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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, March 13, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 051


                            Headlines


A Z E R B A I J A N

AZERENERJI JSC: Fitch Alters Outlook to Stable & Withdraws IDRs


I C E L A N D

ORKUVEITA REYKJAVIKUR: Fitch Hikes Long-Term IDR to BB+


F R A N C E

CGG: S&P Raises ICR to 'B-' on Completed Financial Restructuring


I T A L Y

FCA BANK: Moody's Raises Standalone BCA to Ba1


N E T H E R L A N D S

ATRADIUS FINANCE: Moody's Raises Sub. Notes Rating From Ba1(hyb)


N O R W A Y

NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: Oceanwood Wins Dispute Over Sale of Assets


R U S S I A

ALMAZERGIENBANK: Fitch Maintains B+ IDR on Rating Watch Negative
RENAISSANCE CREDIT: S&P Alters Outlook to Pos & Affirms B-/B ICRs
RUSSIAN STANDARD: Meeting on Restructuring Proposal "Positive"
URALTRANSBANK: Fitch Lowers & Then Withdraws 'CC' Long-Term IDR


S P A I N

IM CAJAMAR 4: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCCsf'


T U R K E Y

TURKEY: Moody's Cuts LT Issuer & Sr. Unsec. Debt Ratings to Ba2


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CHANNEL ISLAND EXECUTIVE: Creditors Unlikely to Get Money Back
CINEWORLD GROUP: S&P Assigns 'BB-' ICR, Outlook Stable
HEATHER CAPITAL: Liquidator Drops Claim Against Levy & Mcrae
MANSARD MORTGAGES 2007-2: S&P Lifts Class B2a Notes Rating to BB
MAPLIN: Axes 63 Jobs at Head Office After Failing to Find Buyer

NESCU: Aberdeen City Council Set to Begin Rescue Talks
NEW LOOK: Paul Hastings Advises on CVA Proposal
PRECISE MORTGAGE 2018-2B: Fitch Rates Class X Notes 'BB+(EXP)sf'
PREZZO: Owes Banks, Suppliers More Than GBP220 Million


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A Z E R B A I J A N
===================


AZERENERJI JSC: Fitch Alters Outlook to Stable & Withdraws IDRs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Azerbaijan-based utilities company JSC
Azerenerji's Outlook to Stable, affirmed its Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+', affirmed its Short-Term IDR at 'B'
and simultaneously withdrawn the ratings for commercial reasons.

Fitch rated Azerenerji under its "Government-Related Entities
Rating Criteria". Azerenerji's ratings are aligned with that of
its sole shareholder Azerbaijan (BB+/Stable), which reflects Fitch
assessment of the strong links with the state due to the
guarantees provided by the state for the majority of Azerenerji's
outstanding debt, and the equity injections which the company
continues to receive. The revision of the Outlook reflects the
revision of the Outlook on the Republic of Azerbaijan sovereign
rating on Feb. 2, 2018.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

State Guarantees Drive Alignment: The rating alignment between
Azerenerji and Azerbaijan was driven by the fact that the majority
of its debt is guaranteed by the state.

Explicit State Support: Fitch views the support track record and
the state's incentive to support all operations of Azerenerji as
very strong, as the state provided equity injections over the past
few years to partially fund Azereneji's investment programme.
Following the decree signed at end-2015, the state will continue
providing equity injections to Azerenerji to assist the company in
repaying its foreign-currency loans over 2016-2025.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Not applicable as the ratings have been withdrawn.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Fitch Rating Case for the Issuer.
Not applicable as the ratings have been withdrawn.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Not applicable as the ratings have been withdrawn.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

  Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook
  revised to Stable from Negative, Withdrawn;

  Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B', Withdrawn.



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I C E L A N D
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ORKUVEITA REYKJAVIKUR: Fitch Hikes Long-Term IDR to BB+
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Orkuveita Reykjavikur's (RE) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB+' from 'BB'. The Outlook is
Stable.

The upgrade of RE's IDR reflects Fitch assessment of the moderate-
to-strong links between the company and its main shareholder, the
City of Reykjavik under Fitch's Government-Related Entities (GRE)
Criteria published on February 7, 2018.

The ratings also take into account the company's progress on
deleveraging, and increased earnings as a result of RE's improved
operational performance including cost efficiencies achieved by
management and improved macroeconomic conditions in Iceland
(A/Stable), with EBITDA expected to increase by 5.4% to ISK26.7
billion in 2017. Leverage and high exposure to market risks
continue to constrain the rating. The Stable Outlook reflects the
expected continued shareholder support including parent guarantees
of RE's debt, and the steady regulatory environment.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Standalone Credit Profile of 'BB-': RE was among the companies
Fitch placed on Rating Watch in November 2017 when the exposure
draft of its new GRE Rating Criteria was published. Under the new
methodology, RE's rating is based on a bottom-up approach, and is
two notches above RE's standalone credit profile, which Fitch
continues to assess as commensurate with a 'BB-' rating. The
uplift is based on the moderate-to-strong links with the City of
Reykjavik (main municipality shareholder), including tangible
support.

Moderate-to-Strong Municipal Links: Fitch views the municipality's
ownership and control of RE as strong. The municipality has an
influence on the company's strategy and ultimately approves RE's
business plan annually. Fitch views the support track record and
likelihood of municipality support as moderate, mainly as a result
of the conditional nature of the guarantees provided by the parent
which are expected to decrease as debt amortises.

Fitch also assesses the socio-political implications of a
potential GRE default as moderate. In Fitch's view, RE plays an
important role in Iceland's strategic energy sector, but a
financial default would not materially affect water and
electricity supply as Fitch would expect the municipality's
intervention until a substitute is found to assure continuation of
operations. Fitch also assesses the financial implications of a
hypothetical GRE default as moderate as Fitch see some contagion
risk to the municipalities and other GREs coming from the
hypothetical default of RE, but Fitch believes this would result
in a moderate impact on the availability and costs of domestic
financing options for the municipality and other GREs owned by it.

Shareholder Support Expected to Continue: Fitch expects RE's three
municipality shareholders, the City of Reykjavik (around 93.5%),
the Municipality of Akranes (around 5.5%) and the Municipality of
Borgarbyggd (around 1%) to continue to provide support through
fully cost-reflective tariffs linked to inflation, adequate
returns on investments, and moderate dividends. The shareholders'
support includes the conditional parent guarantees of over 67% of
outstanding debt (81% in 2016 and expected to decrease in future
as the guaranteed debt amortises) and subordinated shareholder
loans from its municipality shareholders representing a further 9%
of outstanding debt.

Deleveraging Anticipated: Fitch forecasts average funds from
operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage at 5.1x and average FFO
fixed charge cover at 4.9x over 2017-2021, indicating continued
deleveraging, albeit at a slower pace than previously expected. In
addition to management's efforts to reduce leverage and the
expected increase in earnings and cash flow generation as a result
of operational efficiencies the company's ability to continue
deleveraging depends to some extent on movements of the Icelandic
krona and the price of aluminium. Other factors include
shareholders' continued support with similar measures to those
agreed for the 2011-2016 business plan, and especially keeping
tariffs linked to inflation, and moderate dividend payments.

For the year ending December 31, 2017, Fitch expects FFO adjusted
net leverage at 5.5x and FFO fixed charge cover at 5.5x. The
increase in leverage compared to 5.2x in 2016 is as a result of a
slight depreciation of the Icelandic krona in the last months of
2017, which has an impact on RE's debt in local-currency
equivalent and lessens management's debt reduction measures, as
well as reductions in some regulated tariffs, increased capital
expenditure, the acquisition of the company's headquarters for
ISK5.5 billion and first-time payments of income taxes and
dividends. This is mitigated by the increased EBITDA as a result
of the improvements in RE's operational performance and improving
macroeconomic conditions in Iceland.

Regulated Earnings Support Rating: RE's rating is supported by a
significant proportion of EBITDA over the next five years being
derived from regulated businesses, although Fitch expects the
share of regulated business to decrease to around 56% by 2020.
This is due to lower expected tariff increases over the forecast
period driven by lower assumptions for the Building Cost Index
(BCI) and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to which regulated
tariffs are linked, and the proportion of EBITDA derived from the
non-regulated businesses (ON Power and Fibre Optics and Other)
growing at a faster pace over the forecast period than previously
anticipated due to the improvement in economic growth in Iceland
('A'/Stable).

For 2017, Fitch expects the company's EBITDA from regulated
networks to fall to around 60% of total EBITDA from 61.2% in 2016
as a result of the reduction of regulated tariffs as well as lower
BCI and CPI. The tariffs for the cold water and electricity
distribution businesses were lowered in some municipalities by the
regulator in 2017 by 11.2% and 5.7% respectively. A further
reduction of 7.5% was applied to the electricity distribution
tariffs for 2018. The tariff reductions were implemented as a
result of the company achieving a greater return on investment
than stipulated by the shareholders mainly due to operating cost
efficiencies achieved by RE in those regulated businesses.

Market Risk Mitigated by Hedging: RE's cash flows are exposed to
currency fluctuations (with the largest exposures to the dollar
and the euro), interest rates and to aluminium prices to which
some of the company's generation contracts are linked. In Fitch
view, this exposure, though mitigated through hedging, may affect
the pace at which RE will deleverage if currency fluctuations are
substantial.

At December 31, 2017, the company's total debt was ISK144.5
billion, of which 56.1% (ISK81.0 billion equivalent) was
denominated in foreign currencies compared with around 14% of the
company's revenues in foreign currencies. Variable-rate debt was
61.4% and interest-rate hedges along with fixed-rate loans covered
on average 69% of the variable-rate debt for 2018-2022. The
company has also hedged 49% of its exposure to aluminium prices a
year ahead and 30% for 2019. RE has also hedged some of its
foreign-currency exposure up to 2021.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Reykjavik Energy is an integrated regional publicly owned utility
with around 60% of its earnings deriving from its regulated
business which compares well to peers. The company is more highly
leveraged than its peers with forecast FFO net adjusted leverage
averaging 5.2x for 2017-20 compared with the UK's renewable
electricity operator Melton Renewable Energy UK PLC's (BB/Stable)
average forecast leverage of 2.9x for 2018-21 and Viridian Group
Investments Limited (B+/Stable) with forecast net leverage
averaging 4.4x for 2018-20. In addition, in contrast to its peers
the company is highly exposed to market risk, including foreign-
exchange risk, and aluminium-price and interest-rate risk. No
Country Ceiling or operating aspects impact the rating. The rating
incorporates a two-notch uplift from the standalone credit profile
(BB-) as a result of Fitch assessment of the links between the
company and its main shareholder, the City of Reykjavik under the
Government-Related Entities Criteria.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

- inflation from Statistics Iceland (CPI; 1.8% for 2017, peaking
   at 2.9% in 2018-2019 and falling to 2.6% in 2021);

- the majority of wholesale electricity generation earnings are
   linked to aluminium forward prices;

- retail earnings, including earnings from the regulated
   business, are inflation-linked throughout 2021;

- aluminium price per tonne at USD2,061 for 2017 and USD1,900
   for 2018-2021 as per Fitch's current commodity price
   assumptions;

- a 4% annual appreciation of the krona trade currency-weighted
   index (implying krona depreciation against other currencies)
   from 2019 for FX- denominated debt;

- weighted average cost of debt of 3.5%;

- average EBITDA of ISK27.7 billion for 2017-2021;

- total capital expenditure of around ISK80 billion for 2017-
   2021;

- inflows from the bond of around ISK4 billion received in full
   in February 2018;

- dividends in line with management assumptions in 2017, a
   payout ratio of 15% in 2018 and 30% from 2019 onwards,
   resulting in generally positive free cash flow (FCF) of on
   average ISK2.0 billion for 2017-2021.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- Continued tariff increases and operational outperformance and
   continued net repayments of debt leading to FFO adjusted net
   leverage below 5.0x and FFO fixed charge coverage over 5.0x on
   a sustained basis

- Stronger support from the parent, for example unconditional
   debt guarantees or prolonged restrictions on dividends

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- Restrictions on tariff increases and higher investments
   leading to FFO adjusted net leverage above 6x and FFO fixed
   charge coverage under 4.5x on a sustained basis

- A significant weakening of the City of Reykjavik's credit
   profile or a reassessment of the likelihood of support in case
   of financial difficulties of the GRE, for example a
   significant reduction of the conditional parent guarantees for
   the company's debt

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity: At Sept. 30, 2017, RE had ISK12.8 billion in
cash and cash equivalents and ISK8.5 billion of undrawn committed
facilities against short-term debt maturities of ISK4.8 billion.
Fitch assesses the company's current liquidity as adequate to
cover operational requirements over the next 24 months due to
Fitch's expectation that it will remain on average FCF-positive
over the next five years.



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F R A N C E
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CGG: S&P Raises ICR to 'B-' on Completed Financial Restructuring
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term issuer credit rating on
French geoscience company CGG to 'B-' from 'D' (default). The
outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' issue rating to CGG's $664
million first-lien senior secured notes, and its 'CCC+' issue
rating to the $452 million second-lien senior secured notes.

The upgrade follows CGG's emergence from default and the
implementation of its comprehensive financial restructuring. S&P
said, "In our view, the reduction of the debt by more than $1.6
billion and equity injection of $125 million into the company, has
created a much more sustainable capital structure, especially
given the current difficult market conditions. We consider that
the current cash position of about $550 million-$600 million and
lack of maturities in the coming five years, would allow the
company to bridge 2018 and 2019, even with no recovery in demand
for seismic services." Over time, maintaining the current rating
would require a pick-up in the market that would support a higher
EBITDA, break-even free operating cash flows (FOCF), and
ultimately deleveraging.

Recently, CGG completed a financial restructuring under which it
equitized nearly all of its $2.0 billion unsecured debt. It also
exchanged the remaining $0.8 billion secured debt for a
combination of new notes and cash. In addition, CGG completed a
right issue that raised $125 million in equity, and issued $375
million in new notes. CGG's new capital structure includes gross
debt of about $1.1 billion, consisting of:

-- $664 million first-lien senior secured debt due 2023,
-- $452 million second-lien senior secured notes maturing 2024
    (comprising $355 million and EUR80 million facilities), and
-- A sizable cash balance of $550 million-$600 million.

S&P said, "In our view, the seismic subsector is one of the most
vulnerable in the oilfield services industry. When exploration and
production (E&P) companies revise their exploration budgets,
seismic companies have only a short lead time before this change
affects their results. Consequently, the 2017 financial results
for seismic companies still reflect E&P companies' small appetite
for spending cash on exploration. Under our Brent oil price
assumption of $60/bbl in 2018, we do not project a material pick-
up in the exploration budget, meaning that 2018 will also be tough
for seismic data providers. That said, we consider the current
global capital expenditure (capex) to be substantially below the
levels needed to sustain global oil production--this may support
higher oil prices in the future. In turn, this would provide some
incentive for E&P companies to spend more cash on exploration,
reviving the demand for CGG's services. WesternGeco,
Schlumberger's seismic division, recently announced that it would
exit the seismic market, which we view as positive for the two
leading players: CGG and Petroleum Geo-Services ASA (PGS).

"Under our base-case scenario, we project that CGG's adjusted
EBITDA will be $230 million-$260 million in 2018 (equivalent to a
reported EBITDA of $430 million-$460 million when adding back the
spending on MultiClient and netting our operating lease
adjustment). It is likely to recover to about $250 million-$300
million (equivalent to a reported EBITDA of $500 million-$600
million) in 2019, compared with our estimation of $150 million-
$170 million (equivalent to a reported EBITDA of $360 million-$380
million) in 2017. In the second half of 2017, the company saw a
material pick-up in the results, driven by MultiClient business
(in the first half of 2017, the company reported EBITDA of $149
million)."

The following assumptions underpin these estimates:

-- A Brent oil price of $60 per barrel (/bbl) for the rest of
    2018, declining to $55/bbl in 2019. Based on those working
    assumptions, S&P doesn't expect a material change in the E&P
    companies' exploration budgets.

-- Revenue growth of about 5%-10% per year in 2018 and 2019. S&P
    said, "In our view, the recovery in revenues will not be
    consistent across all business units; it would chiefly stem
    from the MultiClient business. Over time, we expect more
    revenues to come from the equipment division because existing
    sensors are reaching the end of their life cycle."

-- Reported EBITDA margin above 30% in 2018-2019 (excluding the
    capitalized MultiClient investments), reflecting moderate
    growth in volumes and the benefits of the cost-cutting
    measures.

-- S&P Global Ratings' capex assumption of about $100 million in
    2018-2019. In addition, CGG will continue to invest
    substantial amounts in building its MultiClient library. That
    said, S&P assumes that the company will continue to benefit
    from prefunding to cover its investments in new seismic data.
    (The average spending on MultiClient in the past few years
    was about $280 million).

-- S&P assumes that the company will use the payment-in-kind
    (PIK) feature in the debt to preserve cash while conditions
    remain difficult. This feature is equivalent to $50 million
    per year.

-- Moderate working capital outflows in 2018-2019, supporting
    the modest recovery in the activity.

-- No dividend payments.

S&P said, "Based on these assumptions, we expect the company to
generate negative FOCF of $75 million-$100 million in 2018 and
slightly less in 2019. Such cash flows would translate into
adjusted debt to EBITDA of 6.0x-6.5x in 2018 (or less than 5.0x
when netting all the cash), with some improvement in 2019. In our
view, the FOCF could change to some extent as a result of the
company's spending on the MultiClient business. In this respect,
we do not rule out a scenario that a pick-up in the industry would
result in higher FOCF as a result of higher spending on
MultiClient business.

"Our unchanged assessment of CGG's business risk profile as weak
reflects its reliance on investments made by oil and gas E&P
companies and the risky nature of seismic data acquisition, which
requires ongoing heavy investments. On the other hand, CGG's key
business strengths include the group's important global position
and diversity, stemming from its seismic acquisition, reservoir,
imaging, and equipment activities both offshore and, to a lesser
extent, onshore. Moreover, the global trend toward difficult-to-
reach offshore exploration areas and the increasingly difficult
nature of reserve replacement, which should support demand for
CGG's services in the long term. We understand that the company is
moving its focus from data acquisition to imaging and equipment,
which may result in lower the ongoing spending on surveys."

The stable outlook reflects the improvement in the company's
liquidity position after the capital restructuring, allowing it to
cover potential short-term negative FOCF as the industry gains
some momentum from the current trough.

S&P said, "Under our base case, we assume only modest recovery in
the seismic industry in 2018, leading to adjusted EBITDA of $230
million-$260 million, which would translate into a negative FOCF
of $75 million-$100 million and adjusted debt to EBITDA of 6.0x-
6.5x. The company would be able to fund the deficit from its
current cash balance (after the restructuring in late February the
company had a cash balance of about $550 million-$600 million).

"We could lower the rating if we considered the capital structure
had become unsustainable. This could occur if the company
experienced material negative FOCF in the coming 12-18 months,
depleting its current cash position. For example, we could lower
the rating if there was negative FOCF in 2018 materially above
$100 million without support from a better market environment, and
we expected the company to experience a large deficit in the
following year."

An upgrade would require improvement in market conditions,
translated into an adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio below 5x and at
least moderately positive FOCF. In S&P's view, this scenario
relies on oil prices remaining above $60/bbl over 12 months or for
E&P companies to have an incentive to spend more on explorations.



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I T A L Y
=========


FCA BANK: Moody's Raises Standalone BCA to Ba1
----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the standalone Baseline Credit
Assessment (BCA) of FCA Bank S.p.A. (FCA Bank) to ba1 from ba2,
affirmed the bank's baa3 adjusted BCA, and affirmed the bank's
A3/Prime-2 deposit ratings and Baa1 long-term issuer rating. The
outlook on the long-term deposit rating remains negative, whilst
the outlook on the long-term issuer rating remains stable. At the
same time, the rating agency assigned a first-time rating of
Prime-2 to the Euro Commercial Paper (ECP) programme of FCA Bank
S.p.A., Irish branch.

RATINGS RATIONALE

  -- UPGRADE OF CAR MANUFACTURER FIAT CHRYSLER AUTOMOBILES N.V.
DRIVES UPGRADE OF FCA BANK'S STANDALONE BCA

Moody's said that the upgrade of FCA Bank's standalone BCA to ba1
from ba2 reflects the upgrade of the Corporate Family Rating (CFR)
of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. (FCA) to Ba2 from Ba3.

Even though FCA Bank offers financing services to car
manufacturers other than FCA, the bank still has a very high
commercial dependence on the car manufacturer's activities; in
line with the rating agency's approach to other auto finance
companies, Moody's limits FCA Bank's standalone BCA to no more
than one notch above FCA's CFR. The upgrade of FCA's CFR removes
this constraint on FCA Bank's standalone BCA.

The ba1 standalone BCA of FCA Bank reflects the bank's low stock
of problem loans, sound capital, and good profitability, while
also signalling the risks stemming from FCA Bank's monoline
business model, high loan growth, and its wholesale funding
profile.

  -- ALL OTHER RATINGS AND ASSESSMENTS WERE AFFIRMED

Despite the upgrade of the bank's standalone BCA, all ratings were
affirmed.

The affirmation of all ratings and assessments of FCA Bank
reflects Moody's unchanged assumptions regarding the bank's
probability of affiliate support, loss-given-failure for deposits
and senior debt, and government support.

Moody's continues to assess the probability of support from Credit
Agricole S.A. (adjusted BCA baa1) as high, reflecting its 50%
shareholding in FCA Bank, substantial exposure in terms of
funding, and broader reputational risk were it to allow FCA Bank
to fail. This together with higher standalone BCA results in an
unchanged adjusted BCA of baa3.

The outcome of Moody's advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis
is likewise unchanged. The bank's substantial volume of senior
debt supports extremely low loss-given-failure for deposits, and
very low loss-given-failure for senior debt, resulting in a three-
notch uplift for deposits and a two-notch uplift for senior debt
from the baa3 adjusted BCA.

Moody's continues to assume low probability of government support
for FCA Bank, given its relatively small size and lack of systemic
importance. As a result, there is no related uplift in the deposit
and senior debt ratings.

  -- OUTLOOK ON LONG-TERM DEPOSIT RATING REMAINS NEGATIVE, OUTLOOK
ON ISSUER RATING REMAINS STABLE

Moody's said that the outlook on FCA Bank's A3 long-term deposit
rating remains negative, reflecting the negative outlook on the
Italian government's Baa2 ratings. In accordance with Moody's
methodology, bank ratings do not typically exceed the related
sovereign bond rating by more than two notches, reflecting the
agency's view that the expected loss of rated bank instruments is
unlikely to be significantly below that of the sovereign's own
debt.

The outlook on FCA Bank's Baa1 issuer rating remains stable,
reflecting Moody's expectation that the credit profile of the bank
will remain resilient over the next 12-18 months, and that the
volume and subordination of senior unsecured debt will remain
broadly in line with the rating agency's current loss-given-
failure assumptions.

  -- ECP PROGRAMME RATING ASSIGNED AT PRIME-2

Moody's said it assigned a Prime-2 short-term rating to FCA Bank's
new Euro Commercial Paper (ECP) programme, which will allow the
bank to issue up to EUR750 million of ECP via its Irish branch.
The rating of FCA Bank's ECP programme reflects the bank's Baa1
issuer rating and is consistent with the standard linkages between
long-term and short-term ratings used by Moody's.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE

FCA Bank's ba1 BCA is currently constrained by FCA's Corporate
Family Rating of Ba2. The baa3 adjusted BCA could be upgraded
following an increase in Moody's expectation of the probability of
support from Credit Agricole S.A., or an upgrade of Credit
Agricole S.A.'s adjusted BCA.

FCA Bank's A3 deposit rating is constrained to two notches above
Italy's sovereign bond rating of Baa2, which has a negative
outlook; a stabilisation or an upgrade of Italy's Baa2 sovereign
debt rating would lead to a stabilisation of FCA Bank's A3 long-
term deposit rating. The bank's Baa1 issuer rating could be
upgraded following an upgrade of FCA Bank's adjusted BCA, or a
material increase in the stock of subordinated debt, which would
enhance the protection available to senior creditors.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO A DOWNGRADE

A downgrade of FCA would likely lead to a downgrade of FCA Bank's
BCA given the inherent links between the two entities; FCA Bank's
deposit and issuer ratings could be downgraded following a
downgrade of Italy's sovereign ratings, a reduced probability of
support from Credit Agricole S.A., or a downgrade of Credit
Agricole S.A.'s adjusted BCA.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: FCA Bank S.p.A.

Upgrades:

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to ba1 from ba2

Affirmations:

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, affirmed baa3

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed P-2(cr)

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed Baa1(cr)

-- Long-term Issuer Rating, affirmed Baa1 Stable

-- Short-term Bank Deposits, affirmed P-2

-- Long-term Bank Deposits, affirmed A3 Negative

Outlook Actions:

-- Outlook remains Negative(m)

Issuer: FCA Bank S.p.A, Irish Branch

Assignments:

-- Commercial Paper, assigned P-2

Affirmations:

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa1 Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Baa1

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: FCA CAPITAL IRELAND P.L.C.

Affirmations:

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa1
    Stable

No Outlook assigned

Issuer: FCA Capital Suisse SA

Affirmations:

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa1
    Stable

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable



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N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ATRADIUS FINANCE: Moody's Raises Sub. Notes Rating From Ba1(hyb)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Insurance Financial
Strength (IFS) rating of Atradius N.V.'s (Atradius) main operating
subsidiaries, including Atradius Credito y Caucion S.A. (ACyC),
Atradius Trade Credit Insurance Inc. (ATCI, USA) and Atradius
Reinsurance DAC (AtradiusRe, Ireland) to A2 from A3. In addition,
Moody's has upgraded the backed subordinated notes issued by
Atradius Finance B.V. to Baa3(hyb) from Ba1(hyb). The outlook is
stable.

This rating action concludes Moody's review for upgrade of
Atradius' ratings, initiated on December 13, 2017.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects steady strengthening of Atradius'
financial profile over the past five years, including strong and
consistent profitability, strengthening capital adequacy and
improvements in its risk management and reserving practices. In
addition, Atradius has upheld its strong market position as the
second largest global trade credit insurer, and continues to
invest in defending and strengthening its market position. These
strengths are partially offset by Atradius' limited
diversification beyond credit insurance, its meaningful exposure
to the Spanish economy (Government of Spain, Baa2 stable),
especially in terms of contribution to profit (21% premiums
generated in Iberia during 2017) via ACyC, the group's main
operating company, domiciled in Spain.

In terms of profitability, Moody's stated that the group's
combined ratio had remained consistently strong, averaging
approximately 79% over the past five years, in part driven by the
strengthening of the Spanish economy, but also due to Atradius'
improved cost efficiencies and stricter underwriting. Atradius was
also able to avoid some of the recent losses that some of its
peers experienced on their emerging markets exposures. Moody's
noted that Atradius' profitability remains susceptible to economic
cycles and could become more volatile if economic conditions
deteriorated.

Notwithstanding the inherent cyclicality of the credit insurance
sector, Atradius has taken tangible steps to limit the volatility
of its underwriting results, including reducing its exposure to
the Iberian market to approximately 16% as of year-end 2017 from
24% in 2011. In addition, Atradius has strengthened its
underwriting practices, evaluation of buyer risk, and overall
enterprise risk management, which Moody's expect will contribute
to less volatile profitability through the cycle.

Regarding capital, Atradius has continued to build up its
capitalisation, thanks to its relatively high retained earnings
which has allowed the company to reinvest a significant portion of
its profits into the business. Net underwriting leverage, a
measure of insurance premiums relative to equity, has improved to
approximately 0.9x at year-end 2016 from 1.2x at year-end 2012,
and remains significantly stronger than pre-2008 levels. Atradius'
solid capitalisation is supported by a robust reinsurance program,
that includes quota-share and excess-of-loss facilities that
protect the group's profitability and capital in the event of
high-loss scenarios.

In 2017, the College of Supervisors (Spanish DGSFP and Irish CBI)
approved the Partial Internal Model (PIM), allowing GCO to use it
for the underwriting risk requirements of credit and bonding lines
of business.

Atradius has consistently reported reserve releases in the past
eight years, demonstrating meaningful improvement compared to the
period after the 2008 financial crisis when the company had to
strengthen reserves. The group has made significant progress in
aligning reserving policies and practices on its Spanish book with
Atradius more broadly, which represents a materially more
conservative approach to reserving than had been in place during
the Spanish sovereign crisis.

The A2 IFS ratings of Atradius' main operating entities are
positioned above the credit profile of its parent, Grupo Catalana
Occidente (GCO). GCO is a Spanish insurance group with its
business split approximately evenly between Spanish retail Life
and P&C insurance and globally diversified credit insurance
through Atradius, of which it has a 83% shareholding. The credit
profile of GCO is constrained by the Spanish sovereign rating
(Government of Spain, Baa2 stable), because of its investment
concentration in Spanish sovereign bonds. Although Atradius'
ratings are linked to the rating of Spain, the global nature of
its business and minimal exposure to Spanish assets limits the
constraint on Atradius' ratings.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP OR DOWN

While there is currently limited potential for upward pressure on
Atradius' IFS rating, given its position at three-notches above
the rating of the Spanish sovereign, Moody's noted that the
following factors could enhance Atradius credit profile relative
to peers: (i) meaningful improvement in market share without
deterioration in profitability and quality of exposure, (ii)
improvement in the group's business diversification towards a
higher proportion of fee-based services, and (iii) reduced
exposure to Spain, both in terms of the extent of the group's
earnings generated in Spain, and indirect affiliation through its
parent, GCO.

Conversely, Moody's noted that the following factors could place
downward pressure on Atradius' ratings: (i) material deterioration
in underwriting profitability, with a 5-year combined ratio
consistently above 95% through-the--cycle, (ii) material decline
in capital adequacy, including Solvency II capital coverage
consistently below 175% and/or considerable volatility in stressed
scenarios, (iii) significant erosion of the company's market
position and franchise, and (iv) meaningful weakening in the
credit profile of GCO or the Spanish sovereign.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Upgraded:

Issuer: Atradius Credito y Caucion S.A.

-- Insurance Financial Strength Rating, upgraded to A2 from A3

-- ST Insurance Financial Strength Rating, upgraded to P-1 from
    P-2

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook, Changed to Stable from Rating Under Review

Issuer: Atradius Finance B.V.

-- BACKED Subordinate, upgraded to Baa3(hyb) from Ba1(hyb)

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook, Changed to Stable from Rating Under Review

Issuer: Atradius Reinsurance DAC

-- Insurance Financial Strength Rating, upgraded to A2 from A3

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook, Changed to Stable from Rating Under Review

Issuer: Atradius Trade Credit Insurance Inc.

-- Insurance Financial Strength Rating, upgraded to A2 from A3

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook, Changed to Stable from Rating Under Review



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N O R W A Y
===========


NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: Oceanwood Wins Dispute Over Sale of Assets
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Hannah George at Bloomberg News reports that Oceanwood Capital
Management LLP won a battle with rival hedge funds over the future
of a bankrupt papermaker after a London judge ruled Citigroup
Inc. could proceed with a sale of Norske Skog's assets.

Judge Anthony Mann said on March 8 that Oceanwood, as majority
holder of senior secured notes, can be considered an "Instructing
Group" and order the bank to begin the sale as well as bid in the
process, Bloomberg relates.  Citigroup had asked the court to make
a swift ruling that would settle the conflict between squabbling
bondholders, Bloomberg recounts.

According to Bloomberg, Foxhill Capital Partners LLC had sought to
block a sale, arguing that Oceanwood's stake created a conflict of
interest that should prevent it from prompting the sale as well as
bidding.

The judge ruled that Oceanwood was "not in control or a
controller" of Norske Skog and criticized Foxhill's position for
its "lack of sense, and indeed logic", Bloomberg discloses.  He
said that there would be no "commercial sense" in a scenario where
the largest creditor "loses the power to have influence",
Bloomberg notes.

The U.K. case is Citibank v. Oceanwood, High Court of Justice,
Financial Listings, Case No. FL-2018-000001. The U.S. case is
Bulwarkbay v. Oceanwood, New York State Supreme Court, Case No.
650060/2018.

                      About Norske Skog

Norske Skogindustrier ASA or Norske Skog, which translates as
Norwegian Forest Industries, is a Norwegian pulp and paper
company based in Oslo, Norway and established in 1962.

                        *   *   *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on December
5, 2017, S&P Global Ratings revised its long- and short-term
corporate credit ratings on Norske Skogindustrier ASA (Norske
Skog) and its core rated subsidiaries to 'D' (default) from 'SD'
(selective default) as the issuer has now defaulted on all of its
notes.  At the same time, S&P lowered its issue rating on the
unsecured notes due in 2033 and issued by Norske Skog Holding AS
to 'D' from 'C'. S&P also removed the issue ratings from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where it had placed them
on June 6, 2017. S&P also affirmed its 'D' ratings on the senior
secured notes due in 2019, and the unsecured notes due in 2021,
2023, and 2026.

The downgrade follows the nonpayment of the cash coupon due on
Norske Skog's unsecured notes due in 2033 before the expiry of the
grace period on Nov. 15, 2017, S&P noted.

The 'D' ratings on the secured notes due 2019, and the unsecured
notes due in 2021, 2023, 2026, and 2033, reflect the nonpayment
of interest payments beyond any contractual grace periods, which
S&P considers a default.

The TCR-Europe also reported on July 24, 2017 that Moody's
Investors Service downgraded the probability of default rating
(PDR) of Norske Skogindustrier ASA (Norske Skog) to Ca-PD/LD from
Caa3-PD. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed Norske Skog's
corporate family rating (CFR) of Caa3.  In addition, Moody's also
affirmed the C rating of Norske Skog's global notes due 2026 and
2033 and its perpetual notes due 2115, the Caa2 rating of the
senior secured notes issued by Norske Skog AS and downgraded the
rating of the global notes due 2021 and 2023 issued by Norske Skog
Holdings AS to Ca from Caa3.  The outlook on the ratings remains
stable.  The downgrade of the PDR to Ca-PD/LD from Caa3-PD
reflects the fact that Norske Skog did not pay the interest
payment on its senior secured notes issued by Norske Skog AS, even
after the 30 day grace period had elapsed on July 15.  This
constitutes an event of default based on Moody's definition, in
spite of the existence of a standstill agreement with the debt
holders securing that an enforcement will not be made under the
secured notes due to non-payment of interest.  In addition, the
likelihood of further events of defaults in the next 12-18 months
remains fairly high, as the company is also amidst discussions
around an exchange offer that would most likely involve
equitisation of debt, which the rating agency would most likely
view as a distressed exchange.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


ALMAZERGIENBANK: Fitch Maintains B+ IDR on Rating Watch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained Almazergienbank's (AEB) Long-Term
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'B+' and Viability Rating (VR) of
'b-' on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR AND SUPPORT RATING

The maintenance of AEB's ratings on Rating Watch Negative (RWN)
reflects continuing uncertainty over the planned capital support
from the bank's majority shareholder Russia's Republic of Sakha
(Yakutia) (BBB-/Stable), as it is contingent on the republic
selling some assets to generate enough cash, with the transaction
having been recently delayed to April-May 2018 from December 2017.
The capital support is needed to reserve sizable credit risks
identified by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) during its review
of AEB in 2017.

AEB's standalone financial profile remains vulnerable in light of
high regulatory provisioning requirements and modest
capitalisation. Although the bank's capital position has somewhat
improved since Fitch placed its ratings on RWN in September 2017
due to profit retention and conversion of RUB330 billion (1% of
RWAs) Tier 2 debt ultimately held by the republic into Tier 1
capital in 4Q17, the bank might still not be able to create in
full the reserves mandated by the CBR, Fitch understands.
Therefore AEB may need to rely on regulatory forbearance for a
deferral of provisioning to comply with mandatory capital ratios,
until it receives capital support from the shareholder.

Positively, the bank's liquidity was adequate with the buffer of
liquid assets covering 17% of customer accounts at end-January
2018, and further underpinned by relatively stable customer
funding.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

Fitch will resolve the RWN and downgrade the IDRs if capital
support becomes less certain or further delayed, potentially
making AEB unable to meet the CBR's requirements for additional
reserve provisioning, or if the regulator does not allow a
temporary forbearance resulting in an intervention. The IDRs could
stabilise at 'B+', if the future capital support is provided as
expected and is sufficient to address identified asset quality
risks.

The bank's IDRs could also be downgraded if (i) Sakha is
downgraded; (ii) the propensity of the parent to provide support
diminishes; or (iii) AEB is sold to a financially weaker investor.

VR
Fitch will resolve the RWN and downgrade the VR if the bank
breaches capital ratios due to absence of capital support or
regulatory forbearance. The bank's VR could stabilise at 'b-' or
be upgraded if the bank's capital position improves significantly
due to capital support coming in as planned.

The rating actions are:

AEB

Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs: 'B+'; maintained on
RWN

Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR: 'B'; maintained on RWN

Viability Rating: 'b-'; maintained on RWN

Support Rating: '4'; maintained on RWN


RENAISSANCE CREDIT: S&P Alters Outlook to Pos & Affirms B-/B ICRs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has revised its outlook on Russia-
based Commercial Bank Renaissance Credit LLC to positive from
stable and affirmed its 'B-/B' long- and short-term issuer credit
ratings.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that Renaissance Credit's
creditworthiness may improve in the next 12-18 months if it
continues to demonstrate stable asset quality and lower cost of
risk than most other retail banks in Russia and the Commonwealth
of Independent States.

Last year, Renaissance Credit's asset quality continued to improve
after major stabilization in 2016, following deterioration in
2013-2015. As of Dec. 31, 2017, the bank's nonperforming loans
(NPLs) declined to about 3.5% of total loans versus 5.2% in 2016,
while the bank's credit losses reduced to about 5.6% of total
loans versus 6.2%. S&P said, "In our view, the bank's asset
quality and performance of its retail portfolio are now better
than those of most other Russian banks specialized in unsecured
retail lending. This is in striking contrast to its results in
2013-2015, when the bank incurred huge credit losses during the
market turbulence. We believe that the bank's recent performance
displays the strengthening of its risk management and general
stabilization of economic conditions in Russia over the past two
years."

The bank's retail loan portfolio expanded by about 34% in 2017, a
growth rate materially exceeding the system average. S&P said, "We
recognize that the growth was not accompanied by relaxation of
underwriting standards and, so far, has not led to higher default
rates among the more recent loans. Although management plans to
moderate growth over the next two years, we consider that recent
or future lending growth may potentially lead to deterioration of
asset quality or higher credit losses. In addition, it could
eventually compromise the bank's underwriting standards, thereby
distorting key asset quality indicators or financial performance
in the future. As a result, we are maintaining our view of the
bank's risk position as weak. Besides the potential issues
stemming from more rapid growth than the system average, we note
the bank's relatively short track record of containing credit
losses throughout the economic cycle, including during an
expansionary phase."

S&P said, "We now regard Renaissance Credit's capital and earnings
as adequate rather than moderate, owing to the expected
strengthening of capitalization over the next two years. This
change is neutral to our ratings on the bank, however. We forecast
that the bank's risk-adjusted capital ratio will increase to 8.7%-
9.2% in the next 12-18 months from 7.6% at the end of 2017, thanks
to strong profitability and internal capital generation. We note
that, in 2017, Renaissance Credit demonstrated solid financial
results on the back of declining credit losses, increasing net
interest margin and fee income, and high business growth. Last
year, the bank's return on equity (ROE) reached a record high of
26.5% compared with 9.8% in 2016. In our base-case scenario, we
expect that over the next two years the bank's ROE will remain
sustainably above 20%, despite additional provisions of Russian
ruble (RUB) 2.4 billion-RUB2.5 billion (about $44 million) this
year following the introduction of International Financial
Reporting Standard No. 9. We don't anticipate any dividend
payments this year, but we understand that the bank may likely
start distributions next year, with a dividend payout ratio close
to 50%.

"We maintain our view on the bank's funding as average, mainly due
to the predominance of granular retail deposits in its funding
base and funding metrics that are generally comparable with those
of peers. We continue to assess the bank's liquidity as adequate
because of its sufficient liquidity buffer and prudent liquidity
management over the past five years. In our view, Renaissance
Credit's business position remains moderate, reflecting its
exclusive focus on the highly competitive unsecured retail lending
market in Russia, and relatively small market share.

"The positive outlook indicates that we could raise the ratings
if, over the next 12-18 months, Renaissance Bank's
creditworthiness strengthens, supported by solid and sustainable
financial performance and stable asset quality.

"We could upgrade the bank if we see continuously stable credit
losses and asset-quality metrics, such as default rates on recent
loan vintages and the first-payment default ratio. However, an
upgrade is contingent on Renaissance Credit maintaining better
metrics than those of regional peers with a similar business model
and risk position. In addition, we would need to observe that
business growth has not led to a buildup of poor-quality assets or
a relaxation of the bank's underwriting and collection practices.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if we see that management
is favoring growth over quality, leading to credit losses rising
beyond our expectations and exceeding those of peers.
Deterioration of the bank's capital position, for example, due to
high growth, increasing credit losses, and generous dividend
payments, may also prompt us to take a negative rating action."


RUSSIAN STANDARD: Meeting on Restructuring Proposal "Positive"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ilya Khrennikov and Anna Baraulina at Bloomberg News report that
Oleg Yegorov, spokesman for Roust group, said the March 6 meeting
with Russian Standard Ltd. creditors was "positive", creating
basis for further "constructive dialog".

According to Bloomberg, the meeting was held as conference call
with multiple participants to explain details of RSL proposal to
restructure debt and get investors' feedback.

The group of investors that owns almost 30% of RSL debt didn't
participate in the meeting and will seek early
repayment, Bloomberg relays, citing RBC news site.

RSL defaulted on bonds in Oct. 2017 and has been proposing to
restructure debt, offering investors 20% to 25% of the face value
in cash, Bloomberg recounts.


URALTRANSBANK: Fitch Lowers & Then Withdraws 'CC' Long-Term IDR
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Uraltransbank's (UTB) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CC' from 'CCC' and removed it from
Rating Watch Negative (RWN). Fitch has simultaneously withdrawn
the ratings for commercial reasons and will no longer provide
ratings and analytical coverage of UTB.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch downgraded UTB's Long-Term IDR to 'CCC' and placed the
rating on RWN on Nov. 14, 2017. This was due to the bank being in
breach of the minimum regulatory Tier 1 capital requirement and
significant uncertainty with respect to its ability to restore
compliance, and hence the risk of regulatory intervention.

The rating actions reflect a further material weakening of the
bank's capital position since the last review, and hence an
increased risk, in the agency's view, of regulatory intervention.
In January 2018, UTB's capital base was further eroded by
impairment-driven losses, leading to both the core Tier 1 and Tier
1 capital ratios dropping to 3.3% and the total capital ratio
falling to 6.2%, all below the minimum levels of, respectively,
4.5%, 6% and 8%.

The affirmation of UTB's VR at 'f' reflects the fact that the bank
continues to have a material capital shortfall.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Not applicable

The rating actions are:

Long-Term IDR downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC', off RWN, withdrawn
Short-Term IDR affirmed at 'C', off RWN, withdrawn
Viability Rating affirmed at 'f', withdrawn
Support Rating affirmed at '5', withdrawn
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'No Floor', withdrawn



=========
S P A I N
=========


IM CAJAMAR 4: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCCsf'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded nine tranches of IM Cajamar 3, IM
Cajamar 4 and TDA Cajamar 2 and affirmed four tranches. IM Cajamar
3 and 4's class A notes , and TDA Cajamar 2's class A to C notes
have been removed from Rating Watch Positive (RWP) and the
Outlooks on all tranches rated above 'CCCsf' is Stable. A full
list of rating actions is at the end of this rating commentary.

The rating actions follow the upgrade of Spain's Long Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) on January 19, 2018.

The transactions comprise residential loans that were originated
and are serviced by Cajamar Caja Rural, Sociedad Cooperativa de
Credito (BB-/Positive/B).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sovereign Upgrade

Following the upgrade of Spain's Long-Term IDR to 'A-'/Stable from
'BBB+'/Positive on January 19, 2018, the maximum achievable rating
of Spanish SF transactions is 'AAAsf' for the first time since
2012, maintaining a six-notch differential.

RWP Resolution

The RWP on five tranches of the three transactions reflected a
potential upgrade to 'AAAsf', the maximum achievable rating in
Spain on the back of the sovereign upgrade. The continued sound
asset performance, which Fitch expects to continue given the high
seasoning of the deals (between 11 and 12 years), combined with
the increased country ceiling has driven the upgrade of the IM
Cajamar 3 and 4's class A notes and TDA Cajamar 2's class A to C
notes to 'AAAsf'.

Updated Multiples

Changes to the standard rating scenario multipliers applied in
Spain have led to lower weighted average foreclosure frequencies
(WAFF) in scenarios above 'Bsf'. This led to the upgrade of IM
Cajamar 3's class D notes and IM Cajamar 4's class C and D notes.

IM Cajamar 4 Class E

Fitch has upgraded IM Cajamar 4's class E notes to 'CCCsf' from
'CCsf', reflecting its view that the likelihood of default of the
note has decreased to possible from probable. This view is
supported by the solid asset performance to date and the high
seasoning of the deal.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Given the rating cap on TDA Cajamar 2's class D notes, changes in
the Long-Term IDR of the account bank could lead to changes in the
class D notes' rating.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions' initial
closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions over the
years is consistent with the agency's expectations given the
operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that the
asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating analysis
was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information below was used in the analysis.

IM Cajamar 3&4

- Loan-by-loan data provided by European Data Warehouse as at
   November 30, 2017.
- Transaction reporting provided by Intermoney Securitisation as
   at November 30, 2017 and December 22, 2017.

TDA Cajamar 2

- Loan-by-loan data provided by Titulizacion de Activos as at
   November 30, 2017.
- Transaction reporting provided by Titulizacion de Activos as
   at November 30, 2017 and December 25, 2017.

The rating actions are as follows:

IM Cajamar 3,FTA

  Class A (ISIN: ES0347783005) upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AA+sf';
  off RWP; Outlook Stable

  Class B (ISIN: ES0347783013) affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable

  Class C (ISIN: ES0347783021) affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable

  Class D (ISIN: ES0347783039) upgraded to 'Asf' from 'A-sf';

  Outlook Stable

IM Cajamar 4,FTA

  Class A (ISIN: ES0349044000) upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AA+sf';
  off RWP; Outlook Stable

  Class B (ISIN: ES0349044018) affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable

  Class C (ISIN: ES0349044026) upgraded to 'A+sf' from 'Asf';
  Outlook Stable

  Class D (ISIN: ES0349044034) upgraded to 'A-sf' from 'BBB+sf';
  Outlook Stable

  Class E (ISIN: ES0349044042) upgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'CCsf'; RE
  revised to 45% from 40%

TDA Cajamar 2, FTA

  Class A3 (ISIN: ES0377965027) upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AA+sf';
  off RWP; Outlook Stable

  Class B (ISIN: ES0377965035) upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AA+sf';
  off RWP; Outlook Stable

  Class C (ISIN: ES0377965043) upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AA+sf';
  off RWP; Outlook Stable

  Class D (ISIN: ES0377965050) affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


TURKEY: Moody's Cuts LT Issuer & Sr. Unsec. Debt Ratings to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (MIS) has downgraded the Government of
Turkey's long-term issuer and senior unsecured debt ratings to Ba2
from Ba1 and its senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Ba2 from
(P)Ba1. The rating outlook has been changed to stable from
negative. Moody's also downgraded the long-term senior unsecured
debt rating of Hazine Mustesarligi Varlik Kiralama A.S. to Ba2
from Ba1, a special purpose vehicle wholly owned by the Republic
of Turkey from which the Treasury issues sukuk lease certificates,
and changed its rating outlook to stable from negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of Turkey's government rating to Ba2 from Ba1 is
driven by two key developments that Moody's identified as triggers
for a downgrade when it assigned a negative outlook on the rating
last year:

1) The continued loss of institutional strength, as evidenced by
further erosion in the effectiveness of monetary policy and
further delays in implementing core structural economic reforms.

2) The increased risk of an external shock crystallizing given the
country's wide current account deficits, higher external debt and
associated large rollover requirements in the context of
heightened political risks and rising global interest rates.

The rationale for assigning a stable outlook to the rating is that
a Ba2 rating appropriately captures the further erosion of
Turkey's institutional strength and its increased susceptibility
to event risks, balanced against the country's economic and fiscal
strengths, mainly its large and dynamic economy and favorable
government debt metrics.

In a related decision, Moody's lowered Turkey's long-term country
ceilings: the foreign currency bond ceiling to Baa3 from Baa2; its
foreign currency bank deposit ceiling to Ba3 from Ba2 and its
local currency country ceilings for bonds and bank deposits to
Baa2 from Baa1. The short-term country ceilings remain unchanged
at Prime-3 (P-3) for foreign currency bonds and Not Prime (NP) for
foreign currency bank deposits.

FIRST DRIVER: CONTINUING EROSION OF INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH

The ongoing weakening of Turkey's credit profile continues to be
primarily driven, as it has over the past four years, by the
deterioration in the country's institutional strength. The
government appears still to be focused on short-term measures, to
the detriment of effective monetary policy and of fundamental
economic reform.

Faltering institutional strength is reflected in a broad range of
adverse outcomes on the economic, financial and political front
despite strong near-term growth rates and healthy public finances.
Inflation has stayed stubbornly in the double digits -- the
highest inflation rates seen in nine years. It is unlikely to fall
to single digits on a sustained basis until 2020 at the earliest.
Both the 2018-20 Medium Term Program as well as the 11th 5-year
National Development Plan, which will start next year, assume
average inflation consistently above the central bank's medium-
term inflation target of 5%. The explicit tolerance of high
inflation in these plans demonstrates the priority accorded to
short-term growth regardless, it appears, of the medium-term
consequences.

The erosion of Turkey's executive institutions has continued with
the government's ongoing activities to remove suspected
sympathizers with the GÅlen movement blamed for 2016's coup
attempt and the ongoing state of emergency. The undermining of the
authority of the judiciary is illustrated by the government's
refusal to honor a Constitutional Court ruling to release certain
political prisoners, and a lower court later sentenced the
prisoners to life terms in prison. Deep divisions in Turkish
society were evident in the campaign before the referendum on the
constitutional amendments last April and the vote itself. Those
amendments -- which will eliminate the office of the prime
minister and very significantly expand the authority of the
president when they become effective next year, with limited
checks and balances -- are likely to undermine the predictability
and therefore the effectiveness of policymaking.

Moreover, while the authorities have registered some successes on
the structural reform front, such as auto-enrollment in company-
run pension plans, legislation to restrict foreign currency
lending to companies and the recent submission of a draft value-
added tax reform to parliament, progress has been slow to date.
Government officials continue to postpone the implementation of
more comprehensive structural reforms, such as to address
rigidities in the labor market, in advance of the 2019 elections.
As a consequence, while growth has exceeded expectations in recent
months, medium-term growth expectations remain below historical
experience and imbalances are growing, as evidenced by the large
current account deficit and double-digit inflation. While the
fiscal deficit and the government's debt burden remain contained
in the near-term, the willingness to support short-term growth
through fiscal stimulus rather than through more sustainable
economic reform signals future fiscal challenges. And, although
the unemployment rate has dropped since 2016, it remains high at
about 10%, with the jobless rate among youth twice as high.

SECOND DRIVER: INCREASED RISK OF EXTERNAL SHOCK DUE TO HIGH
EXTERNAL DEBT AND POLITICAL RISKS

Set against the negative institutional backdrop, Turkey's external
position, debt and rollover needs have continued to worsen.
Although the government's own external borrowing needs are
relatively low, the country as a whole has very large external
financing needs given sizeable current account deficits, maturing
long-term debt and high levels of short-term debt. This external
exposure has continued to grow over the past year and is expected
to continue to do so. The country's foreign exchange buffers are
very low compared to these needs; the country's External
Vulnerability Indicator is expected to rise to well over 200%,
which is extremely high in comparison to Turkey's rating peers,
and signals an ever-rising exposure to changes in international
investor sentiment.

The potential triggers of a re-evaluation of Turkish country risk
by foreign investors continue to multiply with the continuing
deterioration of Turkey's geopolitical situation, its already
strained domestic politics and the prospects of monetary policy
tightening in the more developed economies. Amplifying its
vulnerability to external shock are Turkey's political risks, with
the convergence of risks from the geopolitical arena and domestic
politics. On the domestic front, as described above, the
government's legal crackdown since the failed coup in July 2016
has taken a negative toll on the investment climate and relations
between Turkey and the US and EU.

In Moody's view, the geopolitical risk arising from Turkey's
recent engagement in Syria becomes more marked the longer and
deeper the engagement goes on. Turkey's involvement in the Syrian
conflict and battle against ISIS spilled over into heightened
domestic terrorism in recent years, which has been damaging to
tourism and hence economic stability (tourism being an important
source of export revenues) and confidence. While tourism is now
reviving strongly, the full normalization of the sector remains
vulnerable to political and security risks.

This overall picture suggests that the possibility of a sudden,
disruptive reversal in foreign capital inflows, a more rapid fall
in already inadequate FX reserves and, in a worst-case scenario, a
balance of payments crisis, while still quite low, has increased
beyond Moody's expectations a year ago. The larger the external
indebtedness becomes, the less comfort can be taken from the
country's historical ability to attract large amounts of foreign
capital, and the greater the exposure to shifts in investor
sentiment due to political risks or global monetary tightening.
Such shifts could also worsen the quality and shorten the maturity
of such capital inflows, a trend already witnessed in 2017.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The rationale for assigning a stable outlook to the rating is that
the Ba2 rating appropriately balances the further erosion of
Turkey's institutional strength and its increased susceptibility
to event risks discussed above, against the country's economic and
fiscal strengths stemming from its large and robust economy and
favorable government debt metrics. Turkey's economy is highly
dynamic, although last year's growth was well above the pace
expected in 2018-19. Moody's now believes that Turkey's potential
growth rate is around 3.5%-4%, although this is below the
government's estimate of 5% or more.

Fiscal strength, as illustrated by the debt and debt affordability
metrics, remains favorable relative to many peers, with a general
government gross debt to GDP ratio estimated at about 28% at end-
2017 compared to the median of about 46% for Ba-rated peers.
Although central government spending increased rapidly last year
thanks to the fiscal stimulus, revenue also increased in line with
the fast growth in nominal GDP, so the deficit came in below the
government's forecasts both nominally and as a share of GDP.
Moody's anticipates a somewhat bigger deficit this year and next
but given the expected increase in nominal GDP, the debt to GDP
ratio is not expected to deteriorate.

The growth of contingent liabilities outside of the budget, such
as the Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) or the Credit Guarantee
Fund, is a reversal of reforms that were undertaken in the 2000s
after the 2001 financial crisis. Moody's considers that Turkey's
exposure to PPPs, its costs of military campaigns and its plans
for borrowing against the collateral of the Turkish Sovereign
Wealth Fund lack full transparency, but also that the related
contingent liabilities plus Treasury's explicit debt guarantees
are relatively small and manageable for now.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Potential upward movement in Turkey's issuer rating is constrained
by its high external vulnerability. Upward rating pressure could
materialize in the event of structural reductions in these
vulnerabilities, i.e. a significant and sustained narrowing of the
current account deficit or an elongation of the banking and
corporate sector's external debt structure. Also important would
be material improvements in Turkey's institutional environment or
productivity. Reductions in political risk emanating either from
the geopolitical or domestic political environment, while credit
positive, would not necessarily result in upward rating actions in
the absence of sustainable improvements in external vulnerability.

Turkey's sovereign rating would likely be downgraded if there is a
material increase in the probability and proximity of a balance of
payments crisis relative to what is implied by the current Ba2
rating. Such an event would likely be precipitated by a reduction
in foreign exchange reserves or prolonged capital outflows.
Sustained lower growth and a related worsening in the government's
fiscal strength could also precipitate downward rating pressure,
as could a further erosion of institutional strength and policy
predictability.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 24,986 (2016 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 3.2% (2016 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 8.5% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -1.7% (2016 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -3.8% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 46.9% (2016 Actual)

Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On March 2, 2018, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Turkey, Government of. The main points raised during
the discussion were: The issuer's institutional strength/
framework, have materially decreased. The issuer has become
increasingly susceptible to event risks.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CHANNEL ISLAND EXECUTIVE: Creditors Unlikely to Get Money Back
--------------------------------------------------------------
Guernsey Press reports that there is "no realistic prospect" of
the creditors of Channel Island Executive Travel Ltd. getting any
of their money back, the company's liquidators have said.

The company had an estimated deficit of just over GBP800,000 when
it was placed in voluntary liquidation last month, Guernsey Press
relates.

News of the liquidation emerged in January, when owner Fred
Eulenkamp said that he had decided to retire due to ill health and
that voluntary liquidation was the "cleanest" way of doing it,
Guernsey Press recounts.

The company was the trading name of Travel Solutions, and it
booked hotels and other services and the suppliers would invoice
the third party for payment.

The agency handled travel arrangements for the States until the
end of last November, when its contract ended and providers were
left with payments outstanding, Guernsey Press relays.

According to Guernsey Press, in a letter to creditors, the joint
liquidators at Grant Thornton said that they were appointed after
the company passed a special resolution to go into voluntary
liquidation on Feb. 12.

"On the basis of information presently provided to the joint
liquidators by the directors, the company is insolvent," Guernsey
Press quotes the letter as saying.

"The joint liquidators consider that the value of the company's
assets will be insufficient to meet the costs and expenses of the
winding up.

"The joint liquidators regret to report that there is no realistic
prospect of any dividend return to any class of creditor out of
the proceeds of the liquidation."

Among the creditors are Income Tax and Social Security, which are
owed about GBP16,000, Guernsey Press states.

The largest creditors are the Independent Association of Travel
Agents, which is owed GBP261,430.07, and American Express, which
is owed GBP105,003.83, Guernsey Press discloses.


CINEWORLD GROUP: S&P Assigns 'BB-' ICR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB-' long-term issuer credit
rating to Cineworld Group PLC, the U.K.-based cinema operator,
which is the second-largest in Europe.

S&P said, "At the same time, we assigned our 'BB-' issuer credit
rating to Crown Finance U.S. Inc., Cineworld Group's wholly owned
financing subsidiary.

"We also assigned our 'BB-' issue rating to the $3.325 billion
seven-year senior secured term loan facility and EUR607.6 million
seven-year senior secured term loan facility due in 2025, and $300
million senior secured revolving credit facility (RCF) due in
2023. The recovery rating on these facilities is '3', indicating
our expectations of meaningful recovery (50%-70%; rounded estimate
60%) in the event of a payment default.

"The ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings that we
assigned on Jan. 17, 2018.

"Our rating on Cineworld reflects our view of the volatile nature
of the cinema exhibition industry, balanced against the group's
large scale and strong market position. Its geographic
diversification partly offsets its exposure to the U.S. box
office. Our rating also indicates that we expect the group's
strong cash flow generation to support its deleveraging."

Cineworld is the second-largest operator in Europe by number of
screens. After the acquisition of Regal, the group will remain
headquartered and listed in the U.K., and will become the second-
largest cinema operator globally. The combined group will have 793
sites, 9,542 screens, and a strong market-leading position in 10
countries.

About 75% of revenues will come from the U.S., where we estimate
that Regal has the second-largest market share (about 20% of total
screens). The remaining 25% of revenues will come from the U.K.,
Central and Eastern Europe, and Israel. S&P estimates that the
combined group's 2018 revenues will exceed GBP3.2 billion, and
adjusted EBITDA (including its adjustment for operating leases)
will be GBP1.0 billion-GBP1.1 billion.

The cinema exhibition industry is volatile and highly competitive.
Similar to peers, Cineworld's operating performance depends
heavily on box office performances and the quality of the film
slate, which is subject to seasonal volatility and the success of
films, which is hard to predict. S&P said, "In our view, there is
tough competition in mature markets. At the same time, industry
players also compete with out-of-home entertainment alternatives
such as sport events and theme parks, and with video-on-demand and
over-the-top television, which are growing in popularity. We
expect these competitive pressures will be especially relevant in
the U.S. and in the U.K. In the U.S., total cinema admissions and
admissions per capita have been gradually decreasing over the past
five to 10 years. In 2017 alone, they fell by an estimated 5.8%
compared with 2016."

The group's large size and scale will help it mitigate the risks
inherent in the industry. S&P believes Cineworld will have more
power to negotiate lower film rental costs with major film studios
and will have better purchasing terms for concessions compared
with smaller peers. This will help the group maintain control over
costs although the nature of the business gives it limited leeway
because the overall cost structure is rigid.

Cineworld is present and has leading positions in several Central
European markets, including Poland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia. In S&P's view, these offer better
growth prospects in terms of theatre admissions, increasing ticket
prices, and average concessions spending per patron than mature
markets, which will support Cineworld's operating performance and
profitability. Being in markets such as Poland, where a
significant proportion of the films screened are local content,
will also provide a buffer against the volatility of the Hollywood
film slate.

S&P said, "We expect Cineworld's profitability and reported EBITDA
margins to compare well with peers. Both Cineworld and Regal have
well-invested cinema portfolios with modern capabilities including
recliner seats, 4K digital projection, 4DX, and IMAX screens. We
forecast that, after the merger, the group's reported EBITDA
margins will be about 19%-21% in 2018-2019. We understand that the
group will focus on achieving efficiency improvements by
optimizing the managerial structure and procurement, and will
retarget some of the capital expenditure (capex) within the group.
It will likely prioritize continued investment in the reseating
and refurbishment of Regal's legacy theatres to bring them more in
line with U.S.-based peers such as AMC and Cinemark, and will
support a gradual improvement in EBITDA margins over the medium
term.

"Our rating also reflects our expectation that the group will
continue to generate substantial free operating cash flows that
will allow it to progressively reduce leverage broadly in line
with the target that management publicly communicated when
announcing the acquisition (that is, net debt to EBITDA of 3x by
the end of 2019). We forecast that the group's adjusted debt to
EBITDA will be about 5x in 2018 (including our adjustment for the
present value of operating leases), and that it will fall to about
4.5x in 2019, and close to 4x thereafter.

"We understand that Cineworld plans to maintain its existing
dividend policy. In 2018-2019, we estimate that this will leave
the group with reported discretionary cash flow of about GBP200
million per year, which it will use for debt reduction."

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

-- Real GDP growth of 1.9%-2.6% in the U.S. in 2018-2019 and
    1.0%-1.3% in the U.K.

-- Cineworld's operating performance will mainly depend on the
    quality and timing of film releases; it doesn't directly
    correlate with macroeconomic indicators, in S&P's view.
    Improving consumer confidence may support higher prices in
    the U.S., but price increases may be somewhat constrained in
    the U.K.

-- Total revenues, pro forma the transaction, will be about
    GBP3.2 billion-GBP3.4 billion in 2018, and S&P Global
    Ratings-adjusted EBITDA will be about GBP1.0 billion-GBP1.1
     billion.

-- Annual revenue growth for the group of about 2%-4% in 2018-
    2020, driven by an annual increase in average ticket prices
    and concession sales per patron of 2%-3%, slightly above the
    consumer price index (CPI) in Cineworld's various markets. It
    will achieve this by improving cinema experiences, expanding
    premium formats, and improving the concessions offering. Box
    office revenue growth will be constrained by stagnating
    admissions in the mature U.S. and U.K. markets, but S&P
    expects admissions to continue to increase in Central and
    Eastern Europe.

-- Reported EBITDA margins of about 19%-21% in 2018-2019 to
    continue gradually improving as the group achieves its
    targeted operational synergies and cost savings.

-- Only limited working capital outflows of up to GBP10 million
    per year in 2018-2019, and a maximum seasonal working capital
    swing of up to GBP100 million.

-- Capex of about GBP200 million-GBP210 million in 2018-2019, or
    about 6% of revenues, net of landlord contributions in the
    U.S.

-- No acquisitions.

-- Dividends of about GBP90 million in 2018, and in line with
    Cineworld's existing payout ratio of about 55%.

-- No special dividends or share buybacks.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

-- Adjusted debt/EBITDA of about 5x in 2018 and about 4x-4.5x in
    2019-2020.

-- Adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 13%-15%
    in 2018-2020.

-- Discretionary cash flow of about GBP200 million that
    management plans to use toward debt reduction.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that over the next
12 months Cineworld will progressively reduce leverage, with
adjusted debt to EBITDA falling to 4.0x-4.5x in 2019-2020 from
about 5x in 2018. This will be despite the secular pressures on
the cinema exhibition industry in the U.S. and based on our
expectation of continued box office growth in other regions and
reported EBITDA margins of about 19%-21%. The stable outlook also
assumes that the group will remain committed to its publicly-
stated medium-term deleveraging targets and existing dividend
policy, such that adjusted discretionary cash flow to debt will
exceed 5%, and liquidity will be at least adequate.

"We could lower the rating if the group's adjusted leverage
doesn't improve to comfortably less than 5x in 2019 and beyond.
This could happen if it sees weaker operating performance--for
example, stemming from materially lower admissions and box office
revenues globally--or if it experiences delays in achieving
synergies or higher-than-expected restructuring and other
integration-related costs. A more aggressive financial policy,
with higher shareholder payouts that would reduce discretionary
cash flow, could also lead to a downgrade.

"We see rating upside as remote at this point. Over the longer
term, we could raise the rating if Cineworld achieves and
maintains reported EBITDA margins at about 20%-23% and reduces its
adjusted leverage to below 4x on a sustainable basis, while
adjusted discretionary cash flow to debt remains above 7%."


HEATHER CAPITAL: Liquidator Drops Claim Against Levy & Mcrae
------------------------------------------------------------
The Herald reports that a liquidator has dropped a multi-million
pound claim against Levy & Mcrae, a prominent Scots legal firm.

Paul Duffey sued Levy & Mcrae after Isle of Man-based global hedge
fund Heather Capital collapsed after allegedly running a GBP400
million fraud scheme, The Herald relates.

Heather -- likened to a "Ponzi" fraud by a judge -- was run by
Glasgow lawyer Gregory King, 49, who has since been declared
bankrupt owing around GBP120 million, The Herald discloses.

Mr. Duffy sought GBP28.4 million damages from Levy & Mcrae and
four of its current and former partners, The Herald discloses.

But at a hearing in front of Lord Doherty at the Court of Session
on March 7, the case was formally abandoned by Mr. Duffy of
accountancy giants Ernst & Young, The Herald relays.

The claim had centered on GBP19 million and GBP9.4 million of
investors' cash paid into Levy's client account and then
transferred offshore and which can no longer be traced, The Herald
states.


MANSARD MORTGAGES 2007-2: S&P Lifts Class B2a Notes Rating to BB
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on Mansard Mortgages
2007-2 PLC's class B1a, B2a, and M2a notes. At the same time, S&P
has affirmed its ratings on the class A1a, A2a, and M1a notes.

S&P said, "The rating actions follow our credit and cash flow
analysis of the transaction using information from the most recent
investor report and loan-level data. Our analysis reflects the
application of our European residential loans criteria and our
current counterparty criteria.

"Since our previous review, our weighted-average foreclosure
frequency (WAFF) and the weighted-average loss severity (WALS)
assumptions have decreased." The decrease in WAFF is primarily due
to the transaction's increased seasoning and the reduction in
arrears. The loans' weighted-average seasoning has increased to
125 months from 110 months and arrears over 30 days have decreased
to 7.2% of the pool, from 8.1% in December 2016. The decrease in
WALS is driven by a decrease in the weighted-average current loan-
to-value ratios.

  Rating        WAFF      WALS
  level          (%)       (%)
  AAA          45.28     52.58
  AA           33.12     45.25
  A            25.82     32.19
  BBB          18.81     24.11
  BB           11.85     18.19
  B             9.61     12.96

The transaction's reserve fund is at its required level, and the
liquidity facility has not been drawn. Principal is currently
being paid sequentially as the subordination trigger ratio is not
satisfied. S&P said, "In accordance with our European residential
loans criteria, we have applied various cash flow stress
scenarios, including assuming the recession starts at the end of
the third year to test the resilience of the transaction's
structure to back-ended defaults."

S&P said, "Using our updated WAFF and WALS assumptions in our cash
flow model, the class A1a, A2a, M1a, and M2a notes pass our cash
flow stresses at higher rating levels than those currently
assigned. However, under our current counterparty criteria, our
ratings on the notes in this transaction are capped at our 'A'
long-term issuer credit rating on Barclays Bank PLC as the
guaranteed investment contract account provider and collection
account provider, following its loss of an 'A-1' short-term rating
and failure to take remedy action. We have therefore affirmed our
'A (sf)' ratings on the class A1a, A2a, and M1a notes, and raised
to 'A (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' our rating on the class M2a notes.
As a result of the reduction in our WAFF assumptions and an
increase in the level of credit enhancement, the class B1a and B2a
notes are able to pass our cash flow stresses at higher rating
levels than those currently assigned. Consequently, we have raised
our ratings on these classes of notes.

"Our credit stability analysis indicates that the maximum
projected deterioration that we would expect at each rating level
for one- and three-year horizons, under moderate stress
conditions, is in line with our credit stability criteria."

Mansard Mortgages 2007-2 is a U.K. nonconforming residential
mortgage-backed securities transaction. Rooftop Mortgages Ltd.
originated the loans.

  RATINGS LIST

  Class           Rating
             To             From

  Mansard Mortgages 2007-2 PLC
  GBP550 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

  Ratings Raised

  M2a        A (sf)         BBB (sf)
  B1a        BBB (sf)       BB (sf)
  B2a        BB (sf)        B (sf)

  Ratings Affirmed

  A1a        A (sf)
  A2a        A (sf)
  M1a        A (sf)


MAPLIN: Axes 63 Jobs at Head Office After Failing to Find Buyer
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jon Yeomans at The Telegraph reports that the administrators of
electronics chain Maplin have made 63 head office staff redundant
after failing to find a buyer.

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) said that despite ongoing talks
between the retailer and its suppliers, no buyer was forthcoming
and therefore 55 roles would go in London and eight in Rotherham,
The Telegraph relates.

According to The Telegraph, the company's 217 shops remain open
and trading but Toby Underwood, joint administrator at PwC,
warned: "Due to a lack of interest, we may be required to initiate
a controlled closure programme."

Maplin's private equity owner Rutland Partners had been holding
talks with Edinburgh Woollen Mill, the firm owned by retail tycoon
Philip Day, over a possible sale after credit insurers scaled back
their exposure to the group amid widening losses, causing stock
shortages, The Telegraph discloses.

But the retailer was unable to stave off collapse, with its chief
executive Graham Harris blaming the loss of insurance, "a weak
consumer environment" and the weakness of the pound following the
vote for Brexit, The Telegraph notes.


NESCU: Aberdeen City Council Set to Begin Rescue Talks
------------------------------------------------------
Evening Express reports that Aberdeen council bosses are set to
start talks to bail out a collapsed credit union.

NESCU, based in Torry, went into administration last month,
Evening Express recounts.

The firm had 2,500 customers and now Aberdeen City Council is in
talks with creditors to take over the business, Evening Express
discloses.

According to Evening Express, if successful, new branches of the
credit union are planned across the city in a bid that could
provide an alternative to high-street banks that are shutting
services.

Banking giant Royal Bank of Scotland has announced plans to close
branches across the North-east including Dyce, Bridge of Don and
Ellon, Evening Express relates.

It is also understood that having the banking facilities could
open up new lines of credit to the cash-strapped authority,
Evening Express notes.

On Feb. 27, a message was published on the NESCU website stating
that the co-operative had gone into administration and had ceased
trading, Evening Express relays.  More than 2,500 people who
invested money into the North-east credit union have been assured
they will have their savings returned after the organization went
bust, Evening Express states.

Aberdeen City Council co-leader Jenny Laing said directors are set
to begin talks, Evening Express discloses.


NEW LOOK: Paul Hastings Advises on CVA Proposal
-----------------------------------------------
Paul Hastings LLP, a global law firm, on March 7 disclosed that it
is advising leading clothing retailer New Look and its owner, the
listed South African group Brait SE, on the Company Voluntary
Arrangement announced by New Look Retailers Limited.  Under the
proposal, New Look will restructure rents on a majority of its
stores as part of a operational turnaround plan.  The CVA
identifies 60 out of its total 593 stores in the UK for potential
closure, alongside a further 6 sites which are sub-let to third
parties.

New Look is seeking creditor approval on the proposal, which is
due on March 21, 2018.  New Look's secured creditors have already
consented to the CVA.

The Paul Hastings team in London was led by partner David Ereira,
with partners Peter Schwartz, Edward Holmes, and Conor Downey, and
associates Valean Gherendi, Carlos Ruiz, Corey Blake, Saffi
Rayman, and John Lambillion.

With a strong presence throughout Asia, Europe, Latin America, and
the U.S., Paul Hastings is recognized as one of the world's most
innovative global law firms.


PRECISE MORTGAGE 2018-2B: Fitch Rates Class X Notes 'BB+(EXP)sf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Precise Mortgage Funding 2018-2B Plc's
(PMF 2018-2B) notes expected ratings:

Class A: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C: 'A(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class D: 'BBB+(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class E: 'BBB-(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class X: 'BB+(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

The assignment of the final ratings is contingent on the receipt
of final documents conforming to information already received.

This transaction is a securitisation of buy-to-let (BTL) mortgages
that were originated by Charter Court Financial Services (CCFS),
trading as Precise Mortgages (Precise), in England and Wales.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Prime Underwriting
Fitch has treated the loans as prime. The loans have been granted
to borrowers with no adverse credit, full rental income
verification, full property valuations and with a clear lending
policy in place. The available data, although limited, shows
robust performance, which Fitch would expect of prime loans. Fitch
has applied a lender adjustment of 1.10x to account for a certain
feature in CCFS's underwriting process and its limited performance
history.

Geographical Diversification
The pool displays no geographical concentration in excess of two
times population. This differs from previous issuances, where at
closing, the London concentration was within 0.1% of the threshold
for adjustment. The proportion of loans in London is smaller in
Precise PMF 2018-2B than in Precise Mortgage Funding 2018-1B Plc
(PMF 2018-1B), but the weighted average (WA) sustainable LTV is
higher, due to slightly higher current LTV underwriting in the
loans included in this pool.

Borrower Affordability
CCFS changed its serviceability calculation at the start of 2017
to impose higher interest coverage ratios (ICRs) of 145% and 160%
for tax payers in the higher and additional brackets,
respectively. It previously used 125% for all borrowers. In
addition, an upward stress to the interest rate has been applied.
This change produced a higher WA ICR for PMF 2018-1B and PMF 2018-
2B compared with previous transactions, as a higher percentage of
the pool was originated under the updated methodology.

Class X Note Capped
Prior to the optional redemption date, all excess spread will be
used to make payments of interest and principal on the class X
note. However, any subordinated hedging amounts payable are due
senior to these items in the revenue priority of payments. In case
of a default of the swap counterparty and the swap mark-to-market
being in favour of the swap counterparty, excess spread may not be
available to make payments to the class X note. Fitch has
therefore capped the class X note at 'BB+sf'

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Material increases in the frequency of defaults and loss severity
on defaulted receivables producing losses greater than Fitch's
base case expectations may result in negative rating action on the
notes. Fitch's analysis revealed that a 30% increase in the WA
foreclosure frequency, along with a 30% decrease in the WA
recovery rate, would imply a downgrade of the class A notes to
'A+sf' from 'AAAsf'.


PREZZO: Owes Banks, Suppliers More Than GBP220 Million
------------------------------------------------------
Foodservice Equipment Journal reports that troubled casual dining
chain Prezzo owes banks and suppliers more than GBP220 million,
according to the Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) it announced
last week.

According to FEJ, while GBP154 million is owed to secured
creditors such as Barclays Bank, AIB Group and RBS, dozens of
unsecured trade creditors are collectively owed nearly GBP66
million.

The 169-page CVA document, seen by FEJ, shows the level of
exposure that catering equipment suppliers currently have to the
business.

There is nothing at this stage to suggest that suppliers won't
recoup the money they are owed, FEJ notes.  However, they will be
waiting with bated breath until March 23, when creditors decide
whether to approve the CVA, according to FEJ.  It needs a 75% vote
in favor to go ahead, FEJ states.

Unsecured creditors will receive a greater return on the amount
owed to them in the CVA than they would do if Prezzo was to enter
administration, which is the likely scenario if it doesn't get
approved, FEJ relays.

Kitchen equipment suppliers such as Extracair and Lockhart are
from the largest unsecured trade creditors, however, according to
FEJ.

Prezzo plans to axe 94 restaurants as part of its restructuring
plans and is calling on landlords to agree rent reductions, FEJ
discloses.

"This will allow the company to focus its resources on the core,
more profitable restaurants whilst continuing to meet its
obligations to suppliers and creditors," FEJ quotes the company as
saying.  "This proposed restructuring will allow Prezzo to
continue operating while it implements plans to improve its food
and service and to invest in new restaurant layouts and designs."



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Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


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