/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/180302.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, March 2, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 044


                            Headlines


C R O A T I A

AGROKOR DD: Supports Croatia Gov't in Search for New Receiver


F I N L A N D

STORA ENSO: Moody's Hikes CFR to Ba1, Outlook Positive


G R E E C E

ELETSON HOLDINGS: Moody's Cuts CFR to Caa2, Outlook Negative
ESTIA MORTGAGE I: Fitch Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to Bsf
EUROBANK ERGASIAS: Fitch Ups Gov't.-Guaranteed Debt Rating to 'B'


I R E L A N D

CVC CORDATUS VII: S&P Puts B- Class F Notes Rating on Watch Neg.


I T A L Y

ITALO NUOVO: Fitch Affirms BB- Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable


L U X E M B O U R G

ALGECO SCOTSMAN: S&P Assigns 'B-' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

E-MAC NL 2004-1: Fitch Lowers Class D Notes Rating to 'CCCsf'
SUNSHINE MID: S&P Affirms Preliminary 'B+' CCR, Outlook Stable
VIVAT NV: Fitch Affirms BB Subordinated Debt Rating


N O R W A Y

NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: Hedge Funds Fight Over Assets


P O L A N D

ADFORM GROUP: Files for Bankruptcy in Rzeszow Court


R U S S I A

MTS BANK: Fitch Affirms B+ Long-Term IDR, Outlook Negative
* S&P Takes Positive Actions on Some Russian Banks
* S&P Upgrades Ratings on Nine Russian Corporate Entities


S P A I N

BANCAJA 10: S&P Cuts Class B Notes Rating to 'D'


S W I T Z E R L A N D

INOFINA AG: Regulator Initiates Bankruptcy Proceedings


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

COLLATERAL UK: In Administration After Trading Without License
MIZZEN MEZZCO: Fitch Affirms B+ Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable
SEADRILL LTD: Fredriksen Reaches Deal with Majority of Creditors


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History


                            *********



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C R O A T I A
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AGROKOR DD: Supports Croatia Gov't in Search for New Receiver
-------------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that suppliers and creditors of Croatia's Agrokor
support the government in its search for a new receiver of the
ailing concern and want the process of extraordinary
administration and talks towards settlement to continue.

The suppliers and creditors expect a new receiver to be appointed
as soon as possible, the government said late on Feb. 26 following
their meeting with prime minister Andrej Plenkovic and his close
aides, SeeNews states.

Among the representatives of the creditors present at the meeting
were Russian banks Sberbank and VTB, as well as US-based hedge
fund Knighthead Capital, SeeNews discloses.

According to SeeNews, local media quoted Thomas Wagner from
Knighthead as saying "We expect a new emergency administrator to
be appointed shortly.  It is essential to recognize that that
process needs to bring together creditors and suppliers and that
they need to work together".

Mr. Wagner, according to news agency Hina, also said the creditors
are working together to find a solution to benefit Croatian
citizens, SeeNews relates.

On Feb. 21, Agrokor's outgoing receiver, Ante Ramljak, said he has
handed in his irrevocable resignation to the prime minister, after
it emerged that he had hired his former employer, Texo Management
consultancy, to advise on the process of Agrokor restructuring,
SeeNews relays.

Mr. Plenkovic, as cited by SeeNews, said also on Feb. 21 that a
section on conflict of interest may be added to the law on
emergency administration of companies of systemic importance for
the country's economy.

                      About Agrokor DD

Founded in 1976 and based in Zagreb, Crotia, Agrokor DD is the
biggest food producer and retailer in the Balkans, employing
almost 60,000 people across the region with annual revenue of
some HRK50 billion (US$7 billion).

On April 10, 2017, the Zagreb Commercial Court allowed the
initiation of the procedure for extraordinary administration over
Agrokor and some of its affiliated or subsidiary companies.  This
comes on the heels of an April 7, 2017 proposal submitted by the
management board of Agrokor Group for the administration
proceedings for the Company pursuant to the Law of Extraordinary
Administration for Companies with Systemic Importance for the
Republic of Croatia.

Mr. Ante Ramljak was simultaneously appointed extraordinary
commissioner/trustee for Agrokor on April 10.

In May 2017, Agrokor dd, in close cooperation with its advisors,
established that as of March 31, 2017, it had total liabilities
of HRK40.409 billion.  The company racked up debts during a rapid
expansion, notably in Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Serbia, a
Reuters report noted.

On June 2, 2017, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Agrokor
D.D.'s corporate family rating (CFR) to Ca from Caa2 and the
probability of default rating (PDR) to D-PD from Ca-PD. The
outlook on the company's ratings remains negative.  Moody's also
downgraded the senior unsecured rating assigned to the notes
issued by Agrokor due in 2019 and 2020 to C from Caa2.  The
rating actions reflect Agrokor's decision not to pay the coupon
scheduled on May 1, 2017 on its EUR300 million notes due May 2019
at the end of the 30-day grace period. It also factors in Moody's
understanding that the company is not paying interest on any of
the debt in place prior to Agrokor's decision in April 2017 to
file for restructuring under Croatia's law for the Extraordinary
Administration for Companies with Systemic Importance.

On June 8, 2017, Agrokor's Agrarian Administration signed an
agreement on a financial arrangement agreement worth EUR480
million, including EUR80 million of loans granted to Agrokor by
domestic banks in April. In addition to this amount, additional
buffers are also provided with additional EUR50 million of
potential refinancing credit. The total loan arrangement amounts
to EUR1,060 million, of which a new debt totaling EUR530 million
and the remainder is intended to refinance old debt.



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F I N L A N D
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STORA ENSO: Moody's Hikes CFR to Ba1, Outlook Positive
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Corporate Family Rating
(CFR) of Stora Enso Oyj (Stora Enso) to Ba1 from Ba2, its
probability of default rating (PDR) to Ba1-PD from Ba2-PD, the
rating of its senior unsecured MTN programme to (P)Ba1 from
(P)Ba2, as well as its various senior unsecured bond ratings to
Ba1 from Ba2. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed Stora Enso's NP
Commercial Paper rating and (P)NP Other Short Term programme
rating. The outlook remains positive. A complete list of affected
ratings is included at the end of this press release.

"The rating action recognises a further strengthening of Stora
Enso's business profile and its balance sheet during 2017, with an
increasing likelihood that over the next 18 months the company
will reach credit metrics sustainably commensurate with an
investment grade rating", says Martin Fujerik, Moody's lead
analyst on Stora Enso.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action recognises a further strengthening of Stora
Enso's business profile during 2017 and continuation of successful
business diversification beyond the traditional graphic grade
paper, which is in structural decline in mature markets. In the
past couple of years Stora Enso has invested sizeable amounts into
businesses with underlying growth, such as paper packaging, well
in excess of depreciation and maintenance capex levels. In 2017
these growth businesses represented already over 80% of the
group's operating income, as defined by Stora Enso, which compares
to around one third in 2006. The last year also marks the first
year in the past five years when Stora Enso's growth businesses
outpaced the decline in paper business in topline -- a trend that
Moody's expects to continue into 2018 and 2019.

Given that growth activities generally also enjoy structurally
higher profitability than the paper operations, the continuous
shift in the business mix has led to a sustained improvement of
Stora Enso's credit metrics that is now fully in line with a Ba1
rating. Moody's estimates that Stora Enso's EBITDA margin, as
adjusted by the rating agency, reached around 15% and retained
cash flow (RCF) to debt roughly 22% in 2017. Even when Moody's
considers a pro-forma impact of the Bergvik Skog transaction
announced in November last year, which would reduce the RCF/debt
to around 18%, this would still position Stora Enso solidly in the
Ba1 rating category. The upgrade also recognises the return of a
meaningful positive free cash flow generation, with a Moody's
adjusted (RCF-capex)/debt in mid-single digit in % terms, driven
by a normalisation of capital investments following number of
years of extraordinary growth.

RATIONALE FOR POSITIVE OUTLOOK

The positive outlook reflects the increasing likelihood that over
the next 18 months Stora Enso's credit metrics will further
improve and reach the levels that Moody's would deem commensurate
with an investment grade, such as EBITDA margin above 15% and
RCF/debt above 20% (including the Bergvik Skog transaction).
Moody's expects organic growth to be solid through 2018 supported
by good pricing for a number of end products. In addition, the
rating agency recognises that some of the previously undertaken
investments, such as the Beihai mill in China, are still ramping
up and provide further upward potential until the desired return
on investments is reached.

Moody's also understands that Stora Enso's management is
considering tightening of its net leverage ceiling (as defined by
Stora Enso), which is currently 3.0x (1.4x in 2017, or around 2.0x
pro-forma for the Bergvik Skog transaction). Such tightening would
increase the likelihood that Stora Enso would be also willing to
maintain credit metrics that are commensurate with an investment
grade.

WHAT COULD CHANGE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Moody's could upgrade Stora Enso's ratings if the company built
further track record of good operational performance with Moody's
adjusted EBITDA margin above 15%. In addition to that it would
require (1) a financial policy that would lead to Moody's adjusted
RCF/debt sustainably above 20% with meaningful free cash flow
generation and (2) strengthening of its liquidity profile with a
reduced reliance on short-term debt.

The rating agency could downgrade Stora Enso ratings if the
company experienced sustainable deterioration of operating
performance with Moody's EBITDA margin toward low-teens in %
terms. It could also result from more aggressive use of balance
sheet, with Moody's adjusted RCF/debt declining sustainably below
15%.

Headquartered in Helsinki, Finland, Stora Enso is among the
world's largest paper and forest products companies, with sales of
around EUR10 billion in 2017. Its portfolio comprises production
of paper, paper-based packaging, wood products and pulp. Stora
Enso's shares are listed on the NASDAQ QMX Helsinki and Stockholm.
The company's single-largest shareholder, with 12.3% of shares, is
Solidium Oy, which is 100% owned by the Finnish state, followed by
Foundation Asset Management, with a holding of 10.2% shares. Stora
Enso has roughly 26,000 employees worldwide, with the majority of
revenue generated in Europe.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Stora Enso Oyj

Upgrades:

-- LT Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2

-- Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to Ba1-PD from Ba2-PD

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Ba1 from
    Ba2

-- Senior Unsecured MTN Program, Upgraded to (P)Ba1 from (P)Ba2

Affirmations:

-- Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

-- Other Short Term Program, Affirmed (P)NP

Outlook Actions:

-- Outlook, Remains Positive

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Paper
and Forest Products Industry published in October 2013.



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G R E E C E
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ELETSON HOLDINGS: Moody's Cuts CFR to Caa2, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Eletson Holdings Inc.'s
corporate family rating (CFR) to Caa2 from Caa1 and senior secured
rating on the $300 million notes to Caa2 from Caa1. At the same
time, Moody's has revised the company's probability of default
rating (PDR) to Ca-PD/LD from Caa1-PD. The rating outlook remains
negative.

Moody's views the non-payment of interest due on the senior
secured notes on January 15, 2018, after considering the grace
period of 30 days, as a missed payment default and hence the PDR
is appended with the "/LD" (limited default) designation, which
will remain until the company resolves the missed payment. Moody's
views this as a limited default as it represents a default of
approximately 39% of the company's capital structure. The
downgrade of the CFR and the senior notes ratings reflects tighter
liquidity, weak operating environment and increased risk of a
distressed exchange.

This rating action follows the company's announcement on February
16, 2018 that it has entered into a Forbearance Agreement with at
least 80% of the holders of its 9.625% notes due 2022.

RATINGS RATIONALE

On February 16, 2018, Eletson announced that it has entered into a
Forbearance Agreement with 80% of holders of its $300 million
senior secured notes due 2022. The company and the bondholders
agreed in principle to certain material terms of a proposed
transaction that would enhance Eletson's liquidity. The
Forbearance Agreement will allow the company and the bondholders
to finalize the terms of the proposed transaction.

Eletson's corporate family rating (CFR) of Caa2 continues to
reflect (1) the group's weakened operating performance over the
past 18 months in both of its operating segments (product tankers
and LPG), which has resulted in a sharp rise in Eletson's leverage
and put pressure on the already weak liquidity profile; (2) the
expectation that both the product tanker and the LPG markets will
remain under pressure over the next twelve months; and (3) the
limited visibility of revenues, as the company focuses mostly on
the spot market. The Caa2 rating also takes into account (1) the
long track record of technical and operational efficiency; (2) a
strong customer base, as the group maintains long-term customer
relationships; and (3) the ownership of a versatile and relatively
young fleet, especially on the LPG side.

Moody's currently has a negative outlook on the tanker sector
driven by the expectations of additional new deliveries: 3% of
fleet in 2018 according to Banchero Costa Research, as reported by
Eletson. The oversupply, which became material in early 2017 has
negatively affected spot rates with long-range product tankers
(LR1) rates declining by 31% to $13,000 in January 2018 from
$18,750 in 2016 and Aframax rates declining by 32% to $15,000 in
January 2018 from $22,100 in 2016. For the restricted group, in
the first nine months of 2017, EBITDA declined to $15,392 from
$50,771 in the corresponding prior-year period owing to the sharp
deterioration in spot rates. This reduction in EBITDA drove
leverage for the restricted group to 17.9x based on a debt/EBITDA
metric for the twelve months ending September 30, 2017. For 2016,
debt/EBITDA leverage for the restricted group was 7.4x.

Eletson's liquidity is weak. Historically, it relied primarily on
operating cash flows, but these have been pressured by persistent
weakness in spot rates. Positively, in September 2017, the company
refinanced a final maturity of a term loan from Citibank totaling
approximately $83 million. Over the coming quarters Eletson also
faces debt amortization payments of approximately $30 million in
2018, as well as close to $23 million in equity commitments for
vessels under construction, according to the company. Eletson is
in discussions with Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding and Offshore
Co., Ltd. (SWS) to postpone the payments for its Aframax
newbuilding programme. This excludes expected LPG vessel
deliveries to the joint venture, which are funded with Blackstone
equity contributions. The company had $57 million of cash,
restricted cash and short-term investments on hand at 30 September
2017 and no availability under its revolving facilities. Moody's
expects that Eletson's liquidity profile will continue to weaken,
as its cash balance will be consumed owing to negative free cash
flow.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the risk of further pressure on
Eletson's rating if market conditions remain unchanged and
liquidity further weakens particularly as a result of failure to
negotiate with the shipyard to postpone remaining equity
commitments for the newbuilding Aframaxes.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Eletson's rating could be upgraded if the market conditions in
tankers and/or LPG/LEG improve, resulting in the company returning
to positive free cash flow generation, and if its liquidity
profile improves.

Eletson's rating could be downgraded further if the company
defaults on other elements of its capital structure or if its
operating performance or liquidity sustainably deteriorates.
Additionally, ratings could be downgraded if Moody's comes to
expect the recovery to be lower than currently estimated.

Eletson Holdings Inc. is an owner and operator of product tankers
and liquefied petroleum gas carriers, with a double-hulled fleet
of 21 product tankers and 11 LPG carriers as at September 30,
2017. The group recorded total revenues of $254 million and EBITDA
of $38 million in the last twelve months to September 30, 2017.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Shipping
Industry published in December 2017.


ESTIA MORTGAGE I: Fitch Hikes Ratings on 2 Tranches to Bsf
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded nine tranches of four Greek RMBS
transactions originated by Piraeus Bank S.A. (Piraeus, RD/RD/ccc)
and Consignment Deposit & Loans Fund (CDLF). In addition, Fitch
has affirmed three other tranches. The nine upgraded tranches are
being maintained on Rating Watch Positive (RWP) while the affirmed
tranches have been removed from Rating Watch Evolving (RWE) as
follows:

Estia Mortgage Finance Plc (Estia I)

Class A (XS0220978737): upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'B-sf'; RWP
  Maintained

Class B (XS0220978901): upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'B-sf'; RWP
  Maintained

Class C (XS0220979115): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; off RWE; Recovery
  Estimate (RE) 100%

Estia Mortgage Finance II Plc (Estia II):

Class A (XS0311458052): upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'B-sf'; RWP
  maintained

Class B (XS0311459969): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; off RWE; RE 80%

Class C (XS0311460892): affirmed at 'CCsf'; off RWE; RE 0%

Grifonas Finance No. 1 Plc (Grifonas)

Class A (XS0262719320): upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'B-sf'; RWP
  maintained

Class B (XS0262719759): upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'B-sf'; RWP
  maintained

Class C (XS0262720252): upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'B-sf'; RWP
  maintained

Kion Mortgage Finance Plc (Kion)

Class A (XS0275896933): upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'B-sf'; RWP
  Maintained

Class B (XS0275897311): upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'B-sf'; RWP
  Maintained

Class C (XS0275897741): upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'B-sf'; RWP
  Maintained

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Performance; Adequate Credit Support

The rating actions reflect the transactions' stable asset
performance, supported by high seasoning, and adequate credit
support available. All transactions benefit from non-amortising
cash reserves being at target levels, which, together with the
sequential pay-down of the transactions, ensure stable
accumulation of credit enhancement.

European RMBS Rating Criteria and Greece Upgrade

The rating actions also reflect the application of the new
European RMBS Rating Criteria and the upgrade of Greece's Long-
Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B-' and the revised Country Ceiling
of 'B' in August 2017. Fitch placed nine tranches on RWP on 1
September 2017 following the sovereign upgrade and the remaining
tranches on RWE on October 5, 2017 following the publication of
the European RMBS Rating Criteria.

The RWP on the nine tranches is maintained to reflect the February
2018 upgrade of Greece's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'B'
and the revised Country Ceiling of 'BB-'. Fitch will resolve the
RWP following the calibration of Fitch's Greek residential
mortgage asset assumptions for the 'BBsf' rating category.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Further changes to the Greek sovereign Issuer Default Rating,
Country Ceiling or structured finance rating cap may result in
corresponding changes on the tranches rated at the cap.

Asset deterioration beyond Fitch's expectations could lead to
negative rating action.


EUROBANK ERGASIAS: Fitch Ups Gov't.-Guaranteed Debt Rating to 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Eurobank Ergasias S.A.'s and National
Bank of Greece S.A.'s (NBG) government-guaranteed debt programmes
to 'B' from 'B-'.

This rating action follows the upgrade of Greece's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B' on February
16, 2018.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Eurobank's and NBG's government-guaranteed debt are senior
unsecured instruments that are unconditionally and irrevocably
guaranteed by the Greek State under the Greek Law 3723/2008 "for
the enhancement of liquidity of the economy in response to the
impact of the international financial crisis".

The ratings reflect Fitch's expectation that Greece would honour
the guarantees provided to the noteholders and that these
guaranteed obligations would be treated equally with other senior
obligations of the Greek State.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings of Eurobank's and NBG's state-guaranteed debt are
sensitive to Greece's sovereign ratings.



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CVC CORDATUS VII: S&P Puts B- Class F Notes Rating on Watch Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed on CreditWatch with negative
implications its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C, D, E,
and F notes issued by CVC Cordatus Loan Fund VII DAC (CVC Cordatus
VII).

The CreditWatch placements follow S&P's assessment of the
transaction's performance using data from the December 2017
monthly report, and the application of S&P's relevant criteria.

The data from the December 2017 report indicates that the
transaction is failing the S&P CDO Monitor Test by 268 basis
points (bps). The S&P CDO Monitor Test is a collateral quality
test applicable to transactions with reinvestment flexibility. It
dynamically tracks whether the key credit parameters in a
transaction are consistent with the thresholds we assumed when S&P
initially assigned the ratings. A failure of this test indicates
that the underlying collateral's credit quality has worsened,
recovery prospects are lower, or portfolio yield has decreased
since closing; or a combination of these factors.

The par value and interest coverage tests are currently passing.

Since S&P assigned its initial ratings to the transaction, it has
observed negative migration in the credit quality of the
portfolio. As of December 2017, assets rated 'B' or lower
accounted for 60.0% of the current portfolio, compared with 48.0%
of the target portfolio at closing. The erosion of credit quality
has been partially offset by par build-up of about EUR400,000. As
a result, the transaction is slightly above the target par
balance.

The portfolio's expected recovery rates have also decreased
materially since closing, with the weighted-average recovery rate
(WARR) dropping to 33.95% at the 'AAA' level from 37.57%. The most
significant drop in recoveries occurred at the 'B' rating level,
where WARR dropped to 60.87% from 64.98% over the same period.

At the same time, the weighted-average spread (WAS) earned on the
portfolio, excluding the uptick provided by euro interbank offered
rate (EURIBOR) floors, has dropped to 3.86% from 4.45% at closing
(to 4.06% from 4.87% when accounting for the benefit of EURIBOR
floors). The fall in WAS is mainly fueled by spread tightening and
repricing activity on the underlying loans, a trend S&P has
observed in other CLO transactions in the same vintage as CVC
Cordatus VII. CLO liability spreads have also tightened over this
time horizon. The coupon on the class A-1 and A-2 notes for this
transaction is 130 bps, compared with 72 bps for the manager's
latest CLO transaction, CVC Cordatus Loan Fund X DAC. However, CLO
issuers can typically only reprice their liabilities after the
expiry of the two-year noncall period, which for this transaction
is in August this year.

S&P said, "Given the decrease in WAS and WARR levels in the
portfolio and the weakened credit profile, our cash flow analysis
indicates that the rated notes cannot sustain the assigned
ratings. This outcome is consistent with the transaction's failure
of the S&P CDO Monitor Test.

"However, our ratings indicate a forward-looking opinion. As such,
we recognize the possibility that the notes could be refinanced
once the CLO exits the noncall period. In our view, if a
refinancing is executed the original notes would be repaid at par.
A refinancing would also improve the CLO's cash flow generation as
the cost of debt for the refinanced liabilities is likely to be
lower. As a result, we have put the ratings on the class A-1, A-2,
B-1, B-2, C, D, E, and F notes on CreditWatch negative.

"We expect to resolve the CreditWatch placement when we obtain
more details about the CLO's potential refinancing at the end of
its two-year noncall period. If the refinancing is not executed,
we would expect to lower the ratings on the notes. If the
refinancing is executed, we expect the rated notes to be repaid at
par."

CVC Cordatus VII is a cash flow CLO transaction that closed in
August 2016. It has a two-year non-call period that ends in August
2018 and a four-year reinvestment period that ends in August 2020.

RATINGS LIST

CVC Cordatus Loan Fund VII DAC

EUR454.20 Million Secured Floating-Rate And Fixed-Rate Notes
(Including Subordinated Notes)

  Ratings Placed On CreditWatch Negative

  Class                Rating
            To                       From

  A-1       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg       AAA (sf)
  A-2       AAA (sf)/Watch Neg       AAA (sf)
  B-1       AA (sf)/Watch Neg        AA (sf)
  B-2       AA (sf)/Watch Neg        AA (sf)
  C         A (sf)/Watch Neg         A (sf)
  D         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg       BBB (sf)
  E         BB (sf)/Watch Neg        BB (sf)
  F         B- (sf)/Watch Neg        B- (sf)



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I T A L Y
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ITALO NUOVO: Fitch Affirms BB- Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Italo - Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori
S.p.A.'s (ITALO) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with Stable Outlook. Fitch has simultaneously withdrawn the rating
because ITALO's previously outstanding bonds were fully repaid in
December 2017. Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide public
ratings coverage for ITALO.

The rating reflects the strong outperformance posted by ITALO in
2017 compared with Fitch expectations as well as the lack of
visibility on the strategy and financial policy targeted by Global
Infrastructure Partners (GIP), which acquired the company
recently. ITALO is strongly positioned in the current rating and
could absorb a moderate increase in leverage. Based on preliminary
results, EBITDA (excluding one-offs) was EUR156 million for the
year compared with EUR113 million in Fitch's previous rating case.
Strong cash flow performance, partly due to a different phasing of
the cash-out related to new trains, led to a debt reduction to
around EUR443 million compared with EUR662 million forecasted by
Fitch.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Private High-Speed Train Operator:  ITALO has been operating high-
speed trains in Italy since 2012 under the brand name ITALO and is
the first private high-speed operator in the European passenger
rail industry. ITALO's only direct competitor is Trenitalia, owned
by the incumbent Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane (FS, BBB/Stable).
As of 2016, ITALO had a 35% share of the markets it operates in
with a fleet of 25 high-speed trains offering 56 daily services
with a focus on the strategic routes Naples-Rome-Milan-Turin and
Naples-Rome-Venice/Verona. In December 2017 four trains were
delivered to ITALO out of the 12 ordered in 2015-2016. In November
2017 ITALO ordered five additional trains.

New Shareholder Base: On February 11, in the context of ITALO's
imminent listing, the shareholder base, mostly composed of Italian
entrepreneurs and financial institutions, accepted an offer from
GIP for 100% of the capital at an equity value of almost EUR2
billion. The offer, which grants the option to prior shareholders
to reinvest up to the limit of 25%, is conditional only on
antitrust approval. At this stage, there is no visibility around
the strategy and financial structure targeted by GIP. However,
ITALO's credit profile demonstrates good financial flexibility and
some headroom at the current rating level. Fitch believes that
ITALO is well-positioned to exploit the future railway
liberalisation across Europe.

Strong 2017 Outperformance: The outperformance at EBITDA level has
been driven both by volumes and yields. The company had an
effective pricing mechanism and improved its fleet management,
increasing the offer of train kilometres, while keeping costs
under control. Cash flow benefitted also from the sale of a VAT
credit, lower-than-expected capex (only due to a different phasing
of the cash-outs for new trains), and an equity injection of EUR15
million. As a result, ITALO's funds from operations (FFO) adjusted
net leverage fell to 2.9x in 2017 from 6.7x in 2016. In case of an
unchanged financial structure, Fitch would expect net leverage to
slightly increase to around 4x in 2018, but that would still be
well below Fitch previous expectations of 5.7x for the same year.

Fleet Expansion: ITALO will benefit from an expanding fleet as it
increases scale, frequencies and geographic footprint throughout
its rail network. On the other hand, it adds execution risk to the
company's business plan. The delivery of the first four trains out
of the 17 ordered in 2015-2017 from Alstom occurred on time and on
budget. All the additional services (with related routes and
times) have been approved by the regulator. At end-2017, ITALO has
paid some EUR150 million of its around EUR370 million total
related investments.

Financial Policy Key: ITALO has a rigid operating cost structure,
but its capacity to sustainably generate positive free cash flow
(FCF) is enhanced by low maintenance capex (around EUR10 million
per year) and potential cash generation from working capital.
Therefore, assuming satisfactory operational performance in the
future, ITALO's FCF will be mainly shaped by GIP's decisions on
the company's expansionary capex, dividends and financial
structure.

Competitive Landscape: ITALO has a market share of 24% in the
total high-speed long-haul market in Italy and 35% in its
reference market. The entry of a second player was a key driver
for the market growth in Italy in the last few years (CAGR 2012-
2016 of 7.6%). Prices for high-speed trains in Italy are quite low
compared with other EU countries and there is room for additional
penetration, since the high-speed train solution is gaining market
share relative to traditional train and airlines, while bus
operators are generally small. Fitch believe that barriers to
entry are significant, both in terms of capital and time needed to
penetrate the market.

Regulatory Framework: The Italian independent authority for
transport ART defined a new methodology for the period 2016-2021,
which resulted in lower access fees for the use of the
infrastructure by ITALO (36% yoy reduction in 2015). In 2016
access and electricity costs (also regulated) represented almost
40% of the company's cost base. While the establishment of the
independent regulator provides a foundation for the development of
a competitive environment, its track record in the implementation
of its policies is rather limited.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

ITALO is rated below transport peers such as Stagecoach Group plc
(BBB/Negative), FirstGroup plc (BBB-/Stable) and National Express
Group Plc (BBB-/Stable), mainly due to limited track record and
scale, lack of diversification and somewhat weaker credit metrics.
On the other hand, it is rated one notch higher than airline peers
at 'B+' with similar financial profiles, including Public Joint
Stock Company Aeroflot-Russian Airlines and LATAM Airlines Group
S.A., due to its stronger business profile. If the company
continues posting strong operational performance and maintaining
FFO adjusted net leverage below 4.0x, the rating gap with main
transport peers may reduce over time.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Fitch Rating Case for the Issuer
Key assumptions are not applicable as the rating has been
withdrawn.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating sensitivities are not applicable as the rating has been
withdrawn.

LIQUIDITY. Not applicable.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


ALGECO SCOTSMAN: S&P Assigns 'B-' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it assigned its 'B-' long-term issuer
credit rating to Luxembourg-headquartered modular space leasing
group Algeco Scotsman Investments B.V. (Algeco). The outlook is
stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we assigned our 'B-' issue rating and
recovery rating of '4' to the EUR1,190 million senior secured
notes. The recovery rating reflects our expectation of average
recovery (30%-50%; rounded estimate 35%) in the event of payment
default.

"We also assigned our 'CCC' issue rating and recovery rating of
'6' to the EUR258 million senior unsecured notes, reflecting our
expectation of negligible recovery (0%-10%; rounded estimate 0%).
We also discontinued our ratings on former group entity Algeco
Scotsman Global S.a.r.l.

"The ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings we assigned
on Jan. 25, 2018. The final documentation differs from what we
reviewed in January. The overall amount of secured notes was
increased by EUR70 million to EUR1,190 million. The unsecured
notes amount rose from EUR295 million to $305 million. At the same
time, the achieved interest rate was higher than the initial
indication. However, we still view Algeco's credit metrics as
commensurate with a highly leveraged financial risk profile and
with the current rating level."

The rating actions follow an improvement in Algeco's capital
structure following a complete refinancing of its debt. The
refinancing follows the group's repayment of a portion of its debt
with proceeds from the sale of its U.S. modular space subsidiary
Williams Scotsman. The refinancing alleviates S&P's concerns
surrounding Algeco's liquidity. S&P views Algeco's business risk
profile as weak and financial risk profile as highly leveraged.

Algeco is a leading service provider of modular space and remote
accommodation solutions. It primarily serves European and Asian
markets. TDR Capital LLP, a U.K.-based private equity firm,
currently holds a majority interest in Algeco.

Algeco's products include single-unit buildings and largescale,
multistory permanent structures used for various purposes
including offices, classrooms, accommodation/sleeper units,
hospitals, restaurants, and retail stores. Most of Algeco's
revenues derive from the lease/rental of standardized modular
spaces, with initial lease terms averaging 24 months, although a
significant portion of its customers choose to renew their
contracts beyond that initial term. Companies in this sector
typically operate in somewhat volatile end-markets, such as
nonresidential construction and manufacturing, which, combined,
account for about 33% of revenues.

Following the sale of Williams Scotsman, the U.S.-based modular
space and portable storage solutions business, Algeco is focused
on Europe, although its remote accommodation business brings
moderate geographic diversification, with operations in the U.S.,
Australia, and New Zealand. S&P said, "Furthermore, although
Algeco's operations depend on different end-markets, we consider
that the group is exposed to many cyclical industries, such as oil
and gas, mining, and construction. Finally, our business risk
assessment factors in profitability that we assess as below
average compared with the operating leasing industry average."

The group's strategy is to increase the sale of value-added
products and services (VAPS). S&P said, "We consider this a
positive as it differentiates Algeco from its competition,
improves customer relationships, and creates additional sources of
revenues. That said, we view this activity as very much linked to
the group's underlying leasing business. We believe that Algeco
remains focused on leasing standardized single-unit buildings and
large-scale, multistorey permanent structures."

These weaknesses are partly offset by Algeco's leading position as
a lessor of modular units in Europe, and its No. 1 or No. 2
positions in most of the markets it serves. The group also holds
No. 1 market positions in the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand for
remote accommodation. S&P said, "We view Algeco's wide network of
sites for modular units--which are spread across Europe--as a key
strength, as this allows customers to contract with one single
European supplier, but also access local facilities. This also
minimizes transportation costs for Algeco. We note that Algeco's
lease terms average 24 months, which represents a relatively low
portion of its assets' economic lives, and translates into
moderate revenue and cash flow visibility for the group. Finally,
we believe that the group benefits from a relatively fragmented
customer base (and hence lower customer concentration) since its
five largest customers represent about 15% of total revenues."

S&P said, "Our assessment of Algeco's financial risk profile is
primarily constrained by the group's highly leveraged credit
metrics, including S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to capital of
above 90% and funds from operations (FFO) to debt of below 9%.
Algeco's ultimate ownership by private-equity firm TDR Capital,
which we consider a financial sponsor, informs our opinion of the
group's financial policy."

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

-- Real GDP growth in the eurozone will remain steady for 2018
    and decline slightly over the next two years. S&P has
    adjusted revenues to account for Brexit since 20% of the
    group's revenues derive from the U.K.

-- Pro forma year-on-year revenue growth of about 10% in 2018,
    mainly driven by the integration of Touax and Iron Horse,
    which will contribute about EUR110 million to total revenues.
    S&P expects that organic growth will mainly be driven by
    modular space revenues due to increased demand.

-- Gross margins in line with historical levels for each
    business segment. S&P expects that the total reported gross
    margin will improve marginally to about 48% in 2018 from
    about 47% in 2017 as Algeco's top-line grows and absorbs a
    greater amount of fixed costs.

-- Depreciation and amortization as a percentage of revenues to
    remain at about 13%, in line with 2017 levels.

-- After taking into account about EUR30 million of exceptional
    costs in 2018, we forecast an improvement in Algeco's EBIT
    margin to about 11% in 2018 from 10.5% in 2017. S&P also
    expects that an increasing focus on VAPS and a higher
    utilization rate will boost EBIT margins over the forecast
    horizon.

-- Cash taxes of EUR5 million-EUR7 million per year.

-- Total capital expenditure (capex) of about 10%-11% of
    revenues as the group is investing in maintaining and growing
    its fleet to serve increasing demand.

-- No dividend payments.

-- A EUR207 million cash outflow to finance the acquisition of
    Touax (EUR170 million) and Iron Horse ($37 million), offset
    by the equity contribution from TDR. S&P's forecasts do not
    consider any additional acquisition.

-- S&P's view of the new preferred equity (which capitalizes
    interest at 11.5% per year) as debt.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

-- EBIT interest coverage of slightly below 1.0x in 2018, and
    about 1.0x in 2019;

-- FFO to debt of about 4-6% in 2018, and about 5%-7% in 2019;
    and

-- A debt-to-capital ratio of well above 90% over the forecast
    horizon.

S&P said, "The stable outlook on Algeco reflects our view that
increasing demand for modular units, combined with the integration
of recent acquisitions Touax and Iron Horse, will support modest
revenue growth of about 10% and an adjusted EBIT margin of about
11% in 2018. However, we believe that these positives will
continue to be offset by debt to capital of well above 90% and our
view of the group's aggressive financial policy as a result of its
financial sponsor ownership.

"We could lower our ratings if Algeco's liquidity position
deteriorates substantially or if we view its capital structure as
unsustainable.

"Although unlikely over the next 12 months, we could raise our
ratings if earnings and free operating cash flow generation exceed
our expectations, resulting in improved EBIT interest coverage of
more than 1.3x."



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


E-MAC NL 2004-1: Fitch Lowers Class D Notes Rating to 'CCCsf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two tranches and affirmed 12 tranches
of three Dutch E-MAC RMBS transactions. The agency has resolved
the Rating Watch on all tranches and assigned Stable Outlooks to
all notes rated 'Bsf' and higher.

The rating actions follow the publication of Fitch's new European
RMBS Rating Criteria.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Application of New Rating Criteria
The application of the European RMBS Rating Criteria resulted in
the affirmation and downgrade of the various tranches. Fitch took
into account the non-standard structural features (see pro-rata
structures below), as well as the scheduled maturity of a number
of assets after the legal final maturity date of the notes. Where
appropriate, ratings different to those implied by Fitch's
proprietary cash flow model were assigned.

The excess spread notes in 2005-III and 2006-II have been affirmed
at 'CCCsf'. Principal redemption of these notes ranks subordinate
to the payment of extension margins on the collateralised notes in
the revenue waterfall. Fitch's ratings do not address the payment
of the extension margins, and as such they are not modelled in its
cash flow model. As the extension margin amounts have been
accruing and remain unpaid, full principal redemption of the
excess spread notes from interest receipts was considered
unlikely.

The reserve funds in these transactions may increase following
asset performance deterioration. Funds collected would be released
once arrears drop again below the pre-defined three-month arrears
trigger, at which point the funds released will be used towards
the redemption of the excess spread notes. As the portfolios
continue to amortise, a small number of loans can lead to greater
volatility in arrears performance, leading to the possibility of
continuous replenishments and releases in the reserve funds, and
subsequent redemptions on the excess spread notes. Given this
variability, the credit risk of these notes is commensurate with
the 'CCCsf' rating definition, leading to the affirmation of the
excess spread notes.

Asset Maturity Risks
In all three transactions Fitch identified assets with maturity
dates exceeding those of the notes'.

Note amortisation in these transactions is pro-rata given
satisfactory performance. Note amortisation will only switch to
sequential in case of (i) drawings on the reserve fund, (ii)
drawings on the liquidity facility, (iii) uncleared balances on
the principal deficiency ledgers, or (iv) more than 1.5% of
delinquent loans over two months. Therefore, in a benign
environment it is possible for the transactions to amortise pro-
rata until note maturity. This implies a loss to the structure
equal to the balance of the loans that mature after the notes.

Fitch notes that such loans have shown a history of prepayments
and are small as a proportion of the current pool. Additionally,
all such borrowers also have at least one loan-part that matures
prior to note maturity. Should the borrower decide to refinance
that loan-part they will have to refinance all their outstanding
loan-parts.

Fitch also notes a number of loan-parts maturing within the two
years up until notes' legal final maturity. Given the curtailed
time to note maturity, if borrowers fail to refinance these loans
the recoveries from the sale of the underlying properties may not
feed into the transactions.

Given the elevated risk to default, Fitch is of the opinion that a
rating of 'BBsf' is appropriate for these transactions.

Stabilising Performance
Late-stage arrears (borrowers who have been delinquent for over
three months) have stabilised over the last 12 months. As of
January 2018, late-stage arrears ranged from 0.5% (2004-I) to 0.8%
(2005-III), down from 0.5% (2004-I) to 1.2% (2005-III) 12 months
prior. Similarly the rate at which losses are building has slowed
down.

High Interest-only Concentration
The interest-only (IO) concentrations in these transactions range
between 72% (2004-I) and 79% (2006-II) of the outstanding
portfolio and are high compared with other Fitch-rated Dutch RMBS.
According to criteria a 50% weighted average foreclosure frequency
(WAFF) is assumed for the peak concentration at the 'AAAsf' level
(lower WAFF assumptions are applied at lower rating stresses) and
at the 'Bsf' level to the remainder of the pool.

For two out of the three transactions application of the IO
concentration WAFF resulted in model-implied ratings that were
more than three notches different to the rating derived by
applying a WAFF produced by the standard criteria assumptions.
Therefore, Fitch took into account the IO concentration WAFF in
its rating analysis of these two transactions.

Pro-Rata Structures
As of the January 2018 payment date, two of the transactions were
amortising pro-rata. Should note amortisation on 2005-III,
currently amortising sequentially, revert to pro-rata, the credit
enhancement build-up for the senior notes will be reduced as per
the amortisation mechanism in the documentation. This feature has
been factored into the rating analysis to the extent that the
relevant pro-rata triggers are captured by Fitch's modelling
assumptions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Should the assets maturing after note maturity prepay, it would
address the risk of the notes incurring losses at maturity. This
may lead to positive rating actions.

Adverse macroeconomic factors may affect asset performance. An
increase in foreclosures and losses beyond Fitch's stresses may
erode credit enhancement leading to negative rating action.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

E-MAC NL 2004-1 B.V.

  Class A (ISIN XS0188806870) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off Rating Watch
   Evolving (RWE); Outlook Stable
  Class B (ISIN XS0188807506) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWE; Outlook
   Stable
  Class C (ISIN XS0188807928) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWE; Outlook
   Stable
  Class D (ISIN XS0188808819) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'BBsf';
   off RWE; Recovery Estimate (RE) of 40%

E-MAC NL 2005-III B.V.

  Class A (ISIN XS0236785431) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWE; Outlook
   Stable
  Class B (ISIN XS0236785860) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWE; Outlook
   Stable
  Class C (ISIN XS0236786082) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWE; Outlook
   Stable
  Class D (ISIN XS0236786595) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'BB sf';
   off RWE; RE 40%
  Class E (ISIN XS0236787056) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; off RWE; RE 90%

E-MAC NL 2006-II B.V.

Class A (ISIN XS0255992413) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWE; Outlook
  Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0255993577) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWE; Outlook
  Stable
Class C (ISIN XS0255995358) affirmed at 'BBsf'; off RWE; Outlook
  Stable
Class D (ISIN XS0255996166) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; off RWE; RE 90%
Class E (ISIN XS0256040162) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; off RWE; RE 30%


SUNSHINE MID: S&P Affirms Preliminary 'B+' CCR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its preliminary 'B+'
long-term issuer credit rating on Sunshine Mid B.V., the new
parent company of Netherlands-based independent bottler, Refresco
Group N.V. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we affirmed our preliminary 'B+'
issue rating on the proposed EUR1.970 billion senior term loan B
facilities and EUR200 million revolving credit facility issued by
Sunshine. The recovery rating on these issues, which rank pari
passu, is '3', indicating our expectation of meaningful (50%-70%;
rounded estimate: 50%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

"We also affirmed our preliminary 'B-' issue rating on the
subordinated EUR445 million senior unsecured debt instruments
issued by Sunshine. The recovery rating of '6' indicates our
expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery in the event of a
payment default."

The final ratings will be subject to the successful closing of the
proposed issuance and will depend on our receipt and satisfactory
review of all final transaction documentation. Accordingly, the
preliminary ratings should not be construed as evidence of the
final ratings. S&P said, "If the final debt amounts and the terms
of the final documentation depart from the materials we have
already reviewed, or if we do not receive the final documentation
within what we consider to be a reasonable time frame, we reserve
the right to withdraw or revise our ratings."

The affirmation follows the launch of a public cash offer by
Sunshine Investments B.V. (the holding company created by PAI
Partners SAS and Cubalibre Holdings Inc., being part of a group
led by the British Columbia Investment Management Corporation) for
all the shares of Refresco. The acceptance period, unless
extended, will close on March 19, 2018, at which point the number
of issued and outstanding shares tendered, will be assessed. This
is largely in line with S&P's expectations for the private
takeover, which, if successful, will see the group delisted from
the Dutch stock exchange (Euronext Amsterdam).

Refresco has managed to secure competition clearance from the
European Commission and the competent authorities in the U.S. and
China. This was a condition outlined in the offering memorandum
and can no longer delay the transaction.

S&P said, "We also note that the group has completed the
acquisition of Cott's bottling activities following the approval
in principle of the U.K.'s Competition and Markets Authority and
the relevant competition authorities in both the U.S. and Canada.
The group will, however, have to operate separately in the U.K. in
the short term until it has found a suitable buyer for the
Aseptic-PET facility at the Nelson site. However, we understand
that the integration and expansion of the North American business
is already underway.

"Our main views on the strength of the combined business and
operating and credit metrics remain unchanged from our last
publication."


VIVAT NV: Fitch Affirms BB Subordinated Debt Rating
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlooks on VIVAT N.V.'s (VIVAT)
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and SRLEV N.V.'s and REAAL
Schadeverzekeringen N.V.'s (together VIVAT Insurance) Insurer
Financial Strength (IFS) Ratings to Evolving from Stable. Fitch
has simultaneously affirmed VIVAT's IDR at 'BBB', and VIVAT
Insurance's IFS Ratings at 'BBB+' (Good).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of the ratings reflects Fitch view that VIVAT's
credit profile as a standalone Dutch insurer is not directly
affected by the credit profile of its parent, Anbang Insurance
Group Co. Ltd. (Anbang). This follows a recent announcement by the
China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) that it has taken
control of Anbang, as provided for under Chinese law.

The Outlook revision reflects Fitch view of heightened uncertainty
whether Anbang will remain VIVAT's owner longer-term. Fitch does
not have any direct or indirect knowledge of any actions the CIRC
is contemplating in its oversight of Anbang.

Under Fitch's criteria for assessing the impact of ownership,
Fitch has viewed Anbang's credit profile as neutral to VIVAT's
rating. Fitch believes that the regulatory and governance
framework under which VIVAT operates in the Netherlands protects
its capitalisation and policyholders through restrictions on the
minimum capital position and on capital flows (i.e. dividend
payments) to the shareholder. Fitch believes that the announcement
by the CIRC, and any uncertainty that it creates, does not affect
this capital protection.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As noted, while Fitch does not have any knowledge this will be
contemplated by the CIRC, a change in ownership could have
positive or negative implications for VIVAT's ratings.

An adverse change in Fitch perception of the strength of the ring-
fencing provided by the regulatory and governance framework in the
Netherlands under which VIVAT operates could lead to a downgrade.

Net income ROE (2016: 4%) sustained above 6% could lead to an
upgrade. The ratings could also be upgraded if financial leverage
(1H17: above 30%) falls below 25% while the Prism Factor Based
Model (FBM) score is 'Extremely Strong' on a sustained basis.

The ratings could be downgraded if VIVAT's net income ROE falls
below 3%, or if the Prism FBM score falls to the low end of the
'Strong' category, or if financial leverage increases to more than
35% for a sustained period.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Reaal Schadeverzekeringen N.V.

-- IFS Rating affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook revised to Evolving
    from Stable

SRLEV N.V.

-- IFS Rating affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook revised to Evolving
    from Stable

VIVAT N.V.

-- Long-Term IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook revised to Evolving
    from Stable
-- Senior debt (XS1600704982) affirmed at 'BBB-'
-- Subordinated debt (XS1717202490) affirmed at 'BB'



===========
N O R W A Y
===========


NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: Hedge Funds Fight Over Assets
----------------------------------------------------
Hannah George at Bloomberg News reports that hedge funds fighting
over the assets of bankrupt papermaker Norske Skog are asking a
London judge to decide how much control is too much control.

Oceanwood Capital Management, the company's largest bondholder,
wants to bid for the Norwegian firm's assets during a public sale,
Bloomberg discloses.  Foxhill Capital Markets and similar smaller
investors are trying to block the trustee, Citigroup Inc., from
holding an auction, saying that it could be rigged in Oceanwood's
favor, Bloomberg states.

"Without resolution of this issue Citi is, in effect, paralyzed,"
the bank, as cited by Bloomberg, said in filings that ask the
London judge to allow it to go ahead with a sale.

The fight for Norske Skog, once one of Norway's biggest companies
and one with deep local roots, has been raging for years,
Bloomberg notes.

Foxhill didn't attend the hearing on Feb. 26, Bloomberg discloses.
It may appeal a judgment made on Feb. 20 that rejected its request
to have the case judged in New York, where it has filed a lawsuit
against Oceanwood and Citigroup, Bloomberg relays. Judge Anthony
Mann told the court on Feb. 26 that the urgency of the case means
Foxhill "should have to make up its mind" about appealing soon,
according to Bloomberg.

Oceanwood bought out the original lenders of a EUR100 million
(US$123 million) securitization facility, and Foxhill alleges that
the purchase further extends its control over the company,
Bloomberg recounts.

According to Bloomberg, Gabriel Moss, a lawyer for Citigroup, told
the court that his client gave notice to other note holders,
asking them if they wanted to attend the trial.  With Foxhill
absent, Citigroup put up another lawyer to present the argument
against Oceanwood, to ensure any judgment is seen as binding,
Bloomberg says.

The central issue is whether Oceanwood, as majority holder of
senior secured notes, or SSNs, can be considered an "Instructing
Group" and order the bank to begin the sale as well as bid in the
process, Bloomberg states.

Foxhill asserts Oceanwood shouldn't be considered such because it
"controls" Norske Skog, which would trigger a rule preventing it
from issuing directions, according to Bloomberg.

                         About Norske Skog

Norske Skogindustrier ASA or Norske Skog, which translates as
Norwegian Forest Industries, is a Norwegian pulp and paper
company based in Oslo, Norway and established in 1962.

                           *   *   *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on December
5, 2017, S&P Global Ratings revised its long- and short-term
corporate credit ratings on Norske Skogindustrier ASA (Norske
Skog) and its core rated subsidiaries to 'D' (default) from 'SD'
(selective default) as the issuer has now defaulted on all of its
notes.  At the same time, S&P lowered its issue rating on the
unsecured notes due in 2033 and issued by Norske Skog Holding AS
to 'D' from 'C'. S&P also removed the issue ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where it had placed them
on June 6, 2017. S&P also affirmed its 'D' ratings on the senior
secured notes due in 2019, and the unsecured notes due in 2021,
2023, and 2026.

The downgrade follows the nonpayment of the cash coupon due on
Norske Skog's unsecured notes due in 2033 before the expiry of the
grace period on Nov. 15, 2017, S&P noted.

The 'D' ratings on the secured notes due 2019, and the unsecured
notes due in 2021, 2023, 2026, and 2033, reflect the nonpayment
of interest payments beyond any contractual grace periods, which
S&P considers a default.

The TCR-Europe also reported on July 24, 2017 that Moody's
Investors Service downgraded the probability of default rating
(PDR) of Norske Skogindustrier ASA (Norske Skog) to Ca-PD/LD from
Caa3-PD. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed Norske Skog's
corporate family rating (CFR) of Caa3.  In addition, Moody's also
affirmed the C rating of Norske Skog's global notes due 2026 and
2033 and its perpetual notes due 2115, the Caa2 rating of the
senior secured notes issued by Norske Skog AS and downgraded the
rating of the global notes due 2021 and 2023 issued by Norske Skog
Holdings AS to Ca from Caa3.  The outlook on the ratings remains
stable.  The downgrade of the PDR to Ca-PD/LD from Caa3-PD
reflects the fact that Norske Skog did not pay the interest
payment on its senior secured notes issued by Norske Skog AS, even
after the 30 day grace period had elapsed on July 15.  This
constitutes an event of default based on Moody's definition, in
spite of the existence of a standstill agreement with the debt
holders securing that an enforcement will not be made under the
secured notes due to non-payment of interest.  In addition, the
likelihood of further events of defaults in the next 12-18 months
remains fairly high, as the company is also amidst discussions
around an exchange offer that would most likely involve
equitisation of debt, which the rating agency would most likely
view as a distressed exchange.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


ADFORM GROUP: Files for Bankruptcy in Rzeszow Court
---------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Adform Group SA on Feb. 28 said the company
filed for bankruptcy in the district court in Rzeszow.

Adform Group SA operates in sales support, technologies, and
products manufacturing areas in Poland.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


MTS BANK: Fitch Affirms B+ Long-Term IDR, Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed MTS Bank's (MTSB) Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+' and Support Rating at '4'. The
Outlook is Negative. The agency has also upgraded MTSB's Viability
Rating (VR) to 'b' from 'b-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

The affirmation of MTSB's IDRs and Support Rating reflects Fitch's
view that the bank would likely be supported, in case of need, by
its majority shareholder, Sistema Public Joint Stock Financial
Corp. (Sistema; BB-/Negative) and/or its subsidiaries. This view
is mainly based on the (i) the track record of capital support,
including RUB15 billion of equity provided in 2016; (ii) MTSB's
role as a treasury bank for the group; and (iii) the brand
association with PJSC Mobile TeleSystems (MTS; BB+/Negative), a
major operating subsidiary of Sistema.

At the same time, the one-notch difference between the ratings of
Sistema and MTSB reflects the bank's weak performance to date, and
its limited franchise and therefore strategic importance for the
group.

The Negative Outlook on the bank's ratings reflects that on
Sistema.

VIABILITY RATING (VR)

The upgrade of MTSB's VR to 'b' from 'b-' mainly reflects the
recent moderation of asset quality risks due to adequate
provisioning of most legacy problem exposures and tighter
underwriting of newly issued loans, and a reduction of contingent
risks stemming from MTSB's former subsidiary bank, East-West
United Bank (EWUB), which was sold to Sistema and de-consolidated
from MTSB in May 2017. The rating also captures MTSB's reasonable
capital adequacy and funding profile. On the negative side the
rating reflects the bank's limited franchise and unproven business
model, and its weak pre-impairment performance.

Based on MTSB's preliminary 2017 IFRS accounts, non-performing
loans (NPLs; loans 90 days overdue) decreased to 16% of gross
loans (end-2016: 40%) mainly due to write-offs of previously
provisioned problem loans. Remaining NPLs were 80% reserved with
additional hard collateral available in most cases. At end-2017,
unreserved NPLs and restructured loans equalled, respectively, a
moderate 20% and 8% of Fitch Core Capital (FCC). Some of the 25
largest exposures, although reportedly performing and not
restructured, were of high risk, in Fitch's view, and equalled a
further 10% of FCC, net of reserves. Investment property and
foreclosed assets amounted to an additional 24%.

The performance of the bank's unsecured retail lending (36% of
gross loans) also improved as reflected by the NPL origination
ratio (calculated as the net increase in NPLs plus write-offs
divided by average performing loans) decreasing to 5.7% in 2017
from 7.8% in 2016. Although MTSB has been actively expanding in
unsecured retail lending (growth of 28% in 2017), in Fitch's view,
high credit risks stemming from consumer finance lending are
mitigated by MTSB's generally adequate underwriting standards and
are reasonably covered by high effective interest rates (about 30%
on average, according to management).

Capitalisation is adequate with a FCC ratio of 13% at end-2017.
Regulatory capitalisation, although supported by the disposal of
the equity investment in EWUB, which had previously been deducted
from MTSB's regulatory capital, is rather tight. The regulatory
Tier-1 ratio stood at 8.4% at end-2017 (minimum 7.9% including
buffers) due in part to higher risk-weights applied to high-margin
retail loans. However, this should improve to 10% after the
auditing of 2017 net income.

MTSB's pre-impairment profit (equal to 1.6% of average gross loans
in 2017) remains sluggish, despite wide margins in retail lending,
mainly as a result of poor operating efficiency (cost/income ratio
of 86%). The bottom line was also weak, as almost all pre-
impairment profit was consumed by loan impairment charges. Fitch
expect only a limited improvement in performance in 2018. MTSB's
focus on unsecured retail lending could result in greater
cyclicality of earnings in the medium to long term.

At end-2017, MTSB was mainly customer funded (95% of total
liabilities) with a significant reliance on highly concentrated
related party funding (50% of total liabilities). However,
liquidity is comfortable, with liquid assets covering more than
40% of total liabilities at end-2017.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

An upgrade/downgrade of Sistema would likely result in a similar
rating action on MTSB's support-driven ratings. Failure of the
parent to provide timely support, if needed, could result in a
downgrade of the support-driven ratings.

VR

A further upgrade of MTSB's VR would require (i) an extended track
record of reasonable asset quality, particularly in unsecured
retail lending, and (ii) stronger pre-impairment performance,
resulting in improved internal capital generation capacity.
Conversely, a marked asset quality deterioration could lead to a
downgrade of the VR.

The rating actions are as follows:

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'B+', Negative Outlook
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating upgraded to 'b' from 'b-'
Support Rating affirmed at '4'


* S&P Takes Positive Actions on Some Russian Banks
--------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has raised its issuer credit
ratings on Russia-based BNP PARIBAS BANK JSC, AO UniCredit Bank,
and Alfa-Bank JSC, as well as its ratings on the debt issued by
Volkswagen Bank RUS.

The upgrades follow S&P's upgrade of Russia on Feb. 23, 2018.

S&P said, "We consider that the operating environment for Russian
banks will remain challenging at least in 2018. Although we expect
asset quality pressures to ease because of the increasing economic
activity, and the situation gradually stabilized during 2017, the
banking sector's recovery will take a long time and be uneven.

"However, we raised the ratings on BNP PARIBAS BANK and AO
UniCredit Bank and our ratings on senior unsecured debt issued by
Volkswagen Bank RUS (99% subsidiary of Volkswagen Financial
Services AG, benefitting from the parent's irrevocable offers on
issued bonds) because they continue to be capped at the sovereign
rating level. In our opinion, the creditworthiness of these
financial institutions will be constrained by the sovereign's
creditworthiness, while benefiting from expected support from
respective parent banking institutions.

"Specifically, in the case of AO UniCredit Bank, we would consider
revising our assessment of the bank's stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) downward if we observed continuous decline in the loan
portfolio and deterioration of the bank's market position.
However, even a weaker SACP would not trigger a downgrade, all
other factors being equal, due to the likelihood of extraordinary
support from UniCredit SpA.

"We raised our ratings on Alfa-Bank because we currently believe
that the Russian government's propensity to support systemically
important banks has been enhanced. The upgrade in this case
reflects an additional notch of uplift for potential extraordinary
government support, which we did not incorporate in the rating
previously because of the only one-notch gap between the bank's
SACP and the sovereign foreign currency long-term rating.

"Our ratings on ABH Financial Ltd., Alfa-Bank's nonoperating
holding company, remain at B+/Positive/B, reflecting a potential
upward revision of our assessment of Alfa-Bank's SACP."

OUTLOOKS

BNP PARIBAS BANK JSC

The stable outlook on BNP Paribas Bank JSC mirrors that on Russia,
since the bank operates solely in the Russian market and is
therefore exposed to the risks related to operations in Russia.

S&P said, "We could take a positive rating action on BNP Paribas
Bank JSC over the next 18-24 months if we took a positive rating
action on Russia, assuming that the bank's parent continued to
view Russia as an important region for its operations.

"We could revise our outlook on BNP Paribas Bank JSC to negative
if we revised the outlook on Russia to negative or if we
considered that the group status of the Russian subsidiary had
weakened and if we believed that the likelihood of group support
had decreased, but this is not our base-case scenario."

AO UniCredit Bank

The stable outlook on AO UniCredit Bank mirrors that on Russia and
on its parent, UniCredit SpA. S&P said, "It reflects our view that
the bank will be able to maintain its creditworthiness over the
next 18-24 months, keep its highly strategic status for the
UniCredit group, and receive support from the group in case of
need."

S&P said, "We could revise our outlook on AO UniCredit Bank to
negative if we revised the outlook on Russia to negative. A
negative rating action could also be triggered if we considered
that the bank's group status had weakened and if we believed that
the likelihood of group support had decreased, but this is not our
base-case scenario. "

A positive rating action over the next 18-24 months would depend
on both a positive rating action on Russia and a simultaneous
positive rating action on the parent.

Alfa-Bank JSC

S&P said, "The stable outlook on Alfa-Bank JSC reflects our view
that the Alfa-Bank group's business and financial profiles will
remain unchanged over the next 12-18 months.

"We would consider lowering the ratings if we observed significant
changes in the group's risk appetite that could lead to asset
quality deterioration to system average levels, higher credit
costs than currently envisaged, or if we believe that the group's
capital were no longer sufficient to cover the risks it bears. We
could also take a negative rating action if we revised our
assessment of the sovereign's tendency to support private banks to
uncertain, from currently supportive.

"We consider the possibility of a positive rating action on Alfa-
Bank to be remote in the current environment, because it would
require significant improvement in the bank's credit profile,
moving our SACP assessment two notches above the current level to
trigger an upgrade."

Ratings List
Upgraded; Ratings Affirmed
                               To                 From

Alfa-Bank JSC
  Issuer Credit Rating         BB+/Stable/B       BB/Positive/B
  Senior Unsecured             BB+                BB
  Subordinated                 B                  B
  Commercial Paper             B                  B

ABH Financial Ltd.
  Issuer Credit Rating         B+/Positive/B      B+/Positive/B

BNP PARIBAS BANK JSC
  Issuer Credit Rating         BBB-/Stable/A-3    BB+/Positive/B

AO UniCredit Bank
  Issuer Credit Rating         BBB-/Stable/A-3    BB+/Positive/B

Volkswagen Bank RUS
  Senior Unsecured*            BBB-               BB+

NB: This list does not include all the ratings affected.

*Guarantor: Volkswagen Financial Services AG.


* S&P Upgrades Ratings on Nine Russian Corporate Entities
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has raised its ratings on nine
Russian corporations and affirmed its ratings on three companies.
These rating actions following the upgrade of the sovereign on
Feb. 23, 2018.

COMMODITY PRODUCERS (EXPORTERS)

-- S&P raised its ratings by one notch on Gazprom PJSC and
    Gazprom Neft PJSC. The outlooks are stable.

-- S&P affirmed its rating on Oil Company Rosneft OJSC. The
    outlook is positive.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND UTILITY COMPANIES

-- S&P raised, by one notch, its ratings on oil transporters
    Public Joint Stock Company Transneft, Rosseti PJSC, Federal
    Grid Passenger Co. JSC, Atomic Energy Power Corp. JSC, and
    PJSC RusHydro. Our outlooks on all seven companies are
    stable.

-- At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on Mosenergo PJSC
    and its ratings on TGC-1 PJSC. S&P's outlooks on both
    companies remain positive.

OUTLOOKS: COMMODITY PRODUCERS (EXPORTERS)

-- Gazprom PJSC

The stable outlook on Gazprom mirrors that on Russia. It also
incorporates our expectation that our 'bbb-' assessment of
Gazprom's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) is unlikely to change
and that the likelihood of state support to Gazprom will remain
extremely high. On a stand-alone basis, we expect Gazprom's funds
from operations (FFO) to debt will weaken to 40%-50% and debt to
EBITDA to 1.6x-2.0x in 2017-2019, due to large capital expenditure
(capex) on several large projects. Furthermore, we take into
account that Gazprom continues to have access to the international
capital markets, which should support its liquidity.

S&P said, "We would likely raise our foreign currency rating on
Gazprom to 'BBB' if we upgraded the sovereign. An upgrade of the
local currency rating would require both a sovereign upgrade and a
stronger SACP, which we currently do not expect given Gazprom's
sizable capex program.

"We would downgrade Gazprom in the event of a sovereign downgrade.
If Gazprom's SACP were to deteriorate by one notch to 'bb+', we
would lower our local currency rating to 'BBB-' and affirm the
'BBB-' foreign currency rating. This could happen if FFO to debt
declines to about 30% due to materially lower gas prices, larger-
than-expected investments and contingent liabilities, or weakening
liquidity. Neither of these scenarios is part of our base case,
however."

-- Gazprom Neft PJSC (GPN)

S&P said, "In our view, GPN is a strategically important
subsidiary of Gazprom that is unlikely to be sold and important to
the group's long-term strategy. We also consider that it has a
long-term commitment from senior group managers, who are on
Gazprom Neft's board. We continue to assess GPN's SACP at 'bbb-'.

"The stable outlook on GPN mirrors our outlook on Gazprom and on
Russia, Gazprom's controlling shareholder. We expect that our
ratings on GPN will not exceed those on Gazprom, given GPN's
importance to the group and close link to Gazprom's operating and
funding prospects. In our base case, we generally expect that
GPN's FFO to debt will exceed 45% on average over the next two
years.

"On a stand-alone basis, we expect that GPN will continue to
benefit from its solid market position, underpinned by large
reserves with a comfortable reserve life, significant production
volumes, and a natural hedge, thanks to the local tax system. If
the sovereign ratings, the rating on Gazprom, and our assessment
of GPN's group status remain unchanged, we would likely downgrade
GPN only if the company's SACP weakens to 'bb+'. However, we see a
limited likelihood of this scenario, since the company's credit
metrics are set to improve on the back of increasing production
and lower capex."

-- Oil Company Rosneft OJSC

The positive outlook on Rosneft reflects the likelihood of an
upgrade if the government demonstrates its commitment to
supporting Rosneft, directly or indirectly, helping the company
manage liquidity and improve its capital structure. Operating
under financial sanctions, the company has accumulated very
sizable short-term debt of more than $40 billion. The government
has not yet stepped in to support refinancing, which calls into
question the link between the company and the government. S&P
could upgrade Rosneft if it sees evidence of such support.

OUTLOOKS: INFRASTRUCTURE AND UTILITY COMPANIES

-- Public Joint Stock Company Transneft

The stable outlook on oil pipeline operator Transneft mirrors the
stable outlook on the sovereign rating. S&P continues to assess
Transneft's SACP at 'bbb' and, in its base-case scenario, S&P
expects FFO to debt will exceed 60% on average for the next three
years, capex will decline after major projects have been
completed, potentially increasing dividends, and adequate
liquidity.

S&P said, "We will raise our ratings on Transneft if we raise our
ratings on Russia and Transneft's SACP remains unchanged. We do
not expect to rate Transneft above the sovereign because of the
very strong links between the company and the government, which
could leave room for potential negative government intervention.
Also, we view Transneft as a domestically focused company exposed
to country risks in Russia."

Rating downside could stem from a sovereign downgrade. In
addition, we could lower the local currency rating on Transneft to
'BBB-' if the likelihood of extraordinary state support to the
company reduced, for instance due to changes in government policy.
S&P said, "If the company's role for and link to the government
remain unchanged, our expectation of an extremely high likelihood
of extraordinary government support creates a cushion for our
rating on the company. If Transneft's FFO to debt fell below 45%,
or is in the 45%-60% range but discretionary cash flow after capex
and dividends is substantially negative, we may revise the SACP
assessment to 'bbb-'. However, this won't affect the rating. We
would lower the local currency rating only if the SACP
deteriorates to 'bb+', which could happen after a very large debt
increase or unexpected liquidity pressures. These are not our
base-case scenarios, however."

-- Rosseti PJSC

S&P said, "The stable outlook on the Russian government-controlled
electricity transmission and distribution holding company Rosseti
reflects the stable outlook on the sovereign and our view of a
high likelihood of extraordinary government support for Rosseti if
needed. In addition, it reflects Rosseti's healthy stand-alone
performance, with an EBITDA margin of about 30%, FFO to debt of
30%-35%, debt to EBITDA of 2.0x-2.3x, negative discretionary cash
flow due to high capex and potentially increasing dividends, and a
manageable debt maturity profile. In our base-case scenario, we
include no material changes to the group's consolidated perimeter,
and have therefore not changed our assessment of the likelihood of
extraordinary government support.

"We may upgrade Rosseti if we upgraded Russia and the group's SACP
strengthened to 'bb+'. Still, we see such an improvement of the
SACP as unlikely, given our expectations of still materially
negative discretionary cash flow, alongside risks of potential
dividend pressures and the group's complex structure. The
shareholder agreement with the Russian government constrains
Rosseti's access to cash flows from Federal Grid Co. of the
Unified Energy System (FGC), its largest transmission subsidiary.
Any upside to the SACP would also require no major changes in the
group's consolidated perimeter or to the government's policy
regarding Rosseti.

"Rating downside could stem from a sovereign downgrade. We don't
expect to rate Rosseti above the sovereign because its SACP is
weaker than the sovereign foreign currency rating, its business is
domestically focused, and the link with the government is very
strong, implying risks of negative government intervention in a
sovereign stress scenario.

"We could also lower the rating if Rosetti's SACP were to
deteriorate to 'bb-' or lower, owing to weaker financial
performance, with FFO to debt lower than 20% (for example, if
capex, dividends, or working capital outlays are significantly
larger than our current expectations), or if liquidity becomes
less than adequate. A downgrade could also stem from a material
weakening of ongoing or extraordinary government support or loss
of control over key assets, such as FGC. However, these scenarios
are not part of our base case."

-- Federal Grid Co. of the Unified Energy System (FGC)

The stable outlook on FGC reflects that on Russia. S&P's base-case
scenario implies FFO to debt of 25%-35%, negative discretionary
cash flow on large capex projects, and dividends at 50% of
adjusted net income.

S&P would likely raise its ratings on FGC in case of a sovereign
upgrade.

S&P said, "Even if we were to revise our SACP assessment upward,
we would not expect to rate FGC above the long-term foreign
currency rating on Russia, given the full exposure of FGC's
operations to country risk in Russia, its very strong links with
the government, and the consequent risks of negative sovereign
intervention. We may revise our assessment of the company's SACP
to 'bbb-' if FFO to debt exceeds 40%, which we see as unlikely
over 2017-2019 because of the sizable capex and dividends." This
would also depend on developments regarding the company's
strategic capex, including more details regarding execution, the
scope of works, funding, and compensation for that investment.

Rating downside could stem from a sovereign downgrade. S&P said,
"We don't expect to rate FGC above the sovereign because its SACP
is weaker than the foreign currency sovereign rating, its business
is domestically focused, and the link with the government is very
strong, implying risks of government interference in a sovereign
stress scenario.

"Our expectation of a high likelihood of government support for
FGC creates a cushion against a downgrade of the company. We could
lower the ratings if the SACP deteriorated to 'bb-' or lower, for
example due to materially higher leverage caused by significantly
higher-than-expected capex or dividends, or less than adequate
liquidity, which are not part of our base-case scenario."

-- Russian Railways JSC (RZD)

S&P said, "The stable outlook on RZD reflects that on Russia and
our expectation of an extremely high likelihood of state support
for RZD if needed.

"We expect RZD will maintain a 'bb+' SACP, with FFO to debt at
20%-30%, debt to EBITDA at about 2.5x-3.0x, and negative free
operating cash flow (FOCF) due to high capex. We expect that the
negative FOCF will be partly mitigated by increased equity funding
of capex from the state, and by the company retaining some
flexibility in capex projects in case of delays in state funding.
We would upgrade RZD in case of a sovereign upgrade. In addition,
upside for the local currency rating could arise if RZD's SACP
strengthened to 'bbb-'. This could happen if FFO to debt rose
sustainably above 30%, thanks to higher profitability or lower
capex.

"We could consider a downgrade if we lowered the sovereign
ratings. Given RZD's very strong links with the sovereign, its
primarily domestic focus, and its weaker SACP than the sovereign
rating, we do not expect to rate RZD above Russia.

"Our view of an extremely high likelihood of extraordinary state
support creates a significant cushion against potential rating
downside. We could consider a downgrade if RZD's SACP weakened to
'b+'. Nevertheless, we would not lower the rating if RZD's SACP
deteriorated to 'bb', which could stem from FFO to debt declining
below 20% on weaker-than-anticipated profitability, significant
traffic declines, higher investments that are not covered by
equity injections from the government, or more rapid debt
accumulation than we expect, for instance, due to weakening of the
Russian ruble. These scenarios are not part of our base case,
however."

-- Federal Passenger Co. JSC (FPC)

S&P said, "The stable outlook on FPC reflects our view of a high
likelihood that the Russian government would provide timely and
sufficient extraordinary support to FPC if needed. On a stand-
alone basis, we expect FPC will deliver FFO to debt of 55%-75% and
FFO cash interest coverage of 7x-9x in 2017-2018, and that the
group will manage its liquidity proactively.

"We could lower the ratings on FPC if we were to lower the ratings
on Russia and on FPC's parent, Russian Railways. At the same time,
a downgrade could be triggered by a deterioration of FPC's stand-
alone credit quality to 'bb-'. In particular, we could lower the
ratings if FPC's FFO-to-debt ratio were to fall to below 30% and
FFO cash interest coverage to below 4x. This could happen as a
result of weaker operating performance, significantly increased
capex, or a deterioration of liquidity, with limited covenant
headroom in particular, which could also lead to a negative rating
action.

"We could raise the ratings on FPC if we were to upgrade Russian
Railways and Russia, and if FPC's credit quality doesn't
deteriorate."

-- Atomic Energy Power Corp. JSC (AEPC)

The stable outlook on AEPC reflects that on the sovereign. Under
S&P's base-case scenario, it expects AEPC will maintain solid
credit metrics, with FFO to debt above 60%, but negative FOCF due
to high capex.

S&P said, "We would raise our ratings on AEPC in case of a
sovereign upgrade. Even if our assessment of AEPC's SACP were to
strengthen from 'bb+', we do not expect to rate AEPC above our
foreign currency rating on the sovereign, given the company's very
strong links with the government. At this stage, the main factor
limiting an upward revision of the SACP is the company's ambitious
growth strategy, with a large portfolio of highly complex
projects.

"We would downgrade AEPC in case of a sovereign downgrade. Our
expectation of a very high likelihood of government support
creates a substantial cushion against ratings downside. To trigger
a downgrade, AEPC's SACP would need to weaken to 'b+', which is
not part of our base-case scenario."

-- PJSC RusHydro

S&P said, "Our stable outlook on electricity provider RusHydro
mirrors that on the sovereign. On a stand-alone level, we expect
RusHydro's FFO to debt to be in the 30%-40% range, but FOCF to be
strongly negative in 2018 due to large capex.

"We may upgrade RusHydro if we upgrade Russia and the group's SACP
strengthens to 'bb+'. We could revise our assessment to 'bb+' if
FFO to debt stays above 30% and FOCF turns at least neutral, which
could happen after the group completes its key investment projects
in 2018. Still, a stronger SACP would not lead to an upgrade,
absent an upgrade of the sovereign.

"Rating downside could stem from a sovereign downgrade. We don't
expect to rate RusHydro above the sovereign because its SACP is
below the sovereign foreign currency rating, the business is
domestically focused and the link with the government is very
strong, implying risks of government interference in a sovereign
stress scenario.

"We would also lower the rating if RusHydro's SACP were to
deteriorate to 'bb-' or below, owing to weaker financial
performance, with FFO to debt below 20% or a material reduction in
liquidity. This is not part of our base-case scenario, however."

-- Mosenergo PJSC

S&P said, "The positive outlook indicates that we could raise our
ratings on Mosenergo if we are satisfied that the government is
likely to support the company via its ultimate parent, Gazprom, or
if the company's SACP strengthens to 'bbb-'. A stronger SACP
assessment would take into account the company's performance
relative to peers' and require continuously solid financial
metrics, with FFO to debt sustainably above 60%, prudent liquidity
management, and more clarity on the company's future financial
policy, notably regarding potential capex projects. An upgrade of
Mosenergo would also be contingent on there being no deterioration
of Gazprom's credit quality. We currently assess Mosenergo's SACP
at 'bb+' and view the company as a moderately strategic subsidiary
of Gazprom group.

"We would revise the outlook to stable if we saw a significant
deterioration of Mosenergo's SACP, for example due to substantial
acquisitions, with debt to EBITDA exceeding 3x and FFO to debt
falling below 30%, which is not part of our base-case scenario. We
would also revise the outlook to stable if we believe that
Mosenergo is unlikely to benefit from state support via its parent
and, at the same time, we no longer foresee potential
strengthening of Mosenergo's SACP."

-- TGC-1 PJSC

S&P said, "The positive outlook indicates that we could raise the
rating on TGC-1 if we are satisfied that the government is likely
to support the company via its controlling shareholder, Gazprom.
We could also raise the rating if the company's SACP strengthened
to 'bbb-', which would depend on the company's performance
relative to peers', solid financial metrics, with FFO to debt
sustainably above 60%, prudent liquidity management, and more
clarity on the company's future financial policy, notably
regarding potential capex projects. An upgrade of TGC-1 would be
contingent on there being no deterioration of credit quality at
Gazprom, and no weakening of shareholder support. We currently
assess TGC-1's SACP at 'bb+' and view the company as a moderately
strategic subsidiary of Gazprom group.

"We would revise the outlook to stable if we believe that TGC-1 is
unlikely to benefit from state support via its controlling
shareholder and, at the same time, we no longer foresee potential
strengthening of TGC-1's stand-alone credit quality. We would also
revise the outlook to stable if we saw a significant deterioration
of TGC-1's SACP, for example following sizable acquisitions or an
enlarged investment program, resulting in substantially worse
credit metrics. If such actions caused debt to EBITDA to exceed
1.5x and FFO to debt to fall below 60%, we would likely reassess
the company's financial risk profile and our view on its financial
policy."

Ratings List

Atomic Energy Power Corp. JSC
Upgraded
                                To                From
  Issuer Credit Rating          BBB-/Stable/A-3   BB+/Positive/B

Federal Grid Co. of the Unified Energy System
Upgraded
                                To                From
  Issuer Credit Rating          BBB-/Stable/--    BB+/Positive/--
  Senior Unsecured              BBB-              BB+

Gazprom PJSC
Upgraded
                                To                From
   Foreign Currency             BBB-/Stable/A-3   BB+/Positive/B
   Local Currency               BBB/Stable/A-2    BBB-/Pos/A-3
   Senior Unsecured             BBB-              BB+

Gazprom Neft PJSC

  Issuer Credit Rating          BBB-/Stable/--    BB+/Positive/--
  Senior Unsecured              BBB-              BB+

TGC-1 PJSC
Rating Affirmed

  Corporate Credit Rating       BB+/Positive/B

Mosenergo PJSC
Ratings Affirmed

  Issuer Credit Rating          BB+/Positive/--

Oil Company Rosneft OJSC
Ratings Affirmed

  Issuer Credit Rating          BB+/Positive/--
  Senior Unsecured              BB+

PJSC RusHydro
Upgraded
                                To                From
  Issuer Credit Rating          BBB-/Stable/A-3   BB+/Positive/B
  Senior Unsecured              BBB-              BB+

Public Joint Stock Company Transneft
Upgraded; Rating Affirmed
                                To                From
  Issuer Credit Rating
   Foreign Currency             BBB-/Stable/--    BB+/Positive/--
   Local Currency               BBB/Stable/--     BBB-/Pos./--
   Senior Unsecured             BBB-              BBB-

Rosseti PJSC
Upgraded
                                To                From
  Issuer Credit Rating          BBB-/Stable/A-3   BB+/Positive/B

Russian Railways JSC
Ratings Affirmed

  Issuer Credit Rating
   Local Currency               BBB-/Stable/--

Russian Railways JSC
Upgraded
                                To                From
  Issuer Credit Rating
   Foreign Currency             BBB-/Stable/--    BB+/Positive/--
   Senior Unsecured             BBB-              BB+

Federal Passenger Co. JSC

  Issuer Credit Rating          BBB-/Stable/A-3   BB+/Positive/B

NB: This list does not include all the ratings affected.



=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCAJA 10: S&P Cuts Class B Notes Rating to 'D'
------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' its credit
rating on Bancaja 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class B
notes.

All the other classes of notes are unaffected by the rating
action.

The level of cumulative defaults over the original portfolio
balance increased to 10.93% on the Feb. 22, 2018 interest payment
date (IPD) from 10.78% at the November IPD.

Under the transaction documents, the class B notes' interest
deferral trigger is based on the level of cumulative defaults over
the original securitized balance. Due to the increase in the level
of defaults in the last IPD, the class B notes breached their
10.90% interest deferral trigger on the February 2018 IPD.
Consequently, the class B notes' interest is unpaid.

S&P said, "Our ratings in Bancaja 10's address timely interest and
ultimate principal payments. We expect the interest shortfalls to
last for a period of more than 12 months. Therefore, in line with
our temporary interest shortfall criteria and our timeliness of
payments criteria, we have lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' our
rating on the class B notes."

Bancaja 10 is a Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transaction that closed in January 2007 and securitizes
residential mortgage loans. Caja de Ahorros de Valencia, Castell¢n
y Alicante (Bancaja; now Bankia S.A.) originated the pools, which
are mainly located in the Valencia region.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


INOFINA AG: Regulator Initiates Bankruptcy Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------
The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority has initiated
bankruptcy proceedings against Inofina AG and Keyco AG.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


COLLATERAL UK: In Administration After Trading Without License
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kate Beioley at The Financial Times reports that Collateral (UK),
a Manchester-based peer-to-peer lender, has gone into
administration after trading without a license, putting GBP21
million of investors' money at risk.

Collateral (UK), a small P2P company offering pawnbroker-style and
property-backed loans with 15% returns, went into administration
on Feb. 28 after it emerged that it was not authorized by the
Financial Conduct Authority, the FT relates.

According to the FT, in a letter to investors on Feb. 28,
administrator Refresh Recovery said: "The company was operating in
the belief that it was authorized and regulated by the Financial
Conduct Authority under interim permission.  It has transpired
that this is not the case and consequently the company has ceased
lending."

Collateral's permission lapsed in February, the FT relays, citing
people close to the situation.

The company inserted a new clause into its website at the start of
the month warning that in the case of insolvency customers would
rank as "unsecured creditors" and would be unlikely to recover
their cash, the FT states.

On Feb. 28, Collateral shut down its website and investors have
been unable to access their money or see their accounts, the FT
discloses.

The administrators said the company has not ceased trading but
will not be making new loans or allowing customers to transfer
existing loans "until the company's position is clarified", the FT
notes.


MIZZEN MEZZCO: Fitch Affirms B+ Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Mizzen Mezzco Limited's (MML) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+'. The Outlook is Stable. Fitch
has also affirmed the GBP189 million senior notes issued by MML's
wholly-owned subsidiary, Mizzen Bondco Limited (MBL), at long-term
'B-' rating with a Recovery Rating 'RR6'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDR AND SENIOR DEBT

MML is the parent and consolidating entity for a group of
companies, which includes as its principal operating subsidiary
Premium Credit Ltd (PCL), the largest provider of instalment
finance for personal and business insurance premiums in the UK and
Ireland. As a result, MML's credit profile is driven both by the
financial performance of PCL and by MML's capacity to upstream
dividends from PCL to service debt elsewhere within the group,
including bond issuer MBL. Dividends from PCL represent the only
material source of income for the rest of the group.

The Long-Term IDR of MML is principally constrained by its
leverage. Consolidated shareholders' equity is negative, and
internal capital generation is low, as most net income is
distributed in dividends to companies higher up the private equity
ownership structure rather than retained within the MML group. The
lack of capital buffer with which to protect against unexpected
events is, however, mitigated by the generally low-risk and stable
nature of PCL's business model, which has been recurringly cash-
generative over many years.

MML is reliant on the wholesale markets for its funding, with most
debt secured and the proportion of encumbered assets high.
However, management has made progress in diversifying the group's
funding sources, issuing a total GBP600 million of term asset-
backed notes in 2017, which has led to a more diversified investor
pool and improved the group's debt maturity profile. Management
expects the group to become a regular issuer in the asset-backed
markets, subject to market conditions and its ability to grow its
receivables. Refinancing risk is also mitigated by the short-term
maturity of PCL's receivables, which on average mature
significantly faster than the company's liabilities.

PCL is a low-margin, volume-driven business. Although earnings
lack diversification, profitability has proven resilient through
the cycle, and has improved in recent years due to increased
operational efficiencies and lower funding costs. Impairments are
typically low, reflecting the small-ticket, short-term nature of
receivables and the inherent need of customers to maintain their
insurance cover. PCL's recovery record in the event of payment
default is also strong, supported by a large proportion of the
company's lending being recourse-based.

The strong position of PCL within its niche segment of the market
is driven by limited competition and its longstanding
relationships with many of the industry's largest intermediaries.
Barriers to entry are high, reflecting the substantial upfront IT
costs and thin margins associated with the sector.

The senior notes are rated two notches below MML's Long-Term IDR,
and are in line with their 'RR6' Recovery Rating. The low recovery
expectations are mainly driven by the notes' structural
subordination to PCL's securitisation facility, which encumbers
the majority of group receivables.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDR AND SENIOR DEBT

The Long-Term IDR of MML is sensitive to movements in its
capitalisation and leverage, both in relation to the volume of
non-operational debt it holds, which is reliant on PCL's dividends
for servicing, and the extent to which it then distributes
residual earnings further up its ownership structure. Negative
rating pressure could also result from material loss of
intermediary relationships, thereby reducing market share and
revenues, or from increased risk appetite, for example through
significant increase in appetite for non-recourse lending.

Materially lower leverage, combined with continued diversification
of funding, could lead to a positive rating action in the medium
term.

The rating of MBL's senior notes is primarily sensitive to
movements in their anchor rating, MML's Long-Term IDR. Lower
levels of encumbrance could have a positive impact by improving
recovery prospects for bondholders.


SEADRILL LTD: Fredriksen Reaches Deal with Majority of Creditors
----------------------------------------------------------------
Nerijus Adomaitis and Tom Hals at Reuters, citing U.S. court
documents, report that shipping tycoon John Fredriksen has reached
an agreement with a majority of creditors over a restructuring
plan for oil rig firm Seadrill Ltd.

The company, once the world's largest offshore driller by market
value, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection with debt and
liabilities of over US$10 billion last September after a sharp
drop in oil prices in 2014 cut demand for rigs, Reuters recounts.

According to Reuters, under an amended plan, supported by 99% of
its bank lenders and about 70% of unsecured creditors, including
South Korean shipyards, the company will raise US$1.08 billion in
new capital.

Seadrill will issue US$880 million in new secured notes, up from
US$860 million planned previously, and US$200 million in new
equity, the same level as previously planned, Reuters discloses.

Thomas Mayer, an attorney for the official committee of unsecured
creditors, relayed in a U.S. Bankruptcy Court hearing on Feb. 26
in Houston that unsecured creditors ended up with at least a 50%
larger recovery under the Feb. 26 deal, Reuters relays.

He said banks from the start had demanded Seadrill raise fresh
capital, which promised investors lucrative returns, Reuters
notes.

The source said the unsecured creditors' stake in the new company
will increase to 36.4% from an initial offer of around 19%, while
the combined stake of Fredriksen's family investment vehicle Hemen
and Centerbridge will be reduced to 36.4% from an original 49%,
according to Reuters.

                      About Seadrill Ltd

Seadrill Limited is a deepwater drilling contractor providing
drilling services to the oil and gas industry.  It is incorporated
in Bermuda and managed from London.  Seadrill and its affiliates
own or lease 51 drilling rigs, which represents more than 6% of
the world fleet.

As of Sept. 12, 2017, Seadrill employed 3,760 highly-skilled
individuals across 22 countries and five continents to operate
their drilling rigs and perform various other corporate functions.

As of June 30, 2017, Seadrill had $20.71 billion in total assets,
$10.77 billion in total liabilities and $9.94 billion in total
equity.

Seadrill reported a net loss of US$155 million on US$3.17 billion
of total operating revenues for the year ended Dec. 31, 2016,
following a net loss of US$635 million on US$4.33 billion of total
operating revenues for the year ended in 2015.

After reaching terms of a reorganization plan that would
restructure $8 billion of funded debt, Seadrill Limited and 85
affiliated debtors each filed a voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Lead Case No. 17-60079) on Sept. 12, 2017.

Together with the chapter 11 proceedings, Seadrill, North Atlantic
Drilling Limited ("NADL") and Sevan Drilling Limited ("Sevan")
commenced liquidation proceedings in Bermuda to appoint joint
provisional liquidators and facilitate recognition and
implementation of the transactions contemplated by the RSA and
Investment Agreement, and Simon Edel, Alan Bloom and Roy Bailey of
Ernst & Young are to act as the joint and several provisional
liquidators.

In the Chapter 11 cases, the Company has engaged Kirkland & Ellis
LLP as legal counsel, Houlihan Lokey, Inc. as financial advisor,
and Alvarez & Marsal as restructuring advisor.  Slaughter and May
has been engaged as corporate counsel, and Morgan Stanley served
as co-financial advisor during the negotiation of the
restructuring agreement.  Advokatfirmaet Thommessen AS is serving
as Norwegian counsel.  Conyers Dill & Pearman is serving as
Bermuda counsel.  Prime Clerk serves as claims agent.

The United States Trustee for Region 7 formed an official
committee of unsecured creditors with seven members: (i)
Computershare Trust Company, N.A.; (ii) Daewoo Shipbuilding &
Marine Engineering Co., Ltd.; (iii) Deutsche Bank Trust Company
Americas; (iv) Louisiana Machinery Co., LLC; (v) Nordic Trustee
AS; (vi) Pentagon Freight Services, Inc.; and (vii) Samsung Heavy
Industries Co., Ltd.

Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP is serving as lead counsel to
the Committee.  Cole Schotz P.C. is local and conflicts counsel to
the Committee.  Zuill & Co (in exclusive association with Harney
Westwood & Riegels) is serving as Bermuda counsel.  London-based
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, UK LLP, is serving as English
counsel.  Parella Weinberg Partners LLP is the investment banker
to the Committee.  FTI Consulting Inc. is the financial advisor.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History
----------------------------------------------------
Author: Alfred L. Malabre, Jr.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 256 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry
Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/KNTLyr

Alfred Malabre's personal perspective on the U.S. economy over the
past four decades is firmly grounded in his experience and
knowledge. Economics Editor of The Wall Street Journal from 1969
to 1993 and author of its weekly "Outlook" column, Malabre was in
a singular position to follow the U.S. economy in recent decades,
have access to the major academic and political figures
responsible for economic affairs, and get behind the crucial
economic stories of the day. He brings to this critical overview
of the economy both a lively, often provocative, commentary on the
picture of the turns of the economy. To this he adds sharp
analysis and cogent explanation.

In general, Malabre does not put much stock in economists. "In
sum, the profession's record in the half century since Keynes and
White sat down at Bretton Woods [after World War II] provokes
dismay." Following this sour note, he refers to the belief of a
noted fellow economist that the Nobel Prize in this field should
be discontinued. In doing so, he also points out that the Nobel
for economics was not one originally endowed by Alfred Nobel, but
was one added at a later date funded by the central bank of Sweden
apparently in an effort to give the profession of economists the
prestige and notice of medicine, science, literature and other
Nobel categories.

Malabre's view of economists is widespread, although rarely
expressed in economic circles. It derives from the plain fact
that modern economists, even hugely influential ones such as John
Meynard Keynes, are wrong as many times as they are right. Their
economic theories have proved incomplete or shortsighted, if not
basically wrong-headed. For example, Malabre thinks of the
leading economist Milton Friedman and his "monetarist colleagues"
as "super salespeople, successfully merchandising.an economic
medicine that promised far more than it could deliver" from about
the 1960s through the Reagan years of the 1980s. But the author
not only cites how the economy has again and again disproved the
theories and exposed the irrelevance of wrong-headedness of the
policy recommendations of the most influential economists of the
day. Malabre also lays out abundant economic data and describes
contemporary marketplace and social activities to show how the
economy performs almost independently of the best analyses and
ideas of economists.

Malabre does not engage in his critiques of noted economists and
prevailing economic ideas of recent decades as an end in itself.
What emerges in all of his consistent, clear-eyed, unideological
analysis and commentary is his own broad, seasoned view of
economics-namely, the predominance of the business cycle. He
compares this with human nature, which is after all the substance
of economics often overlooked by professional and academic
economists with their focus on monetary policy, exchange rates,
inflation, and such. "The business cycle, like human nature, is
here to stay" is the lesson Malabre aims to impart to readers
interested in understanding the fundamental, abiding nature of
economics. In Lost Prophets, in language that is accessible and
jargon-free, this author, who has observed, written about, and
explained economics from all angles for several decades,
persuasively makes this point.

In addition to holding a top position at The Wall Street Journal,
Malabre is also the author of the books, Understanding the New
Economy and Beyond Our Means, which received the George S. Eccles
Prize from the Columbia Business School as the best economics book
of 1987.




                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *