TCREUR_Public/170622.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Thursday, June 22, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 123


                            Headlines


A U S T R I A

IMMIGON PORTFOLIOABBAU: Moody's Hikes LT Deposit Rating to Ba1


A Z E R B A I J A N

INT'L BANK: Offers Creditors New Debt Restructuring Terms
MUGANBANK OJSC: S&P Cuts Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'CCC+/C'


F R A N C E

CGG SA: Moody's Lowers CFR to C on Bankruptcy Filing


G R E E C E

SEANERGY MARITIME: Inks Time Charter Contract for M/V Partnership


I R E L A N D

TABERNA EUROPE II: Moody's Hikes Class A1 Notes Rating from Ba1


I T A L Y

BANKRUPTCY NO. 823/14: July 12 Bankruptcy Auction Set for Assets
POPOLARE DI VICENZA: Rothschild Tapped to Find Buyers for Assets
PRIVILEGE YARD: July 20 Deadline for Shipbuilding Complex Offers
SESTANTE FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A2 Notes to 'B'

* July 6 Bid Submission Deadline Set for Business Complex


L U X E M B O U R G

INTELSAT JACKSON: Moody's Rates $1.5BB Sr. Unsecured Notes Caa2
INTELSAT SA: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC+', Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

STORM 2017-II: Fitch Assigns 'B(EXP)sf' Rating to Class D Debt
STORM 2017-II: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba1(sf) Rating to Cl. E Notes


P O R T U G A L

NOVO BANCO: Moody's Extends Review for Downgrade on Caa1 Rating


R U S S I A

SNBCO FB: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked


S P A I N

AUTOVIA DEL NOROESTE: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on EUR54MM Bonds
AYT CGH I: Fitch Affirms 'B+sf' Rating on Class D Notes
REYAL URBIS: Fails to Get Creditor Support for Payments Plan


S W I T Z E R L A N D

SOLWAY INVESTMENT: Fitch Affirms B- IDR, Outlook Stable
SWISSAIR SWISS: 3rd Interim Payment List Open for Inspection


T U R K E Y

SEKERBANK TAS: Fitch Rates Basel III-Compliant Tier 2 Notes 'B'


U K R A I N E

PRIVATBANK: Ukraine May Need to Inject More to Recapitalize Bank


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CASTELL 2017-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Caa2(sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes
EQUITY RELEASE NO. 5: Fitch Affirms BB+sf Rating on Class C Notes
VENATOR MATERIALS: S&P Assigns 'B+' CCR, Outlook Stable


                            *********



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A U S T R I A
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IMMIGON PORTFOLIOABBAU: Moody's Hikes LT Deposit Rating to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded by three notches the long-
term deposit, senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings of immigon
portfolioabbau ag (immigon) to Ba1 from B1 and affirmed the
short-term Not Prime deposit ratings and (P)Not Prime programme
ratings. Concurrently, the rating agency upgraded the wind-down
entity's standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) and its
Adjusted BCA to ba3 from caa1 and its Counterparty Risk
Assessments (CR Assessment) to Baa3(cr)/Prime-3(cr) from
B1(cr)/Not Prime(cr). The outlook on the long-term deposit,
senior unsecured and issuer ratings is stable.

Furthermore, Moody's has upgraded immigon's senior subordinate
and subordinate ratings to Ba3 from Caa1, while immigon's non-
cumulative preferred stock rating which continues to be rated on
an expected loss basis was confirmed at C(hyb) reflecting an
unchanged expected loss severity.

In addition, hybrid capital instruments issued by OEVAG Finance
(Jersey) Limited and Investkredit Funding Ltd were upgraded to
Caa1(hyb) from C(hyb) reflecting an improved expected recovery
for these liabilities of 90%-95% from less than 35% previously.

The upgrade of several long-term ratings of immigon follows the
positive impact from Moody's reassessment of the company's
progress in its wind-down process and reflects: i) immigon's
standalone financial profile, which now operates with improved
capital and substantial liquidity buffers; and ii) the protection
offered to creditors more senior in the creditor hierarchy, as
captured by Moody's Advanced Loss-Given-Failure (LGF) liability
analysis in light of immigon's significant deleveraging.

The stable outlook on immigon's long-term ratings reflects
Moody's expectation that immigon can achieve its target to
economically wind itself down by end-2017.

The rating action concludes the review for upgrade on immigon's
hybrid capital instruments which was initiated on January 30,
2017.

Moody's will then subsequently withdraw immigon's long- and
short-term deposit ratings at Ba1/Not Prime.

RATINGS RATIONALE

  -- IMPROVEMENT OF IMMIGON'S STANDALONE BCA REFLECTS BETTER
RESILIENCE TO SHOCKS DURING THE WIND-DOWN PROCESS

The upgrade of immigon's standalone BCA by four notches to ba3
reflects the entity's reduced tail risks, and improved capital
and liquidity following the accelerated wind-down of assets
during 2016. Compared to its end-2015 balance sheet -- when
immigon reported total assets of EUR3.4 billion and a capital
cushion of EUR330 million of shareholder's equity (under local
accounting regime) -- immigon's assets declined to EUR2.0
billion, while its equity capital improved to EUR420 million. The
reduction in assets reflects the disposal of subsidiaries,
affiliated companies, and performing and non-performing loans.
The company's improved capital cushion reflects the positive
effect from voluntary buyback programs for subordinated and non-
subordinated liabilities and the reversal of loan-loss
provisions, key drivers for immigon's positive net income of
EUR91 million for 2016 (2015: EUR305 million).

In Moody's view, the likelihood has further increased that
immigon can achieve its target to economically wind-down its
remaining assets by end-2017. During 2016, immigon's liquidity
position improved (as reflected by EUR1.1 billion in cash or
around 56% of assets; 2015: 32%) and Moody's believes that the
entity will proactively use its excess liquidity to offer further
liability buybacks. However, immigon's BCA remains constrained by
its still considerable portion of non-performing loans, despite
some level of provisioning, and uncertainties around the sale
proceeds from its remaining subsidiaries and affiliated entities.
In an adverse economic scenario, immigon's improved capital base
may prove insufficient to absorb unexpected losses during its
continued wind-down process.

After failing the ECB's Comprehensive Assessment in October 2014
by a substantial margin, immigon transferred the majority of its
performing assets to other parts of the Volksbanken sector to
prevent default or regulatory intervention, but retained its
higher risk assets and relinquished its banking license in July
2015.

  -- RE-ASSESSMENT OF PROTECTION OFFERED TO DEPOSITORS, SENIOR
UNSECURED AND OTHER CREDITORS

The company is subject to the Federal Banking Restructuring and
Resolution Act (BaSAG), which transposes the European Union's
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) into Austrian law,
and also applies to this wind-down entity. Therefore, Moody's is
applying its Advanced LGF analysis, which has a positive effect
on immigon's debt and deposit ratings.

For immigon, the LGF analysis is based on the entity's liability
structure according to local GAAP as of year-end 2016 and also
takes into account the agency's assumption of possible
redemptions during 2017. The analysis indicates a low loss-given-
failure for deposits and senior unsecured debt, leading to two
notches of uplift from its ba3 Adjusted BCA. This assessment is
supported by the wind-down entity's volume of senior unsecured
debt including promissory notes, which Moody's considers to rank
pari passu with senior unsecured instruments as well as the
amount of subordinated liabilities.

For subordinated debt issued by immigon, the LGF analysis
indicates a moderate loss-given-failure for this junior debt
class, leading Moody's to position the wind-down entity's
subordinated debt in line with its ba3 Adjusted BCA.

  -- STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on immigon's long-term deposit, senior
unsecured and issuer ratings reflects Moody's expectation that
immigon can achieve its target to economically wind itself down
until end-2017.

  -- RATING ACTIONS ON HYBRID CAPITAL INSTRUMENTS

The upgrade of immigon's non-cumulative preferred stock ratings,
issued by the entity's finance vehicles OEVAG Finance (Jersey)
Limited and Investkredit Funding Ltd, to Caa1(hyb) from C(hyb)
reflects Moody's re-assessment of an improved expected recovery
for these liabilities at 90%-95% from less than 35% previously,
according to Moody's expected recoveries associated with ratings
for defaulted or impaired securities. The improved capital of
immigon, as well as the ranking of these liabilities at the time
of immigon's legal dissolution, which the agency does not expect
to occur during the next 12 to 18 months, were key drivers for
its re-assessment.

The confirmation of immigon's non-cumulative preferred stock
ratings at C(hyb) reflects the rating agency's unchanged
assessment of a recovery rate below 35% at the time of immigon's
legal dissolution, according to Moody's expected recoveries
associated with ratings for defaulted or impaired securities. In
Moody's view, these instruments rank subordinated to instruments
issued from immigon's finance vehicles, and therefore benefit
less from its successful wind-down.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- UP/DOWN

The stable outlook implies no upward rating pressure on immigon's
long-term ratings.

However, upward rating pressure on immigon's long-term ratings
could result from further substantial improvement in the entity's
standalone creditworthiness that would prompt an upward
adjustment of its standalone BCA.

Upward pressure on immigon's ba3 BCA could arise from a
substantial capital increase and/or a further successful wind-
down and de-risking of its balance sheet, which would support
immigon's aim of preserving adequate liquidity. Upward pressure
on the entity's long-term ratings could develop under Moody's LGF
analysis, if material changes in the liability structure occur
during its unwinding, resulting in higher cushion for senior
instruments from subordinated liabilities.

Downward rating pressure on immigon's long-term ratings could
result from a deterioration in the entity's standalone
creditworthiness and/or negative effects from the LGF analysis,
for example, if material changes in the liability structure occur
during its unwinding, including a significant reduction in the
volume of subordinated instruments.

Downward pressure on the BCA could develop if the proposed
restructuring proves insufficient to indicate that senior
creditors will be repaid in full and on time and/or if the
Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA) steps in to initiate
resolution measures.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: immigon portfolioabbau ag

The following ratings and rating inputs of immigon portfolioabbau
ag were upgraded

-- Long-term Issuer Rating, upgraded to Ba1 Stable from B1
    Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to Ba1
    Stable from B1 Stable

-- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to Ba3 from Caa1

-- Senior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to Ba3
    from Caa1

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, upgraded to (P)Ba1
    from (P)B1

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, upgraded to (P)Ba3 from
    (P)Caa1

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to ba3 from
    caa1

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to ba3 from caa1

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to Baa3(cr)
    from B1(cr)

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to P-3(cr)
    from NP(cr)

The following rating of immigon portfolioabbau ag was confirmed

-- Preferred Stock Non-cumulative, confirmed at C(hyb)

The following ratings of immigon portfolioabbau ag were affirmed:

-- Other Short Term, affirmed (P)NP

The following ratings of immigon portfolioabbau ag were upgraded
and will be withdrawn

-- Long-term Bank Deposits, upgraded to Ba1 Stable from B1
    Stable

The following ratings of immigon portfolioabbau ag were affirmed
and will be withdrawn

-- Short-term Bank Deposits, affirmed NP

-- Short-term Deposit Note/CD Program, affirmed NP

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Stable from Stable(m)

Issuer: Investkredit Funding Ltd

The following rating of Investkredit Funding Ltd were upgraded

-- Preferred Stock Non-cumulative, upgraded to Caa1(hyb) from
    C(hyb)

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to No Outlook from Rating Under Review

Issuer: OEVAG Finance (Jersey) Limited

The following rating of OEVAG Finance (Jersey) Limited were
upgraded

-- BACKED Preferred Stock Non-cumulative, upgraded to Caa1(hyb)
    from C(hyb)

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to No Outlook from Rating Under Review

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


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A Z E R B A I J A N
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INT'L BANK: Offers Creditors New Debt Restructuring Terms
---------------------------------------------------------
Henry Foy at The Financial Times reports that International Bank
of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan's biggest bank, has offered creditors,
including Fidelity and Allianz, a series of concessions in a bid
to calm disquiet over its US$3.3 billion restructuring, amid
claims that its mishandling of the issue could hurt the country's
investor profile.

The state-run bank, under pressure from a US lawsuit, was forced
into negotiations with a group of investors last week, the FT
relays.  The bank has offered creditors new terms, including
extra amortization payments on new debt, a guaranteed choice of
new bonds and an increased interest payment, the FT discloses.

But some bondholders say the company, which defaulted in May, is
causing long-term damage to the Central Asian economy's
reputation by imposing haircuts, repayment delays and a forced
exchange of bonds for sovereign paper, instead of tapping its
national reserves, the FT relates.

"The new proposal is as disappointing as the previous one," the
FT quotes Lutz Roehmeyer, a portfolio manager at Landesbank
Berlin who holds IBA bonds and will vote against the new offer,
as saying.  "International investors can't understand why an oil-
rich country with a huge sovereign wealth fund does not have the
money to pay back [investors]."

"Calculate the harm that could be done.  Only a small increase in
the future funding costs of Azerbaijan will be more costly than
the small amount you save right now."

A group of investors holding US$220 million worth of IBA bonds,
led by Fidelity and Franklin Templeton, last week filed an
objection against the restructuring in a US court, the FT
recounts.  A second group, accounting for around US$400 million,
met IBA this week to demand better terms, the FT discloses.

"It is difficult to assess the level of bad blood . . . obviously
the market was taken by surprise," Eric Lalo of Lazard Freres who
is advising IBA on the restructuring, as cited by the FT, said.

"The revised terms we believe are a fair proposal," he told the
FT.  "People were not happy because they anticipated IBA would be
a sovereign risk.  But it is not."

The meeting of claimants to approve the restructuring has also
been pushed back five days to July 18, the FT states.

The International Bank of Azerbaijan is Azerbaijan's biggest
bank.

                            *   *   *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported on June 1, 2017,
that Moody's Investors Service said the foreign-currency senior
unsecured debt rating of International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA)
is unaffected at Caa3, under review for downgrade.  The rating
agency downgraded the bank's long-term foreign- and local-
currency deposit ratings to Caa2 from B1 and changed the review
to direction uncertain from review for downgrade.  IBA's baseline
credit assessment (BCA) of ca was has also been placed on review
with direction uncertain. In addition, Moody's downgraded IBA's
long-term counterparty risk assessment (CRA) to Caa1(cr) from
Ba3(cr) and changed the review to direction uncertain from review
for downgrade.  IBA's Not Prime short-term foreign- and local-
currency deposit ratings and Not Prime(cr) short-term CRA were
affirmed.  IBA's foreign-currency debt rating of Caa3 reflects
the likely loss for creditors as a result of a proposed debt
restructuring.  Based on the terms of this restructuring
announced on May 23, which proposes several options to investors
including a proposed exchange ratio of 0.8 in sovereign bonds
against existing claims, Moody's estimates the loss to be at
about 20%, which is consistent with the current Caa3 debt rating.
The rating agency maintains the review for possible downgrade on
the bank's debt ratings, which was opened on May 15. In Moody's
view, given the significant weight of Azerbaijani government-
related entities amongst the creditors, coupled with the threat
of a liquidation of the bank should the proposal be rejected,
there is little prospect for creditor losses to be less than the
agency now assumes.  However, there remains a possibility of
higher losses, should the proposal fail and the authorities
proceed to liquidate the bank.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 29,
2017, Fitch Ratings downgraded International Bank of Azerbaijan's
(IBA) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD' (Restricted
Default) from 'CCC' and removed it from Rating Watch Evolving
(RWE).  The downgrade of IBA's IDRs to 'RD' follows the
announcement of the bank's restructuring plan, presented on
May 23, 2017.  The proposed restructuring will represent a
distressed debt exchange (DDE) according to Fitch's criteria as
it will impose a material reduction in terms on certain senior,
third-party creditors through a combination of write-downs, tenor
extensions and interest rate reductions.


MUGANBANK OJSC: S&P Cuts Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'CCC+/C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long- and short-term counterparty
credit ratings on Muganbank OJSC to 'CCC+/C' from 'B-/B'.  The
outlook is negative.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view that Muganbank's credit
profile -- notably its liquidity and capitalization -- has
deteriorated owing to unfavorable operating conditions prevailing
in Azerbaijan, particularly for midsize banks.  S&P now believes
that the bank is dependent upon favorable business, financial,
and economic conditions to meet its financial obligations, and
therefore, view its stand-alone credit profile at 'ccc+'.

In 2016, Muganbank faced a material outflow of customer deposits,
with a decline of about 30%, adjusted for devaluation of the
Azerbaijani new manat (AZN).  As a result, Muganbank's liquidity
position came under significant pressure, with highly liquid
assets declining by 77% over the year to about AZN14.5 million
(about EUR7.6 million).  As of Dec. 31, 2016, the liquidity
buffer net of restricted cash covered only 7.5% of customer
deposits versus 24% a year earlier.  While S&P notes that the
deposit outflows have moderated in 2017, the bank is left with a
barely adequate liquidity buffer and with a more concentrated
depositor base, therefore further increasing risks.

Muganbank's asset quality also deteriorated in 2016:
Nonperforming loans increased to about 15% of its gross portfolio
and the bank restructured another 10% of loans.  The bank had to
recognize material credit losses, causing cost-of-risk to peak at
an excessive 8.0% for the year.  This development reflects
Muganbank's business focus, including loans provided to
individual entrepreneurs, which suffered from the economic slump
in Azerbaijan and the manat devaluation last year.  Although S&P
expects that the growth of nonperforming loans will slow in 2017-
2018, S&P thinks that these loans will reach 20% of the loan
portfolio this year, with another 10%-12% of restructured loans,
therefore remaining below peer average.

S&P has revised its assessment of the bank's capital and earnings
to weak from moderate because S&P now forecasts that the bank's
risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio will be in the range of 3.0%-
3.8% in the next 12-18 months.  S&P notes that the bank's
capitalization came under pressure in 2016, when the RAC declined
to 4.7%.  This reflected Muganbank's net loss of about AZN12
million and the emergence of high tax losses, leading to a low
capacity to absorb further losses, in S&P's view.  S&P expects
that Muganbank's capitalization will remain under pressure over
the next two years since S&P forecasts that the bank will be
loss-making in 2017.  S&P views positively Muganbank's
shareholders' continued support, including the AZN25 million
injected in 2016 to support the bank's capitalization.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that Muganbank's ability
to fulfill its financial obligations will remain under pressure
in the next 12 months.

S&P could lower the ratings by one or several notches if it saw
that that the bank's liquidity position had weakened further, so
that there was a higher probability of the bank defaulting on its
financial obligations.  A negative rating action may also follow
greater deterioration of the bank's capital and risk profile, if
the bank fails to reverse the current negative trend.

S&P could consider revising the outlook to stable or consider a
positive rating action, if S&P saw that Muganbank's liquidity had
sustainably improved to an extent that it had become less
vulnerable to further deposit outflows and thus less dependent on
more favorable economic conditions to meet its financial
commitments.


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F R A N C E
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CGG SA: Moody's Lowers CFR to C on Bankruptcy Filing
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded CGG SA's (CGG) Corporate
Family Rating (CFR) and Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to C
from Caa3 and D-PD from Ca-PD, respectively. Concurrently,
Moody's has downgraded to C from Caa1 the ratings on the senior
secured French revolving credit facility (RCF) due 2018 borrowed
by CGG SA, and the senior secured US RCF and senior secured term
loan B due 2019 borrowed by CGG Holding (U.S.) Inc, a subsidiary
of CGG SA. Finally, Moody's also downgraded the ratings on the
outstanding senior unsecured notes to C from Ca. This follows the
company's announcement that it voluntarily filed for
reorganization under French Sauvegarde Collective Insolvency
Proceedings and Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy code
on June 14, 2017. The outlook remains negative.

Shortly following this rating action, Moody's will withdraw all
ratings for the company, consistent with Moody's practice for
companies operating under the purview of the bankruptcy courts
where information flow typically becomes much more limited.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's downgraded the CFR to C from Caa3 to reflect the current
stressed financial situation of the company and untenable capital
structure. Moody's also notes that the company has obtained on 2
June 2017 from its main creditors an in principle debt
restructuring agreement which would see approximately $1.95
billion its debt swapped into equity and $500 million of new
money to be raised to support financing of its operations once
the restructuring is implemented. The C CFR rating reflects
Moody's view that the company's operations and liquidity will
benefit from the debt standstill under legal protection of
Sauvegarde and Chapter 11, and could show potential recovery if
the restructuring is approved. Moody's views the current cash on
balance sheet of approximately $391 million at the end of March
as adequate to support the company's operation while under Court
protection.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Oilfield Services Industry Rating Methodology published in May
2017.

CGG ranks among the top three players in the seismic industry. In
2016, CGG generated USD1.2 billion in revenues. It is listed on
both Euronext Paris and the New York Stock Exchange.


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G R E E C E
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SEANERGY MARITIME: Inks Time Charter Contract for M/V Partnership
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp. has entered into a time charter
contract with a major European utility and energy company for its
recently delivered Capesize vessel.  The 2012-built M/V
Partnership will commence a period employment of about twelve to
eighteen months and is expected to generate approximately $8.8
million of gross revenue, assuming the full 18 months employment.

Stamatis Tsantanis, the Company's chairman & chief executive
officer, commented, "We are pleased to announce a period
employment contract for our most recent Capesize acquisition.
The strong rate achieved supports our projections for continued
improvement in the Capesize market and overall dry bulk sector.

"Assuming the full 18 months employment, this time charter is
expected to generate approximately $8.8 million of gross revenue,
offering a considerable return on our most recent investment."

            About Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp.

Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp. --
http://www.seanergymaritime.com/-- is an international shipping
company that provides marine dry bulk transportation services
through the ownership and operation of dry bulk vessels.  The
Company currently owns a modern fleet of eleven dry bulk
carriers, consisting of nine Capesizes and two Supramaxes, with a
combined cargo-carrying capacity of approximately 1,682,582 dwt
and an average fleet age of about 8.1 years.

The Company is incorporated in the Marshall Islands with
executive offices in Athens, Greece and an office in Hong Kong.
The Company's common shares and class A warrants trade on the
Nasdaq Capital Market under the symbols "SHIP" and "SHIPW",
respectively.

Seanergy incurred a net loss of US$24.62 million in 2016
following a net loss of US$8.95 million in 2015.

As of Dec. 31, 2016, Seanergy had US$257.53 million in total
assets, US$226.70 million in total liabilities, and US$30.83
million in total stockholders' equity.


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TABERNA EUROPE II: Moody's Hikes Class A1 Notes Rating from Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the
following notes issued by Taberna Europe CDO II p.l.c.:

EUR588,000,000 Class A1 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2038
(current balance of EUR53,456,835), Upgraded to A1 (sf);
previously on April 29, 2016 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Taberna Europe CDO II p.l.c., issued in September 2007, is a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) backed mainly by a portfolio
of REIT and bank trust preferred securities (TruPS) as well as
subordinated corporate bonds and loans.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is primarily a result of deleveraging of the
Class A1 notes and an increase in the Class A1 over-
collateralization (OC) ratio, as well as the diminishing
likelihood of Event of Default (EOD) since the deal is no longer
required to make scheduled payments to the initial purchaser.

The Class A1 notes have paid down by approximately 84% or
EUR275.7 million since August 2016 using principal proceeds from
the redemption of the underlying assets. In particular, the
transaction has terminated its exposure to EUR222 million of
synthetics securities in October 2016, and distributed the entire
EUR222 million to the Class A1 notes in November 2016. Based on
Moody's calculations, the OC ratio for the Class A1 notes has
improved to 333.3% from 146.8% in August 2016. In addition, the
Class A1 notes are expected to benefit from credit enhancement
available in the form of excess spread, because two out-of-the-
money interest rate swaps, with a total notional of EUR62.4
million, are scheduled to mature by October 2017.

Furthermore, rating action reflected a lower likelihood that the
deal will declare an EOD arising from a missed interest payment
on the Class A1 or A2 notes, because since May 2017 the deal is
no longer required to make scheduled payments (senior to interest
payments on the Class A1 and A2 notes) to the initial purchaser.
However, Moody's notes the transaction still has EUR565,162.66 of
unpaid deferred senior collateral management fees (also senior to
interest payments on the Class A1 and A2 notes), which if not
waived, continue to expose the transaction to some degree of EOD
risk. The upgrade magnitude on the Class A1 notes is tempered to
reflect this concern.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating TruPS CDOs" published in October 2016.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

This transaction is subject to a number of factors and
circumstances that could lead to either an upgrade or downgrade
of the ratings, as described below:

1) Macroeconomic uncertainty: TruPS CDOs performance could be
negatively affected by uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.

2) Portfolio credit risk: Credit performance of the assets
collateralizing the transaction that is better than Moody's
current expectations could have a positive impact on the
transaction's performance. Conversely, asset credit performance
weaker than Moody's current expectations could have adverse
consequences on the transaction's performance.

3) Deleveraging: One source of uncertainty in this transaction is
whether deleveraging from unscheduled principal proceeds and
excess interest proceeds will continue and at what pace. Note
repayments that are faster than Moody's current expectations
could have a positive impact on the notes' ratings, beginning
with the notes with the highest payment priority.

4) Exposure to non-publicly rated assets: The deal contains a
large number of securities whose default probability Moody's
assesses through credit scores derived using credit estimates.
Because these are not public ratings, they are subject to
additional uncertainties.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also conducted
sensitivity analyses to test the impact of a number of default
probabilities on the rated notes relative to the base case
modeling results, which may be different from the current public
ratings of the notes. Below is a summary of the impact of
different default probabilities (expressed in terms of WARF) on
all of the rated notes (by the difference in the number of
notches versus the current model output, for which a positive
difference corresponds to lower expected loss):

Assuming a two-notch upgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 1536)

Class A1: 0

Assuming a two-notch downgrade to assets with below-investment
grade ratings or rating estimates (WARF of 4051)

Class A1: -1

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's applied a Monte Carlo simulation framework in Moody's
CDROM(TM) to model the loss distribution for TruPS CDOs. The
simulated defaults and recoveries for each of the Monte Carlo
scenarios defined the reference pool's loss distribution. Moody's
then used the loss distribution as an input in its CDOEdge(TM)
cash flow model. CDROM(TM) is available on www.moodys.com under
Products and Solutions -- Analytical models, upon receipt of a
signed free license agreement.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, and weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed
the underlying collateral pool has having a performing par of
EUR178.2 million, defaulted par of EUR139.2 million, a weighted
average default probability of 29.22% (implying a WARF of 2444),
and a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 19.18%.

In addition to the quantitative factors Moody's explicitly
models, qualitative factors are part of rating committee
considerations. Moody's considers the structural protections in
the transaction, the risk of an event of default, recent deal
performance under current market conditions, the legal
environment and specific documentation features. All information
available to rating committees, including macroeconomic
forecasts, inputs from other Moody's analytical groups, market
factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of
credit stress on the transactions, can influence the final rating
decision.

The portfolio of this CDO contains mainly of TruPS issued by REIT
companies that Moody's does not rate publicly. To evaluate the
credit quality of REIT companies that do not have public ratings,
Moody's REIT group assesses their credit quality using the REIT
firms' annual financials.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANKRUPTCY NO. 823/14: July 12 Bankruptcy Auction Set for Assets
----------------------------------------------------------------
A competitive sale ex art 107 Bankruptcy Law for Bankruptcy
procedure n. 823/14 R.F., Court of Rome, Judge Dott.ssa
Cavaliere, will be conducted on July 12, 2017, at 11:30 a.m.
before notary Alfonso Colucci at his office in Rome Via Emanuele
Giaturco.

The assets for sale include:

1. Single lot: Municipality of Semproniano (Grosseto, Tuscany),
Estate of Cortevecchia, with a total surface area of about 2250
hectares located in part in the municipality of Semproniano and
in part in the municipality of Castell'Azzara; consisting of 1080
property units, including buildings and land areas.

Base price EUR10,205,425.00 and, in case of auction, minimum
increment of EUR10,000.00.

Offers have to be submitted within 10:00 a.m. on July 12, 2017,
at the office of the notary.

For further information on the modalities of submission of the
offer and the participation in the competitive sale contact:
receiver Avv. Anna Rita Dell'Olmo e-mail:
avv.annaritadellolmo@gmail.com, certified electronic mail:
f823.2014@pecfallimenti.it, on the websites
www.tribunale.roma.it, www.giustizia.lazio.it and
www.astegiudiziarie.it (Cod. A333354).  The bankruptcy procedure
does not act through intermediaries.


POPOLARE DI VICENZA: Rothschild Tapped to Find Buyers for Assets
----------------------------------------------------------------
Francesca Landini at Reuters reports that Italy has hired
Rothschild to find buyers for the best assets of two ailing
Veneto-based lenders, with Intesa Sanpaolo viewed as the most
likely taker.

The move is part of a new plan by the Rome government that
envisages the effective liquidation of Banca Popolare di Vicenza
and Veneto Banca with the help of state money to reduce losses
for the lenders' private investors, Reuters notes.

Rome is scrambling to prevent the two banks from being wound down
under European banking rules that would impose losses on senior
bondholders and large depositors before taxpayer money can be
used -- a politically unpalatable prospect ahead of national
elections next year, Reuters discloses.

Instead the government is working on a hybrid plan that would
split the two lenders' assets into "bad" and "good" banks,
Reuters says.  According to Reuters, two sources said the bad
bank would take on their soured debts and be financed partly with
state money, with junior bondholders and shareholders also taking
a hit.

Intesa Sanpaolo, Italy's top retail bank, is considering buying
the healthier parts of the two Veneto banks, Reuters discloses.
According to Reuters, two other sources close to the matter said
Intesa wants to pay as little as possible to avoid having to
launch a capital increase or backtrack on its dividend policy.

Three sources said the Iccrea group of cooperative lenders is
also looking at the assets but is seen as a less likely
candidate, while UniCredit has ruled itself out, Reuters notes.

Details of the scheme remain sketchy and it is not clear whether
the European Commission, which must authorize the use of state
aid, would allow the plan to proceed, Reuters states.

Banca Popolare di Vicenza (BPVi) is an Italian bank.  The bank
was the 13th largest retail and corporate bank of Italy by total
assets, according to Mediobanca.

                         *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Mar 21,
2017, Fitch Ratings downgraded Banca Popolare di Vicenza's
(Vicenza) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CCC' from
'B-' and Viability Rating (VR) to 'cc' from 'b-'. The Long-Term
IDR has been placed on Rating Watch Evolving (RWE).

The downgrade of Vicenza's VR to 'cc' reflects Fitch's view that
it is probable that the bank will require fresh capital to
address a material capital shortfall, which under Fitch's
criteria would be a failure.

The downgrade of the Long-Term IDR to 'CCC' reflects Fitch's view
that there is a real possibility that losses could be imposed on
senior bondholders if a conversion or write-down of junior debt
is not sufficient to strengthen capitalisation and if the bank
does not receive fresh capital in a precautionary
recapitalisation.


PRIVILEGE YARD: July 20 Deadline for Shipbuilding Complex Offers
----------------------------------------------------------------
The shipbuilding complex of Privilege Yard S.p.a., Bankruptcy no.
19/15, Civitavecchia Law Court, has been put up for sale.

Offers Gathering No. 2734

Sale/rental of Shipbuilding Complex composed of the Privilege One
P430 luxury ship under construction, industrial site,
photovoltaic system, movable property and right to succeed to the
concession of November 29, 2007, situated in Civitavecchia/Rome,
specifically in the La Mattonara - Port Area

Deadline: by 6:00 p.m., Thursday, July 20, 2017

Auction No. 2735

Sale of Privilege One P430 Luxury Ship length 125 m under
construction, steel hull, holding under 36 passengers.
The lot is situated in Civitavecchia/Rome, specifically in the La
Mattonara - Port Area,

Starting price
EUR16,000,000.00

Deadline by: 3:00 p.m., August 4, 2017

Participation conditions and deadlines are available on the
website: www.gobid.it

info@gobid.it
+39 0737 782080


SESTANTE FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A2 Notes to 'B'
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered to 'B (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' its
credit rating on Sestante Finance S.r.l. series 4's class A2
notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings
on the class B, C1, and C2 notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that it has received as
of the April 2017 payment date.  S&P has applied its European
residential loans criteria and its structured finance ratings
above the sovereign criteria.

Since December 2014, available credit enhancement--considering
performing collateral only--has decreased for all classes of
notes.

Class         Available credit
               enhancement (%)
A2                        1.87
B                       (13.24)
C1                      (20.11)

The reserve fund has not been replenished since its depletion in
August 2009.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days, at 5.25%, are on
average higher for this transaction than S&P's Italian
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) index.  Defaults
are defined as mortgage loans in arrears for more than 12 months
in this transaction.  Cumulative defaults, at 17.53%, are also
higher than in other Italian RMBS transactions that S&P rates.
Prepayment levels remain low and the transaction is unlikely to
pay down significantly in the near term, in S&P's opinion.

After applying S&P's European residential loans criteria to this
transaction, its credit analysis results show an increase in the
weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF).  S&P's analysis
also shows a decrease in the weighted-average loss severity
(WALS) at the 'AAA', 'AA', and 'A' rating levels, but a slight
increase at the 'BBB' to 'B' rating levels.

Rating level    WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
AAA                27.80       27.01
AA                 21.62       23.66
A                  16.22       16.97
BBB                13.26       13.62
BB                 10.30       11.32
B                   7.35        9.25

The WAFF movements are mainly due to the application of S&P's
arrears assumptions, while the WALS movements are mainly due to
the application of S&P's updated market value decline
assumptions. The overall effect is an increase in the required
credit coverage for all rating levels.

Taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis, it considers that the decreased available credit
enhancement for the class A2 notes is not commensurate with the
currently assigned rating.  The class A2 notes rely on recoveries
from defaulted asset to be fully repaid.  Cumulative recoveries
are lower than our expectations and S&P do not expect them to
increase in the near term.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'B (sf)'
from 'BBB- (sf)' its rating on the class A2 notes.

The class C1 and C2 notes breached the interest deferral trigger
in October 2013 and the class B notes breached it in October
2016, following which S&P lowered to 'D (sf)' its ratings on
these classes of notes.  As interest on the class B, C1, and C2
notes continues to be unpaid, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)'
ratings on these classes of notes.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Italian residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 2.55% from 1.50%, when S&P applies its European
residential loans criteria, to reflect this view.

Sestante Finance's series 4 is an Italian RMBS transaction, which
closed in December 2006.  It is backed by a pool of residential
mortgage loans originated by Meliorbanca SpA.

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
            To             From

Sestante Finance S.r.l.
EUR647.9 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Series 4

Rating Lowered

A2          B (sf)         BBB- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

B           D (sf)
C1          D (sf)
C2          D (sf)


* July 6 Bid Submission Deadline Set for Business Complex
---------------------------------------------------------
The judicial administrator appointed by the Court of jurisdiction
has been authorized to initiate a bidding procedure for the sale
of a line of business under precautionary seizure and formerly
owned by bankrupt company -- subject to the trustee in bankruptcy
being authorized by the Creditors' Committee to take action to
sell, insofar as this may be required -- which purchases,
processes, sells and markets tobacco and the by-products thereof;
moreover it manufactures and sells cigarettes.

The line of business will be sold as a going concern.  Its market
share in Italy is about 0.7%, and it will include the business
assets described in more detail in the expert's appraisal.
The starting price for this sale is set at EUR3,217,500.00, plus
applicable taxes.

Bids shall be no lower than the starting price requested and
shall be accompanied by a bid guarantee amounting to 20% of the
bid amount in the form of a banker's draft, made out according to
the call for bids.  Bids shall be delivered to the offices
of the appointed Notary, Andrea Ganelli, Corso Galileo Ferraris
no. 73, Turin (Italy) -- no later than midday on July 6, 2017.

Bids will be opened at 3:00 p.m. on July 6, 2017, in the offices
of the appointed Notary, Andrea Ganelli, Corso Galileo Ferraris
no. 73, Turin (Italy).  If more than one bid is valid, the court-
appointed judicial administrator shall be entitled to order
a competitive procedure among the bidders, according to the terms
and conditions that will be explained at that time.

Contact the court-appointed judicial administrator, Dario
Spadavecchia on +39011-7410435, pec:
dario.spadavecchia@legalmail.it for information and to
view the documents on the business complex, including the call
for bids.

This notice is exclusively an invitation to bid and is not a
public offering pursuant to Section 1336 of the Italian Civil
Code, or a solicitation of funds from the public.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


INTELSAT JACKSON: Moody's Rates $1.5BB Sr. Unsecured Notes Caa2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Caa2 rating to Intelsat
Jackson Holdings S.A.'s (Intelsat Jackson) $1.5 billion senior
unsecured notes due 2025.

Intelsat Jackson is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of
Intelsat S.A. (Intelsat), the senior-most entity in the Intelsat
group of companies, and the only company in the family issuing
financial statements. Intelsat guarantees debts at its
subsidiary, Intelsat (Luxembourg) S.A. and, as well, at Intelsat
(Luxembourg)'s subsidiary, Intelsat Connect Finance S.A., and its
subsidiary, Intelsat Jackson Holdings S.A. (Jackson).

Since Intelsat Jackson's new $1.5 billion notes fund the
repurchase of its 7.250% $1.5 billion senior unsecured notes due
April 01, 2019, and are issued in the same legal entity with the
same ranking as the notes they replace, the transaction has no
ratings implications, and all of the family's ratings remain
unchanged. Ratings for instruments that will be repaid will be
withdrawn in due course.

The following summarizes Moody's ratings and rating actions for
Intelsat:

Assignments:

Issuer: Intelsat Jackson Holdings S.A.

-- GTD Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned Caa2
    (LGD3)

Other Ratings and Outlook:

Issuer: Intelsat S.A.

-- Corporate Family Rating, Unchanged at Caa2

-- Probability of Default Rating, Unchanged at Caa3-PD

-- Speculative Grade Liquidity Rating, Unchanged at SGL-3

-- Outlook, Unchanged at Negative

Issuer: Intelsat (Luxembourg) S.A.

-- GTD Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Unchanged at Ca
    (LGD5)

Issuer: Intelsat Connect Finance S.A.

-- GTD Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Unchanged at Ca
    (LGD4)

Issuer: Intelsat Jackson Holdings S.A.

-- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Unchanged at B1 (LGD1)

-- GTD Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Unchanged at B1
    (LGD1)

-- GTD Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Unchanged at B1
    (LGD1)

-- GTD Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Unchanged at
    Caa2 (LGD 3)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Intelsat's Caa2 CFR is based primarily on Moody's assessment that
with debt/EBITDA of approximately 9.5x (Moody's adjusted), and
with business conditions in the fixed satellite services sector
evolving and uncertain, and with resulting poor cash flow
visibility and uncertain business valuations, the company's
capital structure is not sustainable. Moody's believes that
additional liability management transactions may be required in
the event that the company's cash flow does not materially expand
in 2018/19. Such transactions may be assessed as comprising
distressed exchanges and limited defaults.

Intelsat's speculative grade liquidity rating continues to be
SGL-3, indicating adequate liquidity. Intelsat relies on cash in
lieu of an accessible third party provided revolving credit
facility. While Moody's estimates Intelsat will incur about a $50
million FCF deficit over the next four quarters, with ~$625
million of cash (31Mar17) and an estimated financial covenant
compliance cushion of 25%, liquidity is assessed as adequate.

Rating Outlook

The negative outlook is based on Moody's assessment that business
conditions in the fixed satellite services sector are evolving
and uncertain and, in turn, poor cash flow visibility and
uncertain valuations point to a high probability of additional
liability management transactions which may be assessed as
distressed exchanges, which Moody's defines as defaults.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

The rating could be considered for upgrade if, along with
expectations of solid industry fundamentals, good liquidity, and
clarity on capital structure planning, Moody's anticipated:

* Leverage of debt/EBITDA normalizing below 6x on a sustained
basis;

* Cash flow self-sustainability over the life cycle of the
company's satellite fleet.

What Could Change the Rating -- Down

The rating could be considered for downgrade if, Moody's
expected:

* Near-term defaults; or

* Substantial and sustained free cash flow deficits; or

* Less than adequate liquidity arrangements.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Communications Infrastructure Rating Methodology published in
June 2011.

Headquartered in Luxembourg, and with executive offices in
McLean, VA, Intelsat S.A. (Intelsat) is one of the two largest
fixed satellite services operators in the world. Annual revenues
are expected to be approximately $2.2 billion with EBITDA of
approximately $1.6 billion.


INTELSAT SA: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC+', Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its corporate credit rating on
Luxembourg-based Intelsat S.A. to 'CCC+' from 'SD'.  The outlook
is stable.

At the same time, S&P raised the issue-level rating on Intelsat
Jackson Holdings S.A.'s secured debt to 'B' from 'B-'.  The
recovery rating remains '1', indicating S&P's expectation for
very high (90%-100%; rounded estimate: 95%) recovery for lenders
in the event of a payment default.

S&P also raised the issue-level rating on Intelsat Jackson
Holdings S.A.'s unsecured debt to 'CCC+' from 'CC' and revised
the recovery rating to '3' from '4'.  The '3' recovery rating
indicates S&P's expectation for meaningful (50%-70%; rounded
estimate: 50%) recovery for lenders in the event of a payment
default.

S&P raised the issue-level rating on Intelsat Connect Finance
S.A.'s unsecured debt to 'CCC-' from 'CC'.  S&P raised the issue-
level rating on Intelsat (Luxembourg) S.A.'s senior unsecured
notes due 2018 to 'CCC-' from 'CC' and raised S&P's rating on the
rest of its unsecured debt to 'CCC-' from 'D'.  The recovery
rating remains '6', indicating S&P's expectation for meaningful
(0%-10%; rounded estimate: 0%) recovery for lenders in the event
of a payment default.

Additionally, S&P assigned a 'CCC+' issue-level rating and '3'
recovery rating to Intelsat Jackson Holdings S.A.'s proposed
$1.5 billion senior unsecured notes due 2025.  The company plans
to use the proceeds from the notes issuance to repay
its $1.5 billion 7.25% senior unsecured notes due 2019.

S&P will withdraw the ratings on Intelsat Jackson Holdings S.A.'s
$1.5 billion 7.25% senior unsecured notes due 2019 when they have
been redeemed.

"The upgrade follows our review of Intelsat following the
termination of its combination agreement with OneWeb," said S&P
Global Ratings credit analyst Rose Askinazi.  The merger was
contingent on a series of debt exchange offers that were not
completed.  S&P had considered the potential repurchase of
existing notes at a material discount to par as a distressed
restructuring and tantamount to default.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the company
will maintain adequate liquidity over the next 12 months with no
near-term debt maturities.  In addition, S&P do not expect any
payment defaults or distressed restructuring over the next 12
months.

S&P could lower the rating if growth from Epic does not
significantly materialize over the next couple years, resulting
in negative or minimal levels of free operating cash flow.  This
would lessen our confidence in the company's ability to refinance
its sizable debt maturity in 2019 or 2020.

While unlikely over the next 12 months, S&P could raise the
rating if the company experiences significant growth from Epic,
which returns networks services to a more moderate growth profile
and enables the company to significantly reduce leverage and
materially improve free cash flow.  Under this scenario, S&P
would have increased confidence in the company's ability to
refinance future debt maturities.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


STORM 2017-II: Fitch Assigns 'B(EXP)sf' Rating to Class D Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Storm 2017-II B.V.'s notes expected
ratings:

Class A: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B: 'A+(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C: 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class D: 'B(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class E: Not rated

The assignment of the final ratings is contingent on the receipt
of final documents conforming to information already received.

This transaction is a securitisation of prime Dutch residential
mortgage loans originated and serviced by Obvion N.V.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Market Average Portfolio
This is an 86-month seasoned portfolio consisting of prime
residential mortgage loans, with a weighted average (WA) original
loan-to-market-value of 87.0% and a WA debt-to-income ratio of
27.0%, both of which are typical for Fitch-rated Dutch RMBS
transactions and in line with previous STORM transactions.

Revolving Transaction
A five-year revolving period allows new assets to be added to the
portfolio. In Fitch's view, the additional purchase criteria
adequately mitigate any significant risk of potential migration
due to future loan additions. Fitch considered a stressed
portfolio composition, based on the additional purchase criteria,
rather than the actual portfolio characteristics.

Interest Rate Hedge
At close, a swap agreement has been entered into with Obvion to
hedge any mismatches between the fixed and floating interest on
the loans and the floating interest on the notes. In addition,
the swap agreement guarantees a minimum level of excess spread
for the transaction, equal to 50bp per year of the outstanding
class A through D notes' balance, less principal deficiency
ledgers (PDLs). The remedial triggers are linked to the parent's
ratings (Rabobank).

Rabobank Main Counterparty
This transaction relies strongly on the creditworthiness of
Rabobank, which fulfils a number of roles. Fitch analysed the
structural features in place, including those mitigating
construction deposit set-off and commingling risk and concluded
that counterparty risk is adequately addressed.

Robust Performance
The past performance of transactions in the Storm series, as well
as data received on Obvion's loan book, indicate good historical
performance in terms of low arrears and losses.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Material increases in the frequency of foreclosures and loss
severity on foreclosed receivables could produce losses larger
than Fitch's base case expectations, which in turn may result in
negative rating actions on the notes. Fitch's analysis revealed
that a 15% increase in the WA foreclosure frequency, along with a
15% decrease in the WA recovery rate, would imply a downgrade of
the class A notes to 'AA-sf' from 'AAAsf'.


STORM 2017-II: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba1(sf) Rating to Cl. E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
following classes of notes to be issued by STORM 2017-II B.V.:

-- EUR [*] million senior class A mortgage-backed notes due
     2064, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- EUR [*] million mezzanine class B mortgage-backed notes due
    2064, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

-- EUR [*] million mezzanine class C mortgage-backed notes due
    2064, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

-- EUR [*] million junior class D mortgage-backed notes due
    2064, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

-- EUR [*] million subordinated class E notes due 2064, Assigned
    (P)Ba1 (sf)

STORM 2017-II B.V. is a revolving securitisation of Dutch prime
residential mortgage loans. Obvion N.V. (not rated) is the
originator and servicer of the portfolio.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings on the notes take into account, among
other factors: (1) the performance of the previous transactions
launched by Obvion N.V.; (2) the credit quality of the underlying
mortgage loan pool; (3) legal considerations; and (4) the initial
credit enhancement provided to the senior notes by the junior
notes and the reserve fund.

The expected portfolio loss of [0.65]% and the MILAN CE of [7.7]%
serve as input parameters for Moody's cash flow and tranching
model, which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution,
as described in the report "The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS
Analysis", published in July 2000.

MILAN CE for this pool is [7.7]%, which is in line with preceding
revolving STORM transactions and in line with other prime Dutch
RMBS revolving transactions, owing to: (i) the availability of
the NHG-guarantee for [27.6]% of the loan parts in the pool,
which can reduce during the replenishment period to [25]%, (ii)
the replenishment period of 5 years where there is a risk of
deteriorating the pool quality through the addition of new loans,
although this is mitigated by replenishment criteria, (iii) the
weighted average loan-to-foreclosure-value (LTFV) of [91.12]%,
which is similar to LTFV observed in other Dutch RMBS
transactions, (iv) the proportion of interest-only loan parts
([59.4]%) and (v) the weighted average seasoning of [7.13] years.
Moody's notes that the unadjusted current LTFV is [91.01]%. The
slight difference is due to Moody's treatment of the property
values that use valuations provided for tax purposes (the so-
called WOZ valuation).

The risk of a deteriorating pool quality through the addition of
loans is partly mitigated by the replenishment criteria which
includes, amongst others, that the weighted average CLTMV of all
the mortgage loans, including those to be purchased by the
Issuer, does not exceed [87]% and the minimum weighted average
seasoning is at least [40] months. Further, no new loans can be
added to the pool if there is a PDL outstanding, if loans more
than 3 months in arrears exceeds [1.5]% or the cumulative loss
exceeds [0.4]%.

The key drivers for the portfolio's expected loss of [0.65]%,
which is in line with preceding STORM transactions and with other
prime Dutch RMBS transactions, are: (1) the availability of the
NHG-guarantee for [27.6]% of the loan parts in the pool, which
can reduce during the replenishment period to [25]%; (2) the
performance of the seller's precedent transactions; (3)
benchmarking with comparable transactions in the Dutch RMBS
market; and (4) the current economic conditions in the
Netherlands in combination with historic recovery data of
foreclosures received from the seller.

The transaction benefits from a non-amortising reserve fund,
funded at [1.02]% of the total class A to D notes' outstanding
amount at closing, building up to [1.3]% by trapping available
excess spread. The initial total credit enhancement for the Aaa
(sf) provisionally rated notes is [8.0]%, [6.98]% through note
subordination and the reserve fund amounting to [1.02]%. The
transaction also benefits from an excess margin of [50] bps
provided through the swap agreement. The swap counterparty is
Obvion N.V. and the back-up swap counterparty is COOPERATIEVE
RABOBANK U.A. ("Rabobank"; rated Aa2/P-1). Rabobank is obliged to
assume the obligations of Obvion N.V. under the swap agreement in
case of Obvion N.V.'s default. The transaction also benefits from
an amortising cash advance facility of [2.0]% of the outstanding
principal amount of the notes (including the class E notes) with
a floor of [1.45]% of the outstanding principal amount of the
notes (including the class E notes) as of closing.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2016.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Please note that on March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request
for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on
potential revisions to its Approach to Assessing Counterparty
Risks in Structured Finance. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, the credit ratings of the notes issued
by Green STORM 2017 B.V. may be affected. Please refer to Moody's
Request for Comment, titled "Moody's Proposes Revisions to Its
Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance",
for further details regarding the implications of the proposed
Methodology revisions on certain Credit Ratings.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with Moody's
expectations at close due to either a change in economic
conditions from Moody's central scenario forecast or
idiosyncratic performance factors would lead to rating actions.

For instance, should economic conditions be worse than forecast,
the higher defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in a downgrade of the ratings.
Downward pressure on the ratings could also stem from (1)
deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement; or (2)
counterparty risk, based on a weakening of a counterparty's
credit profile, particularly Obvion N.V. and Rabobank, which
perform numerous roles in the transaction.

Conversely, the ratings could be upgraded: (1) if economic
conditions are significantly better than forecasted; or (2) upon
deleveraging of the capital structure.

STRESS SCENARIOS:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: At the time the ratings were
assigned, the model output indicated that class A notes would
have achieved Aaa (sf), even if MILAN CE was increased to
[10.78]% from [7.7]% and the portfolio expected loss was
increased to [1.30]% from [0.65]% and all other factors remained
the same.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

The provisional ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal with respect to the notes by the
legal final maturity. Moody's ratings only address the credit
risk associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have
not been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavour
to assign definitive ratings to the Notes. A definitive rating
may differ from a provisional rating. Moody's will disseminate
the assignment of any definitive ratings through its Client
Service Desk. Moody's will monitor this transaction on an ongoing
basis. For updated monitoring information, please contact
monitor.rmbs@moodys.com.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


NOVO BANCO: Moody's Extends Review for Downgrade on Caa1 Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has extended its review for downgrade
of the Caa1 long-term deposit and Caa2 senior debt ratings of
Novo Banco, S.A. (Novo Banco) and its supported entities. The
ratings review was initiated on April 5, 2017, following the
announcement made by the Bank of Portugal on March 31, 2017 that
as part of Novo Banco's sale process, a liability management
exercise (LME) on senior bondholders will be undertaken with the
aim of recapitalizing the bank by at least EUR500 million. The
Bank of Portugal also announced that the private equity firm Lone
Star (unrated) will acquire 75% of Novo Banco's capital after
injecting EUR1 billion of capital, while the resolution fund will
maintain 25% of the bank's shares.

Concurrently, Moody's has extended its review for downgrade of
Novo Banco's long-term counterparty risk assessment (CR
Assessment) of B3(cr). The bank's standalone Baseline Credit
Assessment (BCA) stands at ca.

The extension of the review reflects the fact that Novo Banco's
LME on senior bondholders is still in the process of being
defined and implemented. Moody's expects to conclude the review
on Novo Banco's ratings once the rating agency will have further
visibility on the completion of the LME, which is a requirement
that needs to be fulfilled before Lone Star can complete the
acquisition of a majority stake in Novo Banco. If the LME fails
to succeed, there is an increased risk of a resolution or
liquidation for the bank with consequent losses for creditors.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's decision to extend the rating review process is driven by
the fact that Novo Banco's sale process remains in progress.

Novo Banco's standalone (BCA) of ca reflects Moody's view that
the proposed LME on the bank's outstanding senior bonds (EUR3
billion at end-December 2016) to recapitalize the bank has the
effect of allowing the issuer to avoid a likely eventual default
according to Moody's definitions. The rating agency considers
this offer to be a distressed exchange that will be made as a
means to avoid Novo Banco's liquidation and close the sale
process.

The sale of Novo Banco by the resolution fund before August 2017
was a condition imposed by the European Commission (EC) in
compensation for state aid provided by the Portuguese authorities
in 2014 when Novo Banco was created as a bridge institution
following the collapse of Banco Espirito Santo, S.A. (unrated).
Moody's understands that the sale agreement signed in March 2017
by the resolution fund and Lone Star is compliant with the EC's
condition but still requires final approval by relevant
authorities.

Novo Banco's ca standalone credit assessment also reflects the
bank's very weak fundamentals given its very high and still
growing stock of problem loans and the large losses that it
continues to report (EUR797 million at end-December 2016). These
will be in part mitigated by Lone Star's EUR1 billion capital
injection and the establishment of the so-called contingent
capital mechanism to recapitalize the bank under specific
circumstances. However, these measures are not sufficient to
prevent the proposed LME on the bank's senior debt to raise at
least EUR500 million of Common Equity Tier 1 and hence the bank's
default on its senior debt.

The bank's senior debt rating of Caa2 on review for downgrade
reflects the rating agency's view that Novo Banco's senior debt
bondholders will suffer losses under the proposed LME. Based on
current available information that the offer would apply to about
EUR3 billion of senior unsecured bonds, Moody's estimates that
losses for these investors would be in the range of 10% to 20%.
However, losses could be higher should the LME apply to a more
limited stock of debt or fails to succeed, and the review for
downgrade will consider the potential for further losses for
these instruments once the rating agency has more information.

Moody's does not at present expect junior deposits, currently
rated at Caa1, to incur losses. However, the review for downgrade
on these ratings reflects the risk that losses could yet arise
for Novo Banco's junior deposits should the announced measures
prove insufficient to restore the viability of the bank, or fail
altogether, thereby increasing the risk of a resolution or
liquidation and consequent losses for depositors.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Given the low standalone BCA, scope for further downgrade is
limited, but it would likely be downgraded to c in the event that
plans to recapitalize the bank through a LME on senior
bondholders proves unsuccessful, which would mean the failure of
the sale process to Lone Star. In such circumstances it is very
likely that the resolution fund would place the bank into a
resolution or liquidation process. This or the prospect of
larger-than-expected losses on senior unsecured debt or deposits
would likely result in lower ratings.

The BCA could be upgraded if the bank successfully completes the
LME and demonstrates that its solvency has been materially
improved after the sale to Lone Star without the prospect of
further losses for creditors. A positive change in the BCA would
likely lead to an upgrade in all ratings.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings/analysis was
Banks published in January 2016.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


SNBCO FB: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1620, dated June 19,2017,
revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit institution
Joint-stock Company Settlement Non-Banking Credit Organisation
Feedback (JSC SNBCO FB, Registration No. 3502-K), further
referred to as the credit institution.  According to the
financial statements, as of June 1, 2017, the credit institution
ranked 571th by assets in the Russian banking system.  The credit
institution is not a member of the deposit insurance system.

The credit institution's business was almost entirely focused on
"shadow" foreign exchange transactions.  Furthermore, the credit
institution was actively working towards conducting its business
in contempt of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism
legislation which provide for mandatory control of transactions
and client identification.  Despite the repeated corrective
restrictive actions by regulator, meant to suppress the above
operations, the credit institution has failed to correct its
business as required.  Further still, the credit institution's
business operations are found to have been regularly conducted
without the appropriate accounting treatment.  These facts
provide evidence that the credit institution's management and
owners never intended to make appropriate steps towards
normalization of its business operations.

Besides, the credit institution failed to comply with legislative
requirements on countering the legalization (laundering) of
criminally obtained incomes and the financing of terrorism. Under
the circumstances, the Bank of Russia took the decision to
withdraw JSC SNBCO FB from the banking services market.

The Bank of Russia's decision is made in connection with non-
execution by the credit organization of the federal banking
legislation and Bank of Russia regulations, repeated violations,
within one year, of requirements provided by Article 7 (excepting
Para. 3 of Article 7) of the Federal Law "On Countering the
Legalisation (Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the
Financing of Terrorism", as well as Bank of Russia regulations
related to the above-mentioned Federal Law, considering repeated
corrective measures provided by the Federal Law "On the Central
Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)".

By its Order No. OD-1621, dated 19 June 2017, the Bank of Russia
has appointed a provisional administration to JSC SNBCO FB for
the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under
Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the
credit institution's executive bodies have been suspended.


=========
S P A I N
=========


AUTOVIA DEL NOROESTE: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Rating on EUR54MM Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+' rating on the EUR54 million
fixed-rate senior secured bonds due 2025 issued by Spain-based
limited-purpose entity and motorway project Autovia del Noroeste
Concesionaria de la Comunidad Autonoma de la Region de Murcia
S.A. (Aunor).  The outlook is stable.

The recovery rating on the bonds is '1', reflecting S&P's
expectation of very high recovery (90%-100%; rounded estimate
95%) in the event of a payment default.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view of the improved relationship
between Aunor and the granting authority, the regional government
of Murcia (Comunidad Autonoma de la Region de Murcia; CARM).
Although the two parties had disagreed on the timing and amount
of the project's lifecycle, they signed an agreement to settle
the dispute in November in 2015.  S&P understands that the
relationship between Aunor and CARM has been stable ever since.

S&P's view of Aunor's credit quality takes into account the
relative simplicity and strong track record of the project's
operations, as well as the lack of material market exposure.
Under S&P's base-case scenario -- which reflects long-term growth
in volumes in line with its view of GDP growth in Spain and
pricing increases consistent with our long-term inflation
estimates -- S&P forecasts that the project will generate senior
debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs) of at least 1.15x, and
average annual DSCRs of 1.17x.  This results in an operations
phase stand-alone credit profile (SACP) of 'bbb' and cash flow
resilient to S&P's downside.  However, the rating is capped by
the creditworthiness of the key revenues counterparty, CARM.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view of CARM's
creditworthiness. This is because the rating on Aunor is
currently constrained by our opinion of the creditworthiness of
CARM, the sole provider of the project's revenues.

S&P could raise the rating if, in its opinion, CARM's
creditworthiness improves and the project continues to sustain
DSCRs in line with S&P's current expectations.

S&P could lower the rating if CARM's creditworthiness were to
deteriorate.  In addition, S&P could lower the rating if the
forecast minimum annual DSCR deteriorated below 1.1x.


AYT CGH I: Fitch Affirms 'B+sf' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed AyT CGH Caixa Galicia I's notes and
removed the class B notes from Rating Watch Negative (RWN):

Class A notes (ISIN ES0312273289): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook
Stable
Class B notes (ISIN ES0312273297): affirmed at 'Asf'; off RWN;
Outlook Stable
Class C notes (ISIN ES0312273305): affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook
Stable
Class D notes (ISIN ES0312273313): affirmed at 'B+sf'; Outlook
Stable

This Spanish RMBS transaction comprises residential mortgages
serviced by ABANCA Corporacion Bancaria, S.A. (BB+/Stable). The
transaction closed in March 2008 and the portfolio is more than
10 years seasoned.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Error Correction
The affirmation of class B notes and removal from RWN follows the
correction of an error that occurred during the last annual
surveillance review on June 22, 2016, where portfolio data was
incorrectly processed and entered into Fitch's EMEA RMBS
Surveillance Model for Spain producing inconsistent credit
estimates (see 'Fitch Places AyT CGH Caixa Galicia I Class B
Notes on Rating Watch Negative on Error Discovery', dated March
3, 2017 at www.fitchratings.com). The affirmation of the class B
notes takes into consideration the corrected credit analysis and
the agency's view that this tranche is able to absorb the credit
and cash flow stresses commensurate with a 'Asf' stress.

Credit Enhancement (CE) Trends
The transaction is currently paying down the notes sequentially,
but it is expected to switch to pro-rata amortisation in the next
12 months as the relevant performance triggers are close to being
met. Therefore, Fitch anticipates CE ratios will most likely
remain stable and sufficient to withstand the stress scenarios
associated with the ratings, as reflected in the affirmations of
the notes.

Stable Asset Performance
The transaction has shown sound asset performance compared with
the Spanish average. As of the latest reporting period, three-
months plus arrears (excluding defaults) as a percentage of the
current pool balance stood at 0.74% versus Fitch's Spanish RMBS
index of 0.9%. Similarly, the transaction cumulative defaults,
defined as mortgages in arrears by more than 18 months, stood at
0.4% of the portfolio initial balance as of January 2017 below
Fitch's Spanish RMBS average of 5.6%.

Payment Interruption Risk
Fitch views the transaction liquidity sources provide sufficient
protection to cover at least six months of senior fees and
interest on the senior notes in case of a servicer disruption
event, while alternative collection arrangements are implemented
if needed.

Portfolio Risky Attributes
Fitch has applied a 15% increase to the base foreclosure
frequency assumption for loans located in regions that represent
each more than 35% of the portfolio balance, such as Galicia with
a 47% exposure. Additionally, the portfolio is almost entirely
composed of increasing instalment loans, which are considered
riskier than standard mortgage loans and are subject to an
increased foreclosure frequency of 20%.

VARIATIONS FROM CRITERIA

Performance Adjustment Factor (PAF)
Fitch applies a PAF to the base foreclosure frequency when
conducting its asset analysis in accordance with its criteria.
For seasoned transactions, the PAF compares gross cumulative
defaults and outstanding arrears against expected default at that
point in the transaction's life. The maximum credit Fitch gives
to better than expected portfolio performance is floored at a 30%
decrease in foreclosure frequency. However, Fitch has reduced the
PAF floor for this transaction to 46% to reflect the relatively
good performance of the highly seasoned loans (over 10 years)
even during a period of economic stress. The removal of the floor
constitutes a variation from Fitch's EMEA RMBS Rating Criteria.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A worsening of the Spanish macroeconomic environment, especially
employment conditions, or an abrupt shift in interest rates could
jeopardise the ability of the underlying borrowers to meet their
payment obligations.


REYAL URBIS: Fails to Get Creditor Support for Payments Plan
------------------------------------------------------------
Charles Penty at Bloomberg News, citing Expansion, reports that
Reyal Urbis is set to be notified by court in the coming days
that its main creditors reject payments plan needed to overcome
insolvency.

According to Bloomberg, the newspaper says auditor BDO, which is
overseeing the proceedings, has told court that the company
doesn't have necessary support of 75% of creditors to approve the
payment plan.

Expansion says once the company is formally notified of this
fact, liquidation process will proceed, Bloomberg relates.

The newspaper, citing the company's accounts, says Reyal Urbis
has EUR4.7 billion of debt and asset portfolio of EUR1.17
billion, Bloomberg notes.

Reyal Urbis is a Spanish real estate group.


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


SOLWAY INVESTMENT: Fitch Affirms B- IDR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlook on Swiss-based Solway
Investment Group's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
Stable from Positive, while affirming the company's Long- and
Short-Term IDRs at 'B-' and 'B', respectively.

The Outlook revision reflects Fitch expectations that Solway's
operational profile will not improve until 2019, given the
continued delays in the ramp-up of Fenix - the company's
important nickel project in Guatemala. In 2016 Solway generated
nearly USD60 million EBITDA, a 33% decrease yoy, and held USD13
million of available cash (of which Fitch restricts USD10 million
to maintain the minimum level of operations). The disposal of
zinc and lead mines in 2015 improved the company's credit metrics
and liquidity position, but the small scale of its operations,
exposure to "high-risk" countries and dividend leakage totalling
nearly USD100 million in 2015 and 2016, mainly in the form of
upstream shareholder loans that were subsequently cancelled,
constrain the company's rating at the current level in the medium
term.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Delays in Fenix Ramp-Up: Since the completion in 2014 of Solway's
low-cost nickel project in Guatemala, the production ramp-up has
been slower than expected, mainly due to power supply
constraints. This has translated to production of approximately
9,000 tonnes (t) of ferronickel in 2016 compared to an
expectation of 13,000 t. In order to reach this target, the power
supply equipment, which was damaged by boiler explosion in 2016,
will have to be repaired. In addition, to reach the design
capacity of 20,000t p.a., further work will be required to
optimise the smelter electricity equipment.

Fitch expects Fenix's production in 2017 to remain unchanged at
9,000t, increase to 13,000t in 2018 and reach full capacity from
2019. The company's ability to deliver on this will be key to
achieving Fitch-forecast financial metrics.

Low Prices Impact Profitability: Low commodity prices have
affected Solway's profitability. Based on Fitch nickel and gold
mid-cycle price assumptions, Fitch expects Solway's EBITDA to
remain between USD50 million-USD60 million in 2017 and 2018 and
to gradually improve to above USD100 million in 2019 subject to
Fenix ramping up its production volumes as per Fitch's schedule.
The gold project KurilGeo was the biggest contributor to the
company's cash-flow in 2016, followed by its copper mine in
Macedonia and its ferronickel processing plant in Ukraine.
However, Fenix's free cash flow has been negative since its
commissioning.

Asset Disposal Improves Credit Metrics: Solway disposed its
Macedonian lead and zinc mine SASA for USD180 million in November
2015. The proceeds were partly used for debt repayment (USD152
million repaid in 2015), with the remaining amount paid as
dividends. The sale of SASA and subsequent debt reduction
significantly improved the company's FFO adjusted gross leverage
to below 1.0x by end-2016. Fitch believes that the company is now
focusing on the improvement of the Fenix smelter and will not
make large acquisitions until the project is finalised.

Fitch however conservatively assumes that in the context of
Solway's historical acquisition and disposal activity, further
asset sales are possible, which may reduce the company's
operational diversification while improving its liquidity and
cash position, in the absence of any significant dividend
leakage.

Small Scale; Adequate Diversification: Solway is a comparatively
small mining company with revenue of USD404 million in 2016 from
the production of ferronickel, copper and gold. Solway operates
in countries with "high" and "medium" risk relative to mining
operations (Ukraine, Macedonia, Guatemala and Russia), although
this is partially mitigated by geographical diversification.

Below-Average Corporate Governance: Limited public information
disclosure constrains the rating. The weak current corporate
governance profile, illustrated by the nearly USD100 million of
upstream cash flows to the shareholders over 2015-2016, largely
reflects Solway's private company status.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Solway is a smaller company than its direct peer group (Norilsk
Nickel (BBB-), Polyus Gold (BB-) or First Quantum (B)) in terms
of scale of operations, and has lower revenue generation and
weaker liquidity, which is partially mitigated by product and
geographical diversification. No Country Ceiling,
parent/subsidiary or operating environment aspects impact the
rating.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:

- nickel mid-cycle price assumptions of USD9,500/t in 2017;
   USD10,500/t in 2018 and USD11,050/t in 2019;
- gold mid-cycle price assumptions of USD1,144/t in 2017and
   USD1,100/t thereafter;
- Fenix to reach full capacity in 2019;
- no disruptions to KurilGeo operations;
- average USD25 million capex in 2017 and 2018;
- USD100 million from asset sales in 2017;
- dividends representing 90% of CFO minus capex and 50% of
   proceeds from any asset disposals.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action
- Sustained positive FCF from Fenix
- FFO-adjusted gross leverage sustainably below 2.0x (2016:
0.7x)
- Strengthening of the liquidity profile with a minimum
available
   cash balance of USD30 million
- Improvement of corporate governance, including greater
   transparency and information disclosure

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
- Further delays in key Fenix ramp-up
- Sustained negative FCF
- Deterioration of the liquidity profile

LIQUIDITY

Weak Liquidity; Low Leverage: At end-December 2016 Solway had
USD33 million debt against USD13 million available cash (of which
Fitch restricts USD10 million to maintain a minimum level of
operations). In 1H17 Solway raised an additional USD15 million
for financing its KurilGeo operations and is in the process of
refinancing the whole USD35 million KurilGeo's debt to extend
maturities to 2019 (USD17 million) and 2020 (USD15 million).

Liquidity has been weak, partly due to USD100 million of upstream
shareholder loans and dividend payments in 2015 and 2016. In
addition, Fitch now expects Fenix to only start contributing to
the company's cash flows from 2019. Other non-operational
measures, such as an asset sale, would possibly improve the
liquidity profile, but Fitch forecasts assume that at least 50%
of the proceeds of such a sale, as well as 90% of any free cash-
flow generation from current assets, would be distributed to
shareholders over the rating horizon.


SWISSAIR SWISS: 3rd Interim Payment List Open for Inspection
------------------------------------------------------------
The provisional distribution list for the third interim payment
in the debt restructuring proceedings with assignment of assets
concerning Swissair Swiss Air Transport Company Ltd., in debt
restructuring liquidation, Balz Zimmerman-Strasse, 8302 Kloten,
will be open to inspection by creditors concerned between
June 14, 2017, and June 26, 2017, at the offices of the
liquidator, Karl Wuthrich, attorney-at-law, Wenger Plattner,
Goldbach-Center Seestrasse 39, 8700 Kusnacht.  For inspection,
please call the hotline +41 43 222 38 50 to arrange an
appointment.

Appeals against the provisional distribution list must be lodged
with the District Court of Bulach, supervisory authority for debt
enforcement and bankruptcy, Spitalstrasse 13, P.O. Box, 8180
Bulach, within ten days of the list's publication, i.e. by
June 26, 2017 (date of postmark of a Swiss post office).  If no
appeals are lodged, the third interim payment will be made as
provided for in the provisional distribution list.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


SEKERBANK TAS: Fitch Rates Basel III-Compliant Tier 2 Notes 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Sekerbank T.A.S.'s (B+/Stable/b+)
USD85 million issue of Basel III-compliant Tier 2 capital notes
due 2027 a final rating of 'B'. The bonds' Recovery Rating is
'RR5'.

The final rating is the same as the expected rating assigned on
June 8, 2017.

The notes qualify as Basel III-complaint Tier 2 instruments and
contain contractual loss absorption features, which will be
triggered at the point of non-viability of the bank. According to
the terms, the notes are subject to permanent partial or full
write-down upon the occurrence of a non-viability event (NVE).
There are no equity conversion provisions in the terms.

An NVE is defined as occurring when the bank has incurred losses
and has become, or is likely to become, non-viable as determined
by the local regulator, the Banking and Regulatory Supervision
Authority (BRSA). The bank will be deemed non-viable when it
reaches the point at which either the BRSA determines that its
operating licence is to be revoked and the bank liquidated, or
the rights of Sekerbank's shareholders (except to dividends), and
the management and supervision of the bank, should be transferred
to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund on the condition that
losses are deducted from the capital of existing shareholders.

The notes have a 10-year maturity and a call option after five
years.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The notes are rated one notch below Sekerbank's Viability Rating
(VR) of 'b+' in accordance with Fitch's "Global Bank Rating
Criteria". The notching includes zero notches for incremental
non-performance risk relative to the VR and one notch for loss
severity.

Fitch has applied zero notches for incremental non-performance
risk, as the agency believes that write-down of the notes will
only occur once the point of non-viability is reached and there
is no coupon flexibility prior to non-viability.

The one notch for loss severity reflects Fitch's view of below-
average recovery prospects for the notes in case of an NVE. Fitch
has applied one notch, rather than two notches, for loss
severity, as partial, and not solely full, write-down of the
notes is possible. In Fitch's view, there is some uncertainty as
to the extent of losses the notes would face in case of an NVE,
given that this would be dependent on the size of the operating
losses incurred by the bank and any measures taken by the
authorities to help restore the bank's viability.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As the notes are notched down from Sekerbank's VR, their rating
is sensitive to a change in this rating. The notes' rating is
also sensitive to a change in notching due to a revision in
Fitch's assessment of the probability of the notes' non-
performance risk relative to the risk captured in Sekerbank's VR,
or in its assessment of loss severity in case of non-performance.

Sekerbank's ratings are listed below:

Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs 'B+'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs 'B'
Viability Rating 'b+'
Support Rating '5'
Support Rating Floor 'No Floor'
National Long-Term Rating 'A/(tur)'; Outlook Stable
Basel III-compliant Tier 2 notes: 'B'/'RR5' assigned


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


PRIVATBANK: Ukraine May Need to Inject More to Recapitalize Bank
----------------------------------------------------------------
Daryna Krasnolutska and Kateryna Choursina at Bloomberg News
report that already reeling from a US$4.5 billion bill to save
its ailing No. 1 lender, Ukraine is now bracing for an even
costlier rescue, and says audits by PwC's local office were
instrumental in the bank's failure.

The government may have to stump up UAH38.5 billion (US$1.5
billion) more to recapitalize Privatbank after last year's state
takeover, according to documents seen by Bloomberg.  The figure
is from due diligence carried out by Ernst and Young Audit
Services LLC, which estimated a "conservative" shortfall of
UAH192 billion before nationalization, Bloomberg notes.

Ukraine has already injected more than UAH100 billion into
Privatbank, while also wiping out holders of the lender's bonds,
Bloomberg discloses.  The cabinet will approve the additional
capital this week, two people familiar with the matter at the
central bank told Bloomberg, asking not to be identified as the
information isn't public.

The new figure compares with a hole of UAH148 billion as
calculated by the central bank before nationalization, Bloomberg
notes.  The lender's accounts were audited by PwC from at least
2007 to 2015, Bloomberg states.  Ukraine is considering banning
the company from auditing any more banks, Bloomberg relays,
citing a person at the central bank who asked not to be
identified.

"At the time of issuance of the 2015 opinion Privatbank had
agreed with the National Bank of Ukraine a comprehensive
restructuring plan," Bloomberg quotes PwC as saying, "The
National Bank of Ukraine confirmed that restructuring was on
track in a meeting with PwC Ukraine the day before signing the
audit opinion."

PrivatBank is the largest commercial bank in Ukraine, in terms of
the number of clients, assets value, loan portfolio and taxes
paid to the national budget.  PrivatBank has its headquarters in
Dnipropetrovsk, in central Ukraine.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CASTELL 2017-1: Moody's Assigns (P)Caa2(sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional long-term
credit ratings to the following classes of notes to be issued by
Castell 2017-1 Plc:

Issuer: Castell 2017-1 Plc

-- GBP [ ] Class A Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
    October 2044, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- GBP [ ] Class B Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
    October 2044, Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

-- GBP [ ] Class C Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
    October 2044, Assigned (P)A1 (sf)

-- GBP [ ] Class D Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
    October 2044, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

-- GBP [ ] Class E Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
    October 2044, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

-- GBP [ ] Class F Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
    October 2044, Assigned (P)Caa2 (sf)

This transaction represents a refinancing of an existing
warehouse backed by second lien mortgage loans originated by
Optimum Credit Limited ("Optimum", not rated) previously rated by
us and constitutes the first term securitisation transaction
issued by Optimum. The portfolio consists of loans secured by
second charge mortgages on properties located in the UK extended
to [5,823] borrowers and the current pool balance is
approximately equal to GBP [242.3] million.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings take into account the credit quality of the
underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined the
MILAN Credit Enhancement and the portfolio expected loss, as well
as the transaction structure and legal considerations. The
expected portfolio loss of [6]% and the MILAN required credit
enhancement of [21]% serve as input parameters for Moody's cash
flow model and tranching model.

Portfolio expected loss of [6]% is higher than in other UK non-
conforming RMBS transactions owing to: (i) all of the loans in
the pool having a second charge over the properties; (ii) the
performance of comparable originators, (iii) the current
macroeconomic environment in the UK, (iv) the lack of historical
information and (v) benchmarking with similar UK non-conforming
transactions.

MILAN CE of [21]% is higher than in other UK non-conforming RMBS
transactions, owing to: (i) all of the loans in the pool having a
second charge over the properties, (ii) the percentage of self-
employed borrowers in the pool of [12.9]%, (iii) a high
concentration in London and South East, (iv) the lack of
historical information and (v) benchmarking with similar UK non-
conforming transactions.

At closing the general reserve fund will be equal to [2.0]% of
the closing principal balance of mortgage loans in the pool
(including retained commitment), i.e. GBP[4.7] million. The
general reserve fund will be replenished after the PDL cure of
the Class F notes and can be used to pay senior fees and costs
and interest on the Class A - F notes and clear Class A - F PDL.

The liquidity reserve fund will be equal to 1.5% of the
outstanding Class A and B notes and will be funded by principal
proceeds. The liquidity reserve fund will be available to cover
senior fees and costs and Class A and B interest. After the
liquidity reserve fund reaches its target, it will be replenished
using interest collections if it is utilised thereafter.

Operational Risk Analysis: Optimum Credit Limited is servicer in
the transaction while Citibank N.A., London Branch will be acting
as a cash manager. In order to mitigate the operational risk,
Capita Mortgage Services Limited (not rated) will act as back-up
servicer and Intertrust Management Limited will act as backup
servicer facilitator. To ensure payment continuity over the
transaction's lifetime the transaction documents incorporate
estimation language whereby the cash manager can use the three
most recent servicer reports to determine the cash allocation in
case no servicer report is available. The transaction also
benefits from the equivalent of [3.8] months liquidity assuming a
stressed Libor assumption of 5.7%.

Interest Rate Risk Analysis: [40.9%] of the loans in the pool are
fixed rate loans reverting to Optimum SVR with the remaining
proportion linked to Optimum SVR. To mitigate the fixed floating
mismatch there will be a fixed floating swap provided by The
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (A3/P-2 & A3(cr)/P-2(cr)) (trading as
NatWest Markets). Moody's has taken into account the absence of a
basis swap to mitigate the difference between the reset dates of
the assets and the liabilities and the swap structure (which is a
fixed schedule swap) in the stressed margin vector used in the
cash flow modelling.

Methodology:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2016.

Please note that on March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request
for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on
potential revisions to its Approach to Assessing Counterparty
Risks in Structured Finance. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, the Credit Rating on Castell 2017-1 Plc
is not expected to be affected. Please refer to Moody's Request
for Comment, titled "Moody's Proposes Revisions to Its Approach
to Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance", for
further details regarding the implications of the proposed
Methodology revisions on certain Credit Ratings.

The provisional ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the Notes. In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest for
A, B, C and D notes, ultimate payment of interest on or before
the final legal maturity date for E and F notes and ultimate
payment of principal at legal final maturity for all rated notes.
Moody's ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed but
may have a significant effect on yield to investors.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of a
ratings for an RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become
less relevant or typically remain unchanged during the
surveillance stage.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and the above rating reflects Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation and the final note structure,
Moody's will endeavor to assign definitive ratings to the Notes.
Definitive ratings may differ from provisional ratings.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Significantly different loss outcomes compared with Moody's
expectations at close due to either a change in economic
conditions from Moody's central scenario forecast or
idiosyncratic performance factors would lead to rating actions.
For instance, should economic conditions be worse than forecast,
the higher defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in a downgrade of the ratings.
Deleveraging of the capital structure or conversely a
deterioration in the notes available credit enhancement could
result in an upgrade or a downgrade of the rating, respectively.

Stress Scenarios:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the portfolio expected loss
was increased from [6]% to [9]% of current balance, and the MILAN
CE was increased from [22]% to [25.2]%, the model output
indicates that the class A notes would still achieve Aaa (sf)
assuming that all other factors remained equal. Moody's Parameter
Sensitivities quantify the potential rating impact on a
structured finance security from changing certain input
parameters used in the initial rating. The analysis assumes that
the deal has not aged and is not intended to measure how the
rating of the security might change over time, but instead what
the initial rating of the security might have been under
different key rating inputs.


EQUITY RELEASE NO. 5: Fitch Affirms BB+sf Rating on Class C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Equity Release Funding No. 5 Plc's
(ERF5) class A notes and affirmed the others:

Class A (ISIN XS0225883387): upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AA-sf'; off
Rating Watch Positive (RWP); Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0225883973): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS0225884278): affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable

The ratings do not address the payment of any step-up amounts due
on the notes.

The transaction is a securitisation of UK equity release
mortgages originated by Aviva UK Equity Release Ltd.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Model Error Resolution
Fitch has found that in the proprietary equity release asset
model it used for its September 30, 2016 rating action, there
were inconsistencies in relation to the application of
foreclosure costs and in the cash flows received upon prepayment
of a loan. The correction of the two inconsistencies has an
upward effect on the model-implied ratings of the class A notes
of two notches.

Valuation Data Error Resolution
Fitch has been notified by Aviva UKERL that the original
valuation data for the loans were incorrect. The correction in
the original valuations resulted in a change to the original
valuation for 238 borrowers - 7% of the pool by current balance.
On average the revised valuation is GBP73,321 lower for those
borrowers for whom the valuation is different. The correction in
the inconsistency results in a one-notch downgrade to the model-
implied rating of the class A notes. The combination of this and
the model error resolution described above results in a one-notch
upgrade of the class A notes.

Bespoke Criteria
To reflect the product-specific features of equity release, Fitch
has supplemented its EMEA RMBS Rating Criteria and Criteria
Addendum: UK Residential Mortgage Assumptions with bespoke
assumptions. The key assumptions underpinning the asset cash
flows include the borrowers' mortality and morbidity (long-term
care) rates (instead of foreclosure frequency rates), voluntary
prepayment rates, property price stresses and property price
growth.

The loan-by-loan data (including loan balance, interest rate,
property valuation, borrower age and gender) has been used to
produce asset cash flows for each payment date. The asset cash
flows are then input into Fitch's proprietary cash flow model to
determine whether the notes can withstand various combinations of
stresses of the key assumptions. The cash flow model has been
customised to reflect the particular features of this transaction
structure.

The assumptions that Fitch has used are the same as those
detailed in the rating action commentary "Fitch Downgrades 2
Tranches of Equity Release Funding 5 on Criteria Change" dated
September 29, 2016 at www.fitchratings.com.

Interest Deferral
According to its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria',
Fitch will only assign 'Asf' or 'BBBsf' ratings to bonds that are
expected to incur interest deferrals if certain conditions are
met. Interest on the class C notes is likely to continue being
deferred (as it has been since October 2012) and hence the class
C note rating has been capped at 'BB+sf'.

VARIATIONS FROM CRITERIA

Interest on the class B notes was deferred from October 2012
until October 2015. This was due to a breach of the House Price
Index (HPI) trigger (set at 2% p.a. since closing). Since October
2015 interest payments have been made on time. However,
previously deferred interest will remain deferred.

In a variation to its 'Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria'
Fitch has decided to cap the ratings of the class B note at 'Asf'
as opposed to speculative grade. This is because Fitch does not
expect the class B house price trigger to be breached and
consequently the class B interest to be deferred for an excessive
amount of time.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

House price declines increase the risk that proceeds from the
sale of the property are insufficient to cover the loan balance
including accrued interest, resulting in lower asset cash flows
and ratings on the notes.

In addition, lower repayment rates may result in lower ratings.
Lower prepayment rates will reduce the portion of loans prepaid
in full. Improved mortality rates would delay the maturity of the
loans leading to increased LTV ratios at maturity, which may
reduce redemption amounts.

The ratings on the class B and C notes are less sensitive to the
above factors as they are capped due to historical or expected
interest deferrals. However, a future deferral of class B
interest could result in the application of a lower rating cap to
the class B notes.


VENATOR MATERIALS: S&P Assigns 'B+' CCR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B+' corporate credit rating to
Venator Materials PLC.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'BB' issue-level rating (two
notches above the corporate credit rating) to Venator's proposed
$350 million term loan, with a '1' recovery rating.  The '1'
recovery rating indicates S&P's expectation of very high (90%-
100%; rounded estimate: 95%) recovery in the event of a default.
In addition, S&P assigned its 'BB-' issue-level rating and '2'
recovery rating to the company's proposed senior unsecured notes.
The '2' recovery rating indicates S&P's expectation of
substantial (70%-90%; rounded estimate: 75%) recovery in the
event of a default.  The debt is being issued by Venator
Materials LLC and Venator Finance S.a.r.l. for Venator Materials
PLC.

S&P based its ratings on preliminary terms and conditions.

"The ratings reflect our assessment of Venator's business risk
profile strengths as a producer of titanium dioxide and pigments,
with manufacturing locations in several countries, and capacities
that rank among the top three globally; offset by weaknesses
including the largely commodity nature of its products, with
competitive pressures and sometimes unstable supply-demand
balance with volatile pricing, all of which can result in low-
single-digit EBITDA margins during downturns," said S&P Global
Ratings credit analyst Paul Kurias.  "In our assessment of the
company's financial risk profile, we incorporate our view that
the sector is in the midst of an upturn and expect funds from
operations to total debt ratios of above 20%.  We also anticipate
that during cyclical downturns this ratio could be one category
weaker in the 12% to 20% range during periods of volatility."

The stable outlook reflects S&P's base-case expectation that the
company will implement its capital structure as proposed.  S&P's
expectations for the capital structure include $700 million of
debt consisting of $350 million of senior secured debt and the
balance in unsecured debt.  In addition, S&P expects the company
to put in place a $300 asset-based revolving credit facility.
S&P factors in a proposed one-time dividend of $685 million to
Huntsman Corp. on spinoff.  S&P expects the key ratio of FFO to
total debt to be slightly above 20% over the next 12 months on a
weighted-average basis factoring expected credit metrics over the
next three years.  S&P's base case has been tempered by the fact
that pricing tends to be volatile, and can be unpredictable.

S&P also anticipates that the transition to a stand-alone company
will proceed as envisaged.  Venator's business is a distinct part
of Huntsman's portfolio of businesses and S&P believes that
should support a smooth transition.  A key assumption S&P makes
is that during the next year of transition, the market
environment will be supportive and Ti02 prices will continue to
improve.  S&P do not expect significant shareholder rewards after
the initial one-time dividend to Huntsman Corp.  In S&P's base
case, it do not assume large debt pay-downs.

S&P could lower ratings in the next 12 months if it anticipates
that the key ratio of FFO to total debt drops below 12% with no
immediate prospect for improvement over that threshold.  S&P
believes ratios could weaken to such levels if EBITDA margins
unexpectedly drop by more than 4% in 2017 and beyond to levels
below 7%.  A surge in raw material pricing that the company is
unable to pass on combined with a decline in the volatile product
pricing could conceivably create such as situation.

S&P could raise ratings over the next 12 months if the key ratio
of FFO improved meaningfully to levels above 30% in a manner S&P
believed was sustainable.  S&P believes ratios at these levels
generate a comfortable level of earnings to account for potential
volatility and S&P would consider a one-notch upgrade.  An
improvement in EBITDA margins by four-percentage points or higher
in 2017 and beyond could result in this key ratio improving the
levels above 30%.  Such a scenario could arise from a stronger
improvement in titanium dioxide pricing and demand than S&P has
factored in its base case.  While considering a potential
positive rating action S&P would review Venator's progress in its
transition to a standalone company.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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