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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, June 30, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 129


                            Headlines


F R A N C E

NOVARTEX SAS: Fitch Raises IDR to 'CCC' After Restructuring


G E R M A N Y

HAPAG-LLOYD: S&P Affirms 'B+' CCR on Merger Completion


G R E E C E

EPIHIRO PLC: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class A Notes to Caa2(sf)
FRIGOGLASS SAIC: Moody's Revises PDR to Ca-PD/LD After Default


I R E L A N D

BLUEMOUNTAIN FUJI II: Moody's Rates EUR9.8MM Class F Notes B2
EURO-GALAXY IV: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B-' Rating to Cl. F-R Notes
HARVEST CLO XI: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating to Class F-R Notes
TAURUS CMBS 2007-1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. F Notes


I T A L Y

VENETO BANCA: S&P Cuts to D Then Withdraws Sub. Debt Rating
* ITALY: Recent Bank Bailout Setback for European Union


K A Z A K H S T A N

EURASIAN RESOURCES: S&P Raises CCR to 'B-/B', Outlook Stable


L U X E M B O U R G

PENTA CLO 1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB'
PINNACLE HOLDCO: S&P Cuts CCR to 'CCC' on Deteriorating Liquidity


R U S S I A

SISTEMA JSFC: Fitch Puts BB- IDR on Rating Watch Negative


S P A I N

BANCO DE SABADELL: S&P Ups Nondeferrable Sub. Debt Rating to 'BB'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Green Made Six Attempts to Settle Pension Issues
BRANTANO: Administrators Seeking to Sell Intellectual Properties
BREWERS FAYRE: To Close 'Antrim Park' Branch
CO-OP BANK: Private Investors May Lose 55% Under Rescue Deal
CO-OP BANK: Paul Hastings Advises Tier 2 Noteholders' Committee

DOROTHY PERKINS: Closes Store in Llandudno Town Centre
MISSOURI TOPCO: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC+' on Better Performance

* UK: Transition Deal Needed to Avert Business Insolvencies


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Landmarks in Medicine - Laity Lectures


                            *********


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F R A N C E
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NOVARTEX SAS: Fitch Raises IDR to 'CCC' After Restructuring
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch has downgraded Novartex SAS's Long-Term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) to 'RD' from 'C' following completion of its debt
restructuring on June 21, 2017. Fitch immediately upgraded the
IDR to 'CCC' to reflect Vivarte's new business plan and capital
structure. In addition, under the new plan and capital structure
Vivarte SAS's senior secured debt ("new money") instrument rating
is upgraded to 'CCC' from 'CCC-'/RWP. Following the debt
restructuring, Novarte SAS's reinstated debt is affirmed at 'C'
and withdrawn upon its conversion into equity.

The conclusion of the financial restructuring represents a
restricted default under Fitch's methodology. The IDR of 'CCC'
reflects high execution risk in sustainably turning around
Vivarte's remaining activities due to a very unfavourable market
environment, while maintaining high leverage. This is despite
positive initiatives accompanying the debt restructuring, such as
comprehensive asset-disposal and cost-cutting plans. High
operational risk compounds a high level of refinancing risk
inherent in the fiducie agreement between the company and its
lenders, which was signed in parallel with the debt restructuring
agreement. Under the fiducie terms the group has to prepay at
least EUR300 million of remaining debt by October 2019.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Financial Restructuring Plan Complete: The debt restructuring
concluded on June 21, 2017. As a result, financial debt has been
reduced by more than half to approximately EUR590 million,
including EUR548 million of new money senior secured debt. Fitch
expects FFO adjusted gross leverage to fall to 8.8x at the end of
the financial year ending August 2017 versus 13.5x one year
earlier.

Adverse Market Changes: Fitch estimates market risks are
increasing for Vivarte, thus further compromising the chances of
a successful repositioning. The French apparel retail sales
dropped by around 12% between 2012 and 2015 and by a further 1.2%
in 2016. Customers are not only shifting to lower prices but also
reducing the number of purchases, fuelling competition. Having
been harmed by fast-fashion players such as Zara and H&M, Vivarte
now also has to face new entrants (pure online retailers,
Primark), which are more aggressive in terms of prices and also
challenge traditional fast-fashion retailers.

Asset Pruning; Cost-Cutting:  Management's brand disposal plan
and the closing of non-performing stores are credit-positive. If
executed effectively, they should help management focus on
turning around the remaining brands while supporting liquidity to
fund investments.

Execution Risk in Operational Turnaround: Management's ability to
generate like-for-like sales growth in a declining market remains
uncertain. Beyond cost-cutting measures, as fruitful as they may
be, like-for-like growth is a key element to sustainable
profitability. In the current market environment, characterised
by intense competition and customers' lack of loyalty, the
success of a brand goes depends not just on prices, but also on a
wide variety of other factors including omni-channel capacity,
and customer experience. In its rating case Fitch incorporates
this risk through like-for-like sales stabilising in FY19, with
EBITDA margin slowly growing to around 6% by that time, driven by
cost reductions.

High refinancing Risk: Fitch evaluates Vivarte's refinancing risk
at FYE19 rather than at FYE21, despite the maturity of the
remaining new money being lengthened by two years to October
2021. Fitch assessment derives from the terms of the fiducie
agreement: failure to prepay at least EUR300 million of debt by
October 2019 would lead to the sale of the group. Fitch expects
FFO adjusted gross leverage at 7.9x at FYE19, a level of
refinancing risk consistent with a 'CCC' IDR. Any upgrade would
be conditional on a successful asset sale leading to at least a
EUR300 million debt repayment, then to improved business and
financial profiles of the remaining assets.

Expected New Money Recoveries: The upgrade of the new money
instrument rating to 'CCC' from 'CCC-' reflects Recovery Ratings
in the 'RR4' range (31%-50%) and Vivarte's post-restructuring IDR
of 'CCC'. Fitch estimates post-restructuring sustainable EBITDA
of EUR90 million and a multiple of 4.0x. The EBITDA level
reflects the group's smaller scale after asset disposals and
store closures, together with low profitability prospects
following recurring turnaround failures.

The distressed multiple is at the low end of the sector due to
the likely loss of attractiveness among potential buyers
following numerous failed restructurings in an adverse market
environment. Fitch assumes fully drawn letter of credit
commitments ranking ahead of the super senior debt in the payment
waterfall.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Vivarte is a diversified retailer in terms of price points (low
cost and mid-market), locations (both downtown and out-of-town)
and products (apparel and footwear). However, it has a lower
EBITDAR margin than most non-food retailers due to its
uncompetitive position in the fast-changing market, also leading
to higher leverage. Its large capex needs and restructuring costs
also weaken its cash conversion capability compared with
relatively asset-light competitors.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:
-- progressive stabilisation of like-for-like sales by FY19,
    growth below 1% thereafter;
-- negative net proceeds from asset disposals in FY17, including
    the upcoming disposal of Kookai by financial year end, net
    proceeds limited to EUR50 million from the sale of Chevignon
    and Merkal in FY18, no other brand disposals;
-- progressive EBITDA margin recovery towards 6.2% in FY19,
    driven by the disposal or closure of non-performing assets
    and to a lesser extent by like-for-like sales growth and
    business model optimisation;
-- broadly neutral annual changes in working-capital needs;
-- close to EUR150 million non-recurring cash flow in FY17-FY18
    related to discontinued activities and restructuring costs,
    falling to EUR15 million per annum thereafter;
-- EUR55 million financing cash outflow in FY17 resulting from
    financial restructuring and increase in cash collateral.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action
-- Evidence of return to positive like-for-like sales growth,
    with significant improvement in profitability
-- Reduced refinancing risk, implying successful repayment of at
    least EUR300 million debt through asset sales by October 2019
-- Improved financial flexibility including neutral FCF, FFO
    fixed charge cover sustainable above 1.5x and perennial
    access to committed facilities to fund working capital

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
-- Fitch's increased perception that the group will fail to
    repay at least EUR300 million of remaining new money by
    October 2019, which would probably be due to a lack of sales
    and EBITDA improvement in FY18
-- Major deterioration in liquidity

LIQUIDITY

Limited Liquidity: Fitch expects limited net proceeds from asset
sales over FY17-FY18. Should Vivarte's operating performance come
under further pressure, banks could deny the renewal of the
existing letters of credit and therefore compromise its liquidity
position. This is despite the additional cash headroom provided
by lower debt and the toggle option.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Novartex SAS
-- Downgrade to 'RD' on completion of debt restructuring
-- Upgrade to 'CCC' post debt restructuring

Vivarte SAS
-- Senior secured debt ("new money"): upgrade to 'CCC'/'RR4'
    (33%) from 'CCC-'/'RR4' (47%) RWP

Novarte SAS
-- Senior secured debt ("reinstated debt"): affirmed at
    'C'/'RR6' (0%) on completion of debt restructuring, withdrawn


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G E R M A N Y
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HAPAG-LLOYD: S&P Affirms 'B+' CCR on Merger Completion
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating on Germany-based container liner operator
Hapag-Lloyd AG and its 'B-' issue rating on the company's senior
unsecured notes.  S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications, where it had placed them on April 26,
2016. The outlook is negative.

The ratings affirmation reflects S&P's expectation that although
the merger with United Arab Shipping Co. (UASC) will add
significant debt to Hapag-Lloyd's capital structure and weaken
its credit measures, the company should be able to maintain
credit ratios S&P considers commensurate with the current rating
in 2017-2018.

According to S&P's current base case, Hapag-Lloyd will
significantly expand its EBITDA to about EUR1.2 billion in 2017
and about EUR1.3 billion in 2018 (from EUR607.4 million in 2016).
Combined with UASC's balance-sheet debt of about US$4 billion,
this will result S&P Global Ratings-adjusted funds from
operations (FFO) to debt of 12%-14% in 2017, compared with about
15% in 2016. This is predicated on S&P's base-case assumptions of
a sustained improvement in container shipping freight rates (from
historical lows seen in 2016), Hapag-Lloyd's strict cost control
(including the realization of further efficiency gains and
synergies from its merger with UASC), and its light and
internally funded capital investments in 2017-2018.  S&P
nevertheless believes that the pace and magnitude of a rebound in
Hapag-Lloyd's credit measures post-merger is susceptible to
sustainability of the most recent improvement in freight rates,
in the context of the structural containership overcapacity and
slowed expansion of global trade.

Hapag-Lloyd has demonstrated its ability to integrate acquired
businesses and extract synergies, for example, after the 2014
takeover of the container liner shipping activities of Chile-
based Compania Sud Americana de Vapores (CSAV), which underpins
S&P's rating action.  S&P furthermore believes that Hapag-Lloyd's
management and shareholders are committed to reducing financial
leverage and strengthening the company's liquidity, as indicated
by the shareholders' backstop commitment to a US$400 million cash
capital increase within the six months after the merger closes.

"We acknowledge that merger with UASC offers Hapag-Lloyd
competitive advantages, such as increased size and capacity,
enhanced network diversity, and access to a young fleet.
Nevertheless, we consider these insufficiently material overall
to revise our view of the business risk profile.  Our assessment
remains constrained by the shipping industry's high risk and
fragmentation, although the most recent mergers, acquisitions,
and insolvencies in the sector resulted in leading players
expanding their marker shares, which normally should support
industry pricing.  Furthermore, Hapag-Lloyd's profitability
remains vulnerable because of its operating margins and return on
capital tied to the industry's cyclical swings, heavy exposure to
fluctuations in bunker fuel prices, and its limited short-term
flexibility to adjust its operating cost base," S&P said.

These weaknesses are partly mitigated by Hapag-Lloyd's leading
market positions and coverage through a far-reaching and
strategically located route network, broad customer base, and
attractive fleet profile, supported by a large and fairly diverse
fleet.  S&P's business risk profile assessment incorporates the
company's track record of achieving operational efficiencies and
its proactive efforts to steadily reduce its cost base, which S&P
considers to be a critical support to earnings.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- An average global GDP growth rate of about 2.8% in 2017 and
      2.9% in 2018 compared with 2.4% last year.  However, this
      average hides wide regional variations. China, a key engine
      of shipping growth, and many European economies including
      the eurozone are slowing down.  Brazil and Russia are
      emerging from recession, and S&P expects a return to
      positive real GDP growth in 2017-2019.  Furthermore, on
      continued strength in job gains, accelerating wage
      inflation, and a relatively healthy economy, the pace of
      U.S. economic expansion will likely continue into next
      year. S&P expects U.S. GDP growth of 2.3% this year and
      2.4% in 2018 (from 1.6% in 2016).  General economic growth
      is vital to the shipping industry.  Given the global nature
      of shipping sector demand, S&P considers the GDP growth of
      all major contributors to trade volumes.

   -- In 2017, Hapag will add about 3.1 million 20-foot-
      equivalent units (TEUs) with the incorporation of UASC,
      totaling 10.7 million TEUs.  On an organic basis, S&P
      forecasts annual growth rates in Hapag-Lloyd's transported
      volumes of 3%-4% in 2017-18, based on global trends and
      growth in the company's fleet capacity.

   -- About a 4%-5% increase in freight rates in 2017, from
      historical lows in 2016.

   -- The stable trade dynamics, higher bunker fuel prices, and
      proactive supply-side adjustments that will likely underpin
      the positive trend in freight rates.  S&P expects that
      industry conditions will be further supported by vessel
      demolition or lay-up and rationalization of networks as a
      consequence of a recent dynamic consolidation between
      liners.  However, strong deliveries of ultra-large
      containerships during 2017-2018, which were ordered a few
      years ago, when the trade volume prospects were brighter,
      pose an inevitable risk to the sustainability in freight
      rates, which will ultimately depend on the supply
      discipline of the leading container liners.  Cost per TEU
      to remain flat in 2017-2018, after the company successfully
      completed its major cost-efficiency programs.

   -- Prudent capital investments tied to favorable industry
      prospects and available funding.  S&P forecasts total
      annual investments of EUR450 million-EUR500 million in 2017
      and  2018.  These relate to payments for ships on order,
      new ships and containers, and dry-docking/maintenance.
      About one-third of the capital expenditure (capex) S&P
      forecasts is currently committed.

   -- Capital increase of about EUR385 million backstopped by the
      main shareholders in the next six months.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- A ratio of adjusted FFO to debt of 13%-16% in 2017 and 15%-
      17% in 2018, compared with about 15% in 2016 for Hapag-
      Lloyd on a stand-alone basis.

   -- A ratio of adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 5.0x-5.5x in
      2017 and 4.5x-5.0x in 2018, compared with about 4.8x in
      2016 on a stand-alone basis.

S&P views Hapag-Lloyd's liquidity as adequate, although it is
susceptible to the company performing below S&P's base-case
scenario.  S&P expects the company's sources of liquidity to be
at least 1.2x its uses over the coming 12 months.  In particular,
S&P views the upcoming debt maturities as manageable.  For S&P to
view cyclical transportation companies as having adequate
liquidity, liquidity sources must exceed uses even if EBITDA
declines by more than 30% (rather than the standard 15%). Hapag-
Lloyd passes this test for the 12 months from March 31, 2017.

In addition, Hapag-Lloyd appears to have sound relationships with
its lenders and a generally satisfactory standing in credit
markets.  S&P considers Hapag-Lloyd's financial risk management
to be generally prudent.

The negative outlook reflects a one-in-three likelihood that the
most recent uptick in freight rates will not hold, preventing
Hapag-Lloyd from maintaining its rating-commensurate credit
measures, including the debt burden from the acquisition of UASC,
and resulting in a downgrade.

S&P could lower the rating if credit metrics deteriorate, such
that FFO to debt is less than 12% in the next 12 months.  This
could stem from 5% lower freight rates and higher bunker fuel
prices than S&P forecasts, combined with Hapag-Lloyd's inability
to offset this by adjusting its cost base, amid ongoing volatile
industry conditions.  Furthermore, S&P might consider lowering
the rating if it sees clear signs that liquidity coverage will
underperform its base case of 1.2x coverage of uses by sources
for the next 12 months on a rolling basis.

S&P would revise the outlook to stable if it believes that the
likelihood that the company will fail to maintain its rating
commensurate credit measures is remote.  This would follow a
sustained improvement in freight rates and successful integration
of UASC, resulting in EBITDA that appears to be in line with or
above S&P's projections.  A stable outlook is also contingent on
S&P's view of whether the company will manage its capital
expenditures and adjusted debt in a manner that supports a
gradual deleveraging.  Furthermore, given the underlying
industry's inherent volatility, S&P considers maintaining
adequate liquidity to be a critical and stabilizing rating
factor.


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EPIHIRO PLC: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class A Notes to Caa2(sf)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes:

Issuer: EPIHIRO PLC

-- EUR1623M Class A Notes, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
    Sep 29, 2015 Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Titlos plc

-- EUR5100M Class A Notes, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
    Sep 29, 2015 Confirmed at Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions taken are the result of the upgrade of
Greece's long-term issuer rating as well as all senior unsecured
bond and programme ratings to Caa2 and (P)Caa2 from Caa3 and
(P)Caa3, respectively. The outlook has been changed to positive
from stable. Moody's has also raised the long-term country
ceilings for foreign-currency and local-currency bonds to B3 from
Caa2 and the local-currency deposits to Caa2 from Caa3 on June
23, 2017. For further information on this action see the press
release titled "Moody's upgrades Greece's sovereign bond rating
to Caa2 and changes the outlook to positive" on www.moodys.com.

-- EPIHIRO PLC NOTES UPGRADED ON INCREASED SOVEREIGN RISK

Moody's upgraded the notes issued by EPIHIRO PLC to Caa2(sf) from
Caa3(sf) as a result of the decrease in country risk and the
related local-currency deposit ceiling on Greece. The principal
source of liquidity is provided by a reserve fund kept in an
account located in Greece and maintained by Alpha Bank AE.
Moody's believes that the local-currency deposit ceiling
currently reflects the liquidity risk resulting from the draws on
the reserve.

-- TITLOS PLC NOTES UPGRADED ON INCREASED SOVEREIGN RISK

Moody's upgraded the notes issued by Titlos plc to Caa2(sf) from
Caa3(sf). The note is backed by a swap relying on payments by the
Greek government, reflecting the Greek sovereign rating. Moody's
believes the main risk driver of this transaction is Greek
sovereign risk and, as such, the rating on the note mirrors that
of the Greek government.

Methodologies Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in rating EPIHIRO PLC was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations",
published in October 2016. The principal methodology used in
rating Titlos plc was "Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged
Securities", published in June 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings are (1) a decreased probability of high-loss scenarios
owing to a downgrade of the country ceiling; (2) improvement in
the notes' available CE; and (3) improvement in the credit
quality of the transaction counterparties.

An increase in Moody's assessment of the sovereign risk in
Greece, as well as a deterioration in the collateral performance,
could lead to a downgrade of the ratings.


FRIGOGLASS SAIC: Moody's Revises PDR to Ca-PD/LD After Default
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a limited default (LD)
indicator to Greek manufacturer Frigoglass SAIC's probability of
default rating (PDR) of Ca-PD. The PDR has therefore been
affirmed and changed to Ca-PD/LD (formerly Ca-PD) following the
failure to pay -- at the end of the 30-day grace period -- the
coupon on the senior unsecured notes issued by Frigoglass Finance
B.V. and due 2018. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the
corporate family rating (CFR) of Frigoglass at Caa3 and the
instrument rating on the senior unsecured notes of Frigoglass
Finance B.V. at Ca. The outlook on all ratings remains negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The change in Frigoglass's PDR to Ca-PD/LD follows the payment
default on the coupon, due May 15, 2017, on the EUR250 million
notes due May 2018. This rating action has been taken at the end
of the 30-day grace period and following the company's
announcement that it has not paid the coupon. Frigoglass is still
meeting its obligations on other liabilities, including some bank
facilities at the operating subsidiaries level.

The company is undergoing a capital restructuring plan in
agreement with its major shareholder Boval S.A. who is also a
lender of the company, its core lender banks and representatives
of some bondholders. The company will implement the restructuring
of the Notes through a Scheme of Arrangement under English law,
which would need the consent of at least 50% by number and 75% by
principal value of bondholders who vote, whether in person or by
proxy, at a meeting of Holders convened to consider the Scheme.

Under the proposed plan, bank lenders and bondholders are
requested to inject EUR40 million of fresh cash in the company in
the form of a new first lien debt. Accepting lenders and
bondholders would receive in exchange of their outstanding senior
unsecured debt a mix of first lien debt, second lien debt and
equity, while non-accepting bondholders would receive only second
lien notes and equity.

If completed as planned, Moody's would likely consider the
proposed debt restructuring as a Distressed Debt Exchange (DE),
owing to: 1) the haircut on the principal amount for both lenders
and bondholders, which Moody's estimates at approximately 35-37%
depending on the level of acceptance; 2) the bond maturity
extension from the current 2018 to 2021 and 2022 of the new first
lien and second lien instruments respectively; 3) the reduction
of the coupon from the current 8.25% to a floating Euribor+4.25%
for the first lien and a fixed 7% for the second lien
instruments.

The Ca-PD/LD reflects Frigoglass's payment default under its
current obligations and Moody's expectation that the company will
go ahead with the proposed restructuring plan. The notching
differential between the Caa3 CFR and the Ca rating on the 2018
notes reflects Moody's view that, based on the proposed terms of
the plan, the recovery rate for bondholders will be lower than
the average recovery for Frigoglass creditors. Moody's will
reassess the ratings after the completion of the debt
restructuring, based on the new financial structures and on the
operating performance of the company that remains challenging,
with both revenue and EBITDA declining in the first quarter 2017.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects Moody's view that the risk of a
default is increasing and that the recovery rate in case of a
default could be lower than currently expected.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - UP/DOWN

Upward pressure on the rating could materialise once a new
capital structure is in place following the announced
restructuring and resulting in a material reduction in debt.

Given the rating positioning, downward pressure could result if
Moody's believes that recovery prospects for creditors will
further deteriorate, as for example if the restructuring proposal
doesn't go ahead as planned.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Manufacturing Companies published in June 2017.

Incorporated in Greece, Frigoglass has a widespread global
presence, with a focus on countries in both Western and Eastern
Europe, Africa and the Middle East, and Asia and Oceania. The
group produces beverage refrigerators for global players in the
beverage industry, with key customers including Coca-Cola Company
(The) bottlers and major brewers. Truad Verwaltungs A.G. owns
approximately 45% of Frigoglass and is a long-term investor in
the group. Truad Verwaltungs A.G. is a trust representing the
interests of the Leventis family and no member has a majority
vote.


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BLUEMOUNTAIN FUJI II: Moody's Rates EUR9.8MM Class F Notes B2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by BlueMountain Fuji
EUR CLO II Designated Activity Company:

-- EUR 207,800,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR 44,700,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR 20,600,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR 17,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR 22,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR 9,800,000 Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive ratings of the rated notes address the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2030. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, BlueMountain Fuji
Management, LLC, acting through its Series A ("BlueMountain A"),
has sufficient experience and operational capacity and is capable
of managing this CLO.

BlueMountain Fuji EUR CLO II is a managed cash flow CLO. At least
90% of the portfolio must consist of secured senior obligations
and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of senior unsecured
obligations, second-lien loans, high yield bonds, first-lien
last-out Loan and mezzanine obligations. The portfolio is
expected to be approximately 75% ramped up as of the closing date
and to be comprised predominantly of corporate loans to obligors
domiciled in Western Europe. The remainder of the portfolio will
be acquired during the six month ramp-up period in compliance
with the portfolio guidelines.

BlueMountain A, will manage the CLO. It will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit improved and credit impaired
obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the six classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR 35,800,000 of subordinated notes. Moody's
will not assign ratings to this class of notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. BlueMountain's A investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
October 2016. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR 350,000,000

Diversity Score: 38

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2800

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.45%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.25%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

As part of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential
exposure to obligors domiciled in countries with local currency
country risk ceiling (LCC) of A1 or below. As per the portfolio
constraints, exposures to countries with a LCC of A1 or below
cannot exceed 10%, with exposures to countries with LCCs of Baa1
to Baa3 further limited to 5%. Following the effective date, and
given these portfolio constraints and the current sovereign
ratings of eligible countries, the total exposure to countries
with a LCC of A1 or below may not exceed 10% of the total
portfolio. As a worst case scenario, a maximum 5% of the pool
would be domiciled in countries with LCCs of Baa1 to Baa3 while
an additional 5% would be domiciled in countries with LCCs of A1
to A3. The remainder of the pool will be domiciled in countries
which currently have a LCC of Aa3 and above. Given this portfolio
composition, the model was run with different target par amounts
depending on the target rating of each class of notes as further
described in the methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a
function of the exposure size to countries with LCC of A1 or
below and the target ratings of the rated notes, and amount to
0.75% for the Class A Notes, 0.50% for the Class B Notes, 0.38%
for the Class C Notes and 0% for Classes D, E and F Notes.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the definitive ratings
assigned to the rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes
increased default probability relative to the base case. Below is
a summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3220 from 2800)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3640 from 2800)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -3

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.


EURO-GALAXY IV: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B-' Rating to Cl. F-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary credit ratings to
Euro-Galaxy IV CLO B.V.'s class X-R, A-R, B-R, C-R, D-R, E-R, and
F-R notes.  The unrated subordinated notes initially issued will
not be redeemed and will remain outstanding with an extended
maturity to match the newly issued notes.

The preliminary ratings assigned to Euro-Galaxy IV's reset notes
reflect S&P's assessment of:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily
      of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans and bonds that are governed by collateral quality
      tests.

   -- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination
      of cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

   -- The transaction's legal structure, which S&P expects to be
      bankruptcy remote.

In S&P's view, the transaction's documented counterparty
replacement and remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate its
exposure to counterparty risk under S&P's current counterparty
criteria.

Under S&P's structured finance ratings above the sovereign
criteria, the transaction's exposure to country risk is limited
at the assigned preliminary rating levels, as the exposure to
individual sovereigns does not exceed the diversification
thresholds outlined in S&P's criteria.

S&P considers that the transaction's legal structure will be
bankruptcy remote, in line with its legal criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, S&P believes its preliminary
ratings are commensurate with the available credit enhancement
for each class of notes.

Euro-Galaxy IV CLO is a European cash flow corporate loan
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) securitization of a
revolving pool, primarily comprising euro-denominated senior
secured loans and bonds issued mainly by European borrowers.
PineBridge Investments Europe Ltd. is the lead collateral manager
and Credit Industriel et Commercial S.A. is the co-collateral
manager.  The transaction is a reset of an existing transaction,
which closed in 2015.

RATINGS LIST

Euro-Galaxy IV CLO B.V.
EUR616.95 mil, GBP15.7 mil delayed draw and floating- and fixed-
rate notes

Prelim Amount
Class                 Prelim Rating        (mil, EUR)
X-R                   AAA (sf)             1.5
A-R                   AAA (sf)             189.1
B-R                   AA (sf)              40.6
C-R                   A (sf)               22.1
D-R                   BBB (sf)             15.7
E-R                   BB (sf)              19.0
F-R                   B- (sf)              9.6


HARVEST CLO XI: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating to Class F-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its credit ratings to Harvest CLO XI
DAC's class A-R, B-1-R, B-2-R, B-3-R, C-R, D-R, E-R, and F-R
notes.  The unrated subordinated notes initially issued were not
redeemed and remain outstanding with an extended maturity to
match the newly issued notes.

The ratings assigned to Harvest XI's notes reflect S&P's
assessment of:

   -- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily
      of broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
      loans and bonds that are governed by collateral quality
      tests.

   -- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination
      of cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

   -- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
      the performance of the rated notes through collateral
      selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

   -- The transaction's legal structure is bankruptcy remote.

In S&P's view, the transaction's documented counterparty
replacement and remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate its
exposure to counterparty risk under S&P's current counterparty
criteria.

The application of S&P's structured finance ratings above the
sovereign criteria indicates that the transaction's exposure to
country risk is limited at the assigned rating levels, as the
exposure to individual sovereigns does not exceed the
diversification thresholds outlined in S&P's criteria.

S&P considers that the transaction's legal structure is
bankruptcy remote, in line with its European legal criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, S&P believes its ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each class
of notes.

Harvest XI is a European cash flow corporate loan collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) securitization of a revolving pool,
comprising euro-denominated senior secured loans and bonds issued
mainly by European borrowers.  Investcorp Credit Management EU
Ltd. is the collateral manager.  The transaction is a reset of an
existing transaction, which closed in 2015.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Assigned

Harvest CLO XI DAC
EUR413.85 Million Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes (Including
EUR45.60 Million Subordinated Notes)

Class                   Rating           Amount
                                       (mil. EUR)

A-R                     AAA (sf)         242.42
B-1-R                   AA (sf)           19.16
B-2-R                   AA (sf)           10.00
B-3-R                   AA (sf)           20.00
C-R                     A (sf)            22.58
D-R                     BBB (sf)          20.64
E-R                     BB (sf)           22.12
F-R                     B- (sf)           11.33
Subordinated            NR                45.60

NR--Not rated.


TAURUS CMBS 2007-1: Fitch Affirms D Rating on Cl. F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Taurus CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2007-1
Limited's notes due 2020:

EUR75.7 million class A1 (XS0305732181) affirmed at 'CCsf';
Recovery Estimate (RE) 100%
EUR10.9 million class A2 (XS0309194248) affirmed at 'CCsf';
RE100%
EUR16.1 million class B (XS0305744608) affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE100%
EUR23.3 million class C (XS0305745597) affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE
revised to 100% from 90%
EUR18.5 million class D (XS0305746215) affirmed at 'Csf'; RE
revised to 50% from 0%
EUR0.5 million class E (XS0309195567) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%
EUR0 million class F (XS0309195997) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%

Taurus CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2007-1 was originally the securitisation
of 13 loans originated by Merrill Lynch. The loans comprised both
tranched and whole facilities which were secured on collateral
located in Switzerland, France and Germany. Two loans now remain.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Since the last rating action in June 2016, EUR7.4 million of
previously held surplus funds from the two loans remaining have
been applied against the principal of the class A1 notes. The
safeguard plan regarding the Fishman JEC loan envisages 58% of
principal to be repaid 10 months after bond maturity in February
2020, which would see the issuer default on its obligations,
despite probable full repayment of the Hutley loan. Speedier
resolution cannot be ruled out, but the risk of delay is
reflected by ratings in the distressed categories, although
strengthening underlying conditions in the French real estate
market are improving the recovery prospects for the class C and D
notes.

The EUR22.9 million Hutley loan has amortised by EUR2 million
since the last rating action through the application of excess
cash flow. As a result, the interest coverage ratio has increased
to 26.2x from 23.99x in July 2016, when the borrower failed to
repay in full after being unable to produce relevant land charge
documentation. Fitch expects a refinancing to occur soon after
the issuance of replacement land charge certificates.

The EUR121.9 million Fishman JEC loan entered safeguard
proceedings in July 2014. In September 2015, a safeguard plan was
agreed, which set out a formal debt service and repayment plan,
effectively rescheduling the debt. Resumption in interest
payments has led to repayment of the liquidity facility drawings
and allowed the issuer to clear accrued and unpaid senior
interest. However, planned sales have been postponed pending
negotiations with main tenants, which breached the agreed terms
of the safeguard plan.

Agreement has been reached between the special servicer and
borrower to resume the sales process, with nine properties
scheduled for disposal of by the end of 3Q17. The loan has
amortised by EUR5.5 million since the last rating action through
the application of retained amounts, with an additional EUR3
million due to be applied to the loan once approval from the
courts has been granted. In the meantime, reported net operating
income has fallen to EUR5.7 million from EUR7.57 million one year
ago. As Fitch understand this is the result of one-off items, it
does not drive Fitch's Recovery Estimates.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Keeping strictly to the safeguard plan will result in the notes
being downgraded to 'Dsf'.

Fitch estimates 'Bsf' recoveries of EUR135 million.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


VENETO BANCA: S&P Cuts to D Then Withdraws Sub. Debt Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it has lowered its ratings on Veneto
Banca SpA's nondeferrable subordinated debt and preferred stock
to 'D' from 'C'.

S&P has subsequently withdrawn all of its ratings on Veneto
Banca.

The rating actions follow the Italian government's decision to
place Veneto Banca under orderly liquidation and to transfer all
of its senior liabilities to Intesa Sanpaolo.

On June 23, 2017, Veneto Banca was declared to be failing or
likely to fail as the bank breached a supervisory capital
requirement and was unable to restore its capital position.  The
Single Resolution Board informed that conditions for a resolution
action were not fulfilled.

On June 25, 2017 the Italian government issued a decree placing
Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza under orderly
liquidation.  Intesa Sanpaolo then announced the acquisition of
its performing assets as well as its senior liabilities for a
token price of EUR1.

As a consequence of the transfer of senior unsecured debt
formerly issued by Veneto Banca to Intesa Sanpaolo, S&P raised to
'BBB-' from 'B' its rating on the senior unsecured debt issues
(ISIN: XS0862199725) maturing December 2017 and (ISIN:
XS1069508494) May 2019.

As part of the liquidation plan, all non performing exposures of
Veneto Banca will be transferred to a new state-owned vehicle,
Societa' per la Gestione di Attivita' S.G.A. SpA., which will
manage them.

At the same time, the European Commission (EC) stated that all
hybrid debt and liabilities toward shareholders and investors in
subordinated debt fully contributed to the costs of the
liquidation of Veneto Banca, thus reducing the final amount
committed by the Italian government.  The resulting burden
sharing of subordinated liabilities under state aids rules
represents a default according to S&P's criteria.

S&P has therefore lowered to 'D' from 'C' its issue rating on
Veneto Banca's nondeferrable subordinated debt (ISIN:
XS1327514045) and preferred stock (ISIN: XS0337685324).

This rating action does not affect S&P's counterparty credit
ratings on Veneto Banca or any other issue ratings.

Finally, S&P has withdrawn all its issuer credit and issue
ratings on Veneto Banca.  The withdrawal reflects S&P's
understanding that all of its senior obligations have been
transferred to Intesa Sanpaolo, the subordinated debt wiped out,
and the bank will no longer be able to undertake senior
obligations in the future.  The EC has confirmed that Veneto
Banca will be orderly wound up and exit the market.


* ITALY: Recent Bank Bailout Setback for European Union
-------------------------------------------------------
David Shipley at Bloomberg News reports that the European
Commission's decision to let Italy spend up to EUR17 billion
(US$19 billion) to clean up the mess left by two failed banks is
bad news -- and not just for Italy's taxpayers.

It's also a setback for the euro zone's putative banking union,
and for the European Union's efforts to supervise anti-
competitive state aid, Bloomberg says.

Over the weekend, the Italian government wound down Banca
Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca, two regional lenders
struggling under the weight of non-performing loans, Bloomberg
recounts.  Intesa Sanpaolo, a rival, bought the banks' good
assets for one euro, and was promised another EUR4.8 billion in
state aid to deal with restructuring costs and bolster its
capital ratio, Bloomberg discloses.  Italy's taxpayers get to
keep the bad loans, which could end up costing them another EUR12
billion (though the government believes it will be much less),
Bloomberg states.

According to Bloomberg, the deal makes a mockery of the EU's plan
for banking union, designed during the sovereign debt crisis to
ensure all member states deal with bank failures the same way.
The Single Resolution Board -- whose purpose is to take the
politically difficult decision of whether to close a bank out of
the hands of governments -- chose not to intervene, Bloomberg
notes.  Italy's government then chose not to impose losses on
senior creditors, as the EU's rules would have required, but to
provide a taxpayer bailout instead, according to Bloomberg.

Strictly speaking, all this is legal, Bloomberg says.  The SRB
can choose to step back if it believes a bank is not significant
for financial stability, according to Bloomberg.

Lawful it may be; good policy it certainly is not, Bloomberg
states.  The outcome seriously undermines the credibility of the
banking union project, leaving great uncertainty about the rules
that will prevail next time, Bloomberg relays.  In addition,
Italy's government, the European Central Bank and the SRB all
took way too long to deal with the banks in question, compounding
the eventual cost to taxpayers, according to Bloomberg.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


EURASIAN RESOURCES: S&P Raises CCR to 'B-/B', Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long- and short-term corporate
credit ratings on Kazakh miner Eurasian Resources Group (ERG)
S.a.r.l. to 'B-/B' from 'CCC+/C'.  The outlook is stable.

The rating action reflects the recent improvements in ERG's
capital structure and liquidity position following the completed
refinancing negotiations with Russian state-owned banks Sberbank
and VTB, which are the company's two largest creditors,
representing about 76% of total debt.  In accordance with the
signed agreements, ERG has substantially improved its maturity
profile (it now has minimal annual repayments to these two banks
of $100 million in total in 2017-2020), reduced interest
payments, introduced a cash sweep mechanism aimed at early debt
repayment if the pricing environment is supportive, and adopted a
new covenant package providing wider headroom.  The final
maturity dates on the loans were also extended to 2022 (with
automatic extension to 2025 if certain covenants are met at that
time).

As a result of these achievements, S&P no longer views the
company's capital structure as unsustainable.  S&P has therefore
revised its stand-alone credit profile on ERG to 'b-'.

At the same time, S&P now assess the likelihood of ERG receiving
timely and sufficient extraordinary state support as low, rather
than moderate, because S&P believes the government is more
interested in ERG's continued operations rather than timeliness
of its debt repayments.  This view is based on the track record
during 2015-2016 when there were sizable liquidity shortfalls and
covenant breaches, but no extraordinary support (such as capital
injections) from the state.  However, S&P continues to factor
ongoing state support into its ratings on ERG, since S&P has seen
examples of tangible ongoing support provided by the state of
Kazakhstan to ERG in the form of tax benefits, reduction of
railway network charges, and some loans provided by state-owned
banks.  S&P thinks these actions were encouraged by ERG's role as
a sizable mining company in the country and a relatively big
employer (with a large workforce in remote regions).  S&P
recently lowered its assumption on state support to Kazakhstan's
national railroad company, Kazakhstand Temir Zholy, for similar
reasons.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that ambitious capex,
heavily negative FOCF, and high leverage are balanced by some
year-on-year recovery in the prices for certain metals, notably
ferroalloys, aluminum, and iron ore, as well as ERG's flexibility
to defer some capex and its minimal annual debt amortization
payments in 2017-2020 after negotiations with its two major
lenders, Russian state-owned banks Sberbank and VTB.  S&P assumes
that cash flow and EBITDA generation will continue to be highly
exposed to hugely volatile ferrochrome prices (this segment
contributed 55% of ERG's EBITDA in 2016) and foreign exchange
rates.  The company's credit metrics demonstrate rapid
deterioration during periods of stressed market conditions, for
example in 2015 when EBITDA fell to $1.2 billion from $1.9
billion a year before.

S&P's base-case envisages the company will remain highly
leveraged in 2017-2018, despite some recovery in metals prices,
with FFO to debt of less than 10% and debt to EBITDA exceeding
5.0x.

S&P could lower the rating if the company's liquidity
deteriorates or the capital structure becomes unsustainable.
This could happen if:

   -- ERG increases its reliance on short-term borrowings.
   -- A drop in commodity prices, notably ferrochrome, or lower-
      than-expected production volumes, lead to a material cash
      flow deficit.  Increased investment cash outflows (for
      example, due to cost overruns) or acquisitions result in
      rapid debt accumulation and covenant breaches.

S&P could take a positive rating action if the company turns
sustainably cash-flow-neutral (after capex and debt service) and
its credit metrics improve, with debt to EBITDA of materially
below 5.0x and FFO to debt above 12% on a sustainable basis.
This could happen if commodity prices recover sustainably, if the
company receives a meaningful capital injection from
shareholders, or if it successfully disposes of noncore assets.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


PENTA CLO 1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its credit rating on Penta CLO 1
S.A.'s class E notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its
ratings on the class A-2, B, C, and D notes.  On the June 2017
payment date the class A-1 notes were fully repaid, and S&P has
therefore withdrawn its rating on this class of notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction's
performance and the application of its relevant criteria.

Since S&P's Nov. 6, 2015 review, the class A notes have further
amortized.  During the same time, S&P has observed the deal has
lost par due to further defaults.

S&P subjected the capital structure to our cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each class of
notes at each rating level.  The BDRs represent S&P's estimate of
the level of asset defaults that the notes can withstand and
still fully pay interest and principal to the noteholders.

S&P has estimated future defaults in the portfolio in each rating
scenario by applying its corporate collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) criteria.

S&P's analysis shows that the available credit enhancement for
the class A-2, B, C, and D notes is commensurate with the
currently assigned ratings.  Therefore, S&P has affirmed its
ratings on these classes of notes.

S&P's analysis also indicates that the available credit
enhancement for the class E notes is commensurate with a lower
rating than that currently assigned.  Although the class E notes
have benefitted from increased credit enhancement due to
deleveraging of the senior notes, the expected default rate at
the current rating level has increased due to fewer obligors,
negative rating migration observed in the portfolio, and higher
scenario default rates.

With further defaults in the portfolio and a lower weighted-
average spread (compared with S&P's previous review), its credit
and cash flow analysis suggests a lower rating on the class E
notes than that currently assigned.  S&P has therefore lowered to
'BB (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' its rating on the class E notes.

On the June 2017 payment date the class A-1 notes were fully
repaid, and S&P has therefore withdrawn its rating on this class
of notes.

Penta CLO 1 is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction managed by Penta Management Ltd.  A portfolio of
loans to European speculative-grade corporate firms backs the
transaction.  Penta CLO 1 closed in April 2007 and its
reinvestment period ended in June 2014.

RATINGS LIST

Penta CLO 1 S.A.
EUR405 mil floating-rate notes
                                    Rating
Class            Identifier         To                  From
A-1              XS0289330028       NR                  AAA (sf)
A-2              XS0289330531       AAA (sf)            AAA (sf)
B                XS0289331182       AA+ (sf)            AA+ (sf)
C                XS0289331935       A+ (sf)             A+ (sf)
D                XS0289333717       BBB+ (sf)           BBB+ (sf)
E                XS0289336652       BB (sf)             BB+ (sf)

NR--Not rated


PINNACLE HOLDCO: S&P Cuts CCR to 'CCC' on Deteriorating Liquidity
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit rating on
Luxembourg-based Pinnacle Holdco S.ar.l. to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'.
The outlook is negative.

S&P also lowered its issue-level rating on the company's first-
lien credit facilities to 'CCC' from 'B-' and revised the
recovery rating to '3' from '2'.  The '3' recovery rating
indicates S&P's expectation for meaningful (50% to 70%; rounded
estimate: 60%) recovery in the event of a payment default.
Additionally, S&P lowered its issue-level rating on the company's
second-lien term loan to 'CC' from 'CCC-'.  The recovery rating
remains '6', indicating S&P's expectation for negligible (0% to
10%; rounded estimate: 0%) recovery in the event of a payment
default.

The downgrade reflects customer loss in the quarter ended
March 31, 2017, resulting in maintenance revenues declining
approximately 35% on a year-over-year basis.  Despite S&P Global
Ratings' expectation that O&G capital spending will rise more
than 20% in 2017, S&P estimates Pinnacle's revenues will decline
in the 20% area because of recent customer losses resulting in
declining license and professional services revenues.  S&P also
expects the company's minimum EBITDA covenant will tighten while
it increasingly relies on its $25 million revolving credit
facility to fund operations because of declining liquidity.

The negative outlook on Pinnacle reflects S&P's view of a
prolonged weak selling environment in the E&P services industry
because of depressed commodity prices and increased competition,
which should lead to lower revenues, a less than 10% EBITDA
covenant cushion, and lower liquidity over the next 12 months.

S&P could lower the rating to 'CCC-' if it views default, a
distressed exchange, or redemption to be inevitable within six
months.  These scenarios could happen if the company's revenue
and profitability to underperform its base-case expectations or
S&P believes the company sponsor will not exercise its right to
provide an equity cure.

Although unlikely, S&P could raise the rating if the energy
market recovers, causing customers to increase spending and the
company to generate modest revenue growth, margin expansion, and
positive FOCF.  S&P could also raise the rating if it sees
increased EBITDA covenant cushion and improved liquidity.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


SISTEMA JSFC: Fitch Puts BB- IDR on Rating Watch Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Sistema Public Joint Stock Financial
Corporation (Sistema) and PJSC Mobile TeleSystems (MTS) on Rating
Watch Negative following a Russian court injunction to freeze
significant Sistema assets including its 31.76% stake in MTS, in
relation to claims filed by Rosneft against Sistema.

Rosneft filed claims against Sistema seeking RUB170.6 billion of
damages for alleged abuse of Sistema's shareholding rights in
PJSOC Bashneft (Bashneft) (BBB-/Stable), a medium-sized Russian
oil company with legal registration in Russian Republic of
Bashkortostan (BBB-/Stable) and currently a majority-controlled
subsidiary of Rosneft, during the period when Sistema was the
majority owner of Bashneft. The government of Bashkortstan, a
shareholder in Bashneft, was accepted as the co-plaintiff. The
hearings on the substance of this case started on June 27, 2017.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Significant Assets Affected: The court injunction and the
subsequent bailiff's decision significantly limit Sistema's
ability to control a sizeable portion of its assets, and may
reduce the flow of dividends to the holding company. The watch is
likely to be resolved when Fitch receives more clarity on the
financial consequences of the litigation, and their implications
for both Sistema and MTS. The freeze on shares does not pre-empt
the court decision on the substance of the claims. The total
amount of claims consists of a number of individual claims of
smaller size, and the court is likely to make a decision on the
merit and the size of each of the sub-claims.

Worst Case Scenario: The worst case scenario for MTS will be for
Sistema to exercise its majority shareholder rights to upstream
significant additional distributions from MTS that may be
necessary to cover Sistema's potential losses under this
litigation.

The total amount of claims is significant and equal to more than
4.5x dividends received by Sistema in 2016 from its operating
subsidiaries. If satisfied in full, the impact on the company's
leverage and its ratings is likely to be negative.

Frozen Stakes: Sistema announced that its 31.76% equity interest
in MTS (out of its owned 51% stake), 100% equity stake in Medsi
and 90.47% equity interest in Bashkirian Power Grid Company were
frozen by a decision of the arbitration court. In addition,
bailiffs imposed additional restrictive measures prohibiting
Sistema to receive any income on the frozen shares, including
dividends.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Sistema's credit profile is primarily shaped by the company's
ability to control cash flows and upstream dividends from MTS.
This is overlaid by a significant debt burden at the holdco
level, including exposure to substantial off-balance-sheet
liabilities related to its subsidiaries. Efforts to diversify
dividend inflows are likely to take time before providing a
sustainable contribution.

MTS's credit profile is supported by the company's position as a
leading Russian and CIS mobile operator with moderate leverage
and sustainable positive pre-dividend free cash flow (FCF)
generation. It is the largest operator in Russia and the second-
largest in Ukraine by subscriber and revenue. MTS's ratings are
notched down to reflect the potential negative influence of its
controlling shareholder Sistema.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The RWN is driven by the assumption that Sistema may incur losses
from the litigation initiated by Rosneft.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The RWN is likely to be resolved when there is more clarity on
the financial consequences of the litigation with Rosneft, and
their implications for both Sistema and MTS.

Sistema:
Sustained deleveraging at the holdco level to below 2.5x net
debt, including off-balance-sheet liabilities to normalised
dividends received from Sistema's operating subsidiaries, may be
positive for Sistema's rating.

A protracted rise in net debt including off-balance-sheet
liabilities to normalised dividends to above 4.5x may lead to
negative rating action. A portfolio reshuffle, increasing the
share of subsidiaries with week credit profiles, could also be
rating-negative.

MTS:
MTS's rating could benefit from an upgrade of Sistema's rating
provided that MTS continues to adhere to high corporate
governance standards.

A downgrade could arise from weaker corporate governance but also
excessive shareholder remuneration and other developments that
lead to a sustained rise in funds from operations adjusted net
leverage to above 3.0x. Competitive weaknesses and market-share
erosion, leading to significant deterioration in pre-dividend FCF
generation, may also become a negative rating factor. A downgrade
of Sistema may also be negative if Sistema remains the dominant
shareholder.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Sistema Joint Stock Financial Corp.
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs): 'BB-'; placed on RWN
Senior unsecured debt: 'BB-'; placed on RWN

Sistema International Funding S.A.
Loan participation notes guaranteed by Sistema: 'BB-'; placed on
RWN

PJSC Mobile Telesystems' (MTS)
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs: 'BB+'; placed on RWN
Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDR: 'B'; placed on RWN
Senior local and foreign currency unsecured debt: 'BB+'; placed
on RWN

MTS International Funding Ltd
Loan participation notes guaranteed by MTS: 'BB+'; placed on RWN


=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCO DE SABADELL: S&P Ups Nondeferrable Sub. Debt Rating to 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long- and short-term counterparty
credit ratings on Spain-based Banco de Sabadell S.A. to 'BBB-/A-
3' from 'BB+/B'.  The outlook remains positive.

At the same time, S&P raised to 'BB' from 'B+' Sabadell's
nondeferrable subordinated debt and to 'B' from 'CCC+' the
preferred stock.

The rating action reflects S&P's belief that Sabadell has
continued to strengthen its solvency and it is continuing making
progress in de-risking its balance sheet.

S&P anticipates that the bank's risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio
will be above 7% at year-end 2017 and reach 7.5%-8.0% by December
2018 compared to 6.4% as of December 2016.  S&P's forecast
factors in the recent issuance of a EUR750 million hybrid
instrument (additional Tier 1, not rated); the agreed sale of the
Florida-based subsidiary (Sabadell United Bank N.A.), which
should generate a net gain of EUR450 million; and sustained
organic capital generation in the next two years.

Specifically, S&P considers that the bank's net profits should
remain broadly stable in 2017 and 2018, excluding the one-off
gain from the subsidiary's sale, with a return on tangible equity
of 6%-7%. Lower trading gains and broadly flat net interest
income will be compensated by solid fee growth (+2% annually in
the next two years) and total provisions, which will go below 70
basis points (bps; on average gross loans) in 2018, down from 160
bps in 2015.

At the same time, asset quality measures are improving, with a
nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio of 5.9% as of March 2017, compared
to 7.5% a year earlier, and improving to 5.0% by 2018.  The
benign economic conditions in Spain are mostly behind these
positive dynamics and have resulted in sustained clean-up of the
domestic credit portfolio and foreclosed assets reduction.
Specifically, S&P calculates that the domestic nonperforming
asset (NPA) ratio (including both NPLs and real estate assets)
dropped to 14.7% as of March 31, 2017, from about 20% three years
before.  S&P projects this domestic metric to decline to around
12% by 2018 as the Spanish economy maintains its steady growth
path.

The ongoing balance sheet de-risking, coupled with sustained
customer-funds gathering, has led the bank toward a more balanced
financing profile, with a stable funding ratio above 100% as of
December 2016.

S&P raised the rating on the bank's nondeferrable subordinated
debt and preferred shares by two notches because the stand-alone
credit profile improving to 'bbb-' led S&P to reduce the notching
differential for subordination to one notch from two notches.

The positive outlook indicates that S&P could raise its long- and
short-term ratings over the next 12-24 months if Spain's economic
and operating environment become more supportive, ultimately
resulting in a strengthening of banks' creditworthiness and
therefore a higher anchor for Spanish banks.

S&P's outlook also reflects the expectation that Sabadell will
continue strengthening its solvency through earnings retention,
and maintaining a RAC ratio sustainably above 7% in the next two
years.  Also, S&P anticipates the bank will continue to
substantially reduce its NPAs--both NPLs and real estate.

S&P could revise the outlook back to stable if it do not see
prospects of the economic or operating risk environment in Spain
easing further for banks, or other risks offset the potential
benefits of a likely more supportive domestic environment.  This
could happen if the group's capitalization were to materially
weaken and the balance sheet derisking process were to slow down
substantially.  It could also happen if S&P considers that an
economic slowdown in the U.K. could add material risk to the
bank's subsidiary.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BHS GROUP: Green Made Six Attempts to Settle Pension Issues
-----------------------------------------------------------
Mark Vandevelde at The Financial Times reports that Sir Philip
Green made six rejected attempts to settle a dispute over the
pension liabilities of BHS before regulators launched legal
action last year, according to an official postmortem that has
reopened the battle of words over the UK retailer's collapse.

Revealing for the first time the details of their abandoned legal
case against Sir Philip, officials vowed to act "robustly" to
secure financial support for stricken pension schemes, if
necessary by invoking its "anti-avoidance" powers in court, the
FT relates.

The Pensions Regulator eventually struck a deal under which the
billionaire handed over GBP343m to pay the pensions of 19,000
former BHS workers, the FT recounts.  While defending that
outcome on June 27, officials conceded they "could have been
quicker and more proactive" in the early stages of the retailer's
collapse, the FT relays.

Laying out the threats of legal action that preceded that deal,
officials, as cited by the FT, said the tycoon had been the
"driving force" behind two initiatives that were to prove pivotal
in the demise of BHS in 2016.

The first, an abortive effort to plug the gap in the BHS pension
scheme, would have seen Sir Philip pay between GBP54 million and
GBP80 million to a rescue vehicle that would have taken over
responsibility for retired workers, the FT says.

When that effort was "paused", Sir Philip decided to sell BHS for
GBP1 to a vehicle led by Dominic Chappell, a former bankrupt who
proved unable to supply either the cash or management nous needed
to turn the business round, the FT recounts.

Even after that, regulators alleged that Sir Philip "continued to
have involvement in the management of BHS" and "still benefited
from BHS and key elements of the relationship" established while
he was formally in charge, the FT notes.

"Sir Philip Green was personally involved with the schemes,
including investment issues, the 2012 valuation and recovery plan
negotiations, and the appointment of new trustees and advisers,"
the FT quotes officials as saying.

                            About BHS

BHS Group was a high street retailer offering fashion for the
whole family, furniture and home accessories.

BHS was put into administration in April 2016 in one of the
U.K.'s largest ever corporate failures, according to The Am Law
Daily.  More than 11,000 jobs were lost and 20,000 pensions (the
U.K. equivalent of a 401k) put at risk after it emerged that the
company, which had more than 160 stores across the U.K., had a
pension deficit of GBP571 million (US$703 million), The Am Law
Daily disclosed.

Sir Philip Green, a retail magnate with a net worth of more than
US$5 billion, has been heavily criticized for his role in the
collapse of BHS, The Am Law Daily said.  Mr. Green and other
shareholders had taken around GBP580 million (US$714 million) out
of the business before selling it for just GBP1 (US$1.23), The Am
Law Daily noted.

Linklaters acted for Green's Arcadia Group on the sale of the
company to Retail Acquisitions, which was advised by London-based
technology, media and telecoms specialist Olswang, The Am Law
Daily added.

Weil Gotshal & Manges and DLA then took the lead roles on the
administration, acting for the company and administrators Duff &
Phelps, respectively, while Jones Day was appointed by the
administrators to investigate the actions of the company's former
directors, The Am Law Daily related.


BRANTANO: Administrators Seeking to Sell Intellectual Properties
----------------------------------------------------------------
Storm Rannard writing for Insider Media reports agents have been
appointed to sell off the intellectual property (IP) assets of
shoe retailer Brantano, which went into administration three
months ago.  Since the insolvency, more than 900 redundancies
have been made, although the business continues to trade,
according to Insider Media.

The report relays that Tony Barrell and Mike Jervis of PwC were
appointed as joint administrators of Brantano Retail Ltd on
March 22, 2017.

The report discloses that Metis Partners is now seeking buyers
for its assets, which includes a portfolio of shoe brands, a
national trade mark portfolio, a website, domain name and e-
commerce software.

Morven Fraser, of Metis Partners, who is co-ordinating the
marketing drive, said: "Brantano is highly recognised and, as a
result, a very valuable brand.

"With the footwear market forecast by PwC to rise from its
present value of GBP7.9 billion to GBP9.1 billion in 2020, the
Brantano brand is in pole position to take advantage of this
anticipated growth," the report relays.

The report discloses that administrators have now confirmed that
all 69 Brantano stores have been closed as part of a "trading
assessment", leading to the loss of 842 jobs.  A further 59 head
office employees were also made redundant.

The report relays that four stores were acquired by family-owned
footwear business Pavers, saving 43 roles.

The report further discloses that Alteri acquired Brantano and
Jones Bootmaker in October 2015.  Three months later, Brantano
was in administration and was rescued by a company controlled by
Alteri in February 2016, the report relays.  The deal preserved
1,372 jobs, as well as 140 outlets and concessions, the report
notes.

Jones Bootmaker called in administrators from KPMG in March 2017
and was subsequently sold to private equity firm Endless, the
report relays.  However, a number of branches were not included
in the deal, with 260 jobs cut, the report adds.


BREWERS FAYRE: To Close 'Antrim Park' Branch
--------------------------------------------
Rachel Martin writing for Belfast Telegraph reports budget
restaurant chain Brewers Fayre will close one of its three
Northern Ireland branches, as part of a sale to English firm
Marston Estates, Business Telegraph can reveal.

Brewers Fayre, known for its pub grub, has been part of the
Whitbread Group --- which also owns Costa and Premier Inn,
according to Belfast Telegraph.

However, it's understood some of its 130 branches across the UK,
including at least one in Northern Ireland, will pass to pub
giant Marston as part of a deal due to complete soon, the report
notes.

It's been confirmed that Brewers Fayre's branch based at Antrim's
The Junction - also known as 'Antrim Park' - will close on June
26, the report relays.

The report states the restaurant sits alongside several other
family eateries including Safari Grill, Moe's Grill and The Red
Panda at the town's retail park.

However, it's understood Brewers Fayre's two other Northern
Ireland branches in Carrickfergus and Londonderry, which are also
thought to be part of the deal, will remain open, the report
notes.

The report relays a spokeswoman for The Junction owners Lotus
Group said the news of the restaurant's closing was "extremely
disappointing".

"We have been in extensive talks recently with Brewers Fayre
about the future of the pub/restaurant at Antrim following the
portfolio sale to Marston Estates by Whitbread.

"Marston Estates do not operate in Northern Ireland which has
resulted in the extremely disappointing decision to close this
location at The Junction.

"We are continuing our discussions to resolve this situation and
hope to announce an exciting new operator in the near future,"
she said.

Marston's and Brewers Fayre were unavailable for comment, notes
the report.


CO-OP BANK: Private Investors May Lose 55% Under Rescue Deal
------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Evans at The Telegraph reports that private investors who
hold certain Co-op Bank bonds can expect to lose at least 55% of
their money in a restructuring designed to save the lender from
collapse.

Some had already suffered a loss in a previous restructuring in
2013, The Telegraph discloses.

According to The Telegraph, those affected are holders of Co-op
Bank subordinated bonds that pay an 11% "coupon" and were due to
mature in 2023.  These bonds were issued in the earlier
restructuring to replace former "Pibs" (permanent interest-
bearing shares) issued by Britannia Building Society, which Co-op
Bank took over, The Telegraph relays.  That swap involved a loss
or "haircut" of about 50% of bondholders' original investment,
The Telegraph notes.

Mark Taber, who campaigned for a better deal for Co-op Bank
bondholders in the previous restructuring, as cited by The
Telegraph, said retail holders were being "harshly treated" by
being forced to accept a loss when shareholders, who normally
expect to be wiped out entirely before lenders are affected, were
being allowed to retain 5% of the bank.

Bondholders will be able to vote on the restructuring, The
Telegraph states.

                    About Co-operative Bank

The Co-operative Bank plc is a retail and commercial bank in the
United Kingdom, with its headquarters in Balloon Street,
Manchester.

In 2013-2014, the Bank was the subject of a rescue plan to
address a capital shortfall of about GBP1.9 billion.  The Bank
mostly raised equity to cover the shortfall from hedge funds.

In February 2017, the Bank's board announced that they were
commencing a sale process for the Bank and were "inviting
offers."

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported on February 17,
2017 that Moody's Investors Service downgraded Co-operative Bank
plc's standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) to ca from
caa2.  The downgrade of the bank's BCA to ca reflects Moody's
view that the bank's standalone creditworthiness is increasingly
challenged and that the bank will not be able to restore its
declining capital position without external assistance.

TCR-Europe also reported on February 23, 2017 that Fitch Ratings
has downgraded The Co-operative Bank p.l.c.'s (Co-op Bank) Long-
Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B-' from 'B' and placed it
on Rating Watch Evolving (RWE).  The Viability Rating (VR) was
downgraded to 'cc' from 'b'.  The downgrade of the VR reflects
Fitch's view that a failure of the bank appears probable as it
likely needs to obtain new equity capital to restore viability.
Fitch believes there is a very high risk that this will include a
restructuring of its subordinated debt that Fitch is likely to
consider a distressed debt exchange, which would result in a
failure according to Fitch definitions.  However, the bank had
originally hoped to strike a deal by mid-June, in order to
complete the debt-for-equity swap process before GBP400 million
of senior bonds mature in September, the FT states.

The Co-op Bank said it was still pursuing an attempt to sell the
entire lender at the same time as advancing talks with existing
investors to raise capital, the FT relays.


CO-OP BANK: Paul Hastings Advises Tier 2 Noteholders' Committee
---------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Hastings LLP, a global law firm, disclosed that it has
advised the ad hoc committee of existing Tier 2 noteholders on
the capital raising plan for the Co-operative Bank.

The Paul Hastings team was led by restructuring partners
David Ereira and Karl Clowry and senior corporate associate
Matthew Poxon.  Additional support came from corporate partners
Ronan O'Sullivan and Peter Schwartz and tax partner Arun Birla.
The team also included associates Ian McKim, Aimee Fabri, Carlos
Ruiz and Jiten Tank.

This is a significant mandate for Paul Hastings' restructuring
practice.  Other firms involved in the high-profile deal
included:

   -- Clifford Chance advising the Co-operative Bank
   -- Allen & Overy advising the Co-operative Group
   -- Linklaters advising the Pace Trustees Limited (the
      Cooperative Pension Scheme)
   -- Freshfields advising the Prudential Regulation Authority

The Co-operative Bank p.l.c. (the "Bank") confirmed on June 26,
2017, that it was in advanced discussions with a group of
existing investors on a prospective equity capital raise and
recapitalisation and that discussions were continuing with
respect to the separation of The Co-operative Pension Scheme
(Pace) ("Pace").

The Bank confirmed that those discussions have now concluded and
that it is pleased to support an equity capital raise and
recapitalisation proposal (the "Proposal") from an ad hoc
committee of existing Tier 2 noteholders (the "AHC").  The Bank
also confirmed that it and Co-operative Group Limited (the
"Group") have agreed principles with Pace Trustees Limited to
separate their respective sections of Pace.

The Board believes that the Proposal will enable the Bank to
thrive as a stand-alone entity, with values and ethics and strong
customer service continuing at the heart of its business.  The
Board, therefore, has given its approval to the Proposal and the
Bank has entered into an agreement (the "Lock-Up Agreement")
whereby the AHC and the Bank have committed, subject to certain
conditions, to take certain steps to implement the Proposal.

The Board further believes the Proposal will position the Bank to
be able to access the public debt markets and thereby meet
enhanced regulatory capital and MREL requirements.

The Proposal

New Equity

Under the Proposal, the qualifying institutional holders of the
Bank's GBP206m 11.0% Fixed Rate Notes due December 2023 (the
"2023 Notes") and the GBP250m 8.5% Fixed Rate Notes due July 2025
(the "2025 Notes", and together with the 2023 Notes, the "Notes")
and the Bank's existing qualifying shareholders will be invited
to participate in a GBP250m equity raise in exchange for an
ownership stake of 67.6% of the pro forma ordinary shares (the "A
Shares") outstanding in a new holding company of the Bank
("Holdco").  Backstop fees and equity subscribed for as part of
the initial capitalisation of Holdco on incorporation represent
10% of the pro forma A Shares, of which 5% will be available to
all Tier 2 noteholders who provide backstop commitments.
Participation in the equity raise is expected to be subject to
certain qualifying conditions, including securities laws
certifications.

Recapitalisation

In parallel, the Proposal provides that a recapitalisation (the
"Recapitalisation") will involve the cancellation of the Notes
and is expected to result in the following:

   -- Retail noteholders of the 2023 Notes ("Retail Noteholders")
(individual persons with a holding of an aggregate principal
amount of GBP100,000 or less and to be further defined at the
time of launch) as of 27 June 2017 are expected to receive cash,
at a level equivalent to up to 45% of the nominal value of their
2023 Notes and subject to an overall cap of GBP13.5m on the
aggregate cash amount to be paid to Retail Noteholders and
potential downward adjustment to the cash amount to be paid to
Retail Noteholders if such a cap is reached.

   -- Other holders of the Notes ("Noteholders") who are not
Retail Noteholders will receive A Shares equivalent to 17.4% of
the pro forma A Shares outstanding in Holdco in aggregate and to
be allocated among such Noteholders pro rata to their holdings in
the Notes.

   -- Based on a total conversion of approximately GBP426m of
Notes and an assumed principal amount held by Retail Noteholders
of approximately GBP30m, the Recapitalisation will be used to
generate at least GBP443m of Common Equity Tier 1 ("CET1")
capital.

   -- Existing shareholders of the Bank will also exchange their
shares in the Bank for A Shares in Holdco equivalent in aggregate
to 5% of the pro forma A Shares outstanding in Holdco.

New Holdco

As part of the implementation of the Proposal, shareholders who
hold 10% or more of the A Shares in Holdco and who satisfy
certain other eligibility conditions (including having been
approved by the PRA as a "controller" of the Bank through their
proposed holding of B Shares) will be entitled to subscribe for B
Shares in Holdco, for nominal consideration, in proportion to
their holding of A Shares.  The B Shares will carry voting rights
and will also benefit from certain governance, notification and
approval rights with respect to the new Holdco group but will
have no rights to distributions, other than on exit in an amount
of GBP25m in aggregate, subject to achieving a minimum valuation
threshold.  The A Shares will have rights to participate in
distributions.  The A Shares will not carry voting rights other
than if there are no B Shares in issue and in other limited
circumstances.  Further details relating to Holdco and the
governance structure of the Holdco group will be available in
mid-July.

Upon implementation of the Proposal, the New Equity (GBP250m) and
the Recapitalisation (at least GBP443m) will generate
approximately GBP700m of CET1 capital, before expenses, for the
Bank.

Dennis Holt, Chairman said:

"The Board is pleased to confirm this proposal for a
recapitalisation which will mean that The Co-operative Bank can
continue as a viable stand-alone entity, with values and ethics
at its heart.  It is a great outcome for our customers.  Our
investors share our commitment to building our distinctive
ethical franchise and see strong future growth potential for The
Co-operative Bank."

A spokesperson on behalf of the AHC said:

"We have supported the turnaround of The Co-operative Bank since
2013 and this further investment will provide the Bank with the
capital needed to realise its potential as the UK's leading
ethical bank."

The Recapitalisation has been discussed and will continue to be
discussed with the PRA, which supports the efforts of the Bank to
build greater financial resilience.

Implementation of the Proposal

The Recapitalisation will be implemented by way of a creditors'
scheme of arrangement for the institutional holders of the 2023
Notes and all holders of the 2025 Notes and, in respect of the
2023 Notes, a concurrent and inter-conditional consent
solicitation.  A shareholders' scheme of arrangement will also be
necessary in order for Holdco to become Bank's new holding
company.  To become effective, each scheme of arrangement would
require, amongst other things, the approval by a majority in
number of the class members of each relevant class, representing
75% in value of the class that are present and voting at the
relevant court meeting, and the sanction of the court.  The
consent solicitation would require approval by 75% of Noteholders
in aggregate principal amount of the 2023 Notes voting at a
quorate meeting (the quorum being Noteholders of the 2023 Notes
holding at least two-thirds of the aggregate principal amount of
such Notes, and one-third at any adjourned meeting).  A separate
shareholders' meeting of the Bank will also be required to pass
certain resolutions to facilitate the implementation of the
Proposal.

Under the Lock-Up Agreement, the AHC have undertaken to vote in
favour of the schemes of arrangement, the consent solicitation
and the shareholder resolutions subject to certain conditions
being satisfied or waived, including satisfactory completion of
limited confirmatory due diligence, final investment committee
approvals, and  applicable regulatory consents and approvals.

As at the date of this announcement, the AHC represent 47% of the
Notes and 32% of the Bank's ordinary shares.

The Group, with a current shareholding in the Bank of
approximately 20%, has confirmed that it is supportive of the
Proposal and intends to vote in favour.  Following implementation
of the Proposal, Group's pro forma shareholding will be
approximately 1% of the A Shares.  As a result, some formal
arrangements including the right of Group to nominate a Director
to the Bank Board will end immediately on completion.  In
addition, the promotion of Bank services to members of Group will
naturally fall away and come to a formal end in 2020.
Implementation of the Proposal and, in particular, the Pace
sectionalisation will represent a further important milestone
towards the completion of the separation of Bank from Group that
began in 2013.  The Co-operative Bank name, brand and commitment
to co-operative values, set out in its Ethical Policy, will
continue unaffected.

Further details of the Proposal are expected to be made available
in mid-July and will be published on the Bank's website.
Noteholders and shareholders are encouraged to contact BofA
Merrill Lynch, UBS Investment Bank or Houlihan Lokey, which are
acting for the Bank, or PJT Partners, which is acting for the
AHC, with any questions that they may have on the process. Retail
Noteholders should seek their own financial advice, where
appropriate.  The Bank is seeking to complete the equity capital
raising and Recapitalisation by the beginning of September 2017.

The PRA has accepted the plan. Implementation of the Proposal
remains subject to certain regulatory approvals by the PRA and
other parties, including permissions relating to the issuance and
exchange of capital instruments and the determination of any
change in control applications.  Implementation of the Proposal
is also subject to a number of other conditions, including: the
approval of requisite majorities of Noteholders and shareholders;
the sanction of the court to the schemes of arrangement; and
entry into binding Heads of Terms relating to the separation of
Pace. Accordingly, there can be no certainty that the Proposal
will be approved or implemented.  If the Proposal is not
implemented, and consequently the Bank's Plan is not able to be
delivered, as set out in the Bank's 2016 Annual Report and
Accounts, the Bank's regulators have the discretion to exercise
one or more of various powers over the Bank.

Pace

The Group, Pace Trustees Limited and the Bank have agreed
principles to sectionalise Pace into two legally separate Bank
and Group sections within Pace, with c.21% of the assets and
liabilities of Pace allocated to the Bank section, and with the
removal of the Bank's obligation to support the pension
liabilities of the Group section.  Agreement has been reached as
to the recovery plan for the Bank section and the related deficit
recovery contributions.  It is proposed that this will be GBP100m
over 10 years, with GBP12.5m per year from 2018 for the first
five years and GBP7.5m per year for years six to ten thereafter.
This recovery plan will be reviewed at each triennial valuation
date in accordance with statutory funding obligations.  The Bank
will also provide initial collateral of GBP216m from the point of
sectionalisation.  An obligation on the Group to support the
pension liabilities of the Bank section could arise in limited
circumstances.  The Bank would expect a reduction in its Pillar
2a pension risk add-on relating to Pace, once the separation
completes (expected in 2018).

The separation of Pace is conditional on implementation of the
Proposal and clearance from The Pensions Regulator.

Other

BofA Merrill Lynch, UBS Investment Bank and Houlihan Lokey are
acting for the Bank and PJT Partners is acting for the AHC on the
Proposal.

                    About Co-operative Bank

The Co-operative Bank plc is a retail and commercial bank in the
United Kingdom, with its headquarters in Balloon Street,
Manchester.

In 2013-2014, the Bank was the subject of a rescue plan to
address a capital shortfall of about GBP1.9 billion.  The Bank
mostly raised equity to cover the shortfall from hedge funds.

In February 2017, the Bank's board announced that they were
commencing a sale process for the Bank and were "inviting
offers."

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported on February 17,
2017 that Moody's Investors Service downgraded Co-operative Bank
plc's standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) to ca from
caa2.  The downgrade of the bank's BCA to ca reflects Moody's
view that the bank's standalone creditworthiness is increasingly
challenged and that the bank will not be able to restore its
declining capital position without external assistance.

TCR-Europe also reported on February 23, 2017 that Fitch Ratings
has downgraded The Co-operative Bank p.l.c.'s (Co-op Bank) Long-
Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B-' from 'B' and placed it
on Rating Watch Evolving (RWE).  The Viability Rating (VR) was
downgraded to 'cc' from 'b'.  The downgrade of the VR reflects
Fitch's view that a failure of the bank appears probable as it
likely needs to obtain new equity capital to restore viability.
Fitch believes there is a very high risk that this will include a
restructuring of its subordinated debt that Fitch is likely to
consider a distressed debt exchange, which would result in a
failure according to Fitch definitions.  However, the bank had
originally hoped to strike a deal by mid-June, in order to
complete the debt-for-equity swap process before GBP400 million
of senior bonds mature in September, the FT states.

The Co-op Bank said it was still pursuing an attempt to sell the
entire lender at the same time as advancing talks with existing
investors to raise capital, the FT relays.


DOROTHY PERKINS: Closes Store in Llandudno Town Centre
------------------------------------------------------
Owen Hughes writing for Daily Post reports that clothes retailer
Dorothy Perkins has closed its store in Llandudno town centre.

The brand has left the Victoria Centre precinct, although the
franchise within Outfit on Parc Llandudno will remain in the
resort, according to Daily Post.

The report discloses that Edward Hiller, managing director of
Mostyn Estates, which owns the Victoria Centre, confirmed the
store had closed.

Dorothy Perkins did not respond to an approach from the Daily
Post.

The report states it is not known whether staff at the store are
facing redundancy or have been relocated to other stores.

The report notes the Victoria Centre has recently undergone a
major refurbishment after being bought by Mostyn Estates and this
has already attracted new tenants.

Mr. Hiller said another two new lets are to be confirmed,
including the Tourism Information office relocating from the
library, the report adds.


MISSOURI TOPCO: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC+' on Better Performance
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has raised its long-term
corporate credit rating on Missouri Topco Ltd., the holding
company for U.K.-based apparel retailer Matalan, to 'CCC+' from
'CCC'.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P raised to 'CCC+' from 'CCC' its long-term
issue ratings on Matalan's GBP342 million first-lien notes, in
line with the corporate credit rating.  S&P's recovery rating on
these notes remains '4', reflecting its expectation of average
recovery (30%-50%; rounded estimate: 45%) in the event of
default.

S&P has also raised to 'CCC-' from 'CC' its long-term issue
ratings on the group's GBP150 million second-lien notes (of which
GBP138.0 million remains outstanding).  The recovery rating is
unchanged at '6', indicating S&P's expectation of negligible
recovery in the event of default.

Matalan recently reported significant improvements in operating
performance in financial 2017 (ending Feb. 25), underpinned by
significant improvements in earnings and EBITDA margins,
resulting in material free operating cash flows (FOCF).  These
positive results have seen the prices of Matalan's first- and
second-lien notes materially increase, and they now trade at 94%
and 91% of par respectively.  S&P understands that future debt
repurchases will be contingent on Board approval and, in S&P's
opinion, at these prices, the attractiveness to Matalan of
repurchasing further portions of the notes has fallen, especially
in light of the positive returns generated by store refurbishment
capital expenditures (capex).  The likelihood of future
repurchases at significantly below par therefore appears lower
than S&P had previously anticipated, and S&P no longer envisage a
specific default scenario within the next 12 months.

However, S&P maintains its view that unless the company
demonstrates a significant growth in earnings and cash flows over
the next 12-24 months, its capital structure could still be
unsustainable in the long term, especially given the approaching
maturities of the group's existing bonds.  With the first-lien
notes maturing in June 2019 and the second-lien notes maturing in
June 2020, a full and orderly refinancing of the capital
structure is somewhat dependent upon favorable business,
financial, and economic conditions, with little headroom for any
future underperformance.

S&P thinks weak operating trends in the U.K. apparel retail
sector are a result of both cyclical headwinds exacerbated by the
Brexit vote and a secular change in consumer spending habits.
Consumers have increasingly shifted their purchases online, drawn
by convenience, selection, and price transparency.  While Matalan
benefits from its fast-growing e-commerce business, its physical
stores still contribute the vast majority of retail revenues.

S&P expects the difficult conditions of the past several quarters
to continue through calendar years 2017 and 2018, limiting
topline growth.  S&P thinks the company's comprehensive hedging
strategy, focus on tighter inventory management, and successful
turnaround of its logistical operations will help to mitigate
some of the cost inflation resulting from the depreciation of
pound sterling versus the U.S. dollar, wage inflation, and
investment in store refurbishment, resulting in moderate EBITDA
margin expansion.  S&P's assessment of Matalan's business risk
profile remains constrained however by the low visibility of
earnings and the intrayear seasonality of cash flow.

S&P assumes:

   -- Moderate U.K. real GDP growth, forecast to be 1.7% in 2017
      and 1.2% in 2018, with consumer price inflation of 2.6% in
      2017 and 2.3% in 2018, driven by exchange rate pressures,
      some of which will be passed on to consumers and suppliers.
      S&P also expects a slowdown in the growth of real
      consumption in the U.K. to 2.6% in 2017 and 2.5% in 2018.

   -- Sales increase slightly above GDP growth at 1%-3% in
      financial year (FY) 2018, with a further increase of 1%-2%
      in FY 2019.  S&P expects this topline growth to be driven
      by broadly flat like-for-like trading in U.K. stores,
      supported by inflationary pressures and the moderately
      defensive nature of Matalan's low-ticket offering, but
      limited by a U.K. retail market that S&P expects to remain
      challenging as real disposal incomes begin to be squeezed.

   -- S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA margin of 18%-19% over
      the next two years (compared with 17.2% in FY 2017 and
      14.1% in FY16) bolstered by better sales realization and
      tight cost control measures that should lead to a moderate
      improvement in EBITDA margins.

   -- Moderate working capital outflows of approximately GBP5
      million per year despite tighter stock control, owing to
      revenue growth and the effect of the depreciation of
      sterling, albeit smoothed by the remaining contribution
      from pre-Brexit hedging.

   -- Capex of around GBP35 million annually, in line with
      management's public guidance, which will be used to fund
      store refurbishments, new store openings, and capital
      investments in technology.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Adjusted EBITDA of GBP190 million-GBP200 million in FY
     2018, compared with the GBP180 million generated in FY 2017;

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of 6.0x-6.5x in both FY 2018 and FY
      2019;

   -- Adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of 5%-10% in
      both FY 2018 and FY 2019;

   -- Reported FOCF generation of GBP5 million-GBP10 million in
      both FY 2018 and FY 2019; and

   -- Adjusted EBITDAR (reported EBITDA plus rent) to cash
      interest plus rent coverage (EBITDAR coverage) of
      1.3x-1.4x.

S&P continues to assess Matalan's liquidity as adequate as S&P
expects sources of liquidity to exceed uses by about 1.8x over
the next 12 months, assuming the GBP50 million revolving credit
facility (RCF) is fully available, other than the GBP11.6 million
already utilized for letters of credit and guarantees.  Matalan's
liquidity position further benefits from the absence of debt
amortization financial maintenance covenants so long as the RCF
is less than 35% drawn (equivalent to GBP17.5 million).  S&P also
views the group's risk management as generally prudent in the
context of an adequate assessment, but believe that use of cash
to repurchase of portions of the group's bonds limits this
assessment somewhat.  S&P also considers that Matalan is unlikely
to be able to absorb high-impact, low-profitability events
without a need for material refinancing.

Principal liquidity sources are:

   -- Cash balances of GBP80 million (compared with the balance
      sheet figure of GBP81.1 million) as of February 2017, which
      accounts for cash trapped in tills and subsidiaries that
      S&P considers not immediately available;

   -- Forecast FFO of about GBP43.5 million in FY 2018; and

   -- Full availability of the remaining GBP38.4 million under
      the RCF facility, based on S&P's view that Matalan would
      pass its covenant tests were it to draw down on the
      facility beyond the 35% threshold at which the covenants
      spring.

Principal liquidity uses are:

   -- Capex of about GBP35 million in FY 2018; and

   -- Working capital outflows (including intrayear seasonal
      peak-to-trough requirements) of up to GBP55 million.

Matalan is subject to springing covenants upon 35% drawing of the
total RCF commitment.  These covenant tests do not lead to any
events of default or cross-default clauses on any of the rest of
the capital structure, but could limit future availability under
the facility.  Despite these covenants having now been reset to
their original schedules, S&P forecasts headroom to exceed 15%
over the next 12 months, ensuring the full GBP50 million remains
available.

S&P's base case does not forecast any further drawings under the
RCF (beyond the GBP11.6 million already utilized for guarantees
and letters of credit).

The outlook is stable, reflecting S&P's view that the likelihood
of Matalan repurchasing portions of its debt at significantly
below par during the next 12 months has materially receded given
recent improvements in operating performance and the associated
increase in the trading prices of the company's bonds.  Over the
next 12 months S&P expects Matalan to continue to make moderate
improvements to earnings and cash flows, resulting in a modest
deleveraging to 6.0x-6.5x adjusted debt to EBITDA in the next 12
months and EBITDAR coverage of 1.2x-1.4x.  S&P also expects
Matalan will continue to generate positive FOCF.

S&P could lower the ratings if Matalan's earnings fail to grow as
S&P expects in FY 2018, which could reduce the likelihood of a
full, orderly refinancing of the existing capital structure.
This would likely be accompanied by negative FOCF generation.

A downgrade could also be forthcoming were Matalan or its
shareholders to complete further debt repurchase transactions at
significantly below par value within the next 12 months.  This
could trigger a downgrade to 'SD' (selective default).
Alternatively, if the company were to announce a broad
restructuring of its capital structure, S&P could lower the
corporate credit rating to 'CC'.

S&P could consider an upgrade if the company improved its
operating performance over the next few quarters, demonstrating
that management's strategic initiatives had allowed Matalan to
maintain its market position and sustainably turn around
performance.  This would allow the company to deleverage
sustainably and ensure the viability of the capital structure in
the long term.  Specifically, any positive rating action would be
contingent on Matalan reducing adjusted leverage toward 5.0x and
continued generation of positive reported FOCF, whilst also
maintaining adequate liquidity.

   -- The GBP342 million senior secured notes have an issue
      rating of 'CCC+' and a recovery rating of '4'.  This
      reflects S&P's expectations of average recovery (30%-50%;
      rounded estimate 45%).  The recovery rating is supported by
      the limited amount of prior ranking liabilities but
      constrained by the company's low visibility of earnings and
      the intrayear seasonality of cash flow.

   -- The GBP150 million second-lien notes (of which GBP138
      million remain outstanding) have an issue rating of 'CCC-'
      and a recovery rating of '6'.  The recovery rating reflects
      the notes' subordination to the GBP342 million senior
      secured notes and GBP50 million revolving credit facility.
      The recovery prospects for the notes remains 0%.

   -- S&P's hypothetical default scenario assumes a default in
      2018 and is predicated on a deterioration in macroeconomic
      conditions in the U.K., accompanied by increased
      competition and cost inflation, which Matalan is unable to
      pass onto customers.

   -- S&P continues to value Matalan as a going concern given its
      reasonable level of brand recognition in the U.K. value
      retail segment, and the high participation rate of its
      customers in its customer loyalty program.  S&P continues
      to use a 4.0x multiple of our projected emergence EBITDA to
      value the business after emergence from default.

   -- Simulated year of default: 2018
   -- Implied enterprise value multiple: 4.0x
   -- EBITDA at emergence: GBP58 million
   -- Jurisdiction: U.K.

   -- Net enterprise value at default (after 5% administrative
      costs): GBP220 million
   -- Collateral value available to secured creditors:
      GBP220 million
   -- Priority claims: GBP44 million (1) (2)
   -- First-lien secured debt claim: GBP354 million (1)
      -- Recovery expectations: 30%-50% (rounded estimate: 45%)
   -- Unsecured debt claim: GBP144 million
      -- Recovery expectations: 0%-10% (rounded estimate: 0%)

(1) All debt amounts include six months of prepetition interest.
(2) Includes RCF assumed 85% drawn at default.


* UK: Transition Deal Needed to Avert Business Insolvencies
-----------------------------------------------------------
A transition deal on goods and services between the UK and the EU
is needed to prevent a possible sharp rise in the number of UK
business insolvencies in 2019, according to Euler Hermes, the
world's leading trade credit insurer.

Euler Hermes defines a transition deal as a bridge solution in
which the UK will remain in the Single Market in exchange for
continued EU contributions, maintenance of some of the
regulations and no migration control until a final trade deal is
concluded, perhaps as early as 2021. The company believes a
transitional agreement is needed as the UK will officially exit
the EU as soon as 2019.

Ana Boata, European economist at Euler Hermes, commented: "The
General Election result has tempered the threat of a hard Brexit
to some degree, and supports our view that a transition deal is
the most likely scenario and that negotiations will lead to a
limited free trade agreement.  In the short-term, the political
uncertainty presented by the result could trigger an increase in
financial volatility and further sterling swings, which have
epitomized market stress around Brexit."

Its economic insight, "The Taming Of The Brexit", forecasts a
number of scenarios for the UK economy.  In the worst case
scenario, leaving the EU on World Trade Organisation (WTO) terms
after the two-year negotiating period finishes in 2019, could
result in 3,300 additional British companies falling into
bankruptcy.  This 15 per cent rise year-on-year would increase
total insolvencies to 25,100 businesses.

However, the research predicts that signing such an agreement
with the EU by March 2019 will significantly soften the negative
economic impact of exiting the EU.  Insolvency levels could rise
by just 3 per cent (less than 1,000 additional companies
bankrupted) after increasing by 5 per cent and 6 per cent in 2017
and 2018 respectively.  Inward investment is forecast to fall by
2.5 per cent, according to the research.  Exports would continue
to grow at 1.6 per cent in 2019 in real terms, a positive if
relatively weak performance, given British companies' dependency
on imported goods and the depreciation of sterling.

Failure to agree a transition deal could result in export losses
in 2019 of GBP30 billion for goods and GBP36 billion for
services.  In real terms this would mean a drop of 6 per cent for
total exports on the previous year, according to the research.
The report predicts that the level of inward investment in
British companies would fall by 8 per cent.

Ana Boata added: "In the long term the UK will clearly be worse
off if access to the Single Market is restricted.  Rising
financing costs, divestment, a significant decline in exports and
further falls in the value of sterling will increase the pressure
on terms of payment, turnovers and profit margins of UK
companies.

"The new government must endeavour to settle on a transition deal
as it will be next to impossible for the UK and EU to finalise
and ratify a free trade agreement in the next two years at the
same time as finalizing the EU exit.  By avoiding legal
uncertainty and keeping trading arrangements with the EU
unchanged, the UK economy would stay resilient for the duration.
It allows more time for negotiations for a positive outcome for
the next trade partnership.  In our view, this will translate
into tariffs on selective goods -- 2% to 3% tariffs on average --
and some add-ons on services."

Euler Hermes expects the UK would fall into recession in 2019
following a Brexit with no deal (WTO terms), with GDP predicted
to contract by 1.2 per cent and lasting for at least three
consecutive years, according to the findings.  A transition
agreement would still result in a slowdown, but the economy would
continue to grow at 0.9 per cent.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Landmarks in Medicine - Laity Lectures
-----------------------------------------------------
Introduction by James Alexander Miller, M.D.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 355 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry
Order your own personal copy today at http://bit.ly/1sTKOm6
As the subtitle points out, the seven lectures reproduced in this
collection are meant especially for general readers with an
interest in medicine, including its history and the cultural
context it works within. James Miller, president of the New York
Academy of Medicine which sponsored the lectures, states in his
brief "Introduction" that this leading medical organization "has
long recognized as an obligation the interpretation of the
progress of medical knowledge to the public." The lectures
collected here succeed admirably in fulfilling this obligation.
The authors are all doctors, most specialists in different areas
of medicine. Lewis Gregory Cole, whose lecture is "X-ray Within
the Memory of Man," is a consulting roentgenologist at New York's
Fifth Avenue Hospital. Harrison Stanford Martland is a professor
of forensic medicine at New York University College of Medicine.
Many readers will undoubtedly find his lecture titled "Dr. Watson
and Mr. Sherlock Holmes" the most engrossing one. Other doctor
authors are more involved in academic areas of medicine and
teaching. Reginald Burbank is the chairman of the Section of
Historical and Cultural Medicine at the New York Academy of
Medicine. He lectured on "Medicine and the Progress of
Civilization." Raymond Pearl, whose selection is "The Search for
Longevity," is a professor of biology at Johns Hopkins
University.

The authors' high professional standing and involvement in
specialized areas do not get in the way of their aim to speak to
a general audience. They are all skilled writers and effective
communicators. As the titles of some of the lectures noted in the
previous paragraph indicate, the seven selections of "Landmarks
in Medicine" focus on the human-interest side of medicine rather
than the scientific or technological. Even the two with titles
which seem to suggest concern with technical aspects of medicine
show when read to take up the human-interest nature of these
topics.

"The Meaning of Medical Research", by Dr. Alfred E. Cohn of the
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, is not so much about
methods, techniques, and equipment of medical research, but is
mostly about the interinvolvement of medical research, the
perennial concern of individuals with keeping and recovering good
health, and social concerns and pressures of the day. "The
meaning of medical research must regard these various social and
personal aspects," Cohn writes. In this essay, the doctor does
answer the questions of what is studied in medical research and
how it is studied. And he answers the related question of who
does the research. But his discussion of these questions leads to
the final and most significant question "for what reason does the
study take place?" His answer is "to understand the mechanisms at
play and to be concerned with their alleviation and cure." By
"mechanisms," Cohn means the natural--i. e., biological--causes
of disease and illness. The lay person may take it for granted
that medical research is always principally concerned with
finding cures for medical problems. But as Cohn goes into in part
of his lecture, competition for government grants or professional
or public notoriety, the lure of novel experimentation, or
research mainly to justify a university or government agency can,
and often do, distract medical researchers and their associates
from what Cohn specifies should be the constant purpose of
medical research. Such purpose gives medicine meaning to
humankind.

The second lecture with a title sounding as if it might be about
a technical feature of medicine, "X-ray Within the Memory of
Man," is a historical perspective on the beginnings of the use of
x-ray in medicine. Its author Lewis Cole was a pioneer in the
development of x-rays in the late 1800s and early1900s. He mostly
talks about the development of x-ray within his memory. In doing
so, he also covers the work of other pioneers, notably William
Konrad Roentgen and Thomas Edison. Roentgen was a "pure
scientist" who discovered x-rays almost by accident and at first
resented the application of his discovery to practical uses such
as medical diagnosis. Edison, the prodigious inventor who was
interested only in the practical application of scientific
discoveries, and his co-worker Clarence Dally enthusiastically
investigated the practical possibilities of the discoveries in
the new field of radiation. Dally became so committed to his work
in this field that he shortly developed an illness and died. At
the time, no on knew about the dangers of prolonged exposure to
x-rays. But sensing some connection between his co-worker's
untimely death and his work with x-rays, Edison stopped his own
investigations.

Cole himself became involved in work with x-rays during his
internship at Roosevelt Hospital in New York City in 1898 and
1899. His contribution to this important field was in the area of
interpretation of what were at the time primitive x-rays and
diagnosis of ailments such as tuberculosis and kidney stones.
Cole writes in such a way that the reader feels she or he is
right with him in the steps he makes in improving the use of x-
rays. He adds drama and human interest to the origins of this
important medical technology. The lecture "Dr. Watson and Mr.
Sherlock Holmes" uses the popular mystery stories of Arthur Conan
Doyle to explore the role of medicine in solving crimes,
particularly murder. In some cases, medical tests are required to
figure out if a crime was even committed. This lecture in
particular demonstrates the fundamental role played by medicine
in nearly all major areas of society throughout history. The
seven collected lectures have broad appeal. All of them are
informative and educational in an engaging way. Each is on an
always interesting topic taken up by a professional in the field
of medicine obviously skilled in communicating to the general
reader. The authors seem almost mind readers in picking out the
most fascinating aspects of their subjects which will appeal to
the lay readers who are their intended audience. While meant
mainly for lay persons, the lectures will appeal as well to
doctors, nurses, and other professionals in the field of medicine
for putting their work in a broader social context and bringing
more clearly to mind the interests, as well as the stake, of the
public in medicine.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *