TCREUR_Public/170815.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, August 15, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 161



ATABANK: Fitch Cuts IDR to CCC on Weak Post-Merger Credit Profile


NOVARTEX SAS: Moody's Hikes CFR to Caa3, Outlook Stable


ENDO INT'L: S&P Cuts CCR to 'B' & Secured Debt Rating to 'BB-'


GAMENET SPA: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B' Corp Credit Rating


BAITEREK HOLDING: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB-/B' ICR


ARMACELL HOLDCO: S&P Affirms 'B' LT Corporate Credit Rating


JUBILEE CDO VII: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1(sf)
REFRESCO GROUP: Moody's Confirms Ba3 CFR, Outlook Negative
VIMPELCOM HOLDINGS: Moody's Gives Def. Ba2 Unsec. Rating to Bonds


ENERGETICHESKAYA: Court Applies for Observation Proceedings

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Liquidators Commence Legal Action
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Narrows Losses Following Rescue Deal
FAIRPOINT GROUP: Enters Into Administration, CEO to Exit Board
MOVETTE: High Court Puts Business Under Liquidation
TATA STEEL: Reaches Deal to Restructure British Pension Fund



ATABANK: Fitch Cuts IDR to CCC on Weak Post-Merger Credit Profile
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Azerbaijan-based Atabank OJSC's (AB)
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CCC' from 'B-' and
affirmed Expressbank Open Joint Stock Company's (EB) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook.


IDRs and VRs


The downgrade of AB reflects Fitch's view that the post-merger
credit profile has turned out to be weaker than previously
anticipated and no longer commensurate with the 'B-' rating level.
Specifically, asset quality is worse than expected due to
additional deterioration in 1H17, offsetting the positive impact
from the merger with the stronger-capitalised Caspian Development
Bank OJSC (CDB), with the volume of unreserved non-performing
loans (NPLs, 90+ days overdue) equaling a high 1.2x Fitch core
capital (FCC) at end-1H17.

Fitch also estimates that cash-based (excluding non-received
accrued interest) pre-impairment profitability was about breakeven
in 2016-1H17, which makes reserving of problem loans challenging
without external capital support.

AB's NPLs increased significantly to 42% of total gross loans at
end-1H17, from 14% at end-2015, while the loan book grew 14% in
the same period with more than 40% of this growth being
uncollected accrued interest. Reserve coverage of NPLs weakened to
26% at end-1H17 from 39% at end-2015 and their additional
provisioning could erode the bank's capital position. Even after
the merger with CDB in May 2017 and a further AZN20 million equity
injection in 1H17, AB's unreserved NPLs were a significant 1.2x
FCC at end-1H17 (end-2015: 0.8x FCC).

Following a review of the bank's 25 largest corporate exposures
Fitch identified that about 26% of gross loans at end-1H17,
although not NPLs, were potentially high-risk (project finance,
foreign currency loans to unhedged borrowers and non-amortising
bullet repayment loans). Loans to related parties (excluding those
considered higher-risk) equalled a further 4% of gross loans at
end-1H17. The lower-risk corporate loans (15% of gross loans) were
mostly guaranteed by the state or fully covered by pledged
deposits. The performance of AB's retail portfolio (21% of gross
loans) is also weak with around a third of them being NPLs at end-

AB's post-merger regulatory tier 1 and total capital ratios were
21.4% and 22.9%, respectively (regulatory minimums are 5% and 10%)
at end-1H17, up from 12.8% and 14.2% at end-4M17. However, this
should be viewed together with the bank's significantly increased
unreserved NPLs, other high-risk loans and weak core earnings.
Fitch estimates that at end-1H17 AB's regulatory capital would
allow the bank to reserve only around half of unreserved NPLs.

Internal capital generation capacity is weak due to modest
earnings (return on average equity (ROAE) of 3.2% in 1H17, -0.6%
in 2016) with a sizable part of interest income not received in
cash (around 41% in 2016). Fitch estimates that cash-based
(excluding not received accrued interest) pre-impairment profit
was negative in 2016 and is likely to have remained weak in 1H17
and unable to absorb loan impairment losses to cover NPLs, which
in turn would eat into capital.

AB's liquidity is tight after funding outflows in 4Q15-1H16. The
bank's total available liquidity net of potential debt repayments
equaled a low 6.2% of non-related customer accounts (excluding
deposits pledged as collateral against loans). This is
particularly weak in light of the bank's rather concentrated
customer funding and largely long-term nature of the bank's
corporate book.


The affirmation of EB's ratings reflects only limited changes to
its credit profile over the last 12 months. The ratings take into
account EB's limited franchise in the difficult Azerbaijan
operating environment and a high level of related-party lending.
Positively, the ratings reflect EB's solid capital buffer, still
reasonable, albeit moderately deteriorating, asset quality,
limited exposure to foreign currency lending and ample liquidity.
The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation that, despite the
potential for some further asset quality deterioration, this
should be covered by pre-impairment profits and additionally
mitigated by the bank's solid capital buffer.

EB's corporate loan book (55% of gross loans at end-1Q17) is
reportedly performing with zero NPLs. It almost entirely consists
of exposures to the bank's main corporate shareholder and its
subsidiaries (79% of FCC), including a large construction company
engaged in infrastructure construction and to a start-up
diversified production plant, the development of which is
supported by the government. In addition, EB issued a AZN30
million uncovered guarantee in favour of these related companies
(around 22% of FCC).

Positively, total related-party exposure decreased to AZN139
million (101% of FCC) at end-1Q17 from AZN192 million (138% of
FCC) at end-2015, and may decrease further due to the gradual
phasing-in (by mid-2018) of the regulatory deduction of related-
party exposures from Tier 1 capital for capital adequacy purposes.
These borrowers reportedly target repaying foreign currency loans
first, thus also reducing EB's foreign currency risks.

Retail NPLs decreased significantly to 6% of total retail loans
(almost fully covered by reserves) at end-1Q17 from a high 20% at
end-1H16, due to large write-offs. However, NPL generation - a
good proxy for credit losses and calculated as the net increase in
NPLs plus write offs and divided by average performing loans,-
increased in 1Q17 to 17% (annualised) from 11% in 2016, indicating
ongoing deterioration.

EB's robust capital position, as expressed by its high FCC ratio,
further improved to around 50% at end-2016 from 43% at end-2015
following a moderate 14% deleveraging. Near-term loan growth
potential is limited, and the FCC ratio is unlikely to
significantly decrease in the next couple of years. However,
regulatory capitalisation is lower due to deduction of half of
related-party exposure at end-1Q17. The bank plans to reduce the
related-party exposure to avoid taking a bigger hit on regulatory

EB is funded by customer deposits (87% of total liabilities at
end-1Q17) and liquidity risks are mitigated by a sizeable net
liquidity buffer, which was sufficient to repay a high 44% of
customer funding at end-1Q17, and by rapid retail loan turnover.
Wholesale funding (11% of end-1Q17 liabilities) is sourced
domestically and likely to be rolled over.


AB and EB

The SRFs of 'No Floor' and SRs of '5' for both banks reflect their
limited scale of operations and market shares. Although Fitch
believes some regulatory forbearance may be available for these
banks, in case of need, any extraordinary direct capital support
from the Azerbaijan authorities is very uncertain. This view is
also supported by the recent default of International Bank of
Azerbaijan (IBA; 'Restricted Default'; See 'Fitch Downgrades
International Bank of Azerbaijan to 'RD'' on May 24, 2017, on, which is the largest bank in the country
and government-owned, meaning that state support for less
systemically-important privately-owned banks cannot be relied
upon. The potential for support from the banks' private
shareholders is not factored into the ratings.


Positive rating action for EB would be contingent on substantial
franchise development through growth of third-party business, a
reduction in volumes of operations with affiliated parties and a
moderation of asset quality risks.

At both banks, capital depletion as a result of further asset
quality deterioration (more likely in AB) may lead to negative
rating actions. Negative rating pressure for AB could also stem
from a further liquidity squeeze.

Fitch believes that positive rating actions on the banks' SR and
SRFs are unlikely in the near-term.

The rating actions are:

Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B', Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

Long-Term IDR: downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B-'
Short-Term IDR: downgraded to 'C' from 'B'
Viability Rating: downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'


NOVARTEX SAS: Moody's Hikes CFR to Caa3, Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Novartex S.A.S.' corporate
family rating (CFR) to Caa3 from C and probability of default
rating (PDR) to Caa3-PD from Ca-PD. Concurrently, Moody's has
confirmed the Caa3 instrument rating on the EUR500 million senior
bonds due in October 2021 (the new money bonds) issued by Vivarte,
a subsidiary of Novartex. The outlook on the ratings is stable.

The rating action concludes the review for upgrade initiated on
July 4, 2017 following Moody's review of the company's strategy
and financial policy, including potential disposals, projected
liquidity position over the short- to medium-term, and amended
legal terms and conditions of the new money bonds and fiducie
agreement post restructuring.

The restructuring closed on June 20, 2017 and resulted in the
conversion of EUR780 million of reinstated debt maturing in
October 2020 into common equity. In addition, Novartex' lenders
agreed to convert the EUR800 million bonds redeemable into NRD B
Preferred Shares into common equity, while the shareholders' loan
was downsized to EUR1.6 million from EUR2 million. Before the
conversion of the preferred shares, Moody's had treated both the
preferred shares and shareholders' loan as debt as the instruments
did not meet Moody's published criteria for equity treatment.


"The two-notch upgrade of Novartex' CFR mainly reflects the
significant improvement in the company's adjusted gross leverage
to 6.1x as projected by Moody's by fiscal year (FY) end August 31,
2017 following the completion of the debt restructuring from close
to 11x prior to the transaction", says Sebastien Cieniewski,
Moody's lead analyst for Novartex.

Nevertheless Moody's believes that the rating remains constrained
by (1) the company's track record of prolonged decline in like-
for-like sales over the last three years in the context of
challenging trading and competitive environments, (2) the
vulnerability of the business to unfavorable weather conditions
which has historically led to a significant volatility in
earnings, (3) the elevated risk of default over the next two years
driven by the fact that Novartex is operating under limited
headroom under covenants set up in the amended terms and
conditions of new money bonds and fiducie agreement, and (4) the
expectation that the company will continue generating a negative
free cash flow (FCF) over at least the next 12-18 months mainly
due to significant restructuring charges related to store closures
and social plans.

Post restructuring, Novartex will operate under tight covenants as
set up in the new money bonds and fiducie agreements, including
the requirement (1) to meet certain minimum weekly and monthly
liquidity tests, with the latter set at EUR95 million (or EUR75
million in the third quarter of each fiscal year), (2) to meet
maximum leverage tests, and (3) to repay EUR300 million of new
money bonds by October 2019. Failure to meet these requirements
could lead to the launch of a forced market sale process or the
equitisation of the new money bonds. The repayment of EUR300
million of new money bonds by October 2019 will rely on the
ability of Novartex to dispose of some of its banners starting
from Naf Naf and Merkal, which have been put up for sale earlier
in 2017. Moody's notes, however, that such disposals are subject
to execution risk, including lower-than-expected consideration and
delayed closing of the sale.

While Moody's forecasts an improvement in EBITDA (as calculated by
the company pre-restructuring charges) to approximately EUR75
million for FY 2017 compared to EUR54 million in the prior year,
the rating agency considers that a return to a sustainable
recovery remains uncertain. The higher EBITDA in FY 2017 should be
driven by (1) the positive sales momentum in Q4 2017 vs.
relatively weak comparables in the same period last year as well
as (2) cost savings, including those generated from the closure of
non-performing stores during the year.

Novartex' liquidity position has been deteriorating over the last
12 months. The cash balance declined to EUR167 million as of
May 31, 2017 from EUR288 million a year earlier and Moody's
projects FCF to remain negative over the next 12-18 months.
Despite the potential relief provided by the PIK toggle feature of
the amended new money bonds -- to be activated if the monthly cash
position is projected below EUR95 million at any point over the
following 6-month period - and the intention of management to
maintain capital expenditures at below 4% of sales, Moody's
believes that high restructuring charges will continue to
constrain FCF generation in FY 2018. In that context, the cash
flow from the disposal of banners is important to support
Novartex' liquidity position and to face large working capital
swings related to the seasonality of the business.

The Caa3 rating on the EUR500 million new money bonds, at the same
level as the CFR, reflects the absence of any significant non-debt
liabilities ranking ahead or behind. The new money bonds do not
benefit from guarantees from operating subsidiaries, however, they
are secured by a pledge over receivables related to intercompany
loans down-streaming the proceeds of the notes to the operating
subsidiaries. At the level of the operating companies, these
intercompany loans rank pari passu with the other operating
liabilities, except for up to EUR80.2 million of trade payables,
which are guaranteed by letters of credit, ranking ahead.

The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that Novartex' operating performance will not experience any
significant deterioration and that it will be able to maintain its
liquidity position above the minimum covenant threshold over the


Upward pressure on the ratings is unlikely in the short-term. Over
time, Novartex' ratings could be upgraded if (1) the company
generates sufficient proceeds from the disposal of its banners to
meet the EUR300 million debt repayment requirement in October
2019, (2) the liquidity position stabilizes as FCF breaks even,
and (3) LfL sales experience growth on a sustained basis.

Downward pressure on the ratings could result from (1) a
deterioration in Novartex' liquidity position due to larger-than-
expected negative FCF generation and (2) a higher probability that
Novartex will not meet its minimum liquidity tests or its debt
repayment requirement by October 2019 in the absence for example
of significant proceeds generated from disposal well in advance of
the deadline.


The principal methodology used in these ratings was Retail
Industry published in October 2015.

Novartex is a leading France-based footwear and apparel retailer
focusing on city centre boutiques and out-of-town stores. In FY
2016, the company generated revenues of EUR2.2 billion and
statutory EBITDA of EUR54 million (corresponding to EUR279 million
on a Moody's-adjusted basis, primarily after the capitalization of
operating leases).


ENDO INT'L: S&P Cuts CCR to 'B' & Secured Debt Rating to 'BB-'
S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit rating on Dublin,
Ireland-based pharmaceutical company Endo International PLC (Endo)
to 'B' from 'B+'. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we lowered our issue-level rating on
Endo's senior secured debt to 'BB-' from 'BB'. The recovery rating
on this debt remains '1', indicating our expectations for very
high (90%-100%; rounded estimate: 90%) recovery in the event of
payment default. In addition, we lowered our issue-level rating on
the company's unsecured debt to 'CCC+' from 'B-'. The recovery
rating on this debt remains '6', reflecting our expectation for
negligible (0%-10%; rounded estimate: 0%) recovery in the event of
payment default."

Endo is the fourth-largest generic pharmaceutical company and a
competitor in the specialty branded market with a small
international presence in select markets. The company's businesses
have been negatively affected by continued generic pricing
pressures and increased scrutiny on opioid prescriptions. Endo is
seeing double-digit growth in its higher-margin specialty drug
franchise, highlighted by growth in products such as Xiaflex and
Supprelin (treatments for Peyronie's disease/Dupuytren's
contracture and precocious puberty, respectively). S&P said,
"However, we expect gains will be largely offset by price and
volume declines in its base generic drug and branded pain
management portfolios."

S&P added, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation for lower
revenue and EBITDA over the next year due to continued price
erosion, lower market shares, and asset divestitures. We also
expect an increase in adjusted leverage to over 6.0x reflecting
the higher mesh obligations."

Downside scenario

S&P said, "We could lower the rating if we see a trajectory of
sustained revenue contraction or EBITDA erosion. We believe this
could result from intensified generic price erosion coupled with a
significant decline in volumes in the pain management segment
without successful product launches. Alternatively, we could
downgrade the company if its cash flows weaken materially beyond
our expectations as a result of significant litigation costs."

Upside scenario

S&P said, "Although unlikely over the next year, we could raise
the rating if we see a trajectory of top-line and free cash flow
growth. In our view, this could happen if the generic industry
stabilizes and the company achieves better-than-expected new
product launches while achieving targeted cost efficiencies."


GAMENET SPA: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B' Corp Credit Rating
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating on Italy-based gaming and betting operator Gamenet SpA.

S&P subsequently withdrew the rating on Gamenet SpA at the parent
company Gamenet Group SpA's request, as currently debt is issued
and the accounts are reported at the parent level. Therefore
Gamenet Group SpA is now the only rated entity in the group.

The outlook was stable at the time of withdrawal.


BAITEREK HOLDING: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB-/B' ICR
S&P Global Ratings, on Aug. 11, 2017, affirmed its long- and
short-term foreign and local currency issuer credit ratings on
Kazakhstan's Baiterek Holding (Baiterek, or the holding company)
at 'BB-/B'. S&P said, "At the same time, we affirmed the
Kazakhstan national scale ratings at 'kzBBB+'. We subsequently
withdrew the ratings at the issuer's request.

"At the time of the withdrawal, the ratings on Baiterek Holding
reflected our view that the Baiterek group remains an essential
government tool, and the likelihood of the group receiving
extraordinary support from the government remains almost certain.
The ratings on Baiterek Holding incorporate several notches of
support, being higher than what its intrinsic, stand-alone
creditworthiness would warrant. We assess at 'b' the consolidated
group's creditworthiness on an autonomous basis, that is, without
factoring in the potential for extraordinary government support."

Nevertheless, the ratings also reflect the gradual decline in the
Kazakhstani government's willingness to provide resources for
timely debt service to the government-related entity (GRE) sector
in case of need. This is evidenced by the authorities'
comparatively limited involvement in ensuring a timely payment on
the obligations of several GREs in Kazakhstan over the past 18

The Baiterek group and its parent company Baiterek Holding were
established in 2013 by presidential decree. The group is
controlled by the government, which fully owns the holding
company. At present, there are 11 subsidiaries under the holding
company, which can be broadly characterized as development
institutions implementing several strategic government programs.
Specifically, the government mandates the group to:

-- Foster the development and diversification of the Kazakhstan

-- Support small and midsize enterprises (SMEs); and

-- Resolve some of the state's socially oriented tasks, in
    particular in the housing segment.

S&P assesses the consolidated group's creditworthiness (the group
credit profile [GCP]) at 'bb+', which is based on its view of the

-- Integral link with the government. The state owns 100% of
    Baiterek Holding, which in turn fully owns its subsidiaries
    (with the exception of one subsidiary, of which Baiterek
    Holding owns 97.7%). Being one of the three national
    management holdings in the country, Baiterek Holding has a
    special public status. A number of senior government
    officials are on the Baiterek board of directors, including
    the prime minister, first deputy prime minister, minister of
    investments and development, minister of finance, and the
    minister of the economy, among others. The government closely
    oversees the activities of the group.

-- Critical public policy role as a vehicle for implementing a
    number of strategic government programs. The subsidiaries of
    Baiterek Holding are involved in implementing several key
    national policies, including the Business Road Map 2020, the
    infrastructure program Nurly Zhol, and the new housing
    construction program Nurly Zher. Baiterek is also a financial
    operator for the State Program for Industrial and Innovative
    Development for 2015-2019 and plays a role in implementing
    the Program for Development of Productive Employment.

S&P said, "Our ratings on Baiterek Holding are two notches lower
than the 'bb+' GCP, reflecting the higher credit risks
characteristic of a nonoperating holding company compared with its
operating subsidiaries. These include the holding's reliance on
distributions from operating companies to meet its obligations. It
also reflects our perception of the group's importance for the
government as primarily stemming from the operating companies that
are directly involved in implementing government programs. In our
view, in a hypothetical scenario of the group being under stress,
the government may have incentives to support subsidiaries ahead
of the holding company.

"The holding company's role involves overseeing the implementation
of government programs, managing the subsidiaries, in particular
improving their financial performance, and removing any
duplication of functions. However, while we view this function as
important for the government -- as it improves the operational
efficiency of dealing with several development institutions -- we
do not view it as critical from a credit standing point of view."

In March 2017, Baiterek Holding adopted a new development strategy
through 2023. According to the document, Baiterek Holding will
continue to participate in the implementation of many government
programs. At the same time, the strategy explicitly states that
the holding needs to be optimized with a transfer of functions
that could be commercially fulfilled to the private sector,
reflecting the demands of President Nursultan Nazarbayev in his
speech in January 2017. The strategy also calls for a reduction of
state financing and increasing focus on borrowing from other
sources. S&P said, "That said, we expect the latter to be a
gradual process. The holding company has received both capital
contributions and loans on concessional terms in recent years and
we expect this will continue in the near future.

"The negative outlook on Baiterek Holding at the time of
withdrawal mirrored our outlook on the sovereign ratings on


ARMACELL HOLDCO: S&P Affirms 'B' LT Corporate Credit Rating
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating to Armacell Holdco Luxembourg S.a.r.l. (Armacell Holdco),
producer of flexible foam insulation products. The outlook is

S&P said, "We also affirmed our 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating Armacell Bidco Luxembourg S.a.r.l. (Armacell). The outlook
is stable.

"At the same time, we affirmed our 'B' issue ratings on Armacell's
senior secured debt, including its first-lien EUR100 million
revolving credit facility (RCF), its EUR482 million first-lien
term loan, and its EUR140 million first-lien debt. The '4'
recovery rating on these instruments remains unchanged, indicating
our expectation of recovery prospects of about 35% in the event of
a payment default.

"Lastly, we withdrew our 'B' long-term corporate credit rating on
Armacell International S.A."

S&P related, "The affirmation reflects our view that the group
should be able to strengthen its credit metrics over the next
couple of years, after a peak in debt to EBITDA following debt-
financed bolt-on acquisitions in 2016 and 2017.

"We estimate that Armacell's adjusted debt to EBITDA was about
7.5x (pro forma the acquisitions) at year-end 2016, but we think
it will reduce to about 6.5x by the end of 2017 and decrease
further to 5.5x-6.0x in 2018, which we view as commensurate with
the 'B' rating. The decline should occur as the company unlocks
synergies in the newly integrated group, continues to grow in its
global market, and repays some of its first-lien debt. The
repricing of debt and lower interest costs in the first quarter of
2017 will support stronger cash flows and better EBITDA interest
coverage ratios, in our opinion. We also foresee improvement in
the operating cash flow-to-debt ratio to about 10% in 2018. We see
such credit metrics in 2017-2018 as commensurate with the 'B'

"The ratings on Armacell continue to reflect our view of its
relatively limited scale and scope of operations compared with
global building materials producing peers and by its exposure to
the cyclical construction industry, which accounts for more than
50% of total revenues. These risks are partly mitigated by the
group's leading positions in the niche market of engineered foams,
with strong market shares above 30% in its key regions of
operation. Armacell also benefits from the geographic diversity of
its business, with a balanced presence and market-leading
positions in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA), the
Americas, and Asia-Pacific. Its relatively asset-light business
model and flexible cost base help it support stable profitability.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that, over the next 12
months, Armacell's profitability will continue to gradually
improve on the back of above-market-average growth in most
regions, synergies unlocked after recent acquisitions, and a
continued focus on cost savings. At the same time, we think that
the group will reduce its currently high debt to EBITDA to about
6.5x by the end of 2017.

"We could lower our rating on Armacell over the next 12 months if
we saw material margin erosion due to weakening markets in Europe
and Asia-Pacific. We could also consider a downgrade if large
debt-funded acquisitions or distributions to shareholders led to
leverage metrics substantially deviating from our base-case
scenario, such that we no longer anticipated that debt to EBITDA
would decrease to about 6.5x in 2017-2018.

"In our view, the potential for an upgrade is currently limited,
given the group's highly leveraged capital structure and
aggressive financial policy, owing to its private equity
ownership. Strong recurring free cash flow and adjusted debt to
EBITDA improving to below 5.0x, on a consistent basis, could be
positive for the rating over the long run."


JUBILEE CDO VII: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1(sf)
Moody's Investors Service has taken various actions on the ratings
of the following classes of notes issued by Jubilee CDO VII B.V.:

-- EUR50M (Current outstanding balance of EUR17.3M) Class B
    Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2016 Affirmed
    Aaa (sf)

-- EUR30M Class C Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 8,
    2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR31M Class D Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul
    8, 2016 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

-- EUR20M Class E Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul
    8, 2016 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Jubilee CDO VII B.V., issued in November 2006, is a Collateralised
Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield
senior secured European loans. The portfolio is managed by
Alcentra Limited. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
November 2012.


The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
significant deleveraging of the senior notes following
amortisation of the underlying portfolio over the past twelve

The Class A Notes have fully redeemed and Class B Notes paid down
by approximately EUR32.7M (65.4% of orginal balance) over the last
two payment dates. As a result of the deleveraging, over-
collateralisation has increased. As per the latest trustee report
dated June 2017, the Classes A/B, C, D and E OC ratios are
reported at 644.98%, 236.10%, 142.65% and 113.63%, respectively,
compared to 220.92%, 159.13%, 123.45% and 107.85% in the June 2016

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR110.51M,
defaulted par of EUR7.02M, a weighted average default probability
of 17.71% over a 3.73 years weighted average life (consistent with
a WARF of 2754), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
47.36% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 12
and a weighted average spread of 3.69%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance
and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analysing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed lower weighted average recovery rate for the
portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the weighted
average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs which
were unchanged for Classes B and C, and within one notch of the
base-case results for Classes D and E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

* Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.
Fast amortization would usually benefit the ratings of the
notes beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment

* Around 4.99% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed large
concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate as
described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in
Rated Transactions" published in October 2009 and available at

* Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's analysed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price or the
recovery rate to account for potential volatility in market
prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings.

* Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction maturity, the
liquidation value of such an asset will depend on the nature of
the asset as well as the extent to which the asset's maturity lags
that of the liabilities. Liquidation values higher than Moody's
expectations would have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

* Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors especially when they default. Because of the deal's low
diversity score and lack of granularity, Moody's supplemented its
typical Binomial Expansion Technique analysis with a simulated
default distribution using Moody's CDOROMTM software and an
individual scenario analysis.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

REFRESCO GROUP: Moody's Confirms Ba3 CFR, Outlook Negative
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Ba3 corporate family
rating (CFR) and the Ba3-PD probability of default rating (PDR) of
Refresco Group N.V., a leading independent manufacturer of soft
drinks and juices for A-brands and retailers.

Concurrently, Moody's has assigned Ba3 ratings to Refresco's new
senior secured facilities, which include a EUR200 million
revolving credit facility due 2023, a EUR1,300 million term loan
due 2024, and a USD620 million term loan due 2024. Proceeds from
the new debt will be used to fund the acquisition of Cott
Corporation's (B2 review for upgrade) bottling activities as well
as refinance existing debt.

The outlook on all ratings is negative. The confirmation of
Refresco's CFR and PDR concludes Moody's review initiated on July
27, 2017 following the announcement of the acquisition.

The confirmation of Refresco's Ba3 CFR with a negative outlook
reflects the high Moody's-adjusted debt / EBITDA of 5.2x at
closing of the acquisition (based on full-year 2016 accounts).
Moody's will consider stabilising the outlook if the Moody's-
adjusted debt / EBITDA reduces below 4.5x on a sustained basis,
supported by the envisaged new equity raise and merger synergies.


Moody's views the Ba3 CFR as weakly positioned given the increase
in the Moody's-adjusted debt / EBITDA to approximately 5.2x pro-
forma for the debt-funded acquisition from 3.4x on a stand-alone
basis (based on full-year 2016 accounts). The company intends to
reduce its reported net leverage to below 3.5x within two years of
closing from the reported net leverage of 4.5x at closing
supported by (1) its intention to raise EUR200 million of new
equity within 12 months of closing to reduce its gross
indebtedness, (2) EBITDA growth driven by estimated cost synergies
of EUR47 million of which 30% and 60% is expected to be realised
on a cumulative basis the first year and the second year
respectively after closing, and (3) free cash flow generation.

Moody's considers that there is scope for deleveraging towards
4.5x on Moody's-adjusted basis in the next 12 to 18 months but
cautions that the equity raise is subject to market conditions and
there are significant execution risks associated with the
integration of the target business given its scale and recent
history of growth challenges. The company is acquiring assets that
will likely require additional capex to offset under-investments
in the past two years as the traditional beverage business became
less strategic to the previous owner. It will also face challenges
to reinvigorate growth in a category that has been in secular
decline for nearly a decade. That being said, Moody's acknowledges
the company's good track record in terms of integration including
large scale acquisitions such as Gerber Emig in 2013, which
generated GBP650 million of revenues at the time of the
acquisition (based on full-year 2012 accounts).

Moody's also views the acquisition as positive to Refresco's
business profile owing to the increased scale, wider geographic
footprint and reduced customer concentration of the combined
group. The acquisition will also enable Refresco to become the
largest independent manufacturer of soft drinks for retailer
brands and A-brands in North America, where it made its first
entrance in July 2016 via the acquisition of Whitlock Packaging.
The combination of the two businesses will enable Refresco to be
the main consolidator of the regional market through further
investments and acquisitions. However, Moody's understands that
the company intends to focus on the integration of the acquired
activities before considering further large scale acquisitions.

Closing of the acquisition is expected by year-end 2017, subject
to anti-trust approval in various jurisdictions and approval of
Refresco's extraordinary general meeting to be held in early


The liquidity profile is adequate. At closing, Moody's expects
cash balances of approximately EUR124 million at closing and the
EUR200 million revolving credit facility to be undrawn. Moody's
also expects positive free cash flow generation and comfortable
financial covenant headroom over the next 12-18 months.


Applying the Moody's Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade
Companies methodology with a 50% recovery rate, the senior secured
credit facilities are rated Ba3, at the same level as the CFR
because they are the only debt class in the debt structure.


The negative outlook reflects the high Moody's-adjusted debt /
EBITDA of 5.2x at closing of the acquisition (based on full-year
2016 accounts). Moody's will consider stabilising the outlook if
the Moody's-adjusted debt / EBITDA reduces below 4.5x on a
sustained basis, driven by the planned new equity raise and merger


While unlikely in the near term given the weak rating positioning,
there could be positive pressure over time if (1) the Moody's-
adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio remains sustainably below 3.5x; and the
company maintains a financial policy consistent with this leverage
level; (2) the company sustains its Moody's-adjusted EBITA margin
at around 7%; and (3) maintains a solid liquidity profile
including positive free cash flow.

Conversely, the rating could be lowered if Refresco does not
launch the equity raise within 12 months of closing or is unable
to successfully integrate the acquired activities, resulting in
the debt/EBITDA ratio remaining sustainably above 4.5x. The rating
could also be lowered if underlying operating performance
deteriorates, resulting in falling margins, negative free cash
flow or liquidity concerns.


The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Soft
Beverage Industry published in January 2017.

Headquartered in Rotterdam, the Netherlands and listed on Euronext
Amsterdam, Refresco is a leading independent manufacturer of soft
drinks and juices for A-brands and retailers. It generated sales
and EBITDA (as reported) of EUR2.1 billion and EUR222 million
respectively in 2016 (approximately EUR3.6 billion and EUR350
million respectively pro-forma for the acquisition of Cott's
bottling activities based on USD/EUR exchange rate of 1.14).

VIMPELCOM HOLDINGS: Moody's Gives Def. Ba2 Unsec. Rating to Bonds
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive Ba2 senior
unsecured rating and LGD4 to the bonds issued by VimpelCom
Holdings B.V., a 100% indirectly-owned subsidiary of VEON Ltd.
(Ba2 stable), on June 16, 2017. The bonds were provisionally rated
by Moody's (P)Ba2 on May 30, 2017.

Moody's has also upgraded the senior unsecured rating on the
outstanding bonds of GTH Finance B.V. guaranteed by VimpelCom
Holdings B.V. to Ba2 (LGD4) from Ba3 (LGD5).

The action concludes the review for an upgrade of the Ba3 senior
unsecured rating of the outstanding bonds of GTH Finance B.V.
guaranteed by VimpelCom Holdings B.V. initiated by Moody's on May
30, 2017.

The outlook on all ratings is stable.

Moody's acknowledges that the steps completed by VEON to date
reflect a significant progress of the group in transitioning to a
new predominantly unguaranteed debt/capital structure.


In May 2017, VEON refinanced approximately $1.1 billion worth of
subsidiary RUB-denominated bank debt at VimpelCom Holdings B.V.
level, and repaid $0.6 billion of subsidiary or subsidiary-
guaranteed debt. In June, VEON successfully bought back $1.26
billion, or more than 50% of the bonds targeted during a tender
offer (USD-denominated 9.125% Loan Participation Notes issued by
VIP Finance Ireland Limited (the 2018 Notes), 7.748% Loan
Participation Notes issued by VIP Finance Ireland Limited (the
2021 Notes), and 7.5043% Guaranteed Notes issued by VimpelCom
Holdings B.V. (the 2022 Notes), all guaranteed by VimpelCom PJSC.
The buy-back was refinanced via a new bonds issue at VimpelCom
Holdings B.V. Subsequently, VEON terminated subsidiary VimpelCom
PJSC's (issuer rating Ba2 stable) "fall-away" guarantees on the
approximately $1.78 billion of bonds issued at the holding level.
As a result, guaranteed financial debt was reduced to
approximately 22% of the group's financial debt from more than 70%
previously (excluding debts at Global Telecom Holding S.A.E. and
its subsidiaries, where Moody's maintains separate CFRs).

Further steps, such as prepayment and/or repayment at maturity of
other debts within the next 6-7 months will help VEON to reduce
subsidiary and subsidiary-guaranteed financial debt to less than
15% of total financial debt of the group (excluding debts at
Global Telecom Holding S.A.E. and its subsidiaries).

Moody's expects VEON to complete the transformation of its
debt/capital structure by April 2018 and a move to a predominantly
unsecured and unguaranteed centralised group-financed model from
the previous subsidiary-financed model. VimpelCom Holdings B.V.
will act as the main borrower for the VEON group of companies, and
manage liquidity within the group by orchestrating distribution of
proceeds and managing group's repayments from diversified cash
flow sources including dividends, proceeds from the sale of assets
and intracompany loans. As a result of the restructuring, debt
investors now have a single credit reference and benefit from pari
passu credit ranking of the majority of the group's obligations.
As part of the process, VEON' currently significant foreign
exchange risks associated with debt/cash flow currency mismatch
should be reduced.


The stable outlook on VEON's ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that the company will sustainably maintain its leverage around
3.0x on an adjusted gross-debt basis and trend towards 2.0x on a
net-debt basis (unadjusted, consistent with the internal financial
policy), and adjusted RCF/Debt above 20%. The agency expects that
VEON will maintain a robust liquidity profile and address its
refinancing needs in a timely fashion.


A sustainable reduction in leverage measured by gross debt/EBITDA
towards 2.5x and below and strengthening of coverage metrics would
exert positive pressure on the ratings, provided that there are no
negative developments in the company's operating profile, market
positions and liquidity.

Conversely, a material deterioration in VEON's operating and
financial profile measured by (1) an increase in leverage measured
by gross debt/EBITDA above 3.5x, and (2) a weakening of RCF/debt
to below 20% on a sustained basis would put pressure on the
ratings. Moody's would assess any material acquisition/shareholder
distribution; such actions could exert negative pressure on the

The principal methodology used in these ratings was
Telecommunications Service Providers published in January 2017.

Headquartered in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, VEON Ltd. (VEON,
former VimpelCom Ltd.) is an international telecoms company
operating in 13 countries. It consolidates VimpelCom PJSC
(Russia), Kyivstar G.S.M. Joint Stock Company (Ukraine), and
Global Telecom Holding S.A.E., and operates in Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Italy, Algeria, Pakistan, and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). VEON operates in Italy via a 50/50 joint
venture with CK Hutchison Holdings Limited (A3 stable) - Wind Tre
S.p.A. (B1 positive). VimpelCom is 47.9% owned by LetterOne (not
rated), 19.7% by Telenor ASA (A3 stable), 8.3% by the Stichting
Administratiekantoor Mobile Telecommunications Investor (the
"Stichting") and 24.1% is in free float. In the last 12 months to
March 31, 2017, VimpelCom generated revenue of $9.1 billion and
Moody's-adjusted EBITDA of $3.9 billion.


ENERGETICHESKAYA: Court Applies for Observation Proceedings
A Russian Court has applied observation proceedings for
Energeticheskaya Russkaya Kompaniya.

OAO Energeticheskaya Russkaya Kompaniya (OAO ERKO or Russian
Energy Company OJSC) offers real estate leasing services.  The
company is based in Moscow, Russian Federation.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Liquidators Commence Legal Action
Rhiannon Bury at The Telegraph reports that liquidators for BHS
have begun legal action against Sir Philip Green's Arcadia retail

Papers have been filed in the High Court by lawyers representing
SHB Realisations, the holding company for BHS, which is now in the
hands of restructuring firm FRP Advisory, The Telegraph relates.

In the documents, SHB is named as the claimant and Arcadia Group,
Sir Philip's company which is behind shops such as Miss Selfridge
and Topshop, is the defendant, The Telegraph discloses.

After its collapse, BHS was placed into the hands of administrator
Duff & Phelps, before FRP Advisory was appointed as joint
administrator in July, The Telegraph recounts.

It was eventually appointed liquidator of BHS last December,
meaning it is handling the sale of the retailer's assets in order
to pay creditors, The Telegraph states.

Duff & Phelps had protested about an attempt to push the retailer
into liquidation amid claims that it could recover more money for
creditors without a duplication of adviser fees, The Telegraph

However, the Pension Protection Fund (PPF), the company's biggest
unsecured creditor, put pressure on the business to move into
liquidation, The Telegraph notes.

CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Narrows Losses Following Rescue Deal
Martin Flanagan at The Scotsman reports that the red ink has
continued at embattled Co-operative Bank as the lender on Aug. 10
put out its first earnings report since it recently sealed a
GBP700 million rescue deal with investors.

On the plus side, Co-op Bank reduced its losses to GBP135.2
million in the six months to end-June, down from GBP177 million a
year earlier, The Scotsman relates.  The group however is not out
of the woods as it has been revealed that the haemorrhaging of
customers and cash goes on against a backcloth of uncertainty
about the financial lifeline thrown to it by the former mutual's
hedge fund investors, The Scotsman notes.

Co-op Bank said it had lost about another 25,000 current account
customers since the end of 2016 and that GBP400 million of instant
access savings cash had been pulled out of the bank, The Scotsman
relays.  The lender, which has struggled since a GBP1.5 billion
shortfall was discovered in its balance sheet in 2013, put itself
up for sale earlier this year before the rescue deal was agreed
with the hedge funds and bondholders, The Scotsman recounts.

According to The Scotsman, Co-op Bank said on Aug. 10 that its
latest six-month trading performance had been hit by "retail
customer reaction to uncertainty" before and after that deal was
agreed in June.

Under the refinancing package agreed with its investors, which is
expected to complete next month, the wider Co-op Group, whose
businesses include food retail and funeral directors, will see its
residual stake in the finance arm contract from 20% to 1%, The
Scotsman discloses.  The lender has also agreed to divorce itself
from the Co-op Group's pension scheme, The Scotsman notes.

Co-op Bank has hailed the rescue deal as enabling it to meet
regulatory requirements on long-term capital cushions, and
allowing it to continue as a stand-alone bank, The Scotsman

                    About Co-operative Bank

The Co-operative Bank plc is a retail and commercial bank in the
United Kingdom, with its headquarters in Balloon Street,

In 2013-2014, the Bank was the subject of a rescue plan to
address a capital shortfall of about GBP1.9 billion.  The Bank
mostly raised equity to cover the shortfall from hedge funds.

In February 2017, the Bank's board announced that they were
commencing a sale process for the Bank and were "inviting

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported on February 17,
2017 that Moody's Investors Service downgraded Co-operative Bank
plc's standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) to ca from
caa2.  The downgrade of the bank's BCA to ca reflects Moody's
view that the bank's standalone creditworthiness is increasingly
challenged and that the bank will not be able to restore its
declining capital position without external assistance.

TCR-Europe also reported on July 5, 2017, Moody's Investors
Service has placed on review for upgrade Co-Operative Bank Plc's
Ca long-term senior unsecured debt rating, reflecting Moody's
expectation that the bank's recently announced capital raising
plan does not include a liability management exercise on senior
unsecured bonds, reduces the probability of the bank being placed
in resolution, and lowers the risk of loss on these instruments.
These developments are also reflected in Moody's review for
upgrade on the bank's ca standalone baseline credit assessment
(BCA), given the rating agency's expectations that the bank's
credit profile and risk-absorption capacity will improve if the
capital raising plan is implemented as announced.  Moody's has
placed on review direction uncertain the Caa2 long-term deposit
ratings, reflecting a different balance of risks for junior
deposit holders, who would benefit from the recapitalisation but
would be at risk of loss in a resolution, should the plan fail.
The short-term deposit ratings were unaffected by this action and
remain at Not Prime.

FAIRPOINT GROUP: Enters Into Administration, CEO to Exit Board
Fairpoint Group PLC disclosed that Sandy Kinninmonth, Lindsey
Cooper and Gareth Harris of RSM Restructuring Advisory LLP have
been appointed as joint administrators to Fairpoint Group plc.

The relevant business address of RSM Restructuring Advisory LLP is
3 Hardman Street, Manchester M20 3LD.

The company directors intend to continue to work with the
administrators of Fairpoint Group in order to try and preserve any
remaining stakeholder value.

As a result of the appointment of administrators, David Broadbent,
Chief Executive Officer, is to leave the Board with immediate
effect.  Furthermore, with mutual agreement by the Board, Shore
Capital and Corporate Limited has resigned as Nominated Adviser
and Shore Capital Stockbrokers Limited as Broker to the Company
with immediate effect.  Pursuant to AIM Rule 1, if a replacement
Nominated Adviser is not appointed within one month, the admission
of the Company's securities will be cancelled on AIM.  The Company
has no current intention of appointing a replacement Nominated

The suspension to trading in the Company's shares on AIM, as
announced on June 28, 2017, remains effective.

However, Simpson Millar and its subsidiary companies, (the "Legal
Businesses"), will continue to trade as going concerns through the
dedicated funding line provided by Doorway Capital.  The
appointment of administrators to Fairpoint Group will have no
impact on the day to day running of these businesses.  The client
services that Simpson Millar provides and the protections its
clients' enjoy are not in any way affected by the appointment of
administrators to Fairpoint Group.

The announcement will have no material impact on the planned
disposal of the IVA and Claims divisions to a third party, as
previously announced on August 4, 2017.

Headquartered in Adlington, UK, Fairpoint Group PLC provides
consumer debt reduction and management advice.

MOVETTE: High Court Puts Business Under Liquidation
CityA.M reports that a company that scammed more than GBP500,000
by pretending to be part of Google has been wound up in the High

According to CityA.M, Manchester-based Movette "misrepresented"
itself by claiming either to be an affiliate of the Silicon Valley
giant or that it worked on its behalf, managing the "Google My
Business" listings.

The company also "falsely stated or implied" that customers would
lose their existing services from Google if they did not pay up,
CityA.M relates.

Movette charged a fee of between GBP199 and GBP249 for a 12-month
contract, which automatically renewed, CityA.M discloses.  It
ignored or rejected requests for contracts to be cancelled and
used "offensive and threatening" debt collection methods. Its
financial records showed that it had received GBP537,00 during its
two-and-a-half year trading history, CityA.M relays.

An investigation found that a "significant volume of complaints"
had been made against Movette to regulatory bodies such as Action
Fraud and Trading Standards, CityA.M relates.

Colin Cronin, investigation supervisor with the Insolvency
Service, as cited by CityA.M, said: "Movette used deceptive
methods to persuade customers to sign up for its service,
including stating or implying that it represented or was connected
to Google.

"The company then made it difficult for customers to extract
themselves from rolling contracts and used debt collection methods
which were coercive and intimidatory.  These proceedings show that
the Insolvency Service will take firm action against companies
which operate in this manner."

TATA STEEL: Reaches Deal to Restructure British Pension Fund
Michael Pooler and Naomi Rovnick at The Financial Times report
that Tata Steel has agreed a deal to restructure its 130,000-
member British pension fund after nearly a year of negotiations.

The UK steelmaker, part of the Indian conglomerate, said it had
approval from regulators and the trustees of the GBP15 billion
British Steel Pension Scheme (BSPS) to offload the scheme into the
Pension Protection Fund, the government's pensions lifeboat, the
FT relates.

In return, Tata will inject GBP550 million into the old scheme and
the BSPS will own 33% of Tata Steel UK, the FT discloses.

A new defined benefit scheme, which provides a guaranteed income
in retirement, will also be set up but with lower annual increases
in income, the FT states.

The deal will clear the way for Tata to merge its European steel
business with German steelmaker ThyssenKrupp, the FT notes.

The legacy pension scheme has been a millstone around Tata's
British steelmaking business, which was threatened with closure
last year after global steel prices crashed due to oversupply, the
FT says.

Union members voted to accept the closure of the BSPS earlier this
year in an attempt to keep the tradition of iron and steelmaking
alive at Port Talbot and save 8,500 jobs across the company, which
also includes smaller mills throughout Wales and England, the FT

The settlement involves a rarely used legal mechanism, called a
regulated apportionment agreement, which allows an employer in
financial difficulties to rid itself of defined benefit pension
liabilities, the FT states.

According to the FT, a final deal was signed off by the trustee of
the BSPS, the UK pension regulator and the Pension Protection

The one remaining barrier to a definitive settlement is a 28-day
period for legal challenges, the FT discloses.

Tata Steel is the UK's biggest steel company.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at

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