/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/180419.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, April 19, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 077


                            Headlines


B E L A R U S

BELAGROPROMBANK: S&P Hikes Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating to B


F R A N C E

LA POSTE: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Subordinated Hybrid Notes


G E R M A N Y

P&ISWBIDCO GMBH: S&P Assigns 'B' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating


I R E L A N D

HARVEST CLO XIX: Fitch Rates EUR12MM Class F Notes 'B-(EXP)sf'


N E T H E R L A N D S

CEVA GROUP: S&P Puts 'B-' ICR on Watch Positive on Potential IPO


P O L A N D

POSITIVE POWER: Files for Bankruptcy in Gliwice Court


P O R T U G A L

HIPOTOTTA NO. 4: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class C Notes to 'B+sf'


R U S S I A

B&N BANK: S&P Upgrades ICR to 'B+' on Improved Capitalization
CONFIDENCE BANK: Put on Provisional Administration
EN+ GROUP: Fitch Withdraws BB- Long-Term FC Issuer Default Rating
LEADER JSC: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
SAMARA OBLAST: S&P Alters Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'BB' ICR


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AA BOND: S&P Affirms 'B+ (sf)' Rating on GBP3BB Class B2 Notes
HOMEBASE: Taps BCG to Advise CEO Amid Financial Woes
NEW LOOK: HSBC Withdraws Credit Protection for Suppliers
SELECT: Creditors Approve CVA, Nearly 2,000 Jobs Saved


                            *********



=============
B E L A R U S
=============


BELAGROPROMBANK: S&P Hikes Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating to B
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has raised its long-term issuer
credit rating on Belarus-based Belagroprombank JSC to 'B' from
'B-' and affirmed the 'B' short-term issuer credit rating.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B/B' long- and short-term
issuer credit ratings on JSC Savings Bank Belarusbank and Bank
BelVEB OJSC.

S&P's outlooks on all three banks are stable.

S&P said, "The rating actions stem from our view of improved
economic fundamentals for Belarus' banking sector. In 2017,
Belarus' real GDP growth was higher than expected, at an
estimated 2.4%, benefiting primarily from stronger economic
performance of key trade partners, particularly Russia and
several EU member states. We forecast that Belarus' economy will
expand by close to 2% annually for the next few years, while
inflation will stabilize at 6% compared with double digits over
the past six years.

"We expect that recent stabilization of macroeconomic factors can
help decrease credit risk in the economy and allow economic
agents to better face adverse cycles. This in turn would further
bolster business conditions and resilience for banks operating in
the country. We expect that the economic performance and debt-
servicing capacity of key corporate borrowers will likely stop
deteriorating, and remain fairly stable in 2018. This will likely
lead to lower credit losses and stabilizing nonperforming loans
for Belarus banks. We estimate credit growth in the range of 8%-
12%, primarily stemming from retail loans and a moderate recovery
of the corporate portfolio.

"Nevertheless, we believe that economic risks for banks operating
in Belarus remain considerable, given the high, although
declining, portion of foreign currency denominated loans,
remaining balance-of-payments risk, the economy's volatility and
vulnerability to oil prices, and limited progress on structural
reforms.

"As a result of the reduced economic risk, we have revised the
anchor that starts our ratings on banks operating predominantly
in Belarus, to 'b' from 'b-'.

"Yet despite improvements in economic risk, we have revised our
assessment of the institutional framework to reflect our view of
a weaker regulatory track record, which now compares with that in
countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Uzbekistan. In our view, banking supervision in Belarus has been
more reactive than proactive, resulting in Belarusian banks'
historically significant risk taking and weak underwriting
standards. As a result, the government had to support the workout
of problem loans in 2016-2017."

BELAGROPROMBANK JSC

S&P said, "The upgrade reflects our view that stabilizing
economic conditions and lower economic risk in Belarus will be
beneficial for Belagroprombank's stand-alone credit profile
(SACP). In particular, we think that the bank will likely
demonstrate more stable asset quality, especially since the
balance-sheet clean-up undertaken by the government in 2016-2017,
given its moderate capital buffer and sufficient liquidity
cushion. We also think that Belagroprombank's business position
will remain sustainable, reflecting that it has the second-
largest customer franchise in Belarus and is a major lender to
companies from strategically important economic sectors.

"Nevertheless, we note that, historically, the bank's performance
was sensitive to some extended periods of economic turbulence in
Belarus, due to geographic concentrations and the high share of
loans to the vulnerable agriculture sector. The recent balance-
sheet cleanup helped improve the bank's asset quality and
decrease its exposure to agriculture. But we understand that the
bank intends to resume lending growth, and gradually change the
asset structure by increasing the share of loans and decreasing
the share of securities. This move may eventually result in
higher credit risk, in our view. We also anticipate that the
implementation of International Financial Reporting Standard No.
9 may inflate the bank's credit losses in 2018.

"We also continue to classify Belagroprombank as a government-
related entity that is significantly exposed to risks in Belarus.
In addition, we believe there is a moderately high likelihood
that Belagroprombank would receive support from the Belarusian
government if needed. However, we do not factor in any uplift for
extraordinary government support into our ratings on
Belagroprombank because the bank's SACP is already at the same
level as the sovereign rating and capped by it.

"The stable outlook on Belagroprombank reflects our view that the
ratings will not change materially over the next 12-18 months. We
also take into account the stable outlook on Belarus."

Any positive rating action on Belagroprombank would depend on a
positive rating action on the sovereign as well as an improvement
in the bank's own creditworthiness, such as a sizable and
persistent increase in capital or sustainable improvement in the
bank's business diversification.

A negative rating action on Belarus would lead to a similar
action on Belagroprombank. S&P can also lower the ratings in the
next 12-18 months, if it observes that Belagroprombank's
creditworthiness, including its risk position, were deteriorating
significantly, or significantly increased credit costs lead to
massive deterioration in capital not compensated by capital
injections.

JSC SAVINGS BANK BELARUSBANK

S&P said, "We believe the stabilization of macroeconomic
fundamentals in Belarus and easing pressure on the banking system
will have a positive influence on Belarusbank's creditworthiness.
We have therefore revised our assessment of its SACP to 'b+' from
'b'.

"This assessment is the highest among the banks we rate in
Belarus, mainly reflecting the bank's market-leading business
position and ongoing support from the Belarusian government. It
also incorporates our view of the bank's adequate risk position
and stable funding structure. We acknowledge, however, that these
strengths are offset by Belarusbank's tight capitalization,
domestic geographic concentration, and strong dependence on
regular government support. We believe that revenue stability,
profitability, and improvement of business diversification will
be very important for the bank to keep its strong business
position in the medium term.

"At the same time, we consider Belarusbank to be a government-
related entity that is significantly exposed to risks in Belarus.
We therefore continue to rate Belarusbank at the same level as
the sovereign ratings on Belarus and cap our long-term and short-
term ratings on Belarusbank at 'B/B'.

"The stable outlook on Belarusbank mirrors that on Belarus and
reflects our view that the bank's creditworthiness will likely
remain unchanged over the next 12-18 months."

Any positive rating action on Belarusbank would depend on a
positive rating action on the sovereign because the ratings on
the bank are capped at the level of the rating on the sovereign.

A negative rating action on Belarus would lead to a similar
action on Belarusbank.

BANK BELVEB OJSC

S&P said, "We believe that the stabilization of macroeconomic
fundamentals in Belarus and easing pressure on the banking system
will have a positive influence on Bank BelVEB's creditworthiness.
We have revised our assessment of its SACP to 'b' from 'b-'.

"We continue to view Bank BelVEB as a strategically important
subsidiary of Russia-based Vnesheconombank (VEB). We think that
Bank BelVEB is unlikely to be sold over the near few years, and
that the VEB group has a strong long-term financial commitment to
the bank. Bank BelVEB shares the parent's brand and has close
links with VEB in terms of reputation and risk management.
However, our ratings on Bank BelVEB are constrained by the
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on Belarus because the
bank operates exclusively in Belarus and remains highly exposed
to country risks. We therefore do not include uplift for parental
support and continue to rate Bank BelVEB at the same level as the
sovereign ratings, namely 'B/B'.

"The stable outlook on Bank BelVEB mirrors that on Belarus and
reflects our view that the bank's creditworthiness will likely
remain unchanged over the next 12-18 months.

"An upgrade of Bank BelVEB is therefore contingent on an upgrade
of the sovereign, since the sovereign ratings constrain our
ratings on Bank BelVEB.

"We are unlikely to lower the ratings, but could do so if Bank
BelVEB's creditworthiness deteriorated significantly and it
received no support from parent VEB. However, this is not our
base-case scenario over the next 12-18 months."

A negative rating action on Belarus would also lead to a similar
action on Bank BelVEB.

  BICRA SCORE SNAPSHOT*
  Belarus                      To               From
  BICRA Group                  10               10
  Economic risk                9                10
   Economic resilience         Very high        Very high
   Economic imbalances         Very high        Very high
   Credit risk in the economy  Very high        Extremely high
    Trend                      Stable           Stable

  Industry risk                10              10
   Institutional framework     Extremely high  Very high
   Competitive dynamics        Very high       Very high
   Systemwide funding          Extremely high  Extremely high
    Trend                      Stable          Stable

*Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) economic risk
and industry risk scores are on a scale from 1 (lowest risk) to
10 (highest risk).

  RATINGS SCORE SNAPSHOTS
  Belagroprombank
                          To                 From
  Issuer Credit Rating    B/Stable/B         B-/Stable/B

  SACP                    b                  b-
   Anchor                 b                  b-
   Business Position      Adequate (0)       Adequate (0)
   Capital and Earnings   Moderate (0)       Moderate (0)
   Risk Position          Adequate (0)       Adequate (0)
   Funding and            Average and (0)    Average and (0)
   Liquidity              Adequate (0)       Adequate
  Support                 0                  0
   ALAC Support           0                  0
   GRE Support            0                  0
   Group Support          0                  0
   Sovereign Support      0                  0

  Additional Factors      0                  0


  JSC Savings Bank Belarusbank
                          To                   From
  Issuer Credit Rating    B/Stable/B         B/Stable/B

  SACP                    b+                 b
   Anchor                 b                  b-
   Business Position      Strong (+1)        Strong (+1)
   Capital and Earnings   Weak (0)           Weak (0)
   Risk Position          Adequate (0)       Adequate (0)
   Funding and            Above Average (0)  Above average (0)
   Liquidity              Adequate           Adequate
  Support                 0                  0
   ALAC Support           0                  0
   GRE Support            0                  0
   Group Support          0                  0
   Sovereign Support      0                  0
  Additional Factors      -1                 0


  Bank BelVEB OJSC
                          To                  From
  Issuer Credit Rating    B/Stable/B          B/Stable/B
  SACP                    b                   b-
   Anchor                 b                   b-
   Business Position      Adequate (0)        Adequate (0)
   Capital and Earnings   Weak (0)            Weak (0)
   Risk Position          Adequate (0)        Adequate (0)
   Funding and            Average and (0)     Average and (0)
   Liquidity              Adequate            Adequate
  Support                 0                   +1
   ALAC Support           0                   0
   GRE Support            0                   +1
   Group Support          0                   0
   Sovereign Support      0                   0

  Additional Factors      0                   0

  Ratings List
  Upgraded; Ratings Affirmed
                                To                 From
  Belagroprombank JSC
  Issuer Credit Rating          B/Stable/B         B- /Stable/B

  Ratings Affirmed

  JSC Savings Bank Belarusbank
   Issuer Credit Rating                   B/Stable/B
  Bank BelVEB OJSC
   Issuer Credit Rating                   B/Stable/B


===========
F R A N C E
===========


LA POSTE: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Subordinated Hybrid Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has assigned its 'BB' long-term
issue rating to the proposed perpetual deeply subordinated hybrid
notes to be issued by French postal services operator La Poste
(A/Stable/A-1).

The completion and size of the transaction will be subject to
market conditions, but we anticipate a benchmark issuance of over
EUR500 million. La Poste plans to use the proceeds for general
corporate purposes. Assuming a EUR1 billion new issue, S&P
estimates the ratio of outstanding hybrids to adjusted
capitalization at approximately 14%, which is below the 15% limit
for it to view the instruments as having intermediate equity
content. If the ratio were to exceed 15%, the equity content
would reduce to minimal for the portion of the notes that exceeds
15%.

S&P said, "The 'BB' rating on the proposed hybrid notes is two
notches below our assessment of La Poste's stand-alone credit
profile, reflecting their subordination and optional interest
deferability. Our issuer credit rating on La Poste reflects our
expectation that there is a very high likelihood that it would
receive timely and sufficient extraordinary state support if it
faced financial distress. However, we do not rate the proposed
hybrid bonds based on our issuer credit rating on La Poste
because we see potential impediments to the French government's
ability to support the hybrid notes, if necessary.

"We classify the proposed notes as having intermediate equity
content until their first call date occurring more than five
years after the issue date, because they meet our criteria in
terms of their subordination, permanence, and optional
deferability during this period. Consequently, in our calculation
of La Poste's credit ratios, we treat 50% of the principal
outstanding and accrued interest on the hybrids as equity rather
than debt. We also treat 50% of the related payments on these
notes as equivalent to a common dividend."

KEY FACTORS IN S&P'S ASSESSMENT OF THE INSTRUMENTS' PERMANENCE

Although the proposed notes have no final maturity date, the
issuer may redeem them for cash on the first call date (occurring
more than five years after the issue date), and on each interest
payment date thereafter. In addition, the notes may be purchased
at any time in the open market. The issuer intends to redeem or
repurchase the notes only to the extent that they are replaced
with instruments with equivalent equity content, but is not
obliged to do so. In addition, the notes may be called at any
time for tax, rating, and accounting events, or if 75% or more of
the notes have already been redeemed.

KEY FACTORS IN S&P'S ASSESSMENT OF THE INSTRUMENTS' DEFERABILITY

S&P said, "In our view, the issuer's option to defer payment on
the proposed notes is discretionary. This means that the issuer
may elect not to pay accrued interest on an interest payment
date. La Poste retains the option to defer interest throughout
the life of the notes. However, any outstanding deferred interest
is cumulative and will ultimately be settled in cash if, for
example, the issuer paid interest on the next interest payment
date, or declared a dividend. We see this as a negative factor,
but this condition remains acceptable under our methodology,
given that the issuer can still choose to defer on the next
interest payment date after settling a previously deferred
amount."

KEY FACTORS IN S&P'S ASSESSMENT OF THE INSTRUMENTS' SUBORDINATION

The proposed notes (and coupons) would constitute unsecured and
subordinated obligations of the issuer, and would rank senior
only to the issuer's ordinary shares and preference share, and
pari passu with the outstanding $500 million hybrid instrument.


=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


P&ISWBIDCO GMBH: S&P Assigns 'B' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' long-term issuer credit
rating to P&ISWBidCo GmbH, the indirect parent of P&I Personal &
Informatik AG (P&I), a German provider of payroll and HR-related
software and services. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "We assigned our 'B' long-term issue rating to
P&ISWBidCo's proposed EUR380 million first-lien debt, consisting
of a EUR355 million term loan and a EUR25 million revolving
credit facility (RCF). The recovery rating on this debt is '3',
indicating our expectation of approximately 50% recovery for
creditors in the event of a payment default."

The rating reflects P&I's focus on the niche market for payroll
and HR software in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, paired with
our expectation that the company will maintain high leverage
under the control of its financial sponsor owners. Essentially
all of P&I's revenues stem from software and services related to
payroll and other HR tasks, such as time measurement, workforce
planning, or recruiting. This leaves P&I exposed to possible
unfavorable changes in growth dynamics or the competitive
conditions in this segment.

S&P said, "We expect that the proposed debt reduction will
improve our adjusted debt to EBITDA by about 0.7x relative to our
estimate of 6.8x at the end of fiscal 2018 (ended March 31), but
that it is set to remain well above 5x in fiscals 2019-2020. This
is partly because we forecast EBITDA growth to remain
approximately flat in fiscal 2019--as P&I shifts its revenue
model toward software as a service (SaaS) and undertakes growth-
related investments in products and sales capacity--before
accelerating to more than 7% in fiscal 2020. In addition, we
think that, over time, P&I's owners might use headroom created by
EBITDA growth and free operating cash flow (FOCF) of more than
EUR25 million per year (S&P's projection of reported FOCF) for
acquisitions or shareholder returns."

S&P said, "P&I's narrow specialization on HR and payroll products
is a key constraint for our assessment of its business risk
relative to some of its rated peers with broader product
portfolios. In our view, HR and payroll software is less mission-
critical than solutions covering a broader range of customer
needs, such as enterprise resource planning software, which also
implies lower switching costs. In addition, P&I faces some price-
driven competition from other payroll software providers, such as
the not-so-distant No. 3 player Datev and smaller players.
Furthermore, we see some risks that new HR software products by
larger international software vendors could intensify competition
in the long term. Moreover, P&I has limited geographic
diversification. In fiscal 2017, P&I generated three-quarters of
its revenues in Germany and the remainder in Switzerland and
Austria. With EUR130 million of revenues expected in fiscal 2018,
P&I is much smaller than the majority of vendors in the wider
enterprise software market. P&I's customer base also exhibits
some customer concentration, with its 10-largest customers
accounting for about 18% of revenues in fiscal 2017.

"Our view of P&I's business risk is supported by its No. 2
position in the market for payroll software for midsize companies
in Germany, its well-developed product portfolio, and good share
of recurring revenues. In fiscal 2017, P&I held an 18% market
share in the German payroll software market for companies with
between 500 and 2,000 employees, after leader SAP (25%), and
followed by Datev and ADP (about 15% each), according to P&I. In
addition, in fiscal 2017, 61% of P&I's revenues were recurring,
consisting of contracted SaaS, maintenance, and services
revenues, and we expect this share to rise steadily to more than
70% in the next three years. Furthermore, P&I's good product
offerings and well-established relationships with its clients
have contributed to what we view as modest churn rates of less
than 3.5% per year since fiscal 2014. In addition, P&I enjoys
sound profitability, and we forecast its adjusted EBITDA margins
will be 44%-47% for fiscals 2019 and 2020, despite some short-
term pressure on margins from the ongoing transition to SaaS from
the traditional license model.

"Our view of P&I's financial risk primarily derives from its high
leverage and the fact that we consider its owners to be financial
sponsors. Gross financial debt as of March 31, 2018, after giving
effect to the proposed refinancing, amounts to EUR355 million,
and we expect adjusted debt to EBITDA will remain well above 5.0x
for fiscals 2019-2020, after our estimate of about 6.8x for
fiscal 2018. Given our view that P&I's owners are likely to
pursue an aggressive financial policy, we calculate P&I's credit
metrics on a gross debt basis. We believe that P&I intends to
pursue acquisitions to participate in the consolidation of the HR
software market in its countries of operations, or potentially to
enter this market in new countries. Although we see limited risk
that such deals would cause material deviations from our leverage
forecast at this point, they may offset organic deleveraging
through EBITDA growth. In our view, P&I benefits from good cash
conversion thanks to low capital expenditure (capex) needs and
flat to modestly positive working capital-related cash inflows
due to a growing recurring revenue base with upfront billing. We
expect this to support adjusted FOCF to debt of more than 8% over
the next two fiscal years.

"The stable outlook reflects our anticipation that P&I will
successfully maintain its market position in the payroll and HR
software and services segment, and that it will continue to
develop its recurring revenue base through up-selling and
improved fee models. We think this will facilitate revenue growth
of 3%-5% and adjusted EBITDA margins of 44%-46% in the next 12
months, despite a temporary impact from its transition to SaaS
and commercial investments. We forecast this will result in S&P
Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 6x and
sustainably positive reported FOCF of more than EUR25 million in
fiscal 2019.

"Rating upside is limited as we expect P&I's financial sponsor
owners to pursue aggressive financial policies in the future,
potentially involving debt-funded acquisitions or shareholder
returns. However, we could raise the rating if P&I reduced
adjusted debt to EBITDA toward 5x on a sustainable basis through
further gross debt repayments combined with steady EBITDA growth,
alongside a firm financial policy commitment to maintain leverage
at this level. An upgrade would also require FOCF at about 10% of
adjusted debt.

"We could lower the rating if declining revenues or EBITDA or
debt-funded acquisitions resulted in adjusted leverage exceeding
7.5x on a prolonged basis or FOCF declining toward zero. In our
view, operating underperformance could be caused by increased
competition or failure to maintain a competitive product
portfolio, which could in turn lead to higher customer churn and
a weakening of P&I's recurring revenue base."


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


HARVEST CLO XIX: Fitch Rates EUR12MM Class F Notes 'B-(EXP)sf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Harvest CLO XIX DAC notes expected
ratings:

EUR1.5 million Class X: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR248 million Class A: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR22 million Class B-1: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR20 million Class B-2: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR26 million Class C: 'A(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR22 million Class D: 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR22 million Class E: 'BB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR12 million Class F: 'B-(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR40 million subordinated notes: not rated

Harvest CLO XIX DAC is a cash flow collateralised loan obligation
(CLO). Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes will be used
to purchase a EUR400 million portfolio of mostly European
leveraged loans and bonds. The portfolio is actively managed by
Investcorp Credit Management EU Limited. The CLO envisages a
4.25-year reinvestment period and an 8.5-year weighted average
life (WAL).

The assignment of final ratings is contingent on the receipt of
final documents conforming to information already received.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stress Portfolio
For the analysis, Fitch created a stress portfolio based on the
transaction's portfolio profile tests and collateral quality
tests. These included a top 10 obligor at 20% limit, an 8.5-year
WAL, a top industry limit of 17.5% with the top three industries
at 40%, and a maximum 'CCC' bucket at 7.5%.

Limited Interest Rate Exposure
Up to 10% of the portfolio can be invested in fixed-rate assets,
while fixed-rate liabilities represent 5% of the target par.
Fitch modelled both 0% and 10% fixed-rate buckets and found that
the notes can withstand the interest rate mismatch associated
with each scenario.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 125% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and with this increase added to all rating default levels,
would lead to a downgrade of up to two notches for the rated
notes. A 25% reduction in recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of up to three notches for the rated notes.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CEVA GROUP: S&P Puts 'B-' ICR on Watch Positive on Potential IPO
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'B-' long-term issuer credit rating
on the Netherlands-based integrated logistics services provider
CEVA Group PLC (CEVA) and its holding company CEVA Holdings LLC
on CreditWatch with positive implications.

S&P said, "At the same time, we placed our 'B-' issue rating on
CEVA's first-lien notes and our 'CCC' issue ratings on CEVA's
first-and-a-half-lien and unsecured notes on CreditWatch
positive. The recovery ratings on these notes remain unchanged.

"The CreditWatch placement follows CEVA's recent announcement
that it plans to execute an IPO in the second quarter of 2018 and
it reflects the possibility that we could raise our ratings on
CEVA, if the company launches and successfully completes the IPO.
We typically view IPOs as credit positive, because publicly
traded issuers generally exercise less aggressive financial
policies than issuers controlled by private-equity sponsors, and
this is the case with CEVA.

"We understand that the proposed IPO will consist purely of a
primary offering for approximately Swiss franc (CHF) 1.3 billion
(about EUR1.09 billion), and we expect the proceeds will be used
to repay debt such that net debt to adjusted EBITDA, as defined
by CEVA, falls below 3x. Taking into account such debt repayment
and our analytical adjustments--in particular for the immediate
parent-level payment-in-kind (PIK) notes, preferred shares, and
operating leases, which we add to debt for our ratio-calculation
purposes--the company's post IPO pro forma S&P Global-adjusted
debt-to-EBITDA ratio would improve to around 6.0x in 2018 from
our previous forecast of 8.0x-8.5x. We note that any potential
changes to the features of the parent-level PIK notes or
preferred shares in connection with the proposed IPO, which
result in our reclassification of such instruments as equity-
like, would reduce adjusted debt and boost credit measures
further, such as adjusted debt to EBITDA dropping to 3.5x-4.0x.

The ratings on CEVA continue to reflect the company's exposure to
highly fragmented and competitive underlying industry with
stronger and larger players, which limits growth prospects and
pressures profitability. Although CEVA seeks to offset operating
risk and pricing pressure with long-term contracts, it is still
highly exposed to air and freight rate cyclicality and volatile
volume demand, which can hit profit margins during economic
slowdowns. In addition, the industry relies heavily on technology
to be competitive and serves demanding customers who want faster
and cheaper services. As a result, part of CEVA's growth will
depend on its ability to further invest in new technology where,
in S&P's view, competitors have greater capital resources to fund
cost-efficient technologies, such as data analytics and
automation.

These weaknesses are partly mitigated by the company's strong
client retention rates and long-standing relationships across a
broadly diversified end-market. S&P said, "In addition, while
bidding for contracts is competitive and can squeeze margins, we
positively note that CEVA has been reducing its exposure to
underperforming contracts. Furthermore, we believe that CEVA's
top management, including the CFO who joined about two years ago,
has demonstrated good operational effectiveness and focus on
profitability that will drive further efficiencies in CEVA's cost
structure."

S&P said, "We intend to resolve the CreditWatch placement within
the next 90 days, once the IPO closes or if it seems unlikely
that it will be executed. The extent of the potential upgrade
depends on the magnitude of the company's reduction in adjusted
debt and CEVA's commitment to maintaining a lower level of
financial leverage. Alternatively, we could affirm our 'B-' issue
credit rating if CEVA elects not to pursue an IPO."


===========
P O L A N D
===========


POSITIVE POWER: Files for Bankruptcy in Gliwice Court
-----------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Indata SA on April 16 said its unit,
Positive Power Sp. z o. o., filed for bankruptcy in the District
Court in Gliwice.

Positive Power is a software house, which gathers over 90
experts.  It has been delivering bespoke IT solutions for over 13
years.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


HIPOTOTTA NO. 4: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class C Notes to 'B+sf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one tranche of HipoTotta No. 4 Plc and
affirmed the others:

Class A (ISIN XS0237370605): affirmed at 'Asf'; removed from
Rating Watch Evolving (RWE); Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0237370787): affirmed at 'Asf'; removed from RWE;
Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS0237370860: upgraded to 'B+sf' from 'CCCsf';
removed from RWE; Outlook Stable

This Portuguese RMBS transaction comprises prime mortgage loans
originated and serviced by Banco Santander Totta S.A.
(BBB+/Stable/F2). The removal of the RWE follows the
implementation of Fitch's new European RMBS Rating Criteria. The
ratings were placed on RWE on 5 October 2017.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Account Bank Trigger Restructured
The maximum achievable rating of the notes is capped at 'Asf'
category under Fitch's Structured Finance and Covered Bonds
Counterparty Rating Criteria, due to the new account bank's
minimum eligibility trigger being set at 'F2', which is
insufficient to support 'AAsf' or 'AAAsf' ratings.

Deutsche Bank AG (DB, BBB+/F2), which acts as issuer account
bank, became ineligible to continue performing this role
following the bank's downgrade to 'BBB+'/'F2' from 'A-'/'F1'on 28
September 2017, as the initial transaction documentation defined
a minimum eligibility rating level of 'F1'. Fitch has received
confirmation that steps are being taken to amend the issuer
account bank minimum eligibility rating to 'F2' (see "Fitch:
Remedial Actions Underway for DB SF Account Bank Exposure" dated
1 February 2018 at www.fitchratings.com).

Stable Credit Performance
The transaction continues to show sound asset performance. Three-
month plus arrears (excluding defaults) as a percentage of the
current pool balance stood at 0.6% as of the last reporting
period and gross cumulative defaults (defined as arrears over 12
months) were at 3.4% of the initial portfolio balance. Fitch
expects performance to remain stable, especially given the
significant seasoning of the securitised portfolio of
approximately 15 years, and the gradual deleveraging of the
mortgages, with an estimated weighted average current loan-to-
value ratio of 46% compared with the weighted average original
LTV of 77%.

Credit Enhancement (CE) Trends
Current and projected levels of CE for the rated notes are
expected to remain broadly stable as the notes are amortising on
a pro-rata basis provided certain performance indicators are
satisfied and the outstanding portfolio balance represents more
than 10% of its original amount (currently at 26%). When the
portfolio balance drops below 10% of its initial balance, the
notes will switch to sequential amortisation.

Swap Collateral Posting Waived
Banco Santander S.A. (A-/F2) as swap counterparty has been in
breach of the minimum 'F1' and 'A' rating eligibility trigger
defined in the contract since its downgrade to 'F2' in 2012. The
trustee received a waiver from the noteholders regarding swap
collateralisation and therefore no posting of collateral is
taking place, which is not in line with Fitch's counterparty
criteria expectations. Fitch acknowledges the presence of a
subsequent 'BBB-/F3' replacement trigger on the swap, and has
therefore factored the swap cash flows into its analysis,
allowing the notes' rating to be higher than that of the
derivative counterparty.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The class A and B notes could be upgraded to 'AAsf' if the
account bank replacement triggers were updated to 'A-' or 'F1' in
accordance with Fitch's Structured Finance and Covered Bonds
Counterparty Rating Criteria, subject to the performance of the
mortgage pool and also the prevailing swap counterparty
arrangement.

Deterioration in asset performance may result from economic
factors. A corresponding increase in new defaults and associated
pressure on excess spread and reserve funds, beyond Fitch's
assumptions, could result in negative rating action.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


B&N BANK: S&P Upgrades ICR to 'B+' on Improved Capitalization
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it raised its long-term issuer
credit rating on B&N Bank and long-term issue ratings on the
bank's senior unsecured debt to 'B+' from 'B'. S&P said, "We
removed the ratings from CreditWatch developing, where we placed
them on Sept. 22, 2017. We also affirmed our short-term issuer
credit rating on B&N Bank at 'B'. The outlook is positive."

S&P said, "The upgrade of B&N Bank reflects our view that its
financial standing has substantially improved following receipt
of government support in the form of a capital injection and full
repayment of its interbank loan to Rost Bank. We have revised
upward our assessment of B&N Bank's capital and earnings,
resulting in an upward revision of its stand-alone credit profile
(SACP), which we now assess at 'b'. The ratings on B&N Bank
continue to incorporate one notch of uplift above the SACP to
reflect our view of a moderate likelihood of extraordinary
government support in case of need."

In March 2018, Rost Bank used government support to fully repay
its Russian ruble (RUB) 790 billion (US$13.8 billion) interbank
loan from B&N Bank. B&N Bank also received capital support of
RUB56.9 billion (US$1 billion) from the Central Bank of Russia
(CBR). This enabled the bank to cover losses incurred over 2017
and to build up substantial capital buffers, becoming fully
compliant with regulatory capital requirements.

S&P said, "We expect B&N Bank's management to continue its focus
on the recovery of its problem loans, improving its efficiency,
and begin merger and integration processes with Bank Otkritie
over 2018. We therefore do not expect noticeable growth of its
business over that period. We understand that, in addition to
further development of small-to-midsize enterprise and corporate
lending, the bank plans to focus on extending its retail
business, backed by relevant expertise of the newly appointed
management team. Management will also aim to improve efficiency
and bring down the cost of funding to support its net interest
margin at around 2.7%-3.0% over 2018. Taking into account the
support measures described above, we expect our risk-adjusted
capital ratio to improve to above 7% by the end of 2018, from the
level of below 3% that we estimated for end-2017.

"Our assessment of the group's risk position remains a negative
rating factor. This reflects B&N Bank's level of nonperforming
loans (NPLs), which remain above the system average at more than
15% of the gross customer loan portfolio, according to our
estimation. At the same time, we do not expect material new loan
loss provisions, as we understand that most of the existing
problem loans have been identified and provisioned.

"Our assessment of the bank's business position also remains a
negative rating factor, reflecting significant ongoing
restructuring and business transformation at B&N Bank and Bank
Otkritie as well as potential merger implementation risks. Within
the next 12 months, management will be focusing on efficiency
improvements and aligning the businesses and procedures of B&N
Bank with those of Bank Otkritie. At the same time, the detailed
restructuring strategy and its implementation plan is yet to be
finalized and approved. We think that it will take time for the
management team to implement a successful restructuring of the
merged group and to support its development as a sustainable,
stable, profit-generating business. At the same time, we
recognize that the merged bank's business position will likely be
supported by its large market share, material geographical
footprint in Russia, large number of customers, and its status as
a state-owned bank. Moreover, we think that the experience of the
new management team in integration and transformation should
support the development and implementation of the bank's
transformation.

"We assess the bank's funding as average and its liquidity as
adequate. After the intervention of the CBR in mid-September
2017, repayment of the loan to Rost Bank thanks to CBR support
and the direct capital support to B&N Bank, the funding profile
has stabilized and the dependence on the CBR has been eliminated.
We consider that the bank's liquidity buffers are now sufficient
and are supported by substantial cash and investments in
uncollateralized government bonds, which together represented
about 33% of the bank's liabilities as of mid-March 2018 after
the capital increase was accomplished.

"Our view of a moderate likelihood of extraordinary government
support for B&N Bank in case of need provides one notch of uplift
to the bank's SACP of 'b', resulting in the long-term issuer
rating of 'B+'. Moreover, we think that the probability of
extraordinary government support may increase after the merger of
B&N Bank and Bank Otkritie is completed, provided that the CBR
retains its control over the merged entity and the restructuring
strategy does not materially change. The merged group will be the
third-largest banking group in Russia in terms of retail
deposits, with a market share of about 3.5%, and the fifth-
largest in terms of total assets. We think that a default of the
enlarged group, all else being equal, would have substantial
reputational costs for the CBR.

"The positive outlook reflects our expectation that B&N Bank will
merge into Bank Otkritie by April 1, 2019, and that the merged
group's systemic importance--and therefore the probability of
extraordinary government support--might increase, provided that
the merger proceeds as expected and the restructuring strategy
remains solid and fully supported by the CBR. The positive
outlook also reflects our view that the merged group's
creditworthiness will likely gradually strengthen in the next
12-18 months, and its risk profile might improve due to the
reduction of NPLs.

If the merger with Bank Otkritie does not take place over the
next 12 months or is cancelled, although this is currently not
our base-case scenario, we nevertheless could consider a positive
rating action if we considered that B&N Bank's stand-alone
creditworthiness had materially and sustainably improved. We
could judge this to have happened if there is a sustainable
decrease of NPLs and restructured loans to levels at least
comparable with the sector average, with solid provisioning
coverage. The upward revision of B&N Bank's creditworthiness
would also be conditional on the bank's development of a solid
risk management system to support its new business generation.

"We may consider revising the outlook back to stable if the
merger with Bank Otkritie does not go ahead and at the same time
we do not see improvements to the bank's risk management
procedures, with NPLs remaining above the system average. We
could consider a negative rating action if the management team
fails to develop and implement a successful restructuring,
resulting in a significant deterioration of the bank's franchise
and inability to generate sustainable new business. We could also
take a negative rating action if we see a change in the CBR's
strategy toward the bank and believe that the probability of
extraordinary support has diminished."


CONFIDENCE BANK: Put on Provisional Administration
--------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by Order No. OD-936, dated April 13, 2018,
effective from the same date, revoked the banking license of
Kostroma-based credit institution Limited Liability Company
Commercial Bank CONFIDENCE BANK (Registration No. 970), further
referred to as the credit institution.  According to the
financial statements, as of April 1, 2018, the credit institution
ranked 271st by assets in the Russian banking system.

Problems in the credit institution's operations owe their origin
to the use of a risky business model focused on loans to
companies related to the credit institution's management, which
resulted in multiple low-quality assets building up on its
balance sheet.  The due diligence check of credit risk at the
regulator's request established a substantial loss of capital and
entailed the need for action to prevent the credit institution's
insolvency (bankruptcy); there arose a real threat to its
creditors' and depositors' interests.

The credit institution failed to comply with the requirements of
the legislation and Bank of Russia regulations on countering the
legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained incomes and the
financing of terrorism with regard to the provision to the
authorized body of required data on operations subject to
obligatory control and the identification of its customers'
beneficiaries.  Besides, the credit institution conducted dubious
transit operations.

The Bank of Russia repeatedly applied supervisory measures
against the credit institution, including four impositions of
restrictions on household deposit taking.

The management and owners of the bank failed to take any
effective measures to normalize its activities. Under the
circumstances the Bank of Russia took the decision to withdraw
the credit institution from the banking services market.

The Bank of Russia took this measure following the credit
institution's failure to comply with federal banking laws and
Bank of Russia regulations, repeated violations within a year of
the requirements stipulated by Article 7 (excluding Clause 3 of
Article 7) of the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism" as well as Bank of Russia regulations issued in
accordance with the said law and application of the measures
stipulated by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian
Federation (Bank of Russia)", taking into account a real threat
to the interests of creditors.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-937, dated April 13,
2018, appointed a provisional administration to the credit
institution for the period until the appointment of a receiver
pursuant to the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies have been suspended.

The credit institution is a member of the deposit insurance
system.  The revocation of the banking license is an insured
event as stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance
of Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the
bank's retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said
Federal Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than a total of
RUR1.4 million per depositor.

The current development of the bank's status has been detailed in
a press statement released by the Bank of Russia.


EN+ GROUP: Fitch Withdraws BB- Long-Term FC Issuer Default Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Russia-based EN+ Group PLC's (EN+)
Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of
'BB-'/Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

Fitch has withdrawn the ratings for EN+ due to the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the
Treasury sanction restrictions.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
The rating actions follow the sanctions imposed on EN+ by OFAC.
US persons will be prohibited from dealing with EN+ from 7 May/5
June (depending on the nature of the transaction). Additionally,
non-US persons could face sanctions for knowingly facilitating
significant transactions for or on behalf of EN+. At this stage
there is lack of guidance how the latter would be implemented.

EN+ published a press release on 9 April 2018 indicating that
legal counsel is assessing the impact of the OFAC sanctions on
the group. EN+'s initial assessment is that it is highly likely
that the impact may be materially adverse to the business and
prospects of the company.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Not applicable

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

- Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs of 'BB-'/RWN:
   withdrawn
- Short-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs of 'B': withdrawn


LEADER JSC: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by Order No. OD-938, dated April 13, 2018,
effective the same date, revoked the banking license of
Moscow-based non-bank credit institution Joint-stock Company
LEADER (Registration No. 3304-K), further referred to as the
credit institution.  According to the financial statements, as of
April 1, 2018, the credit institution ranked 488th by assets in
the Russian banking system. The credit institution is not a
member of the deposit insurance system.

The operations of the credit institution were found multiple
times to be non-compliant with the law and Bank of Russia
regulations on countering the legalization (laundering) of
criminally obtained incomes and the financing of terrorism with
regard to the timely provision, completeness and accuracy of
information submitted to the authorized body about operations
subject to obligatory control.  Furthermore, there arose a
considerable amount of non-core assets and bad debt in the credit
institution's balance sheet.  The due diligence check of credit
risk at the Bank of Russia's request established a substantial
loss of capital and entailed the need for action to prevent the
credit institution's insolvency (bankruptcy), which created a
real threat to its creditors' interests.

The Bank of Russia took supervisory action against the credit
institution on more than one occasion.

The management and owners of the credit institution failed to
take effective measures to normalize its activities.  Under the
circumstances the Bank of Russia took the decision to withdraw
the non-bank credit institution LEADER from the banking services
market.

The Bank of Russia took this measure following the credit
institution's failure to comply with federal banking laws and
Bank of Russia regulations, repeated violations within a year of
the requirements stipulated by Article 7 (excluding Clause 3 of
Article 7) of the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism" as well as Bank of Russia regulations issued in
accordance with the said law and application of the measures
stipulated by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian
Federation (Bank of Russia)", taking into account a real threat
to the interests of creditors.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-939, dated April 13,
2018, appointed a provisional administration to the credit
institution for the period until the appointment of a receiver
pursuant to the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies have been suspended.

The current development of the bank's status has been detailed in
a press statement released by the Bank of Russia.


SAMARA OBLAST: S&P Alters Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'BB' ICR
------------------------------------------------------------
On April 13, 2018, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on
Russia's Samara Oblast to positive from stable. At the same time,
S&P affirmed the 'BB' long-term issuer credit rating on the
region.

OUTLOOK

The positive outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the oblast
may contain its deficit after capital accounts below 5% of total
revenue, despite potential pressures on expenditures and debt,
while we expect the liquidity position will remain robust.

Downside Scenario

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the oblast's management
relaxed its financial policies with regards to expenditures,
allowing the pace of operating spending to accelerate, or if the
region's economic development stagnated, thereby putting pressure
on the oblast's budgetary performance, debt, and liquidity
position.

Upside Scenario

S&P could raise the rating on Samara if the oblast remains
committed to prudent financial policies in the context of
upcoming governor elections and possible pressures on
expenditures, resulting in consistently sound budgetary
performance.

RATIONALE

S&P said, "We have raised our assessment of Samara Oblast's
liquidity, following the federal government's extension of the
tenor of its budget loans to the regions. We also expect that the
oblast's financial management will remain committed to operating
surpluses above 5% of operating revenues and deficits after
capital accounts within 5% of total revenues in the coming three
years. We think that strong performance and steady revenue growth
will allow the region to keep its tax-supported debt below 60% of
consolidated operating revenues through 2020." Volatility of the
institutional framework under which Russian regions operate and
relatively low wealth of the local economy will continue to
constrain the rating on Samara.

Improved debt and liquidity management, despite a volatile and
unbalanced institutional framework

Under Russia's volatile and unbalanced institutional framework,
Samara's budgetary flexibility and performance are significantly
affected by the federal government's decisions regarding key
taxes, transfers, and expenditure responsibilities. S&P said, "We
estimate that federally regulated revenues will continue to make
up more than 95% of Samara's budget revenues, which leaves very
little revenue autonomy for the region. The application of the
consolidated-tax-payer-group, the tax payment scheme used by
corporate taxpayers since 2012, continues to undermine
predictability of corporate profit tax (CPT) payments. In
addition, the federal budget law for 2018-2020 has no provisions
for new budget loans. However, we understand that the region
is participating in the restructuring of its outstanding budget
loans, initiated by the Federal Ministry of Finance, which we
view as a significant support to liquidity." Samara will pay back
only 5% of the budget loan stock each year in 2018 and 2019, and
10% in 2020. At the same time, the restructuring agreement
imposes a limit on debt stock at less than 50% of total revenues
by 2020, and on the deficit after capital expenditure, at less
than 10% of total revenues. Samara will also benefit from the
extension of the revolving federal Treasury facility from 50 to
90 days starting from January 2018.

Samara Oblast is one of Russia's key industrial regions, home to
over 2% of the total country's population and historically
contributing around 2% of national GDP. Nevertheless, the
oblast's wealth levels remain low in an international comparison.
S&P forecasts gross regional product (GRP) per capita could be
around US$7,000 in 2018-2020. Moreover, the oblast's revenues
remain exposed to the changes in the tax regime on oil production
and the refining industry, which together provide about 15% of
GRP, as well as the financial strategies of a few holding
companies operating in this sector. At the same time, in S&P's
view, the oblast's tax base is not intrinsically concentrated
compared with other commodity- and mineral extraction-oriented
peers.

Samara Oblast's modifiable revenues (mainly transport tax and
nontax revenues) are low and don't provide much flexibility--we
forecast they will account for less than 10% of the oblast's
operating revenues on average in the next three years. On the
expenditure side, the leeway remains limited because of a large
share of inflexible social spending. S&P said, "At the same time,
we believe that capital expenditure will remain above 15% of
total spending in the coming three years since some of the
construction projects launched for the 2018 FIFA World Cup will
be finalized in the subsequent years, and since management
intends to increase capital investment in social infrastructure.
Overall, we believe that the oblast's flexibility buffers will
remain weak, given the relatively small size of the self-financed
capital program."

S&P said, "We note improvement in the oblast's debt and liquidity
management, with longer debt maturities and larger amounts of
liquidity facilities available to cover debt service. At the same
time, similar to all Russian local and regional governments, the
oblast lacks reliable long-term financial planning and doesn't
have sufficient mechanisms to counterbalance the potential tax
volatility."

Adequate liquidity, thanks to stronger balances and lower debt
service

S&P said, "We believe that in the coming three years the oblast
will demonstrate stronger balances compared with our previous
forecast, thanks to a more pronounced recovery of operating
results. Over the past two years, Samara produced consistent
balance improvement, supported by tax growth and continuous
application of budget consolidation measures by the management.
We expect revenues to increase, driven by stronger performance of
manufacturing and food processing industries, as well as larger
tax contributions from domestically oriented oil production and
refinancing companies. At the same time, we believe the oblast
could experience pressure on expenditures from the upcoming
governor elections in 2018 and the implementation of presidential
development priorities in the medium term. We therefore assume
that modest deficits after capital accounts of less than 5% of
total revenues in 2018-2020 are likely to persist.

"We anticipate that a modest deficit after capital accounts and
lower debt service, thanks to the budget loan restructuring, will
allow the oblast to achieve adequate liquidity. The oblast's
average cash, including the cash of its budgetary units, will
likely be about Russian ruble (RUB)15 billion (about $250
million) through year-end 2018. We consider that the oblast's
cash will cover debt service of about RUB10.4 billion by more
than 100% over the next 12 months. At the same time, we consider
that the oblast has limited access to external liquidity, given
the weaknesses of the domestic capital market."

"We believe that management's efforts on budget consolidation
will likely allow the oblast to maintain the level of its tax-
supported debt below 60% of consolidated operating revenues
through 2020. We consider this debt level as still low in an
international context." At the end of 2017, the oblast's debt
stock consisted of medium-term bank loans (18%), budget loans
(29%), and medium- and long-term bonds. The portion of budget
loans in the oblast's stock of debt has been increasing in the
past few years since management has used this support to reduce
debt service costs.

S&P said, "We view Samara Oblast's outstanding contingent
liabilities as very low. The oblast's administration continues to
reduce its presence in the local economy by privatizing
government-related entities (GREs). We estimate support to GREs
will not exceed 2% of the oblast's total revenues, and we believe
that its municipal sector is relatively healthy financially. We
therefore don't expect any significant extraordinary support to
be required from the budget in the coming years."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

                                     Rating
                               To                 From
  Samara Oblast
   Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency   BB/Positive/--     BB/Stable/--
  Senior Unsecured
  Local Currency               BB                 BB


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AA BOND: S&P Affirms 'B+ (sf)' Rating on GBP3BB Class B2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BBB- (sf)' credit ratings on AA
Bond Co. Ltd.'s class A notes. At the same time, S&P has affirmed
its 'B+ (sf)' rating on the class B2 notes.

On Feb. 21, 2018, AA PLC announced a strategic overhaul and
investment plan for the next three fiscal years. The company's
long-term goals are to generate some growth in its roadside
membership base from fiscal year ending Jan. 31, 2021 (FY21),
which has stayed broadly flat following its flotation in 2014,
and expand its insurance services base. As a result of the
increased investment and operating costs, short-term
profitability, albeit still sound, will be weaker than we had
previously expected.

BUSINESS RISK PROFILE

S&P said, "We have applied our corporate securitization criteria
as part of our rating analysis on the senior notes in this
transaction. As part of our analysis, we assess the ability of
the cash flow generated by the borrower and the entities that
cross guarantee its liabilities (together, the borrowing group)
to make the payments required under the class A notes' loan
agreements using a long-term debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
analysis under a base case and a downside scenario. Our view of
the borrowing group's potential to generate cash flows is
informed by our base-case operating cash flow projection and our
assessment of its business risk profile (BRP), which are derived
using our corporate methodology."

The borrowing group's principal activity is the provision of
roadside assistance service in the U.K. The group also provides
complementary services such as insurance and driving services. It
provides breakdown services either through a membership model or
as part of a business service agreement, whereby the services are
provided to the underlying customer base of AA PLC's corporate
clients. Business customers typically include fleet operators and
motor manufacturers. The borrowing group is also a U.K. personal
lines insurance broker, particularly for motor and home
insurance.

S&P continues to view the BRP of the borrowing group as
satisfactory, taking into account the recent strategic update and
reflecting the following strengths and weaknesses.

Industry Risk

Although the business services industry is not capital intensive,
its good customer retention, strong brand, and market share
provides a barrier to entry. Customer retention is high because,
in the absence of significant dissatisfaction, customers prefer
to retain the incumbent service provider. Within business
services, the car breakdown sector enjoys higher barriers to
entry than the broader industry due to established brand name
players and the need for an efficient route-based network.

Car breakdown services are similar to a form of insurance,
resulting in generally stable revenue through economic cycles.
There is a partial natural macroeconomic hedge as consumers tend
to keep their vehicles longer during periods of economic weakness
and therefore are statistically more likely to require breakdown
assistance.

Competitive Position

The borrowing group has a leading position in the U.K. roadside
assistance market with an approximately 40% market share (3.3
million-members) in the business-to-consumer (B2C) segment and
approximately 65% market share (9.9 million members) in the
business-to- business (B2B) segment. Compared with its closest
competitor, RAC Bidco Ltd., the borrowing group is twice as big
(in terms of EBITDA). S&P notes AA PLC's well-recognized brand
name, its membership-based business model having consistently
high retention rates in both segments (about 82% and 100% in the
B2C and B2B segments, respectively), and its still strong
profitability, despite the decline expected over the next three
fiscal years as a result of operating investment initiatives, as
key supportive factors of the group's competitive position. In
addition, even though the substantial rise in capital expenditure
(capex) needs through 2021 exceeds the 10% of total revenues
threshold we typically associate with capital intensive
businesses, the borrowing group does not require long-term,
ongoing investments at this level to maintain its competitive
position. In particular, S&P notes that about 46% of the total
budgeted capex expenditure in FY19 (and projected to be 30% in
FY20 and FY21) relates to previous IT transformation projects and
new growth initiatives, which are non-recurring.

Profitability

S&P said, "We assess the group's profitability as strong under
our business and consumer services criteria. Our assessment of
the group's profitability, which supports our overall
satisfactory BRP assessment, is based on its strong EBITDA
margins, which at more than 30% remain well above the blended
threshold of 25% we would expect from the group, and on its low
volatility. While we anticipate that the company's profitability
will suffer as a result of reduced margins and increased
volatility as the strategic update is implemented, we would
continue to assess AA Intermediate Co. Ltd.'s (the borrowing
group's holdco) profitability as strong if margins do not fall
materially further than the company anticipates in FY19, with a
recovery we view as on track for FY20. If, on the other hand, we
do not believe the group can contain increased operating costs,
or that the inherent volatility in the group's profitability has
increased, then we might revise our assessment.

"Our assessment of the borrowing group's BRP is constrained by
its weak geographic and service diversification. It derives its
revenues solely in the U.K., with approximately 80% coming from
the core roadside assistance operations.

"Moreover, we also view the borrowing group's exposure to the
insurance broker business as a potentially constraining factor.
As part of its strategic update, AA PLC announced plans to expand
its market share in the home and motor insurance segments, which
we estimate will contribute about 17%-18% of the borrowing
group's consolidated EBITDA. Industry risk for the insurance
broker business (particularly in motor vehicles and home
insurance) is, in our view, weaker than for typical business and
consumer services as the end markets are more competitive due to
the presence of numerous operators and aggregators, and as price
comparison websites continue to influence overall market pricing.
In addition, the insurance business may be subject to regulatory
changes that may limit the group's earnings potential."

RECENT PERFORMANCE

AA PLC, the borrower's parent company, has reported preclosing
trading results for the FY18. The company expects trading EBITDA
to be in the GBP390 million-GBP395 million range. The lower end
of this EBITDA guidance would represent a drop of about 3.2%
year-on-year. The main drivers of this decline were the weaker
trading conditions on the core roadside assistance market, where
the 1% year-on-year increase in car breakdowns and 7% year-on-
year increase in new members were more than offset by third-party
garaging costs, continued negative impact of the insurance
premium tax, and outflow of paid members as a result of the
discontinuation of free roadside membership for AA PLC insurance
customers (from December 2015). S&P said, "As the insurance
underwriting business is not an obligor in the transaction, we
have not considered in our analysis the cash flows generated by
this segment of AA PLC's insurance business. However, we do not
believe that the borrowing group's recent performance reflects
its future performance near-term, as the company's recent
strategic decisions will likely hamper growth further."

As a result of the significant investment program, profitability,
albeit still sound, will be weaker than previously expected over
the next three fiscal years. In particular, the group expects a
sharp drop in reported EBITDA of about GBP50 million in FY19
relative to FY18, with the vast majority of this attributed to
discretionary investment initiatives. The group plans to invest
about GBP66 million over the next three fiscal years on various
initiatives, including further expansion of its digital service
offering around Car Genie, and an increase in roadside car
patrolling and staff in contact centers across the U.K. The
latter should help the group optimize its cost structure and
reduce reliance on third-party garaging providers. The group's
expansion strategy for the insurance segment will also weigh on
its overall profitability as a result of additional investment
needs and pricing adjustments to allow it to grow its business
book. S&P said, "In particular, we expect EBITDA margins in the
insurance business to drop below 50% over the next 24 months
(from a high 58%-60% enjoyed in recent years). Overall, we expect
margins to reduce by about 400 basis points on average over the
same period compared to the high 40% EBITDA margin reported in
FY17."

S&P's near-term cash flow forecasts are broadly in line with the
company's most recent guidance.

RATING RATIONALE FOR THE CLASS A NOTES

AA Bond Co.'s primary sources of funds for principal and interest
payments on the outstanding notes are the loan interest and
principal payments from the borrowing group, which are ultimately
backed by future cash flows generated by the operating assets.

S&P's ratings address the timely payment of interest and the
ultimate payment of principal due on the notes.

A GBP165 million liquidity facility is also available at the
issuer level and is sized to cover about 18 months of peak debt
service on the class A notes. The class B notes do not benefit
from liquidity support.

DSCR Analysis

S&P said, "Our cash flow analysis serves to both assess whether
cash flows will be sufficient to service debt through the
transaction's life and to project minimum DSCRs in our base-case
and downside scenarios."

Base-Case Scenario

S&P said, "Our base-case EBITDA and operating cash flow
projections in the short term and the company's satisfactory BRP
rely on our corporate methodology. Considering the nature of the
investment plan, under which we expect free cash flow generation
to reach a low point in FY19, we gave credit to growth through
the end of FY20. Beyond FY20, our base-case projections are based
on our methodology and assumptions for corporate securitizations,
from which we then apply assumptions for capex, finance leases,
pension liabilities, and taxes to arrive at our projections for
the cash flow available for debt service." For AA Intermediate
Co., S&P's assumptions were:

-- Maintenance capex: GBP30 million up to FY21 included.
    Thereafter, S&P assumes GBP25 million, in line with the
    transaction documents' minimum requirements.

-- Development capex: GBP54 million for FY19 and GBP29 million
    for both FY20 and FY21, as S&P considers the likelihood of
    these expenses to be high. Thereafter, as S&P assumes no
    growth it considered no investment capex, in line with its
    corporate securitization criteria.

-- Net finance leases: In line with company's guidance provided
    late February 2018.

-- Pension liabilities: S&P considered the plan agreed by the
    company with the trustee in June 2017.

-- Tax: GBP25 million for FY19 and GBP22 million for FY20.
    Thereafter, S&P considered a tax rate 1% above the statutory
    corporate tax rate, in line with company's guidance.

The transaction structure includes a cash sweep mechanism for the
repayment of principal following an expected maturity date (EMD)
on each class of notes. Therefore, in line with our corporate
securitization criteria, we assumed a benchmark principal
amortization profile where each class A notes is repaid over 15
years following its respective EMD based on an annuity payment
that S&P includes in its calculated DSCRs.

S&P established an anchor of 'bbb-' for the class A notes based
on:

-- S&P's assessment of AA Intermediate Co.'s satisfactory BRP,
    which it associates with a business volatility score of 3;

-- The minimum DSCR achieved in S&P's base-case analysis, which
    considers only operating-level cash flows, including any
    trapped projected cash, after the class A3 notes' EMD, but
    does not give credit to issuer-level structural features
   (such as the liquidity facility); and

-- S&P said, "We excluded from our analysis our projected DSCR
    for FY19 as we consider it as one-off outlier resulting from
    the significant investments planned by the company. Notably,
    we believe that it will not result in a breach of any
    financial covenant and that the transaction has sufficient
    liquidity to meet its financial obligations."

S&P said, "We typically view liquidity facilities and trapped
cash (either due to a breach of a financial covenant or following
an expected repayment date) as being required to be kept in the
structure if: 1) the funds are held in accounts or may be
accessed from liquidity facilities; and 2) we view it as
dedicated to service the borrower's debts, specifically that the
funds are exclusively available to service the issuer/borrower
loans and any super senior or pari passu debt, which may include
bank loans."

Downside DSCR Analysis

S&P said, "Our downside DSCR analysis tests whether the issuer-
level structural enhancements improve the transaction's
resilience under a stress scenario. AA Intermediate Co. falls
within the business and consumer services industry for which we
apply a 30% decline in EBITDA relative to the base-case at the
point where we believe the stress on debt service would be
greatest.

"Our downside DSCR analysis resulted in a strong resilience score
for the class A notes. The combination of a strong resilience
score and the 'bbb-' anchor derived in the base-case results in a
resilience-adjusted anchor of 'bbb+' for the class A notes.

"The GBP165 million liquidity facility balance represents about
7.5% of liquidity support, measured as a percentage of the
current outstanding balance of the class A notes and senior term
facility, which is below the 10% level we typically consider for
significant liquidity support. Therefore, we have not considered
any further uplift adjustment to the resilience-adjusted anchor
for liquidity."

Modifiers Analysis

The expected maturity date of the class A2 notes, which rank pari
passu with all other senior notes, falls in July 2025. S&P said,
"As this is beyond the seven-year repayment window we typically
consider under our corporate securitization criteria, we have
lowered the resilience-adjusted anchor by one notch to account
for the long tenor of the expected maturity date."

Comparable Rating Analysis

Due to its cash sweep amortization mechanism, the transaction
relies significantly on future excess cash. S&P sid, "In our
view, the uncertainty related to this feature is increased by the
execution risks related to the company's investment plan and the
returns it will effectively generate. Furthermore, we note that
this new investment plan looks very similar to the one
implemented four years ago at the time of its flotation. This
signals, in our view, that the firm might need to invest
periodically in order to maintain its cash flow generation
potential over the long term, which could negatively impact
future excess cash. To account for this combination of factors,
we applied a one-notch decrease to the senior class A notes'
resilience-adjusted anchor."

Counterparty Risk

S&P said, "Our 'BBB- (sf)' ratings on the class A notes are not
currently constrained by the ratings on any of the
counterparties, including the liquidity facility, derivatives,
and bank account providers. We note, however, that under the
transaction documents, the counterparties are allowed to invest
cash in short-term investments with a minimum required rating of
'BBB-'. Given the substantial reliance on excess cash flow as
part of our analysis and the possibility that this could be
invested in short-term investments, full reliance can be placed
on excess cash flows only in rating scenarios up to 'BBB-'."

RATING RATIONALE FOR THE CLASS B2 NOTES

S&P's rating on the junior class B2 notes only addresses the
ultimate repayment of principal and interest on or before its
legal final maturity date in July 2043.

The class B2 notes are structured as soft-bullet notes with an
EMD in July 2022 and a legal final maturity date in July 2043.
Interest and principal is due and payable to the noteholders only
to the extent received from the borrower under the class B2 loan.
Under the terms and conditions of the class B2 loan, if the loan
is not repaid on its EMD, interest would no longer be due and
would be deferred. The deferred interest, and the interest
accrued thereon, becomes due and payable on the final maturity
date of the class B2 notes in 2043. S&P said, "Our analysis
focuses on the scenarios in which the underlying loans are not
repaid on their EMD and the corresponding notes are not redeemed.
Therefore, our fundamental assumption is that the class B2 notes
defer interest six months after their EMD and do not receive
payments until the class A notes are fully repaid."

Moreover, under their terms and conditions, further issuances of
class A notes are permitted without consideration given to any
potential impact on the then current ratings on the outstanding
class B2 notes.

S&P said, "Both the extension risk, which we view as highly
sensitive to the future performance of the borrowing group given
its deferability, and the ability to issue more senior debt
without consideration given to the class B2 notes, may adversely
affect the issuer's ability to repay the class B2 notes. As a
result, the uplift above the borrowing group's creditworthiness
reflected in our rating on the class B2 notes is limited.
Despite the expected weakening in credit metrics over the
investment horizon, our view of the borrowing group's standalone
creditworthiness has not been altered. Therefore, we have
affirmed our 'B+ (sf)' rating on the class B2 notes."

OUTLOOK

A change in S&P's assessment of the company's BRP would likely
lead to rating actions on the notes. S&P would require
higher/lower DSCRs for a weaker/stronger BRP to achieve the same
anchors.

UPSIDE SCENARIO

S&P said, "We do not see any upside scenario at this stage in
relation to our assessment of the borrowing group's BRP, given
the aforementioned constraining factors. Furthermore, our ratings
on the class A notes are capped at 'BBB- (sf)' due to the
eligible investments criteria implemented in the transaction
documentation."

DOWNSIDE SCENARIO

S&P said, "We could lower our ratings on the notes if we were to
revise the borrowing group's BRP to fair from satisfactory. This
could occur if the group faced significant operational
difficulties in relation to its investment plan or if trading
conditions in its core roadside service market were to
deteriorate with significant customer losses and/or lower revenue
per customer. Under these scenarios, we would likely observe
margins falling below 25% with little prospect for rapid
improvement, or an increase of the group's profitability
volatility.

"We may also consider lowering our ratings on the class A notes
if our minimum projected DSCR falls below 1.4x in our base-case
scenario or 1.8x in our downside scenario. This could happen if
the group's investment plan significantly fails to meet its
target returns or if there is a significant increase in pension
liability.

"We could lower our rating on the class B2 notes if our view of
the borrowing group's stand-alone creditworthiness weakens. This
may occur if AA PLC is unable to materialize the expected
benefits from its investment plan, which would hamper cash flow
generation and prevent meaningful deleveraging from the expected
elevated levels. We view the group's strong cash flow generation
as a key mitigating factor to the group's high expected adjusted
leverage levels of over 9x in the short term. Consequently, if we
observe a sustained reduction of free operating cash flow, we may
take a negative rating action on the class B2 notes."

AA Bond Co.'s financing structure blends a corporate
securitization of the operating business of the Automobile
Association group with a subordinated high-yield issuance.

RATINGS LIST

  AA Bond Co. Ltd.
  GBP3 Billion Fixed-Rate Secured Notes (Including Tap Issuances)

  Class             Rating

  Ratings Affirmed

  A2                BBB- (sf)
  A3                BBB- (sf)
  A5                BBB- (sf)
  A6                BBB- (sf)
  B2                B+ (sf)


HOMEBASE: Taps BCG to Advise CEO Amid Financial Woes
----------------------------------------------------
Consultancy.uk reports that Boston Consulting Group (BCG) has
been drafted in to aid struggling retailer Homebase.

With the home improvements warehouse chain looking to avoid
sharing the fate of high street names Maplin and Toys R Us, a
number of private equity firms are tipped for a takeover at the
DIY chain, Consultancy.uk discloses.

Homebase's future has been thrown into doubt two months,
following a "botched" takeover by Australian conglomerate,
Wesfarmers, Consultancy.uk recounts.

Founded in 1979, the company was owned by Home Retail Group from
October 2006 until it was sold in February 2016, having declared
revenues of GBP1,4679 billion as recently as 2014, Consultancy.uk
notes.  Since then, however, Wesfarmers has been forced to write
off GBP584 million from the acquisition, having axed a number of
Homebase's most popular business lines, before in 2018, it
announced that half-year losses would widen from GBP28 million to
GBP97 million, Consultancy.uk relates.

Retail experts have widely blamed Wesfarmers for the demise of
Homebase, suggesting that the conglomerate misjudged the UK
market after completing its GBP340 million takeover two years
ago, Consultancy.uk discloses.

Wesfarmers has since launched a strategic review of Homebase, and
as part of a Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) to offset
bankruptcy until a buyer is found, Rob Scott, Wesfarmers Managing
Director, pledged to close some 40 stores, jeopardizing as many
as 2,000 jobs, Consultancy.uk relays.  Homebase presently has
around 250 UK stores and employs around 12,000 people, according
to Consultancy.uk.

In a bid to turn the beleaguered company around in the meantime,
and make Homebase more attractive for acquisition, management
consultancy BCG has reportedly been brought in to advise Homebase
boss Damian McGloughlin, who took the helm in January,
Consultancy.uk notes.

According to the British press, Homebase already has a variety of
suitors vying for ownership, including a number of private equity
firms, Consultancy.uk discloses.  These include Hilco, Endless
and Lion Capital, are also considering a bid for the business,
Consultancy.uk states.  It is not yet clear whether any bid would
be for all of the business, part of it, Consultancy.uk notes.


NEW LOOK: HSBC Withdraws Credit Protection for Suppliers
--------------------------------------------------------
Emily Seares at Drapers reports that HSBC has withdrawn credit
protection cover for some suppliers of embattled fashion retailer
New Look.

The credit protection insurance is thought to only affect a small
number of New Look suppliers, Drapers notes.

HSBC reduced the level of credit protection cover before
Christmas but has now made the decision to withdraw it
completely, Drapers relates.  Suppliers can continue to trade
with New Look through HSBC without credit protection or under a
supply chain finance scheme, Drapers states.

According to Drapers, there is speculation that New Look's
company voluntary arrangement, which was approved on 21 and
involves up to 60 store closures and 980 redundancies, prompted
the decision.

The news follows credit insurer Euler Hermes withdrawing its
cover and QBE reducing its level of cover for New Look "in
places" in January amid concerns about the retailer's
performance, Drapers relays.

In New Look's most recent financial results for the 39 weeks to
December 23, group revenue fell 6.3% to GBP1.07 billion, group
like-for-like sales dropped 10.6% year on year and the business
reported an underlying operating loss of GBP5.1 million, Drapers
discloses.


SELECT: Creditors Approve CVA, Nearly 2,000 Jobs Saved
------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Bieber at Daily Star reports that value ladies fashion
chain Select, which has 183 stores in the UK, has approved a
major rescue plan.

The retailer has signed a Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA)
which rearranges or reduces debts and buys it time to save itself
from going bust, Daily Star relates.

This is effectively one step short of going into administration,
and will give it one last chance to stay afloat, Daily Star
notes.

Under the terms of the deal, Select says it will shut no stores
which will save nearly 2,000 jobs, Daily Star discloses.

But it will fight for rent reductions from up to 75% of its
landlords as well as carrying out other cost-saving measures,
Daily Star relays.

The CVA, which was approved by 94% of its creditors, is the same
move undertaken by Toys R Us and Maplin -- both of which are now
in administration, Daily Star states.

According to Daily Star, Andrew Andronikou --
andrew.andronikou@quantuma.com -- of business advisory firm
Quantuma, said: "The proposal primarily seeks to obtain the
approval from a number of the company's landlords to accept a
reduction in rent for some stores with an option to take back
loss-making sites, which appears to reflect the current
prevailing issues for businesses trading on the high streets.

"The company is committed to protecting employment and following
the acceptance of the proposal, will seek to continue to operate
all of its UK sites.

"In doing so, this should provide stability to landlords and
staff with further costs savings to be achieved via economies of
scale and a controlled review of operational costs and structures
to be conducted outside of the CVA proposal."



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *