities
within the next 9 months will help to reduce subsidiary and
subsidiary-guaranteed debt to less than 15% of total financial
debt of the group (excluding debts at Global Telecom Holding S.A.E
and its subsidiaries, where Moody's maintains separate CFRs).

DEFINITIVE BOND RATING AND CONCLUSION OF REVIEW FOR POSSIBLE
UPGRADE

Moody's aims to assign a definitive rating to the new bond and
conclude the review on the GTH Finance B.V. bonds within the next
60 days. During this period VEON should demonstrate sufficient
progress in transitioning to the new unguaranteed structure.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The (P)Ba2 rating assigned to the new bonds is the same as VEON's
corporate family rating (CFR), which reflects Moody's view that
the proposed bond will rank pari passu with other outstanding
senior unsecured debt issued by or guaranteed by VimpelCom
Holdings B.V., where the majority of the group's debt will be
located following completion of the debt restructuring programme.
The documentation of the proposed bond contains standard terms and
conditions such as a negative pledge with permitted liens. The
bond will have a cross default clause with VEON's significant
subsidiaries.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on VEON's ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that the company will sustainably maintain its leverage around
3.0x on an adjusted gross-debt basis and trend towards 2.0x on a
net-debt basis (unadjusted, consistent with the internal financial
policy), and adjusted RCF/Debt above 20%. The agency expects that
VEON will maintain a robust liquidity profile and address its
refinancing needs in a timely fashion.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

A sustainable reduction in leverage measured by gross debt/EBITDA
towards 2.5x and below and strengthening of coverage metrics would
exert positive pressure on the ratings, provided that there are no
negative developments in the company's operating profile, market
positions and liquidity.

Conversely, a material deterioration in VEON's operating and
financial profile measured by (1) an increase in leverage measured
by gross debt/EBITDA above 3.5x, and (2) a weakening of RCF/debt
to below 20% on a sustained basis would put pressure on the
ratings. Moody's would assess any material acquisition/shareholder
distribution; such actions could exert negative pressure on the
ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was
Telecommunications Service Providers published in January 2017.

Headquartered in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, VEON Ltd. (VEON,
former VimpelCom Ltd.) is an international telecoms company
operating in 13 countries. It consolidates VimpelCom PJSC
(Russia), Kyivstar G.S.M. Joint Stock Company (Ukraine), and
Global Telecom Holding S.A.E., and operates in Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Italy, Algeria, Pakistan, and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). VEON operates in Italy via a 50/50 joint
venture with CK Hutchison Holdings Limited (A3 stable) - Wind Tre
S.p.A. (B1 positive). VimpelCom is 47.9% owned by LetterOne (not
rated), 19.7% by Telenor ASA (A3 stable), 8.3% by the Stichting
Administratiekantoor Mobile Telecommunications Investor (the
"Stichting") and 24.1% is in free float. In the last 12 months to
March 30, 2017, VimpelCom generated revenue of $9.1 billion and
Moody's-adjusted EBITDA of $3.9 billion.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


ELEMENT LEASING: Fitch Assigns B+ Long-Term IDRs, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia-based Element Leasing (EL) Long-
Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of
'B+'. The Outlooks are Stable. A Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR
of 'B' has also been assigned.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The IDRs of 'B+' reflect EL's intrinsic creditworthiness. Although
the company benefits from close connections with Basic Element
(three out of six members of EL's board are representatives of the
group and most of funding is provided by entities affiliated with
the group), Fitch does not factor any institutional support into
the ratings. This is because EL is formally owned by an unrelated
individual, while the ability of Basic Element and its affiliated
entities to provide support may be constrained or difficult to
ascertain. Basic Element is a large Russian financial-industrial
group, with wide business interests, including those in GAZ Group,
Ingosstrakh and Bank SOYUZ.

EL's business model is focused on providing small-ticket financial
leasing of commercial vehicles to SMEs. The franchise is narrow,
with a sizable share of GAZ Group brands, which made up over 40%
of new business volumes in 2016.

Fitch views EL's asset quality as reasonable. Reported impaired
lease receivables and foreclosed assets were relatively high at 9%
of total lease assets at end-2016, or 41% of equity if net of
reserves, but most were represented by granular exposures with
reasonable recovery prospects given the company's liquid and
adequately valued collateral. However, a smaller part of net
impaired assets accounting for a moderate 16% of equity was
represented by legacy (dating back to 2008 crisis) foreign-
currency (FC) leasing of printing equipment, which may generate
further losses. Positively, EL's core auto-leasing portfolio
performs well, with negligible final losses in 2016.

For past years, EL has reported modest financial results (return
on average equity (ROAE) of 8% in 2016, break-even in 2015),
notably below its peers due to sizable impairment charges (4% in
2016, 3% in 2015) mainly attributable to aforementioned legacy FC
exposures, while pre-impairment profitability is strong (pre-
impairment ROAE of 33% in 2016, 23% in 2015). Performance is
likely to improve on reduced risks from the legacy portfolio and
generally strengthened underwriting standards accompanied by a
shift of business mix towards more liquid assets (light commercial
vehicles and trucks instead of specialised vehicles and non-
movable equipment).

At end-2016, EL's reported debt-to-equity ratio was at a moderate
5x. However, leverage may increase due to anticipated growth of
30%-40% in 2017 and a historically high dividend pay-out ratio of
above 50% amid moderate financial results.

At end-2016, more than half of liabilities were raised from
financial institutions affiliated with Basic Element, namely Bank
SOYUZ (bank loans) and Ingosstrakh (domestic bonds) mitigating
refinancing risk to an extent. Its RUB2bn bonds with final
maturity in 2019 (31% of end-2016 liabilities) have a put option
on 6 June 2017, but according to management, these are mostly held
by Ingosstrakh, which did not put them for early redemption prior
to cut-off date on 30 May 2017. The remaining debt due in 2017 (a
further 24% of liabilities) is well-matched by maturity with
proceeds from lease book repayments.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

EL's IDRs could be downgraded if asset quality and performance
weaken significantly, to the extent that this results in a marked
increase in EL's leverage ratios or compromises the quality of the
company's capital.

Upside is currently limited. However, strengthening of EL's
franchise, improvement in profitability and diversification of
funding sources could be positive for the credit profile.


SAMARA OBLAST: Moody's Rates RUB10BB Senior Unsecured Bonds Ba3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba3 rating to Samara,
Oblast of (Samara) upcoming RUB10 billion senior unsecured bond.
Concomitantly Moody's affirms the Ba3 long-term issuer rating. The
outlook remains stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upcoming senior unsecured amortised bond (state number
RU35013SAM0) will have a fixed coupon rate and approximately seven
years maturity. The amortisation will start in 2020 whereby the
region will have to repay 10% of the issue. The bond is direct,
unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligation of the
issuer, ranking pari passu with all its other unsecured and
unsubordinated debt. The new bond will be primarily used to
refinance the maturing debt obligations.

The rating is assigned based on documentation received by Moody's
as of the rating assignment date. In the unlikely event that the
structure changes, Moody's will assess the impact that these
differences may have on the rating.

The affirmation of the issuer rating reflects 1) the adequate
budgetary performance, 2) the expected stabilisation of debt
burden at the moderate level and its relatively diversified
maturity structure and 3) the dynamic local economy. At the same
time, the rating is constrained by the relatively modest budgetary
flexibility.

In 2016, Samara recorded an adequate performance with gross
operating balance accounting for 6% of operating revenues and
fiscal deficit accounted for 4% of total revenues. The net direct
and indirect debt was overall stable at 51% of operating revenues
in 2016 up from 49% in 2015 and Moody's expects it to stabilise at
around similar levels in 2017.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- UP/DOWN

Changes of the rating of the bond will mirror changes in Samara's
long-term issuer rating. Samara's issuer rating could benefit from
upward changes in the sovereign rating as well as improvement of
its financial performance. Deterioration in the sovereign's credit
quality, and/or persistent deterioration in the credit metrics of
the region, could exert downward pressure on its ratings.

The bond issue required the publication of this credit rating
action on a date that deviates from the previously scheduled
release date in the sovereign release calendar, published on
www.moodys.com.

The specific economic indicators, as required by EU regulation,
are not available for this entity. The following national economic
indicators are relevant to the sovereign rating, which was used as
an input to this credit rating action.

Sovereign Issuer: Russia, Government of

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 26,490 (2016 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): -0.2% (2016 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 5.4% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -3.7% (2016 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: 1.9% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 40.0% (2016 Actual)

Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On May 30, 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Samara, Oblast of. The main points raised during the
discussion were: The issuer's fiscal or financial strength,
including its debt profile, has not materially changed. The new
bond issue required assignment of the debt rating.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: Spars with US Energy Dept.'s Bid for Repayment
----------------------------------------------------------
Katy Stech, writing for The Wall Street Journal Pro Bankruptcy,
reported that Spain's renewable-energy giant Abengoa S.A. is
fighting the U.S. Department of Energy's effort to recover federal
tax dollars that helped construct an $850 million ethanol plant
and neighboring electricity plant in Kansas.

According to the report, citing court papers, lawyers for Abengoa
Bioenergy Biomass of Kansas LLC, the Abengoa subsidiary behind the
rural project, argued that, under the terms of the DOE's
investment, the U.S. government isn't entitled to collect money
for chipping in $95 million toward construction costs in 2007.
The plant was never completed, and the property was sold last year
for nearly $50 million, the report said, citing court documents.

The Journal related that Abengoa lawyers asked Judge Robert Nugent
to determine that the government's contribution was an investment
that doesn't need to be paid back with a portion of the sale
money.  In court papers, they said that documentation outlining
the terms of the DOE's investment in the project "contains no
repayment terms or payment enforcement rights; no maturity date;
no interest provisions; and no other terms or conditions typical
of a loan agreement," the report further related.

DOE officials have argued that the government is entitled to
collect a portion of the ethanol plant's sale money based on the
percent of construction money that came from federal sources, the
report said.

Abengoa officials asked Judge Nugent to set a July 12 hearing on
the matter, the report added.

                About Abengoa Bioenergy US

Abengoa Bioenergy is a collection of indirect subsidiaries of
Abengoa S.A., a Spanish company founded in 1941.  The global
headquarters of Abengoa Bioenergy is in Chesterfield, Missouri.
With a total investment of $3.3 billion, the United States has
become Abengoa S.A.'s largest market in terms of sales volume,
particularly from developing solar, bioethanol, and water
projects.

Spanish energy giant Abengoa S.A. is an engineering and clean
technology company with operations in more than 50 countries
worldwide that provides innovative solutions for a diverse
range of customers in the energy and environmental sectors.
Abengoa is one of the world's top builders of power lines
transporting energy across Latin America and a top
engineering and construction business, making massive
renewable-energy power plants worldwide.

On Nov. 25, 2015, in Spain, Abengoa S.A. announced its intention
to seek protection under Article 5bis of Spanish insolvency law, a
pre-insolvency statute that permits a company to enter into
negotiations with certain creditors for restricting of its
financial affairs.  The Spanish company is facing a March 28,
2016, deadline to agree on a viability plan or restructuring plan
with its banks and bondholders, without which it could be forced
to declare bankruptcy.

Gavilon Grain, LLC, et al., on Feb. 1, 2016, filed an involuntary
Chapter 7 petition for Abengoa Bioenergy of Nebraska, LLC ("ABNE")
and on Feb. 11, 2016, filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition for
Abengoa Bioenergy Company, LLC.  ABC's involuntary Chapter 7 case
is Bankr. D. Kan. Case No. 16-20178. ABNE's involuntary case is
Bankr. D. Neb. Case No. 16-80141. An order for relief has not been
entered, and no interim Chapter 7 trustee has been appointed in
the Involuntary Cases. The petitioning creditors are represented
by McGrath, North, Mullin & Kratz, P.C.

On Feb. 24, 2016, Abengoa Bioenergy US Holding, LLC and five
affiliated debtors each filed a Chapter 11 voluntary petition in
St. Louis, Missouri, disclosing total assets of $1.3 billion and
debt of $1.2 billion.  The cases are pending before the Honorable
Kathy A. Surratt-States and are jointly administered under Bankr.
E.D. Mo. Case No. 16-41161.

The Debtors have engaged DLA Piper LLP (US) as counsel, Armstrong
Teasdale LLP as co-counsel, Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC as
financial advisor, Lazard as investment banker and Prime Clerk LLC
as claims and noticing agent.

               About Abengoa Bioenergy Biomass of Kansas

On March 23, 2016, three subcontractors asserting disputed state
law lien claims against Abengoa Bioenergy Biomass of Kansas, LLC
filed an involuntary petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code.  The case was converted to a case under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. Kan. Case No. 16-10446) on April 8,
2016.

In April 2016, Chief Bankruptcy Judge Robert E. Nugent denied the
request of Abengoa Bioenergy Biomass of Kansas to transfer its
case to the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware where
cases involving its indirect parent companies and other affiliates
are pending.  Judge Nugent said the facts and unique circumstances
surrounding the debtor and its known creditors do not warrant
transferring the case.

The Debtor is represented by Christine L. Schlomann, Esq., Richard
W. Engel, Jr., Esq., and Erin M. Edelman, Esq., at Armstrong
Teasdale LLP, Vincent P. Slusher, Esq., David E. Avraham, Esq., R.
Craig Martin, Esq., and Kaitlin M. Edelman, Esq., at DLA Piper LLP
(US).

Petitioning creditor Brahma Group, Inc. is represented by W. Rick
Griffin, Esq. -- wrgriffin@martinpringle.com -- and Samantha M
Woods, Esq. -- smwoods@martinpringle.com -- at Martin Pringle
Oliver Wallace & Bauer.  Petitioning creditors CRB Builders LLC
and Summit Fire Protection Co. are represented by Robert M.
Pitkin, Esq. -- rPitkin@hab-law.com -- and Danne W Webb, Esq. --
dwebb@hab-law.com -- at Horn Aylward & Bandy LLC.

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors is represented in
the Kansas bankruptcy case by Adam L. Fletcher, Esq., Michelle
Manzoian, Esq., Alexis C. Beachdell, Esq., Michael A. VanNiel,
Esq., and Kelly S Burgan, Esq., at Baker & Hostetler LLP and
Robert L. Baer, Esq., at Cosgrove, Webb & Oman.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


METALLINVESTBANK: Moody's Affirms B2 BCA, Outlook Positive
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to positive from stable the
outlook on B2 long-term local- and foreign-currency deposit
ratings of Metallinvestbank JSCB (Metallinvestbank). Concurrently,
Moody's affirmed the bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA) and
adjusted BCA of b2. Metallinvestbank's Not Prime short-term local-
and foreign-currency deposit ratings were also affirmed. The
overall outlook has been changed to positive from stable.

Moody's has also affirmed Metallinvestbank's long-term
Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessment) of B1(cr) and the
bank's short-term CR Assessment of Not Prime(cr).

The rating action is primarily based on Metallinvestbank's audited
financial statements for 2016 prepared under International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the bank's unaudited
financial statements for 2017 year-to-date prepared under local
GAAP.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's change of the outlook on Metallinvestbank's ratings to
positive reflects (1) the demonstrated resilience of the bank's
solvency metrics to the challenging operating environment in
Russia over the 2014-2016 economic downturn, with asset quality
metrics starting to improve in 2016; (2) Metallinvestbank's
enhanced corporate governance practices resulting in a work-out of
loans issued to related parties; and (3) its consistently strong
funding profile and conservative liquidity management, which helps
the bank to weather market stresses.

At year-end 2016, the proportion of Metallinvestbank's loans
overdue by more than 90 days reduced to 5.8% of total gross loans
from 8.8% reported a year earlier, whereas the proportion of
impaired but not overdue loans started to prevail in the total
problem loan portfolio, having risen to 7.3% from 5.8% over the
same period. In this context, the rating agency considers the
bank's 70% coverage of problem loans by loan loss reserves as
sufficient.

Moody's expects that Metallinvestbank's problem loans will
continue to decrease over 2017 as the structure of the loan book
is changing towards better-performing segments. The proportion of
secured mortgage loans in the bank's loan book increased to 28% at
year-end 2016 from 24% a year before; over the same period, the
share of factoring portfolio in the total loan book increased to
17% from 14%. Overall, Metallinvestbank's single-borrower credit
concentration is lower compared to local peers: at year-end 2016,
the bank's aggregate exposure to the 20 largest borrowers
(including guarantees) accounted for 177% of its Tier 1 capital,
which is in line with Russian banks rated by Moody's b1 on their
BCAs and well below the sector average of 240%. This reflects
Metallinvestbank's increasing focus on retail and SME loans and
makes its asset quality dynamics more predictable than those of
many other Russian banks.

Over the past two years, Metallinvestbank has significantly
diversified away from lending to related parties: these credit
exposures in aggregate decreased to 3% of the bank's Tier 1
capital as at year-end 2016 from the 35% reported two years ago.
This change has not only contributed to an improved granularity of
the bank's loan portfolio (since the related borrowers were mostly
represented by large sister companies included in United
Metallurgical Company holding), but also helped the bank to expand
its net interest margin (NIM) to the sector-average levels: the
bank's NIM improved to 3.8% in 2016 from 3.0% in 2014, and Moody's
sees this improvement as sustainable.

In 2016, Metallinvestbank's return-on-average assets (ROAA)
increased to 1.4% from the already solid 1.2% reported in 2015.
Moody's expects that in 2017 the bank will again post sound
profitability, thanks to the expanded NIM and low anticipated
credit losses. Metallinvestbank also reports solid capital
adequacy, with regulatory total and Tier 1 capital ratios of
14.25% and 10.57%, respectively, reported at 1 May 2017, almost
double the regulatory minimums of 8% and 6%, respectively.

Metallinvestbank's funding and liquidity profiles have been
historically strong. As of year-end 2016, 72% of the bank's total
funding came from core customer deposits, with related-party
deposits (attracted on an arm's-length basis) accounting for 10%
of the total customer funding. This funding profile is matched by
an ample liquidity cushion accounting for 38% of total assets as
of the same reporting date.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP / DOWN

The assigned positive outlook may --- over the next 12 to 18
months -- translate to an upgrade of Metallinvestbank's deposit
ratings if the current improving trends in the bank's asset
quality and profitability protract into the future, coupled with
the sustainable good capital adequacy and sound funding and
liquidity profiles.

Moody's does not currently anticipate any negative rating action
on Metallinvestbank given the positive outlook assigned on the
bank's ratings. However, the outlook could be reversed back to
stable if the bank's performance proves to be weaker than Moody's
current expectations.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2017.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Metallinvestbank reported, at
January 1, 2017, total IFRS assets of RUB68.9 billion and total
equity of RUB8.3 billion. The bank's IFRS profits for 2016 stood
at RUB1.0 billion.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


SYNGENTA AG: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Corporate Family Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service withdrew Syngenta AG Baa2 long term
issuer rating and assigned a Ba2 corporate family rating (CFR) and
Ba2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to the company, in line
with the rating agency's practice for corporates with non-
investment-grade ratings.

Moody's also downgraded the senior unsecured ratings assigned to
its guaranteed subsidiaries Syngenta Finance N.V. and Syngenta
Finance AG to Ba2 from Baa2 and their senior unsecured MTN
programme rating to (P)Ba2 from (P)Baa2. Finally, Moody's
downgraded the short term ratings of Syngenta and its guaranteed
subsidiaries Syngenta Wilmington Inc. and Syngenta Finance N.V. to
Not Prime from Prime-2. The outlook on all ratings is stable. This
concludes the review for downgrade initiated on February 4, 2016,
which continued after the previous downgrade on May 12, 2017.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Following the successful completion on May 18, 2017 of the first
settlement of China National Chemical Corporation (ChemChina, Baa2
negative)'s tender offer for Syngenta that paves the way for
closing the transaction for a cash consideration of approximately
$44 billion, the downgrade of Syngenta's ratings reflects (i) the
increase in Syngenta's and CNAC Saturn (NL) B.V. (Bidco)'s stand-
alone debt leverage combined with (ii) the potential pressures on
Syngenta's financial profile resulting from ChemChina's highly
leveraged capital structure post acquisition.

The stand-alone financial leverage of Syngenta and Bidco will
significantly rise following the acquisition by ChemChina, which
will lead to incremental debt of c.$7.2 billion, including (i)
$6.5 billion outstanding under BidCo's Term Facility B that is
expected to be refinanced through the issuance of senior unsecured
bonds guaranteed by Syngenta and (ii) c.$0.7 billion to settle a
special dividend and employee equity plans.

Post closing of the transaction, Syngenta's total debt to EBITDA
(as adjusted by Moody's) will be above 4 times. In addition,
Moody's views the extent and pace of any future deleveraging of
Syngenta's balance sheet as uncertain given the large debt
servicing obligations of its new owner.

Moody's considers that the highly leveraged capital structure of
ChemChina post acquisition (approximately 11x leveraged on a
Moody's adjusted basis) heightens the risk that Syngenta's new
owner makes, in the future, calls on its subsidiary's cash flow
and debt capacity. Moody's acknowledges ChemChina's intent to
manage Syngenta as a standalone business and keep its highly
experienced management team in place. ChemChina management
emphasized that protecting Syngenta's investment grade rating was
a key priority of its financial policy and Syngenta's future
dividend policy would be aligned with this objective. However,
given Syngenta's robust cash flow generating capacity, Moody's
expects that the regular upstreaming of a dividend from Syngenta
in line with a recent pay-out rate of around 60% of net income,
will be a primary source of liquidity to service the acquisition
finance of approximately $35.5 billion raised by ChemChina and its
guaranteed subsidiaries, although acknowledging that a significant
part of the acquisition financing was raised in the form of
perpetual bonds, giving ChemChina flexibility with regard to
interest payment and repayment. In the past three years, Syngenta
generated average operating cash flow after capex of $1.1 billion
p.a..

In this context, Moody's notes the various corporate governance
measures set out in the merger agreement between ChemChina and
Syngenta dated February 3, 2016. Nevertheless, Moody's does not
believe that these provisions constitute a sufficient ring-fencing
mechanism under Moody's criteria that would effectively insulate
Syngenta's creditors from any potential action detrimental to
Syngenta's credit quality. Moody's views ChemChina's consolidated
credit quality and high leverage reflected in its baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of ba3 as a material constraint -- Syngenta's
rating is positioned just one notch above this BCA.

At the same time, Moody's recognises that the acquisition of
Syngenta is a highly strategic transaction for ChemChina and China
(A1 stable). This is the largest-ever foreign acquisition by a
Chinese company. It is in line with ChemChina's innovation and
overseas investment strategy, and significantly strengthens its
agrochemical operations. Gaining access to Syngenta's advanced
seed and crop protection products and technologies should also
support the Chinese authorities' efforts to modernise the
country's agricultural practices and improve food security of
supply and quality, by enhancing crop yields and productivity.

In this context, Moody's expects that ChemChina and the Chinese
government will be mindful not to endanger the growth prospects of
their highly strategic acquisition by putting undue pressure on
its financial position. ChemChina should continue to benefit from
its privileged access to low cost funding from Chinese state-owned
financial institutions, as well as from ongoing state support.
This helps mitigate the pressure on Syngenta's credit profile and
ratings arising from ChemChina's high financial leverage, and
supports a one-notch uplift of Syngenta's rating relative to
ChemChina's ba3 BCA.

Also, Moody's takes comfort from the fact that Syngenta's credit
quality continues to be underpinned by a strong business profile,
benefiting from solid positions in the concentrated global crop
protection and seeds markets and relatively high barriers to entry
for generic competitors. Syngenta's future revenue growth should
be driven by its broad product portfolio and healthy product
pipeline against a backdrop of robust long-term demand
fundamentals.

This mitigates Syngenta's focused business profile, its increasing
exposure to high growth but also volatile developing markets, and
the inherent cyclicality of the agribusiness that is sensitive to
various factors such as weather conditions, harvest productivity
and commodity prices, which ultimately affect farmer income
levels.

In recent years, Syngenta's results were affected by the
challenging operating conditions prevailing in the global
agricultural sector and the currency volatility experienced in
several key emerging markets. However, Moody's expects that the
group's strong product pipeline and ongoing initiatives undertaken
under the AOL efficiency programme, will help strengthen its
future operating profitability.

RATING OUTLOOK

The rating outlook is stable reflecting Moody's expectations that
(i) Syngenta's operating profitability will be underpinned by its
strong product pipeline and further efficiency gains, and (ii)
ChemChina will refrain from upstreaming dividends in excess of 60%
of Syngenta's net income.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Considering the constraints resulting from ChemChina's highly
leveraged capital structure, an upgrade of the Ba2 rating is
unlikely in the near term. However, a substantial reduction in
ChemChina's leverage may give rise to some upward pressure on the
rating in the future.

Conversely, any prolonged increase in Syngenta's financial
leverage that may result from higher than expected dividend
payouts (i.e. in excess of 60% of net income) to its parent and/or
a sizeable debt funded acquisition, would put downward pressure on
the Ba2 rating.

LIQUIDITY PROFILE

Moody's views Syngenta's liquidity position as healthy, supported
by a five-year $3 billion revolving credit facility maturing in
2022 with two one-year extension options and a committed Target
Facilities Agreement provided by ChemChina to cover change of
control-related cash settlements such as the special dividend of
CHF5 per share paid to all shareholders on May 16, 2017, employee
equity plans and the potential redemption of three US private
placements for an aggregate amount of $250 million.

Further ahead, the $6.5 billion outstanding under BidCo's term
facility B, which terminates on May 18, 2018 (with a possible six-
month extension at BidCo's option), will need to be refinanced.
Moody's expects Syngenta to place senior unsecured bonds during
the second half of 2017.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Chemical Industry Rating Methodology published in December 2013.

Headquartered in Basel, Switzerland, Syngenta AG is a leading
global agribusiness. In 2016, it reported consolidated sales of
$12.8 billion and EBITDA of $2.7 billion.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ENSCO PLC: Moody's Puts B1 Sr. Rating Under Review for Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the B1 senior unsecured and other
ratings of Ensco plc under review for downgrade following the
announcement on May 30, 2017 that it has agreed to acquire Atwood
Oceanics, Inc. (Atwood) in an all-stock transaction. At the same
time, Atwood's Caa3 senior unsecured and other ratings were placed
under review for upgrade.

Ensco will issue 1.6 of Ensco share for each Atwood share, and
Ensco's shareholders will own 69% of the combined company pro
forma for the transaction. The transaction has been approved by
the Board of Directors at both companies and is subject to
approval by the shareholders of Ensco and Atwood as well as other
customary closing conditions. The transaction is not subject to
any financing conditions.

"Moody's view this transaction to be leveraging for Ensco," said
Sajjad Alam, Moody's Senior Analyst. "While the transaction is an
equity for equity exchange with Atwood's shareholders, Ensco still
will have to address Atwood's roughly $1.3 billion of balance
sheet debt and $249 million in remaining shipyard payments
(deferred until 2022) in a weak offshore contract drilling
market."

On Review for Downgrade:

Issuer: Ensco plc

-- Probability of Default Rating B1-PD, Placed on Review for
    downgrade

-- Corporate Family Rating B1, Placed on Review for downgrade

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debentures B1 (LGD4), Placed on
    Review for downgrade

Issuer: ENSCO International Incorporated

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture B1 (LGD4), Placed on
    Review for downgrade

Issuer: Pride International, Inc.

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debentures B1 (LGD4), Placed on
    Review for downgrade

On Review for Upgrade:

Issuer: Atwood Oceanics, Inc.

-- Corporate Family Rating, Caa1, Placed on Review for upgrade

-- Probability of Default Rating, Caa1-PD, Placed on Review for
    upgrade

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Caa3 (LGD5), Placed
    on Review for upgrade

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Ensco plc

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review from Stable

Issuer: ENSCO International Incorporated

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review from Stable

Issuer: Pride International, Inc.

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review from Stable

Issuer: Atwood Oceanics, Inc.

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review from Negative

RATINGS RATIONALE

Ensco will benefit from adding 11 high quality rigs that were
built in recent years (four drillships, two semi-submersibles and
five jackups), thus improving Ensco's global scale,
diversification and marketing capability. Ensco also expects to
achieve $65 million in annual synergies by 2019 through cost
reductions. However, despite the strategic benefits, this
transaction will weaken Ensco's net leverage position and
liquidity. Ensco continues to contend with a severe downturn in
offshore markets where demand conditions and dayrates are likely
to remain challenged at least through 2018.

Moody's review will focus on the post-merger capital structure,
including the status of Atwood's 6.5% senior notes, overall fleet
contract position and latest outlook for offshore markets and
dayrates, as well as liquidity and financial flexibility of the
combined entity. Based on the proposed terms and conditions for
the acquisition and available information, the potential downgrade
of Ensco's CFR appears unlikely to be more than one notch.
Atwood's notes will likely be upgraded to Ensco's levels if they
remained outstanding and Ensco provides a guarantee. Atwood's
ratings will be withdrawn if the notes are fully redeemed.

Ensco plc is headquartered in London, UK and is one of the world's
largest providers of offshore contract drilling services to the
oil and gas industry.

Atwood is a Houston, Texas based international offshore drilling
contractor.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Oilfield Services Industry Rating Methodology published in May
2017.


LIFELINE: Jobs at Risk as Administration Looms
----------------------------------------------
Alan Jones at Press Association reports that workers at Lifeline,
a drug and alcohol charity, fear they could be out of a job within
days because of its collapse into administration.

Unite said its members at Lifeline have been "plunged into
uncertainty" as the charity officially was set to go into
administration yesterday, June 1, Press Association relates.

According to Press Association, work is being transferred to
another charity, CGL, but Unite said some workers fear they could
be out of a job by next week.

Unite national officer Siobhan Endean, as cited by Press
Association, said: "The collapse of Lifeline should set alarm
bells ringing, which is why we have launched an email campaign,
urging members of the public to contact their local prospective
parliamentary candidates ahead of next week's General Election.

"They are being asked to protect the future of drugs and alcohol
services in their local communities and the jobs of the people who
currently work for Lifeline.

"Drug and alcohol services are chronically underfunded as a result
of the Government's savage cuts.

"We believe that the payment by results model of commissioning is
placing the services at risk.

"Unite members in the sector report that they are under pressure
to focus on unattainable measures and targets.

"Organisations can be tempted to bid for contracts where they are
at risk of operating at a loss.

Lifeline employs 1,300 workers, provides services for tens of
thousands of people a year, including prisoners in 22 jails and
young offender institutions, Press Association discloses.


PETROFAC LIMITED: Moody's Cuts 2018 Unsec. Bonds Rating to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings pertaining to
UK engineering and construction company Petrofac Limited by one
notch. Specifically, Moody's has withdrawn the Baa3 issuer rating
and assigned a Ba1 corporate family rating (CFR) to the group in
line with the rating agency's practice for corporates with non-
investment-grade ratings.  The rating agency has also downgraded
the rating assigned to the 2018 senior unsecured bond issued by
Petrofac to Ba1 from Baa3. The outlook on all ratings is negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

"The downgrade reflects an announcement by the Serious Fraud
Office (SFO) that it is investigating Petrofac as part of a
further inquiry into Monaco-based consultancy group Unaoil" says
Scott Phillips, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst and
Lead Analyst for Petrofac. "Whilst the outcome of the
investigation is uncertain, it could result in financial penalties
that would negatively affect profitability if any allegations are
proven. The investigation, as well as the suspension of the
Group's COO, could undermine the group's reputational standing to
the detriment of new construction orders," added Mr. Phillips.

On May 12, 2017, Petrofac announced that the UK's SFO had opened
an investigation into Petrofac and that its Group Chief Executive
Officer and Group Chief Operating Officer (Group COO) had been
interviewed under caution. The SFO subsequently confirmed that the
investigation related to its ongoing inquiries into the activities
of Unaoil, and suspected bribery, corruption and money laundering.
On May 25, 2017, Petrofac announced a number of decisions in
response, including the suspension of the Group COO. In addition
to this, Petrofac confirmed that the SFO had informed the Company
that it did not accept the findings of its independent
investigation conducted last year, nor did it believe that
Petrofac had cooperated with it, a term used in relevant SFO and
sentencing guidelines.

Moody's believes that the SFO's investigation has the potential to
last for at least several months, which increases the uncertainty
relating to Petrofac's future revenues and profitability, a credit
negative. In addition, the rating agency believes one of the
consequences of the SFO's investigation could be a financial
penalty such as a fine or costs associated with remediation.
Currently, Moody's has no visibility on how large such penalties
could be in the event allegations are proven. While a fine in the
double-digit millions (of US-dollars) could potentially be
manageable for the group at the previous rating level, anything
larger than this would likely have longer-term implications for
leverage, a further credit negative.

In addition to this risk, Moody's also believes the impact on
Petrofac's reputation and customer-standing could be undermined if
allegations are proven or if the investigation persists for an
extended period of time. Any additional challenges to winning new
construction orders could, in conjunction with persistently low
commodity prices, threaten the ability of the group to maintain
profitability at current levels. In addition to this risk, the
rating agency believes the SFO investigation could distract the
attention of senior management to the detriment of the core
business.

Despite these negative risks, Moody's maintains its view that
Petrofac's extensive order backlog (of over $14 billion at the end
of 2016) and construction contracts awarded in 2017 (most notably
GC32 in Kuwait) will underpin cash flow in the period 2017-18. As
such, any long-term disruption to order intake will likely only
manifest in financial metrics from 2019 onwards.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- UP/DOWN

Given the negative outlook and the uncertainty resulting from the
SFO's investigation, Moody's believes that an upgrade within the
next 12-18 months is unlikely. Nevertheless, if the outcome of the
SFO investigation does not result in material fines and if there
is no observed impact to customer behavior and order intake,
Moody's could upgrade the ratings of Petrofac. An upgrade would
also expect leverage (as measured by debt / EBITDA) to be below 3x
and free cash flow (FCF) to be positive.

Moody's could further downgrade the ratings of Petrofac if the SFO
investigation results in large fines that would materially
increase Moody's medium-term leverage expectations. A downgrade
could also result from a decline in order intake resulting from
either a change in customer behavior (because of the SFO
investigation) or reflecting the ongoing challenges in the oil &
gas industry.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Construction
Industry published in March 2017.

Petrofac Limited is incorporated in Jersey, UK and operates out of
seven strategically located operational centres, in Aberdeen,
Sharjah, Abu Dhabi, Woking, Chennai, Mumbai and Kuala Lumpur. It
is a leading engineering and construction company focused on the
upstream oil and gas sector. In 2016, the group reported revenues
and EBITDA of $7.9 billion and $704 million, respectively.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: The Money Wars
-----------------------------
Author: Roy C. Smith
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 370 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by David Henderson
Get your own personal today at
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1893122697/internetbankrupt

Business is war by civilized means. It won't get you a tailhook
landing on an n aircraft carrier docked in San Diego, but the
spoils of war can be glorious to behold.

Most executives do not approach business this way. They are
content to nudge along their behemoths, cash their options, and
pillage their workers. This author calls those managers "inertia
ridden." He quotes Carl Icahn describing their companies as run
by "gross and widespread incompetent management."

In cycles though, the U.S. economy generates a few business
warriors with the drive, or hubris, to treat the market as a
battlefield. The 1980s saw the last great spectacle of business
titans clashing. (The '90s, by contrast, was an era of the
investment banks waging war on the gullible.) The Money Wars is
the story of the last great buyout boom. Between 1982 and 1988,
more than ten thousand transactions were completed within the U.S.
alone, aggregating more than $1 trillion of capitalization.
Roy Smith has written a breezy read, traversing the reader through
an important piece of U.S. history, not just business history. Two
thirds of the way through the book, after covering early twentieth
century business history, the growth of financial engineering
after WWII, the conglomerate era, the RJR-Nabisco story, and the
financial machinations of KKR, we finally meet the star of the
show, Michael Milken. The picture painted by the author leads the
reader to observe that, every now and then, an individual comes
along at the right time and place in history who knows exactly
where he or she is in that history, and leaves a world-historical
footprint as a result. Whatever one may think of Milken's ethics
or his priorities, the reader will conclude that he is the
greatest financial genius this country has produced since J.P.
Morgan.

No high-flying financial era has ever happened in this country
without the frothy market attracting common criminals, or in some
cases making criminals out of weak, but previously honest men (and
it always seems to be men). Something there is about testosterone
and money. With so many deals being done, insider trading was
inevitable. Was Michael Milken guilty of insider trading?
Probably, but in all likelihood, everybody who attended his lavish
parties, called "Predators' Balls," shared the same information.
Why did the Justice Department go after Milken and his firm,
Drexel Burnham Lambert with such raw enthusiasm? That history has
not yet been written, but Drexel had created a lot of envy and
enemies on the Street.

When a better history of the period is written, it will be a study
in the confluence of forces that made Michael Milken's genius
possible: the sclerotic management of irrational conglomerates, a
ready market for the junk bonds Milken was selling, and a few
malcontent capitalist like Carl Icahn and Ted Turner, who were
ready and able to wage their own financial warfare.

This book is a must read for any student of business who did not
live through any of these fascination financial eras.
Roy C. Smith is a professor of entrepreneurship, finance and
international business at NYU, and teaches on the faculty there of
the Stern School of Business. Prior to 1987, he was a partner at
Goldman Sachs. He received a B.S. from the Naval Academy in 1960
and an M.B.A. from Harvard in 1966.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *