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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, August 18, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 164


                            Headlines


D E N M A R K

DANSKE BANK: Moody's Hikes Preferred Stock Rating From Ba1


G E R M A N Y

AIR BERLIN: Lufthansa Plans to Buy Majority of Aircraft
AIR BERLIN: Germany Rejects Ryanair's "Conspiracy" Claims
AIR BERLIN: Takeover by Single Airline Unlikely, Minister Says
AIR BERLIN: Germany's Bridging Loan Enough to Ensure Flights


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO VIII: Fitch Affirms 'B+sf' Rating on Class E Notes
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2015-2: Moody's Gives (P)Ba2 Rating to Cl. D Notes
HARVEST CLO IX: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class F-R Notes
HARVEST CLO IX: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F-R Notes
HARVEST CLO X: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

CONTEGO CLO II: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Cl. F-R Notes
MONASTERY 2006-I: S&P Raises Class D Notes Rating to BB(sf)
ST. PAUL'S V: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class F Notes


R U S S I A

ALFA-BANK: Moody's Rates $700MM Loan Participation Notes B2(hyb)
CB RIABANK: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
STATE TRANSPORT: S&P Alters Outlook to Pos., Affirms BB-/B CCRs


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALBA 2015-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
MALACHITE FUNDING: S&P Puts Credit Ratings on Watch Negative
NEW LOOK: Moody's Lowers CFR to Caa1 on Weak Credit Metrics
* UK: 28% of East Midlands Businesses at Risk of Insolvency


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: The First Junk Bond


                            *********


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D E N M A R K
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DANSKE BANK: Moody's Hikes Preferred Stock Rating From Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Danske Bank A/S's long-term
deposit ratings to Aa3 from A1, and its long-term deposit note/ CD
program rating to (P)Aa3 from (P)A1. At the same time, the rating
agency upgraded the bank's long-term senior unsecured debt ratings
to A1 from A2, its long-term senior unsecured MTN to (P)A1 from
(P)A2 and its issuer rating to A1 from A2. Moody's also upgraded
the bank's junior subordinated debt to Baa2(hyb) from Baa3(hyb),
its preferred stock non-cumulative to Baa3(hyb) from Ba1(hyb), its
long-term counterparty risk assessment (CRA) to Aa2(cr) from
Aa3(cr) and affirmed all other ratings. The ratings upgrades
follow an upgrade in the bank's standalone baseline credit
assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA to a3 from baa1. The rating
agency also changed the outlook to stable from positive on Danske
Bank A/S's long-term deposit ratings, and maintained the positive
outlook on its long-term issuer rating and senior unsecured debt
ratings, due to the expectation of an increase in the volume of
senior unsecured debt over the outlook period.

At the same time, Moody's upgraded Danske Bank Plc's long-term
deposit ratings to Aa3 from A1, its senior unsecured MTN to (P)A1
from (P)A2 and its issuer rating to A1 from A2, subordinate MTN to
(P) Baa1 from (P)Baa2 and its long-term counterparty risk
assessment (CRA) to Aa2(cr) from Aa3(cr). The ratings upgrades
follow an upgrade in the bank's adjusted baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to a3 from baa1. The rating agency also affirmed
Danske Bank Plc's BCA at baa1, changed the outlook to stable from
positive on Danske Bank Plc's long-term deposit ratings, and
maintained the positive outlook on its long-term issuer rating,
due to the expectation of an increase in the volume of senior
unsecured debt over the outlook period.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE UPGRADE OF THE BCA AND ADJUSTED BCA

The upgrade of Danske Bank A/S's BCA to a3 from baa1 reflects the
continuing strengthening of its asset quality, capitalisation and
profitability, as the bank benefits from a balanced and well-
diversified lending portfolio. These improvements follow a
challenging period in the aftermath of the financial crisis, both
domestically and abroad. These improvements bring Danske's credit
profile in line with those of its large Nordic peers.

Moody's expect Danske Bank A/S's asset quality to record moderate
improvements in the next twelve months, supported by the domestic
economy, which is forecasted to grow by 1.8% in 2017, following
continued improvements in recent quarters: group problem loans as
a percentage of gross loans (as calculated by the bank) declined
to 2.0% at end-June 2017 from 2.3% at end-2016 and 3.0% at end-
2015. The bank's high historic problem loans ratio partially
reflects weak asset quality at its operations in the Republic of
Ireland (government bond rating A3 positive) and to some extent in
Northern Ireland (UK government bond rating Aa1 negative) and the
impact of the financial crisis in Denmark on its domestic
portfolio. The Irish and Northern Irish exposure have
significantly decreased and now represent around 3% of the loan
book.

The bank's regulatory capital should continue to benefit from the
normalization of the bank's profitability in 2017 and going
forward, increasing the bank's ability to absorb potential future
losses. At end-June 2017, its Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio
was 16.2%. well-above regulatory requirements.

Management's focus on reducing operating cost and a contained cost
of credit should continue to support a positive profitability
trend, mitigating margin pressure resulting from the current low
interest-rate environment in Denmark. During the first six months
of 2017, the bank's annualized net income to tangible assets was
0.6%, in line with the bank's Nordic peers.

RATIONALE FOR THE UPGRADE OF DEPOSITS, SENIOR UNSECURED DEBT AND
ISSUER RATINGS

The upgrade of Danske Bank A/S's long-term deposit ratings to Aa3
from A1 and the upgrade of the bank's senior unsecured debt and
issuer ratings reflects the upgrade of the BCA and Adjusted BCA to
a3 from baa1 previously.

Taking account of the group's consolidated balance sheet structure
at end-June 2017 and its near-term funding plan, Moody's Advanced
Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis indicates that Danske Bank A/S's
deposits are likely to face very low loss-given-failure, due to
the loss absorption provided by subordinated debt and,
potentially, by senior unsecured debt should deposits be treated
preferentially in a resolution, as well as the substantial volume
of deposits and senior debt themselves. This results in two
notches uplift.

Danske Bank A/S's senior unsecured debt is likely to face low
loss-given-failure due to the loss absorption provided by its own
volume and the amount of debt subordinated to it. This results in
one notch uplift.

Moody's assumption of a moderate probability of government support
for Danske Bank A/S's senior unsecured debt and deposits results
in a further one-notch uplift, leading to long-term deposit
ratings of Aa3 and long-term senior unsecured and issuer ratings
of A1.

RATIONALE FOR THE CR ASSESSMENT

As part of action, Moody's also upgraded Danske Bank A/S's long-
term CR Assessment at Aa2(cr) from Aa3(cr), and affirmed the
short-term CR Assessment at P-1(cr). The CR Assessment is driven
by the banks' standalone assessment based on the substantial
cushion against default provided to the senior obligations
represented by subordinated instruments, accounting for three
notches of uplift relative to the BCA, as well as one notch of
government support, in line with the agency's support assumptions
on the bank's deposits and senior unsecured debt.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Upward rating pressure could develop from significant improvements
in the bank's financial performance, including: (1) a further
decline in problem loans, supported by a decrease in agriculture
and oil-related exposures; (2) an improvement in the capital
leverage position, currently constrained by the large nominal size
of the bank's balance sheet; (3) a further increase in
profitability and reduced earnings volatility; and/or (4) A
further increase in the volume of senior unsecured debt over the
outlook period.

Downward rating pressure could arise from: (1) any renewed
pressure on asset quality, particularly in one of the bank's core
markets; (2) any indication that the firm will not deliver the
anticipated improvement in profitability; or (3) any sign that the
improvements achieved in recent years are not sustainable.

-- Danske Bank Plc

Moody's has upgraded Danske Bank Plc's long-term deposit ratings
to Aa3 from A1, its senior unsecured MTN to (P)A1 from (P)A2 and
its issuer rating to A1 from A2. The rating agency also upgraded
the subordinate MTN to (P) Baa1 from (P)Baa2 and its long-term
counterparty risk assessment (CRA) to Aa2(cr) from Aa3(cr). The
ratings upgrades follow an upgrade in the bank's adjusted baseline
credit assessment (BCA) to a3 from baa1. At the same time, the
rating agency affirmed Danske Bank Plc's BCA at baa1.


The rating agency also changed the outlook to stable from positive
on Danske Bank Plc's long-term deposit ratings, and maintained the
positive outlook on its long-term issuer rating, due to the
expectation of an increase in the volume of senior unsecured debt
over the outlook period.

The upgrade of the bank's adjusted BCA reflects Moody's "high"
assumption of affiliate support provided by the parent (Danske
Bank A/S), with a a3 BCA rated one notch higher than the one of
its Finnish subsidiary at baa1. The rating agency aligns the
subsidiary's long term ratings with that of its parent Danske Bank
A/S and assigns one notch of affiliate support uplift to Danske
Plc.

The affirmation of Danske Bank Plc's standalone BCA of baa1
reflects the bank's solid market position as Finland's third-
largest bank, stable earnings generation and sound asset quality.
Danske Bank Plc's profitability is relatively low. However,
Moody's expects that the implementation of restructuring measures
to improve cost efficiency and profitability, set against the low
pace of economic growth in the country, will drive a positive
trend in profits.

The upgrade of Danske Bank's long-term deposit rating to Aa3 from
A1 and issuer rating to A1 from A2 with a change in outlook to
stable from positive is based on the bank's Adjusted BCA of a3 and
the results of Moody's Advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis.

Danske Bank is subject to the Bank Recovery Resolution Directive
(BRRD) and Moody's expects its resolution to take place with a
Single Point of Entry (SPE) approach. Therefore, Moody's performs
the LGF analysis on the consolidated balance sheet of Danske Bank
group, including the Finnish operations. Moody's LGF analysis for
Danske Bank Plc indicates a very low loss-given-failure, resulting
in a two-notch uplift from the bank's adjusted BCA to the long-
term deposits and a one-notch uplift to senior unsecured ratings.
The LGF analysis assesses the banking group's own volume of
deposits and debt, and the volume of securities subordinated to
them in Moody's creditor hierarchy, which together offset the
decrease in government support assumptions.

As with its parent, Danske Bank A/S, Moody's continues to believe
that the probability of government support for Danske Bank Plc's
long-term deposits and senior unsecured debt is moderate,
resulting in a one-notch uplift included in the bank's A1 issuer
rating and Aa3 long-term deposit ratings.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Upward pressure on the ratings might develop if: (1) the bank is
able to strengthen its earnings generation without increasing its
risk profile; and/or (2) A further increase in the volume of
senior unsecured debt over the outlook period.

Downward rating pressure would emerge if: (1) the bank's
profitability deteriorates; (2) its asset quality deteriorates;
and/or (3) its risk profile increases, for example as a result of
increased exposures to more volatile sectors or increased
involvement in more risky operations such as capital market
activities.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

List of Affected Ratings

Upgrades:

Issuer: Danske Bank A/S

-- LT Bank Deposits, Upgraded to Aa3 Stable from A1 Positive

-- LT Issuer Rating, Upgraded to A1 Positive from A2 Positive

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to A1
    Positive from A2 Positive

-- LT Deposit Note/CD Program, Upgraded to (P)Aa3 from (P)A1

-- Junior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Baa2
    (hyb) from Baa3 (hyb)

-- Senior Unsecured MTN, Upgraded to (P)A1 from (P)A2

-- Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Upgraded to Baa3 (hyb) from Ba1
    (hyb)

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to a3 from baa1

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to a3 from baa1

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Upgraded to Aa2(cr) from
    Aa3(cr)

Issuer: Danske Bank A/S (London Branch)

-- LT Deposit Note/CD Program, Upgraded to (P)Aa3 from (P)A1

Issuer: Danske Bank Plc

-- LT Bank Deposits, Upgraded to Aa3 Stable from A1 Positive

-- LT Issuer Rating, Upgraded to A1 Positive from A2 Positive

-- Senior Unsecured MTN, Upgraded to (P)A1 from (P)A2

-- Subordinate MTN, Upgraded to (P)Baa1 from (P)Baa2

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to a3 from baa1

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Upgraded to Aa2(cr) from
    Aa3(cr)

Affirmations:

Issuer: Danske Bank A/S

-- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed P-1

-- BACKED ST Deposit Note/CD Program, Affirmed P-1

-- ST Deposit Note/CD Program, Affirmed (P)P-1

-- Commercial Paper, Affirmed P-1

-- Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)P-1

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed P-1(cr)

Issuer: Danske Bank Plc

-- ST Bank Deposits, Affirmed P-1

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed baa1

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed P-1(cr)

Issuer: Danske Corporation

-- BACKED Commercial Paper, Affirmed P-1

Issuer: Danske Bank A/S (London Branch)

-- ST Deposit Note/CD Program, Affirmed (P)P-1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Danske Bank A/S

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable(m) From Positive

Issuer: Danske Bank Plc

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable(m) From Positive

Issuer: Danske Bank A/S (London Branch)

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive



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G E R M A N Y
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AIR BERLIN: Lufthansa Plans to Buy Majority of Aircraft
-------------------------------------------------------
Sabine Wollrab at Reuters reports that Germany's Lufthansa is
considering buying a majority of insolvent Air Berlin's aircraft,
two people familiar with the matter said, as the government and
rivals race to carve it up.

Transport Minister Alexander Dobrindt backed Lufthansa to buy a
major portion of Air Berlin's assets, saying Germany needed a
"national champion" in international aviation, Reuters relates.

Mr. Dobrindt told daily newspaper Rheinische Post, "That is why it
is urgently necessary that Lufthansa can take over significant
parts of Air Berlin", Reuters relates.

Air Berlin's demise offers Lufthansa and rivals a chance to
acquire slots at airports such as Berlin Tegel and Duesseldorf,
with Germany's largest airline keen to defend its domestic
position against low-cost rival Ryanair, Reuters states.

According to Reuters, one of the people said on Aug. 17 said one
scenario Lufthansa's Chief Executive Carsten Spohr has presented
to the flagship carrier's supervisory board is that it could take
on as many as 90 of Air Berlin's roughly 140 planes, all of which
are leased.

That would include the 38 aircraft that Lufthansa is already
leasing from Air Berlin and its Niki division, Reuters notes.

"These are ideas that Lufthansa is bringing into the talks," the
source, as cited by Reuters, said, adding that no decisions had
been made yet and that it was ultimately up to Air Berlin's
administrator.

The other source said the number of aircraft that Lufthansa could
take on was lower than 90, Reuters relays.

Air Berlin itself has said it is in talks with three aviation
firms and aims to strike deals with at least two of them by the
end of September, Reuters discloses.

                        About Air Berlin

Air Berlin Plc is a Germany-based airline that is registered in
the United Kingdom. On August 15, 2017, Air Berlin's Board of
Directors filed with the competent local district court of
Berlin-Charlottenburg a petition for the opening of debtor-in-
possession insolvency proceedings.  In addition, a petition for
the opening of debtor-in-possession insolvency proceedings was
filed with the local district court of Berlin-Charlottenburg for
Air Berlin PLC & Co. Luftverkehrs KG and airberlin technik GmbH
and will be filed for further subsidiaries of the Air Berlin
group.  The Board has, after close evaluation, determined that
Air Berlin has no longer a positive continuation prognosis.  The
reason for this conclusion is that its main shareholder Etihad
Airways PJSC has notified Air Berlin of the fact that it will not
provide any further financial support to the Air Berlin group.


AIR BERLIN: Germany Rejects Ryanair's "Conspiracy" Claims
---------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that Germany on Aug. 16 rejected a
claim by budget airline Ryanair of a "conspiracy" behind efforts
to keep bankrupt rival Air Berlin afloat until a new owner is
found.

The Irish airline lodged a complaint with European Union
competition authorities after Air Berlin filed for bankruptcy
protection and then got a EUR150 million (US$177 million) loan
from the German government, AP relates.

According to AP, Ryanair said on Aug. 15 there's "an obvious
conspiracy" between the German government, Lufthansa and Air
Berlin.  The loan will help Air Berlin to keep flights running for
the next three months, while it is negotiating a possible deal
with Lufthansa and another unnamed carrier, reported by German
media to be easyJet, AP states.

A spokeswoman for Germany's Economy Ministry said it was "absurd"
to claim that the rescue package had been staged, the AP relays.
Beate Baron said the government expects the loan to Germany's
second-largest airline to be repaid, AP notes.

The airline, which carries some 80,000 people a day mostly on
short-haul destinations, made a loss of about EUR782 million last
year, AP discloses.

                        About Air Berlin

Air Berlin Plc is a Germany-based airline that is registered in
the United Kingdom. On August 15, 2017, Air Berlin's Board of
Directors filed with the competent local district court of
Berlin-Charlottenburg a petition for the opening of debtor-in-
possession insolvency proceedings.  In addition, a petition for
the opening of debtor-in-possession insolvency proceedings was
filed with the local district court of Berlin-Charlottenburg for
Air Berlin PLC & Co. Luftverkehrs KG and airberlin technik GmbH
and will be filed for further subsidiaries of the Air Berlin
group.  The Board has, after close evaluation, determined that
Air Berlin has no longer a positive continuation prognosis.  The
reason for this conclusion is that its main shareholder Etihad
Airways PJSC has notified Air Berlin of the fact that it will not
provide any further financial support to the Air Berlin group.


AIR BERLIN: Takeover by Single Airline Unlikely, Minister Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Nienaber at Reuters reports that German Deputy Economy
Minister Matthias Machnig was quoted as saying on Aug. 17 that the
assets of insolvent Air Berlin could not be bought by any one
competitor due to regulatory reasons.

According to Reuters, Mr. Machnig told German media group Funke,
"It is quite clear that there won't be a takeover of Air Berlin by
a single airline."

"This is necessary and correct for antitrust and competitive
reasons."

Media reports said on Aug. 17 that Germany's Lufthansa is in talks
to buy a majority of Air Berlin's assets such as airport slots,
with the backing of Berlin, which is pushing for a national
aviation champion, Reuters relates.

                       About Air Berlin

Air Berlin Plc is a Germany-based airline that is registered in
the United Kingdom. On August 15, 2017, Air Berlin's Board of
Directors filed with the competent local district court of
Berlin-Charlottenburg a petition for the opening of debtor-in-
possession insolvency proceedings.  In addition, a petition for
the opening of debtor-in-possession insolvency proceedings was
filed with the local district court of Berlin-Charlottenburg for
Air Berlin PLC & Co. Luftverkehrs KG and airberlin technik GmbH
and will be filed for further subsidiaries of the Air Berlin
group.  The Board has, after close evaluation, determined that
Air Berlin has no longer a positive continuation prognosis.  The
reason for this conclusion is that its main shareholder Etihad
Airways PJSC has notified Air Berlin of the fact that it will not
provide any further financial support to the Air Berlin group.


AIR BERLIN: Germany's Bridging Loan Enough to Ensure Flights
------------------------------------------------------------
Madeline Chambers and Joseph Nasr at Reuters report that a German
government bridging loan for insolvent Air Berlin should be enough
to ensure flights for three months, Economy Minister Brigitte
Zypries said on Aug. 15, adding that the loans would be paid back
from proceeds of asset sales.

According to Reuters, Ms. Zypries said, "We assume that Air
Berlin's airport slots . . . can be marketed and sold and we
assume that the loan can be paid back."

Ms. Zypries added that the EUR150 million (US$176 million) loan
would not only ensure that flights continue for a period of three
months but would also secure the positions of the airline's 7,200
employees in Germany.

                        About Air Berlin

Air Berlin Plc is a Germany-based airline that is registered in
the United Kingdom. On August 15, 2017, Air Berlin's Board of
Directors filed with the competent local district court of
Berlin-Charlottenburg a petition for the opening of debtor-in-
possession insolvency proceedings.  In addition, a petition for
the opening of debtor-in-possession insolvency proceedings was
filed with the local district court of Berlin-Charlottenburg for
Air Berlin PLC & Co. Luftverkehrs KG and airberlin technik GmbH
and will be filed for further subsidiaries of the Air Berlin
group.  The Board has, after close evaluation, determined that
Air Berlin has no longer a positive continuation prognosis.  The
reason for this conclusion is that its main shareholder Etihad
Airways PJSC has notified Air Berlin of the fact that it will not
provide any further financial support to the Air Berlin group.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


AVOCA CLO VIII: Fitch Affirms 'B+sf' Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all rating on Avoca CLO VIII Limited's
notes:

Class A1 (ISIN XS0312372112): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2 (ISIN XS0312377772): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0312378747): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Positive
Class C (ISIN XS0312379984): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Positive
Class D (ISIN XS0312380305): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
  Positive
Class E (ISIN XS0312380727): affirmed at 'B+sf'; Outlook Positive
Class U (ISIN XS0312840746): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
  Positive

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation reflects increased credit enhancement (CE) across
the capital structure due to the deleveraging of the transaction
since October 2016. The deleveraging was mainly driven by the
amortisation of the class A1 notes to EUR51.7 million. CE for the
class A1 notes has increased to 77.8% from 61% over the past 12
months, while CE for the class E notes has increased to 9.2% from
6.7%.

The Positive Outlook on the mezzanine and junior notes reflects
the possibility of a further upgrade if the deleveraging continues
at the current pace.

As the portfolio deleverages the transaction is becoming more
exposed to obligor concentration. The top 10 obligors currently
represent 39%, compared with 36% a year ago and the largest
obligor now represents 6.3%, compared with 4% previously. For this
review a sensitivity analysis was performed to assess near-term
performance volatility if the top three obligors were to default.

The transaction currently benefits from significant excess spread.
The weighted average spread of the portfolio is 3.55% while the
weighted average spread on the rated notes is only 0.94%. The
portfolio remains diversified across countries and industrial
sectors. There are currently no defaulted assets in the portfolio
and assets rated 'CCC' or below represent 5.4%. The weighted-
average rating of the portfolio remains at 'B'/'B+'. The Fitch
weighted average rating factor, as calculated by the trustee, has
increased to 29.7 from 26.7 over the past year and the Fitch
weighted average recovery rate has decreased to 63.4 from 67.32.

Fitch has adjusted the default timing in the cash flow model, as
the current portfolio has a short tenor of 3.3 years. The default
timing used is 25%, 25% and 50 % for front-loaded, 25%, 50% and
25% for middle-loaded and 50%, 25% and 25% for back-loaded
scenarios.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

In its rating sensitivity analysis, Fitch found that a 25%
increase of the default probability could result in a downgrade of
up to one notch and a 25% reduction of the recovery rate could
result in a downgrade of up to two notches across the junior
notes.


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2015-2: Moody's Gives (P)Ba2 Rating to Cl. D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following provisional
ratings to seven classes of notes to be issued by Carlyle Global
Market Strategies Euro CLO 2015-2 Designated Activity Company (the
"Issuer"):

-- EUR238,225,000 Refinancing Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating
    Rate Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- EUR5,275,000 Refinancing Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate
    Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- EUR30,350,000 Refinancing Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating
    Rate Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR10,550,000 Refinancing Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed
    Rate Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR25,800,000 Refinancing Class B Senior Secured Deferrable
    Floating Rate Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

-- EUR24,000,000 Refinancing Class C Senior Secured Deferrable
    Floating Rate Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

-- EUR24,900,000 Refinancing Class D Senior Secured Deferrable
    Floating Rate Notes due 2029, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of
financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavour
to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the refinancing notes address the
expected loss posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks
due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

The Issuer will issue the Refinancing Class A-1A Notes, the
Refinancing Class A-1B Notes, the Refinancing Class A-2A Notes,
the Refinancing Class A-2B Notes, the Refinancing Class B Notes,
the Refinancing Class C Notes and the Refinancing Class D Notes
(the "Refinancing Notes") in connection with the refinancing of
the Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029, the
Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029, the Class A-
2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029, the Class A-2B
Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029, the Class B Senior
Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029, the Class C
Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029 and the
Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2029,
("the Original Notes") respectively, previously issued on August
21, 2015 (the "Original Closing Date"). The Issuer will use the
proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes to redeem in
full the Original Notes that will be refinanced. On the Original
Closing Date, the Issuer also issued one class of rated notes and
one class of subordinated notes, which will remain outstanding.

Other than the changes to the spreads and coupon of the notes, the
main material change to the terms and conditions will involve
increasing the Weighted Average Life Test by 15 months to a total
of 7 years and one month from the refinancing date. The length of
the reinvestment period will remain unchanged and will expire on
September 21, 2019. Furthermore, the manager is expected to be
able to choose from a new set of collateral quality test covenants
(the "Matrix"). No other material modifications to the CLO are
occurring in connection to the refinancing.

Carlyle Global Market Strategies Euro CLO 2015-2 Designated
Activity Company is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will
be collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien
senior secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans or senior secured bonds and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured senior loans, second
lien loans, mezzanine obligations, high yield bonds and/or first
lien last out loans. The underlying portfolio is expected to be
100% ramped as of the refinancing date.

CELF Advisors LLP (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It directs the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer. After the end of the reinvestment period, the Manager
may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from
sales of credit risk obligations, subject to certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section
2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modelling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par, recoveries and principal proceeds balance:
EUR400,000,000

Defaulted par: EUR0

Diversity Score: 38

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2900

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.7%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.08 years

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.0%

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to
uncertainty. The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive
to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn
depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. The
Manager's investment decisions and management of the transaction
will also affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the ratings assigned to the rated notes.
This sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the
rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference
versus the current model output, whereby a negative difference
corresponds to higher expected losses), holding all other factors
equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: + 15% (from 2900 to 3335)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Refinancing Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Refinancing Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Refinancing Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Refinancing Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Refinancing Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:
-2

Refinancing Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:
-1

Refinancing Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:
-1

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF: +30% (from 2900 to 3770)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Refinancing Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Refinancing Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Refinancing Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Refinancing Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

Refinancing Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:
-3

Refinancing Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:
-2

Refinancing Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:
-2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4


HARVEST CLO IX: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class F-R Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to the notes issued by Harvest CLO IX
Designated Activity Company (the "Issuer"):

-- EUR1,850,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR294,500,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR50,000,000 Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR25,000,000 Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR26,000,000 Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR27,500,000 Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR34,300,000 Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR15,200,000 Class F-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive ratings of the rated notes address the expected
loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of the notes
in 2030. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of loans given the characteristics and
eligibility criteria of the constituent assets, the relevant
portfolio tests and covenants as well as the transaction's capital
and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's is of the opinion that
the Collateral Manager, Investcorp Credit Management EU Limited,
has sufficient experience and operational capacity and is capable
of managing this CLO.

The Issuer has issued the Class X Notes, the Class A-R Notes, the
Class B-1-R Notes, the Class B-2-R Notes, the Class C-R Notes, the
Class D-R Notes, the Class E-R Notes and the Class F-R Notes (the
"Refinancing Notes") in connection with the refinancing of the
Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028, the Class B
Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2028, the Class C Senior
Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2028, the Class D
Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2028, the Class
E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2028 and the
Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2028
("the Original Notes") respectively, previously issued on July 16,
2014 (the "Original Issue Date"). The Issuer will use the proceeds
from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes to redeem in full the
Original Notes that will be refinanced. On the Original Issue
Date, the Issuer also issued EUR55,000,000 of unrated Subordinated
Notes, which will remain outstanding.

Harvest CLO IX Designated Activity Company is a managed cash flow
CLO. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured
loans and senior secured bonds. The portfolio is expected to be
fully ramped up as of the Issue Date and to be comprised
predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western
Europe.

Investcorp Credit Management EU Limited ("Investcorp") will manage
the CLO. It will direct the selection, acquisition and disposition
of collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading
activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's four-year reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases
are permitted using principal proceeds from unscheduled principal
payments and proceeds from sales of credit improved and credit
risk obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. Investcorp's investment decisions and management
of the transaction will also affect the notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section
2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016. The
cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the binomial
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore,
the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche. As such, Moody's encompasses the assessment of
stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR508,500,000

Diversity Score: 40

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2820

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.65%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42.00%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.5 years

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the definitive ratings assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3243 from 2820)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3666 from 2820)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -4

Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class F-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.


HARVEST CLO IX: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F-R Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Harvest CLO IX DAC refinancing notes
final ratings as follows:

EUR1.85 million class X notes: assigned 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR294.5 million class A-R notes: assigned 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR50 million class B-1-R notes: assigned 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR25 million class B-2-R notes: assigned 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR26 million class C-R notes: assigned 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR27.5 million class D-R notes: assigned 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR34.3 million class E-R notes: assigned 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR15.2 million class F-R notes: assigned 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

The proceeds of this issuance are being used to redeem the old
notes, with a new identified portfolio comprising the existing
portfolio, as modified by sales and purchases conducted by the
manager. The portfolio is managed by Investcorp Credit Management
EU Limited. The refinanced CLO envisages a further four-year
reinvestment period and an 8.5-year weighted average life (WAL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B' Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch assesses the average credit quality of obligors to be in the
'B' category. The Fitch-weighted average rating factor (WARF) of
the current portfolio is 32.85, below the indicative maximum
covenanted WARF of 34 for assigning the final ratings.

High Recovery Expectations
At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations. Fitch views the recovery prospects for these assets
as more favourable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets. The Fitch-weighted average recovery rate of the current
portfolio is 66%, above the minimum covenant of 62.6%
corresponding to the matrix point of WARF 34 and weighted average
spread 3.7%.

Limited Interest Rate Exposure
Up to 5% of the portfolio can be invested in fixed-rate assets,
while fixed-rate liabilities represent 4.9% of the target par.
Fitch modelled both 0% and 5% fixed-rate buckets and found that
the rated notes can withstand the interest rate mismatch
associated with each scenario.

Diversified Asset Portfolio
The covenanted maximum exposure to the top 10 obligors is 20% of
the portfolio balance. This covenant ensures that the asset
portfolio will not be exposed to excessive obligor concentration.

Documentation Amendments
The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency
confirmation or noteholder approval. Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyse the
proposed change and may provide commentary if the change would
have a negative impact on the ratings. Such amendments may delay
the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis confirms
the expected repayment of principal at the legal final maturity.

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective Fitch may decline to comment. Noteholders
should be aware that the structure considers confirmation to be
given if Fitch declines to comment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 125% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and with this increase added to all rating default levels,
would lead to a downgrade of two notches for the rated notes.

A 150% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and with this increase added to all rating default levels,
would lead to a downgrade of seven notches for the rated notes.

A 25% reduction in recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of
four notches for the rated notes.

A 50% reduction in recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of
five notches for the rated notes.

A combined stress of default multiplier of 125% and recovery rate
multiplier of 75% would lead to a downgrade of five notches for
the rated notes.


HARVEST CLO X: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Harvest CLO X DAC refinancing notes
ratings and affirmed the others as follows:

EUR264.4 million Class A-R notes: assigned 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR56.3 million Class B-R notes: assigned 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR30.4 million Class C-R notes: assigned 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR23.6 million Class D-R notes: assigned 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR29.2 million Class E: affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR12.4 million Class F: affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable

The transaction is a cash flow collateralised loan obligation
securitising a portfolio of mainly European leveraged loans and
bonds. The portfolio is managed by Investcorp Credit Management EU
Limited. Harvest CLO X DAC closed in November 2014 and is still in
its reinvestment period, which is set to expire in November 2018.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower Liability Cost
The lower liability spreads have resulted in a lower weighted
average cost of funding and as a result the transaction now
benefits from higher excess spread.

Increased Weighted Average Life
The remaining weighted average life (WAL) has been extended by
approximately 12 months, resulting in a WAL from the refinancing
date of 6.25 years.

Matrix Amendment
The asset manager has chosen to amend the Fitch test matrix
concurrently with the refinancing. The weighted average recovery
rate thresholds in the amended matrix are lower than in the
original matrix. This is offset by the transaction's reduced risk
horizon. The maximum remaining portfolio weighted average life on
the refinancing date is 6.25 years, compared with eight years at
closing.

Fitch has tested all points in the amended matrix for the
assignment of ratings.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The issuer issued new notes to refinance part of the original
liabilities. The refinanced notes have been redeemed in full as a
consequence of the refinancing. The refinancing notes bear
interest at a lower margin than the notes being refinanced.

In addition, the issuer extended the WAL to 6.25 years from the
refinancing date and updated the Fitch test matrices. The
remaining terms and conditions of the refinancing notes (including
seniority) are the same as the refinanced notes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 125% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and with this increase added to all rating default levels,
would lead to a downgrade of maximum three notches for the rated
notes.

A 25% reduction in recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of
maximum two notches for the rated notes.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CONTEGO CLO II: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Cl. F-R Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Contego CLO II B.V. refinancing notes
final ratings as follows:

EUR209.5 million Class A-R: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR37.6 million Class B-R: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR24.25 million Class C-R: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR16.25 million Class D-R: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR23.4 million Class E-R: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR10.8 million Class F-R: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

Contego CLO II B.V. is a cash flow collateralised loan obligation
securitising a portfolio of mainly European leveraged loans and
bonds. The transaction closed in November 2014 and is still in its
reinvestment period, which is set to expire in November 2018. The
portfolio is managed by Five Arrows LLP, a subsidiary of N.M.
Rothschild.

The issuer issued new notes to refinance the original liabilities.
The refinancing notes bear interest at a lower margin over EURIBOR
than the notes being refinanced. The original notes have been
redeemed in full as a consequence of the refinancing.

In addition, the issuer extended the weighted average life (WAL)
covenant to seven years (rounded to the nearest quarter) from 5.25
years and has updated the Fitch Test Matrix. The remaining terms
and conditions of the refinancing notes, including seniority,
remain the same as the refinanced notes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Reduced Weighted Average Life
While the current portfolio WAL is 5.57 years, the maximum WAL
test has been extended to seven years compared with the WAL
covenant of eight years set at closing, thus resulting in lower
Fitch default assumptions at all rating stresses. In combination
with the key rating drivers below this has led to lower breakeven
recovery rates in the Fitch Test Matrix.

Reduced Cost of Funding
Lower liability spreads have resulted in a lower weighted average
cost of funding and as a result the transaction benefits from
higher excess spread.

'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch assesses the average credit quality of obligors in the
underlying portfolio to be in the 'B'/'B-' range. The Fitch
weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the current portfolio is
31.6, below the current maximum covenant of 34.

High Recovery Expectations
The portfolio comprises a minimum of 90% senior secured
obligations. The weighted average recovery rate (WARR) of the
current portfolio is 67.7%, compared with a minimum WARR covenant
of 60.2% (as derived by interpolation based on the updated Fitch
Test Matrix).

Limited Interest Rate Risk
Interest rate risk is naturally hedged for most of the portfolio
as fixed-rate assets represent only between 0% and 2.5% of the
target par amount.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability or a 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates could each lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes.


MONASTERY 2006-I: S&P Raises Class D Notes Rating to BB(sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on Monastery 2006-I
B.V.'s class B, C, and D notes. At the same time, S&P has affirmed
its rating on the class A2 notes.

S&P said, "T[he] rating actions follow our credit and cash flow
analysis of the transaction and the application of our European
residential loans criteria.

"In our opinion, the current outlook for the Dutch residential
mortgage and real estate market is benign (see "Outlook
Assumptions For The Dutch Residential Mortgage Market," published
on Nov. 23, 2016). The generally favorable economic conditions
support our view that the performance of Dutch residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) collateral pools will remain
stable in 2017. Given our outlook on the Dutch economy, we
consider the base-case expected losses of 0.5% at the 'B' rating
level for an archetypical pool of Dutch mortgage loans, and the
other assumptions in our European residential loans criteria, to
be appropriate.

"The collateral performance has improved since our previous
review, with the total level of arrears as of May 2017 falling to
3.5% from 4.7% (see "Rating Actions Taken In Dutch RMBS
Transaction Monastery 2006-I Following DSB Bank Bankruptcy
Trustee," published on June 6, 2016).

"After applying our European residential loans criteria to this
transaction, our credit analysis results show a decrease in the
weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and the weighted-
average loss severity (WALS) for each rating level compared to the
previous review."

  Rating level          WAFF (%)      WALS (%)
  AAA                      31.1           49.1
  AA                       21.6           45.7
  A                        16.4           38.8
  BBB                      11.1           35.0
  BB                        6.2           32.1
  B                         4.6           29.4

S&P said, "The decrease in the WAFF is primarily due to the
increased seasoning and lower level of arrears in the transaction.
The decrease in the WALS is mainly due to the decrease in the
weighted-average current loan-to-value ratio since our previous
review and our lower market value decline assumptions.

"In our previous review of this transaction, the resolved duty-of-
care setoff compensation claims from borrowers were successfully
paid back to the issuer by the originator (DSB Bank N.V.'s)
bankruptcy estate on the basis of, among other factors, a breach
of the representations and warranties that DSB Bank provided at
closing to the issuer. Consequently, the reserve fund, which had
been utilized to pay setoff claims, was partially replenished.
Despite the resolved duty-of-care losses being paid back to the
issuer at the previous review, there remained a small subset of
unresolved claims that could have possibly incurred further setoff
losses. Consequently, at the time of our previous review, the
junior notes, especially the class D notes, remained vulnerable to
potential losses. As of May 2017, we understand that the
unresolved claims have now mostly been resolved and have also been
successfully paid back to the issuer.

"As a result of the improved asset performance, the reserve fund
has further replenished to 82% of the target amount since our
previous review, thereby increasing the credit and liquidity
enhancement available to the notes.

"The final resolution of the duty-of-care setoff losses, the
decreased WAFF and WALS, and the increased level of available
credit and liquidity enhancement for the class B, C, and D notes
are commensurate with higher ratings than those currently
assigned. We have therefore raised our ratings on these classes of
notes.

"The available credit enhancement for Monastery 2006-I's class A2
notes is commensurate with a higher rating than currently
assigned. However, as we do not consider the swap agreements to be
in line with our current counterparty criteria, the maximum
potential rating for the notes is constrained at one notch above
the issuer credit rating on the swap guarantor, Cooperatieve
Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. (Rabobank Nederland;
A+/Stable/A-1) (see "Counterparty Risk Framework Methodology And
Assumptions," published on June 25, 2013). We have therefore
affirmed our 'AA- (sf)' rating on the class A2 notes."

The assets backing the transaction are residential mortgage loans,
granted to individuals in the Netherlands. DSB Bank (now
insolvent) originated the loans.

RATINGS LIST

  Class               Rating
            To                    From

  Monastery 2006-I B.V.
  EUR 875 Million Secured Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

  Ratings Raised

  B         A+ (sf)               BBB+ (sf)
  C         BBB (sf)              BB (sf)
  D         BB (sf)               CCC (sf)

  Rating Affirmed

  A2        AA- (sf)


ST. PAUL'S V: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to nine
classes of notes (the "Refinancing Notes") issued by St. Paul's
CLO V DAC:

-- EUR1,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR201,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR36,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR16,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR12,500,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR7,500,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR19,500,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR23,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR10,000,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive ratings of the notes address the expected loss
posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes in connection with the
refinancing of the following classes of notes: Class A Notes,
Class B Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and
Class F Notes due 2027 (the "Original Notes"), previously issued
on September 10, 2014 (the "Original Closing Date"). On the
Refinancing Date, the Issuer will use the proceeds from the
issuance of the Refinancing Notes to redeem in full its respective
Original Notes. On the Original Closing Date, the Issuer also
issued one class of subordinated notes. Following the Refinancing
Date the amount of subordinated notes outstanding will remain
unchanged.

St. Paul's CLO V is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes are
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans and eligible investments, and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second lien loans,
unsecured loans, mezzanine obligations and high yield bonds.

Intermediate Capital Managers Limited (the "Manager") manages the
CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition, and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer. After the reinvestment period,
which ends in August 2021, the Manager may reinvest unscheduled
principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk
obligations, subject to certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the binomial
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore,
the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche. As such, Moody's encompasses the assessment of
stressed scenarios.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: EUR352,750,000

Diversity Score: 38

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.5 years

Moody's has analysed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries. As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling of A1 or below. Following the effective date, and given
the portfolio constraints, only up to 10% of the pool can be
domiciled in countries with local currency country risk ceiling
between A1 and A3. As a result, Moody's has not made any
adjustments to the target par amount as further described in the
methodology.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the notes is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit
conditions that may change. The Manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the performance of
the notes.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a
component in determining the definitive ratings assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the notes (shown
in terms of the number of notch difference versus the current
model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher
expected losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal.

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2850 to 3278)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: 0

Class B-1 Notes: -2

Class B-2 Notes: -2

Class C-1 Notes: -2

Class C-2 Notes:-2

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -1

Class F Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2850 to 3705)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Class X Notes: 0

Class A Notes: -1

Class B-1 Notes: -3

Class B-2 Notes: -3

Class C-1 Notes: -4

Class C-2 Notes:-4

Class D Notes: -2

Class E Notes: -2

Class F Notes: -2



===========
R U S S I A
===========


ALFA-BANK: Moody's Rates $700MM Loan Participation Notes B2(hyb)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B2(hyb) rating to Alfa-
Bank's $700 million 8% perpetual loan participation notes.

The notes were issued by a special purpose vehicle, Alfa Bond
Issuance plc., for the sole purpose of financing subordinated loan
to Alfa-Bank. The notes are classified as additional Tier 1
capital under Russian regulations.

The rating for these loan participation notes was initiated by
Moody's and was not requested by the rated entity.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's framework for rating non-viability securities
under its bank rating methodology, the agency typically positions
the rating of additional Tier 1 securities three notches below the
bank's adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA). One notch
reflects the high loss-given-failure that these securities are
likely to face in a resolution scenario, due to their
subordination and limited protection from residual equity. Moody's
also incorporates two additional notches to reflect the higher
risk associated with the non-cumulative coupon skip mechanism,
which could precede the bank reaching the point of non-viability.

The notes are perpetual, rank at least pari passu with the claims
of all other unsecured subordinated creditors, and senior to
ordinary shares. They have a non-cumulative optional coupon-
suspension mechanism. A full or partial write down event is
triggered if the bank's Common Equity Tier 1 ratio falls below
5.125% for six or more operational days in aggregate during any
consecutive period of 30 operational days, which Moody's views as
close to the point of non-viability, or the banking supervision
committee of the Central Bank of Russia approves a plan for the
participation of the Deposit Insurance Agency in bankruptcy
prevention measures in respect of Alfa-Bank. As of July 1, 2017,
Alfa-Bank's Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (N 1.1) stood at 7.71%.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Any changes in the ba2 adjusted BCA of the bank would result in
changes to the B2(hyb) rating assigned to these securities.

Upward pressure on Alfa-Bank's BCA could be driven by a further
sustained improvement to its key financial metrics. Conversely,
downward pressure on the bank's BCA could arise if Alfa-Bank's
credit profile weakens as a consequence of an unexpected
deterioration of any of its financial fundamentals.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in January 2016.


CB RIABANK: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by virtue of its Order No. OD-2323, dated
August 17, 2017, revoked the banking license of Moscow-based
credit institution Commercial Bank Russian Investment Alliance
(joint-stock company) or CB RIABANK (JSC) as of August 17, 2017,
according to the press service of the Central Bank of Russia.

According to the financial statements, as of August 1, 2017, the
credit institution ranked 334th by assets in the Russian banking
system.

RIABANK had ineffective risk management and internal controls,
which resulted in large volume of low-quality assets.  Proper
credit risk assessment and fair presentation of asset value in the
bank's financial statements revealed a complete loss of its equity
capital.  The bank's business model was not aimed at conventional
banking services.  The credit institution was involved in dubious
cash-out transactions and overseas money diversion.

The Bank of Russia repeatedly applied supervisory measures to
RIABANK, including three impositions of restrictions on household
deposit taking.

The management and owners of the bank failed to take effective
measures to normalize its activities.  Under these circumstances,
the Bank of Russia performed its duty on the revocation of the
banking license from RIABANK in accordance with Article 20 of the
Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure because of the
credit institution's failure to comply with federal banking laws
and Bank of Russia regulations, equity capital adequacy ratios
below two per cent, decrease in bank equity capital below the
minimum value of the authorized capital established as of the date
of the state registration of the credit institution, and given the
repeated application within a year of measures envisaged by the
Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank
of Russia)".

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2324, dated August 17,
2017, appointed a provisional administration to RIABANK for the
period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the Federal
Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under Article
23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".  In
accordance with federal laws, the powers of the credit
institution's executive bodies have been suspended.

RIABANK is a member of the deposit insurance system. The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than a total of RUR1.4
million per one depositor.


STATE TRANSPORT: S&P Alters Outlook to Pos., Affirms BB-/B CCRs
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Russia-based State
Transport Leasing Co. PJSC (STLC) to positive from stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we affirmed our 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on STLC.

"The outlook revision stems from our view that the Russian
government has been increasingly using STLC as an instrument for
modernization and development of the Russian transport sector over
the past two years. Although the overall leasing market remains
quite small in Russia (less than 5% of GDP in 2016), the company's
relative importance within the market is gradually strengthening.
STLC's leasing portfolio has more than doubled since 2014 and it
is now one of the market leaders by overall portfolio size."

Although the leasing market remains very competitive, with a large
number of private- and public-sector players, STLC plays a unique
role in the government's import-substitution policy in the
transport sector through the Sukhoi Superjet and other aviation
projects. It is also involved in implementing government programs
for noncommercial leasing in certain key segments, such as energy
efficiency and transport infrastructure, which are important for
the transport industry's long-term development but not attractive
for private leasing companies because of their long-term, capital-
consuming nature and low margins.

S&P said, "We note that, since 2015, the Russian government has
used STLC as a lease financing vehicle in an increasing number of
programs, including for the development of a ferry line in the
Sakhalin region, the renewal of passenger rolling-stock fleets, as
well as regional aviation and helicopter-leasing development. The
government has supported the execution of these programs through
substantial capital injections into STLC: Russian ruble (RUB) 35
billion (about $580 million) in 2015, RUB12.5 billion in 2016, and
RUB1.98 billion at the beginning of 2017. We anticipate that STLC
will receive an additional RUB19.3 billion in 2017-2018."

STLC's public policy mandate, aimed at modernizing Russia's
transport sector and supporting its aviation, maritime,
automobile, and machinery industries, has been broadening amid the
difficult economic environment and increased pressure on the
transport industry. S&P said, "We understand that the government
is now increasingly looking at STLC as its key development agency
and lease financing vehicle to bridge gaps in the transport sector
that other private- and public-sector entities would not otherwise
fill. STLC is also a tool for implementing countercyclical
measures as well as government policy for import substitution, in
particular in areas related with development of regional aviation
and sea and river shipping.

"We view the company's business position as strong, reflecting its
public role, as well as its stable franchise and business model,
which are closely linked with government-supported projects. STLC
was among the top-four Russian leasing companies with a market
share of about 12% at year-end 2016. It maintains leading
positions in major segments of the transport sector, benefiting
from capital injections that allow extensive business-volume
growth.

"We assess STLC's capital, leverage, and earnings as strong,
reflecting our forecast that the risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio
will be sustainably above 10% over the next 12-18 months. This is
because we understand the government intends to provide further
capital support to STLC to enable it expand its business under
various state programs aimed at transport sector development. Our
assessment is constrained by STLC's weak earnings capacity.
However, we understand that profitability is not the company's or
its shareholder's key priority, given its involvement in
noncommercial leasing and its public role.

"Our assessment of the company's risk position as moderate
reflects our view that STLC has higher single-name and sector
concentrations than other leasing companies; the 20 largest
lessees represent about 89% of the gross leasing portfolio, and
exposure to the largest client accounts for about 30% of the lease
portfolio. We view the company's asset quality as comparable with
that of its peers, with nonperforming assets at a moderate 2.1% at
year-end 2016 compared with the 7% peer average. This is, however,
to a large extent supported by very fast asset growth over the
past few years. We consider the quality of STLC's portfolio to be
vulnerable to swings in operating conditions, particularly due to
single-name concentration in riskier operating leasing activities.
We note, however, that those risks are partly mitigated by STLC's
increasing expertise in residual-value risk management.

"We consider STLC's funding profile to be in line with the system
average for nonbank financial institutions in Russia. Despite the
wholesale nature of its funding sources, STLC adequately matches
its long-term leasing exposure with long-term funding. The stable
funding ratio was 86.2% at year-end 2016 and we expect it will
move closer to 100% over the next few years. The company has also
managed to diversify its funding base by placing an additional
$500 million Eurobond in 2017 and arranging a RUB43.1 billion
($720 million) syndicated loan in May 2017.

"In our view, STLC's liquidity is adequate, since the company
generates enough cash to cover interest payments and other costs.
Our cash flow analysis shows that STLC's liquidity buffer covers
its monthly requirements by 1.3x, on average."

S&P continues to consider STLC to be a government-related entity
with a moderately high likelihood of receiving extraordinary
government support. As a result, S&P's long-term rating on STLC
includes one notch of uplift. S&P's view of the likelihood of
support reflects its assessment of STLC's:

-- Important role as one of the government's policy tools to
    modernize the transport sector by purchasing and leasing
    Russia-produced vehicles, aircrafts, and equipment at
    subsidized rates. After supporting government programs for
    road construction equipment and machinery in 2010-2013, S&P
    expects STLC will play an increasing role in the government's
    aviation leasing programs, in particular for
    commercialization of Sukhoi Superjets. That project is
    important to Russia's overall strategy of import-substitution
    and regional aviation development, and the government
    actively supports it; and

-- Strong link with the Russian government, which fully owns
    STLC and has strong oversight of STLC's business and
    strategy. S&P understands that the company will not be
    privatized over the next three years, since it will remain
   involved in the implementation of countercyclical measures to
   support the transportation industry. Moreover, STLC's strategy
   is under the Ministry of Transport, and the Ministry of
   Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation.

S&P said, "The positive outlook on STLC reflects our view that,
over the next 12 months, an ongoing solid pipeline of government
programs, involving the company as a policy tool, will continue to
support STLC's market share and balance-sheet growth, resulting in
a stronger public policy role.

"We could take a positive rating action in the coming 12 months if
we considered that the likelihood of support from the government
had increased, for example, due to STLC's significantly stronger
public policy role for or closer link with the government. This
would be demonstrated, for example, by STLC's increasing
involvement in state-funded transport-related programs that
underline its status as crucial for the government's transport
policy.

"We could revise the outlook to stable within the next 12 months
if STLC's role for the government does not increase, as signaled
by lower market share or its replacement by other state-owned
entities in carrying out a similar public mandate.

"We could also consider a negative rating action if STLC's capital
management weakened, with growth of risk-weighted assets outpacing
that of the capital base, resulting in deterioration of its
capital buffers and our RAC ratio falling substantially below 10%.
Ratings downside could also build if we observed weakening of
STLC's risk management systems, for example, via significant
deterioration of asset quality or an elevation of residual value
risk."



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ALBA 2015-1: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on Aggregator of
Loans Backed by Assets 2015-1 PLC's (ALBA 2015-1) class B, C, and
D notes. At the same time, S&P affirms its ratings on the class A
and E notes.

S&P said, "The rating actions follow our credit and cash flow
analysis of the transaction and the application of our European
residential loans criteria and our current counterparty criteria
(see "Methodology And Assumptions: Assessing Pools Of European
Residential Loans," published on Aug. 4, 2017, and "
Counterparty Risk Framework Methodology And Assumptions,"
published on June 25, 2013).

"The portfolio's collateral performance has been stable and in
line with our expectations since closing (see "New Issue:
Aggregator of Loans Backed by Assets 2015-1 PLC," published on
April 23, 2015). Total arrears in the pool have decreased to 7.5%
from 8.4% at closing and are below our U.K. residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) index level of 14.8% (see "U.K. RMBS
Index Report Q1 2017," published on June 1, 2017).

"After applying our European residential loans criteria to this
transaction, our credit analysis results show that due to the
increase in the pool seasoning and the reduction in total arrears,
the weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) has decreased at
all rating levels since closing. Over the same period, our
weighted-average loss severity (WALS) calculations have increased
at the 'AAA' level and decreased at all other rating levels."

Although the transaction has benefitted from the decreases in the
weighted-average current loan-to-value ratio, this has been offset
by an increase in S&P's repossession market value decline
assumptions, which are greatest at the 'AAA' level.

  Rating level    WAFF (%)       WALS (%)
  AAA                42.62          50.88
  AA                 32.10          43.21
  A                  25.62          31.14
  BBB                19.18          23.84
  BB                 13.31          18.55
  B                  11.36          13.83

The overall effect is a decrease in the required credit coverage
for all rating levels.

Available credit enhancement in this transaction has increased for
all classes of notes since closing, due to the transaction
deleveraging and a currently nonamortizing reserve fund.

S&P said, "We understand that there are some historical
capitalizations of arrears in the pool. Therefore, we have
performed a sensitivity analysis to assess the additional
foreclosure risk of these loans.

"Our analysis indicates that the class B, C, and D notes pass our
cash flow stresses at higher rating levels than those currently
assigned. We have therefore raised to 'AA+ (sf)' from 'AA (sf)'
our rating on the class B notes, to 'AA (sf)' from 'A (sf)' our
rating on the class C notes, and to 'A+ (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' our
rating on the class D notes.

"We consider the available credit enhancement for the class A and
E notes to be commensurate with our currently assigned ratings. We
have therefore affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' and 'BB (sf)' ratings on
the class A and E notes, respectively.

"Our credit stability analysis indicates that the maximum
projected deterioration that we would expect at each rating level
for one- and three-year horizons under moderate stress conditions
is in line with our credit stability criteria (see "Methodology:
Credit Stability Criteria," published on May 3, 2010)."

ALBA 2015-1 is a securitization of U.K. residential mortgage
loans. Edeus Mortgage Creators Ltd., Kensington Mortgage Company
Ltd., Amber Homeloans Ltd., and Paratus AMC Ltd. (formerly known
as GMAC-RFC Ltd.) originated the pool's underlying collateral,
which consists of first-lien U.K. nonconforming owner-occupied and
buy-to-let residential mortgage loans. The majority of the loans
were originated in 2006 and 2007.

  RATINGS LIST

  Class                    Rating
                  To                    From

  Aggregator of Loans Backed by Assets 2015-1 PLC
  GBP273.673 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating- And
  Fixed-Rate Notes
  (Including Unrated Notes)

  Ratings Raised

  B               AA+ (sf)              AA (sf)
  C               AA (sf)               A (sf)
  D               A+ (sf)               A- (sf)

  Ratings Affirmed

  A               AAA (sf)
  E               BB (sf)


MALACHITE FUNDING: S&P Puts Credit Ratings on Watch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed on CreditWatch negative its credit
ratings on various tranches in Malachite Funding Ltd. and Mazarin
Funding Ltd.

S&P said, "We have identified an error in the application of our
structured finance temporary interest shortfall methodology in
these two transactions (see "Structured Finance Temporary Interest
Shortfall Methodology," published on Dec. 15, 2015). This
methodology states that the maximum potential ratings assigned to
structured finance securities without any payment-in-kind or
economically equivalent features are capped in accordance with
Table 1 of the criteria."

The actual performance of the notes affected by the CreditWatch
negative placements continues to be strong from a cash flow
perspective.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placements within the next
90 days.

  RATINGS LIST

  Ratings Placed On CreditWatch Negative

  Class                    Rating
              To                      From

  Malachite Funding Ltd.

  $110 Million Floating-Rate Senior Secured Notes Tier 10 Series
  2010-4

              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg      AAA (sf)

  $72 Million Junior Senior Series 2010-5 Tranche 1 Tier 12

              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg      AA+ (sf)

  GBP39 Million Junior Senior 2010-6 Tranche 1 Tier 14

              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg      AA+ (sf)

  EUR 40 Million Junior Senior 2010-7 Tranche 1 Tier 16

              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg      AA+ (sf)

  $75 Million Junior Senior 2010-8 Tranche 1 Tier 18

              AA (sf)/Watch Neg       AA (sf)

  $70 Million Junior Senior 2010-9 Tranche 1 Tier 20

              A+ (sf)/Watch Neg       A+ (sf)

  $55 Million Junior Senior 2010-10 Tranche 1 Tier 22

              A (sf)/Watch Neg        A (sf)

  $50 Million Junior Senior 2010-11 Tranche 1 Tier 24

              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg     BBB+ (sf)

  Mazarin Funding Ltd.

  $200 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 4 Series
  2010-1

              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg      AAA (sf)

  $320 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 6 Series
  2010-2

              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg      AAA (sf)

  $270 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 8 Series
  2010-3

              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg      AAA (sf)

  $320 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 10
  Series 2010-4

              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg      AAA (sf)

  $320 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 12
  Series 2010-5

              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg      AAA (sf)

  $180 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 14
  Series 2010-6

              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg      AAA (sf)

  $320 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 16
  Series 2010-7

              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg      AA+ (sf)

  $160 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 18
  Series 2010-8

              AA+ (sf)/Watch Neg      AA+ (sf)

  $160 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 20
  Series 2010-9

              AA (sf)/Watch Neg       AA (sf)


  $160 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 22
  Series 2010-10

              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg      AA- (sf)

  $80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 24 Series
  2010-11

              A+ (sf)/Watch Neg       A+ (sf)

  $80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 26 Series
  2010-12

              A+ (sf)/Watch Neg       A+ (sf)

  $80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 28 Series
  2010-13

              A- (sf)/Watch Neg       A- (sf)

  $80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 30 Series
  2010-14

              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg     BBB+ (sf)

  $80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 32 Series
  2010-15

              BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg     BBB+ (sf)

  $80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 34 Series
  2010-16

              BBB (sf)/Watch Neg      BBB (sf)

  $80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 36 Series
  2010-17

              BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg      BB+ (sf)

  $80 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 38 Series
  2010-18

              BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg      BB+ (sf)

  $45 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 40 Series
  2010-19

              BB- (sf)/Watch Neg      BB- (sf)

  $40 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 42 Series
  2010-20

              B+ (sf)/Watch Neg       B+ (sf)

  $15 Million Floating-Rate Junior Senior Tranche 1 Tier 44 Series
  2010-21

              B+ (sf)/Watch Neg       B+ (sf)


NEW LOOK: Moody's Lowers CFR to Caa1 on Weak Credit Metrics
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Caa1 from B3 the
Corporate Family Rating (CFR) of UK apparel retailer New Look
Retail Group Limited (New Look or the company).

"Our decision to downgrade New Look's ratings reflects Moody's
views that financial performance and credit metrics will remain
under pressure during the rest of this year. At this stage it's
unclear if and when the operational changes the company are
implementing will stabilise profitability. In the meantime,
competition is intense and Moody's expects the retail environment
to remain challenging," says David Beadle, a Moody's Vice
President - Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for New Look.

Concurrently, the rating agency has downgraded New Look's
probability of default rating (PDR) to Caa1-PD from B3-PD. Moody's
has also downgraded the ratings of the GBP700 million and the
EUR415 million senior secured notes due in July 2022 issued by New
Look Secured Issuer plc to B3 from B2 and the rating of the c.
GBP177 million outstanding senior unsecured notes due in July 2023
issued by New Look Senior Issuer plc to Caa3 from Caa2.

The outlook on all ratings is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects Moody's expectation that New Look's credit
metrics will remain weaker than the levels appropriate for a B3
CFR during the next 12-18 months. After weak results during the
fiscal year ended March 2017 (FY17), the further decline in
profitability in the first quarter of FY18 highlights the
challenges New Look faces to reinvigorate its product offering and
in turn arrest, and ultimately reverse, the deterioration in
credit metrics.

New Look's gross leverage (Moody's-adjusted) now exceeds 7x and
adjusted interest coverage has declined to less than 1x. The
rating agency also expects profitability to remain under pressure
and credit metrics to remain weak in the coming quarters. Against
a backdrop of online specialists increasing their market share and
weak consumer sentiment, the company's efforts to improve the
attractiveness of its product range and reduce the level of
discounting will at best take time. Rising costs in respect of
staff wages and, notably, online advertising represent further
headwinds against profit growth.

More positively, subject to drawing or retaining access to its
revolving credit facility, Moody's believes that New Look still
has adequate liquidity. Furthermore, New Look's relatively long
dated debt maturities give the company time to recover towards
previous levels of profitability and grow back into its capital
structure.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's expectations that
despite the deterioration in New Look's credit metrics the company
will be able to maintain adequate liquidity over the course of the
next 12-18 months.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Upward pressure on the rating is unlikely in the short term but
could arise if the company were to return to positive like-for-
like growth and achieved a sustainable recovery in profitability,
leading to Moody's-adjusted gross leverage returning sustainably
to less than 7.0x.

Downward pressure on the rating could arise if New Look's
liquidity deteriorated or if profitability continues to fall such
that the company's Moody's-adjusted Debt / EBITDA remained
sustainably above 7.5x.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Retail
Industry published in October 2015.

COMPANY PROFILE

Headquartered in London and Weymouth (with its registered office
in Weymouth, UK), New Look Retail Group Limited is a value fashion
retailer selling a range of apparel, accessories and footwear,
primarily for women. As at March 25, 2017, New Look operated 872
stores under the New Look brand: 592 directly-operated stores in
the UK; 86 stores in Europe (Ireland, France, Belgium and Poland);
110 stores in China; and 84 franchise stores (predominantly in the
Middle East). In the financial year ended March 25, 2017, New Look
recorded revenues and reported adjusted EBITDA of GBP1.45 billion
and GBP155 million respectively.

Since June 2015 the business has been majority owned by South
African investment firm Brait SE (unrated). The family trusts of
founder Tom Singh and certain members of the management reinvested
alongside Brait.


* UK: 28% of East Midlands Businesses at Risk of Insolvency
-----------------------------------------------------------
Sam Metcalf at The BusinessDesk.com reports that despite national
government statistics showing a sharp 15.4% drop in underlying
corporate insolvencies in the second quarter of 2017, more East
Midlands businesses are standing at the brink of insolvency than
at any other time this year.

This is according to new monthly research by the Midlands branch
of restructuring and insolvency trade body R3 which shows that
over one in four businesses in the region -- 28% -- are now at
higher than normal risk of becoming insolvent, The
BusinessDesk.com notes.

R3's August figures, compiled using Bureau Van Dijk's Fame
database, highlight that this is equivalent to over 57,400 East
Midlands companies and is in contrast to January's figure, which
was four points lower at 24% or just over 47,500 local businesses,
The BusinessDesk.com states.

According to The BusinessDesk.com, of the key East Midlands
business sectors monitored by R3 -- which include manufacturing,
retail, construction, agriculture, professional services, pubs,
hotels and restaurants -- technology and IT was the only sector to
register a decrease in insolvency risk this month.

Technology and IT, however, continues to be the highest risk
sector surveyed by R3 in the East Midlands, with nearly four in
ten -- 38.2% -- of businesses at above average risk of insolvency,
The BusinessDesk.com relays.  The East Midlands also has a higher
proportion of technology and IT companies with an elevated risk of
insolvency than any other region in the UK, The BusinessDesk.com
says.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: The First Junk Bond
----------------------------------
Author: Harlan D. Platt
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 236 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher

Order your personal copy today and one for a colleague at
http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/the_first_junk_bond.html
Only one in ten failed businesses is equal to the task of
reorganizing itself and satisfying its prior debts in some
fashion. This engrossing book follows the extraordinary journey
of Texas International, Inc (known by its New York Stock
Exchange stock symbol, TEI), through its corporate growth and
decline, debt exchange offers, and corporate renaissance as
Phoenix Resource Companies, Inc. As Harlan Platt puts it, TEI
"flourished for a brief luminous moment but then crashed to
earth and was consumed." TEI's story features attention-grabbing
characters, petroleum exploration innovations, financial
innovations, and lots of risk taking.

The First Junk Bond was originally published in 1994 and
received solidly favorable reviews. The then-managing director
of High Yield Securities Research and Economics for Merrill
Lynch said that the book "is a richly detailed case study. Platt
integrates corporate history, industry fundamentals, financial
analysis and bankruptcy law on a scale that has rarely, if ever,
been attempted." A retired U.S. Bankruptcy Court judge noted,
"(i)t should appeal as supplementary reading to students in both
business schools and law schools. Even those who practice.in the
areas of business law, accounting and investments can obtain a
greater understanding and perspective of their professional
expertise."

"TEI's saga is noteworthy because of the company's resilience
and ingenuity in coping with the changing environment of the
1980s, its execution of innovative corporate strategies that
were widely imitated and its extraordinary trading history,"
says the author. TEI issued the first junk bond. In 1986 it
achieved the largest percentage gain on the NYSE, and in 1987
suffered the largest percentage loss. It issued one of the first
bonds secured by a physical commodity and then later issued one
of the first PIK (payment in kind) bonds. It was one of the
first vulture investors, to be targeted by vulture investors
later on. Its president was involved in an insider trading
scandal. It innovated strip financing. It engaged in several
workouts to sell off operations and raise cash to reduce debt.
It completed three exchange offers that converted debt in to
equity.

In 1977, TEI, primarily an oil production outfit, had had a
reprieve from bankruptcy through Michael Milken's first ever
junk bond. The fresh capital had allowed TEI to acquire a
controlling interest of Phoenix Resources Company, a part of
King Resources Company. TEI purchased creditors' claims against
King that were subsequently converted into stock under the terms
of King's reorganization plan. Only two years later, cash
deficiencies forced Phoenix to sell off its nonenergy
businesses. Vulture investors tried to buy up outstanding TEI
stock. TEI sold off its own nonenergy businesses, and focused on
oil and gas exploration. An enormous oil discovery in Egypt made
the future look grand. The value of TEI stock soared. Somehow,
however, less than two years later, TEI was in bankruptcy. What
a ride!

All told, the book has 63 tables and 32 figures on all aspects
of TEI's rise, fall, and renaissance. Businesspeople will find
especially absorbing the details of how the company's bankruptcy
filing affected various stakeholders, the bankruptcy negotiation
process, and the alternative post-bankruptcy financial
structures that were considered. Those interested in the oil and
gas industry will find the book a primer on the subject, with an
appendix devoted to exploration and drilling, and another on oil
and gas accounting.

Harlan Platt is professor of Finance at Northeastern University.
He is president of 911RISK, Inc., which specializes in
developing analytical models to predict corporate distress.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


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