TCREUR_Public/170822.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Tuesday, August 22, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 166


                            Headlines


A Z E R B A I J A N

AZERBAIJAN: Moody's Cuts Issuer & Sr. Unsec. Debt Ratings to Ba2


C R O A T I A

AGROKOR DD: Villa Castello Up for Sale, Sept. 21 Bid Deadline Set


F I N L A N D

METSA BOARD: Moody's Hikes CFR to Ba1, Outlook Stable


G E R M A N Y

AIR BERLIN: In Talks with More Than Ten Interested Buyers
AIR BERLIN: Lufthansa May Hire Employees for Eurowings Unit


G R E E C E

GREECE: Fitch Raises Long-Term IDR to B-, Outlook Positive


I R E L A N D

BRENDAN INVESTMENTS: In Liquidation; Owes More than EUR11MM
ORWELL PARK: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class E Senior Notes
ORWELL PARK: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on EUR12MM Class E Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

ST PAUL'S CLO I: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes


N O R W A Y

LYNGEN MIDCO: Moody's Withdraws B1 Corporate Family Rating


R O M A N I A

PARAVION: Files for Insolvency; Closes bavul.com Portal


R U S S I A

TATFONDBANK: DIA Asks Court to Declare Former Chairman Bankrupt
YUGRA BANK: Central Bank Asks Court to Declare Bank Insolvent
* Flight-to-Quality Pressures Some Russian Banks' Liquidity


S E R B I A

FABRIKA AKUMULATORA: Batagon Raises Offer Price to EUR4 Million


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ANGLO AMERICAN: Fitch Hikes IDR From BB+, Outlook Stable
CARILLION PLC: Richard Howson Returns to Role of COO
CIH CONSULTANCY: Commences Insolvency Process
TAHOE SUBCO 1: Moody's Assigns B3 CFR, Outlook Stable


                            *********



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A Z E R B A I J A N
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AZERBAIJAN: Moody's Cuts Issuer & Sr. Unsec. Debt Ratings to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the government of
Azerbaijan's issuer and senior unsecured debt ratings to Ba2 from
Ba1 and changed the rating outlook to stable, concluding the
rating agency's review for downgrade initiated on May 19, 2017.
Moody's also downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1 the senior unsecured debt
rating of Southern Gas Corridor CJSC (SGC), whose bonds are backed
by the government's guarantee, and changed the rating outlook to
stable.

The rating downgrade reflects the significant and long-lasting
weakening of Azerbaijan's fiscal and economic strength, which is
driven by the ongoing impact of lower oil prices, the country's
declining oil production potential and its very weak banking
system. Together these factors will continue to constrain growth
and pose material contingent liability risks to the sovereign.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the growth of
additional direct debt and contingent obligations, including
government guarantees stemming from financial support to
Azerbaijan's banking sector restructuring and its large
hydrocarbon sector projects, will level off by 2020. The stable
outlook also assumes that, over time, the government will manage
fiscal policy and its own balance sheet and the assets of its
sovereign wealth fund in a way that will improve flexibility and
capacity to effectively buffer the impact of lower-for-longer oil
prices and ongoing declines in oil production.

Azerbaijan's local currency debt and deposit ceilings are lowered
to Ba2 from Ba1. The foreign currency bond ceiling is also lowered
to Ba2 from Ba1. The foreign currency deposit ceiling is lowered
to Ba3 from Ba2.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE RATING DOWNGRADE TO Ba2

The downgrade of Azerbaijan's government debt rating to Ba2
reflects a steep rise in government indebtedness, both direct and
indirect in the form of guarantees, beyond the rating agency's
expectations when the rating was lowered to Ba1. Moody's does not
expect the deterioration to reverse.

The increase in gross government debt was initially a consequence
of the large depreciation of the exchange rate in 2015-16 but has
been exacerbated by the additional costs of supporting state-owned
entities (SOEs), primarily the country's biggest, state-owned
bank, the International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA). Following the
restructuring of IBA, the government will assume about $2.45
billion in external debt from the bank. Prior to this transaction,
that support entailed the issuance of government guarantees in
support of Aqrarkredit (the vehicle into which IBA's non-
performing loans have been transferred). The bulk of these
guarantees are in the form of very long-term (30-year with a 5-
year grace period) manat-denominated promissory notes carrying a
0.15% rate of interest. The remaining guarantees, which were meant
to back the bank's external liabilities, will be cancelled
following the transfer of most of those obligations to direct debt
of the sovereign.

Moody's consolidates the explicit guarantees issued by the
government in support of Aqrarkredit and to a number of other SOEs
into its overall assessment of government indebtedness. This
interpretation reflects the rating agency's view that, for
example, the likelihood of guarantees in support of Aqrarkredit
being triggered is high, given the poor quality of the assets
transferred at face value from IBA. It also reflects the close
operational relationship between the government and the SOEs, as
illustrated by the periodic transfer of funds by SOFAZ and the
government to pay the debt service of SOEs. Overall, explicit
guarantees amounted to about 60% of the government's gross debt at
the end of 2016. That proportion will diminish slightly to around
55% at the end of 2017.

On that basis, gross government debt in Azerbaijan is relatively
high for a developing country that is highly dependent on a single
volatile source of foreign currency income -- hydrocarbons -- that
will continue to shrink in the years ahead. Gross government debt
accounted for roughly 51% of GDP at the end of 2016 and Moody's
expects that number to rise to about 52% of GDP by the end of this
year and to more than 55% of GDP by the end of next year.

Accordingly, Moody's expects that gross debt (including explicit
guarantees) will continue to climb towards 60% of GDP through 2020
before tapering off. Moreover, both SGC and its owners, the
government and the 100%-state-owned State Oil Company of the
Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), have additional financial commitments
for various development projects both domestically and abroad,
some of which are not explicitly guaranteed by the government.

With the large rise in gross government debt, Azerbaijan's fiscal
strength has continued to weaken beyond previous Moody's
forecasts. That said, the even-larger financial assets of the
State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), which were equivalent to
about 88% of GDP at the end of 2016, contain the deterioration in
fiscal strength and maintain the government's position as a net
creditor. Assuming a relatively stable manat exchange rate against
the US dollar and little change in the dollar value of SOFAZ
assets, Moody's expects the government's net creditor position
(defined as the difference between SOFAZ assets and the
government's direct plus guaranteed debt) will contract by roughly
one-third as a share of GDP by the end of 2018 from 42% of GDP at
the end of 2016.

Meanwhile, the financial demands on SOFAZ have increased
significantly and highlight the blurred line between the state
budget, SOFAZ and state-owned entities. SOFAZ is the backstop for
the public sector and funds most of the state budget's non-oil
deficit, which came in at 27% of non-oil GDP in the first half of
2017. SOFAZ has also provided foreign-currency liquidity to the
central bank used to pay principal and interest on SGC's and
SOCAR's external debt, likely in order to preserve the central
bank's foreign currency reserves that have fallen to about $5
billion from a peak of $15.2 billion during 2014. A transfer from
SOFAZ to the central bank of up to AZN 7.5 billion (around $4.4
billion at current exchange rates) was approved for 2017, of which
AZN1.4 billion was transferred thus far. Moody's expects that,
going forward, in the quite likely event that oil and gas revenues
are insufficient for SGC and SOCAR to finance their own debt
service in full, additional transfers will be made.

Economic strength has been undermined by the deterioration in
fiscal strength and pro-cyclical fiscal policy

The erosion of fiscal strength limits the scope for accommodative
fiscal policy, which weighs on economic strength. Moody's expects
real GDP to decline by around 1.5% this year after a contraction
of nearly 4% in 2016. The recovery from 2018 onwards is expected
to be gradual, since Azerbaijan's economic dependence on a natural
resource sector that is in long-term decline continues to pose
severe economic challenges. Oil production has fallen by almost a
quarter in the last 6 years, and international organizations such
as the International Energy Agency expect it to fall further.
Revenue from new gas export pipelines, one of which is scheduled
to start operating in June 2018, will offset only part of the
decline in crude oil exports.

In Moody's view, Azerbaijan's economic weakness is exacerbated by
the limited scope for counter-cyclical fiscal policy, compounding
the challenges posed by a fragile banking system and highly
dollarized economy. This limited policy maneuver was demonstrated
by the government's decision to reduce SOFAZ transfers to the 2016
state budget and then not to go forward with the originally
planned fiscal stimulus, instead cutting government capital
expenditure to reduce pressure on the exchange rate. The fiscal
stance will remain tight in 2017, further contributing to the
economy's ongoing contraction, and fiscal policy is likely to
remain pro-cyclical over the coming years.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

STABLE RATING OUTLOOK REFLECTS EXPECTATIONS FOR STABILIZATION OF
GROSS DEBT RATIOS

The stable rating outlook reflects broadly balanced risks to the
sovereign credit profile over the medium term. Most importantly,
and despite the steep rise in gross government debt, Azerbaijan is
expected to remain a net creditor, which provides significant
support to the Ba2 rating.

Moody's expects that the growth of government debt and contingent
obligations including government guarantees will taper off by
2020, partly as a result of the implementation of a set of fiscal
rules intended to shrink the government's non-oil budget deficit
from 2018 onward.

Upside risks would involve higher than expected oil and gas
revenues that would lower the dependence of SOCAR and SGC on SOFAZ
support for debt service. Downside risks derive from potentially
large government-funded investment in the oil sector in order to
ameliorate the persistent decline in oil production capacity,
which could further increase government debt and erode fiscal
strength.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - UP

Upward pressure on the rating would derive from decisive action to
address the principal challenges in the country's credit profile,
namely the erosion in fiscal strength, the lack of economic and
export diversity and the weak banking sector. A sustained
stabilization in the government's direct and indirect debt burden,
most likely reflecting economic recovery and a healthier banking
system, would be credit positive. However, any stabilization would
be unreliable if founded solely on rising oil prices, as distinct
from a gradual diversification of the economy to address the high
dependence on oil, and a more strongly capitalized, liquid banking
system.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - DOWN

The ratings would come under negative pressure if the government's
balance sheet deterioration were to continue beyond 2018,
particularly were that to be associated with further banking
sector shocks and increased budgetary reliance on SOFAZ assets
that further eroded the country's net creditor position. Also
negative would be an escalation of the geopolitical conflict in
Nagorno Karabakh or increased uncertainly within the domestic
political environment, such as related to presidential succession.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 17,439 (2016 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): -3.8% (2016 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 15.6% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -1.2% (2016 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -3.6% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 37.3% (2016 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.

On August 14, 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of Azerbaijan, Government of. The main points raised during
the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals, including
its economic strength, have materially decreased. The issuer's
fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile, has
materially decreased. The issuer has become less susceptible to
event risks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2016.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.



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C R O A T I A
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AGROKOR DD: Villa Castello Up for Sale, Sept. 21 Bid Deadline Set
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The extraordinary administration of Agrokor DD has commenced the
selling procedure of its immovable non-core assets, starting with
Villa Castello.

Since 1999, Agrokor owned the estate of Villa Castello located in
Medveja, Lovran municipality, near Opatija, which is up for sale.
The estate includes two separate buildings, Villa Castello as the
main building which includes a beach front and a pathway along the
sea, and a separate building, an auxiliary house, which is used as
a guest house or staff lodgings.

The estate spreads over 10,062 square meters of land with 969
square meters of housing space, out of which the net area of Villa
Castello is 851 square meters, which includes the basement, the
ground floor and three additional floor, and the auxiliary house's
net area, comprising the ground floor and the first floor, is 118
square meters.

The main building located by the sea was constructed in 1916 in
architectonic style of neoclassicism.  The building consists of
basement, ground floor, first and second floor, and a viewpoint in
the tower on the third floor.  The villa consists of total of five
bedrooms on the first and second floor, while the bottom part
includes five rooms for the staff.  The lowest floor, the
basement, has two entrances, one from the beach, while the other
is connected to the path to the open summer kitchen with the
barbeque grill and the wine cellar.  The ground floor is accessed
by a pedestrian approach between two buildings and contains a
kitchen and three salons.  The first floor is predominantly
residential, connected to the entrance with a staircase and
hallway and an open space connecting two floors.  The floor
contains four rooms, each with bathroom en suite.  A suite
comprising a bedroom, living room and a bathroom, is located on
the second floor. The bedroom has a lower ceiling which rises to
its full height in the living room. The viewpoint is located on
the third floor.

The auxiliary building comprises of two suits with en suite
bathrooms and a common living room.

The estate is equipped with an improvised helipad located in a
development area for hospitality and tourism (T2) in 2c zone --
the tourist complex within the existing dimensions.

The asking price is EUR7 million.  The amount does not include
VAT, and the tax treatment will be ascertained depending on
buyer's tax status.  The procedure of sale is subject to the
conditions defined by the extraordinary procedure, entails the
option of viewing of the estate, informing on the legal conditions
of the possible sale, collections of offers and checking whether
the valid offers qualify, with the criteria of highest offered
price offered.  The buyers are expected to guarantee that their
offer is serious, and the sale and purchase contract will be
drafted by the seller.

All potential buyers wanting to view the estate will have to sign
a standard non-disclosure agreement and will need to pay a viewing
fee, which is standard with the sale of real property of such
value.  The viewing will be possible as of August 21, 2017.

Interested buyers should send their offers for Villa Castello to
the official agent for brokerage of the real estate in question,
Croatia Sotheby's International Realty(R) agency, by an e-mail to
info@sothebysrealty.hr or through the Internet website
sothebysrealty.hr by September 21, 2017.

The extraordinary administration of Agrokor retains the right no
to enter into a sale and purchase contract after all the offers
are received and analyzed.  The focus of the extraordinary
administration in the process of the sale of this real estate as
well as in the case of sale of other Agrokor's assets will be
maintaining a transparent and an open procedure, and achieving
maximum value.

                      About Agrokor DD

Founded in 1976 and based in Zagreb, Crotia, Agrokor DD is the
biggest food producer and retailer in the Balkans, employing
almost 60,000 people across the region with annual revenue of some
HRK50 billion (US$7 billion).

On April 10, 2017, the Zagreb Commercial Court allowed the
initiation of the procedure for extraordinary administration over
Agrokor and some of its affiliated or subsidiary companies.  This
comes on the heels of an April 7, 2017 proposal submitted by the
management board of Agrokor Group for the administration
proceedings for the Company pursuant to the Law of Extraordinary
Administration for Companies with Systemic Importance for the
Republic of Croatia.

Mr. Ante Ramljak was simultanrously appointed extraordinary
commissioner/trustee for Agrokor on April 10.

In May 2017, Agrokor dd, in close cooperation with its advisors,
established that as of March 31, 2017, it had total liabilities of
HRK40.409 billion.  The company racked up debts during a rapid
expansion, notably in Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Serbia, a
Reuters report noted.

On June 2, 2017, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Agrokor
D.D.'s corporate family rating (CFR) to Ca from Caa2 and the
probability of default rating (PDR) to D-PD from Ca-PD. The
outlook on the company's ratings remains negative.  Moody's also
downgraded the senior unsecured rating assigned to the notes
issued by Agrokor due in 2019 and 2020 to C from Caa2.  The rating
actions reflect Agrokor's decision not to pay the coupon scheduled
on May 1, 2017 on its EUR300 million notes due May 2019 at the end
of the 30-day grace period. It also factors in Moody's
understanding that the company is not paying interest on any of
the debt in place prior to Agrokor's decision in April 2017 to
file for restructuring under Croatia's law for the Extraordinary
Administration for Companies with Systemic Importance.

On June 8, 2017, Agrokor's Agrarian Administration signed an
agreement on a financial arrangement agreement worth EUR480
million, including EUR80 million of loans granted to Agrokor by
domestic banks in April. In addition to this amount, additional
buffers are also provided with additional EUR50 million of
potential refinancing credit. The total loan arrangement amounts
to EUR1,060 million, of which a new debt totaling EUR530 million
and the remainder is intended to refinance old debt.



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F I N L A N D
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METSA BOARD: Moody's Hikes CFR to Ba1, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Metsa Board Corporation's
Corporate Family Rating (CFR) to Ba1 from Ba2 and the group's
Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to Ba1-PD from Ba2-PD.
Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded Metsa Board's EUR225 million
Senior Unsecured Notes to Ba1 from Ba2. The outlook on all ratings
is stable.

"The rating action primarily reflects Moody's expectations that
over the next 12-18 months Metsa Board's credit metrics will
improve to levels commensurate with its Ba1 rating as its Husum
mill continues to ramp up", says Martin Fujerik, Moody's lead
analyst for Metsa Board.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade primarily reflects the rating agency's expectation of
an sustainable improvement of Metsa Boards' credit metrics over
the next 12-18 months, such as Moody's adjusted retained cash flow
(RCF)/debt well above 20% and Moody's adjusted EBITDA margin
(without contribution from Metsa Fibre) towards mid-teens in
percentage terms, which is in line with a higher rating. The
improvement will primarily come from the continuing ramp up of the
Husum mill that started production in February 2016. It initially
faced some operational issues in the first year of operation, and
with a 70% utilization rate as of June 2017 still generates
negative EBIT. Metsa Board's management believes there is
potential for around EUR100 million incremental EBITDA until 2019
(vs 2016), coming from 120 thousand tons of lost pulp production
in 2016, efficiency improvements and, most importantly, an
increasing utilisation rate of the folding boxboard machine and
with normalized sales price in paperboard deliveries. Metsa Board
expects utilization to be around 75% in 2017, with almost full
production by the end of 2018.

While the rating agency cautions that there is a still some
execution risk with regards to volumes sold as well as
geographical mix -- so far the proportion of the sales to the
primarily targeted profitable US market has been below
expectations -- Moody's still sees a high likelihood of credit
metrics improvement even if the ramp-up is not fully in line with
the company's original expectations.

In addition, there are other factors that will support the
improvement in credit metrics going forward. Firstly, 2017 will
mark the first full year without its legacy, margin-dilutive paper
business weighing on profitability. Secondly, after exceptionally
high capex spending in 2015 and 2016 related to the expansion of
the Husum mill (on average around EUR170 million p.a. vs. roughly
EUR50 million maintenance capex needs), Moody's expects Metsa
Board's capex to decline towards maintenance levels in 2017 and
2018, which will help the company to return to positive free cash
flow generation. While there is a risk of
re-leveraging in the medium term, considering that Metsa Board
operates below its internal leverage ceiling of net leverage of
2.5x (as defined by Metsa Board, 2.0x for the last 12-month to
June 2017 period), the rating agency does not foresee Metsa Board
utilising this headroom before Husum is fully ramped up.

Thirdly, Metsa Board guides for a further reduction of gross debt
in the second half of 2017 to around EUR600 million (around EUR640
million as per end of June 2017). Finally, in the medium term
there is potential to receive higher dividend payments from its
25% stake in sister company Metsa Fibre, once its sizeable
Aanekoski pulp mill, which is currently starting its production,
is fully operational. In this respect Moody's also recognises the
substantial value of Metsa Board's stake in Metsa Fibre, although
the rating agency does not foresee Metsa Board to reduce its stake
under normal business conditions.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the group's
paperboard operations will continue to perform solidly during the
next 12-18 months with further improvements from ongoing
efficiencies, exit from unprofitable paper business and upward
potential from Husum ramp-up, with Moody's adjusted EBITDA margin
(without contribution from Metsa Fibre) will move towards mid-
teens in % terms and Moody's adjusted retained cash flow to debt
(RCF/Debt) around 25%.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/ DOWN

Positive rating pressure could develop if Metsa Board's builds a
track record of RCF/debt (as adjusted by Moody's) sustainably
around 25% and Moody's adjusted EBITDA margin (without
contribution from Metsa Fibre) were to increase above 16% terms on
a sustained basis.

Moody's could consider downgrading Metsa Board if the group's
profitability were to come under pressure resulting in Moody's
adjusted EBITDA margin (without contribution from Metsa Fibre)
falling towards the low teens percentages and Moody's adjusted
RCF/debt failing to improve above 20%.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Paper
and Forest Products Industry published in October 2013.

Headquartered in Espoo, Finland, with revenues of EUR1.7 billion
in 2016 Metsa Board is a leading European fresh fibre paperboard
producer, including its own pulp production. Metsa Board employs a
workforce of around 2.5 thousand employees and is majority owned
by parent company Metsaliitto Cooperative, which itself is owned
by more than 104,000 Finnish Forest owners. Within Metsa Group,
Metsaliitto Cooperative also holds majority shares in Metsa Fibre
(50.2%) as well as 100% ownership in Metsa Tissue, Metsa Wood and
Metsa Forest. Metsa Group generated a consolidated turnover of
EUR4.7 billion in 2016.



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G E R M A N Y
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AIR BERLIN: In Talks with More Than Ten Interested Buyers
---------------------------------------------------------
Gernot Heller, Thomas Escritt and Victoria Bryan at Reuters report
that Air Berlin has spoken with more than 10 parties interested in
parts of the insolvent carrier and expects its assets will be
divided up amongst two or three buyers.

Talks began on Aug. 18 on carving up Air Berlin, which said on
Aug. 15 it was filing for insolvency, Reuters relates.  German
flag carrier Lufthansa was first in the queue for meetings, ahead
of other potential bidders, Reuters notes.

According to Reuters, Air Berlin chief executive Thomas Winkelmann
told German paper Bild am Sonntag he wanted a sale to be done in
September at the latest.

German Deputy Economy Minister Matthias Machnig said it would take
several investors to offer Air Berlin and its employees a long-
term future, reiterating that Lufthansa would not be the only
buyer of the carrier's assets, Reuters relays.

The head of Germany's advisory Monopoly Commission, Achim Wambach,
told Die Welt that allowing Lufthansa to take over Air Berlin's
route network would render large numbers of German domestic routes
uncompetitive, Reuters discloses.

                       About Air Berlin

Air Berlin Plc is a Germany-based airline that is registered in
the United Kingdom. On August 15, 2017, Air Berlin's Board of
Directors filed with the competent local district court of
Berlin-Charlottenburg a petition for the opening of debtor-in-
possession insolvency proceedings.  In addition, a petition for
the opening of debtor-in-possession insolvency proceedings was
filed with the local district court of Berlin-Charlottenburg for
Air Berlin PLC & Co. Luftverkehrs KG and airberlin technik GmbH
and will be filed for further subsidiaries of the Air Berlin
group.  The Board has, after close evaluation, determined that
Air Berlin has no longer a positive continuation prognosis.  The
reason for this conclusion is that its main shareholder Etihad
Airways PJSC has notified Air Berlin of the fact that it will not
provide any further financial support to the Air Berlin group.


AIR BERLIN: Lufthansa May Hire Employees for Eurowings Unit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Richard Weiss at Bloomberg News reports that Deutsche Lufthansa AG
Chief Executive Officer Carsten Spohr said he's ready to welcome
large numbers of employees from insolvent competitor Air Berlin
Plc to build up his airline's Eurowings unit, promoting his
company as a safe haven for jobs albeit with concessions.

"Those of you who have worked with Air Berlin crews know it: These
are top people, and we'll be very glad to get as many as we can
over to us," Mr. Spohr, as cited by Bloomberg, said at an internal
staff meeting on Aug. 17.  "Of course we cannot hire these
employees on Air Berlin terms, but on Eurowings terms, but we do
want to be fair and take into account seniority and experience."

The comments are a clear sign to unions that Air Berlin employees
could secure a future at Lufthansa, but only in exchange for curbs
to their paychecks, as the companies begin talks on which assets
of the collapsing carrier can shift to its larger rival, Bloomberg
notes.

According to Bloomberg, Lufthansa is interested in operating about
half of Air Berlin's 140-plane fleet, and the discount Eurowings
brand, which is in the process of slashing costs per average seat
kilometer by 30% by 2020, would be the new home for many of those
aircraft and crews.

Mr. Spohr has said for months that, before Lufthansa could take
over more of the fleet, Air Berlin's debt burden must be reduced
and costs cut, while antitrust authorities would have to approve
any deal, Bloomberg relays.

Intro-Verwaltungs GmbH, a German investment company run by former
aviation entrepreneur Hans Rudolf Woehrl, said on Aug. 18 that it
teamed up with investors for a proposal to buy Air Berlin and keep
it intact, Bloomberg relates.

Mr. Woehrl said in a statement shifting large parts of Air Berlin
to Lufthansa isn't in the interest of competition, and therefore
of passengers, Bloomberg recounts.  He said "Breaking up Air
Berlin will propel the weakening of the German aviation industry,"
as any assets that the Federal Cartel Office prevents Lufthansa
from taking over will end up at foreign carriers, Bloomberg notes.

                       About Air Berlin

Air Berlin Plc is a Germany-based airline that is registered in
the United Kingdom. On August 15, 2017, Air Berlin's Board of
Directors filed with the competent local district court of
Berlin-Charlottenburg a petition for the opening of debtor-in-
possession insolvency proceedings.  In addition, a petition for
the opening of debtor-in-possession insolvency proceedings was
filed with the local district court of Berlin-Charlottenburg for
Air Berlin PLC & Co. Luftverkehrs KG and airberlin technik GmbH
and will be filed for further subsidiaries of the Air Berlin
group.  The Board has, after close evaluation, determined that
Air Berlin has no longer a positive continuation prognosis.  The
reason for this conclusion is that its main shareholder Etihad
Airways PJSC has notified Air Berlin of the fact that it will not
provide any further financial support to the Air Berlin group.



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G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: Fitch Raises Long-Term IDR to B-, Outlook Positive
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Greece's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) to 'B-' from 'CCC'. The Outlooks are
Positive.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of Greece's IDRs reflects the following key rating
drivers and their relative weights:

MEDIUM

Fitch believes that general government debt sustainability will
steadily improve, underpinned by on-going compliance with the
terms of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) programme, and
reduced political risk, sustained GDP growth and additional fiscal
measures legislated to take effect through 2020. The successful
completion of the second review of Greece's ESM programme reduces
risks that the economic recovery will be undermined by a hit to
confidence or by the government building up arrears with the
private sector.

The Positive Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation that the third
review of the adjustment programme will be concluded without
creating instability and that the Eurogroup will grant substantial
debt relief to Greece in 2018. In its statement on June 15, 2017,
the Eurogroup confirmed its commitment to implementing a set of
debt relief measures aimed at keeping gross financing needs below
15% of GDP in the medium term and below 20% of GDP thereafter.
This should support market confidence, which will help support
post-programme market access. In Fitch's view, the political
backdrop has become more stable and the risk of any future
government reversing policy measures adopted under the ESM
programme is limited.

The debt relief measures include restarting disbursement of
profits on Greek bonds held by the ECB, partial early ESM
refinancing of relatively expensive IMF loans, and further
European Financial Stability Facility relief (interest rate caps,
coupon deferrals and maturity extensions).

Fitch notes that the Eurogroup has outlined plans to link debt
relief measures to actual growth outcomes over the post-programme
period. In Moody's views, this would be an important development
as it increases confidence that the general government debt will
remain on a sustainable path in the face of adverse growth shocks.
European partners appear to be shifting the focus of Greece's
future conditionality from strict fiscal targets towards restoring
medium-term GDP growth.

Public finances are improving. In 2016 Greece recorded a primary
surplus of 3.9% of GDP, well above the ESM programme target of
0.5%, owing to higher than budgeted revenues and expenditure
restraint. Moody's expects the government to record an average
primary surplus of 2.8% of GDP over 2017-19. Assuming nominal GDP
growth of 3.4%, general government gross debt is forecast to fall
to 169.5% of GDP in 2019. The government has already legislated
fiscal measures that are projected to yield 3% of GDP through
2018, of which just above two-thirds will come from pension and
income tax reform. Full implementation may face political
constraints, but there is a contingent fiscal mechanism to
retrospectively trigger further measures if a fiscal target is
missed.

The economy is gradually recovering. Recent high frequency
indicators point to a faster pace of economic activity, following
a weak 1Q performance due to the impact of programme delays on
confidence and payments to the private sector. The European
Commission economic sentiment indicators reached a two-year high
in July on the back of rising consumer and business confidence.

The completion of the second review and the subsequent
disbursement of EUR8.5 billion by the ESM have supported
confidence and injected liquidity in the economy through clearance
of arrears with the private sector. Fitch forecasts real GDP
growth of 1.6% and 2.1% in 2017 and 2018. Pent-up investment
demand, a declining unemployment rate and continued clearance of
government arrears are set to support domestic demand. Growth
recovery in the eurozone should support export performance.

Greece's IDR also reflect the following key rating drivers:

The ratings are underpinned by high income per capita levels,
which far exceed 'B' and 'BB' medians. Greece's financial crisis
and recession exposed shortcomings in government effectiveness and
put acute pressures on political and social stability. However,
governance is still significantly stronger than in most sub-
investment-grade peers.

Over two-thirds of the total economy's external debt is held by
official creditors and the Eurosystem, helping to keep external
debt servicing at a manageable 12% of GDP. The average maturity of
debt is favourable at 18 years, among the longest across all
Fitch-rated sovereigns. The maturity profile is also benign.
Central government debt repayments are set to peak in 2019.
Moody's expects repayments per year to remain moderate through to
2030.

The Greek sovereign returned to the capital markets on 25 July
after three years. Greece placed a new benchmark EUR3 billion
five-year bond with a yield of 4.625%. The issuance has allowed
the sovereign to smooth the debt maturity profile: of EUR3
billion, around half was swapped in exchange for bonds due to
mature in 2019. Moody's expects the government to continue to
issue market debt and use the proceeds to smooth further the
maturity profile and build a sizeable deposit buffer before the
end of the ESM programme.

In Fitch's view, political risks have partly reduced. The Tsipras
government has legislated a set of politically difficult measures
and its parliamentary majority has held up. Moody's think near-
term snap elections are unlikely. Based on recent polls, Syriza
trails by 15-20pp the centre-right New Democracy party, which has
less ideological opposition to a number of the programme measures
but has been arguing for its renegotiation in particular on the
fiscal targets. Early elections would provide a source of
uncertainty that would likely undermine the recent economic
recovery.

Confidence in the banking sector remains fragile although it is
improving. On August 2 the ECB lowered the Emergency Liquidity
Assistance (ELA) ceiling for Greek banks to EUR38.9 billion from
its peak of EUR90 billion in July 2015, reflecting positive
development in liquidity conditions. Moreover, following
completion of the second review, the Greek government has
announced a further relaxation in capital controls effective from
September 1, 2017.

The customer deposit base is prone to volatility, despite the
positive developments. After falling by 27% between September 2014
and July 2015, private sector deposits have barely recovered.
Since the relaxation of capital controls in July 2016, the inflow
of deposits has been subdued. Several delays to the programme
review may have put additional pressure on investor confidence,
although capital controls have limited deterioration in banks'
liquidity position.

A key challenge for the banking sector is tackling non-performing
exposures (NPEs), which remain stubbornly high at 45% of gross
loans. Improvements have been made to the legal and institutional
framework for resolving loans and banks have stepped up their
restructuring efforts but with limited effect on the stock of NPEs
so far. The reform of the out-of-court workout (OCW) is seen by
the authorities and the European partners as a key element of the
NPL resolution strategy. The basic infrastructure to have the OCW
functioning is now in place. The expectation is that there will be
an increase in voluntary negotiations between creditors and
debtors to reach agreements on debt restructuring solutions.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Greece a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BB' on the Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR scale.

In accordance with its rating criteria, Fitch's sovereign rating
committee decided to adjust the rating indicated by the SRM by
more than the usual maximum range of +/- 3 notches because of
Greece's experience of financial crisis.

Consequently, the overall adjustment of four notches reflects the
following adjustments:

- Public Finances: -1 notch, to reflect public debt at close to
   180% of GDP; the SRM does not capture "non-linear"
   vulnerabilities at such a high level;

- External finances: -2 notches, to reflect: a) Greece's high
   net external debt which is not captured in the SRM, and lack
   of market access which reduces financing flexibility, and b)
   the +2 notch SRM enhancement for "reserve currency
   flexibility" has been adjusted to +1 notch given Greece's
   financial crisis experience;

- Structural Features: -1 notch, to reflect political risks to
   the programme, and a weak banking sector reliant on official
   sector funding and with capital controls still largely in
   place.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR. Fitch's QO is a
forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for
adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating,
reflecting factors within Moody's criterias that are not fully
quantifiable or not fully reflected in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future developments that could, individually or collectively,
result in positive rating action include:

- Evidence that the recent economic recovery is sustained and a
   track record of achieving primary surpluses.

- Material debt relief from the official sector.

- Further track record of successful implementation of the ESM
   programme, underpinned by an orderly working relationship
   between Greece and its official sector creditors and a fairly
   stable political environment.

The Outlook is Positive.

Consequently, Fitch does not currently anticipate developments
with a high likelihood of leading to a downgrade. However, future
developments that could, individually or collectively, result in
negative rating action include:

- Deviation from fiscal targets and a reversal of the policies
   legislated under the ESM programme

- A breakdown in relations with creditors, reducing the prospect
   of debt relief measures from the Eurogroup.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

- Fitch's base case assumes the third programme review is
   completed without creating political and economic instability.

- Any debt relief given to Greece under the ESM programme will
   apply to official sector debt only, and would not therefore
   constitute an event or default under the agency's criteria.

The full list of rating actions is:

Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR upgraded to 'B-' from 'CCC';
Outlook Positive

Long-Term Local-Currency IDR upgraded to 'B-' from 'CCC'; Outlook
Positive

Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR upgraded to 'B' from 'C'

Short-Term Local-Currency IDR upgraded to 'B' from 'C'

Country Ceiling revised to 'B' from 'B-'

Issue ratings on long-term senior-unsecured bonds upgraded to
'B-' from 'CCC'

Issue ratings on short-term senior-unsecured bonds upgraded to
'B' from 'C'



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


BRENDAN INVESTMENTS: In Liquidation; Owes More than EUR11MM
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tim Healy at Irish Independent reports that Brendan Investments
Pan European Property plc (Bipep) has been wound up owing more
than EUR11 million to investors.

The property investment company lost most of its money due to
property investments in the city of Detroit, USA, and Dusseldorf,
Germany, the High Court heard, Irish Independent relays.

It has assets of just EUR91,000 and liabilities of EUR11.4
million, EUR11.3 million of which is owed to investors, the report
discloses.

According to Irish Independent, the wind-up petition was presented
by Stephen Brady BL, on behalf of directors Hugh O'Neill and
Vincent Regan, who are also creditors. Consumer champion Eddie
Hobbs, who became a non-executive director when the company went
public in 2007, resigned from that position more than two years
ago.

The petition, Irish Independent cites, stated that the firm was
incorporated in 2006 and on going public in 2007, raised EUR12.6
million through a public round of funds in exchange for loan notes
and ordinary shares. The strategy was to invest in a mix of
commercial, residential and development property over a 10-year
period.  The investments were initially promising.

However, the fall in value of the company was a result of the
credit crunch and "two unforeseen events", the petition stated,
Irish Independent relays.

The first related to a Dusseldorf office property, which Brendan
Investments Sarl (a wholly owned subsidiary of Bipep) had invested
EUR15.7 million in. The tenant of that building, Dax-listed
Arcandor AG, subsequently became insolvent and Bipep lost a total
of EUR6 million on that, according to Irish Independent.

In 2012, the company decided to invest more than EUR4.5 million in
distressed residential properties in Detroit through a wholly-
owned subsidiary, Artesian Equity LLC.  The value of that
investment, the petition said, was "seriously impacted" by a
number of factors.  These included "poor management" of the
portfolio by the US property manager and high holding cost of the
portfolio, Irish Independent relays.

According to Irish Independent, there was also the water crisis in
Flint, 110km north of Detroit, in which, due to insufficient water
treatment, around 100,000 residents of Flint were potentially
exposed to high levels of lead in their drinking water.  It led to
a federal state of emergency being declared in 2015 and the
resulting crisis reduced demand for properties acquired in Detroit
along with increased costs of having to comply with the region's
regulations, the report says.

As a result of the financial difficulties, the company was not in
a position to discharge outstanding sums to its creditors and
shareholders, the report cites.

Irish Independent relates that Mr. Justice David Keane was told
creditors were notified of the winding up application through
public advertisement of the application.

The judge said he was satisfied to appoint Aidan Garcia Diaz of
Collins Garcia Insolvency Practitioners as official liquidator of
Bipep, Irish Independent adds.


ORWELL PARK: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Class E Senior Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following definitive
ratings to four classes of notes issued by Orwell Park CLO
Designated Activity Company:

-- EUR243,000,000 Refinancing Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating
    Rate Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR42,000,000 Refinancing Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating
    Rate Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR24,000,000 Refinancing Class B Senior Secured Deferrable
    Floating Rate Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2
    (sf)

-- EUR21,500,000 Refinancing Class C Senior Secured Deferrable
    Floating Rate Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2
    (sf)

Additionally, Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the existing
following notes issued by the Issuer on June 4, 2015 (the
"Original Closing Date"):

-- EUR25,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2015
    Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR12,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2015
    Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive ratings of the refinancing notes address the
expected loss posed to noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks
due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Class A-1 Notes, the
Refinancing Class A-2 Notes, the Refinancing Class B Notes and the
Refinancing Class C Notes (the "Refinancing Notes") in connection
with the refinancing of the Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2029, the Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2029, the Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2029 and the Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes due 2029 ("the Original Notes") respectively,
previously issued on the Original Closing Date. The Issuer will
use the proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes to
redeem in full the Original Notes that will be refinanced. On the
Original Closing Date, the Issuer also issued two classes of rated
notes and one class of subordinated notes, which will remain
outstanding.

Other than the changes to the spreads and coupon of the notes, the
main material change to the terms and conditions will involve
increasing the Weighted Average Life Test by approximately 15
months to a total of 7 years from the refinancing date. The length
of the reinvestment period will remain unchanged and will expire
on July 18, 2019. Furthermore, the manager is expected to be able
to choose from a new set of collateral quality test covenants (the
"Matrix"). No other material modifications to the CLO are
occurring in connection to the refinancing.

Moody's rating actions on the Class D Notes and Class E Notes are
primarily a result of the amendments to the transaction documents
and the issuance of the Refinancing Notes.

Orwell Park is a managed cash flow CLO. The issued notes will be
collateralized primarily by broadly syndicated first lien senior
secured corporate loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must
consist of senior secured loans or senior secured bonds and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured senior loans, second
lien loans, mezzanine obligations, high yield bonds and/or first
lien last out loans. The underlying portfolio is expected to be
100% ramped as of the refinancing date.

Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Management Europe Limited (the
"Manager") manages the CLO. It directs the selection, acquisition,
and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer. After the
end of the reinvestment period, the Manager may reinvest
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk obligations, subject to certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay
down the notes in order of seniority.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modelled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modelling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par, recoveries and principal proceeds balance:
EUR400,000,000

Defaulted par: EUR0

Diversity Score: 44

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2957 (*)

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.25%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 41.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.0 years

(*) The transaction includes a Matrix modifier which permits an
increase in the covenanted WARF if the applicable margin of the
Class A-1 Notes is reduced below its initial level as of the
Original Closing Date. The assumed WARF reflects the effect of
this modifier on the combination of portfolio covenants expected
as of closing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The performance of the Refinancing Notes is subject to
uncertainty. The performance of the Refinancing Notes is sensitive
to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn
depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. The
Manager's investment decisions and management of the transaction
will also affect the performance of the Refinancing Notes.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a
component in determining the ratings assigned to the Refinancing
Notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on the Refinancing Notes as well as the existing
notes which are not subject to refinancing, (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), assuming that all other factors are held equal.

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2957 to 3401)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Refinancing Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Refinancing Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Refinancing Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -2

Refinancing Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -2

Refinancing Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -1

Refinancing Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2957 to 3844)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Refinancing Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Refinancing Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Refinancing Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -3

Refinancing Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -2

Refinancing Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -1

Refinancing Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes: -1


ORWELL PARK: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on EUR12MM Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Orwell Park CLO DAC refinancing notes
(classes A-1 to C) final ratings and affirmed the others:

EUR243 million Class A-1 notes: assigned 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR42 million Class A-2 notes: assigned 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR24 million Class B notes: assigned 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR21.5 million Class C notes: assigned 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR25 million Class D notes: affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR12 million Class E notes: affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR47.5 million subordinated notes: not rated

The transaction is a cash flow-collateralised loan obligation
securitising a portfolio of mainly European leveraged loans and
bonds. The portfolio is managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds
Management Europe Limited. Orwell Park CLO DAC closed in June 2015
and is still in its reinvestment period, which expires in July
2019.

The issuer has issued new notes to refinance part of the original
liabilities. The refinanced notes have been redeemed in full as a
consequence of the refinancing. The refinancing notes carry lower
interest than the notes being refinanced. The remaining terms and
conditions of the refinancing notes (including seniority) are the
same as the refinanced notes.

In addition, the issuer has extended the weighted average life
(WAL) covenant to approximatively seven years from the refinancing
date and has updated Fitch test matrices.

In its analysis, Fitch applied a 15bp haircut to the weighted
average spread (WAS) calculation. In this transaction, the
aggregate funded spread calculation for floating-rate collateral
debt obligation with an Euribor floor is artificially inflated by
the negative portion of Euribor.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch places the average credit quality of obligors in the 'B'/'B-
' range. The weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the current
portfolio is 33.95, below the current maximum WARF covenant of 34.

High Recovery Expectations
The portfolio comprises a minimum of 90% senior secured
obligations. The weighted average recovery rate (WARR) of the
current portfolio is 67.4%, above the breakeven WARR of 57.5%
corresponding to the matrix point of 34 WARF, 4.1% WAS and 5%
fixed-rate assets.

Extended WAL covenant
The WAL of the current portfolio is 5.27 years and the issuer has
extended the WAL covenant to approximatively seven years. The
breakeven WARR was determined based on the extended WAL covenant.

Limited Interest Rate Risk
Fixed-rate assets can represent between 0% and 10% of the
portfolio while all liabilities pay a floating rate of interest.
Fitch modelled a 10%, 5% and a 0% fixed-rate bucket in its
analysis, and the rated notes can withstand the interest rate
mismatch associated with each scenario.

Diversified Asset Portfolio
This transaction contains a covenant that limits the top 10
obligors in the portfolio to 20% of the portfolio balance. This
ensures that the asset portfolio will not be exposed to excessive
obligor concentration.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 125% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and with this increase added to all rating default levels,
would lead to a downgrade of up to three notches for the rated
notes.

A 150% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and with this increase added to all rating default levels,
would lead to a downgrade of up to five notches for the rated
notes.

A 25% reduction in recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of up
to three notches for the rated notes.

A 50% reduction in recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of up
to six notches for the rated notes.

A combined stress of a default multiplier of 125% and a recovery
rate multiplier of 75% would lead to a downgrade of up to five
notches for the rated notes.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ST PAUL'S CLO I: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the following notes issued
by St Paul's CLO I B.V.:

-- EUR17.28M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Rate Notes due
    2023, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017
    Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

-- EUR18.05M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Rate Notes due
    2023, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017
    Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the following ratings:

-- EUR211.05M (current outstanding balance of EUR32.20M) Class A
    Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aaa
    (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR18.8M Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Rate Notes due
    2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Upgraded
    to Aaa (sf)

-- EUR6.35M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Rate Notes due
    2023, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Feb 10, 2017 Affirmed
    B1 (sf)

St Paul's CLO I B.V., issued in May 2007, is a collateralised loan
obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield senior
secured European loans. The portfolio is managed by Intermediate
Capital Managers Limited. The transaction's reinvestment period
ended on July 15, 2014.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
deleveraging of the Class A Notes following amortisation of the
underlying portfolio since the last rating action in February
2017. Class A Notes paid down by EUR46.75M (22% of the original
balance) at the July 2017 payment date. According to the July 2017
trustee report, the Classes A/B, C, D and E OC ratios are 151.42%,
128.68%, 111.22% and 106.16% respectively compared to levels just
prior to the payment date in January 2017 of 135.56%, 120.77%,
108.42% and 104.65% respectively. Moody's notes that the July 2017
principal payments are not reflected in the OC ratios reported.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par balance of EUR100.42M, defaulted par of EUR1.29M, a
weighted average default probability of 15.96% (consistent with a
WARF of 2500 and a weighted average life of 3.88 years), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.07% for a Aaa
liability target rating and a diversity score of 16 and a weighted
average spread of 3.56%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery rates for CLO
securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs".
In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be considered
based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO transaction. In
each case, historical and market performance and a collateral
manager's latitude to trade collateral are also relevant factors.
Moody's incorporates these default and recovery characteristics of
the collateral pool into its cash flow model analysis, subjecting
them to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
that were unchanged for Classes A and B and were within two
notches of the base case for Classes C, D and E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

1) Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.
Fast amortisation would usually benefit the ratings of the
notes beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment
priority.

2) Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralisation levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's analysed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price or the
recovery rate to account for potential volatility in market
prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction maturity,
the liquidation value of such an asset will depend on the nature
of the asset as well as the extent to which the asset's maturity
lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values higher than
Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on the notes'
ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===========
N O R W A Y
===========


LYNGEN MIDCO: Moody's Withdraws B1 Corporate Family Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn all of EVRY's ratings,
namely the B1 corporate family rating (CFR) and B1-PD probability
of default rating (PDR) of Lyngen Midco AS, as well as the B1
instrument ratings on the backed senior secured first lien bank
credit facilities borrowed by Lyngen Bidco AS. At the time of the
withdrawal, Lyngen Midco AS' ratings were under review for upgrade
and Lyngen Bidco AS' ratings carried a stable outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings following the completion of
EVRY's IPO, which resulted in the repayment of the company's rated
senior secured facilities.

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Withdrawals:

Issuer: Lyngen Midco AS

-- LT Corporate Family Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated B1,
    under review for upgrade

-- Probability of Default Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated
    B1-PD, under review for upgrade

Issuer: Lyngen Bidco AS

-- Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Withdrawn,
    previously rated B1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Lyngen Midco AS

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Lyngen Bidco AS

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From Stable



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


PARAVION: Files for Insolvency; Closes bavul.com Portal
-------------------------------------------------------
Business Review reports that Paravion, Romania's biggest online
tourism portal, has filed for insolvency and will close bavul.com,
the Turkish-based portal it purchased in 2014. The company
implemented a restructuring plan on August 8.

In the past year, Paravion's Turkish portal, bavul.com, which
represents one third of the business, recorded losses, due to the
political instability and security issues affecting Turkey, the
report says. Losses amounted to several million euros, sources
said. Paravion is managed by GED investment fund.

"The online tourism agency Paravion, present in Turkey with portal
bavul.com, will implement a restructuring program starting 8
August 2017.  The decision was motivated by the dramatic drop of
the business ran by Paravion in Turkey via Bavul, on the back of
political problems and security issues experienced by Turkey in
the past 12 years," the company said in a statement, BR relays.

According to the report, company representatives expect that the
agency will continue to carry its business as usual and will allow
tourists to continue booking airline tickets, accommodation and
holiday purchases.

In 2015, Paravion took over online portal Bavul, with a portfolio
of over 300,000 users from Turkcell, the report recalls.  After
the purchase, in 2016, Bavul recorded EUR23 million, however after
the strong depreciation of the Turkish lira in the last quarter of
2016, had a dramatic impact on the investment and on the Paravion
business.

Therefore, the company decided to close the Bavul portal and
reorganise the company, BR says.

Paravion is the first 100 percent online ticket reservation site
in Romania and has an average 20,000 searches per hour, and
Paravion sales exceeded 440,000 flight tickets," the company, as
cited by BR, said. The company reported a turnover of
approximately EUR78 million. Operations in Romania increased by
20 percent over the previous year, reaching EUR55 million, and
those in Turkey amounted to EUR23 million, the report discloses.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


TATFONDBANK: DIA Asks Court to Declare Former Chairman Bankrupt
---------------------------------------------------------------
CrimeRussia reports that the Deposit Insurance Agency of Russia
has filed a lawsuit with the Arbitration Court of Tatarstan to
declare Robert Musin, former Chairman of the Board of Tatfondbank
detained for swindling on an especially large scale, bankrupt. The
plaintiff requires to recognize the banker insolvent because the
total sum of financial claims filed against him -- some
RUB16.8 million (US$280,000) -- can't be repaid, CrimeRussia says.

At the same time, according to the materials of the criminal case
against Mr. Musin, the total amount of embezzled funds exceeds
RUB35.5 billion (US$591.7 million), while the list of victims
includes the Bank of Russia, Deposit Insurance Agency of Russia,
and Tatfondbank, CrimeRussia says.

CrimeRussia relates that the investigators don't think that the
VIP detainee can be declared bankrupt because the Musin family has
plenty of money; the majority of their assets are stored not in
Russian banks, but most probably, in Switzerland. According to the
Investigations Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the
Russian Federation in the Republic of Tatarstan (ICR), new VIP
suspects are to appear in this criminal case soon, CrimeRussia
says.

According to CrimeRussia, the case against Robert Musin has
already escalated to the international level. The investigators
have found banker's foreign assets, including real estate in
Turkey, offshore companies, and an airplane. However, the traces
of RUB434 million ($7.2 million) -- the income declared by the
Musin family for three years -- can't be located. The funds are
not in Russia, but there are no doubts that these are in
possession of the family, CrimeRussia says.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 24,
2017, The Irish Times related that Tatfondbank had been declared
bankrupt by a Tatarstan court on April 10 on foot of a petition
from the Central Bank of Russia. The country's central bank said
that Tatfondbank had the equivalent of a EUR2 billion hole in its
balance sheet, more than 20% higher than a previous estimate, The
Irish Times noted.

Tatfondbank is the biggest Russian banking collapse since another
lender called Vneshprombank, which also had a Dublin funding
operation, imploded in January last year and defaulted on its
US$225 million of bonds, according to The Irish Times.


YUGRA BANK: Central Bank Asks Court to Declare Bank Insolvent
-------------------------------------------------------------
CrimeRussia reports that the Russian Central Bank appealed to the
capital's commercial court with a statement on the bankruptcy of
the Yugra Bank. The corresponding document is placed in the
electronic file cabinet of the court.

As the CrimeRussia previously wrote, the regulator revoked the
license from the financial institution on July 28, two weeks
earlier the bank introduced a temporary administration and imposed
a moratorium on payments to creditors.  According to the report,
the founders of the bank and the Prosecutor General's Office tried
to challenge the actions of the Central Bank, but the regulator
continued to insist on the financial insolvency of the credit
institution.

In particular, according to the report of the interim
administration, a 'hole' of RUB7 billion was found in Yugra's
capital, CrimeRussia relates. In addition, it was found that the
volume of loans granted to borrowers associated with business
projects of bank owners as of July 1 was almost 90% of the loan
portfolio, CrimeRussia says.

Yugra is the 33rd largest bank in Russia by assets.


* Flight-to-Quality Pressures Some Russian Banks' Liquidity
-----------------------------------------------------------
A flight to quality triggered by depositors' concerns following
the withdrawal of Jugra Bank's license could intensify as the
clean-up of Russia's banking sector continues, Fitch Ratings says.
This would put some weaker privately owned banks' liquidity at
risk.

The clean-up is likely to highlight further problem banks, adding
to concerns about weak solvency positions at certain private
lenders and uncertainty about how the Central Bank of Russia (CBR)
may address these issues. The flight to quality will increase the
dominance of state banks and a handful of private and foreign-
owned institutions, and may leave smaller banks having to pay
higher deposit rates to retain customers.

The liquidity squeeze is evident from the use of expensive CBR
repo funding, which spiked by about RUB300 billion in July after
the CBR started the process of withdrawing Jugra's licence, and
then by a further RUB280 billion in the first half of August.

Jugra, a mid-sized private bank (market share: 0.3%), was deemed
unviable due to weak asset quality and doubts about its financial
reporting. Its closure caused tension among depositors and other
creditors, who started moving their money to stronger private,
foreign or state-supported institutions, although it had no
interbank or bond borrowings and posed no direct risks to other
banks. New regulations that stop lower-rated and unrated banks
from taking deposits from state entities and private pension funds
and make their future bond issuance ineligible for repo financing
with the CBR also appear to have affected some banks' access to
funding.

Otkritie, B&N Bank, Promsvyazbank and Credit Bank of Moscow (CBOM,
BB-/Stable) are among the banks that have been subject to Russian
media speculation in recent weeks, regarding the liquidity
position of some and the potential knock-on effect on others.

Otkritie reported the largest funding contraction in July,
according to CBR data released this week, of about RUB620 billion
or a third of its liabilities, although about half of this seems
to be unwinding of repo transactions and the remaining outflows
were offset by RUB333 billion of borrowings from the CBR. The
bank's liquid assets (cash, short-term interbank and unpledged
bonds) at 1 August were sufficient to cover over 20% of customer
funding.

B&N reported a moderate RUB20 billion (2% of liabilities) outflow
of interbank funding in July after a larger RUB50 billion (5%)
reduction in June, which was mostly covered by borrowing from the
CBR. B&N's funding from the regulator was a significant RUB51
billion at 1 August, and its liquidity buffer was sufficient to
cover about 20% of liabilities.

Promsvyazbank's funding remained stable in June and July, while
its liquidity buffer at August 1 was solid (38% of customer
funding).

CBOM's loans and funding significantly increased in July, by about
RUB250 billion, suggesting that some of the repo transactions
previously on Otkritie's balance sheet may now be with CBOM. The
liquidity buffer is reasonable, covering 21% of customer funding
at August 1.

Russian banks could pledge eligible corporate loans to receive
extra funding from the CBR, and larger institutions could benefit
from extra liquidity support aimed at preventing wider systemic
stress.

Some form of resolution cannot be ruled out at banks where the CBR
identifies significant solvency concerns, although bail-in
legislation in Russia has been postponed indefinitely. One bank,
Peresvet, was resolved through a combination of state support and
voluntary bail-in earlier this year. The CBR provided limited
support, with the remaining capital shortfall covered by senior
creditors, who accepted large haircuts. The CBR considered a
similar approach for Tatartsan's Tatfondbank but this did not
proceed, and the bank went into insolvency.

The banks we rate (representing about 60% of sector assets) have
limited direct unsecured exposure to Otkritie, B&N and
Promsvyazbank through bonds or interbank lending. CBOM has
significantly reduced its exposures to other large privately owned
Russian banks since end-1Q17. But there may be significant
additional exposures in other banks that we do not rate, and other
indirect risks such as corporate exposures to businesses related
to Otkritie, B&N, Promsvyazbank and their shareholders.



===========
S E R B I A
===========


FABRIKA AKUMULATORA: Batagon Raises Offer Price to EUR4 Million
---------------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews, citing Serbian media, reports that Swiss-based company
Batagon International has increased the price it is offering to
acquire Fabrika Akumulatora Sombor (FAS) to EUR4 million (US$4.7
million).

The company has increased the offer by EUR1 million, which
represents a significant improvement, news portal SoInfo quoted
the insolvency administrator of FAS, Predrag Ljubovic, as saying
on Aug. 5, SeeNews relates.

Mr. Ljubovic said the creditors of FAS are expected to approve the
sale of the company, according to SeeNews.

Last month, the creditors rejected the EUR3 million offer placed
by Batagon International for the purchase of the insolvent
company, the report recalls.

The value of the assets of FAS is estimated at EUR24.57 million,
SeeNews discloses citing SoInfo.

In May 2014, the Serbian government agreed to sell FAS to Greek
company DEM Hellas owned by entrepreneur Eftimios Karanasios, the
report recalls. However, DEM Hellas did not meet its contractual
obligations and the Serbian government called a new tender for the
sale of FAS in October 2016. The tender attracted no bids, the
report says.

Fabrika Akumulatora Sombor (FAS) is Serbia-based car battery
maker.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ANGLO AMERICAN: Fitch Hikes IDR From BB+, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Anglo American Plc's Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'. The Outlook is Stable.

The upgrade reflects the improvement in Anglo American's financial
profile on the back of stronger-than-expected results and cash-
flow generation since mid-2016, and steps taken by the company to
strengthen its balance sheet. The group used free cash flow from
the recovery in commodity prices, and to a lesser extent proceeds
from non-core asset disposals, to reduce leverage. Gross debt fell
from USD19.8 billion at end-2015 to USD13.6 billion at June 30,
2017. The financial profile is now in line with an investment-
grade rating and Moody's base case assumes that FFO adjusted
leverage will remain around the 2.5x guideline for a 'BBB' rating
category over the next four years.

Fitch views Anglo American's operational profile to be
commensurate with the mid-'BBB' rating category. This is supported
by the company's significant scale, with leading positions in the
diamond and platinum market, significant commodity and geographic
diversification and competitive cost positions.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stronger Financial Profile: Anglo American's funds from operations
(FFO) adjusted gross leverage fell to 3.0x at end-2016 from 5.4x
at end- 2015. Since December 2015, the group has been able to
reduce gross debt to USD13.6 billion from USD19.8 billion. FCF was
boosted by the recovery in commodity prices and was used, along
with proceeds from divestments, to pay down debt. Anglo American
generated around USD1.8 billion mainly from the sale of its
niobium and phosphates assets in 2016. Moody's expects leverage to
decrease to 2.2x in 2017 as the group continues to pay down debt,
albeit more slowly.

Investment-Grade Financial Metrics: Moody's projections include a
gradual increase in capex after 2017 to USD2.5 billion in 2018 and
USD3 billion in 2019. Moody's dividend forecasts are in line with
the company's policy at 40% of underlying earnings (net profit) or
roughly USD1 billion per annum. Under the base case, Anglo
American generates positive FCF of around USD500 million in 2018
and 2019, which translates into leverage of 2.6x in 2018, and 2.5x
in 2019 and 2020. Moody's projections show that the net debt to
EBITDA ratio would remain within the group's target range of 1x-
1.5x.

Sufficient Headroom: Moody's now believes that Anglo American is
well placed at a 'BBB-' rating level, with adequate headroom under
its debt protection measures. Moody's also assume that if its
performance exceeds Moody's forecasts, the group will increase its
investments in growth projects or increase shareholder returns, in
line with its capital allocation framework. The latter allocates
cash flow in the following order of priority: sustaining capex;
balance sheet flexibility to support dividends; and then
discretionary capital options (including portfolio upgrades,
future project options and additional shareholder returns).

Strong Performance to Continue: A stronger-than-expected
performance in 2016 and 1H17 was mainly driven by the recovery in
coal and iron ore prices and, to a lesser extent, operational
performance initiatives. This translated into FCF (as defined by
Fitch) of around USD2.3 billion in 2016 and USD2.6 billion in
1H17. As a result, Moody's has revised Moody's assumptions upwards
with FCF forecast to be USD500 million higher in 2017 at USD2.4
billion. This assumes that prices will fall from the highs seen in
1H17.

Fitch also expects that the group will achieve its target cost
improvements, given its strong record and the USD600 million
already delivered as at 30 June 2017 against targeted USD1 billion
cost and volume improvements in 2017.

Strong Business Profile: Anglo American's operational profile is
commensurate with a mid-'BBB' rating category. The group has
significant commodity and geographic diversification, although it
is reliant on South Africa which Moody's views as a challenging
environment for mining companies. Anglo American produces copper,
platinum, diamonds, iron ore, manganese, coal and Nickel and ranks
as the largest diamond miner in terms of value. It also benefits
from competitive platinum assets and its iron ore franchise is
expected to improve as production from Minas Rio's ramps up.

Fitch believes that the bulk commodities division (iron ore and
manganese, coal and nickel) will remain part of the group's
portfolio as improved headroom under its financial profile
provides flexibility to hold onto those assets.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Anglo American is one of the world's largest mining companies with
significant commodity and geographic diversification. It is
however smaller and less diversified than key peers Rio Tinto
Plc/Ltd (A/Stable) and BHP Billiton Plc/Limited (A+/Negative) and
is highly exposed to South Africa, which Moody's view as a
challenging operating environment for mining companies, given the
context of an active, unionised workforce and comparatively high
wage and electricity cost inflation. Historically, Anglo American
has also been more levered than BHP and Rio Tinto. The current
rating reflects the fact that in the last year, the group has been
able to substantially decrease its high debt load.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its ratings case for the issuer
include:

- price assumptions for selected commodities - iron ore (USD55/t
   in 2017, USD45/t thereafter), copper (USD5,500/t in 2017,
   USD6,000/t in 2018, USD6,200/t in 2019 and USD6,500/t
   thereafter), price recovery in De Beers after 2018;

- capex of USD2.3 billion in 2017, rising to USD3.5 billion in
   2020;

- dividends 40% of net profit (reported underlying earnings).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- FFO adjusted gross leverage below 2.5x on a sustained basis
- EBITDA margin above 28%
- FCF Margin above 2.5% through the cycle

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- FFO adjusted gross leverage above 3.0x on a sustained basis
- EBITDA margin below 25%
- FCF Margin below 1% through the cycle

LIQUIDITY

Strong Liquidity Supports Rating: Anglo American's liquidity
remains strong with USD5.9 billion of readily available cash
(Fitch adjustment) as of end-1H17. This compares with short-term
borrowings of around USD1.8 billion and cumulative debt repayments
of USD4.5 billion for 2017-2019. Liquidity is also supported by
undrawn committed facilities of USD8.8 billion at 30 June 2017.
We have treated USD1.5 billion of reported cash as restricted to
reflect the fact that some of the large cash balances held in
South Africa might not be readily available due to the existence
of exchange controls. As of 30 June 2017, the group's cash
balances in South Africa amounted to USD3.7 billion against debt
USD0.9 billion.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Anglo American Plc:

Long-Term IDR: Upgrade to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Positive

Short-Term IDR: Upgrade to 'F3' from 'B'

Anglo American Capital Plc:

Senior unsecured debt guaranteed by Anglo American Plc: Upgrade
to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'


CARILLION PLC: Richard Howson Returns to Role of COO
----------------------------------------------------
Rhiannon Bury at The Telegraph reports that Richard Howson, the
former boss of beleaguered support services and construction
company Carillion, has been moved back into the role of chief
operating officer while he works out his notice period.

Carillion announced in July that Mr. Howson, who had been at the
company for around two years, would step down, after the firm
warned on profits, sending shares down to record lows, The
Telegraph recounts.

Keith Cochrane, formerly the boss of Weir Group, has been
appointed interim chief executive while the firm searches for a
permanent successor, The Telegraph notes.

The company said at the time that they expected Mr. Howson to stay
on for up to a year while this process was carried out, The
Telegraph relays.

But it emerged on Aug. 18 that Mr. Howson will in fact be on the
front line in fighting to get the company back on track, even
though he oversaw a profit warning and a hefty GBP845 million
write-down to cover the costs of contracts which had soured, The
Telegraph discloses.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 18,
2017, The Financial Times related that Carillion appointed some
more outside help to support its efforts to avoid collapse,
bringing in professional services firm Ernst & Young in an effort
to cut costs and collect more cash.  Carillion's shares collapsed
in July after a profit warning, falling 71% amid fears the group
will have to launch a debt-for-equity swap or rights issue to
avoid an emergency takeover or bankruptcy, the FT disclosed.  The
company appointed professional services firm EY "to support its
strategic review with a particular focus upon cost reduction and
cash collection", according to the FT.


CIH CONSULTANCY: Commences Insolvency Process
---------------------------------------------
Scottish Housing News reports that the Chartered Institute of
Housing (CIH) has announced that its consultancy business is to be
made insolvent due to a "difficult financial landscape".

A profit-making body which was purchased in 2007, the CIH
Consultancy is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the CIH and any of its
profits are reinvested back into the organization, the reports
says.

CIH Consultancy is a separate and distinct legal entity and is run
by its own board and directors, and not by CIH, Scottish Housing
News says.

Scottish Housing News quotes a spokesperson for CIH Consultancy
and CIH as saying: "We regret to announce that insolvency
proceedings for CIH Consultancy were initiated [Aug. 2].

"CIH Consultancy offers some excellent products and services, but
in a difficult financial landscape we can no longer be confident
that the organisation is sustainable over the longer term.

"It has been a particularly challenging financial period for CIH
Consultancy and after taking independent financial advice it was
clear that this was unfortunately the only viable option.

"We are supporting any staff affected and will do all that we can
to work with any organisations impacted by the change.

"Though this is regrettable we want to be clear to all of our
members and everyone else that we work with that it is business as
usual for the Chartered Institute of Housing."


TAHOE SUBCO 1: Moody's Assigns B3 CFR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3 corporate family
rating (CFR) and a B3-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to
Tahoe Subco 1 Ltd. (Finastra), the top guarantor in the new
restricted group. The outlook on the ratings is stable.
Concurrently, Moody's has withdrawn Misys Newco 2 S.a r.l.'s B3
CFR and B3-PD PDR, which carried a stable outlook. These actions
follow the completion of Misys' acquisition of D+H Corporation
(unrated) in June 2017 and the renaming of the combined entity as
Finastra.

Concurrently, Moody's has also assigned B2 ratings to the $4.5
billion equivalent senior secured first lien term loans and $400
million pari passu ranking revolving credit facility (RCF), and a
Caa2 rating to the $1.245 billion senior secured second lien term
loan. Moody's has also withdrawn Magic Newco LLC's B1 ratings on
its senior secured first lien credit facilities and Caa1 rating on
its senior unsecured second lien credit facility following their
repayment.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive ratings are unchanged compared to the
provisional ratings assigned on April 19 and April 25, 2017
respectively and follow Moody's review of the final debt
documentation, which was in line with assumptions factored into
the provisional ratings.

Moody's has withdrawn Misys Newco 2 S.a r.l's CFR and PDR for
reorganizational reasons, as the CFR and PDR were re-assigned to
the new top guarantor.

Neither Finastra nor its legacy entities Misys and D+H have
reported any financial results since Moody's last rating actions
in April 2017.

RATING OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Finastra will
(1) record organic revenue growth in fiscal 2018-19, (2) achieve
cost savings from the integration of D+H such that Moody's
adjusted leverage will reduce to below 7.0x within 18 months of
closing, and (3) generate FCF of at least $200 million per annum,
after interest and before integration costs. The stable outlook
also assumes ongoing adequate liquidity and no debt-funded
shareholder distributions or further acquisitions.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE

Finastra's ratings could see upward pressure should the group
delever beyond Moody's expectations, to below 6.5x on a
sustainable basis (or well below 7.5x on EBITDAC basis) and
FCF/debt sustainably improve to 5% or above, whilst generating
organic revenue growth.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO A DOWNGRADE

Finastra's ratings could be downgraded if: (1) the criteria for a
stable outlook were not to be met; (2) liquidity deteriorated; and
(4) a more aggressive financial policy was pursued.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Assignments:

Issuer: Tahoe Subco 1 Ltd.

-- LT Corporate Family Rating, Assigned B3

-- Probability of Default Rating, Assigned B3-PD

Issuer: Almonde, Inc.

-- Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned B2 from
    (P)B2

-- Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned Caa2
    from (P)Caa2

Issuer: DH Corporation

-- Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned B2

Issuer: Finastra Europe SA

-- Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned B2 from
    (P)B2

-- Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned B2

Withdrawals:

Issuer: Misys Newco 2 S.a r.l.

-- LT Corporate Family Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated B3

-- Probability of Default Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated
    B3-PD

Issuer: Magic Newco LLC

-- Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Withdrawn,
    previously rated B1

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Bank Credit Facility, Withdrawn,
    previously rated Caa1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Tahoe Subco 1 Ltd.

-- Outlook, Assigned Stable

Issuer: Almonde, Inc.

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From No Outlook

Issuer: DH Corporation

-- Outlook, Assigned Stable

Issuer: Finastra Europe SA

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From No Outlook

Issuer: Misys Newco 2 S.a r.l.

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From Stable

Issuer: Magic Newco LLC

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From Negative

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Software
Industry published in December 2015.

Headquartered in London, United Kingdom, Finastra is one of the
world's leading financial services software providers, offering a
broad range of solutions to approximately 7,000 banking and
financial institutions located across 125 countries. In the last
twelve months ended February 2017, Finastra had pro-forma revenues
of approximately $2.1 billion.

The group was formed as a result of the acquisition of D+H
Corporation by Misys in June 2017. Finastra and its legacy entity
Misys have been owned by specialist financial investor Vista
Equity Partners since 2012.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *