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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Wednesday, April 11, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 071


                            Headlines


B E L A R U S

BELARUS: S&P Affirms B/B Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable


D E N M A R K

JYSKE BANK: S&P Affirms BB+ Jr. Sub. Notes Rating, Outlook Stable


F R A N C E

ORANO: S&P Raises Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB+', Outlook Stable


G E R M A N Y

BEATE UHSE: Robus Capital Set to Rescue Business


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO IV: S&P Withdraws D (sf) Rating on Class E Def Notes
AVOCA CLO V: S&P Withdraws 'D (sf)' Class F Notes Rating
BLACK DIAMOND 2015-1: S&P Affirms B (sf) Rating on Class F Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

ARES EUROPEAN IX: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating to Class F Notes
SAMVARDHANA MOTHERSON: Fitch Says Reydel Deal Good for Profile
SUEDZUCKER INT'L: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Junior Subordinated Rating


R U S S I A

MAGADAN OBLAST: S&P Withdraws B+' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating


S W I T Z E R L A N D

UBS GROUP: Moody's Reviews Ba1(hyb) Preferred Stock Rating


U K R A I N E

MHP LUX: Fitch Assigns 'B' Final Rating to US$550MM Bond


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AVANTI: May Enter Administration if Debt-for-Equity Swap Fails
COMET BIDCO: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR, Outlook Negative
KERRYFRESH: Appoints Administrators, Buyer Sought for Business
QDS CONTRACTING: Put Under Administration Due to Financial Woes
RMAC NO. 1: Moody's Assigns Ca Ratings to Two Note Classes

RMAC NO. 1: S&P Assigns CCC (sf) Ratings to Classes X1 & X2 Notes
TOM VEHICLE: Appoints Ernst & Young as Administrator


                            *********



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B E L A R U S
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BELARUS: S&P Affirms B/B Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
On April 6, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B/B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Belarus. The outlook on the long-term ratings is stable.

OUTLOOK

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that
Belarus' external imbalances will moderate while the fiscal
stance remains comparatively tight over the next 12 months, with
the government retaining market access to refinance public debt
redemptions beyond 2018.

"We could consider lowering the ratings if the government's
refinancing plans were threatened, for example, due to a reversal
of political and economic support from Russia. We could also
lower the ratings if contingent fiscal risks from the banking or
public enterprise sectors were to crystalize on the sovereign
balance sheet at higher levels than we expect.

"We could raise the ratings if Belarus implemented a credible
reform program that substantially reduced the country's external
vulnerabilities and addressed weaknesses in the public enterprise
and bank sectors. Over time, we expect such reforms would also
benefit Belarus' growth prospects."

RATIONALE

S&P's ratings on Belarus are primarily supported by the potential
for financial assistance from the Russian government, which has
been extended multiple times in the past despite occasional
disputes between the two countries.

The sovereign ratings are constrained by Belarus' low
institutional effectiveness, vulnerable fiscal and balance-of-
payments positions, substantial off-balance-sheet expenditure,
and the limited effectiveness of the monetary policy conducted by
the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (NBRB; the central
bank).

Although S&P expects economic performance to strengthen following
the 2015-2016 recession in Belarus, the country's headline growth
rates will remain below those of countries at a comparable level
of economic development. Moreover, S&P does not expect real GDP
to return to the 2014 level until the end of 2019.

Institutional and Economic Profile: Growth to benefit from trade
partners' stronger economic performance

-- Belarus' economic growth will be supported by a favorable
    foreign trade backdrop.

-- Domestic institutions remain weak. Power is highly
    centralized and there are limited checks and balances between
    various state bodies.

-- S&P expects the government to make only limited progress on
    structural reforms.

In 2017, Belarus' real growth was higher than expected, at an
estimated 2.4%. This is partially explained by the normalization
of the country's relationship with Russia, which enabled it to
resume duty-free oil supplies. These are refined in Belarus and
exported afterward. The higher growth outcome was also partly
bolstered by base effects -- the recession in Belarus in 2015-
2016 saw a cumulative output contraction of close to 6%.

S&P notes that Belarus' economy is dominated by the activities of
the government and state-owned enterprises, which together
account for an estimated half of employment and control 70% of
total assets in the financial sector. In the past, the trajectory
of GDP growth has often reflected state-related spending and it
is thus often difficult to separate the impact of public spending
from other factors. Nevertheless, S&P believes the recent
strengthening of economic performance is underpinned by
recovering demand in Belarus' key trade partners, particularly
Russia and several EU member states.

Some of the newer sectors in the Belarus economy, such as the
information technology (IT) sector, have also shown a stronger
performance. Apart from growth, these sectors also positively
affect the country's balance of payments through increasing
services exports. In S&P's view, Belarus' geographic location,
low unit labor costs, and comparatively high educational
standards bode well for its ability to attract outsourcing of
some IT operations. Several start-ups have also emerged in
Belarus in recent years.

Nevertheless, the economy remains relatively dependent on
commodities. Not only do fuels, chemicals, and metals comprise
nearly 50% of Belarus' exports, but also Russia remains an
important consumer of Belarus' machinery goods and dairy produce.
Therefore, if oil prices undershoot S&P's current forecasts, the
negative impact on Russia would, in turn, affect exports from
Belarus.

The often-volatile relations between the two countries also
carries downside risk. A significant recent dispute--over the
price at which gas is supplied to Belarus--was resolved last
year, but S&P cannot exclude the possibility of further clashes.
For example, a disagreement could arise over Russia's potential
willingness to divert a portion of Belarus' exports to Russian,
instead of Baltic, ports. S&P understand that this would be less
economically attractive to Belarus than the status quo.

In recent months, Russia has raised health and safety concerns
regarding the supply of Belarus' dairy products to Russia,
causing some disagreements between the two countries. So far, the
effect appears contained, according to the Belarus authorities.
However, given that over 40% of Belarus' foreign trade is with
Russia, a further unanticipated escalation could be detrimental
to Belarus' economic performance. This is, however, not S&P's
base-case scenario.

Over the long run, S&P sees constraints on structural growth
improvements in Belarus. Belarus issued Eurobonds in June 2017
and February 2018. Following the warming of relations, it also
received a $700 million bilateral loan from Russia. Furthermore,
financing from the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and
Development resumed. S&P estimates that these resources should
allow the government to meet its debt repayments in 2018. As
such, the need to engage in a funded International Monetary Fund
program has diminished and, consequently, the incentives to
implement major structural reforms have also likely reduced.

S&P said, "In our view, the authorities have taken several
important policy steps over the past few years, including
adhering to a tighter fiscal policy and transitioning to a more
flexible exchange rate arrangement. Nevertheless, we consider
that several fundamental weaknesses still characterize Belarus
and constrain the country's development prospects." These include
the state's pervasive role in the economy, which ultimately
results in an inefficient allocation of resources, and the
existence of a multitude of loss-making public enterprises.
Consequently, although Belarus' growth is strengthening, it
remains below that of countries with a similar level of economic
development.

S&P said, "In our view, Belarus' institutional effectiveness
remains weak, with President Alexander Lukashenko controlling the
government's branches of power. High centralization of power
makes policymaking difficult to predict and we believe there are
only limited checks and balances in place between various state
institutions. The decision by the government to introduce
"unemployment tax" sparked a rare outbreak of public protests in
early 2017. Although the protests have since subsided, the
government nevertheless decided to drop the measure toward the
end of the year. We do not anticipate any major changes in
Belarus' political arrangements over the next few years."

Flexibility and Performance Profile: Balance-of-payments
vulnerabilities remain a key risk

-- Balance-of-payments risks remain a key factor constraining
    the sovereign ratings.

-- Although fiscal policy will remain comparatively tight,
    public debt is expected to grow because the currency is
    projected to weaken moderately and contingent liabilities to
    crystallize.

-- Monetary flexibility is constrained by the limited
    independence of the NBRB, underdeveloped local capital
    markets, and high levels of dollarization.

Belarus' balance of payments vulnerabilities remain the key
constraint on our sovereign ratings. Although the headline
current account deficits are comparatively modest (averaging
around 3% of GDP over the past three years), the economy's
external debt, net of liquid public and financial sector foreign
assets, is projected to be high at 74% of current account
receipts in 2018. Belarus consistently faces elevated external
financing requirements. The bulk of the country's gross external
debt pertains to the public sector and is characterized by a
heavy debt service profile.

Since resolving its disputes with Russia in April 2017, Belarus
has managed to secure financing from multiple external sources:

-- A dual-tranche Eurobond issuance in June 2017 that totaled
    $1.4 billion.

-- A further Eurobond issuance in February 2018 that totaled
    $600 million.

-- A $700 million bilateral loan from Russia received in
    September 2017.

-- Further disbursements of $800 million from the Eurasian Fund
    for Stabilization and Development in 2017.

S&P estimates that the resources secured should cover public
external debt payments for 2018. Beyond that, Belarus will need
to attract additional financing in 2019-2020 to make the
repayments coming up in these years. Belarus is considering a
potential placement of local bonds in Russia and China, as well
as further Eurobond issuance later on. S&P's baseline forecast is
that it will successfully secure financing to ensure timely
payment of government debt.

Absent foreign financing, S&P views Belarus' own external buffers
as weak. As of March 2018, NBRB's gross foreign exchange (FX)
reserves totaled about $7 billion. However, the NBRB has FX
obligations to domestic banks of about $1.3 billion and a
government FX deposit of around $4 billion, underpinned by a
recent bond issuance.

S&P said, "We do not believe that the government will be able to
deploy all its resources at the NBRB, given the need to maintain
a balance-of-payments buffer. In addition to the obligations
described above, external debt of around $1 billion is booked on
NBRB's balance sheet. We understand the authorities aim to
gradually pay down both the NBRB's direct external debt as well
as its FX obligations to domestic banks. Under the current set
up, the interest rate NBRB earns on its foreign reserves is lower
than the cost of its FX obligations. Given the favorable foreign
trade environment, we consider that the central bank likely has
some room to buy reserves and pay down its liabilities, as
planned.

"In our view, continued support from Russia will remain central
to Belarus' ability to service its public sector commercial debt.
Russia's support encompasses favorable trade conditions, such as
continued supply of hydrocarbons at attractive prices, and its
willingness to refinance existing debt. At the end of 2017,
Russia accounted for around 50% of Belarus' total public sector
external debt. We currently expect bilateral relations to remain
stable over the medium term, although downside risks exist.

"We still consider Belarus' fiscal position to be weak. Although
the general government sector has posted annual headline
surpluses averaging an estimated 1.4% of GDP over the past five
years, net debt has been increasing far faster, averaging 6% of
GDP a year over the same time period. Much of the increase can be
attributed to the depreciation of the Belarusian ruble because
over 90% of government debt is denominated in foreign currency.
In addition, some contingent liabilities have materialized.
During 2015 and 2016, the government cleaned up the balance
sheets of several banks by swapping nonperforming loans in the
wood processing and agricultural sectors for central and local
government bonds. In our view, the strained domestic banking
system still poses a moderate contingent liability for the
government, which may need to clean up the balance sheets of more
banks in the future.

Additionally, official statistics for consolidated budgetary
performance exclude the cost of construction of the new nuclear
power plant. The relevant expenditure is instead booked off
balance sheet. The authorities estimate the plant's total cost at
$7 billion (13% of 2017 GDP). It is primarily financed by a
bilateral loan from Russia, which can be drawn on up to $10
billion. As of end-2017, the authorities had drawn $3 billion
under this line and we expect further disbursements over 2018-
2020. S&P said, "We include the impact of construction cost of
the nuclear power plant in our forecast for Belarus' general
government debt. This supports our forecast of rising public
leverage, despite Belarus reporting headline surpluses."

S&P's ratings on Belarus are constrained by the limited
effectiveness of the country's monetary policy. Although
transitioning to a more flexible exchange rate arrangement has
allowed NBRB to relieve some external pressures, its ability to
influence domestic economic conditions remains restricted. In
S&P's view, the institution still lacks independence in key
decisions. The weak position of the banking system and very high
deposit and loan dollarization also inhibit the monetary
transmission channel.

The NBRB aims to gradually move to inflation targeting over the
medium term. S&P said, "Nevertheless, we anticipate that it will
continue to intervene in the FX market in some form, largely
because the authorities want to boost their FX reserves. Despite
this, we forecast that, at 6%, inflation will be broadly in line
with the target over the medium term."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.

At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the
information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was
sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  RATINGS LIST

                                             Rating
                                         To            From

  Belarus
   Sovereign Credit Rating
   Foreign and Local Currency         /Stable/B    B/Stable/B
  Transfer & Convertibility Assessment  B             B
  Senior Unsecured
  Foreign and Local Currency            B             B


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D E N M A R K
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JYSKE BANK: S&P Affirms BB+ Jr. Sub. Notes Rating, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has revised its outlooks on
Denmark-based Danske Bank A/S and Jyske Bank A/S to positive from
stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'A/A-1' long- and short-term
issuer credit and 'K-1' Nordic regional scale ratings on Danske
Bank, and its 'A-/A-2' long- and short-term issuer credit ratings
on Jyske Bank.

The rating actions stem from S&P's expectation that Danske Bank
and Jyske Bank will start issuing bail-in-able senior
nonpreferred debt this year to build up meaningful buffers of
additional loss-absorbing capacity (ALAC) to protect senior
debtholders.

On March 28, 2018, the Danish Financial Services Authority
(FSA) -- Finanstilsynet -- published its final principles for
resolution and minimum requirement for own funds and eligible
liabilities (MREL) for Danske Bank, Jyske Bank, and Sydbank (not
rated).

The FSA has set the MREL at twice the level of capital
requirements of systemic banks at all times, including capital
buffer requirements. Danske Bank and Jyske Bank must fulfil their
MREL from July 1, 2019, and can until Jan. 1, 2022, also include
senior unsecured or senior preferred liabilities issued before
Jan. 1, 2018, provided they fulfil all other MREL criteria. On
March 14 this year, the Danish government proposed changes to the
creditor hierarchy by introducing a senior nonpreferred asset
class in Danish regulation. The law is expected to take effect on
July 1, 2018, but will apply retroactively to instruments issued
from Jan. 1, 2018.

To fulfil these requirements, S&P anticipates that Danske Bank
and Jyske Bank will replace significant portions of maturing
senior unsecured debt with senior nonpreferred debt from midyear
2018, thereby accumulating a material amount of ALAC capacity.
S&P currently expects that Danske Bank will issue about Danish
krone (DKK) 90 billion-DKK100 billion (EUR12.0 billion-EUR13.4
billion) of senior nonpreferred debt through 2021 to meet its
current requirements, and Jyske Bank about DKK15 billion-DKK18
billion.

DANSKE BANK

S&P said, "The positive outlooks on Danske Bank and Danske Bank
A/S, Swedish Branch indicate that we could raise our long-term
ratings by one notch if the bank realizes its issuance plans
throughout 2018 and approaches its target for ALAC buffers
stemming from the MREL. Progress in bringing ALAC above 5% of
risk-weighted assets (RWA) would support an upgrade. We also
expect that Danske Bank will maintain its strong capital and
improved profitability. In our view, Danske Bank has some capital
flexibility, since we forecast our risk-adjusted capital (RAC)
ratio will likely stay within the 10.75%-11.25% range over the
next two years.

"We could revise our outlook to stable if we expect the issuance
of ALAC-eligible instruments will total less than 5% of RWAs or
we see a risk that generous dividend payouts or exposure growth
could result in our projected RAC ratio declining below 10%.

"The stable outlook on subsidiary Danica remains unchanged and
continues to reflect that on Danske Bank's unsupported group
credit profile, since we view Danica as a core group entity, but
not eligible for an uplift for ALAC support in the long-term
rating."

JYSKE BANK

S&P said, "The positive outlooks on Jyske Bank and its core
subsidiary BRFkredit A/S indicate that we could raise the long-
term ratings by one notch if Jyske Bank realizes its issuance
plans in 2018-2019, approaching its target ALAC buffers stemming
from the MREL.

"We expect Jyske Bank's ALAC buffer will increase to more than 3%
of RWA in 2018 and eventually exceed 5% in 2020. This projection
does not incorporate the potential impact of Jyske Bank's
acquisition of Nordjyske Bank, although we anticipate that Jyske
Bank would maintain a RAC ratio sustainably above 10% in such a
scenario.

"We could revise our outlook to stable if we expect issuance of
ALAC-eligible instruments will total less than 5% of RWAs. In
addition, we could lower the ratings if the bank's acquisition of
Nordjyske Bank, capital distributions, or volume growth weakened
Jyske Bank's capital adequacy more than we currently expect,
resulting in our RAC ratio remaining below 10%.

"In addition, we could lower the ratings if Jyske Bank's asset
quality metrics weakened, leading us to take a negative view of
the bank's combined risk and capital position, or if Jyske Bank's
funding and liquidity profile deteriorated significantly.

"The positive outlook on BRFkredit rests on our expectation that
the entity's senior creditors would benefit in a resolution from
the parent's ALAC buffer. We could revise this outlook to stable
if we concluded that BRFkredit would not receive support via
Jyske Bank's ALAC in such a scenario."

Ratings List

  Danske Bank A/S
  Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Action
                                    To                 From
  Danske Bank A/S
  Danske Bank A/S, Swedish Branch
   Issuer Credit Rating             A/Positive/A-1   A/Stable/A-1

  Ratings Affirmed

  Danske Bank A/S
   Nordic Regional Scale Rating           --/--/K-1
   Certificate Of Deposit                 A/A-1
   Senior Unsecured                       A
   Subordinated                           BBB+
   Junior Subordinated                    BBB-
   Commercial Paper                       A-1
   Commercial Paper                       K-1
   Danske Corp., Delaware
   Commercial Paper                       A/A-1

  Jyske Bank A/S
  Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Action
                                        To                 From
  Jyske Bank A/S
  BRFkredit A/S
   Issuer Credit Rating           A-/Positive/A-2   A-/Stable/A-2


  Ratings Affirmed

  Jyske Bank A/S
   Nordic Regional Scale Rating         --/--/K-1
   Certificate Of Deposit
    Foreign Currency                    A-2
  Senior Unsecured                      A-
  Subordinated                          BBB
  Junior Subordinated                   BB+
  Commercial Paper                      A-2


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F R A N C E
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ORANO: S&P Raises Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB+', Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has raised its long-term issuer
credit rating on France-based nuclear services group Orano to
'BB+' from 'BB'. The outlook is stable.

We also raised our ratings on Orano's senior unsecured bonds to
'BB+' from 'BB'. Although we expect substantial recovery (70%-
90%; rounded estimate 85%) on the bonds in the event of a
default, the recovery rating is capped at '3' due to the bonds'
unsecured nature and issuance by a company rated in the 'BB'
category.

The upgrade follows the finalization of Orano's restructuring,
with the sale of Areva NP's assets to ElectricitÇ de France (EDF)
in December 2017, the completion of two equity increases in
February 2018, cumulative cost savings of about EUR480 million
yearly since 2014, and the company's track record of operating as
a stand-alone entity since mid-2017. S&P said, "We expect the S&P
Global Ratings-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will average 5.0x-
5.5x in 2018-2020 and decrease thereafter, despite challenging
industry conditions characterized by low and volatile spot prices
due to uncertainty about the pace of the recovery in demand for
uranium products globally. This is supported by the company's
long-term contract profile, which limits its exposure to spot
prices in the near term; management's new cost-savings plan
through 2020; and the company's commitment to reduce net debt
after 2018. We also anticipate the company will generate
moderately positive free operating cash flow (FOCF) from 2018
onward. We continue to believe that there is a high likelihood of
Orano receiving support from the French government, which is
reflected in a three-notch uplift in the rating above the
company's stand-alone credit profile."

S&P said, "After our adjustments, we calculate that debt to
EBITDA was 4.8x in 2017, which demonstrates the resilience of the
company's business, supported by long-term contracts in its
mining, enrichment, and back-end divisions. We expect that this
ratio could deteriorate to about 6x in 2018, due to one-time
effects linked to the industrial transition at the Comurhex I
site to Comurhex II, as well as expenses related to the Voluntary
Departure Plan. We factor in, however, that after a temporary
increase in 2018, leverage will decrease in 2019 and 2020 on the
back of EBITDA recovery and moderately positive discretionary
cash flow, supported in particular by favorable working capital
movements related to advance payments in the back-end segment as
well as some destocking in the front-end segment."

Orano's restructuring was completed after two Japanese
shareholders, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. and Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, contributed additional equity totaling EUR500 million
in February 2018, after NEW NP (now Framatome) was sold to EDF.
Although the full completion of the capital increases and
restructuring was in line with S&P's expectations, it believes
this enhances Orano's credit profile because it further improves
its liquidity position and capital structure. It has also removed
residual risks related to AREVA SA.

Orano was originally created by France-headquartered nuclear
services provider AREVA to focus on the key nuclear cycle
activities, encompassing AREVA's former mining, uranium
conversion and enrichment, and back-end activities (such as
recycling, dismantling, logistics, and other downstream
services). At year-end 2017, Orano's revenues totaled EUR3.9
billion and the S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA figure was
EUR1.0 billion. S&P views these activities as providing Orano
with stable cash flows, backed by long-term contracts, supporting
its view of Orano's satisfactory business risk profile.

S&P said, "We also take into account Orano's strong global market
positions, fully invested asset base with high-quality mining
sites and reserves, and asset and geographic diversification. We
believe that the sector's high capital intensity, long-term
customer relationships, technological know-how, and security and
safety considerations create important barriers to entry. The
main constraints are the difficult low-price conditions in the
nuclear industry and challenging operating environment, which we
think will persist since utility clients remain under pressure to
contain capital and operating expenditures, with new builds being
delayed and sometimes becoming less likely as some governments
decide to reduce the nuclear part of the energy mix.

"Orano's highly leveraged financial risk profile reflects its
high adjusted debt, which largely comprises bonds. We anticipate
adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 6x in 2018, 5.5x-6.0x in 2019,
and about 5x in 2020 (after 4.8x in 2017). We also anticipate
moderately positive FOCF and discretionary cash flows from 2018,
which should enable the company to gradually reduce debt.

"In our debt calculation, we take into account about EUR1.8
billion of debt adjustments related to pension-related
liabilities and asset-retirement obligations. We view Orano's
credit ratios, including leverage and only limited FOCF
generation (excluding capital injection), as comparatively weaker
than those of peers in the same rating category, which is
reflected in our negative view of Orano under our comparable
ratings analysis.
At this point we don't factor in any impact in our base case from
the French Multi-Year Energy Program (Programmation Pluriannuelle
de l'Energie; PPE). France will decide by the end of this year
how many nuclear reactors it wants to close in order to reduce
the share of nuclear operations in power generation.

"We consider Orano to be a government-related entity (GRE). The
French government owns 90% of Orano (including a direct stake of
45.2% and an indirect stake through AREVA SA and Atomic Energy
Commission). We view the government as committed to ensuring that
any potential liquidity pressure will be addressed in a timely
manner, as demonstrated by its recent commitment to provide new
equity and intermediate funding to Orano.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Orano's focus on
improving its cost position and its FOCF generation will enable
it to reduce adjusted debt to EBITDA to below 5.5x in 2019-2020
despite challenging industry conditions, supported by its
sizeable, long-term order backlog.

"We could lower the rating if debt to EBITDA increased materially
above 6x in 2018 or if we didn't expect deleveraging in 2019-
2020, so that the ratio stayed at about 6x on average. This could
be the case if the currently weak market environment affected
Orano's performance more than we currently expect, despite its
long-term contract structure, or if it faced major, unexpected
operational or quality issues, or if the revision of the French
PPE resulted in a significant negative impact for Orano.

"We do not contemplate an upgrade in the next 18 months, given
our view that challenging industry conditions will limit EBITDA
improvements and deleveraging. We would, however, consider an
upgrade over time if we forecast our adjusted debt to EBITDA will
be sustainably and comfortably between 4.0x and 5.0x, in
conjunction with positive FOCF of at least EUR200 million. This
would require better market conditions, including stronger demand
for uranium and uranium enrichment that in turn would likely
require an increase in global nuclear power production."


=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


BEATE UHSE: Robus Capital Set to Rescue Business
------------------------------------------------
The Local reports that once Europe's biggest erotic retail
company, Beate Uhse filed for insolvency last year, but is now
set to be saved by a financial investor.

According to The Local, financial investment company
Robus Capital is set to step in to keep the company alive.

The company's bankruptcy attorney Georg Bernsau told
WirtschaftsWoche "If all goes to plan, then Robus Capital will
take over the recoverable elements of the company at the
beginning of May," The Local relates.

The surviving elements of the business are to be consolidated
into a subsidiary called "be you GmbH", Mr. Bernsau explained,
saying that the move would save "around 150" jobs at Beate Uhse,
The Local discloses.

According to The Local, WirtschaftsWoche said the restructuring
would see departments such as marketing retained in Germany, and
an increased sales drive through online, third-party companies
such as Amazon.

Beate Uhse had suffered immensely in recent years, as it
struggled to keep its head above water in the digital era, The
Local notes.

It declared insolvency last December, with chairman
Michael Specht expressing the hope that the move would help
"clean up" the business, The Local recounts.


=============
I R E L A N D
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AVOCA CLO IV: S&P Withdraws D (sf) Rating on Class E Def Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings withdrew its credit rating on Avoca CLO IV
PLC's class E Def notes following the transaction's early
termination. Before the withdrawal, S&P lowered to 'D (sf)'
its rating on this class of notes.

The notes' legal final maturity date is Feb. 18, 2022. However,
the transaction was terminated early pursuant to a deed of
amendment, which the class E Def noteholders approved by passing
an extraordinary resolution to terminate the transaction in April
2017 and write down any principal amount outstanding on the
notes.

Under the amended terms of the transaction documents, no legal
default has occurred for the class E Def notes. However, S&P has
lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on the class E
Def notes because the existing terms regarding the payment of
interest and principal amounts outstanding have been amended.

S&P applied its exchange offer criteria and determined that the
offer to the noteholders was distressed, rather than
opportunistic. Furthermore, the offer resulted in the noteholders
receiving less value than under the original terms of the
securities.

Avoca CLO IV is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to speculative-grade corporate
firms.

RATINGS LIST

  Avoca CLO IV PLC
  EUR494.1 mil floating- and fixed-rate notes
                                        Rating
  Class         Identifier         To           From
  E Def         053813AE1          D (sf)       CCC- (sf)

  Ratings Subsequently Withdrawn

  Avoca CLO IV PLC
  EUR494.1 mil floating- and fixed-rate notes
                                        Rating
  Class         Identifier         To           From
  E Def         053813AE1          NR           D (sf)

  NR--Not rated


AVOCA CLO V: S&P Withdraws 'D (sf)' Class F Notes Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings withdrew its credit rating on Avoca CLO V
PLC's class F notes following the transaction's early
termination. Before the withdrawal, S&P lowered to 'D (sf)' its
rating on this class of notes.

The notes' legal final maturity date is Aug. 3, 2022. However,
the transaction was terminated early pursuant to a deed of
amendment, which the class F noteholders approved by passing an
extraordinary resolution to terminate the transaction in November
2017 and write down any principal amount outstanding on the
notes.

Under the amended terms of the transaction documents, no legal
default has occurred for the class F notes. However, S&P has
lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on the class F
notes because the existing terms have been amended regarding the
payment of interest and principal amounts outstanding.

S&P applied its exchange offer criteria and determined that the
offer to the noteholders was distressed, rather than
opportunistic. Furthermore, the offer resulted in the noteholders
receiving less value than under the original terms of the
securities.

Avoca CLO V is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to speculative-grade corporate
firms.

RATINGS LIST

  Avoca CLO V PLC
  EUR543.25 mil floating-rate notes
                                    Rating
  Class           Identifier        To                 From
  F               05381CAJ0         D (sf)             CCC- (sf)

  Ratings Subsequently Withdrawn

  Avoca CLO V PLC
  EUR543.25 mil floating-rate notes
                                    Rating
  Class           Identifier        To                 From
  F               05381CAJ0         NR                 D (sf)

  NR--Not rated


BLACK DIAMOND 2015-1: S&P Affirms B (sf) Rating on Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its credit ratings on Black Diamond
CLO 2015-1 DAC's class A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C, D, E, and F notes.

The affirmations follow its analysis of the transaction's
performance and the application of our relevant criteria.

TRANSACTION PERFORMANCE OVERVIEW AND CREDIT ANALYSIS

The par value and interest coverage tests are currently passing.

Since S&P's previous review in May 2017, the portfolio's credit
quality has exhibited a neutral-to-negative movement in the
average ratings distribution. For example, as of the latest
available data, assets rated in the 'B' category account for
82.3% of the portfolio, compared with 79.2% at our previous
review. The erosion in credit quality has been partially offset
by an increase in obligor diversity and par build. Currently,
there are 168 distinct obligors in the pool spread over 180
assets, and the issuer has built up approximately EUR6 million
(euro equivalent) of par against its initial target par level at
closing. This has helped support the transaction's cash flows
through an increase in available credit enhancement, which in
turn has partially offset the decrease of other key parameters,
namely the CLO's weighted-average recovery rates and weighted-
average spread generated by the underlying portfolio.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

S&P said, "We subjected the transaction's capital structure to a
cash flow analysis to determine the break-even default rates
(BDRs) for each rated class of notes at each rating level. The
BDR is a measure of the maximum level of gross defaults that a
tranche can withstand and still fully repay the noteholders. We
have incorporated a series of cash flow stress scenarios using
various default patterns and levels for each liability rating
category, in conjunction with different interest and foreign-
exchange rate stress scenarios.

"In accordance with paragraphs 94 and 95 of our corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria, we subjected the
capital structure to our cash flow analysis to produce each
scenario BDR, which we then ranked from lowest to highest. We
then applied the percentiles in line with table 14 of the
corporate CDO criteria to determine each tranche's BDR, which we
then compared with the respective scenario default rate (SDR; the
maximum level of defaults that a tranche can expect at each
respective rating level). Our results show that for all classes
of notes, the BDRs are able to surpass the SDRs at their current
rating levels. As a result, we have affirmed our ratings on all
classes of notes."

FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK

At closing, the transaction benefited from a natural foreign
exchange hedge since the amount of U.S. dollar-denominated
liabilities issued by the class A-2 and A-4 notes at closing
closely matched the amount of U.S. dollar-denominated assets.

At the same time, the issuer used the notes' issuance proceeds at
closing to acquire a European-style currency call option with a
five-year maturity. This enables the issuer to receive U.S.
dollar proceeds at a specified strike price on the exercise date.

S&P said, "We note from our BDR analysis that as the transaction
seasons, the benefit awarded toward the call options diminishes.
This is because at every full review, we revisit our cash flow
analysis and reapply our credit, cash flow, and foreign exchange
(FX) stresses, which therefore makes less use of the call options
as the transaction seasons.

"We have taken this into account in our analysis by modeling the
credit and cash flow results at various points in the remaining
life of the transaction, close to where the benefit to the
options is most limited. For the class A notes, our results show
that while the cash flow results come under more pressure as the
transaction seasons, these only occur in certain cash flow
scenarios and show a potentially limited resulting negative
difference between BDRs and SDRs."

BREAK-EVEN DEFAULT ANALYSIS

In addition to the abovementioned BDR analysis, S&P's analysis
under its corporate CDO criteria also focuses on the following:

-- The distribution of scenario BDRs to consider whether the
    results are skewed;

-- Whether BDR failures are associated with certain default
    patterns and timings; and

-- The comparison of scenario BDRs to S&P's forecast of
    corporate default rates over the coming three years.

S&P said, "From our distribution of scenario BDRs and sensitivity
analyses, we noted that there are particular instances where the
scenario BDR is negatively skewed and is an outlier against all
other distributions. Specifically, these are scenarios where,
under our break-even default analysis assumptions, defaults are
biased against any dollar assets in the portfolio and the Euro-
currency is depreciating against the dollar, combined with a flat
or decreasing EURIBOR rate and rising dollar-denominated-LIBOR
rate.

"We have taken these scenarios into account in our BDR analysis;
however, we view them as being limited in scope considering the
current and expected macroeconomic environment for the tenure
that the class A notes remain outstanding. For example, among
other factors, where in stressed scenarios macroeconomic
fundamentals may lead to different outcomes based on central
government/bank involvement; and where current and forecasted
euro-dollar exchange rates appear to be trending in opposite
directions and further away from the movement of the depreciation
rates under our cash flow assumptions. Indeed, on the latter,
through scenario testing, our analysis shows that the BDRs for
all classes improves as euro-dollar exchange rates improve (i.e.,
euro strengthening against the dollar), as FX rates are moving
further away from the most stressful scenario.

"Taking into account our current observations of the transaction
and our analysis of the transaction's performance, including an
updated credit and cash flow analysis, we have concluded that the
available credit enhancement for all classes of notes is
commensurate with the currently assigned ratings. We have
therefore affirmed our ratings on all classes of notes."

RATINGS LIST

  Class                 Rating

  Black Diamond CLO 2015-1 Ltd.
  EUR337.4 Million, $89.6 Million Senior Secured Fixed- And
  Floating-Rate Deferrable Notes And Subordinated Notes

  Ratings Affirmed

  A-1                   AAA (sf)
  A-2                   AAA (sf)
  B-1                   AA (sf)
  B-2                   AA (sf)
  C                     A (sf)
  D                     BBB (sf)
  E                     BB (sf)
  F                     B (sf)


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ARES EUROPEAN IX: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating to Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its credit ratings to Ares European
CLO IX B.V.'s class A, B-1, B-2, C, D, E, and F notes. At
closing, the issuer also issued unrated subordinated notes.

Ares European CLO IX is a European cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO), securitizing a portfolio of primarily senior
secured euro-denominated leveraged loans and bonds mainly issued
by European borrowers. Ares European Loan Management LLP is the
collateral manager.

The ratings assigned to the notes reflect our assessment of:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
    broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans and bonds that are governed by collateral quality and
    portfolio profile tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
    cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
    the performance of the rated notes through collateral
    selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading. The
    transaction's legal structure, which is bankruptcy remote.

Under the transaction documents, the rated notes pay quarterly
interest unless there is a frequency switch event. Following
this, the notes permanently switch to semiannual payment. The
portfolio's reinvestment period ends approximately four years
after closing.

S&P said, "Our ratings reflect our assessment of the collateral
portfolio's credit quality, which has a weighted-average 'B'
rating. We consider that the portfolio is well-diversified,
primarily comprising broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans and senior secured bonds. Therefore, we have
conducted our credit and cash flow analysis by applying our
criteria for corporate cash flow collateralized debt obligations.

"In our cash flow analysis, we used the EUR400 million target par
amount, the covenanted weighted-average spread (3.42%), the
reference weighted-average coupon (4.50%), and the target minimum
weighted-average recovery rate at the 'AAA' rating level as
indicated by the collateral manager. We applied various cash flow
stress scenarios, using four different default patterns, in
conjunction with different interest rate stress scenarios for
each liability rating category."

"Citibank N.A. London Branch is the bank account provider and
custodian. The documented downgrade remedies are in line with our
current counterparty criteria.

"Under our structured finance ratings above the sovereign
criteria, we consider that the transaction's exposure to country
risk is sufficiently mitigated at the assigned rating levels.

"The issuer is bankruptcy remote, in accordance with our legal
criteria.

"Following our analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, we believe our ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each class
of notes."

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Assigned

  Ares European CLO IX B.B.
  EUR413.70 Million Senior Secured Fixed And Floating-Rate Notes
  (Including EUR42.50 Million Unrated Subordinated Notes)

  Class          Rating            Amount
                                 (mil. EUR)

  A              AAA (sf)          228.00
  B-1            AA (sf)            29.80
  B-2            AA (sf)            30.00
  C              A (sf)             26.80
  D              BBB (sf)           22.40
  E              BB (sf)            23.10
  F              B- (sf)            11.10
  Sub.           NR                 42.50

  NR--Not rated. Sub.--Subordinated.


SAMVARDHANA MOTHERSON: Fitch Says Reydel Deal Good for Profile
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects Netherlands-based Samvardhana Motherson
Automotive Systems Group BV's (SMRP BV, BB+/Positive) credit
profile to benefit from its proposed acquisition of Reydel
Automotive Group (Reydel) because the transaction is moderately
sized and neutral to SMRP BV's leverage, and will enhance its
business diversification.

On April 2, 2017, SMRP BV said it would acquire 100% of France-
based Reydel from Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. for USD201
million in cash. Reydel is an automotive parts supplier with 20
plants located in 16 countries and provisional revenue in excess
of USD1.0 billion and EBITDA of USD68 million in 2017. SMRP BV
expects to complete the transaction over the next four to six
months subject to customary closing conditions and regulatory
approvals.

Reydel manufactures and supplies interior products, including
instrument and door panels, console modules and decorative parts,
to global auto original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Its top
customers include Groupe PSA, Renault, Ssangyong, Mahindra,
Volkswagen and General Motors, and its customer relationships
with global OEMs average more than 25 years. Established markets
in Europe (mainly France and Spain) account for nearly two thirds
of Reydel's revenue, with the rest from growing markets in Asia
and Latin America.

Fitch believes the transaction is a good strategic fit for SMRP
BV and it will help the company achieve growth while enhancing
business diversification. The acquisition is in line with the
group's strategy to ensure no single country, customer or
component accounts for more than 15% of turnover. Reydel is small
compared to SMRP BV and will increase the latter's revenue by
only about 15%, but it will help increase SMRP BV's business
diversification in terms of customers, geography and products.

Leading French auto OEMs such as PSA and Renault account for
nearly half of Reydel's revenues. This complements SMRP BV's
existing customer base, in which German auto OEMs, such as Audi,
Daimler and Volkswagen, hold the top positions. The acquisition
will reduce Germany's share of SMRP BV's revenue to about 28%
from 34% and enhance geographical diversification. The
transaction will also increase the contribution from instrument
panels, leading to greater balance across product categories.

Fitch does not foresee material financial risks associated with
the transaction. Reydel's profit margins are lower than SMRP
BV's, but the impact on SMRP BV's overall profitability will not
be significant, given Reydel's small size and low recurring capex
needs. Fitch expects Reydel's operating performance to be
supported by its long-standing customer relationships and good
order-book visibility.

SMRP BV has adequate liquidity to fund the purchase using cash
and existing bank facilities. In Fitch's view, the transaction
will not affect its leverage as the effective purchase
consideration, after reducing Reydel's net cash position of USD63
million as of December 2017, would be USD138 million, or about 2x
of Reydel's 2017 EBITDA.

Overall, Fitch believes the moderate size of the transaction, the
two entities' product overlap, SMRP BV's good track record in
integrating acquired businesses, and prudent purchase price will
reduce the overall execution risks of the transaction. SMPR BV
also expects to generate revenue and cost synergies from cross-
selling opportunities and operations located in the same areas.


SUEDZUCKER INT'L: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Junior Subordinated Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the
outlook on the Baa2 long-term issuer ratings of Suedzucker AG
('Suedzucker' or 'the company'). All ratings, including the long-
term issuer rating of Baa2 and the short-term Prime-2 ratings of
Suedzucker and of Suedzucker International Finance B.V. have been
affirmed. Additionally Moody's has also affirmed Suedzucker
International Finance B.V's junior subordinated rating of Ba2.

"The negative outlook follows the company profit warning
announcement on 26th of March and Moody's expectation that
weakness in sugar prices for more than 12 months, both globally
and across Europe, might result in a structural decline in the
company's profitability and cash flow generation", says Paolo
Leschiutta a Moody's Senior Vice President and lead analyst for
Suedzucker. "Our assessment of the company's credit quality will
depend on how well the company adapts to a lower pricing
environment following the liberalization of the sugar market
across the EU and ongoing low world sugar prices including in
terms of management of breakeven point and cash as well as
financial policies", added Mr Leschiutta.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Suedzucker is expecting a significant drop in its consolidated
operating profit for the year ending February 2019. The drop will
result from an operating loss of around EUR100-200 million in its
sugar division which will drive an overall profit decline to
around EUR100-200 million from around EUR440 million reported
during FYE February 2018 based on preliminary figure published on
26 of March (and EUR426 million in February 2017).

The expectation for the lower profitability follows the decline
in both world and EU sugar prices on the back of ongoing
oversupply in the market and the EU sugar market liberalisation
in October last year, with prices across the EU, in particular,
reaching the lowest level since the implementation of the EU
sugar price reporting in 2006. As of January 2018 white sugar
across the EU was valued at EUR374 per tonne as an average.

Sugar prices in recent months have dropped below Moody's
expectations. In addition to that, the rating agency was also
expecting Suedzucker to be able to compensate for lower prices
with higher volumes and a more flexible cost structure. Higher
production volumes after quota abolishment across the EU are
leading to increasing export activities and increases in
Suedzucker's plants utilisation. Furthermore, sugar producers
across the EU, like Suedzucker, are not obliged to pay any longer
beet farmers a minimum price of EUR26.29 a tonne, which has a
positive effect as it reduces variable costs. Higher volumes and
lower variable costs have not been enough, however, to compensate
for the material negative impact from the historic low EU sugar
prices.

Based on the new company's estimates, Moody's believes that
Suedzucker' financial leverage, measured as Moody's adjusted
(gross) debt to EBITDA, might increase above 4.5x at the end of
FYE Feb 2019. This is well above the rating agency's assumptions
currently built into the Baa2 rating and above the maximum of
3.5x over time tolerated at the Baa2 rating. The level, however,
is similar to that of 2015 and 2016 when the company's
profitability was under pressure due to low sugar prices across
the EU, with a Moody's adjusted leverage of 4.8x and 4.0x
respectively. Moody's expectation was that of a greater
resilience gained by the company after that last bout of
volatility through in particular a lower breakeven point.

To the extent that the company is unable to provide enough
evidence of its capability to restore profitability and that
sugar prices remain depressed for a prolonged period of time, the
rating of Suedzucker could come under negative pressure. In
particular a leverage above 4.5x is seen as unsustainable for the
current rating level. Suedzuker's current credit metrics offer
only a degree of flexibility to tolerate temporary deterioration
as Moody's estimates that its debt to EBITDA, as adjusted by
Moody's, was around 3.0x at FYE 2018 (including full year
contribution of Richelieu Moody's was expecting a leverage below
2.5x). The company's EBITDA, however, includes only few months
contribution from the acquisition of Richelieu Foods, a US-based
private-label frozen pizza manufacturer acquired for $435 million
on first December 2017.

On the positive side, Moody's note that despite a high degree of
uncertainty over the short term, following a period of price
volatility Moody's expects the supply and demand in the sugar
market to become more balanced, leading possibly to a recovery in
sugar prices. Moreover, the company's increased diversification
into non sugar related activities in recent years help
compensate, to some extent, for weaknesses in the sugar activity.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Ba2 rating on Suedzucker International Finance B.V's EUR700
million junior subordinated notes reflects the still good
headroom under the cash flow trigger of the notes, which is
unlikely to result in a stoppage in the cash coupon payment of
the junior notes. This is in line with Moody's methodology to
rate non-cumulative hybrids with a strong mandatory coupon skip
trigger. The subordinated perpetual bond has an indefinite
maturity. The issuer has a call option, subject to Suedzucker
having issued, within the 12 months preceding the redemption
becoming effective, parity securities and/or junior securities
under terms and conditions similar to those of the junior notes,
against issue proceeds at least equal to the amounts payable upon
redemption.

The Ba2 subordinated instrument rating reflects the loss
absorption characteristics of the rated instrument (which
continues to receive Basket D treatment), including (1) its
deeply subordinated and perpetual nature; (2) the presence of a
mandatory non-cumulative coupon suspension linked to a breach of
the strong trigger; and (3) an optional cumulative deferral if no
dividends are paid.

NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectation that currently
low sugar prices will result in a prolonged deterioration in the
company's operating performance and profitability, which will
lead to a weakening in key credit metrics beyond levels which
Moody's deems appropriate for the Baa2 rating. Failure to restore
operating margin or reducing financial leverage towards 4.0x over
the next 12 to 18 months through measures aimed at preserving
cash could result in a rating downgrade.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Positive pressure on the rating is currently unlikely given the
negative outlook. A restoration of profitability, together with
the company's ability to reduce its Moody's adjusted leverage
sustainably below 2.5x could lead to upward pressure on the
rating.

Conversely, negative rating pressure could develop in case of a
prolonged deterioration in both operating margin and credit
metrics. Quantitatively a Moody's adjusted debt to EBITDA ratio
sustained above 3.5x and a retained cash flow/net debt ratio
sustainably below 20% could result in a downgrade. Any
deterioration in the company's liquidity profile could also lead
to a downgrade.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Protein and Agriculture Industry published in June 2017.

Suedzucker is the leading beet sugar producer in Europe, with an
overall reported market share of around 24% in the EU-28.
Suedzucker is also active in three other business segments:
Special Products, CropEnergies and Fruit. Within the Special
Products segment, the divisions are Starch, Freiberger (mainly
frozen and refrigerated pizza), the BENEO Group (mostly sugar
substitutes and functional carbohydrates made from natural raw
materials) and PortionPack Europe. The CropEnergies segment
focuses on bioethanol and high-protein animal feed production. In
the Fruit segment, the divisions are fruit preparations and fruit
juice concentrates. In full year 2018 (ending February 2018),
Suedzucker reported sales of around EUR7.0 billion and operating
profit of around EUR440 million based on preliminary result. The
company generates around 80% of its sales in Europe.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


MAGADAN OBLAST: S&P Withdraws B+' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
On April 5, 2018, S&P Global Ratings withdrew its 'B+' long-term
foreign and local currency issuer credit ratings on Russia's
Magadan Oblast. S&P also withdrew its 'B+' issue ratings on the
region's senior unsecured debt. The outlook on the issuer credit
rating was stable at the time of the withdrawal.

As a "sovereign rating", the ratings on Magadan Oblast are
subject to certain publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of
the EU CRA Regulation, including publication in accordance with a
pre-established calendar. Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations
fromthe announced calendar are allowed only in limited
circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed explanation
of the reasons for the deviation. In this case, the reason for
the deviation is Magadan Oblast's request to withdraw the rating.

RATINGS LIST

                                     Rating
                                 To          From
  Magadan Oblast
   Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency     NR          B+/Stable/--
  Senior Unsecured
  Local Currency                 NR          B+

  NR--Not rated


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


UBS GROUP: Moody's Reviews Ba1(hyb) Preferred Stock Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for upgrade UBS
Group AG's long-term ratings as well as the long-term senior
unsecured debt and deposit ratings of its subsidiaries, including
its principal bank subsidiary, UBS AG. The rating agency further
placed under review for upgrade all of UBS entities' long-term
ratings, including UBS Group AG's Ba1(hyb) preferred stock
ratings as well as UBS AG's Aa3 long-term deposit ratings and its
A1 long-term issuer and senior unsecured debt ratings. UBS AG's
baa1 Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA), its baa1 Adjusted BCA and
its Aa3(cr) Counterparty Risk (CR) Assessment have also been
placed under review for upgrade.

Moody's also affirmed the Baa2 senior unsecured debt ratings of
Credit Suisse Group AG and the A1 long term senior unsecured debt
and deposit ratings of its principal bank subsidiary, Credit
Suisse AG, with a stable outlook. The rating agency further
affirmed Credit Suisse AG's baa2 BCA, its baa2 Adjusted BCA and
its A1(cr)/P-1(cr) Counterparty Risk (CR) Assessment as well as
all of its other long- and short-term ratings. The senior
unsecured debt, issuer as well as deposit ratings of all of
Credit Suisse's subsidiaries have also been affirmed.

RATINGS RATIONALE

  -- UBS

The review for upgrade on UBS's long-term ratings takes account
of UBS's reduction in capital intensive capital market activities
and the curtailment of a large number of inherently more volatile
fixed income product lines. In Moody's view, this has resulted in
a less complex investment banking operation, more aligned with
its wealth and asset management businesses and more focused on
less capital-intensive and flow-based capital markets segments
such as Equities, Foreign Exchange (FX) and Advisory. As a result
of the 'right sizing and refocusing' of the investment bank and
meaningful restructuring that has taken place, Moody's believes
that the volatility in earnings from UBS's inherently more
volatile revenue streams is now more likely to be mitigated by
its solid 'shock absorbers' provided by the group's more stable
earnings generated within its wealth and asset management as well
as Swiss universal banking businesses going forward.

In addition, the rating agency has observed further maturation
and greater embedding of the group's revised risk governance
framework over this period which, if sustained, would continue to
support an improving risk profile and earnings stability, and
thereby support the group's credit profile. Importantly, the
firm's business planning and capital allocation as well as
distribution processes are constrained by the outputs of its
board-approved capital management and stress testing framework,
which incorporates guidance to maintain a common equity Tier 1
(CET1) capital ratio of around 13%. Any loosening of the
underlying framework, however, in particular stepping back on the
combined stress testing approach and its influence on limit
setting and risk appetite or inconsistent application of UBS's
risk governance throughout the various group segments would be
regarded as credit negative.

During the review, Moody's will assess the degree to which UBS
will be able to further improve its profitability levels or to
sustain these even under less favorable market conditions. The
rating agency will examine the stability of the group's expected
earnings profile and volatility as well as analyze the resilience
of the group's profitability and capital position to adverse
market conditions. In doing so, Moody's will focus on the
stability and earnings potential of the group's key earnings
drivers, i.e. its global wealth management and asset management
businesses as well as its Swiss domestic universal banking
businesses and investigate whether these would sustainably
provide sufficient loss absorption capacity to mitigate the risks
and greater earnings volatility inherent in the group's remaining
capital markets businesses.

Any ratings upgrade would also be contingent on UBS maintaining
firm control on risks taken within the group, in particular
within its Investment Bank, as well as the group's success in
controlling costs and reducing the drag on earnings from its Non-
core and Legacy Portfolio (NCL), over and above the levels
achieved in 2017.

UBS's current ratings take account of the group's still sizeable
capital markets activities, the inherent volatility, risk opacity
and confidence sensitivity within and of the capital markets-
related client base, and moderate reliance on wholesale funding.
All of these factors continue to constrain UBS's credit profile.
Despite the evidenced reduction in capital markets-related risks,
Moody's believes that potential additional litigation charges
remain a key threat to the bank's trajectory of an improving
profitability and, in a highly adverse scenario, its solid
capitalization. Most notably, UBS remains exposed to litigation
risk in connection with its activities in the US residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market prior to the financial
crisis, which could lead to sizeable incremental litigation
charges. However, UBS has already established significant
provisions for its US RMBS litigation exposures, which reduces
the risk that any additional provisions required could have a
significant negative impact on earnings or capital.

UBS's ratings remain further supported by the bank's superior
global wealth management and well-positioned Swiss universal
banking franchises, its strong liquidity profile, and its robust
risk-based capital ratios and solid leverage ratios. Moody's
anticipates UBS's risk-based capital ratios to remain among the
strongest in comparison to its global peers; and Moody's expects
UBS to continue growing its capital stock and maintain its solid
capital ratios, despite expected regulatory pressures over the
next three to five years.

  -- CREDIT SUISSE

The affirmation of Credit Suisse's (CS) ratings with an unchanged
stable outlook reflects Moody's consideration that, despite CS's
sound performance throughout its current restructuring program,
the bank will have to carry a material burden from de-risking and
business re-alignment in 2018, constraining its profitability
prospects. While execution challenges are easing as CS approaches
the final stages of its three-year restructuring plan outlined in
2015, its profitability will face continued pressure from the
disposal of remaining non-core assets held in its Strategic
Resolution Unit (SRU) and restructuring charges. At the same
time, the rating agency believes that CS has made strong progress
in reducing tail risks to earnings and capital from outstanding
legacy litigation issues, in particular following the US RMBS
settlement in 2017.

From 2019 onward, Moody's anticipates CS's profitability to
increasingly benefit from the reduced costs of off-loading non-
core assets, lower funding costs as more expensive legacy capital
instruments are redeemed and the near absence of meaningful
restructuring costs. In particular, CS expects the SRU to produce
a USD500 million pre-tax loss in 2019, down significantly from
CHF1.85 billion in 2017 and CHF1.4 billion forecasted for 2018.
Nevertheless, and owing to the uncertain outlook on revenues,
Moody's believes it will be difficult maintaining a sizeable
positive absolute gap between revenue and cost developments going
forward, despite the visible success of CS's large-scale
restructuring and capital reallocation program.

Moreover, upward rating pressure would only arise from a
combination of a significant and sustainable improvement in
profitability coupled with a further meaningful reduction of
risks arising from CS's significant exposures to capital market
activities. Albeit partially de-risked over the past three years,
the group's integrated business model will continue to rely on a
higher share of capital markets businesses versus other global
investment banks; Moody's estimates that CS's capital market
divisions -- Investment Banking and Capital Markets, Global
Markets and Asia Pacific Markets -- combined will continue to
make up approximately 30% of the group's pre-tax profits and 40%
of group risk-weighted assets over the next three years. The
group's comparatively higher dependence on transaction-driven
capital market revenues and particularly its relatively high risk
appetite and exposure to underwriting of leveraged lending as
well as high-yield debt transactions will continue to constrain
its credit profile.

At the same time, CS's ratings remain supported by the stable
earnings and lower risk profile of the bank's large global wealth
management franchise and well-positioned domestic Swiss banking
franchise producing a higher share of recurring revenues in the
future, the bank's pro-active approach to risk management as well
as its sound liquidity position. The rating agency also expects
the bank to maintain its meanwhile strengthened capital position,
despite ongoing regulatory pressures and higher payout plans that
are likely to constrain a faster CET1 capital ratio build-up.

The stable outlook on Credit Suisse's ratings reflects its strong
capital position, good risk management, and sound liquidity
position. The outlook further takes account of progress made thus
far in implementing the group's evolving strategy.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

UBS AG's BCA will be upgraded if Moody's were to conclude that
(1) UBS will be able to improve, or sustain and defend, its
earnings profile as well as profitability levels even under less
benign market conditions; (2) the risks from UBS's capital
markets franchise remain well controlled and managed and the
group's capacity to absorb larger unexpected losses has achieved
a level such that those losses no longer risk diluting UBS's
strong capital position; and (3) UBS will be able to further
build on its solid capital position while still balancing
bondholders' and shareholders' interests.

UBS AG's long-term senior unsecured debt ratings could also be
upgraded if the bank were to continue to issue and thereby
maintain the current proportion of bail-in-able liabilities in
relation to tangible banking assets, affording greater protection
to the bank's senior creditors. This may lead to one additional
notch of rating uplift as a result of Moody's Advanced Loss Given
Failure (LGF) analysis. There is no upward pressure on Credit
Suisse AG's debt and deposit ratings because they already benefit
from three notches of rating uplift under Moody's Advanced LGF
analysis, the maximum achievable.

Upward pressure on CS's ratings could arise if the group were to
successfully achieve a substantial and sustainable improvement in
profitability, coupled with a meaningful reduction of its risk
profile and a significantly reduced reliance on earnings from its
capital markets businesses. Any upgrade remains further
contingent on the group reducing its wholesale funding dependence
to a level commensurate with higher rated peers.

The two banks' ratings could face downward pressure if the banks
were to suffer from any control or risk management failure, if
there were a significant decline in the Swiss economy, if the
banks were to materially increase their risk appetite - evidence
of which could be a significant expansion of the investment
banking franchise - or if there were a deterioration in the
banks' capital or liquidity profiles. The ratings could also face
downward pressure if the banks failed to successfully execute the
planned changes to their business models and/or fail to achieve
the targeted return levels.

The two banks' ratings could further be downgraded should there
be a significant and larger-than-anticipated decrease in the
banks' existing bail-in-able debt cushion leading to a higher
loss severity for their different debt classes. Although regarded
unlikely at present, this may lead to fewer notches of rating
uplift as a result of Moody's Advanced LGF analysis.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

The following ratings and rating assessments were placed on
review for upgrade:


Issuer: UBS Group AG

-- Preferred Stock Non-cumulative, currently Ba1(hyb)

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Issuer: UBS AG

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, currently Aa3(cr)

-- Long-term Bank Deposits, currently Aa3, outlook changed to
    Rating under Review from Stable

-- Long-term Deposit Note/CD Program, currently (P)Aa3

-- Subordinate Deposit Note/CD Program, currently (P)Baa2

-- Long-term Issuer Rating, currently A1, outlook changed to
    Rating under Review from Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, currently A1,
    outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)A1

-- Senior Unsecured Shelf, currently (P)A1

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)Baa2

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, currently baa1

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, currently baa1

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Issuer: Swiss Bank Corporation

-- Backed Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, currently Baa2

No Outlook assigned

Issuer: Swiss Bank Corporation, New York Branch

-- Backed Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, currently Baa2

No Outlook assigned

Issuer: UBS AG, Australian Branch

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, currently Aa3(cr)

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, currently A1,
    outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)A1

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)Baa2

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Issuer: UBS AG, Jersey Branch

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, currently Aa3(cr)

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, currently A1,
    outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)A1

-- Senior Unsecured Shelf, currently (P)A1

-- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, currently Baa2

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)Baa2

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Issuer: UBS AG, London Branch

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, currently Aa3(cr)

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, currently A1,
    outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)A1

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)Baa2

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Issuer: UBS AG, New York Branch

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, currently Aa3(cr)

-- Long-term Deposit Note/CD Program, currently (P)Aa3

-- Subordinate Deposit Note/CD Program, currently (P)Baa2

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)A1

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)Baa2

No Outlook assigned

Issuer: UBS AG, Stamford Branch

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, currently Aa3(cr)

-- Long-term Deposit Note/CD Program, currently (P)Aa3

-- Subordinate Deposit Note/CD Program, currently (P)Baa2

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, currently A1,
    outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)A1

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)Baa2

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Issuer: UBS Americas, Inc.

-- Backed Issuer Rating, currently A1, outlook changed to Rating
    under Review from Stable

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, currently A1,
    outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Shelf, currently (P)A1

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Issuer: UBS Finance (Curacao) N.V.

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, currently A1,
    outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Issuer: UBS Limited

-- Long-term Issuer Ratings, currently A1, outlook changed to
    Rating under Review from Stable

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Issuer: UBS Preferred Funding Company LLC IV

-- Backed Preferred Stock Non-cumulative Shelf, currently (P)Ba1

No Outlook assigned

Issuer: UBS Group Funding (Jersey) Limited

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, currently
    (P)Baa1

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Issuer: UBS Group Funding (Switzerland) AG

-- Backed Preferred Stock Non-cumulative, currently Ba1(hyb)

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, currently
    Baa1, outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

The following ratings and rating assessments were affirmed:

Issuer: Credit Suisse Group AG

Affirmations:

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa2 Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Baa2

-- Senior Unsecured Shelf, affirmed (P)Baa2

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Baa3

-- Subordinate Shelf, affirmed (P)Baa3

-- Preferred Stock Non-cumulative, affirmed Ba2(hyb)

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Credit Suisse AG

Affirmations:

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed A1(cr)

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed P-1(cr)

-- Long-term Bank Deposits, affirmed A1 Stable

-- Short-term Bank Deposits, affirmed P-1

-- Long-term Deposit Note/CD Program, affirmed (P)A1

-- Long-term Issuer Rating, affirmed A1 Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed A1 Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)A1

-- Senior Unsecured Shelf, affirmed (P)A1

-- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa3

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Baa3

-- Subordinate Shelf, affirmed (P)Baa3

-- Other Short Term, affirmed (P)P-1

-- Commercial Paper, affirmed P-1

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, affirmed baa2

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, affirmed baa2

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Credit Suisse AG (Guernsey) Branch

Affirmations:

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed A1(cr)

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed P-1(cr)

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed A1 Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)A1

-- Preferred Stock Non-cumulative, affirmed Ba2(hyb)

-- Other Short Term, affirmed (P)P-1

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Credit Suisse AG (London) Branch

Affirmations:

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed A1(cr)

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed P-1(cr)

-- Long-term Bank Deposit, affirmed A1 Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed A1
    Stable/(P)A1

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)A1

-- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa3

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Baa3

-- Other Short Term, affirmed (P)P-1

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Credit Suisse AG (Nassau) Branch

Affirmations:

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed A1(cr)

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed P-1(cr)

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed A1 Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)A1

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Baa3

-- Other Short Term, affirmed (P)P-1

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Credit Suisse AG (New York) Branch

Affirmations:

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed A1(cr)

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed P-1(cr)

-- Long-term Bank Deposit, affirmed A1 Stable

-- Short-term Bank Deposit, affirmed P-1

-- Long-term Deposit Note/CD Program Takedown, affirmed A1
Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed A1 Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)A1

-- Senior Unsecured Shelf, affirmed (P)A1

-- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa3

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)Baa3

-- Commercial Paper, affirmed P-1

-- Other Short Term, affirmed (P)P-1

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Credit Suisse AG (Sydney) Branch

Affirmations:

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed A1(cr)

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed P-1(cr)

-- Short-term Deposit Note/CD Program, affirmed P-1

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed (P)A1

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed A1 Stable

-- Commercial Paper, affirmed P-1

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Credit Suisse AG (Tokyo) Branch

Affirmations:

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed A1(cr)

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed P-1(cr)

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed A1 Stable

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Credit Suisse (USA) Inc.

Affirmations:

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed A1
    Stable

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, affirmed
    (P)A1

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Shelf, affirmed (P)A1

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: DLJ Cayman Islands LDC

Affirmation:

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed A1
    Stable

No Outlook assigned

Issuer: Credit Suisse International

Affirmations:

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed A1(cr)

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed P-1(cr)

-- Backed Long-term Bank Deposit, affirmed A1 Stable

-- Backed Short-term Bank Deposit, affirmed P-1

-- Long-term Issuer Rating, affirmed A1 Stable

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Shelf, affirmed (P)A1

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Credit Suisse Group Finance (Guernsey) Ltd.

Affirmation:

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa2
    Stable

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable

Issuer: Credit Suisse Group Finance (US) Inc.

Affirmation:

-- Backed Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa3

No Outlook assigned

Issuer: Credit Suisse Group Funding (Guernsey) Ltd

Affirmation:

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Baa2
    Stable

Outlook Action:

-- Outlook remains Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in September 2017.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


MHP LUX: Fitch Assigns 'B' Final Rating to US$550MM Bond
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a final senior unsecured rating of 'B'
with a Recovery Rating of 'RR4' (50%) to MHP Lux S.A.'s new
US$550 million bond due in 2026. The final rating is in line with
the expected rating that Fitch assigned to the proposed issue on
9 March 2018 and follows the pricing and receipt of the final
documentation of the new issue, which conform to the information
already received.

MHP Lux S.A. is a wholly owned subsidiary of MHP SE. MHP SE has a
Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and a
senior unsecured rating of 'B', which were affirmed on 9 March
2018. The Outlook on the IDR is Stable.

MHP SE's rating reflects continued growth in revenues and profits
at MHP's core business of chicken raising, slaughtering and
marketing, particularly thanks to the successful implementation
of an export-led strategy. In 2017 this compensated for a
contraction in EBITDA from the company's grain-growing
operations, which were affected by a country-wide weak harvest.

Leverage remains conservative despite an increase in capex and
continuing dividend payments. The new Eurobond enhances the
company's liquidity position and enables it to maintain a
sufficiently strong hard-currency debt service coverage ratio to
justify a rating of one notch above Ukraine's Country Ceiling of
'B-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Longer Maturities Support Rating: MHP has issued a new USD550
million Eurobond with an eight-year maturity to lengthen its debt
repayment profile. The company aims to use the proceeds to repay
approximately USD400 million of the outstanding USD495.6 million
Eurobond maturing in 2020 and to part-cover its capex.

This, together with other financing transactions concluded in
2017, should contribute to the maintenance of a comfortable
liquidity position. Fitch project that the more comfortable
repayment schedule should enable MHP's hard-currency external
debt service ratio to remain above 1.5x in 2018 and between 1.0x
and 1.5x in 2019-2020, continuing to allow MHP's ratings to
pierce Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'B-' by one notch.

Improving Sales Mix: In 2017, the company further refined its
export strategy, pursuing sales contracts that allow it to
maximise its sales mix by selling higher-value parts of its
chicken into markets that are prepared to pay for them. This,
combined with price increases in Ukraine, meant MHP's core
chicken operations achieved higher EBITDA/kg in US dollar terms,
and the unit's EBITDA rose significantly to USD338 million from
USD264 million in 2016. Exports have now reached 57% of MHP's
sales and will continue to increase as new capacity is added at
the Vinnytsia plant.

Above-Peers EBITDA Margin:  Fitch do not view the high EBITDA
margin achieved in 2017 as repeatable and project that this
margin should trend towards 30.8% in 2020-2021, from 34% in 2017.
The lower EBITDA margin will result from above-inflation poultry
production cost increases and a drop in government support in
2018. However, MHP should maintain its EBITDA margins above those
of international peers in the meat-processing industry thanks to
its integrated business model and the growing proportion of
exports to EU countries.

Government Support Abates: MHP received USD53 million in
subsidies in 2017. This was higher than in 2016 but materially
lower than amounts received historically. The Ukrainian
government continues to review its financial support to the
agricultural industry due to its budget constraints. Therefore
Fitch do not factor in any subsidies from 2018 onwards.
Nevertheless, Fitch project that MHP should compensate for the
adverse effect on its EBITDA due to growing poultry exports as
new production capacity ramps up.

Varying FCF Position: Fitch calculate that 2017 free cash flow
(FCF) generation was around USD9 million. Fitch expect MHP to
generate negative FCF in 2018 as a result of the increase in
capex for the new production lines in the Vinnytsia poultry
complex in 2018-2019, but FCF should turn positive in 2019 as
production increases. Overall Fitch view pre-dividends FCF as
strong. Fitch also believe there is some scope for reducing
future distributions to shareholders or delaying expansion capex
if operating underperformance occurs.

Continuing FX Mismatch: The FX mismatch continues to weigh on
MHP's credit profile, as the company's debt of USD1.2 billion at
end-2017 is mainly denominated in US dollars and euros, while
domestic operations accounted for 43% of revenue in 2017. Fitch
do not expect a material reduction in FX risks over the medium
term, although poultry exports should continue to grow,
particularly once the planned extension of production capacity is
completed between 2018 and 2020.

Average Recoveries for Unsecured Bondholders: Ratings of senior
unsecured Eurobonds are aligned with MHP's Long-Term IDR of 'B',
reflecting average recovery prospects given default. Fitch treats
Eurobonds pari passu with other senior unsecured debt of the
group, which is raised primarily by operating companies, despite
being issued by the holding company. There are no structural
subordination issues, as the Eurobond is covered by suretyships
from operating companies, together accounting for around 90% of
the group's EBITDA in 2017.

Strong Parent-Subsidiary Links: The Long-Term IDRs of PJSC
Myronivsky Hliboproduct, MHP SE's 99.9% owned subsidiary, are
equalised with those of the parent, due to strong strategic and
legal ties between the companies. Myronivsky Hliboproduct is a
marketing and sales company for goods produced by the group in
Ukraine. The strong legal links with the rest of the group are
ensured by the presence of cross-default/cross-acceleration
provisions in Myronivsky Hliboproduct's major loan agreements and
suretyships from operating companies generating a substantial
portion of the group's EBITDA.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

MHP has smaller business size and weaker ranking on a global
scale than international meat processors BRF S.A. (BBB-/Stable),
Tyson Foods Inc. (BBB/Stable) and Smithfield Foods Inc.
(BBB/Stable). MHP has similar credit metrics and vertically
integrated business model to the largest Russian pork producer,
Agri Business Holding Miratorg LLC (B+/Stable). MHP's business
profile is slightly stronger than Miratorg's due to access to
export markets, but this is offset by higher exposure to FX
risks. In addition, MHP's Local-Currency IDR is constrained by
the fact that most of its operations take place in Ukraine, which
has a sovereign Local-Currency IDR of 'B-'.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Fitch Rating Case for the Issuer
- EBITDA margin trending towards 30.8% in 2018-2021
- Average hryvnia/US dollar exchange rate at 28.9 in 2018, 31.0
   in 2019, 32.9 in 2020 and 34.5 in 2021
- 8% CAGR in chicken meat production volume, driven by the
   expansion of the Vinnytsia complex
- Revenues from export of poultry products increasing towards
   48% of total sales in 2021, absorbing the majority of
   production volume growth
- No government grants or VAT discounts from 2018 onwards
- Capex at 15%-20% in 2018-2019 due to the development of the
   Vinnytsia complex, at 9% of sales thereafter
- Cash held offshore equal to 70% of total cash
- Dividends of USD80 million a year in 2018-2021

RATING SENSITIVITIES

For Local-Currency IDR
Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action
- Improved operating environment in Ukraine reflected in a
   higher sovereign Local-Currency IDR
- Reduction in MHP's dependence on the local economy as measured
   by material decrease in proportion of domestic sales in
   revenues

In both cases, upgrade would be subject to maintenance of
adequate liquidity and FFO adjusted leverage sustainably below
3.5x.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
- FFO adjusted leverage above 4.5x and FFO fixed-charge cover
   below 2.0x on a sustained basis
- Liquidity ratio below 1x on a sustained basis coupled with
   deteriorated access to external funding

For Foreign-Currency IDR

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action
- Hard-currency debt service ratio above 1.5x over the rating
   horizon, as calculated in accordance with Fitch's methodology
   "Rating Non-Financial Corporates Above the Country Ceiling"
- Ukraine's Country Ceiling being raised to 'B+' or above

In both cases, an upgrade would be subject to the maintenance of
adequate liquidity and FFO adjusted leverage sustainably below
3.5x.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
- FFO adjusted leverage above 4.5x and FFO fixed-charge cover
   below 2.0x on a sustained basis
- Liquidity ratio below 1x on a sustained basis coupled with
   deteriorated access to external funding
- Hard-currency debt service ratio below 1x over the rating
   horizon

LIQUIDITY

Improved Debt Maturity Profile: The new USD550 million Eurobond
extends the average debt maturity profile as Fitch expect most of
the proceeds to be used to repay approximately USD400 million of
the outstanding USD495.6 million Eurobond maturing in 2020. In
addition, at end-2017 the company had USD101 million Fitch-
calculated readily available cash, along with USD130 million
committed bank lines. This represents enough funding to cover
short-term debt and finance the sunflower crushing cycle to
produce fodder as animal feed.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AVANTI: May Enter Administration if Debt-for-Equity Swap Fails
--------------------------------------------------------------
Nic Fildes at The Financial Times reports that Avanti
Communications, the UK satellite company, has warned that it will
be put into administration unless shareholders accept a debt-for-
equity swap that would allow it to raise fresh funding.

According to the FT, if approved, the proposed swap would leave
US bondholders, led by Solus Funds, controlling 42% of the
company's stock.  Avanti also wants to amend the terms of bonds
due in 2021 and 2023, the FT states.  The plan would reduce its
debt by 60% and cut its annual cash interest payments by more
than 70%, the FT notes.

The company warned that it would default on interest payments
related to some of its bonds if the restructuring is not approved
by the end of April, the FT relates.

Avanti also needs to raise at least US$50 million, and secure
US$40 million of recurring revenue, by the end of June if it is
to repay its creditors, the FT discloses.  That money could be
raised via a new bond or from the bondholders taking control of
the business if the restructuring succeeds, the FT states.

The company, as cited by the FT, said on April 9 that if it
failed to restructure its balance sheet or raise new funds, then
management or a creditor would seek to put the business into
"some form of insolvency proceeding" that would result in little
or no value being generated for shareholders.


COMET BIDCO: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR, Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a first-time B2 Corporate
Family Rating (CFR) and a B2-PD Probability of Default Rating
(PDR) to Comet Bidco Limited, the parent and 100% owner of
Clarion Events (Clarion), a UK-based pure-play events business.
Concurrently, Moody's has assigned B2 ratings to the GBP315
million senior secured term loan B1 facility due 2024, the USD420
million senior secured term loan B2 due 2024 and the GBP75
million revolving credit facility due 2023. The outlook on all
ratings is negative.

The facilities include a USD230 million senior secured
incremental term loan B2 facility due 2024, which together with
cash on balance sheet, will be used to finance the acquisition of
PennWell, a US exhibition business, pay associated fees and
expenses and repay existing revolving credit facility drawings.
This acquisition completed in March 2018.

"The B2 rating with a negative outlook reflects Clarion's high
leverage and track record of rapid growth through M&A, which may
stretch management's resources, but also the company's increased
scale, geographic and event-diversification by industry following
the recent acquisitions of Global Sources and PennWell," says
Christian Azzi, a Moody's Assistant Vice President and lead
analyst for Clarion.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Clarion's B2 CFR reflects the company's (1) small scale relative
to pure-event and global business services peers; (2) high
leverage of 6.0x at acquisition closing (Moody's adjusted gross
debt/EBITDA and averaged over FY2017 and FY2018); (3) revenue
concentration on its top 5 event brands which are forecast to
represent approximately 15% of revenue in FY2018; (4) exposure to
cyclical industries such as retail and energy & resources (in
total forecast to be 31% of revenue in FY2018); (5) event and
execution risks associated with Clarion's strategy to pursue
further M&A activity to increase its scale and growth profile;
and (6) lower EBITDA margins relative to other events peers.

The CFR also reflects Clarion's (1) good diversification across
industry verticals and geographies; (2) the must-attend nature of
the company's top events in their addressed industries; (3) good
medium-term visibility of revenue as a large proportion of event
sales are contracted at least 6-months prior to the event date;
and (4) good Free Cash Flow (FCF) generation as capital
expenditure requirements are low and working capital negative
given the pre-payment terms of the events.

The rating action reflects the fact that at closing of the
PennWell acquisition, Clarion's B2 rating will be weakly
positioned in the rating category given the high leverage (6.0x
Debt/EBITDA as adjusted by Moody's and on a two year average
basis). The rating incorporates Moody's expectations that the
company will reduce its leverage towards 5.5x in the next 18
months, as consistent with the presented strategic plan. Clarion
expects to achieve EBITDA growth by growing the contribution from
existing events through increased rental space within some venues
as well as price increases.

The PennWell acquisition has followed very quickly after the
acquisition of Global Sources, increasing the complexity of group
management. Moody's notes that the acquisition of PennWell, at a
time when Clarion is still digesting the acquisition of Global
Sources, stretches management's resources available to focus on
core operations.

More positively, Moody's views the acquisition of PennWell as
business profile enhancing, given the six largest events acquired
from PennWell have entrenched positions in the verticals to which
they cater. Clarion will have a well diversified revenue by
industry exposure as its events cover various verticals: Energy &
Resources (18% of FY2018 pro forma revenue), Electronics and
Mobile (15%), Retail and Home (13%) and Defence & Security (9%).

The acquisition will further diversify Clarion's revenues by
geography with a stronger focus on the US, the number one
exhibition market globally. Pro forma for the Global Sources and
PennWell acquisitions, its revenues will be diversified across
geographies with roughly equal proportions coming from Europe,
North America and Asia (respectively 29%, 25% and 26% of FY2018
pro forma revenue).

The acquisition will also make Clarion the number three global
exhibition organizer behind Informa/UBM and RELX, which remain
much larger in scale. In addition, Moody's notes the strong
contribution margin of the target which benefits from lower venue
and fitting out costs for its events. Finally, the acquisition of
6 major annual events from PennWell will help to mitigate
Clarion's revenue and EBITDA cyclicality brought on by the high
proportion of biennial events which are scheduled in odd years
(even financial years).

Clarion's liquidity is adequate, supported by the company's GBP75
million revolving credit facility - undrawn at closing of the
acquisition but likely to be used intermittently during the year
as the company will have a pro forma GBP6 million cash balance
post-transaction. The RCF matures in 2023 and the term loan B in
2024. While there are no other scheduled debt repayments until
then, the company is expected to disburse GBP27 million over the
next three years to cover various earn-outs, put options and call
options to acquire minority interests in events it part-owns.

The B2-PD probability of default rating, at the same level as the
CFR, reflects Moody's assumption of a 50% recovery rate as is
customary for covenant-lite capital structures (the term loans
include no maintenance covenants and the RCF includes one
springing leverage covenant set at 40% headroom to opening
leverage and tested at 40% utilization). The term loans as well
as the revolving credit facility are rated B2, in line with the
CFR, as they are the only financial debt instruments in the
capital structure and they rank pari passu, benefitting from the
same guarantees and security package.

RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects Clarion's high leverage, which
Moody's estimates for FY2018 at 6.0x on a pro forma basis. Given
the extent of integration to which Clarion is currently exposed
on the back of the previous acquisitions and the restructuring
needed to re-centre PennWell's operations around Clarion's core
activities, the post-acquisition credit metrics leave no headroom
for underperformance against budget at the current rating level.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP / DOWN

Positive pressure on the ratings could develop should Clarion's
leverage (Moody's adjusted gross debt/EBITDA averaged over two
years) fall well below 4.75x on a sustainable basis as a result
of strong operating performance. Upward rating pressure would
also require the company to develop a track record of leverage
reduction under Blackstone's ownership and to maintain revenue
growth in the mid-single digit as presented in its business plan.

Negative pressure on the ratings could develop should the company
fail to sustain leverage below 6.0x (Moody's adjusted gross
debt/EBITDA averaged over two years), or should the company's
liquidity deteriorate as a result of a change in financial policy
or weakness in the underlying business performance.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Assignments:

Issuer: Comet Bidco Limited

-- Corporate Family Rating, Assigned B2

-- Probability of Default Rating, Assigned B2-PD

-- Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned B2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Comet Bidco Limited

-- Outlook, Assigned Negative

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016.

COMPANY PROFILE

Clarion Events is a UK based pure-play events business operating
globally across a diversified set of industries and geographies.
Clarion is owned by funds managed by Blackstone. The company
offers exhibitions, conferences and hybrids in the Electronics &
Mobile, Retail & Home, Gaming, Energy & Resources, Defence &
Security, Technology, Enthusiast, Public Safety, Life Science,
Fashion and Other sectors. It operates globally targeting a
visitor base from the UK, North America, Europe, Middle East &
Africa, Latin America and Asia. For the FY January 2018 pro forma
for acquisitions, the company generated GBP365 million revenue
and GBP112 million of management reported EBITDA.


KERRYFRESH: Appoints Administrators, Buyer Sought for Business
--------------------------------------------------------------
Hanna Sharpe at Business-Sale reports that Kerryfresh announced
the appointment of administrators on March 23 after falling into
financial difficulty as a result of the failure of Palmer &
Harvey.

Allan Graham -- allan.graham@duffandphelps.com -- and Ben Wiles
-- benjamin.wiles@duffandphelps.com -- of Duff & Phelps were
appointed joint administrators of the chilled wholesale and
distribution company, which had more than 200 refrigerated
vehicles and 300 employees supplying chilled products for the
food and convenience sector, Business-Sale relates.

According to Business-Sale, Mr. Graham said the company had been
showing positive financial results following its acquisition via
a management buy-out in 2015. However, the failure of grocery
wholesaler Palmer & Harvey in November 2018 reportedly led to
cash flow difficulties caused by the delay in the settlement of
insurance claims, Business-Sale notes.

Additionally, Kerryfresh was dealt a further blow at the
beginning of 2018 when the withdrawal of insurance cover on one
of the distributors largest customers left the management with no
choice but to exit its supply agreement, Business-Sale relays.

The administrators went on to confirm they will continue to
search for a possible buyer for the company, as a whole or in
parts, with the aim of preventing the loss of 300 jobs, Business-
Sale discloses.


QDS CONTRACTING: Put Under Administration Due to Financial Woes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Eilis Jordan at Business-Sale reports that engineering
consultancy company Hydrock has placed its specialist remediation
arm QDS Contracting into administration after making the decision
to exit contracting.

The move comes just five weeks after Hydrock announced the
rebranding of its remediation branch as QDS Contracting, after
which the company conducted a review of its business and
concluded the subsidiary company was losing too much money to
remain sustainable, Business-Sale relates.

Specifically, the administrators revealed the division is facing
a number of financial issues related to many unprofitable
contract, and as a result it is now seeking offers from potential
purchasers, Business-Sale discloses.

QDS Contracting, originally Hydrock Contracting, was formed when
the company purchased competitor QDS for GBP450,000 in April
2013, Business-Sale states.  However, the latest figures from the
firm reveal that it lost GBP2.5 million from a revenue of GBP24
million in 2017, a loss the company is unable to support,
Business-Sale notes.


RMAC NO. 1: Moody's Assigns Ca Ratings to Two Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive long-term
credit ratings to Notes issued by RMAC No. 1 PLC:

-- GBP 351.7M Class A Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due
    June 2046, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- GBP 11.9M Class B Mortgage Backed Capped Rate Notes due June
    2046, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- GBP 11.9MClass C Mortgage Backed Capped Rate Notes due June
    2046, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- GBP 8.0M Class D Mortgage Backed Capped Rate Notes due June
    2046, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- GBP 9.9M Class X1 Mortgage Backed Capped Rate Notes due June
    2046, Definitive Rating Assigned Ca (sf)

-- GBP 5.0MClass X2 Mortgage Backed Capped Rate Notes due June
    2046, Definitive Rating Assigned Ca (sf)

Moody's has not assigned ratings to the GBP 14.0M Class Z1
Mortgage Backed Notes due June 2046 and GBP 6.0M Class Z2
Mortgage Backed Notes due June 2046.

The portfolio backing this transaction consists of UK non-
conforming residential loans originated by GMAC-RFC Limited
(currently known as Paratus AMC Limited ("Paratus")) and Amber
Homeloans Limited (not rated). The current pool balance is
approximately equal to GBP406.1 million as of the end of February
2018. 97.5% of the pool was securitised in 12 RMAC
securitisations. On the closing date the assets are pooled
together into the RMAC No. 1 PLC securitisation.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings take into account the credit quality of the
underlying mortgage loan pool, from which Moody's determined the
MILAN Credit Enhancement (CE) and the portfolio expected loss, as
well as the transaction structure and legal considerations. The
expected portfolio loss of 3.0% and the MILAN CE of 15.0% serve
as input parameters for Moody's cash flow model, which is based
on a probabilistic lognormal distribution.

The portfolio expected loss of 3.0%, which is lower than other
recent UK non-conforming transactions and takes into account: (i)
the historical performance of the collateral backing the RMAC
transactions, (ii) the number of loans in arrears at closing,
24.6% of the pool is in arrears at the end of February 2018, of
which 8.1% is less than 30 days in arrears and 8.8% is more than
90 days in arrears, (iii) the weighted-average current LTV of
69.9% and the weighted-average indexed LTV of 49.1%, (iv) the
proportion of interest-only loans, 77.7% of the pool, of which
2.2% are part and part loans, (v) the current macroeconomic
environment and Moody's view of the future macroeconomic
environment in the UK, and (vi) benchmarking with similar
transactions in the UK non-conforming sector.

The MILAN CE for this pool is 15.0%, which is lower than other
recent UK non-conforming transactions and takes into account: (i)
the weighted-average current LTV of 69.9% and weighted-average
indexed LTV of 49.1% which are lower compared to the average of
the UK non-conforming sector, (ii) the presence of 78.6% of the
loans where the borrower income is either self-certified or was
not verified, (iii) the presence of 41.3% of loans in the pool
that were modified at some point in the past as result of loss
mitigation techniques used by Paratus (iv) the weighted average
seasoning of the pool of 13.3 years and (v) the level of arrears
around 24.6% at the end of February 2018, of which 8.1% is less
than 30 days in arrears and 8.8% is more than 90 days in arrears.

A non-amortising reserve fund is funded at closing and is equal
to 1.5% of the Class A, B, C, D and Z1 Notes at closing. It
consists of two components, the first is a liquidity component,
which is funded at closing and is sized at 1.63% of Class A and B
note balance at closing. The liquidity component of the reserve
fund will amortise to the lesser of 1.63% of Class A and B note
balance at closing and 2.0% of the currently outstanding balance
of Class A and B Notes during the life of the transaction. The
liquidity component of the reserve will be available to cover
senior fees and interest on Class A and B (subject to no PDL on
the Class B). The liquidity component of the reserve will be
replenished in the revenue waterfall below the Class B interest
payments.

The second component of the reserve fund is sized at 1.5% of the
Class A, B, C, D and Z1 Notes at closing minus the balance of the
liquidity reserve component from time to time. This means that at
closing the credit component of the reserve fund will be residual
and increase throughout the life of the transaction as the
liquidity component amortises. The general component of the
reserve fund is available upon conditions to cover both credit
and interest and senior fee shortfalls.

Operational Risk Analysis: Paratus AMC Limited will be acting as
servicer and is not rated by Moody's. In order to mitigate the
operational risk, the transaction will have a back-up servicer
facilitator (Intertrust Management Limited (not rated)). Elavon
Financial Services DAC (Aa2 on review for downgrade/P-1), acting
through its UK Branch will be acting as an independent cash
manager from closing. To ensure payment continuity over the
transaction's lifetime, the transaction documents incorporate
estimation language whereby the cash manager can use the three
most recent servicer reports to determine the cash allocation in
case no servicer report is available. Class A Notes benefit from
principal to pay interest, and the liquidity component of the
reserve fund. The liquidity component of the reserve provides the
Class A Notes with the equivalent of 2 quarters of liquidity.

Interest Rate Risk Analysis: The transaction is unhedged with
44.9% of the pool balance linked to Bank of England Base Rate
(BBR), 47.6% linked to three-month LIBOR and 7.5% SVR-linked
loans. Moody's has taken into account the absence of basis swap
in its cashflow modelling.

The definitive ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the Notes. In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal at par for Class A to D Notes on or
before the rated final legal maturity date and ultimate payment
of interest and principal on or before the rated final legal
maturity date for Class X1 and X2 Notes. Other non-credit risks
have not been addressed, but may have a significant effect on
yield to investors.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the portfolio expected loss
was increased from 3.0% to 5.3% of current balance, and the MILAN
CE was kept constant at 15.0%, the model output indicates that
the Class A Notes would still achieve Aaa (sf) assuming that all
other factors remained equal. Moody's Parameter Sensitivities
quantify the potential rating impact on a structured finance
security from changing certain input parameters used in the
initial rating. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged
and is not intended to measure how the rating of the security
might change over time, but instead what the initial rating of
the security might have been under different key rating inputs.

Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2017.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with Moody's
expectations at close due to either a change in economic
conditions from Moody's central scenario forecast or
idiosyncratic performance factors would lead to rating actions.
For instance, should economic conditions be worse than forecast,
the higher defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in a downgrade of the ratings.
Downward pressure on the ratings could also stem from (1)
deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement; (2)
counterparty risk, based on a weakening of a counterparty's
credit profile, or (3) any unforeseen legal or regulatory
changes. Conversely, the ratings could be upgraded: (1) if
economic conditions are significantly better than forecasted; (2)
upon deleveraging of the capital structure, or (3) a better than
expected performance could also lead to upgrade.


RMAC NO. 1: S&P Assigns CCC (sf) Ratings to Classes X1 & X2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its credit ratings to RMAC No. 1
PLC's class A, B, C-Dfrd, D-Dfrd, X1, and X2 notes. At closing,
RMAC No. 1 also issued unrated class Z1 and Z2 notes.

At closing, the issuer purchased the beneficial interest in an
initial portfolio of U.K. residential mortgages from the seller
(Paratus AMC Ltd.), using the proceeds from the issuance of the
rated notes and the unrated Z1 and Z2 notes (together, the class
Z notes). Paratus AMC also acts as the servicer. S&P reviewed
Paratus AMC's servicing and default management processes and are
satisfied that it is capable of performing its functions in the
transaction.

The majority (97.5%) of the pool was previously securitized in
earlier RMAC transactions: RMAC 2003-NS1 PLC (4.2%), RMAC 2003-
NS2 PLC (1.8%), RMAC 2003-NS3 PLC (2.6%), 2003-NS4 PLC (2.8%),
RMAC 2004-NS1 PLC (5.7%), RMAC 2004-NSP2 PLC (13.8%), RMAC 2004-
NS3 PLC (4.8%), RMAC 2004-NSP4 PLC (9.6%), RMAC 2005-NS1 PLC
(10.9%), RMAC 2005-NSP2 PLC (14.7%), RMAC 2005-NS3 PLC (17.4%),
and RMAC 2005-NS4 PLC (9.3%), all of which were called and
redeemed on March 12, 2018. The loans in the closing pool were
randomly selected from a provisional pool comprising all of the
loans in these transactions.

The pool comprises first-lien U.K. owner-occupied and buy-to-let
residential mortgage loans made to nonconforming borrowers. The
loans are secured on properties in England, Wales, Scotland, and
Northern Ireland and were mostly originated in 2004 and 2005
(79.9%). These borrowers may have previously been subject to a
county court judgement (CCJ; or the Scottish equivalent), an
individual voluntary arrangement, a bankruptcy order, have self-
certified their incomes, or were otherwise considered by banks
and building societies to be nonprime borrowers. Paratus AMC
(formerly known as GMAC-RFC Ltd.) originated 99.8% of the pool,
and Amber Homeloans Ltd. 0.2%.

The portfolio includes 18.44% of loans with previous CCJs, and
0.95% of loans to borrowers who have previously been declared
bankrupt. Of the pool, 63.98% are also self-certified loans. The
portfolio's weighted-average original loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
is 76.61%, with 43.35% of the pool having an original LTV ratio
greater than 80.00%. The current LTV ratio is 47.75% (which,
according to our methodology, includes haircuts to valuations
when the valuation method was not a full surveyor valuation). The
weighted-average seasoning of the portfolio is 159.58 months,
with 16.72% currently at least one month in arrears, and 8.47%
delinquent for 90 days or more.

At closing, the class Z2 notes' issuance proceeds fully funded
the reserve fund to its required amount of 1.50% of the class A,
B, C-Dfrd, D-Dfrd, and Z1 notes' closing balance. The reserve
fund is non-amortizing and is split between a liquidity component
and a non-liquidity component. The required balance of the
liquidity component is the lower of 1.63% of the class A and B
notes' closing balance and 2.00% of the class A and B notes'
outstanding balance, while the non-liquidity component is the
difference between the reserve fund required amount and the
reserve fund liquidity required amount. As the class A and B
notes amortize, the proportion attributable to the liquidity
component decreases, while the non-liquidity component
increases -- providing additional credit enhancement to the
notes.

For as long as the class A notes remain outstanding, the entire
reserve fund may only be used to cover senior fees, the class A
notes' interest, the class A principal deficiency ledger (PDL),
and the class B notes' interest if there is no class B PDL. When
the class B notes become the most senior outstanding class, if
there are insufficient revenue collections, and the non-liquidity
component of the reserve fund has been fully used, the issuer may
use the liquidity portion to cover senior fees, the class B
notes' interest, and the class B PDL. Principal receipts can also
be borrowed to meet any senior fees, the class A notes' interest,
the class B notes' interest (subject to it being the most senior
class of notes outstanding or there being no class B PDL while
the class A notes are still outstanding), and any interest
shortfalls for the class C-Dfrd and D-Dfrd notes, subject to that
class being the most senior class of notes outstanding. If
principal is borrowed in this way, the PDL would be debited and
can be cured in future periods using excess spread.

Interest on the notes is equal to three-month sterling LIBOR plus
class-specific margins that step up following the optional
redemption date. The three-month sterling LIBOR is capped at 8.0%
for all rated tranches except the class A notes. The underlying
collateral is linked to three-month sterling LIBOR (which resets
on the same date as the notes), the Bank of England Base Rate
(BBR), or to a standard variable rate (SVR). The SVR loans are
floored at three-month sterling LIBOR plus 2.5%. There is basis
risk for the underlying collateral that is linked to BBR and the
transaction does not benefit from a swap to mitigate this risk.
As a result, S&P stresses the historical timing mismatch between
the index paid on the assets and that paid on the liabilities.

S&P said, "Our ratings on the class A, B, X1, and X2 notes
address the timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of
principal. Our ratings on the class C-Dfrd and D-Dfrd notes
address ultimate payment of principal and interest while they are
a junior class. When the class C-Dfrd and D-Dfrd notes become the
most senior outstanding, our ratings will address the timely
payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal. Under the
transaction documents, the issuer can defer interest payments on
these notes, with interest accruing on deferred payments until
they become the most senior class outstanding, whereby any
accrued unpaid interest is due on the interest payment date when
the class becomes the most senior, and future interest payments
are due on a timely basis. Although the terms and conditions of
the class X1 and X2 notes allow for the deferral of interest,
interest does not accrue on deferred payments. Consequently, our
ratings on the class X1 and X2 notes address the timely payment
of interest and ultimate payment of principal.

"Our ratings reflect our assessment of the transaction's payment
structure, cash flow mechanics, and the results of our cash flow
analysis to assess whether the notes would be repaid under stress
test scenarios. Subordination and the reserve fund provide credit
enhancement to the notes that are senior to the rated class X1
and X2 notes and unrated class Z1 and Z2 notes. Taking these
factors into account, we consider the available credit
enhancement for the rated notes to be commensurate with the
ratings that we have assigned."

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Assigned

  RMAC No. 1 PLC
  GBP418.4 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate
Notes
  (Including Unrated Notes)

  Class               Rating            Amount
                                      (mil. GBP)

  A                   AAA (sf)          351.70
  B                   AA+ (sf)           11.90
  C-Dfrd              AA- (sf)           11.90
  D-Dfrd              A (sf)              8.00
  Z1                  NR                 14.00
  Z2                  NR                  6.00
  X1                  CCC (sf)            9.90
  X2                  CCC (sf)            5.00
  Certificates        N/A                  N/A

  Dfrd -- Deferrable. NR -- Not rated. N/A -- Not applicable.


TOM VEHICLE: Appoints Ernst & Young as Administrator
----------------------------------------------------
Catherine Deshayes at Business-Sale reports that Ernst & Young
(EY) has officially been appointed administrator for TOM Vehicle
Rental after the Scottish firm was forced into liquidation.

Hundreds of workers have lost their jobs after the debt-plagued
firm, which provided long-term vehicle rental services, failed to
find a viable buyer during a drawn out sales process, Business-
Sale relates.

However, the administrators have stated they are confident they
will succeed in finding a buyer and selling the business and the
assets of Alistair Fleming, a third subsidiary, according to
Business-Sale.

In total, 342 employees have been made redundant across the
firm's 11 sites in England and Scotland since it ceased trading,
Business-Sale discloses.  However, EY has confirmed that 86 staff
members will continue to work at the company's head office to
assist with the wind down of the business, Business-Sale notes.

According to Business-Sale, Colin Dempster, joint administrator
from EY, said the group has faced a number of difficulties
related to both operations and liquidity in the last few years
due to changes in their customers' preferences and an increase in
competition in the long-term vehicle rental market.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *