/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/180329.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, March 29, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 063


                            Headlines


C R O A T I A

CROATIA: S&P Raises Long-Term Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'BB+'


G E O R G I A

GEORGIA: Fitch Corrects March 16 Rating Release


I R E L A N D

AURIUM CLO IV: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes
EUROPEAN RESIDENTIAL 2018-1: Moody's Rates Class B Notes Ba3 (sf)


I T A L Y

DYRET SPV: DBRS Rates Class C Notes Due 2038 'BB(high)'
PIETRA NERA: DBRS Finalizes 'B (high)' Rating on Class E Notes


L U X E M B O U R G

BL CONSUMER: DBRS Assigns Provisional B(sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

CAIRN CLO IX: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes


R U S S I A

MOTOVILIKHA PLANTS: Moscow Exchange Suspends Share Trading
TELECOMMERCE BANK: Put on Provisional Administration


S P A I N

AUTOVIA DE LOS VINEDOS: Moody's Hikes EUR103MM Loan Rating to B1
AVINTIA PROYECTOS: DBRS Finalizes Prov. BB(low) Notes Rating
BBVA CONSUMO 9: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class B Notes
CAIXABANK RMBS 1: DBRS Confirms 'C' Rating on Series B Notes
CAIXABANK RMBS 2: DBRS Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to B(high)

NH HOTEL: S&P Alters Outlook to Positive; Affirms 'B' ICR
SANTANDER PRIME 2018-A: DBRS Assigns B Rating to Class F Notes


S W E D E N

ITIVITI GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B' Issuer Credit Rating


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Former Owner Banned from Serving as Company Director
DEBUSSY DTC: DBRS Lowers 2025 Class A Notes Rating to B (sf)
GNG GROUP: Reaches Agreement with Creditors, Exits CVA
HOUSE OF FRASER: Lenders Appoint Adviser to Assess Financials


X X X X X X X X

* DBRS Reviews Ratings on 33 Note Classes From EU CMBS Deals


                            *********



=============
C R O A T I A
=============


CROATIA: S&P Raises Long-Term Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
On March 23, 2018, S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Croatia to
'BB+' from 'BB'. The outlook is stable. S&P affirmed the short-
term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings at 'B'.

At the same time, S&P revised its Transfer and Convertibility
(T&C) assessment to 'BBB+' from 'BBB'.

The upgrade reflects Croatia's improved external position, which
benefits from growing current account receipts on the back of
strong tourism-related inflows, continued external deleveraging
of the economy, and rapid growth of foreign currency reserves.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook balances Croatia's improved external and
fiscal balances against still high government debt levels and
structural rigidities weighing on Croatia's growth outlook over
the next 12 months.

S&P could raise its ratings on Croatia if the government
implements structural reforms that would more sustainably
entrench fiscal consolidation and raise the economy's long-term
growth potential. Moreover, in such a scenario, a stronger-than-
expected reduction in Croatia's still high government debt levels
would support a positive rating action.

Conversely, the ratings could come under downward pressure if
structural reform efforts slowed, leading to lower economic
growth and higher-than-forecast fiscal deficits. Moreover, S&P is
closely monitoring the restructuring efforts at Agrokor and could
consider a negative action if a disorderly restructuring
undermines economic performance or leads to significant fiscal
costs. This is not its base-case scenario, however.

RATIONALE

The upgrade reflects Croatia's improved external position, which
benefits from growing current account receipts on the back of
strong tourism-related inflows, continued external deleveraging
of the economy, and rapid growth of foreign currency reserves.
Moreover, the ratings are supported by Croatia's improved fiscal
picture, benefitting in part from the ongoing economic recovery,
but also from structural reform efforts, such as the income tax
reform that took effect in 2017. This in turn is helping
accelerate the reduction of Croatia's high government debt
burden, which still constrains the ratings.

In addition, the ratings remain constrained by Croatia's
relatively shorter track record of implementing structural
reforms amid bouts of political volatility and low per capita
wealth levels in the context of the 28 EU member states.

Institutional and Economic Profile: Gradual progress of
structural reforms helps safeguard the durability of economic
recovery

-- A favorable external environment and another record tourism
    season supported Croatia's recovery, which is entering its
    fourth year.

-- The ongoing restructuring of retail conglomerate Agrokor
    dampened domestic demand somewhat, though consumption and
    investment growth were still robust.

-- Structural challenges to the economy are apparent in the
    labor market and in the large role the public sector plays in
    the economy, and the government's reform efforts are only
    gradual.

S&P said, "At 2.8%, the initial real economic growth data for
2017 shows a slightly weaker picture than in our September
publication.

However, part of the weakness in the fourth quarter was driven by
one-off factors. For example, the announcement of a new excise
tax system and revised calculation for value-added tax (VAT)
payments for companies on car purchases pushed car sales from
December into January 2018 when sales surged by 30% year on year.
Overall, Croatia's economy continued to be supported by external
and domestic demand in 2017. A further reduction in the
unemployment rate, as well as wage growth in the public and
private sector, supported additional pick-up in consumption
growth. Export growth benefitted from another record tourism
season, but importantly, goods exports showed strength, as well.
Investments slowed somewhat as Agrokor-related uncertainties took
their toll on business and consumer confidence over the course of
the year. Over our forecast horizon through 2021, we see a
gradual deceleration of growth to about 2.5% in 2020 as cyclical
tailwinds subside and structural constraints kick in."

Croatia's structural impediments are well known and the current
government is making gradual progress toward resolving them. The
business environment, as measured by global indicators, lags
behind that of regional peers as the public administration
remains marred by inefficiencies and the role of the public
sector in the economy is still substantial. In addition, the
unemployment rate remains high and appears mostly structural.
Croatia's National Reform Program spells out several reforms that
the government wants to implement, though progress is only
gradual. In addition, the Croatian government has already
implemented structural reforms to the VAT and income tax that
took effect in 2017. Moreover, parafiscal fees, fees and taxes
not directly payable to the government, were reduced by 30% in
2017 and the restructuring of the highway and motorway companies,
including their debts, is progressing. Still, more sustained and
robust reform efforts will be needed to entrench some of the
fiscal gains the ongoing recovery has brought about.

After repeat bouts of political volatility, the current
government of the center-right HDZ and the liberal HNS, in power
since June 2017, appears to be on a more stable footing. The
previous coalition of HDZ and MOST collapsed when some MOST party
members did not support the finance minister in a parliamentary
vote of no confidence after the collapse of Croatia's retail
conglomerate Agrokor. The restructuring of Agrokor is continuing,
despite a setback in February 2018 when the initially appointed
restructuring advisor resigned. Nevertheless, Agrokor intends to
complete the restructuring terms according to the initial plan by
April 10, 2018. To that end, the company continues its frequent
meetings with representatives from the creditor groups. S&P said,
"Our base-case scenario remains that of an orderly restructuring
process. Downside risks to the economy could emerge if a
disorderly restructuring of Agrokor were to negatively affect its
suppliers, mostly small and midsize enterprises and farms, and
resulted in their coming under financial pressure. However, we
understand Agrokor has made payments to smaller suppliers in
order to mitigate the effect of its restructuring on them.
Therefore, we currently see only limited downside risks to the
Croatian economy as a result of the Agrokor turmoil. However, we
will continue monitoring the situation, including the financial
and operational restructuring, and its potential impact on the
Croatian economy."

Flexibility and Performance Profile: Rapid reserve growth and
continued deleveraging strengthen the external position

-- Croatia's external position continues to improve thanks to
    continued external deleveraging, recurring current account
    surpluses, and the associated strong increase in foreign
    currency reserves.

-- In 2017, Croatia achieved its first ever general government
    surplus, supporting the downward trend in the government debt
    ratio.

-- Banks have increased their provisions related to exposure to
    Agrokor and should largely meet regulatory capital
    requirements, even in an adverse scenario.

In 2017, Croatia likely achieved its first ever surplus at the
general government level. S&P said, "Stronger-than-expected
revenues, partially from cyclical factors but also due to ongoing
tax administration reforms, have helped move the general
government balance to a surplus of 0.6% of GDP in 2017 according
to our forecast. Over our forecast horizon, we expect Croatia
will continue incurring small deficits averaging 0.8% of GDP over
2018-2021, as accelerated pick-up of EU structural and cohesion
funds should drive up capital expenditures. The budget could
display upside surprises should the government make more
sustained headway on its structural reform agenda. We understand
that the Croatian government continues working on a reform of the
public administration, as well as reforms in the health care
sector. Plans to introduce a real estate tax have again been
delayed, however."

The general government debt ratio remains firmly on a downward
path. The Croatian government has used the revenue windfall to
pay down debt, as well as clear some of the arrears that
accumulated in the health care system. In addition, the
government continued its efforts to restructure the fully
guaranteed debts of the Croatian roads companies. S&P said, "As a
result, we expect 2017 results will show the government's debt
ratio has fallen below a still high 80% of GDP. In line with our
fiscal and growth forecasts, the ratio could drop another 10
percentage points by 2021 to just below 70% of GDP." A sustained
reduction in Croatia's government debt burden will be important,
as its debt profile still shows some weaknesses. Over 60% of
outstanding debt is denominated in foreign currency, while the
exposure of Croatian banks to the government still amounts to
about 20% of their assets. Croatia's quasi-peg of the kuna to the
euro shields the government somewhat from foreign currency risk.
Moreover, S&P views positively that Croatia's government can
increasingly refinance itself in the domestic market at longer
maturities.

S&P said, "We do not expect the materialization of any contingent
liabilities onto the government's balance sheet from the ongoing
restructuring of Agrokor. We understand that the loan exposure of
Croatian government-owned development bank, Hrvatska banka za
obnovu i razvitak, to Agrokor is very small. It accounts for less
than 2% of Agrokor's recognized debt or 3% of the bank's total
assets. In addition, the lion's share of this exposure is secured
by collateral. Moreover, we note that Agrokor is current on its
tax obligations and that the government has not provided direct
financial support to Agrokor. Nevertheless, Croatian banks'
profitability was hit by loan-loss provisioning, both on direct
exposure to Agrokor and to its related suppliers. Although
additional provisioning on these exposures will likely be
reported in 2018, we expect domestic banks' capitalization to
remain above regulatory capital requirements at the systemwide
level. Apart from Agrokor, domestic banks' asset quality
continued to rebound in 2017, supported by the ongoing economic
recovery and material assets disposals. This is reflected in the
further decline in nonperforming loans, which dropped to 11.4% of
assets from 13.8% over the course of 2017. Despite the high level
of liquidity in the system, we don't expect a material pick-up in
lending activity in 2018, mostly due to still low demand and weak
creditworthiness of corporate customers. Overall, we classify
Croatia's banking system in group '7' of our Banking Industry
Country Risk Assessment."

The hit to bank profitability from Agrokor-related provisioning
also boosted Croatia's current account surplus in 2017. Lower
repatriation of profits by foreign-owned banks reduced the
deficit on the income balance. At the same time, Croatia's
growing surplus on the service balance, which grew thanks to
overnight stays in Croatia being 12% higher than in 2016, is more
than offsetting its simultaneously growing trade deficit, which
is estimated to have exceeded 17% of GDP in 2017. Croatia's
strong current account surplus also helped boost the central
bank's foreign exchange reserves in 2017. In U.S. dollar terms,
reserves grew by roughly US$4.6 billion or 32% year on year. In
addition, interventions by the Croatian National Bank (the
central bank) to the tune of EUR950 million (US$1.1 billion or 2%
of 2017 GDP) to stem appreciation pressures on the kuna have
helped reserves growth, as well. Lastly, positive valuation
effects, thanks to the euro strengthening almost 14% against the
U.S. dollar have had a buoying effect, as well as central bank
reserves being mostly held in euro.

Growing foreign exchange reserves and current account receipts
led to a significant strengthening of Croatia's narrow net
external debt ratio, which fell to an estimated 39% of current
account receipts (CARs) in 2017. S&P said, "We forecast it will
decline further to about 31 % of CARs at the end of 2021, thanks
to recurring, albeit shrinking, current account surpluses and
continued deleveraging. After the Agrokor-related impact in 2017,
we expect the current account surplus will decline to about 2.1%
of GDP by 2021 as strengthening domestic demand will continue to
push up imports. Croatia's net international investment position,
as reported by the central bank, strengthened from around -71% of
GDP in 2016 to -61% of GDP by the end of the third quarter 2017.
This was supported by assets growing 5% over the course of the
year, but also continued deleveraging that decreased liabilities
by 2% over the year. Still, we forecast gross external financing
needs of around 81% of CARs on average over 2018-2021."

The Croatian National Bank is committed to the quasi-peg of the
Croatian kuna to the euro, which limits monetary policy
flexibility, as does the highly euro-ized economy. As of June
2017, over 50% of loans and deposits were denominated in or
linked to a foreign currency, usually the euro. Croatia will hold
the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union
during the first half of 2020. By then, the country hopes to have
been granted accession to the Schengen area. However, before
Croatia can join the Schengen area, the country must solve its
border disputes, most importantly the dispute with Slovenia in
which the Permanent Court of Arbitration gave Slovenia direct
access to international waters through Croatian waters. Moreover,
a joint working group of the central bank and the government has
launched a public debate on Croatia's adoption of the euro. While
S&P does not expect euro adoption over its forecast horizon, S&P
thinks Croatia could potentially consider joining the Exchange
Rate Mechanism 2, a precondition for subsequent euro adoption, by
2020.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the external assessment had improved.
All other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  RATINGS LIST
  Upgraded; Ratings Affirmed
                                          To             From
  Croatia
   Sovereign Credit Rating
    Foreign and Local Currency       BB+/Stable/B   BB/Positive/B
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   BBB+           BBB
   Senior Unsecured
    Foreign Currency                      BB+            BB
   Short-Term Debt   Local Currency       B              B


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G E O R G I A
=============


GEORGIA: Fitch Corrects March 16 Rating Release
-----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has issued a correction to the ratings release on
Georgia published on March 16, 2018, which incorrectly stated
estimated net external debt to GDP for 2017 and gross external
financing requirements as a share of international reserves.

The revised release is:

Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlook on Georgia's Long-Term
Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to
Positive from Stable and affirmed the IDRs at 'BB-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
The revision of the Outlook to Positive reflects the following
key rating drivers and their relative weights:

Medium
Georgia's growth prospects compare favourably with the 'BB' rated
peer group, where median five-year average growth is estimated to
be 3.5%. Georgia's economy grew an estimated 4.8% in 2017, after
2.8% in 2016, and under Fitch's latest projections looks set to
achieve real GDP growth of 4.6% and 4.9% in 2018 and 2019,
respectively. Composition of growth is expected to be broad-
based, supported by a favourable external environment supporting
growth in exports and remittances, as well as higher domestic
demand driven by an increasing government drive towards higher
capital spending.

Georgia's headline fiscal deficit (estimated at 3.4% of GDP,
2017) is currently above the median 3.0% deficit of its 'BB'
rated peers, but Fitch forecasts a gradual convergence towards
3.0% of GDP by 2019. The narrowing of the deficit reflects the
government's priority of reducing current expenditure in order to
meet capital spending needs, while a positive economic outlook
will help support stable growth of tax revenues. At the same
time, Fitch believes a degree of fiscal discipline will be
maintained through the IMF programme, which sets ceilings for
government spending and on-lending activities.

Fitch's projections for the budget deficit and growth performance
are consistent with a gradual decline in government debt. Fitch
sees a stabilisation in the government debt ratio, estimated at
44.5% of GDP in 2017, which is just below the median debt ratio
(47.4%) of 'BB' category peers, and forecast by the agency to
gradually decline towards 43.4% of GDP by 2019. Georgia's
government debt structure has a high level of concessional and
multilateral debt (84% of total debt), but 76% is foreign
currency-denominated, exposing it to exchange rate volatility.
The redemption profile is manageable. For 2018-2019, Fitch
estimates upcoming government debt maturities averaging 4.7% of
GDP and interest payments equivalent to 3.0% of revenues.

Georgia's current account deficit (CAD) to GDP ratio improved
significantly in 2017, with preliminary estimates by Fitch
showing a CAD of 8.7% of GDP, compared with 12.8% of GDP in 2016.
Fitch estimate that the current account including net FDI inflows
was broadly in balance in 2017. For 2018-2019, Fitch forecasts an
average CAD of around 10% of GDP, with FDI inflows averaging 7.6%
of GDP. Upside risks to Fitch's forecast could potentially come
from stronger exports, particularly in the tourism sector, which
had a very positive year in 2017.

Georgia's 'BB-' IDRs also reflect the following key rating
drivers:

Georgia's ratings balance favourable governance and business
environment indicators compared with rated peers and resilience
to recent macroeconomic shocks with weak external finances,
including large current account deficits, high net external debt
and low external liquidity.

Georgia has made good progress remaining on track with
performance and structural benchmarks set out under its three-
year extended fund facility (EFF) agreement with the IMF;
completing its first review in December 2017. Continued progress
in meeting benchmarks aimed at strengthening of its financial
sector, external and fiscal finances (including the
implementation of pension reform), will help contribute towards
further improvement of structural indicators, stimulating
investment and savings.

Despite the improvement in the CAD, Georgia's external finances
are weaker than the majority of its 'BB' category peers.
Georgia's CAD is substantially wider than the 'BB' peer median of
3.4% of GDP. Wide CADs reflect the country's low level of
domestic savings, as well as narrow export base and high import
dependency.

Vulnerabilities in external finances are also reflected by
Georgia's net external debt to GDP (estimated at 60.8% for 2017)
which is more than four times higher than the median 'BB' peer
ratio (13.4% of GDP). Gross external financing requirements as a
share of international reserves is high at 99.7% (estimated
2017). Level of gross international reserves increased 10% in
2017 from 2016 levels, but coverage of months of current account
receipts is low (3.2 months). Steady government progress towards
meeting net international reserve floors set by the IMF, together
with its own medium-term 'Larisation' plan will help mitigate
vulnerabilities in external finances.

The overall soundness of the banking sector mitigates the risks
stemming from widespread dollarisation. At end-2017, the share of
total deposits in foreign currency was 66%, down from 71% at end-
2016, while the share of total loans in foreign currency fell to
57% from 65% in the same period. Georgia scores 2* on Fitch's
Macro-Prudential Indicator, indicating moderate vulnerability
from strong credit growth. Annual credit growth is high at 15.7%
(Feb 2018), but has eased from 22.4% in December 2017. The
average capital adequacy ratio in the Georgian banking sector is
high at 19.1% (2017) up from 15.1% in 2016, while the share of
non-performing loans is low at 2.8% (2017).

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Georgia a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BB' on the Long-Term FC IDR scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the
SRM to arrive at the final Long-Term IDR by applying its QO,
relative to rated peers:

- External finances: -1 notch, to reflect that Georgia relative
to its peer group has higher net external debt, structurally
larger current account deficits, and a large negative net
international investment position.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression
rating model that employs 18 variables based on three year
centred averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a
score equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within
Fitch criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, could
lead to an upgrade are:

- Strong and sustainable GDP growth consistent with
macroeconomic stability

- A reduction in external vulnerability

- Shrinkage in budget deficits and public sector indebtedness

The Rating Outlook is Positive. Consequently, Fitch's sensitivity
analysis does not currently anticipate developments with a high
likelihood of leading to a negative rating change. However,
future developments that could individually, or collectively,
result in the Outlook being revised to Stable include:

- An increase in external vulnerability, for example a widening
of the current account deficit not financed by FDI

- Worsening of the budget deficit, leading to further rise in
public indebtedness

- Deterioration in either the domestic or regional political
environment that affects economics policymaking or regional
growth and stability

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The global economy performs in line with Fitch's Global Economic
Outlook.

Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook revised
to Positive from Stable
Long-Term Local-Currency IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook revised
to Positive from Stable
Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Short-Term Local-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Country Ceiling affirmed at 'BB'
Issue ratings on long-term senior-unsecured foreign-currency
bonds affirmed at 'BB-'
Issue ratings on long-term senior-unsecured local-currency bonds
affirmed at 'BB-'
Issue ratings on short-term senior-unsecured local-currency bonds
affirmed at 'B'


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I R E L A N D
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AURIUM CLO IV: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
seven classes of notes to be issued by Aurium CLO IV Designated
Activity Company ("Aurium IV", the "Issuer"):

-- EUR199,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2031, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- EUR30,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2031, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

-- EUR54,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2031, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR32,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

-- EUR24,200,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR20,300,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR11,800,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will
endeavour to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if
any) may differ from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the rated notes address the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in January 2031. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets. Furthermore, Moody's is of the opinion that
the Collateral Manager, Spire Management Limited (the "Manager"),
has sufficient experience and operational capacity and is capable
of managing this CLO.

Aurium IV is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of secured senior obligations and up to
10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured senior loans,
unsecured senior bonds, second lien loans, mezzanine obligations
and high yield bonds. At closing, the portfolio is expected to be
comprised predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled
in Western Europe. The remainder of the portfolio will be
acquired during the six month ramp-up period in compliance with
the portfolio guidelines.

Spire Management Limited will manage the CLO. It will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's reinvestment
period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal
proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from
sales of credit improved and credit risk obligations, and are
subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the seven classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR36,300,000 of subordinated notes. Moody's
will not assign a rating to this class of notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in August 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the notes is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the notes.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017.

The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the binomial
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.

For modeling purposes, Moody's used the following base-case
assumptions:

Target Par Amount: EUR400,000,000

Diversity Score: 40

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.55%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.25%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.52 years

As part of its analysis, Moody's has addressed the potential
exposure to obligors domiciled in countries with local currency
government bond ratings of "A1" or below. According to the
portfolio constraints, the total exposure to countries with a
local currency country risk bond ceiling ("LCC") below "Aa3"
shall not exceed 10%, the total exposure to countries with an LCC
below "A3" shall not exceed 5% and the total exposure to
countries with an LCC below "Baa3" shall not exceed 0%. Given
this portfolio composition, the model was run with different
target par amounts depending on the target rating of each class
of notes as further described in the methodology. The portfolio
haircuts are a function of the exposure size to countries with
LCC of "A1" or below and the target ratings of the rated notes,
and amount to 0.75% for the Class A-1 and A-2 Notes, 0.50% for
the Class B Notes, 0.375% for the Class C notes and 0% for
Classes D, E and F Notes.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a
component in determining the provisional ratings assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case.

Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default
probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on the notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), assuming that all other factors are
held equal.

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 2750 to 3163)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2750 to 3575)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1


EUROPEAN RESIDENTIAL 2018-1: Moody's Rates Class B Notes Ba3 (sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive credit ratings
to the following notes issued by European Residential Loan
Securitisation 2018-1 DAC:

-- EUR215,377,000 Class A Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
    due January 2061, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR18,690,000 Class B Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
    January 2061, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Moody's has not assigned ratings to EUR26,700,000 Class P and
EUR95,478,000 Class Z Mortgage Backed Notes due January 2061.

This transaction represents the fourth securitisation transaction
that Moody's rates in Ireland that is partially backed by non-
performing loans ("NPL"). The assets supporting the notes are
performing loans ("PLs") and NPLs extended primarily to borrowers
in Ireland. All of the asset within this transaction were
previously securitized within European Residential Loan
Securitisation 2016-1 DAC.

The portfolio is serviced by Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland)
DAC ("Pepper"; NR). The servicing activities performed by Pepper
are monitored by the issuer administration consultant, Hudson
Advisors Ireland DAC ("Hudson"; NR). Hudson has also been
appointed as back-up servicer facilitator in place to assist the
issuer in finding a substitute servicer in case the servicing
agreement with Pepper is terminated.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings reflect an analysis of the characteristics of the
underlying pool of the PLs and NPLs, sector-wide and servicer-
specific performance data, protection provided by credit
enhancement, the roles of external counterparties, and the
structural integrity of the transaction.

In order to estimate the cash flows generated by the pool Moody's
has split the pool into PLs and NPLs.

In analysing the PLs, Moody's determined the MILAN Credit
Enhancement (CE) of 37% and the portfolio Expected Loss (EL) of
14.0%. The MILAN CE and portfolio EL are key input parameters for
Moody's cash flow model in assessing the cash flows for the PLs.

MILAN CE of 37.0%: this is above the average for other Irish RMBS
transactions and follows Moody's assessment of the loan-by-loan
information taking into account the historical performance and
the pool composition including (i) the high weighted average
current loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 90.9% and indexed LTV of
95.0% of the total pool and (ii) the inclusion of restructured
loans.

Portfolio expected loss of 14%: This is above the average for
other Irish RMBS transactions and is based on Moody's assessment
of the lifetime loss expectation for the pool taking into account
(i) the historical collateral performance of the loans to date,
as provided by the seller; (ii) the current macroeconomic
environment in Ireland and (iii) benchmarking with similar Irish
RMBS transactions.

In order to estimate the cash flows generated by the NPLs,
Moody's used a Monte Carlo based simulation that generates for
each property backing a loan an estimate of the property value at
the sale date based on the timing of collections.

The key drivers for the estimates of the collections and their
timing are: (i) the historical data received from the servicer;
(ii) the timings of collections for the secured loans based on
the legal stage a loan is located at; (iii) the current and
projected house values at the time of default and (iv) the
servicer's strategies and capabilities in maximising the
recoveries on the loans and in foreclosing on properties.

Hedging: As the collections from the pool are not directly
connected to a floating interest rate, a higher index payable on
the notes would not be offset with higher collections from the
NPLs. The transaction therefore benefits from an interest rate
cap, linked to one-month EURIBOR, with HSBC Bank plc (Aa3, on
review for downgrade/ P-1/ Aa2(cr)) as cap counterparty. The
notional of the interest rate cap follows a pre-defined
amortization schedule and expires five years from closing.

Coupon cap: The transaction structure features coupon caps that
apply when five years have elapsed since closing. The coupon caps
limit the interest payable on the notes in the event interest
rates rise and only apply following the expiration of the
interest rate cap.

Transaction structure: The Class A Note size is 60.5% of the
total collateral balance with 39.5% of credit enhancement
provided by the subordinated notes. The payment waterfall
provides for full cash trapping: as long as Class A is
outstanding, any cash left after replenishing the Class A reserve
will be used to repay Class A.

The transaction benefits from an amortising Class A reserve equal
to 3.0% of the Class A note outstanding balance. The Class A
reserve can be used to cover senior fees and interest payments on
Class A. The amounts released from the Class A reserve form part
of the available funds in the subsequent interest payment date
and thus will be used to pay the servicer fees and/or to amortise
Class A. The Class A reserve would be sufficient to cover around
12 months of interest on the Class A notes and more senior items,
at the strike price of the cap. Class B benefits from a dedicated
Class B interest reserve equal to 9.0% of Class B balance at
closing which can only be used to pay interest on Class B while
Class A is outstanding. The Class B interest reserve is
sufficient to cover around 28 months of interest on Class B,
assuming EURIBOR at the strike price of the cap. Unpaid interest
on Class B is deferrable with interest accruing on the deferred
amounts at the rate of interest applicable to the respective
note. Moody's notes that the liquidity provided in this
transaction for the respective notes is lower than the liquidity
provided in comparable transactions within the market.

Servicing disruption risk: Hudson Advisors Ireland DAC (NR) is
the back-up servicer facilitator in the transaction. The back-up
servicer facilitator will help the issuer to find a substitute
servicer in case the servicing agreement with Pepper is
terminated. Moody's expects the Class A reserve to be used up to
pay interest on Class A in absence of sufficient regular
cashflows generated by the portfolio early on in the life of the
transaction. It is therefore likely that there will not be
sufficient liquidity available to make payments on the Class A
Notes in the event of servicer disruption. The insufficiency of
liquidity in conjunction with the lack of a back-up servicer mean
that continuity of note payments is not ensured in case of
servicer disruption. This risk is commensurate with the single-A
rating assigned to the most senior note.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: The model output indicates that
if a) on the performing pool MILAN were to be increased to 40.7%
and the EL were to be increased to 15.4% and b) on the non-
performing pool house price volatility were to be increased to
6.51% from 5.92% and it would take an additional 6 months to go
through the foreclosure process, the Class A Notes would move to
A3 (sf). Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a
quantitative/model-indicated calculation of the number of rating
notches that a Moody's structured finance security may vary if
certain input parameters used in the initial rating process
differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is
not intended to measure how the rating of the security might
migrate over time, but rather how the initial rating of the
security might have differed if key rating input parameters were
varied.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and
Re-Performing Loans" published in August 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include that
the recovery process of the NPLs produces significantly higher
cash flows realised in a shorter time frame than expected and a
better than expected performance on the PLs.

Factors that may cause a downgrade of the ratings include
significantly less or slower cash flows generated from the
recovery process on the NPLs and a worse than expected
performance on the PLs compared with Moody's expectations at
close due to either a longer time for the courts to process the
foreclosures and bankruptcies, a change in economic conditions
from Moody's central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic
performance factors.

For instance, should economic conditions be worse than
forecasted, falling property prices could result, upon the sale
of the properties, in less cash flows for the Issuer or it could
take a longer time to sell the properties. Therefore, the higher
defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in downgrade of the rating.
Additionally counterparty risk could cause a downgrade of the
rating due to a weakening of the credit profile of transaction
counterparties. Finally, unforeseen regulatory changes or
significant changes in the legal environment may also result in
changes of the ratings.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity. In Moody's opinion the structure allows for
timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal with
respect to the Class A Notes by the legal final maturity date,
and ultimate payment of interest and principal with respect to
Class B by legal final maturity. Moody's ratings address only the
credit risks associated with the transaction. Other non-credit
risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant effect
on yield to investors.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


DYRET SPV: DBRS Rates Class C Notes Due 2038 'BB(high)'
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned ratings of BBB (high) (sf) to the
EUR26,400,000 Class B Asset Backed Fixed Rate Notes due 2038 (the
Class B Notes) and BB (high) (sf) to the EUR14,300,000 Class C
Asset Backed Fixed Rate Notes due 2038 (the Class C Notes) issued
by Dyret SPV S.r.l. (the Issuer).

The ratings address the timely payment of interest and ultimate
repayment of principal on or before the legal final maturity date
in December 2038. The Issuer is a limited liability company
incorporated under the laws of the Republic of Italy.

On December 20, 2017, DBRS assigned the EUR 210,600,000 Class A
Asset Backed Fixed Rate Notes due 2038 (the Class A Notes) a
rating of 'A' (sf).

The transaction is a securitization of salary and pension
assignment loan receivables as well as payment delegation loan
receivables granted by Dynamica Retail S.p.A. (Dynamica) to
individual borrowers in Italy. Zenith Services S.p.A. acts as the
transaction servicer and Dynamica as the sub-servicer.

The transaction was established on May 23, 2014 and the ratings
follow the execution of amendments to the transaction structure
on December 20, 2017 and March 8, 2017. The Notes are currently
backed by EUR 161,135,266. However, the issuer may purchase
additional receivables offered by Dynamica provided that certain
criteria are met until the payment date falling in December 2018.
The portfolio may increase to a maximum of EUR 250,000,000
provided that the purchase of the accretive portfolios is funded
with payments made by the note holders.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- The transaction's capital structure including the form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement in the form of
    (1) subordination, (2) reserve funds and (3) excess spread;

-- Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support DBRS's
    projected expected cumulative loss assumption under various
    stressed cash flow assumptions for the Notes;

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
    flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms
    of the transaction documents;

-- The cash flow analysis reflects the timely payment of
    interest under the Class B Notes and Class C Notes;

-- The originator, servicer and sub-servicer's capabilities
    with respect to originations, underwriting, servicing and
    financial strength;

-- DBRS conducted an operational risk review at Zenith's
    premises in Milan and deems it an acceptable servicer;

-- The credit quality of the collateral and ability of the
    servicer to perform collection activities on the collateral;

-- The sovereign rating of the Republic of Italy, currently at
    BBB (high); and

-- The consistency of the transaction's legal structure with
    DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
    Transactions" methodology and the presence of legal opinions
    addressing the assignment of the assets to the Issuer.

The transaction cash flow structure was analyzed in Intex
Dealmaker.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


PIETRA NERA: DBRS Finalizes 'B (high)' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized its provisional ratings of the
following classes of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate
Notes due May 2030 issued by Pietra Nera Uno S.R.L.:

-- Class A Notes rated AA (low) (sf)
-- Class B Notes rated A (low) (sf)
-- Class C Notes rated BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class D Notes rated BB (sf)
-- Class E Notes rated B (high) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Pietra Nera Uno S.R.L. is a securitization of three senior
commercial real estate loans and two pari passu-ranking capital
expenditure (capex) facilities advanced by Pietra Nera Uno S.R.L.
(the Issuer) to four Italian borrowers: (1) Moma Fund, a
regulated Italian real estate fund, is the borrower under the
Fashion District Loan; (2) Multi Veste Italy 4 S.R.L. and (3)
Multi Veste Holding Italy 4 B.V. are the borrowers under the
Palermo Loan; and (4) Valdichiana Propco S.R.L. is the borrower
under the Valdichiana Loan. The four borrowers are ultimately
owned by the funds managed/advised by Blackstone (the Sponsor).

The aggregate initial balance of the securitized loans is EUR
403,810,000, including EUR 9,000,000 and EUR 6,500,000 pari
passu-ranking capex facilities related to the Palermo Loan and
the Fashion District Loan, respectively. Each loan has a two-year
term with three one-year extension options, subject to certain
conditions.

The Fashion District Loan and the Valdichiana Loan refinanced
loans that were securitized Taurus 2015-1 IT S.r.l. and Moda 2014
S.r.l, respectively.

Each loan is limited in recourse to the borrower group and the
underlying properties, with no additional recourse to the
Sponsor. Also, there is no cross-collateralization, and the
assets and guarantees securing the loans only secure or guarantee
the liabilities arising under the respective facility agreement.

Each loan bears interest at a floating rate equal to three-month
Euribor (subject to zero floor) plus a margin that is a function
of the weighted-average (WA) of the aggregate interest amounts
payable on the Notes. As such, there is no excess spread in the
transaction, while ongoing costs and expenses incurred by the
Issuer will be paid directly by the borrowers. To hedge against
increases in the interest payable under the loans due to
fluctuations in the three-month Euribor, within ten business days
of the Issue Date each Borrower will enter into hedging
arrangements satisfying different conditions, including: (1) an
aggregate notional amount covering not less than 95% of the
relevant outstanding loan; (2) the hedge counterparty having the
requisite rating; (3) the term of the hedging being in line with
the maturity date of the loan; and (4) the projected interest
coverage ratio at the strike rate not being less than 200% at the
date on which the relevant hedging transaction is contracted. To
maintain compliance with applicable regulatory requirements,
Blackstone, acting through its group company BRE Europe 7 NQ
S.a.r.l., has retained an ongoing material economic interest of
not less than 5% by subscribing an unrated and junior-ranking EUR
20.2 million Class Z Notes.

The collateral securing the loans consists of four Italian retail
assets: three regional outlets and one regionally dominant
shopping Centre, located respectively in Mantua (northern Italy),
Valdichiana (central Italy), Molfetta and Palermo (southern
Italy). Not considering the asset located in Molfetta, which is
currently characterized by a relatively high vacancy rate of
approximately 25% (including phase II, which is currently closed
to the public), the portfolio benefits from a WA occupancy rate
of over 93.4%. The rental income is contributed by over 360
tenants, predominantly well-known international retailers, with
the largest tenant (UCI Cinemas) contributing 4.0% to the total
gross rental income. The top ten tenants generate 18% of the
total rent.

In DBRS's view and based on the valuations instructed by the
arranger, the loans (including the capex facilities) represent
medium leverage financing with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of
71.2% for Fashion District, 72.6% for Palermo and 67.6% for
Valdichiana (the LTV figures are net of the 5%, or EUR 20.2
million, material economic interest retained in the transaction
by the Sponsor). The relatively high DBRS LTV is mitigated by the
debt yield, as the collateral currently generates a Net Operating
Income (NOI) of approximately EUR 36.4 million, translating into
a day-one senior debt yield of 9.0%.

Each loan has a two-year term with three one-year extension
options, provided the following conditions have been met: (1)
there is no payment default and (2) the transaction is compliant
with the required hedging conditions. Assuming the exercise of
the extension options by the Sponsor, two of the three loans, the
Fashion District Loan and the Valdichiana Loan, will amortize
1.0% per annum starting from the second anniversary of the loan.
The Palermo Loan will amortize 1.0% per annum starting from the
first anniversary of the loan and 2.0% per annum in the last
year.

On the issue date, the Capex Facilities of the Fashion District
Loan and the Palermo Loan has been fully drawn and deposited on
two different accounts under the control of the respective
borrowers.

The facility agreements provide the Sponsor with the opportunity
to sell the borrower and respective property portfolio without
repaying the loan if it is sold to a company owning (directly or
indirectly) commercial real estate assets with an aggregate
market value of (1) no less than EUR 2 billion in Europe, or (2)
no less than EUR 5 billion worldwide.

The loan structure does not include financial default covenants
prior to a permitted change of control, but provides other
standard events of default, including: (1) any missing payment,
including failure to repay the loan at maturity date; (2)
borrower insolvency; and (3) a loan default arising as a result
of any creditors' process or cross-default. In DBRS's view,
potential performance deteriorations would be captured and
mitigated by the presence of the following cash trap covenants:
(1) an LTV cash trap covenant set at 85% for the Fashion District
Loan, 86% for the Palermo Loan and 81% for the Valdichiana Loan;
and (2) a debt yield cash trap covenant set at 8.1% in years one
to three and 8.6% in years four and five for the Fashion District
Loan, 7.4% in years one to three and 7.8% in years four and five
for the Palermo Loan, and 9.1% in in years one to three and 9.6%
in years four and five for the Valdichiana Loan.

The DBRS net cash flow (NCF) for the entire portfolio is EUR 30.1
million, which represents a 17.2% haircut to the sponsor's NOI.
DBRS applied a blended capitalization rate of 7.1% to the
aggregate NCF to arrive at a DBRS stressed value of GBP 423.5
million, which represents a 21.7% haircut to the market value
provided by CBRE's valuation completed in September 2017. The
DBRS LTV of the transaction is 95.3%.

The transaction is supported by a EUR 15.0 million liquidity
reserve facility, which is provided by Deutsche Bank AG, London
Branch. The liquidity reserve facility can be used by the Issuer
to fund expense shortfalls (including any amounts owing to third-
party creditors and service providers that rank senior to the
Notes), property protection shortfalls and interest shortfalls
(including with respect to deferred interest, but excluding
default interest and exit payment amounts) in connection with
interest due on the Class A Notes and Class B Notes. The
liquidity reserve facility cannot be used to fund interest
shortfalls on other classes of notes, including the Class Z
Notes. At issuance, the liquidity reserve facility will be fully
drawn and deposited on an account under the control of the Issuer
at BNP Paribas Securities Services, Milan Branch. DBRS currently
estimates that the commitment amount is equivalent to
approximately 23 months of interest coverage on the covered
notes.

Potential interest shortfall on Class E and Class Z, due to loan
prepayments or insufficient loan recovery proceeds, are subject
to an Available Funds Cap.

The final legal maturity of the Notes is in May 2030, seven years
after the third one-year maturity extension option under the
loans agreements. If necessary, DBRS believes this provides
sufficient time, given the security structure and jurisdiction of
the underlying loan, to enforce on the loan collateral and repay
the bondholders.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


BL CONSUMER: DBRS Assigns Provisional B(sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned provisional ratings to the Class A
Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes
and Class F Notes (collectively, the Rated Notes) to be issued by
BL Consumer Issuance Platform S.A., acting in respect of its
compartment BL Cards 2018 (the Issuer) as follows:

-- AAA (sf) to the Class A Notes
-- AA (high) (sf) to the Class B Notes
-- A (high) (sf) to the Class C Notes
-- BBB (sf) to the Class D Notes
-- BB (sf) to the Class E Notes
-- B (sf) to the Class F Notes

The ratings address the timely payment of interest and ultimate
repayment of principal by the final maturity date.

The ratings will be finalized upon receipt of an execution
version of the governing transaction documents. To the extent
that the documents and information provided to DBRS as of this
date differ from the executed version of the governing
transaction documents, DBRS may assign different final ratings to
the Rated Notes.

The ratings are based on these considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure including form and sufficiency
    of available credit enhancement in the form of
    subordination, liquidity support and excess spread.

-- Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support DBRS's
    expected performance under various stress scenarios.

-- The transaction's ability to withstand stressed cash flow
    assumptions and repay the Rated Notes according to the terms
    of the transaction documents.

-- Buy Way Personal Finance's (the Seller) and its delegates'
    capabilities with respect to originations, underwriting, cash
    management, data processing and servicing.

-- DBRS conducted an operational risk review of the Seller and
    deems it to be an acceptable servicer.

-- The transaction parties' financial strength with regard to
    their respective roles.

-- The credit quality and concentration of the collateral and
    historical and projected performance of the Seller's
    portfolio.

-- The sovereign ratings of the Kingdom of Belgium and the Grand
    Duchy of Luxembourg, currently rated AA (high) and AAA,
    respectively, by DBRS.

-- The expected consistency of legal structure with DBRS's
    "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
    methodology and the presence of legal opinions that are
    expected to address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer
    and non-consolidation of the Issuer with the Seller.

The transaction cash flow structure was analyzed with DBRS's
proprietary Excel-based tool.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CAIRN CLO IX: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Cairn CLO IX B.V. final ratings:

Class A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B-1: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B-2: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class D: 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class E: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class F: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable
M-1 notes: not rated
M-2 notes: not rated

Cairn CLO IX B.V. is a securitisation of mainly senior secured
loans (at least 90%) with a component of senior unsecured,
mezzanine, and second-lien loans. A total note issuance of
EUR411million was used to fund a portfolio with a target par of
EUR400 million. The portfolio will be actively managed by Cairn
Loan Investments LLP.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B' Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch views the average credit quality of obligors to be in the
'B' range. The Fitch-weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the
identified portfolio is 31.7, below the indicative maximum
covenant of 34 for assigning the ratings.

High Recovery Expectations
At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations. Fitch views the recovery prospects for these assets
as more favourable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets. The Fitch-weighted average recovery rate of the
identified portfolio is 66.25%, above the minimum covenant of
61.9% for assigning the ratings.

Limited Interest Rate Exposure
Up to 5% of the portfolio can be invested in fixed-rate assets,
while there are 2.5% fixed-rate liabilities. Fitch modelled both
0% and 5% fixed-rate buckets and found that the rated notes can
withstand the interest rate mismatch associated with each
scenario.

Fitch Test Matrices
The transaction features two Fitch test matrices with different
exposures to the largest 10 obligors (maximum 18% and no top 10
limit). The manager can interpolate between these two matrices.
The no top 10 limit matrix is being applied for assigning final
ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
A 125% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and with this increase added to all rating default levels,
would lead to a downgrade of up to two notches for the rated
notes. A 25% reduction in recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for all other rating levels.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


MOTOVILIKHA PLANTS: Moscow Exchange Suspends Share Trading
----------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the Moscow Exchange has decided to suspend
trading of Motovilikha Plants' shares due to recognition of the
company's bankruptcy (liquidation).

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 28,
2018, Reuters related that Motovilikha Plants said the court
declared the company insolvent.

Motovilikha Plants is a Russian metallurgical and military
equipment manufacturer.


TELECOMMERCE BANK: Put on Provisional Administration
----------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-695, dated March 21,
2018, revoked the banking license of Tula-based credit
institution Joint Stock Company Telecommerce Bank or Telecommerce
Bank (Registration No. 3380) from March 21, 2018.  According to
the financial statements, as of March 1, 2018, the credit
institution ranked 416th by assets in the Russian banking system.
The bank is not a member of the deposit insurance system.

It was revealed that Telecommerce Bank repeatedly violated law on
countering the legalisation (laundering) of criminally obtained
incomes and the financing of terrorism, including, but not
limited to, the reliable notification of the authorised body
about, among other things, operations subject to obligatory
control.  Moreover, during 2017 Q4 and 2018 Q1 a sharp increase
in the bank's dubious transit operations and dubious foreign
exchange transactions was observed.

In late February 2018, Telecommerce Bank conducted large
operations with securities that, according to the information
available to the Bank of Russia, were fictitious in nature and
were aimed at a large-scale withdrawal of assets.  Therefore, the
credit institution's operations showed signs of misconduct by the
management who conducted transactions causing direct damage to
its creditors' interests.

Under the circumstances, the Bank of Russia took the decision to
withdraw Telecommerce Bank from the banking services market.

The Bank of Russia took such a decision due to the credit
institution's repeated violations within a year of Bank of Russia
requirements stipulated by Article 7 (excluding Clause 3 of
Article 7) of Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism" as well as Bank of Russia regulations issued in
accordance with the said law, taking into account a real threat
to the interests of creditors.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-696, dated March 21,
2018, has appointed a provisional administration to Telecommerce
Bank for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant
to the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies have been suspended.

The current development of the bank's status has been detailed in
a press statement released by the Bank of Russia.



=========
S P A I N
=========


AUTOVIA DE LOS VINEDOS: Moody's Hikes EUR103MM Loan Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings to B1 from B3
on the EUR103 million European Investment Bank loan facility due
2030 (the "EIB Loan" or the "underlying bank credit facility"),
and the EUR64.1 million underlying bonds due 2027 (the "Bonds"),
both raised by Autovia de Los Vinedos, S.A. (AUVISA) in October
2004.

The outlook on the ratings remains stable. The EIB Loan and Bonds
rank pari passu senior secured. The assigned B1 ratings reflect
Auvisa's credit profile on a stand-alone basis as both the EIB
Loan and the Bonds no longer benefit from unconditional and
irrevocable guarantee of scheduled principal and interest under a
financial guarantee insurance policy issued by Syncora Guarantee
(U.K.) Ltd. (SGUK, not rated).

Auvisa is a special purpose company which in December 2003,
entered into a 30-year concession agreement with Junta De
Comunidades De Castilla La Mancha (Ba2, stable, Castilla-La
Mancha) to build, operate and maintain a 74.5km shadow toll road
being the Consuegra to Tomelloso section of the Autovia de los
Vinedos motorway linking the cities of Toledo and Tomelloso in
central Spain.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings upgrade mainly reflects the recent agreement signed
with the controlling creditors which strengthens the
effectiveness of the distribution lock-up criteria under the
financing documents, which in the past Moody's considered as a
material weakness in the structure. The underlying economics of
the project continue to show a positive trend as demonstrated by
the significant traffic increase over the past four years of
operations.

Auvisa is a shadow toll road and relies on payments from the
offtaker, the region of Castilla-La Mancha. Auvisa has been
receiving timely payments in the last six years, following
historical payment delays in 2011. Since 2012 Castilla-La
Mancha's payments have been backed by funds from the Fondo para
la Financiacion de los Pagos a Proveedores (FPPP) and the Fondo
de Liquidez Autonomico (FLA), both guaranteed by the Government
of Spain. Moody's expects that Castilla-La Mancha will continue
to provide timely payment to Auvisa and that the region will
continue to receive liquidity support from the Government of
Spain until fiscal pressure persists.

Between 2014-2017, traffic on the project road grew on average
over 5%, reaching the traffic levels observed before the
financial crisis. The traffic recovery mainly reflects an
improvement in the macroeconomic environment. The rating agency
notes that the impact of high traffic growth is partially offset
by lower than expected inflation in Spain, as Auvisa's tariffs
are indexed to the Spanish consumer price index (CPI). The
minimum and average DSCRs under the Moody's case, which assumes
long-term traffic growth of around 1.5% per annum, are 1.09x and
1.21x, respectively. Moody's DSCRs show a significant improvement
compared to Moody's previous publication (0.81x and 1.03x,
minimum and average DSCR respectively), mainly in view of the re-
profiling of the long-term maintenance plan and the improved
traffic forecast.

Auvisa benefits from standard project finance protections
including fully-amortising debt, a twelve-month debt service
reserve account and a five-year forward looking maintenance
reserve account. Following the recent agreement, creditors also
benefit from a DSCR protection account currently funded at EUR3
million.

The B1 ratings remain constrained by (1) Auvisa's weak financial
metrics compared to peers and notably lower at the latter period
of debt tenor; (2) the credit quality of Castilla-La Mancha as
payer under the concession agreement; (3) high leverage; and (4)
Auvisa's exposure to low inflation as its revenues are linked to
the Spanish consumer price index (CPI). These risks are to some
extent mitigated by the improving traffic profile and Auvisa's
structural protections which would allow the project to withstand
possible revenue shortfalls.

The stable outlook reflects the expectation that (i) Auvisa will
continue to benefit from positive traffic performance, on the
back of the improved regional economic environment and (ii) the
project's reserves and accumulated cash balances will be
sufficient to cover possible cash flow shortfalls to pay interest
and principal.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Upward rating pressure may arise if shadow toll revenues
consistently outperform Moody's estimates, such that the expected
minimum DSCR, calculated under Moody's Base Case is above 1.20x,
and the region of Castilla-La Mancha continues to pay the project
on a timely basis.

Moody's could consider downgrading the underlying rating if (i)
forecast traffic growth and/or forecast inflation was to be
revised downwards and there were a deterioration in shadow toll
revenues and DSCR consistently below Moody's estimates; (ii)
payment delays from the region of Castilla-La Mancha; or (iii)
operating, maintenance and lifecycle cost assumptions were to
prove inadequate.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Privately
Managed Toll Roads published in October 2017.


AVINTIA PROYECTOS: DBRS Finalizes Prov. BB(low) Notes Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited finalized its provisional rating of BB (low) on the
EUR50 million 4.00% Senior Secured Notes (the Notes) of Avintia
Proyectos Y Construcciones, S.L. (Avintia PyC or the Company).
The Notes have a maturity date of September 1, 2020. DBRS also
confirmed the Issuer Rating of Avintia PyC at BB (low). The
trends on both ratings are Stable.

The Notes are fully and unconditionally guaranteed by deeds of
commitment to grant second-ranking mortgages on three real estate
properties held within related parties. Avintia PyC, Grupo
Avintia, S.L. and its major subsidiaries have provided
intercompany guarantees that are consistent with DBRS's
consolidated credit approach. It is DBRS's understanding that the
amount of debt secured by first mortgage positions on pledged
assets will not be increased. Proceeds from the issuance are
expected to be used toward general corporate and operating
purposes.

On a stand-alone basis, DBRS expects the issuance to weaken
Avintia PyC's core credit metrics because of the increased level
of debt. Forecast coverage ratios are expected to remain in the
bottom range of acceptability for the current rating.

On a consolidated basis, Grupo Avintia, S.L.'s financial metrics
are expected to weaken in the short term, with gradual
improvement to a level commensurate with the current rating by
2019. The consolidated structure also modestly enhances the
Company's business risk profile, as the overall group's business
model strengthens the Company's size and market position, as well
as its diversification away from fixed-price construction
contracts, specifically with a broader focus on property services
and hotel management.

Due to the recent inclusion of intercompany guarantees and the
resulting application of DBRS's consolidated credit approach,
DBRS's future rating reports will change from the current
analysis of Avintia PyC on a stand-alone basis to the analysis of
Grupo Avintia S.L. on a consolidated basis.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


BBVA CONSUMO 9: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed its ratings on the bonds issued by
BBVA Consumo 9 FT (the Issuer):

-- Series A Notes confirmed at A (sf)
-- Series B Notes confirmed at BB (sf)

The rating on the Series A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and ultimate payment of principal on or before September
2033 (the Final Maturity Date). The rating on the Series B Notes
addresses the ultimate payment of interest and principal on or
before the Final Maturity Date.

The rating actions follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies, defaults
    and, as of the December 2017 payment date.

-- Probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD) and
    expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables.

-- Current available credit enhancement to the notes to cover
    the expected losses at their respective rating levels.

-- No revolving termination events have occurred.

The Issuer is a securitization of Spanish consumer loan
receivables originated and serviced by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria, S.A. (BBVA). The transaction closed in March 2017.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of December 2017, two- to three-month arrears represented 0.2%
of the outstanding portfolio, up from 0.1% in June 2017 and the
90+ delinquency ratio was 0.5%, up from 0.1% in June 2017. As of
December 2017, the gross cumulative default ratio was at zero.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS

DBRS conducted a loan-by-loan analysis of the remaining pool of
receivables and has maintained its base case PD and LGD
assumptions at 10.1% and 80.2% respectively.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

As of the December 2017 payment date, credit enhancement to the
Series A Notes was 13.5% and credit enhancement to the Series B
Notes was 4.5%, stable since the DBRS initial rating because of
the transaction's revolving period, scheduled to end on the
September 2018 payment date. Credit enhancement is provided by
subordination of junior classes and the Cash Reserve.

The transaction benefits from a Cash Reserve of EUR 61.9 million,
available to cover senior fees, interest and principal on the
Series A Notes and Series B Notes.

BBVA acts as the account bank for the transaction. The account
bank reference rating of A -, being one notch below the DBRS
public Long-Term Critical Obligations Rating of BBVA of A (high),
complies with the Minimum Institution Rating given the rating
assigned to the Series A Notes, as described in DBRS's "Legal
Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
methodology.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


CAIXABANK RMBS 1: DBRS Confirms 'C' Rating on Series B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed its ratings on the Series A and B
notes issued by Caixabank RMBS 1, FT (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Series A notes confirmed at A (sf)
-- Series B notes confirmed at C (sf)

The rating on the Series A notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal payable on or
before the Legal Maturity Date in March 2063. The rating on the
Series B notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest and
principal payable on or before the Legal Maturity Date in March
2063.

The confirmation follows an annual review of the transaction and
is based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance in terms of delinquencies and defaults,
     as of the December 2017 payment date.

-- Portfolio default rate (PD), loss given default (LGD) and
     expected loss assumptions for the remaining collateral pool.

-- The current available credit enhancement (CE) to the Series A
     notes to cover the expected losses at the A (sf) rating
     level.

Caixabank RMBS 1, FT is a securitization of first-lien
residential mortgage loans and first-lien residential mortgage
"Credito Abierto" drawdowns on properties in Spain originated and
serviced by CaixaBank SA (CaixaBank) that closed in February
2016.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE AND ASSUMPTIONS

The performance of the collateral portfolio is within DBRS's
expectations. As of December 2017, loans more than 90 days in
arrears represented 1.5% of the outstanding performing portfolio
collateral balance. The cumulative default ratio was at 0.2% of
the original portfolio balance.
DBRS conducted a loan-by-loan analysis on the remaining pool and
updated its PD and LGD assumptions on the remaining portfolio
collateral pool to 19.6% and 43.8%, respectively, at the A (sf)
rating level.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

As of the December 2017 payment date, the CE available to the
Series A notes increased to 15.1% from 13.5% since closing, and
consists of subordination of the Series B notes and a transaction
Reserve Fund (RF). The RF provides liquidity support and credit
support to the Series A notes. After the first two years from
closing, the RF may amortize over the life of the transaction
subject to certain amortization triggers. The RF is currently at
its target level of EUR 568 million, which is a minimum of 8% of
the outstanding balance of the rated notes and 4% of their
initial balance, subject to a floor of 2% of that initial
balance. Following the payment in full of the Series A notes, the
transaction RF will also provide liquidity and credit support to
the Series B notes.

CaixaBank acts as the Account Bank provider for the transaction.
The Account Bank reference rating of "A", which is one notch
below the DBRS Long-Term Critical Obligations Rating (COR) of
CaixaBank at A (high), complies with the Minimum Institution
Rating given the rating assigned to the Series A notes, as
described in DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured
Finance Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


CAIXABANK RMBS 2: DBRS Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to B(high)
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited took the following rating actions on the
Class A and B Notes issued by Caixabank RMBS 2, FT (the Issuer):

-- Class A Notes confirmed at A (sf)
-- Class B Notes upgraded to B (high) (sf) from B (sf)

The rating on the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal payable on or
before the Legal Maturity Date in January 2061. The rating on the
Class B Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest and
principal payable on or before the Legal Maturity Date in January
2061.

The rating actions follow an annual review of the transaction and
is based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance in terms of delinquencies and defaults,
    as of the January 2018 payment date.

-- Portfolio default rate (PD), loss given default (LGD) and
    expected loss assumptions for the remaining collateral pool.

-- The current available credit enhancement (CE) to the Class A
    and Class B Notes to cover the expected losses at the A (sf)
    and B (high) (sf) rating levels, respectively.

Caixabank RMBS 2, FT is a securitization of first-lien
residential mortgage loans and first-lien multi-credito (drawn
credit lines) mortgages on properties in Spain originated and
serviced by CaixaBank, S.A. (CaixaBank) that closed in March
2017.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE AND ASSUMPTIONS

The performance of the collateral portfolio is within DBRS's
expectations. As of January 2018, loans more than 90 days in
arrears represented 1.0% of the outstanding performing portfolio
collateral balance. The cumulative default ratio was at 0.03% of
the original portfolio balance.

DBRS conducted a loan-by-loan analysis on the remaining pool and
updated its PD and LGD assumptions on the remaining portfolio
collateral pool to 23.3% and 41.5%, respectively, at the A (sf)
rating level, and to 9.6% and 30.2%, respectively, at the B
(high) (sf) rating level.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

As of the January 2018 payment date, the CE available to the
Class A and B Notes increased to 15.4% and 5.0% from 14.8% and
4.8%, respectively, since closing. The CE consists of
subordination of the Class B Notes and a transaction Reserve Fund
(RF). The RF provides liquidity support and credit support to the
Class A Notes. After the first two years from closing, the RF may
amortize over the life of the transaction, subject to certain
amortization triggers. The RF is currently at its target level of
EUR 129.2 million, which is the minimum of 6% of the then current
outstanding balance of the rated notes and 4.8% of their initial
balance. Following the payment in full of the Class A Notes, the
transaction RF will also provide liquidity and credit support to
the Class B Notes.

CaixaBank acts as the Account Bank provider for the transaction.
The Account Bank reference rating of "A", which is one notch
below the DBRS Long-Term Critical Obligations Rating (COR) of
CaixaBank at A (high), complies with the Minimum Institution
Rating given the rating assigned to the Class A Notes, as
described in DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured
Finance Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


NH HOTEL: S&P Alters Outlook to Positive; Affirms 'B' ICR
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Spain-based NH Hotel
Group S.A. (NH) to positive from stable. At the same time, S&P
affirmed the 'B' issuer credit rating.

S&P said, "We also affirmed our 'BB-' issue ratings on the
group's EUR400 million senior secured notes. The recovery rating
is '1', indicating our expectation of very high (90%-100%;
rounded estimate: 95%) recovery prospects in the event of a
payment default.

"The outlook revision reflects the possibility that if NH reduces
its debt by converting its EUR250 million bond into equity and
generates meaningful FOCF in the next 18 months, we could upgrade
the company.

"We understand that the bond conversion into equity by November
2018 is now likely, considering that its share price (EUR6.30 as
of March 19, 2018) is currently trading comfortably above the
conversion price (EUR4.92 per share). If these notes were
converted, and all other factors stayed the same, we estimate
that NH's reported gross debt would decrease from around EUR740
million to EUR490 million or 1.9x reported gross leverage (about
5.5x on an S&P Global Ratings-adjusted basis).

NH demonstrated solid operating performance in FY2017 with 6.5%
revenue growth mainly driven by its Spanish operations, despite
the political disruptions in Catalonia as well as in Benelux; the
latter is recovering strongly after the negative impact of the
terrorist attacks in 2016. Reported EBITDA margin improved to
14.8%, from 12.3% in 2016, thanks to NH's successful
repositioning plan, which saw its average daily rate (ADR)
increase, and efficiency measures implemented during the year. NH
also generated strong positive FOCF in 2017 after five
consecutive years of negative FOCF. In addition, the company
repaid its EUR100 million high-yield bond due 2019, which
resulted in year-end adjusted debt to EBITDA of 6.2x compared to
7.3x as of December 2016 and funds from operations (FFO) to debt
of around 8.0% (6.9% as of December 2016).

"For FY2018, we anticipate NH will benefit from positive trends
in the travel industry, boosted by supportive macroeconomic
environments in its key operating markets (Spain, Benelux,
Germany, and Italy) and by gaining penetration mainly in Benelux
and Central Europe and to a lesser extent in Spain and Italy. In
our view, the above-mentioned bond conversion and favorable
trading outlook in 2018, barring any unforeseen events, could
lead to our adjusted debt to EBITDA moving close to 5.5x over the
next 12 months. We also believe that the company will likely keep
generating positive reported FOCF, except for non-recurring capex
in connection with the hotel in New York (around EUR46 million).
That said, we expect NH to be able to generate positive FOCF from
2019 onward.

"We note news of possible changes in the group's shareholder
structure. We would assess, if and when necessary, any potential
change in NH's ownership structure that may affect its financial
policy, for example if any private equity group (or a combination
of private equity groups) gained 40% of its equity, which would
lead us to assess the company as financial-sponsor-owned under
our criteria.

"NH's competitive position reflects solid brand recognition and
relatively high barriers to entry given that many of its
properties are located in prime real estate markets. Despite
still relying heavily on owned or leased hotels (about 75% of
total rooms) -- which in our opinion contributes to a high and
relatively inflexible fixed-cost base and greater constraints on
the group's earnings in a cyclical downturn -- we note that NH is
moving toward a more asset-light business model. It is doing this
by focusing on growth through management contracts and more-
flexible rent-leasing agreements, instead of fixed rent
agreements, as well as exiting loss-making lease contracts.
Additionally, we acknowledge the cost initiatives undertaken by
the company across different business levels, which led to EUR11
million cost savings in 2017 and which we estimate will create an
additional EUR5 million savings for 2018, are resulting in a
higher profitability margin.

"In our view, NH's business remains constrained by its limited
geographical concentration in Europe (about 90% of total
revenues) as well as its limited format diversification with a
still significant reliance on mid-scale hotels, where NH
currently has a strong position. Its strategy to continue
increasing its presence in the upper-scale category should
contribute to higher revenue per available room (RevPAR) and
therefore improve profitability."

S&P's assessment factors in some key business risks, including:

-- High profit volatility over the lodging cycle given the high
    fixed cost base of its owned hotels;

-- The cyclical, fragmented and competitive nature of the
    lodging industry; and

-- Exposure to discretionary consumer spending.

-- S&P also thinks that the growing Airbnb market could weigh on
    NH, although it recognizes that NH's proposition is different
    and targets more affluent customers, who are often on
    business trips and needing a shorter average stay.

S&P's base case assumes:

-- GDP growth expectations in NH's main countries of
    operations -- Spain (2%-3%), Italy (about 1%), The
    Netherlands (about 2%), Belgium (1%-2%) and Germany
    (1%-2%) -- should support group revenue growth over the next
    two years.

-- A strong outlook for the lodging industry, from which NH is
    well-placed to benefit.

-- RevPAR increases in the low-to-mid single digits in 2018,
    slowing down in 2019.

-- Revenue growth of about 4%-5% for the next two years coming
    from penetration mainly in Benelux and Central Europe where
    S&P believes there is still room for additional supply.

-- Reported EBITDA margin expected to grow to over 15% by FY2018
    and close to 16% by FY2019 thanks to cost efficiency
    measures. S&P's assumption is supported by the current trend,
    with the EBITDA margin already increasing to 14.8% in FY2017
    from 12.3% in FY2016.

-- Capex of about EUR180 million in 2018 (including EUR46
    million investment in the New York hotel refurbishment),
    which S&P understand will be funded by available cash. For
    2019 and onward, S&P expects capex of around EUR100 million-
    EUR115 million, out of which around EUR65 million would be
    maintenance capex.

-- Progressively increasing shareholder distributions over the
    following years with a dividend payout policy of about 50% of
    net recurring income.

-- S&P assumes a EUR250 million bond conversion in November
    2018, as the company's current share price is well above the
    conversion price of EUR4.919.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

-- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of 5.3x-5.5x in 2018, decreasing
    steadily to 5.0x by 2020.

-- Adjusted FFO to debt of 10%-12% over the next three years.

-- Adjusted EBITDA interest coverage improving to 2.9x by 2020
    from about 2.6x in 2018.

-- Negative FOCF of about EUR35 million in 2018, followed by a
    rapid recovery to above EUR70 million in 2019 and EUR100
    million by 2020.

The positive outlook reflects the potential for an upgrade if NH
generates meaningful positive FOCF over the next 18 months and
reduces its debt by converting its EUR250 million bond into
equity. S&P said, "During this period, we believe that Europe's
lodging market trend should remain positive, and NH should
continue to deliver a solid operating performance with reported
EBITDA margin increasing above 15%. We expect this to happen
through top-line organic growth of about 4%-5% thanks to its
repositioning plan as well as several cost efficiency measures."

S&P said, "We could raise the rating if, as a result of cost-
cutting, NH generates material positive reported FOCF on a
sustainable basis over the next 18 months, as well as reducing
its debt by converting its bond into equity. These developments
should lead adjusted leverage to decline below 5.5x and FFO to
debt to increase toward 12%.

"We would also expect continued commitment to maintain the
deleveraging path that supports improved credit metrics with
sufficient headroom to cushion any unforeseen events in the
lodging industry. Any change in the company's ownership structure
would also need to follow prudent financial policy with regard to
leverage targets, debt-funded acquisitions, and distributions to
shareholders.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if NH fails to convert its
convertible bond into equity or to generate strong positive FOCF
on a sustainable basis over the next 18 months, thereby failing
to deleverage. We believe that this could happen if the company's
operating performance weakened due to macroeconomic pressures,
geopolitical events, or competition resulting in substantial
decline in RevPar performance and EBITDA margin, or if NH
invested more than expected on hotel refurbishments leading to
negative FOCF and deterioration in credit metrics. If,
consequently, the share price dropped below the conversion price,
preventing the company from converting the bond, we would also
revise the outlook back to stable."

Evidence of a more aggressive financial policy focused on debt-
financed dividend distribution or acquisitions, or a move toward
a considerably capital-intensive business model, could also lead
to an outlook revision back to stable.


SANTANDER PRIME 2018-A: DBRS Assigns B Rating to Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS, Inc. assigned new ratings to the following classes of notes
issued by Santander Prime Auto Issuance Notes 2018-A (SPAIN 2018-
A or the Issuer):

-- $1,156,563,000 Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- $51,640,000 Class B Notes rated AA (sf)
-- $98,850,000 Class C Notes rated A (sf)
-- $49,430,000 Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- $35,410,000 Class E Notes rated BB (sf)
-- $55,330,000 Class F Notes rated B (sf)

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, proposed ratings and form and
     sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement is in the form of subordination, the
    reserve account amount and excess spread. Credit enhancement
    levels are sufficient to support DBRS-projected expected
    cumulative net loss assumptions under various stress
    scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
    flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms
    under which they have invested. For this transaction, the
    ratings address the payment of timely interest on a monthly
    basis and principal by the legal final maturity dates.

-- Santander Consumer USA Inc.'s (SC) history as an originator
    in the retail auto loan business, its capabilities with
    respect to underwriting and servicing and its ownership by
    Banco Santander S.A. (Banco Santander; rated "A" with a
    Stable trend by DBRS).

-- DBRS has performed an operational risk review of SC and
    considers the entity to be an acceptable originator and
    servicer of prime and near-prime automobile loan contracts
    with an acceptable backup servicer.

-- The SC senior management team has considerable experience and
    a successful track record within the auto finance industry.

-- Santander Holdings USA, Inc. (SHUSA) owns approximately 68.1%
    of SC. SHUSA is 100% owned by Banco Santander.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and performance of SC's
    prime and near-prime auto loan portfolio.

-- As of the Cut-Off Date, the collateral pool has a weighted
    average (WA) non-zero FICO score of 738, a WA loan-to-value
    ratio of 98.20%, a WA payment-to-income ratio of 8.78% and a
    WA debt-to-income ratio of 27.94%.

-- The pool comprises SC originations from Q3 2017 through Q1
     2018 with a WA seasoning of less than two months and a WA
     remaining term of approximately 68 months.

-- Approximately 4.31% of the balance of the collateral pool is
    commercial loans with co-obligors or guarantors.

-- Approximately 4.37% of the balance of the collateral pool has
    original loan terms from 76 months to 84 months.

-- The rating analysis for SPAIN 2018-A assumes note coupons for
    the Class A Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes and Class D
    Notes that are less than the U.S. Treasury 3 Month Bill Money
    Market Yield, which was published on Bloomberg as of February
    21, 2018.

-- The Notes are supported by a pool of loans originated by SC
    via the Chrysler Capital brand. SC is a wholly-owned
    subsidiary of Banco Santander. Banco Santander is the initial
    purchaser of the Notes.

-- SPAIN 2018-A provides for Class F Notes with an assigned
    rating of B (sf). While the DBRS "Rating U.S. Retail Auto
    Loan Securitizations" methodology does not set forth a range
    of multiples for this asset class for the B (sf) level, the
    analytical approach for this rating level is consistent with
    that contemplated by the methodology. The typical range of
    multiples applied in the DBRS stress analysis for a B (sf)
    rating is 1.10-1.25.

-- The Issuer is a Section 110 Securitization Company in
    Ireland. The legal structure and presence of legal opinions
    address the true sale of the assets from SC to the Issuer,
    the non-consolidation of the special-purpose vehicle with SC,
    that the trust has a valid first-priority security interest
    in the assets and consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria
    for U.S. Structured Finance." The legal structure and
    presence of opinions address the issuance of the Notes by the
    issuer is consistent with the DBRS "Legal Criteria for
    European Structured Finance Transactions."

Notes: All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.



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ITIVITI GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B' Issuer Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' long-term issuer credit
rating to Sweden-based trading software provider Itiviti Group
AB. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we assigned our 'B' issue rating to
Itiviti's first-lien term loan due 2025, with a '3' recovery
rating, indicating our expectation of meaningful recovery at
around 55% in the event of a payment default.

"We also assigned our 'CCC+' issue rating to Itiviti's second-
lien term loan due 2026, with a recovery rating of '6',
indicating our expectation of minimal recovery of 0% in the event
of a payment default."

The rating action follows Itiviti's successful issuance of a
EUR441 (Swedish krona [SEK]4.5 billion) first-lien term loan and
an $140 million (SEK1.15 billion) second-lien term loan. The
proceeds were primarily used to finance the acquisition of
Ullink, a trading and connectivity software company providing
solutions for buy-side and sell-side institutions. The remaining
proceeds were used to refinance existing debt and for general
corporate purposes.

S&P said, "Our rating on Itiviti primarily reflects our
expectation of the combined group's high leverage (debt to
EBITDA) following the Ullink acquisition. The rating also factors
in the enlarged entity's relatively small scale, narrow product
focus, and competition from larger players, as well as Itiviti's
relatively high churn in recent years. We also incorporate
Itiviti's solid cash flow generation, high share of recurring
revenues, strong position in the niche market of trading
software, and positive medium-term growth prospects.

"Our assessment of Itiviti's business risk profile is constrained
by the group's small scale compared with peers, in a highly
fragmented market. With pro forma revenues of SEK1.8 billion
($215 million) in 2017, Itiviti is a relatively small player
exposed to competition from financially larger players such as
Sungard, Fidessa, Bloomberg, and Reuters. Furthermore, Itiviti
operates in a niche within the market for trading software.
Although the addressable market within Itiviti's asset classes
totals nearly $6 billion, the market is highly fragmented and
about 60% is still served by in-house solutions. Our view of the
group's business risk is further constrained by relatively high
churn rates for Itiviti (excluding Ullink) in recent years, with
a peak of 20% in 2017. We understand that known closures of
trading desks largely explain the high churn, coupled with in-
market consolidation among banks. In our view, Itiviti's high
exposure to lower-tiered financial institutions (more than 40% of
total revenues in 2017) partly accounts for the higher churn
because many of its customers are more exposed to downsizing and
closures, and are potential acquisition targets for bigger firms.
We therefore still expect that churn related to downsizing could
influence revenue growth in coming years. We note, however, that
Itiviti's strategy to actively focus on Tier 1 and Tier 2 banks
should gradually decrease its exposure to Tier 3 banks, while
increasing retention of customers.

"These weaknesses are in part balanced by Itiviti's high
recurring revenues, which we expect will exceed 90% for the
combined entity. This revenue base provides good revenue
visibility compared with those of peers that rely more on
perpetual license fees or nonrecurring professional services.
Most contracts run for 12 months and are automatically renewed
unless actively cancelled. Although the contract period is
relatively short, we take into account that Itiviti has long-
standing relationships of more than seven years with 65% of
customers. Moreover, we consider Itiviti's software to be
generally mission critical for banks' daily trading activities.
Furthermore, as a global player, Itiviti has strong geographic
diversification and limited customer concentration because its
top customers account for just 5% of revenues.

"We expect that the combination of Itiviti's Trading and Market
Making solutions division with Ullink's NYFIX network and low-
and high-touch trading products will complement existing
connectivity solutions. The combination should also enable the
group to offer end-to-end solutions and a more competitive
platform. In our view, we consider that Itiviti is well
positioned to capture growth opportunities from the trend toward
IT outsourcing at financial institutions. It's also poised to
benefit from increased demand for solutions assisting banks to
comply with new standards required by the regulatory changes
according to the EU's Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MIFID) II, which came into effect on Jan. 3, 2018. We view
Itiviti's profitability as solid despite its limited scale, with
S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA margins of 30%. We expect that
the merger will further improve profitability, thanks to
synergies from reduced overheads. We therefore project S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted EBITDA margins will widen to about 40% by 2019,
after expensing capitalized research and development (R&D) costs
of about SEK240 million.

"In our assessment of Itiviti's financial risk profile, we factor
in the group's ownership and control by financial sponsor Nordic
Capital, which results in aggressive debt funding, which the
highly leveraged capital structure shows. We also take into
account Itiviti's very high S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt,
primarily consisting of the $686 million (SEK5.6 billion) term
loans, SEK550 million of preference shares, and operating-lease
obligations of about SEK280 million. This is somewhat mitigated
by Itiviti's free operating cash flow (FOCF) generation, which we
expect will be SEK250 million-SEK400 million annually over the
coming two years, leading to a ratio of FOCF to debt of more than
5%. When calculating Itiviti's adjusted credit metrics, we deduct
capitalized development costs from EBITDA and reduce capital
expenditures (capex) accordingly.

"The stable outlook on Itiviti reflects our expectation of solid
revenue growth and EBITDA margin improvements stemming from
increasing scale and cost synergies. We consequently project, by
year-end 2019, adjusted debt to EBITDA below 8.5x (excluding
shareholder loans and nonrecurring costs), solid FOCF of at least
5% of debt, and EBITDA cash interest coverage exceeding 2.5x.

"We could lower the rating if Itiviti's revenues and EBITDA do
not improve in line with our base case, for example due to
higher-than-expected churn or issues related to integrating
Ullink, resulting in debt to EBITDA higher than 8.5x and/or FOCF
to debt lower than 5%.

"We currently view an upgrade of Itiviti as remote, because it
would likely stem from deleveraging, resulting in debt to EBITDA
of about 5x, and FOCF generation of around 10%, supported by the
financial sponsor's commitment to maintain this more moderate
financial profile."


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BHS GROUP: Former Owner Banned from Serving as Company Director
---------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Williams at The Telegraph reports that former BHS
owner Dominic Chappell will be banned from serving as company
director for up to 15 years over his role in the high street
chain's collapse, while its previous owner Sir Philip Green will
escape any sanction.

The Insolvency Service said that the retail mogul Sir Philip, who
sold BHS to thrice bankrupt Mr. Chappell little over a year
before its demise for GBP1, will not face further action, The
Telegraph relates.

The agency on March 27 confirmed it had written to Mr. Chappell
and three other former directors of BHS, and related companies,
to tell them it will seek to ban them from the boardroom, The
Telegraph notes.

The group now has an opportunity to make representations to the
Insolvency Service before formal court proceedings are issued,
The Telegraph states.

According to The Telegraph, the decision not to take action
against Sir Philip means there will be no regulatory sanction
against the 66-year old entrepreneur over BHS.  He came under
heavy fire for offloading the struggling chain and its large
pension deficit to Mr. Chappell, a retail novice with a chequered
business history, The Telegraph relays.

BHS went bust in April 2016 under Mr. Chappell's company Retail
Acquisitions Limited with the loss of around 11,000 jobs, The
Telegraph recounts.

                           About BHS

BHS Group was a high street retailer offering fashion for the
whole family, furniture and home accessories.

BHS was put into administration in April 2016 in one of the
U.K.'s largest ever corporate failures, according to The Am Law
Daily.  More than 11,000 jobs were lost and 20,000 pensions (the
U.K. equivalent of a 401k) put at risk after it emerged that the
company, which had more than 160 stores across the U.K., had a
pension deficit of GBP571 million (US$703 million), The Am Law
Daily disclosed.

Sir Philip Green, a retail magnate with a net worth of more than
US$5 billion, has been heavily criticized for his role in the
collapse of BHS, The Am Law Daily said.  Mr. Green and other
shareholders had taken around GBP580 million (US$714 million) out
of the business before selling it for just GBP1 (US$1.23), The Am
Law Daily noted.

Linklaters acted for Green's Arcadia Group on the sale of the
company to Retail Acquisitions, which was advised by London-based
technology, media and telecoms specialist Olswang, The Am Law
Daily added.

Weil Gotshal & Manges and DLA then took the lead roles on the
administration, acting for the company and administrators Duff &
Phelps, respectively, while Jones Day was appointed by the
administrators to investigate the actions of the company's former
directors, The Am Law Daily related.


DEBUSSY DTC: DBRS Lowers 2025 Class A Notes Rating to B (sf)
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited downgraded its rating on the Class A Notes
of the Commercial Real Estate Loan Backed Fixed-Rate Notes due
July 2025 issued by Debussy DTC plc. to B (sf) from BB (low)
(sf). DBRS maintained its Negative trend on the rating.

The downgrade reflects the expected value decline of the
portfolio following the insolvency of the sole tenant in the
transaction, Toys R Us (TRU). DBRS's new value assumption is GBP
191.0 million, which represents a 2.5% haircut to the most recent
vacant possession value (VPV) of GBP 196.0 million by the
independent appraiser, CBRE, and dated April 2017. The Negative
trend expresses DBRS's concerns about the likely cash flow
fluctuations while TRU is wound down.

DBRS reviewed the transaction prior to the Company Voluntary
Arrangement (CVA). On December 13, 2017, DBRS downgraded its
rating to BB (low) (sf) and placed the transaction Under Review
with Negative implications.

The CVA has since been voted through and the rent payment from
the OpCo has switched to monthly and, most importantly, has been
reduced. Consequently, on February 20, 2018, the projected
interest cover ratio (ICR) covenant ratio of 1.15X was breached
and not remedied, triggering a loan event of default.

On February 22, the TRU loan was transferred to special
servicing. On February 23, the special servicer, Situs Asset
Management Limited, was replaced by Solutus Advisors Limited. TRU
filed for insolvency on February 28, 2018 and administrators have
been appointed to wind down the company.

In light of the new developments, DBRS expects that a prolonged
period of time will be required by the special servicer to
stabilize the property portfolio, providing further stress to the
underlying assets' cash flow. As a result, DBRS reduced its net
cash flow (NCF) assumption to GBP 14.3 million. DBRS's updated
NCF reflects a higher vacancy assumption and increased tenant
incentives as well as capex provisions. DBRS adjusted its value
estimate to GBP 191.0 million, which assumes that the majority of
assets can be re-let over time. However, DBRS notes that certain
usage constraints limit the potential re-letting options.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.


GNG GROUP: Reaches Agreement with Creditors, Exits CVA
------------------------------------------------------
Insider Media reports that Wakefield-based GNG Group has reached
an agreement with its creditors to end its company voluntary
arrangement (CVA), following a substantial investment from its
majority shareholder.

GNG Group is a manufacturer of foam products to the sports,
healthcare and bedding sectors.


HOUSE OF FRASER: Lenders Appoint Adviser to Assess Financials
-------------------------------------------------------------
Hannah Boland at The Telegraph reports that House of Fraser's
lenders have appointed an adviser to double-check the retailer's
financials, as they seek to ward off yet another high street
collapse.

The news of the appointment, first reported by Sky News, comes
just over a month after the UK retailer, owned by China's
Sanpower, brought in Rothschild to advise it on refinancing its
GBP390 million debt package, The Telegraph notes.

Prior to this, in January it agreed to sell the intellectual
property rights to the fashion brands it culled last year to
China's Guangzhou Sunrise Trading and last year received a GBP15
million cash injection from Sanpower, The Telegraph recounts.

According to The Telegraph, it is thought that the lenders have
brought in EY to double-check all these investments amid mounting
concern over the health of the retail sector, and House of Fraser
itself.

Earlier this year, reports emerged that House of Fraser had
sought rent reductions at a number of its sites and, in December
its credit rating was downgraded to Caa1 from B3 by Moody's,
which cited the retailer's poor trading in the first three
quarters of 2017, The Telegraph relates.

Further details over House of Fraser's financial situation are
likely to emerge at its bondholder meeting next month, The
Telegraph states.

The meeting could also provide some clarity over the retailer's
ownership, with confusion having arisen earlier this month when
Chinese tourism group Wuji Wenhua announced it was buying a
majority stake in House of Fraser from Sanpower, The Telegraph
discloses.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* DBRS Reviews Ratings on 33 Note Classes From EU CMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited, on March 14, 2018, took rating actions on
33 classes of notes across seven commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transactions. DBRS completed its review of all
outstanding DBRS-rated true-sale European CMBS transactions. In
its review, DBRS assessed the impact of the material methodology
changes outlined in the "European CMBS Rating and Surveillance
Methodology" published on February 19, 2018, and considered,
where relevant, transaction specific events (e.g., class
redemptions, loan prepayments or property disposals). The below
rating actions are broadly in line with those expected in "DBRS
Updates its European CMBS Rating and Surveillance Methodology",
February 19, 2018.

DBRS took the following rating actions:

Tibet CMBS S.R.L. - (Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate
Notes Due December 2026)

-- Class A confirmed at AA (sf)
-- Class B confirmed at A (high) (sf)
-- Class C confirmed at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D confirmed at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

DECO 2015-Charlemagne S.A. - (Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes Due April 2025)

-- Class A confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B upgraded to AAA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C upgraded to AA (high) (sf) from A (low) (sf)
-- Class D upgraded to A (low) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E upgraded to BBB (high) (sf) from BB (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Deco 2014-Gondola S.R.L. - (Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-
Rate Notes Due February 2026)

-- Class A rating has been discontinued to Disc.-Repaid.
-- Class B rating has been discontinued to Disc.-Repaid.
-- Class C upgraded to AAA (sf) from A (sf), with a Stable
    trend.
-- Class D upgraded to BBB (high) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf);
    trend changed to Stable from Negative.
-- Class E confirmed at BB (high) (sf), with a Negative trend.

Taurus 2015-1 IT S.r.l. - (Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-
Rate Notes Due February 2027)

-- Class A confirmed at A (high) (sf)
-- Class B confirmed at BBB (high) (sf); trend changed to Stable
    from Negative.
-- Class C upgraded to BBB (sf) from BB (sf); trend changed to
    Stable from Negative.
-- Class D upgraded to BBB (low) (sf) from B (sf); trend changed
    to Stable from Negative.

The trends on all Classes are now Stable.

Taurus CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2007-1 Limited - (Commercial Mortgage
Backed Floating Rate Notes due 2020)

-- Class A1 has been discontinued. to Disc.-Repaid.
-- Class A2 upgraded to BBB (sf) from CCC (sf)
-- Class B confirmed at CCC (sf)
-- Class C confirmed at CCC (sf)
-- Class D confirmed at C (sf)

The Interest in Arrears on the Class A2, Class, B, and Class C
Notes have been repaid and accordingly, the Interest in Arrears
designation was removed. However, Class D still has Interest in
Arrears. All the classes have ratings that carry no trends.

Taurus 2016-1 DEU Designated Activity Company - (Commercial
Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Due November 2026)

-- Class A confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B upgraded to AAA (sf) from AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C upgraded to AAA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D upgraded to A (high) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class E upgraded to A (high) (sf) from BB (sf)
-- Class F upgraded to A (sf) from BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Taurus 2016-2 DEU Designated Activity Company - (Commercial
Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Due January 2027)

-- Class A confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B confirmed at AA (sf)
-- Class C upgraded to A (sf) from A (low) (sf)
-- Class D upgraded to BBB (high) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The rating actions are predominantly the result of applying the
revised DBRS loan-to-value (LTV) sizing parameters as outlined in
the DBRS's "European CMBS Rating and Surveillance Methodology"
published on February 19, 2018. The review considered current
loan and property performance as well as transactions specific
events like prepayments or property disposals.

The below ratings assigned materially deviate from the rating
implied by the direct sizing parameters that are a substantial
component of the DBRS "European CMBS Rating and Surveillance"
methodology:

-- Taurus CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2007-1 Limited, Class A2
-- Taurus 2016-1 DEU Designated Activity Company, Class D
-- Taurus 2016-1 DEU Designated Activity Company, Class E

DBRS considers a material deviation to be a rating differential
of three or more notches between the assigned rating and the
rating implied by a substantial component of a rating
methodology. In this case, the assigned rating reflects
structural (i.e., loan or transaction) features that outweigh the
quantitative sizing parameters output.

More specifically, the rating on Class A2 of Taurus CMBS (Pan-
Europe) 2007-1 Limited reflects the lack of third-party liquidity
provisions being available to the issuer and the upcoming bond
maturity in February 2020. The analytical impact of these
structural features is outlined in DRBS's "European CMBS Rating
and Surveillance Methodology" published on February 19, 2018.

The rating of Taurus 2016-1 DEU Designated Activity Company,
Class D likewise reflects that the transaction's liquidity
facility cannot be used to pay interest on this class in case of
loan payment shortfalls. The rating of Taurus 2016-1 DEU
Designated Activity Company, Class E reflects that this class at
a higher rating level would not pass the additional the
additional cash flow stress DBRS undertakes for potential
upgrades, as described in DRBS's "European CMBS Rating and
Surveillance Methodology".

Since publication of the updated methodology, Moda 2014 S.r.L.
repaid in full and DBRS ratings were consequently discontinued
shortly thereafter on 1 March 2018. A separate rating action on
Debussy DTC Class A notes was taken on 9 March 2018. Please refer
to the associated press release for more information.

In addition to true-sale European CMBS transactions, DBRS
publicly rates one interest rate swap related to one European
CMBS transaction. Its rating is not affected by the methodology
update. DBRS maintains provisional ratings on 36 tranches of two
transactions involving unexecuted, unfunded financial guarantees
that reference two commercial real estate loan portfolios
originated by two U.K. banks. For those, DBRS expects to publish
the relevant rating actions in the near term.

Notes: All figures are in euros or British pound sterling unless
otherwise noted.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *