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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Tuesday, November 28, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 236


                            Headlines


C R O A T I A

AGROKOR DD: Units Ink Agreement on IP Pledge with Madison Pacific


D E N M A R K

EVERGOOD 4: Fitch Assigns 'B+(EXP)' Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable


G E R M A N Y

SOLWAY INVESTMENT: Fitch Withdraws 'B-' Long-Term IDR


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Fitch Raises Long-Term IDR From 'BB+'
BANK OF IRELAND: Fitch Raises Rating on GBP197.3MM Notes From BB+
GEMGARTO 2015-1: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class X1 Notes


I T A L Y

FINO 1: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Rating to Class C Notes
UNIPOL BANCA: Fitch Corrects November 3 Rating Release


N E T H E R L A N D S

CADOGAN SQUARE III: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1
JUBILEE CDO V: Moody's Hikes Ratings on Two Note Classes to Ba1
WOOD STREET V: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Tranches to 'B-sf'


R U S S I A

NEW SYMBOL: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked


S E R B I A

FABRIKA AKUMULATORA: Batagon Raises Offer to EUR7.35 Million
INDUSTRIJA MASINA: Serbian Gov't. Commences Privatization Talks


T U R K E Y

VAKIF KATILIM: Fitch Assigns BB+ Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BYRON: R Capital Among Prospective Bidders for Business


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C R O A T I A
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AGROKOR DD: Units Ink Agreement on IP Pledge with Madison Pacific
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Maja Garaca at SeeNews reports that the listed subsidiaries of
Croatia's ailing food-to-retail concern Agrokor said on Nov. 27
they have signed an agreement on pledge of intellectual property
with Hong Kong-based security claimant Madison Pacific Trust
Limited.

The subsidiaries said in separate filings with the Zagreb Stock
Exchange the agreement was signed to create security interest in
favor of Madison Pacific Trust Limited for a loan extended to
Agrokor on June 8, 2017, SeeNews relates.

The agreement constitutes pledging rights in favor of Madison
Pacific on intellectual property belonging to frozen food producer
Ledo, food company Belje, agricultural conglomerate Vupik,
mayonnaise and margarine maker Zvijezda and soft drinks and water
bottling company Jamnica, SeeNews discloses.

In June, Agrokor signed a roll-up arrangement of up to EUR1.06
billion (US$1.27 billion) with over 30 creditors and Hong Kong-
based Madison Pacific Trust Limited, which acted as security agent
on the deal, SeeNews recounts.

The companies said funds secured under this loan arrangement
enabled Agrokor to stabilize its operations and solve liquidity
problems, SeeNews notes.

                      About Agrokor DD

Founded in 1976 and based in Zagreb, Crotia, Agrokor DD is the
biggest food producer and retailer in the Balkans, employing
almost 60,000 people across the region with annual revenue of
some HRK50 billion (US$7 billion).

On April 10, 2017, the Zagreb Commercial Court allowed the
initiation of the procedure for extraordinary administration over
Agrokor and some of its affiliated or subsidiary companies.  This
comes on the heels of an April 7, 2017 proposal submitted by the
management board of Agrokor Group for the administration
proceedings for the Company pursuant to the Law of Extraordinary
Administration for Companies with Systemic Importance for the
Republic of Croatia.

Mr. Ante Ramljak was simultaneously appointed extraordinary
commissioner/trustee for Agrokor on April 10.

In May 2017, Agrokor dd, in close cooperation with its advisors,
established that as of March 31, 2017, it had total liabilities
of HRK40.409 billion.  The company racked up debts during a rapid
expansion, notably in Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Serbia, a
Reuters report noted.

On June 2, 2017, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Agrokor
D.D.'s corporate family rating (CFR) to Ca from Caa2 and the
probability of default rating (PDR) to D-PD from Ca-PD. The
outlook on the company's ratings remains negative.  Moody's also
downgraded the senior unsecured rating assigned to the notes
issued by Agrokor due in 2019 and 2020 to C from Caa2.  The
rating actions reflect Agrokor's decision not to pay the coupon
scheduled on May 1, 2017 on its EUR300 million notes due May 2019
at the end of the 30-day grace period. It also factors in Moody's
understanding that the company is not paying interest on any of
the debt in place prior to Agrokor's decision in April 2017 to
file for restructuring under Croatia's law for the Extraordinary
Administration for Companies with Systemic Importance.

On June 8, 2017, Agrokor's Agrarian Administration signed an
agreement on a financial arrangement agreement worth EUR480
million, including EUR80 million of loans granted to Agrokor by
domestic banks in April. In addition to this amount, additional
buffers are also provided with additional EUR50 million of
potential refinancing credit. The total loan arrangement amounts
to EUR1,060 million, of which a new debt totaling EUR530 million
and the remainder is intended to refinance old debt.



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D E N M A R K
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EVERGOOD 4: Fitch Assigns 'B+(EXP)' Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable
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Fitch Ratings has assigned Evergood 4 APS (Nets) an expected Long-
Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'B+(EXP)' with Stable Outlook.
This rating reflects the proposed transaction by Hellman &
Friedman LLC to acquire Nets A/S and the subsequent issue of debt
to finance this transaction. The tender offer is still outstanding
and this rating is subject to the completion of the acquisition
process. Fitch has also assigned an instrument rating of
'BB(EXP)'/'RR2' to the company's proposed new senior secured
loans.

The assignment of the final instrument ratings is contingent on
final documents conforming to information already received

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Full Service Payment Provider: Nets is a Nordic payment provider
benefitting from a leading position in Denmark, Norway and Finland
and a second position in Sweden behind Swedbank. Its key
differentiating factor is its full service offering across the
payment value chain from merchant acquiring, payment processing
and clearing in contrast to peers such as Worldpay or Concardis,
which typically specialise in particular segments of the payment
value chain. Being an end-to-end payment provider with its own
payment network allows for higher margins and for Nets to capture
significant value.

High Leverage: The key factor constraining the ratings is the high
leverage resulting from the acquisition. Fitch expects pro-forma
funds from operations (FFO) adjusted gross leverage to increase to
9.2x after transaction completion and trend below 8x by 2019. In
addition, FFO fixed charge coverage will decline to 2.3x in 2018
while remaining above its sensitivity guidance of 2.2x for a
downgrade. Mitigating this is the business' strong visibility on
cash flows, which are supported by a highly recurring revenue base
and high EBITDA margins. Fitch expects free cash flow (FCF)
margins to trend from 5% in 2018 towards 9% in 2020.

Merchant Services to Drive Growth: Nets' growth strategy is
underpinned by expansion in its merchant services business. In
Denmark and Norway, the company has a dominant market position. As
Nets grows its business, it will focus on Sweden where it trails
market leader Swedbank. Fitch expects management to expand through
a combination of organic growth and opportunistic bolt-on
acquisitions. As the company grows its revenue, Fitch would also
expect improved operating margins due to economies of scale and
investments in the technology platform.

Supportive Operating Environment: Nordic governments have been
implementing a range of policy measures intended to encourage the
digitalisation of their economies. The Nordics rank among the most
advanced digital societies with one of the highest adoption of
cashless payments in Europe. Fitch believes the growth of mobile
and ecommerce due to the switch from cash payments to card
payments will support the company's future growth. The Nordic
payment services market is further supported by favourable
macroeconomic conditions with expected GDP growth of between 2%
and 3% expected over the next five years.

Above Average Secured Recoveries: Fitch expects senior secured
debt holders to receive above-average recoveries, as reflected in
the instrument rating of 'BB(EXP)'/'RR2'. Note that RR2
corresponds to a recovery range between 71% and 90%.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Nets is well-positioned in the Nordic payment services market
occupying leading positions in Denmark, Norway and Finland. Its
full service offering across the entire payment value chain is
unique among peers and is a key competitive advantage allowing for
operating leverage and high margins. Nets' EBITDA margins stood at
35.5% in 2016, which compare favourably with peers First Data at
26% and Paysafe at 30% though are less than merchant acquirer
Worldpay at 42%.

The key rating constraint for Nets is its high gross leverage,
which stands at 9.2x on an FFO basis, adjusted for the
transaction. This is higher than peers First Data Corp, Global
Payments Inc and Harbortouch Payments LLC, which have between 6x
and 7x FFO adjusted gross leverage. Mitigating this is the
business's strong FCF generation abilities with FCF margins
between 5% and 10%. Furthermore, Fitch projects FFO adjusted gross
leverage to fall towards 7.8x by 2019, supported by revenue and
margin growth.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

- Revenue growth of above 4% trending towards 3% by 2019;
- Gradual improvement in EBITDA margin trending towards 39%
   by 2020;
- Annual capex intensity between 8% and 8.5% of sales; and
- No extraordinary dividend payments or acquisitions.

KEY RECOVERY ASSUMPTIONS

- The recovery analysis assumes that Nets would remain a going
   concern in restructuring and that the company would be
   reorganised rather than liquidated. Fitch has assumed a 10%
   administrative claim in the recovery analysis.

- The recovery analysis assumes a 20% discount to Nets' LTM
   EBITDA as of September 2017, resulting in a post-restructuring
   EBITDA around DKK2,200 million. At this level of EBITDA, which
   assumes corrective measures have been taken, Fitch would
   expect Nets to generate neutral to negative FCF.

- Fitch also assumes a distressed multiple of 6.5x and a fully
   drawn EUR200 million revolving credit facility (RCF).

- These assumptions result in a recovery rate for the senior
   secured debt within the 'RR2' range to allow a two-notch
   uplift to the debt rating from the IDR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- Successful implementation of strategy to expand the merchant
   services division, increasing market share in Nordics ex-
   Denmark leading to mid- to high- single digit revenue
   growth and margin expansion towards 40%.

- FFO adjusted gross leverage below 6.0x.

- FFO fixed charge cover above 3.0x.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- Failure to implement merchant services expansion strategy,
   resulting in low-single digit revenue growth and no
   improvement in EBITDA margins.

- FFO adjusted gross leverage sustainably above 8.0x.

- FFO fixed charge cover below 2.2x.

LIQUIDITY

Liquidity Supported by FCF: As well as the company's cash on
balance sheet, Nets has a EUR200 million fully available RCF that
it can utilise if required. Fitch forecasts strong FCF generation
with FCF margins in the high single digits, which will add to the
company's on balance sheet cash.



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G E R M A N Y
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SOLWAY INVESTMENT: Fitch Withdraws 'B-' Long-Term IDR
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Fitch Ratings is withdrawing Solway Investment GmbH's ratings as
the company has chosen to stop participating in the rating
process. Therefore, Fitch will no longer have sufficient
information to maintain the ratings. Accordingly, Fitch will no
longer provide ratings or analytical coverage for Solway
Investment GmbH.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Ratings sensitivities are no longer relevant given the withdrawal.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has withdrawn the following ratings:

- Long-Term Issuer Default Rating 'B-', Outlook Stable
- Short-Term Issuer Default Rating 'B'



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I R E L A N D
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ALLIED IRISH: Fitch Raises Long-Term IDR From 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Allied Irish Bank's (AIB) Long- and
Short-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDRs) and Viability Rating (VR)
to 'BBB-'/'F3'/'bbb-' from 'BB+'/'B'/'bb+'. The Outlook for the
Long-Term IDR remains Positive.

In addition, Fitch has assigned a 'BBB-(dcr)' Derivative
Counterparty Rating (DCR) to AIB as part of its roll-out of
significant derivative counterparties in western Europe and the
US. DCRs are issuer ratings and express Fitch's view of banks'
relative vulnerability to default under derivative contracts with
third-party, non-government counterparties.

The IDRs of AIB reflects its standalone strength as reflected in
its VR, which Fitch has today upgraded. The upgrade reflects
continued improvements in asset quality, a longer record of stable
profitability and strengthened capitalisation. The Positive
Outlook reflects rating upside if the bank continues to make
progress in reducing problem loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, DCRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

AIB's VR and IDRs are driven by the bank's strong domestic
franchise, strengthened capitalisation, sound funding profile,
diversified revenue streams by product and customer, and
improving, albeit still weak, asset quality.

Asset quality remains a key factor constraining the VR in the low
'bbb' range. Asset quality indicators have been improving at a
strong pace due to a supportive Irish economy, non-recourse loan
sales and the general progress in reducing legacy impaired assets.

The bank's impaired loans ratio fell to 12.2% of gross loans at
end-1H17 (from 14% at end-2016) and Fitch expects this positive
trend to continue over the medium-term, albeit at a more moderate
pace, as the bank works through smaller exposures (namely
residential mortgages). Fitch's assessment of asset quality also
factors in a high proportion of non-performing loans, which
include all loans that are 90 days past due but not impaired and
forborne loans that add up to a high proportion of the bank's
balance sheet.

AIB's strong domestic franchise (particularly in mortgages) and
diversified business model across retail and corporate banking is
a rating strength for the bank. The franchise benefits from a
highly concentrated Irish banking sector while the bank's strong
positioning in its key operating segments provides AIB with clear
loan and deposit pricing power.

Profitability has improved strongly in recent years, driven by a
pick-up in new lending volumes, large releases of loan loss
reserves and a strengthening of the bank's net interest margin.
Nonetheless, revenue and profitability remain constrained by
sluggish net loan growth and the bank's large exposure to low-
yielding tracker mortgages. Although Fitch expects profitability
to remain challenged by the low interest rate environment,
increasing competition and investment costs related to technology
and digitalisation, Fitch expects it to remain sound, supported by
an improving loan mix and low loan impairment charges.

Capitalisation has strengthened considerably since 2015, supported
by improving internal capital generation, the reduction of legacy
loans and the conversion of perpetual government-held preference
shares to equity in 2016. AIB reported a 19.9% transitional common
equity Tier 1 ratio (16.6% on a fully-loaded basis) at end-1H17,
comfortably above its Pillar 2 requirements. However, Fitch
expects the bank will maintain comfortable buffers over minimum
requirements while it works through its still large stock of non-
performing loans. Although the proportion of unreserved impaired
loans to Fitch Core Capital (FCC) continues to fall (end-1H17:
38.2%; end-2016: 48.2%) its level still highlights AIB's
vulnerability to potentially falling collateral prices.

Funding is sound and supported by strong access to retail
deposits, little use of central bank funding and a well-
established and diversified wholesale funding franchise. The
strong pace of deleveraging and sluggish net loan growth has
reduced funding requirements, allowing the bank to roll-off more
expensive and less stable funding. Fitch believes the bank is
strongly - positioned to meet minimum requirement for own funds
and eligible liabilities (MREL), through a mixture of regulatory
capital and MREL-compliant senior issuance, given recent
improvements in solvency and its good wholesale market access.
Liquidity is sound, supported by a large stock of liquid assets
and contingent access to liquidity sources through various central
bank facilities.

Fitch has assigned a DCR to AIB due to its significant derivatives
activity domestically. The DCR is at the same level as the Long-
Term IDR because under Irish legislation, derivative
counterparties have no preferential status over other senior
obligations in a resolution scenario.

SUPPORT RATING (SR) AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR (SRF)

AIB's SR of '5' and SRF of 'No Floor' reflect Fitch's view that
senior creditors cannot rely on extraordinary support from the
Irish authorities in the event that the bank becomes non-viable.
In our opinion, the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) provide a
framework that is likely to require senior creditors to
participate in losses for resolving the bank.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings on the subordinated debt and other hybrid capital
issued by AIB are notched off AIB's VR and reflect Fitch's
assessment of their incremental non-performance risk relative to
the VR (up to three notches) and assumptions around loss severity
(up to two notches).

AIB's subordinated Tier 2 debt rating is notched down once from
the bank's VR, reflecting larger loss severity relative to senior
obligations given their subordinated status. No notching is
applied for incremental non-performance risk as the write-down of
the notes will only occur after the point of non-viability is
reached and there is no prior coupon flexibility.

AIB's AT1 debt rating is notched down twice for loss severity and
three times for non-performance risk, reflecting the notes' deep
subordination and fully discretionary coupon omission.

The 'C' rating on AIB's legacy subordinated notes reflects these
instruments' non-performance since the bank is not paying the
discretionary coupons and also the notes' sustained economic
losses, resulting in weak recoveries.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY

EBS Limited and AIB Group (UK) Plc are wholly-owned by AIB. Both
subsidiaries are, to varying degrees, reliant on AIB for funding
and capital support. Their IDRs, SRs and senior debt ratings are
therefore based on support, and their IDRs and senior debt ratings
are equalised with AIB's. Fitch has not assigned VRs to these
subsidiaries as Fitch believes they are closely integrated with
AIB and therefore cannot be analysed meaningfully on a stand-alone
basis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, DCRS, VRS AND SENIOR DEBT

The Positive Outlook on AIB's IDRs reflect Fitch's expectation
that the ratings could be upgraded, should the bank continue to
make progress in reducing its stock of problem loans over the next
24 months while maintaining sound capitalisation, funding and
liquidity and continuing to generate adequate profitability.

The ratings could come under pressure if the economic effect of
the UK's decision to leave the EU is particularly severe for
either Ireland as it could negatively impact asset quality and
capitalisation. Negative pressure on the VR, and hence the IDRs,
would also arise if the bank increases its risk appetite, for
example, by materially increasing its exposure to commercial real
estate.

SR AND SRFS

An upgrade to the SR and upward revision to the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support its banks. While not impossible, this is highly unlikely
in Fitch's view.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings of all subordinated instruments are primarily
sensitive to a change in the VR of AIB, or to changes in their
notching in accordance with Fitchour criteria and assumptions on
non-performance risk.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES

The ratings of EBS Limited and AIB Group (UK) Plc are sensitive to
the same factors that might drive a change in AIB's. The SR of
both subsidiaries would be sensitive to changes in their strategic
importance to AIB as well as AIB's ability to support them.

The rating actions are as follows:

Allied Irish Banks

Long-Term IDR upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Positive
Short-Term IDR: upgraded to 'F3' from 'B'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bbb-' from 'bb+'
Derivative Counterparty Rating: assigned at 'BBB-(dcr)'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Senior unsecured notes upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'
Short-term debt, including commercial paper upgraded to 'F3'
  from 'B'
EMTN EUR10 billion programme Long-Term and Short-Term ratings
  upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB+' and 'F3' from 'B', respectively
EUR750 million subordinated lower tier 2 notes (XS1325125158)
  upgraded to 'BB+' from 'BB'
EUR500 million subordinated AT1 7% trigger notes (XS1328798779)
  affirmed at 'B'
Subordinated legacy non-performing debt (XS0232498393,
  XS0214107053 and XS0435957682) affirmed at 'C'

AIB Group (UK) PLC

Long-Term IDR upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Positive
Short-Term IDR upgraded to 'F3' from 'B'
Support Rating upgraded to '2' from '3'

EBS d.a.c.

Long-Term IDR upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'; Outlook Positive
Short-Term IDR: upgraded to 'F3' from 'B'
Support Rating: upgraded to '2' from '3'
Senior long-term debt upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'
Short-term debt upgraded to 'F3' from 'B'


BANK OF IRELAND: Fitch Raises Rating on GBP197.3MM Notes From BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Bank of Ireland Group plc's (BOIG) and
Bank of Ireland's (BOI) Long- and Short-Term Issuer Default Rating
(IDRs) and Viability Ratings (VRs) to 'BBB'/'F2'/'bbb' from
'BBB-'/'F3'/'bbb-'.

The agency also upgraded Bank of Ireland (UK) (BOI UK) plc's Long-
Term IDR and VR to 'BBB'/'bbb' from 'BBB-'/'bbb-'. BOI UK's Short-
Term IDR is affirmed at 'F3'.

The Outlooks for all Long-Term IDRs are Stable.

In addition, Fitch has assigned a 'BBB(dcr)' Derivative
Counterparty Ratings (DCR) to BOI and BOI UK as part of its roll-
out of significant derivative counterparties in western Europe and
the US. DCRs are issuer ratings and express Fitch's view of banks'
relative vulnerability to default under derivative contracts with
third-party, non-government counterparties.

The IDRs of BOIG and BOI UK reflect their standalone strength as
reflected in their respective VRs, which Fitch has upgraded. In
BOIG and BOI, the upgrade reflects improving asset quality, a
longer record of stable profitability and strengthened
capitalisation. BOI UK's upgrade reflects further reductions in
the bank's legacy commercial book and sound capitalisation.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, DCRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

The ratings of BOIG reflect its role as the holding company of the
Bank of Ireland group and are aligned with those of its main
operating subsidiary, BOI. As a result, BOIG's ratings are driven
by the same considerations that affect BOI's ratings.

BOI's VR and IDRs are primarily based on the bank's strong
domestic franchise, strengthened capitalisation, sound funding
profile, diversified revenue streams, and improving, albeit still
weak, asset quality. The equalisation of BOIG's VR and IDRs with
BOI's reflects the continued absence of double leverage at the
holding company level and no material restrictions to the transfer
of capital and liquidity across the group, subject to the
operating companies meeting regulatory capital and liquidity
requirements.

Asset quality has a high influence on BOI's ratings. Asset quality
metrics remain weak although they continue to improve on the back
of a continued domestic economic recovery, non-recourse loan sales
and general progress in reducing legacy impaired assets. BOI's
asset quality is better than domestic peers', reflecting the
bank's both lower stock of impaired loans and better-performing UK
residential mortgages. The bank's impaired loans ratio fell to
6.7% of gross loans at end-1H17 (from 7.9% at end-2016) and while
we expect this positive trend to continue, over the medium-term
the pace of improvement is likely to slow as the bank works
through smaller exposures (namely residential mortgages). Asset
quality benefits from a large portfolio of performing residential
mortgages in the UK. Deterioration in the UK real-estate market,
which could result from the UK vote to leave the EU, is a risk for
the group as the UK accounts for around a third of its loan
portfolio.

Fitch views BOI's strong domestic franchise and diversified
business model across retail and corporate banking and into the UK
market as a rating strength for the group. BOI's franchise
benefits from the highly concentrated Irish banking sector, and
the bank's strong market position across several businesses
provides BOI with considerable deposit and loan-pricing power
relative to peers.

Profitability has improved to more stable levels as a result of
lower funding costs, low loan impairment charges and improving
loan mixes. However, revenue and profitability remain challenged
by muted net loan growth and a still large exposure to low-
yielding tracker mortgages. Fitch expects profitability to remain
under pressure from increasing competition, lower releases of loan
loss provisions and increased costs related to investment in
technology and digitalisation.

Capitalisation has strengthened considerably in recent years,
driven by deleveraging and improved organic capital generation.
BOI reported a 14.7% transitional common equity Tier 1 ratio
(12.8% on a fully-loaded basis) at end-3Q17, comfortably above its
Pillar 2 requirements. Fitch expects capital improvements to slow
in 2018, due to IT-related investment costs and the negative
impact from IFRS 9 first-time adoption on capital. Although the
proportion of unreserved impaired loans to Fitch Core Capital
(FCC) fell to 36.5% at end-1H17 (end-2016: 43%), it continues to
show BOI's vulnerability to potentially falling collateral prices.

Funding is sound and benefits from a stable and ample retail
deposit base and diversified wholesale market access. BOI is
strongly positioned to meet minimum requirement for own funds and
eligible liabilities (MREL), given its improved capitalisation and
established access to the wholesale funding market. Fitch expects
MREL requirements to be met through a mixture of regulatory
capital and senior holding company issuance.

The 'F2' Short-Term IDRs of BOIG and BOI are at the higher of the
two possible Short-Term ratings mapped to a Long-Term IDR of
'BBB'. This reflects the group's strong on-balance sheet liquidity
and extensive contingency liquidity facilities through various
central bank facilities.

Fitch has assigned a DCR to BOI due to its significant derivatives
activity and it being a counterparty in Fitch-rated transactions.
The DCR is at the same level as the Long-Term IDR because under
Irish legislation, derivative counterparties have no preferential
status over other senior obligations in a resolution scenario.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES

BOI UK's IDRs reflect the bank's standalone credit profile, as
expressed in the subsidiary's VR. The upgrade reflects further
asset quality improvements, supported by reductions in the bank's
legacy commercial book and a performing mortgage book. The ratings
also incorporate sound funding and capitalisation alongside a
modest franchise and fairly undiversified business model, which is
concentrated on the UK mortgage and savings market. It also
factors in the high level of integration with the parent's
systems, processes and management. Prospects for BOI UK's
standalone credit profile are stable, as reflected in the
subsidiary's Stable Outlook.

In Fitch's view, BOI UK benefits from a high probability of
support, if required, from its parent bank as reflected in the '2'
Support Rating. Although Fitch views BOI's propensity to support
its UK subsidiary as extremely high, driven by the large
reputational risk it would face in case of a default by BOI UK,
the ability to do so is somewhat constrained by the large size of
BOI UK relative to the parent's own equity.

Fitch has assigned a DCR to BOI UK due to it being a counterparty
in Fitch-rated transactions. The DCR is at the same level as the
Long-Term IDR because under UK legislation, derivative
counterparties have no preferential status over other senior
obligations in a resolution scenario.

SUPPORT RATING (SR) AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR (SRF)

BOIG's and BOI's SRs of '5' and SRFs of 'No Floor' reflect Fitch's
view that senior creditors cannot rely on extraordinary support
from the Irish authorities in the event that the bank becomes non-
viable. In Fitch's opinion, the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) provide
a framework that is likely to require senior creditors to
participate in losses for resolving the bank.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings on BOI's subordinated Tier 2 debt are notched down
once from the bank's VR, reflecting larger loss severity relative
to senior obligations given their subordinated status. No notching
is applied for incremental non-performance risk as the write-down
of the notes will only occur after the point of non-viability is
reached and there is no prior coupon flexibility.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, DCRS, VRs AND SENIOR DEBT RATINGS

Rating upside on BOI's and BOIG's ratings is limited in the medium
term given the still high proportion of legacy problem assets
(including forborne, past due but not impaired and low-yielding
loans). Working through the remaining impaired loans, a large
proportion of which are Irish residential mortgages, will take
several years.

The ratings could come under pressure if the economic effect of
the UK's decision to leave the EU is particularly severe for
either Ireland or the UK as it could negatively impact asset
quality and capitalisation. Negative pressure on the VR, and hence
the IDRs, would also arise if the bank increases its risk
appetite, for example, by materially increasing its exposure to
commercial real estate.

Over time, the Long-Term IDR of BOI could be notched up once from
its VR, when sufficient senior debt is down-streamed to it from
its parent company, BOIG, in a manner which is subordinated to
other senior creditors of BOI. The uplift would be influenced by
Fitch's assessment of whether BOI's rating would have achieved the
higher level had the relevant holding company and operating
company junior debt buffers been in the form of FCC, rather than
debt. An upgrade of BOI's Long-Term IDR could take place once
there is sufficient quantum of this down-streamed internal debt to
recapitalise the bank to a viable level without having to bail in
other senior debt holders at BOI.

BOIG's ratings would be downgraded on a material increase in the
holding company's double leverage, which we do not expect.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

An upgrade to the SR and upward revision to the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support its banks. While not impossible, this is highly unlikely
in Fitch's view.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings of all subordinated instruments are primarily
sensitive to a change in the VR of BOI, or to changes in their
notching in accordance with Fitch's criteria and assumptions on
non-performance risk.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES

BOI UK's VR and IDRs are primarily sensitive to a structural
deterioration in profitability, through tighter margins and higher
loan impairment charges, and weaker asset quality. This could be
caused by a material weakening of the operating environment in the
UK if the economic effect of the UK's decision to leave the EU is
particularly severe.

BOI UK's IDRs would only be upgraded if there is an upgrade in
either the subsidiary's VR, for example due to a more diversified
business model and less reliance on key strategic partnerships for
both deposits and loan products, or if there is at least a two-
notch upgrade of BOI's Long-Term IDR. The reason for the latter is
that the SR of '2' reflects Fitch's view that BOI has a strong
propensity to support BOI UK but its ability to provide support is
constrained by BOI UK's large size relative to BOI's own equity
and therefore the probability of support, if solely based on
institutional support, is reflected in a 'BBB-' Long-Term IDR.
Fitch therefore expects that if BOI's Long-Term IDR is upgraded to
'BBB+', BOI UK's IDR would remain at 'BBB', in line with the VR.

The rating actions are as follows:

Bank of Ireland Group plc

Long-Term IDR upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR: upgraded to 'F2' from 'F3'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bbb' from 'bbb-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

Bank of Ireland

Long-Term IDR upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR: upgraded to 'F2' from 'F3'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bbb' from 'bbb-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Derivative Counterparty Rating: assigned at 'BBB(dcr)'
Short-term debt, including certificates of deposit: upgraded to
  'F2' from 'F3'
GBP197.3 million subordinated notes (XS0487711656): upgraded to
  'BBB-' from 'BB+'

Bank of Ireland (UK) Plc

Long-Term IDR upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR affirmed at 'F3'
Viability Rating upgraded to 'bbb' from 'bbb-'
Support Rating upgraded to '2' from '3'
Derivative Counterparty Rating: assigned at 'BBB(dcr)'


GEMGARTO 2015-1: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class X1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded six tranches of Gemgarto 2015-1 Plc and
Gemgarto 2015-2 Plc and affirmed five tranches, as follows:

Gemgarto 2015-1 Plc
Class A (ISIN XS1236650666); affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS1236651714); affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS1236652282); upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AA+sf';
  Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN XS1236652522); upgraded to 'A+sf' from 'BBB+sf';
  Outlook Stable
Class X1 (ISIN XS1236657240); affirmed at 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable

Gemgarto 2015-2 Plc

Class A (ISIN XS1282027579); affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS1282026175); upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf';
  Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS1282021887); upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'Asf';
  Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN XS1282020640); upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'BBB+sf';
  Outlook Stable
Class E1 (ISIN XS1282018826); upgraded to 'BBB-sf' from 'BB+sf';
  Outlook Stable
Class E2 (ISIN XS1317336151); affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Asset Performance

Kensington Mortgage Company (Kensington) has had a manual approach
to underwriting, focusing on borrowers with some form of adverse
credit or complex income. The near-prime origination is reflected
in the performance. In August 2017, three month plus arrears were
1.22% for Gemgarto 2015-1 and 1.15% for Gemgarto 2015-2. One case
of repossession has been reported for Gemgarto 2015-1 and none for
Gemgarto 2015-2.

Considering the near-prime asset nature, and in line with the
rating approach adopted in the more recent Kensington
securitisations, Fitch has derived foreclosure frequency
assumptions using its prime foreclosure frequency matrix and
multipliers with a lender adjustment of 1.45 to reflect the near-
prime nature of the underlying portfolio.

Increased Credit Enhancement

The accelerated pay-down of the portfolio has led to a strong
build-up of credit enhancement for the rated notes. As at August
2017, credit enhancement for Gemgarto 2015-1's class A was 63.8%
compared with 12.5% at close. Gemgarto 2015-2's class A credit
enhancement was 43.0% compared with 15.0% at close.

Servicing Change

Acenden (RPS2+, RSS2+) has taken over servicing the loans from
Homeloan Management Limited. Acenden and KMC are owned by the same
partnership and have a strong business relationship. This
servicing change has not affected the notes' ratings.

Combined Liquidity, General Reserve Supportive

A liquidity reserve fund (2.5% of the outstanding class A and B
notes) was established at close to provide liquidity to the class
A and B notes. As these notes have amortised in both transactions,
the amount released from the class A and B liquidity reserve fund
has become available to absorb credit losses and provide liquidity
to some of the junior notes. The resulting build up in the
available credit enhancement, combined with its expectation of a
stable asset performance, has led to the upgrades of some of the
note classes.

High Prepayment Rate

The junior notes and excess spread note are sensitive to high
unscheduled prepayment rates. The transactions have seen a high
prepayment rate in the past 12 months. However, these levels are
expected to reduce once all the fixed rate loans switch to
floating. For Gemgarto 2015-1 all the fixed rate loans are
expected to switch to floating by January 2018 and for Gemgarto
2015-2 by June 2018. Fitch has tested a high prepayment scenario
in year 1 for both transactions and taken it into account in its
analysis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch believes that the prolonged low interest rate environment
has supported borrower affordability and asset performance. An
increase in interest rates causing a payment shock, could lead to
a worsening of asset performance beyond Fitch's expectations,
potentially leading to a downgrade.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


FINO 1: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Rating to Class C Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive long-term credit
ratings to the following notes issued initially in July 2017 and
amended on the Nov. 22, 2017 by Fino 1 Securitisation S.r.l.:

-- EUR650,000,000 Class A Asset-Backed Floating Rate Notes due
    October 2045, Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR29,640,000 Class B Asset-Backed Floating Rate Notes due
    October 2045, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

-- EUR40,000,000 Class C Asset-Backed Floating Rate Notes due
    October 2045, Assigned B1 (sf)

Moody's has not assigned any rating to EUR50,311,000 Class D
Asset-Backed 12 per cent and Variable Return Notes due October
2045, which were also issued at the closing of the transaction in
July 2017.

RATINGS RATIONALE

This is the first transaction backed by non-performing loans
("NPLs") rated by Moody's with loans originated by Unicredit
S.p.A. ("Unicredit"; Baa1/P-2/Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr)). The assets
supporting the notes are NPLs with a gross book value (GBV) of
EUR5,374 million as of July 3, 2017. From this amount, Moody's has
deducted collections received from that date up to November 4,
2017 not available for the future.

The portfolio is serviced and will continue to be serviced by
doBank S.p.A. ("doBank"; NR) in its role as master and special
servicer. The servicing activities performed by doBank are
monitored by the portfolio monitor agent, an entity affiliated
with Fortress (i.e. Fortress Italian NP Opportunities Series Fund
LLC Series 8, NR). Neither a back-up servicer nor a back-up
servicer facilitator has been appointed at date of the rating
assignment, however the portfolio monitor agent will monitor the
performance of the special servicer by sub-portfolios and may
start a benchmarking process in the event of under-performance
with respect to business plan. Moreover, if the servicer report is
not available at any payment date, the continuity of payment for
the rated notes will be assured by the calculation agent that
prepares the payment report based on estimates and a simplified
waterfall.

Moody's ratings reflect an analysis of the characteristics of the
underlying pool of defaulted loans, sector-wide and originator-
specific performance data, protection provided by credit
enhancement, the roles of external counterparties, and the
structural integrity of the transaction. In order to estimate the
cash flows generated by the pool Moody's used a model that, for
each loan, generates an estimate of: (i) the timing of
collections; and (ii) the collected amounts, which are used in a
cash flow model that is based on a Monte Carlo simulation.

The key drivers for the estimates of the collections and their
timing are: (i) the historical data received from the special
servicer, which shows historical recovery rates and timing of
collections for secured and unsecured loans; (ii) the portfolio
composition with 48% of the GBV being unsecured loans (where at
least one loan attached to the borrower has defaulted within the
last 2 years) and 52% of the GBV representing secured loans
(thereof about 5% of the GBV secured by a second or lower ranking
lien); (iii) 93% of the GBV are loans owned by companies, while
the remaining 7% of the GBV are loans where the borrower was a
business owner; (iv) 80% of the GBV are loans mostly owned by
borrowers defaulted from 2010 onwards (so called "small and
medium-sized portfolio"), while the remaining 20% of the GBV are
loans where the borrower usually defaulted before 2010 (so called
"legacy portfolio"); (v) in relation to the secured portfolio,
residential properties represent around 49% of the total real
estate valuation amount, the remaining being commercial properties
by different types (land and hotels represents 2.9% and 3.6%,
respectively). Properties located in the North of Italy account
for approximately 45% of the total valuation amount. Out of the
26,913 properties backing the portfolio Moody's have only
considered 12,633 properties, because some key information, such
as the real estate valuation and the mortgage amount, were not
available; (vi) 36% of the GBV are loans undergoing an insolvency
process (including a bankruptcy process), which usually takes
significantly longer than a foreclosure; (vii) loans representing
around 57.9% of the GBV for the secured portion of the portfolio
are in their initial legal proceeding stage (typically with a
refreshed real estate valuation), the remainder being mainly in
the process to be evaluated by an expert appointed by the court or
in the auction phase (for a total of around 31% of the secured
portfolio, typically with a valuation provided by an expert
appointed by the court, but sometime dated before 2014); and
(viii) benchmarking with comparable Italian NPL transactions.

Hedging: As the collections from the pool are not directly
connected to a floating interest rate, a higher index payable on
the notes would not be offset with higher collections from the
pool. The transaction therefore benefits from an interest rate cap
agreement, linked to three-month EURIBOR, with HSBC France
(Aa2(cr)/P-1(cr)) as cap counterparty. The notional of the
interest rate cap is equal to EUR 650,000,000 (i.e. at the date of
rating assignment equal to the outstanding balance of the Class A)
decreasing over time. The cap will have a strike starting at 0.50%
moving up to 1.5%.

Transaction structure: The transaction benefits from an amortising
cash reserve equal to 5% of the Class A notes balance (equivalent
to EUR32.5 million at rating date assignment), which will be
funded by a limited recourse loan extended by Natixis (A1(cr)/P-
1(cr)) in case of any shortfall on the first payment date in
January 2018. The cash reserve is replenished after the interest
payments on the Class A notes. However Moody's notes that (i) the
cash reserve is not available to cover Class B and C interest;
(ii) unpaid interests on Class B and C are deferrable without
accruing interests on interests; and (iii) interests on Class B
and C move to a more a junior position upon certain performance
triggers being breached. Moody's has factored in the rating of
Class B and C the high likelihood of a prolonged period of
deferral of interests without accruing interests on interests.

Moody's used its NPL cash-flow model as part of its quantitative
analysis of the transaction. The Moody's NPL model enables users
to model various features of a European NPL ABS transaction, such
as recovery rates under different scenarios, yield as well as the
specific priority of payments and reserve funds on the liability
side of the ABS structure.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: The model output indicates that
(i) with respect to the secured portion of the portfolio, if the
price volatility were to be increased to 8.08% from 6.73% for
residential properties and to 9.94% from 8.29% for commercial
properties and it would take an additional 18 months to go through
the foreclosure process; and (ii) with respect to the unsecured
portion of the portfolio, if the volatility (i.e. the standard
deviation divided by mean recovery rate) were to be increased to
20% from 5%, the Class A notes rating would move to Baa2 (sf)
assuming that all other factors remained unchanged. Moody's
Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-indicated
calculation of the number of rating notches that a Moody's
structured finance security may vary if certain input parameters
used in the initial rating process differed. The analysis assumes
that the deal has not aged and is not intended to measure how the
rating of the security might migrate over time, but rather how the
initial rating of the security might have differed if key rating
input parameters were varied. Parameter Sensitivities for the
typical EMEA ABS transaction are calculated by stressing key
variable inputs in Moody's primary rating model.

METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and
Re-Performing Loans" published in August 2016.

The definitive ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal with respect to the Class A notes by
legal final maturity only. Other non-credit risks have not been
addressed, but may have significant effect on yield to investors.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO A UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include that
the recovery process of the defaulted loans produces significantly
higher cash flows realised in a shorter time frame than expected.
Factors that may cause a downgrade of the ratings include
significantly less or slower cash flows generated from the
recovery process compared with Moody's expectations at close due
to either a longer time for the courts to process the foreclosures
and bankruptcies or a change in economic conditions (such as the
situation of the real estate market) from Moody's central scenario
forecast or idiosyncratic performance factors. For instance,
should economic conditions be worse than forecasted and the sale
of the properties would generate less cash flows for the Issuer or
it would take a longer time to sell the properties, all these
factors could result in a downgrade of the ratings. Additionally
counterparty risk could cause a downgrade of the rating due to a
weakening of the credit profile of transaction counterparties.
Finally, unforeseen regulatory changes or significant changes in
the legal environment may also result in changes of the ratings.


UNIPOL BANCA: Fitch Corrects November 3 Rating Release
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings replaced the rating agency's ratings release on
Unipol Banca published on Nov. 3, 2017 to clarify in the first
paragraph the sequence of rating actions, in particular that
Unipol Banca's Viability Rating (VR) was first downgraded to 'f'
before being upgraded to 'b'.

The revised ratings release is as follows:

Fitch Ratings has downgraded Unipol Banca's VR to 'f' from 'ccc'
and then upgraded it to 'b', and affirmed the bank's Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB'.

The upgrade follows the EUR900 million recapitalisation of the
bank completed in July 2017 and Fitch's expectation that the
planned disposal of the entire stock of doubtful loans will be
implemented successfully in the coming months.

The downgrade of the VR to 'f' before its upgrade to 'b' reflected
that the bank had needed an extraordinary capital injection from
its parent company to cover the large losses and to increase
coverage on its doubtful loans to a level necessary to dispose
them and thus restore its viability. For this reason, Fitch views
the bank as having failed under its criteria definitions. The
subsequent upgrade of the VR reflects Fitch's view of the bank's
restored viability following the recapitalisation.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, SUPPORT RATING
Unipol Banca's IDRs and Support Rating (SR) reflect institutional
support from the bank's ultimate parent company Unipol Group
S.p.A. (UG, BBB-/Stable). Unipol Banca's Long-Term IDR is rated
two notches below UG's to reflect the parent's support track
record to date, Fitch's view that the bank is a potential
candidate for sale given its limited strategic relevance for UG
and the bank's weak performance track record to date, which
necessitated this clean-up transaction to restore the bank's
viability and, possibly, make it more attractive to integrate with
other players in the banking industry. Fitch sees a moderate
probability that the parent will continue to provide support to
the bank given regulatory requirements and its view that a default
of Unipol Banca would carry high reputational risk for UG as both
operate in the same jurisdiction and share the same brand.

UG plans to spin off the entirety of Unipol Banca's doubtful loans
into a separate NewCo, owned by UG and another UG group company
(UnipolSai), and injected EUR900 million of capital in Unipol
Banca in July 2017, which Fitch views as further evidence of
support. However, at the same time, Fitch takes into account that
UG is evaluating strategic options for Unipol Banca following its
restructuring, which could include its integration with other
domestic banks.

Unipol Banca's Stable Outlook is in line with that on UG.

VR

The upgrade of Unipol Banca's VR reflects Fitch's expectation that
the bank will implement a large asset quality clean-up and capital
restoration following the capital injection of EUR900 million from
its parent in July 2017. At the same time, coverage on impaired
loans will improve to average sector levels. However, the VR also
reflects the bank's weak operating performance, burdened by a high
cost base, still high loan impairment charges (LIC) relative to
pre-impairment profit and the bank's business model, which is
highly sensitive to the weak operating environment in Italy and
low interest rates.

Adjusting for the disposal of almost its entire stock of doubtful
loans, the impaired loan ratio would decrease to around 10%, as
per Unipol Banca's calculations, from a very high 35% and largely
be represented by unlikely-to-pay exposures. The additional LIC
booked in June 2017 should help the disposal but also help bring
coverage levels of impaired loans more in line with peers' at
around 49%.

The asset quality clean-up resulted in large losses and eroded
capital, with the CET1 ratio falling to 0.18% at end-1H17 before
being restored to above 15% immediately after through the capital
increase of July 2017. The CET1 will then fall to just above 10%
once the doubtful loans transfer is completed as Unipol Banca
transfers EUR313 million of capital to the NewCo. Equally
important, Fitch acknowledges that capital encumbrance-to-
unreserved impaired loans will drop materially.

Unipol Banca's operating profitability is structurally weak, in
Fitch's view, driven by weak revenue generation from the bank's
core businesses, high operating costs and still growing LICs.
Fitch expect the bank to report material losses in 2017 for the
implementation of the restructuring plan, but starting from 2018
Unipol's profitability should benefit from a cleaner balance
sheet. Despite this, a more positive assessment of the bank's
earnings and profitability would also require evidence that the
bank's ability to generate a sustainable level of acceptable
revenue and earnings has improved.

Unipol Banca's funding and liquidity reflect it being mainly
deposit-funded, but these remain vulnerable to depositors'
sentiment. The bank's standalone liquidity profile benefits from
UG's ability to provide liquidity, which remains important for the
bank, in Fitch's opinion.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, SR

Unipol Banca's IDRs and SR are sensitive to a change in UG's
ability and propensity to support the subsidiary. This means that
the bank's ratings and Outlook are primarily sensitive to changes
in UG's ratings. The ratings would also be affected by a change in
its  assessment of UG's propensity to support Unipol Banca. A sale
of the bank or a reduction in UG's stake in it would likely
diminish the parent's propensity to provide support.

VR

Unipol Banca's VR reflect Fitch's assumption that the bank will
successfully transfer the entirety of its doubtful loans in the
coming months. The rating would be downgraded, probably by several
notches, if the transaction does not go through. The rating could
also be downgraded if the bank fails to turn its profitability
around and if impaired loans increase significantly and weigh
heavily on its capitalisation.

Further VR upgrades, while not likely in the short-term, would
require a sustainable return to operating profitability and
further improvements in asset quality and capitalisation.

The rating actions are as follows:

Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: downgraded to 'f' from 'ccc' and subsequently
  upgraded to 'b'
Support Rating: affirmed at '3'



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CADOGAN SQUARE III: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
actions on the following classes of notes issued by Cadogan Square
CLO III B.V.:

-- EUR36.1M (current outstanding balance EUR 11.75M) Class B
    Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aaa
    (sf); previously on May 25, 2017 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR27.5M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 25, 2017
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- EUR30M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
    due 2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on May 25, 2017
    Upgraded to A1 (sf)

-- EUR18.75M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on May 25,
    2017 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Cadogan Square CLO III B.V., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralised loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans managed by Credit
Suisse Asset Management Limited. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in January 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions taken on the notes are the result of
deleveraging of the senior notes following amortisation of the
portfolio since the last rating action in May 2017.

The Class A notes were completely repaid and the Class B notes
paid down by EUR 24.35 million (or 67.5% of the Class B notes'
original balance) on the July 2017 payment date. As a result of
the deleveraging, over-collateralisation (OC) ratios of all rated
notes have increased. According to the trustee report dated
October 2017, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E OC
ratios are reported at 874.87%, 261.88%, 148.43% and 116.80%
respectively, compared to April 2017 levels of 230.99%, 165.05%,
125.86% and 109.59%, respectively.

The rating actions on the notes are also a result of an
improvement in credit quality of the portfolio since the last
rating action. The credit quality has improved as reflected in the
improvement in the average credit rating of the portfolio
(measured by the weighted average rating factor, or WARF).
According to the trustee report date October 2017, the WARF is
2884, compared with 3115 six months ago.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par EUR 69.3 million, principal proceeds of EUR 28.7
million, defaulted par of EUR 19.9 million, a weighted average
default probability of 17.78% (consistent with a WARF of 2605 over
a weighted average life of 4.3 years), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 41.10% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 14, a weighted average spread of 4.02% and a
weighted average coupon of 7.79%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery rates for CLO
securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF CDOs".
In each case, historical and market performance and a collateral
manager's latitude to trade collateral are also relevant factors.
Moody's incorporates these default and recovery characteristics of
the collateral pool into its cash flow model analysis, subjecting
them to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in August 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
that were unchanged for Classes B and C and within one notch for
Classes D and E of the base-case model outputs.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

1) Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.
Fast amortisation would usually benefit the ratings of the notes
beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralisation levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's analysed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price or the
recovery rate to account for potential volatility in market
prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk
on those assets. Based on the trustee's October 2017 report,
securities that mature after the maturity of the notes currently
make up approximately 28.1% of the portfolio. Moody's assumes
that, at transaction maturity, the liquidation value of such
assets will depend on the nature of the assets as well as the
extent to which the assets' maturity lags that of the liabilities.
Liquidation values higher than Moody's expectations would have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


JUBILEE CDO V: Moody's Hikes Ratings on Two Note Classes to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Jubilee CDO V B.V.:

-- EUR 46.8M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017
    Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

-- EUR 8.475M Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017
    Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

-- EUR 12.725M Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
    Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 1, 2017
    Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

-- EUR 11.325M Class W Combination Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
    previously on Jun 1, 2017 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR 11.725M Class Y Combination Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
    previously on Jun 1, 2017 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

-- EUR 45.8M (current balance EUR 2.0M) Class B Senior Secured
    Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 1,
    2017 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Jubilee CDO V B.V., issued in June 2005, is a Collateralised Loan
Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield
European loans, managed by Alcentra Limited. This transaction's
reinvestment period ended in August 2011.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades of Class C, Class D-1, and Class D-2 notes are
primarily the result of deleveraging of the portfolio and
improvement in the credit quality of the performing collateral
loans since the last rating action in June 2017. On the August
2017 payment date, Class B notes paid down by EUR 26.05 million
(57% of their closing amount). As a result of this deleveraging,
overcollateralization ("OC") levels have increased across the
capital structure. As of the October 2017 trustee report, Class
A/B, Class C and Class D OC ratios are reported at 4423.09%,
180.42% and 125.77% compared to April 2017 levels of 419.36%,
157.13%, and 122.45% respectively. In addition there are principal
proceeds of EUR 12.28 million reported in the October 2017 data.

The credit quality of the underlying collateral pool has improved
as reflected in the weighted average rating factor (WARF) which
reduced from 3706 in April 2017 to 3027 in October 2017.

The ratings of the combination notes address the repayment of the
rated balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Combos W
and Y, the rated balance at any time is equal to the principal
amount of the combination note on the issue date minus the sum of
all payments made from the issue date to such date, of either
interest or principal. The rated balances will not necessarily
correspond to the outstanding notional amounts reported by the
trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR 53.06 million, principal proceeds of EUR
21.63 million including EUR 9.35m in full settlement of JOA
Moliflor loans of par value EUR 16.7 million received pursuant to
the Moliflor's acquisition by Blackstone, defaulted par of EUR
9.21 million, a weighted average default probability of 13.08%
over a 2.99 years weighted average life (consistent with a WARF of
2412), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.65% for
a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 7 and a
weighted average spread of 3.54%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance
and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analysing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in August 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed lower weighted average recovery rate for the
portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the weighted
average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs which
were unchanged for Classes B and C, and within one notch of the
base-case results for Classes D-1 and D-2.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

* Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.
Fast amortization would usually benefit the ratings of the notes
beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

* Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's analysed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price or the
recovery rate to account for potential volatility in market
prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would have a
positive impact on the notes' ratings.

* Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. As per Moody's analysis, long-dated assets represent
32% of current performing par. Moody's assumes that, at
transaction maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will
depend on the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which
the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation
values higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive
impact on the notes' ratings. As per Moody's analysis, 32% of the
performing par represents long-dated assets.

* Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors with Caa or low non-investment-grade ratings, especially
when they default. Because of the deal's lack of granularity,
Moody's substituted its typical Binomial Expansion Technique
analysis with a simulated default distribution using Moody's
CDOROMTM software and an individual scenario analysis.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


WOOD STREET V: Fitch Affirms Ratings on Two Tranches to 'B-sf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded four tranches of Wood Street CLO V B.V.
and affirmed the others:

Class A-2: upgraded to at 'AAAsf' from 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B: upgraded to at 'AAAsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class C-1: upgraded 'BBB+sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C-2: upgraded 'BBB+sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class D: affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class E-1: affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class E-2: affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

Wood Street CLO V is a securitisation of mainly European senior
secured loans with a total note issuance of EUR500 million
invested in a target portfolio of EUR480 million. The portfolio is
actively managed by Alcentra Limited.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of the senior and mezzanine notes reflects the
increase in credit enhancement due to the transaction's
deleveraging and the improvement in the portfolio's credit
quality. The affirmations of the junior notes reflect the increase
in obligor concentration.

Over the past year, the class A-D, A-R and A-T notes have been
paid in full and the class A-2 notes have been paid down by EUR8.6
million. In addition, principal proceeds represent EUR19.2 million
as of the October 2017 investor report, and will be used on the
next payment date to further pay down the class A-2 notes. The
deleveraging of the transaction has led to a significant increase
in credit enhancement available for the senior notes.

The deleveraging was also accompanied by an increase in obligor
concentration. The number of performing obligors decreased to 33
from 52 over the past year and the top 10 obligors now represent
53% of the performing portfolio excluding principal proceeds.
Fitch expects obligor concentration to increase further as the
transaction continues to deleverage. This may cause performance
volatility if large obligors were to be downgraded. As such, Fitch
has upgraded the class C notes below their model-implied ratings
and affirmed the class D and E notes.

The transaction was originally structured with A-R variable
funding notes, various FX options and a GBP interest rate cap. The
A-R notes were recently paid in full and the options and interest
rate cap have now matured. As such, the transaction is now exposed
to unhedged GBP assets. As of the October 2017 investor report,
unhedged GBP assets represent 7.45% of the performing portfolio
excluding cash. Fitch has found that the transaction can withstand
the various combinations of interest rate and currency stresses
between sterling and euro assets at the current rating levels.

The average credit quality of the portfolio has improved over the
past year with a significant decrease of approximatively EUR50
million in assets rated 'CCC' or below by Fitch due to a
combination of upgrades, paydown and sales. In addition, there
have been no new defaults in the transaction. As of the October
2017 investor report, all the overcollateralisation (OC) tests are
passing with a relatively healthy cushion.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 125% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and this increase added to all rating default levels, would
not impact the rating of the senior and mezzanine notes but may
lead to a downgrade of up to one notch for the most junior notes.

A 25% reduction in recovery rates would not impact the rating of
the senior and mezzanine notes but may lead to a downgrade of up
to two notches for the most junior notes.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


NEW SYMBOL: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3320, dated November 27,
2017, revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit
institution New Symbol Bank (JSC) from November 27, 2017,
according to the press service of the Central Bank of Russia.

According to the financial statements, as of November 1, 2017, the
credit institution ranked 420th by assets in the Russian banking
system.

New Symbol Bank failed to comply with the requirements of laws and
Bank of Russia regulations on countering the legalization
(laundering) of criminally obtained incomes and the financing of
terrorism with regard to identifying operations subject to
mandatory control, as well as submitting reliable information to
the authorized body.  Moreover, in 2016-2017, New Symbol Bank was
involved in dubious payable-through operations.  The Bank of
Russia repeatedly applied supervisory measures to the credit
institution, including three impositions of restrictions on
certain operations, including household deposit taking.

The behavior of the bank's management and owners was unscrupulous,
which was evidenced by the failure to comply with restrictive
measures imposed by the supervisor, by operations to withdraw
liquid assets to the detriment of creditors and depositors'
interests, as well as by dubious operations to avoid the
compliance with the supervisor's requirements to create loss
provisions commensurate with risks assumed.

Under these circumstances, the Bank of Russia took the decision to
withdraw New Symbol Bank from the banking services market.

The Bank of Russia took this decision due the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, repeated violations within one year of the
requirements stipulated by Articles 6 and 7 (except for Clause 3
of Article 7) of the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism" and taking into account repeated applications within
one year of measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central
Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)".

Following banking license revocation, in accordance with Bank of
Russia Order No. OD-3320, dated November 27, 2017, New Symbol
Bank's professional securities market participant license was
revoked.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3321, dated November 27,
2017, has appointed a provisional administration to New Symbol
Bank (JSC) for the period until the appointment of a receiver
pursuant to the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies have been suspended.

New Symbol Bank (JSC) is a member of the deposit insurance system.
The revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than a total of RUR1.4
million per depositor.



===========
S E R B I A
===========


FABRIKA AKUMULATORA: Batagon Raises Offer to EUR7.35 Million
------------------------------------------------------------
Radomir Ralev at SeeNews reports that Switzerland-based Batagon
International has increased the price it is offering for Serbian
insolvent car battery maker Fabrika Akumulatora Sombor (FAS) to
EUR7.35 million (US$8.64 million) from EUR7 million.

According to SeeNews, news portal SoInfo quoted the insolvency
administrator of FAS, Predrag Ljubovic, as saying on Nov. 13
representatives of the Swiss company participated in a phone
conference with the creditors of FAS and explained that this is
their final proposal.

Earlier this month, three members of the creditors' board of FAS
rejected an improved EUR7 million acquisition offer made by
Batagon, SeeNews discloses.

The creditors of FAS had earlier rejected three offers made by
Batagon International for the assets of the insolvent company,
SeeNews recounts.

Batagon International originally offered EUR3 million for FAS in
July and then sweetened their bid to EUR4 million, SeeNews notes.

In August, the creditors rejected a EUR5.05 million offer and
Batagon International increased the price to EUR6 million, SeeNews
relates.


INDUSTRIJA MASINA: Serbian Gov't. Commences Privatization Talks
---------------------------------------------------------------
Radomir Ralev at SeeNews reports that Serbia's government said
agriculture minister Branislav Nedimovic has initiated talks with
Indian companies Mahindra, Amalgamations Group and Sonalika on the
privatisation of state-owned insolvent tractor maker Industrija
Masina i Traktora (IMT).

According to SeeNews, the government said in a statement on
Nov. 3 Mr. Nedimovic presented the opportunities for the
production of tractors in Serbia to companies interested in the
sector during an official visit to India.

The agriculture ministry will do its best to find a buyer in the
coming weeks and solve a problem that has been plaguing Serbia for
some 10 to 15 years, Mr. Nedimovic said, as quoted in the
statement, SeeNews notes.

IMT was declared insolvent and ceased production in December 2015,
SeeNews recounts.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


VAKIF KATILIM: Fitch Assigns BB+ Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Turkey's Vakif Katilim Bankasi A.S.
(Vakif Katilim) a Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) of 'BB+' and a Long-Term Local-Currency IDR of
'BBB-'. The Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, NATIONAL RATING, SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Vakif Katilim's IDRs are underpinned by the bank's 'BB+' Support
Rating Floor (SRF), which is aligned with the sovereign's Long-
Term Foreign-Currency IDR. This reflects Fitch's view that the
Turkish authorities would have a high propensity to support the
bank in case of need, given the bank's 99% ownership by state-
related General Directorate of Foundations and significant share
of funding being provided in the form of state-related deposits
(according to the bank definition). It also factors in Vakif
Katilim's participation (Islamic) banking nature, in the light of
the government's strategic focus on developing this particular
sector. The Stable Outlook on the bank's IDRs mirrors that on the
sovereign rating.

VR

The 'b+' Viability Rating (VR) takes into account the bank's only
short record of operation and ensuing limited franchise in the
challenging Turkish operating environment. It also reflects
high -- although improving -- concentration in the finance
portfolio due to the bank's focus on corporate and commercial
finance and small size. Foreign currency financing is also fairly
significant, heightening credit risk in case of depreciation in
the Turkish lira, albeit less than participation bank peers' and
the sector average.

The bank's capital ratios are moderate, considering planned rapid
growth and concentration risk. As a result, additional capital
support is likely to be required to support further growth.

Vakif Katilim's financing/deposits ratio is low in absolute terms
and compares well with other Turkish participation banks'. While
it is budgeted to rise it should remain reasonable. The bank is
mainly deposit-funded and benefits from access to state-related
deposits, which are significant relative to total deposits
according to management's estimate. Funding from other sources is
currently limited but is being developed. The bank aims to
diversify and lengthen the maturity of funding through murabaha
syndications and external foreign-currency sukuk issuance. Fitch
expects wholesale funding to reach about 15% of total liabilities
by end-2018 (end-3Q17: 10%).

Liquidity is healthy as reflected in a strong liquidity coverage
ratio of 146%, far above the regulatory requirement of 70% at end-
3Q17. At end-1H17, short-term foreign currency non-customer
liabilities maturing within a year were fully covered by short-
term foreign currency liquid assets maturing within a year.

Performance is only moderate reflecting the bank's small size,
investments in growth and ensuing high cost base. The operating
profit/risk weighted assets ratio rose sharply in 1H17 to 2.3%,
bringing it closer to the sector average. However, operating
profit included sizeable gains on sharia-compliant derivatives
resulting from excess lira liquidity in 9M17, unlike most other
Turkish banks. The bank benefits from an above-sector-average net
financing margin, reflecting its high share of low-cost state-
related deposits. Limited financing impairments have also
underpinned profitability to date, although impaired financing
could rise due to seasoning.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, NATIONAL RATING AND SENIOR DEBT

Vakif Katilim's IDR could be downgraded in case of a sovereign
downgrade or if Fitch believes the sovereign's propensity to
support the bank has reduced, which would also lead to a negative
action on the SR and SRF. An upgrade of the sovereign could lead
to an upgrade of the bank's IDRs.

A change of ownership at the bank (including privatisation), or
the introduction of bank resolution legislation in Turkey aimed at
limiting sovereign support for failed banks, could also negatively
impact Fitch's view of support propensity, and hence the bank's
IDRs, SR and SRF, although such developments are not expected in
the near term.

VR

A VR downgrade could result from material weakening of asset
quality - which could be indicative of weaknesses in underwriting
standards and the control environment - as financing seasons
following rapid growth, in turn putting pressure on performance
and capitalisation. The VR could also be downgraded due to an
erosion of capital ratios, in the event that the bank is unable to
source for or generate sufficient capital to fund growth.

A VR upgrade is unlikely in the short-term given the bank's small
size, limited record of operation and start-up phase. A material
expansion of the bank's franchise, a reduction in risk appetite -
reflected in a reduction in borrower concentration and a more
moderate pace of growth - and a successful asset quality and
performance record could result in positive pressure on the VR in
the medium term.

The rating actions are as follows:

Vakif Katilim Bankasi A.S.

Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR assigned at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
Long-Term Local-Currency IDR assigned at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR assigned at 'B'
Short-Term Local-Currency IDR assigned at 'F3'
Viability Rating assigned at 'b+'
Support Rating assigned at '3'
Support Rating Floor assigned at 'BB+'
National Long-Term Rating assigned at 'AAA(tur)'; Outlook Stable



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BYRON: R Capital Among Prospective Bidders for Business
-------------------------------------------------------
Mark Kleinman at Sky News reports that a former owner of Little
Chef is among a pack of bidders plotting a cut-price takeover of
Byron, the gourmet burger chain caught in the headwinds afflicting
Britain's casual dining sector.

Sky News understands that R Capital, which specializes in buying
troubled businesses, is one of several suitors to have held talks
with Byron's owners and management in recent weeks.

News of the interest from R Capital, which sold Little Chef in
2013, comes a month after Byron's investors hired KPMG to evaluate
options for their ownership of the company, Sky News notes.

According to Sky News, sources said this weekend that some
prospective bidders were proposing to pay as little as GBP25
million for the burger chain.

A source insisted on Nov. 12 that potential bidders had indicated
"a wide range of valuations for Byron", Sky News relays.

Byron closed four under-performing stores earlier this year, Sky
News recounts.

Insiders pointed out that the company had not breached its banking
covenants, contrary to market rumors, and was not considering a
company voluntary arrangement, a process which enables property-
owners to close loss-making outlets more cheaply, Sky News
discloses.

Information distributed to potential bidders does, however,
indicate that 13 of its sites are loss-making or marginal, and
fall into a category entitled "exit immediately", Sky News states.

Byron said a further dozen restaurants are marked for review and
could be exited by a new owner "with or without a premium", Sky
News notes.

The chain has seen a downturn in trading performance in recent
months amid broader pressure on the restaurant sector amid greater
competition from high street and delivery-based rivals, according
to Sky News.

Byron has been owned by Hutton Collins, an investment firm, for
four years and employs 1,800 people.  The company trades from just
over 70 sites across the UK, having opened its first restaurant in
2007.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at
856-381-8268.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *