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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, May 11, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 093


                            Headlines


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Hikes CFR to B1, Outlook Positive


D E N M A R K

SYDBANK: Moody's Rates Proposed AT1 Securities '(P)Ba1(hyb)'
TDC A/S: Moody's Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to B1
TDC A/S: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDR to 'B+', Outlook Stable


G E R M A N Y

STEINHOFF INT'L: Warns of Additional Writedowns, Faces Lawsuits


G R E E C E

EPIPHERO PLC: Moody's Raises Rating on Class A Notes to B3
HELLENIC REPUBLIC: DBRS Hikes 'B' Long-Term Issuer Ratings to B


I R E L A N D

HARVEST CLO XV: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F-R Notes
HARVEST CLO XV: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)' Rating to Class F-R Notes


P O R T U G A L

NOVO BANCO: DBRS Hikes LT Issuer Rating to B, Trend Positive
NOVO BANCO: Moody's Upgrades CR Assessment to B2(cr)


S P A I N

BCC CAJAMAR: DBRS Finalizes 'CC' Rating on EUR240.0MM Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CAU: May Face Closure, About 700 Jobs at Risk
DREW CONSTRUCTION: Enters Administration, Ceases Trading
HOUSE OF FRASER: Posts GBP43.9MM Loss for Year-Ended Dec. 2017
ITHACA ENERGY: Moody's Assigns Caa1 Rating to US$350MM Sr. Notes
ITHACA ENERGY: S&P Rates New $350MM Unsecured Notes Due 2023 CCC+

MAYFAIR HOLDINGS: Steinhoff Ex-CEO Taps Rescue Practitioners
PERMANENT TSB: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating, Trend Positive


U Z B E K I S T A N

IPOTEKA BANK: S&P Affirms 'B+/B' ICRs, Outlook Stable


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Macy's for Sale


                            *********



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C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Hikes CFR to B1, Outlook Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Central European Media
Enterprises Ltd.'s (CME) Corporate Family Rating (CFR) to B1 from
B2 as well as its Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to B1-PD
from B2-PD. The outlook on the ratings is positive.

The rating action follows the company's announcement in late
April 2018 that in Q2 2018 it intends to apply USD100.9 million
of proceeds from warrants recently exercised by Time Warner,
along with the company's excess cash, to repay EUR110.0 million
of the outstanding principal balance of the 2018 Euro Term Loan.
Concurrent with this announcement, the company also announced an
amendment to their existing term loan package which re-prices and
extends the maturities of those loans, which reduces the
borrowing costs, extends a majority of its debt maturities by at
least two years and improves the company's liquidity.

"The ratings upgrade and the positive outlook principally
reflects the continued decrease in leverage achieved by CME as
well as its continued solid operating performance which we expect
will persist over the next couple of years," says Alejandro
N£§ez, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst and lead
analyst for CME. Including results from the CME's Croatian and
Slovenian subsidiaries that are slated for divestiture, Moody's
estimates that the company's Gross Debt/EBITDA (Moody's-adjusted)
will decrease from 6.0x (as of 31 December 2017) to 5.1x as a
result of the EUR110 million debt repayment and, furthermore,
expects it to decline toward 4.4x by year-end 2018 (excluding any
debt repayment sourced from a pending asset sale). This gross
leverage level could improve further to 3.4x by year-end 2018 if
CME's pending sale of its Croatian and Slovenian subsidiaries
completes in mid-2018.

RATINGS RATIONALE

CME's EUR110 million debt repayment in Q2 2018, which follows two
other voluntarily prepayments of the 2018 Euro Term Loan totaling
EUR100 million and paid in August 2017 and February 2018,
reinforces the company's deleveraging track record since early
2015 and tangibly demonstrates the company's stated commitment to
a significantly lower leverage profile. As a consequence of the
recent debt reduction and the April 2018 refinancing, CME's
average cost of borrowing has declined by approximately 200 basis
points, to a 4.0% weighted average borrowing cost from 6.0% at
year-end 2017, resulting in annual interest cost savings of
approximately USD25 million relative to 2017 levels.

Aside from the debt reduction resulting from the recent repayment
of principal of the 2018 term loan, Moody's anticipates that
CME's improving free cash flow post transaction will allow it to
deleverage further, toward 4.2x Moody's-adjusted gross leverage,
by year-end 2018 and to comfortably reach its credit metric
parameters for the current B1 rating. In addition, CME expects a
pending divestiture of its Croatian and Slovenian subsidiaries
will close in Q2 2018, subject to remaining regulatory approvals
and other customary closing conditions. CME has stated it intends
to apply the EUR230 million of expected proceeds from this
divestiture to repay debt. Together with the April 2018 debt
refinancing, that debt reduction would further decrease the
company's borrowing costs by 80 basis points to approximately
3.2%. Pro forma for that debt reduction, CME's gross leverage
would decline toward 3.4x and its Free Cash Flow / Gross Debt
(both Moody-adjusted) would increase to around 12% by year-end
2018.

CME's B1 CFR reflects: (1) the company's significant progress in
its operational and financial turnaround since early 2014 and the
generation of positive free cash flow (FCF) in 2015-2017; (2) the
fact that Time Warner Inc. (Time Warner, Baa2 stable) has
maintained a majority economic ownership in CME since 2014,
during which time it has extended tangible support to CME; (3)
the positive trends in CME's advertising markets, which have
enabled deleveraging, and our expectation that these markets will
be stable over the coming 12-18 months; and, (4) the benefits of
refinancing transactions in February 2016, March 2017 and April
2018 - which replaced CME's most expensive debt instruments,
extended the company's debt maturities, and reduced its interest
costs and foreign-exchange risk - and the potential for further
deleveraging which CME could achieve using proceeds from the
intended sale of its Croatian and Slovenian subsidiaries.

However, the B1 CFR also considers: (1) the company's
historically volatile operating performance, driven by the
cyclical nature of its advertising-dependent end markets; and (2)
modest non-advertising revenues offset to an extent by a strategy
to gradually increase carriage fees and subscription revenues.

Moody's considers CME's liquidity position to be good for its
near-term operational and financing needs. As of March 31, 2018,
the company had cash and cash equivalents of USD74 million and we
anticipate the company will generate around USD100 million of
free cash flow over the next 12 months. The company has full
availability under its amended revolving credit facility of USD75
million whose maturity was extended to 2023 as part of the debt
refinancing in April 2018. CME expects to fully repay by year-end
2018 the EUR41 million of outstanding principal remaining on its
term loan maturing in May 2019. Following that repayment, the
company's remaining debt principal of just over EUR700 million is
scheduled to mature between November 2021 and April 2023.

RATIONALE FOR POSITIVE OUTLOOK

The positive outlook reflects an expectation of a further
material decline in CME's financial debt and our expectation of
continued operating momentum, which will bolster the company's
key leverage and cash-flow-coverage metrics over the next 12
months toward the stronger end of the expected ranges for the
current rating.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP / DOWN

The rating could move upward if CME's adjusted gross debt/EBITDA
(Moody's-adjusted) declines toward 3.5x and its adjusted
FCF/gross debt increases sustainably into the 7-10% range.
Conversely, the rating could move downward if: (1) CME's earnings
or liquidity deteriorate; (2) Free Cash Flow (FCF)/Gross Debt
(Moody's-adjusted) is not sustainably maintained above 5%; or (3)
it is unable to maintain leverage (gross debt/EBITDA as adjusted
by Moody's) below 5.0x. Any indication of a weakening of material
support from Time Warner could also be credit negative.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Media
Industry published in June 2017.

CME is a Bermuda-incorporated media and entertainment company. It
has broadcast operations in six Central and Eastern European
(CEE) countries -- the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia,
Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia -- with an aggregate population of
around 50 million people. Launched in 1994, CME operates 36
television channels. In 2017, the company reported net revenues
of $701 million and operating income before depreciation and
amortization (OIBDA) of $188 million (including results from
CME's Croatian and Slovenian subsidiaries slated for
divestiture). CME's shares trade on the NASDAQ stock market and
the Prague Stock Exchange. Time Warner, which owns a 45.5% voting
interest and a 76% fully diluted economic interest in CME, is the
company's largest shareholder.


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D E N M A R K
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SYDBANK: Moody's Rates Proposed AT1 Securities '(P)Ba1(hyb)'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba1(hyb)
rating to the EUR100 million high-trigger additional tier 1 (AT1)
perpetual capital notes to be issued by Sydbank A/S (Sydbank; LT
deposit rating A3 positive; baseline credit assessment baa1).

Sydbank's proposed AT1 securities rank junior to Tier 2 capital,
pari passu with other deeply subordinated debt securities and
senior only to the issuer's ordinary shares and other capital
instruments qualifying as Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1). Coupons
may be cancelled in full or in part on a non-cumulative basis at
the issuer's discretion, or mandatorily in case distributable
items are insufficient or if required by the regulator. The
principal of the proposed securities will be partially or fully
written down if Sydbank's both issuer and group-level regulatory
CET1 capital ratio falls below 7%.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final
issuance. These ratings represent the rating agency's preliminary
credit opinion. A definitive rating may differ from a provisional
rating if the terms and conditions of the final issuance are
materially different from those of the draft prospectus reviewed.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The (P)Ba1(hyb) rating assigned to Sydbank's proposed AT1
securities reflects Moody's approach for rating high-trigger
securities, which takes into account both the credit risk
associated with the distance to trigger breach and the credit
risk of their non-viability component.

Moody's assesses the probability of Sydbank's CET1 ratio reaching
the write-down trigger of 7% using a model-based approach
incorporating the issuer's financial strength measured by
Sydbank's baa1 BCA, its reported transitional CET1 ratio of 17.3%
as of year-end 2017 and 16.6% as of end-March 2018, and forward-
looking considerations with regard to the expected development of
its CET1 ratio, such as Sydbank's capital target of a CET1 ratio
of around 14%. Using these input factors, the model provides an
outcome of (P)Ba1(hyb).

To position high-trigger security ratings, Moody's rates to the
lower of the model-based outcome and the non-viability security
rating. For AT1 securities, the non-viability rating is
positioned at the issuer's Adjusted BCA minus three notches,
which also captures the risk that payment of interest may be
canceled ahead of a bank-wide failure. Sydbanks's non-viability
security rating is Ba1(hyb), three notches below Sydbank's
Adjusted BCA of baa1, and the assigned (P)Ba1(hyb) rating is
therefore not constrained by the non-viability security rating
cap.

The (P)Ba1(hyb) rating also takes into account the headroom of
Sydbank's capital buffers above its regulatory capital
requirements. It also considers Moody's assessment of the bank's
strong ability to manage and maintain its capital position,
including its flexibility to generate capital through retained
profits, asset disposals and issuance of fresh equity capital.
Moody's model sensitivity analysis, which considers plausible
changes to Sydbank's capital ratios and its BCA, confirms that
the (P)Ba1(hyb) rating is resilient under the main scenarios.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The rating of this instrument could be upgraded if Sybdank's BCA
is upgraded. A further increase in Sydbank's regulatory
capitalization or an increase in its long-term CET1 capital
target would not lead to an upgrade because the rating of the AT1
would be constrained by the Ba1(hyb) non-viability security
rating cap.

Conversely, the rating of this instrument could be downgraded
following a reduction in Sydbank's baa1 BCA or if the bank's or
group's CET1 ratio falls materially below the 14% expected level
on an ongoing basis. In addition, Moody's would also reconsider
the rating if the probability of a coupon suspension were to
increase.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in April 2018.


TDC A/S: Moody's Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to B1
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the senior unsecured
ratings of Danish telecom operator TDC A/S to B1 from Baa3, and
assigned a new B1 corporate family rating ("CFR") and B1-PD
probability of default rating ("PDR") to its majority
shareholder, DKT Holdings ApS. Simultaneously, Moody's has
withdrawn the Baa3 long-term issuer rating of TDC. The outlook on
the ratings is stable.

The ratings on the existing EMTNs due 2027 and the Junior
Subordinate EMTNs due 3015 remains unchanged, as the ratings on
these instruments will be withdrawn upon establishment of the
permanent capital structure.

On May 4 2018, the Consortium financed the EUR4.9 billion
acquisition of 91% of the share capital of TDC with EUR2.4
billion of equity and EUR2.5 billion of acquisition debt. Moody's
expects the Consortium to execute its rights to squeeze-out the
remaining 9% of TDC's share capital by June 2018. Once the
squeeze-out is settled, the Consortium has announced that it will
establish a permanent capital structure including c. EUR1.0
billion of existing unsecured notes or EUR1.0 billion of backstop
facility at the level of TDC A/S, EUR1.4 billion of high yield
bonds at the level of an intermediate holding company named DKT
Finance ApS, undrawn bank facilities (RCF & Capex) amounting to
EUR600 million and EUR2.7 billion of equity (100% ownership of
TDC).

This action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
February 13, 2018, following the announcement by TDC that it had
received a takeover offer from DK Telekommunikation ApS, a
company controlled by a consortium of Danish pension funds (PFA,
PKA, ATP) and Macquarie Infrastructure and Real Assets.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The B1 CFR assigned to DKT Holdings ApS reflects the combination
of the group's strong business profile and expectation of
improved operating performance, offset by the impact on the
group's credit metrics from the substantial debt incurred to
finance the buyout. Moody's expects that the group will continue
to be managed with a somewhat aggressive financial profile under
its current ownership structure with limited expected
deleveraging.

The group will be highly leveraged as a result of the debt
incurred to finance the buyout. On a pro-forma basis, Moody's
adjusted debt/EBITDA in 2017 will be approximately 6.1x on a
consolidated level, compared to 3.5x pre-transaction. The above
excludes the impact of approximately EUR2.0 billion shareholder
loans to DKT, which receive equity treatment as per Moody's
Hybrid Equity Credit methodology.

The B1 CFR also reflects the strength of the company's market
position in Denmark, as demonstrated by a 63% market share in
landline telephony (retail and wholesale), 51% in broadband, 55%
in TV (combining CATV, PayTV and internet protocol TV) and 41% in
mobile voice services. Competition in the Danish mobile market
remains intense but TDC has sustained price increases while
maintaining relatively stable churn levels and defending its
market share. Moody's believes its stable market share reflects
TDC's strategy to focus on quality of service, superior product
offering and quality of mobile network in Denmark and this is not
expected to change under the new ownership. TDC has strong fixed
and mobile network platforms owing to high capex levels in recent
years and is the owner of the majority of the critical telecom
infrastructure in Denmark, including cable assets, a
differentiating factor compared to other European telecom peers.

The B1 CFR also takes into consideration the expectation that the
company's EBITDA will stabilize in 2018, building on the recovery
of its organic EBITDA in 2017. Moody's expects revenue declines
to persist in 2018, but growth to reach near stabilization in
2019. This will be supported by the continued recovery in
consumer mobile ARPU trends amid growth in demand for data and
market repair, and a gradual recovery in its small and medium-
sized business segment in Denmark, under pressure for a number of
years due to intense competition. Moody's expects further upside
to be provided by the cost-saving initiatives implemented by
management, designed to maintain margins at or above 40%.

The rating agency also expects that cash conversion, defined as
(EBITDA-capex)/EBITDA, will improve, supported by lower
investments following historically high capex in recent years.
However, despite improved cash conversion, free cash flow will be
constrained by high cash interest and dividends paid to its new
shareholder DKT. In the next 12-18 months, Moody's expects
FCF/debt (Moody's adjusted) of approximately 1%, compared to
approximately 6% pre-transaction. As a result of low free cash
flow generation, any deleveraging is likely to be driven
primarily by EBITDA growth supported by opex savings.

The B1 rating assigned to TDC's existing senior unsecured bonds
reflects the fact that the bonds are at the level of TDC, which
is the OpCo, and are structurally senior to over EUR1.4 billion
of debt at the Bidco level. The revised rating, however,
recognizes that TDC's unsecured debt is, nevertheless,
effectively subordinated to the planned new EUR3.9 billion TLB.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that TDC's
operating performance will gradually improve through a
combination of an improving pricing environment in mobile, more
focused and agile marketing strategy, efficiency gains and capex
optimisation. The outlook also reflects Moody's expectation that
DKT will execute its strategy, which will enable the company to
stabilise its operating performance in 2018 and deliver growth
from 2019 onwards. It also recognises Moody's expectation that
the group is likely to continue be managed towards a leveraged
financial profile over time.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The ratings could be upgraded as a result of improvements in the
company's credit metrics, such as adjusted debt/ EBITDA improving
to below 5.0x on a sustainable basis, and adjusted retained cash
flow/gross debt improving sustainably to a level in the mid-
teens, in an improved business environment.

The ratings could be lowered if: (1) the company was to deviate
from the execution of its new strategy; (2) the company was to
embark on an aggressive expansion/acquisition programme, most
likely outside its existing footprint, leading to higher
financial, business and execution risk; or (3) its credit metrics
were to deteriorate, including adjusted retained cash flow/gross
debt falling to below 8% or adjusted gross debt/EBITDA trending
towards 6.0x on an ongoing basis.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was
Telecommunications Service Providers published in January 2017.

COMPANY PROFILE

DKT Holdings ApS is a holding company of TDC A/S, the principal
provider of fixed-line, mobile, broadband data and cable
television offerings in Denmark. The company also provides
telecom services, including TV, mobile and broadband, to
customers in Norway. In 2017, the company generated revenue and
EBITDA of DKK20.3 billion and DKK8.2 billion, respectively.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Downgrades:

Issuer: TDC A/S

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture with maturity March 2,
2022, Downgraded to B1 from Baa3

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture with maturity February
23, 2023, Downgraded to B1 from Baa3

Senior Unsecured Medium Term Note Program, Downgraded to (P)B1
from (P)Baa3

Assignments:

Issuer: DKT Holdings ApS

Corporate Family Rating, Assigned B1

Probability of Default Rating, Assigned B1-PD

Withdrawals:

Issuer: TDC A/S

LT Issuer Rating, Withdrawn , previously rated Baa3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: DKT Holdings ApS

Outlook, Assigned Stable

Issuer: TDC A/S

Outlook, Changed To Stable From Rating Under Review


TDC A/S: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDR to 'B+', Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded TDC A/S's (TDC) Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) to 'B+' from 'BBB-' with a Stable Outlook
following the company's acquisition by Denmark-based DKT Holdings
ApS (DKT). Fitch has also assigned DKT an expected IDR of
'B+(EXP)' with a Stable Outlook. The final IDR is contingent on
the successful completion of the refinancing of acquisition
financing and confirmation of DKT's capital structure. Fitch
expects to withdraw TDC's Long-Term and Short-Term IDRs when the
transaction is completed.

DKT's acquisition of TDC has been funded with a mix of debt and
equity. The debt component was substantial and added DKK20.9
billion to TDC's existing net debt of DKK23 billion at end-2017.
Fitch expects DKT should end 2018 with funds from operations
(FFO) adjusted net leverage of 6.7x. DKT's ability to delever
over the next 18-24 months and the new shareholders' financial
strategy will be key factors for the company's ratings in the
medium term.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Takeover by Consortium: DKT is controlled by a consortium
comprising Macquarie Infrastructure and Real Assets, and three
Danish pension funds (PFA, PKA, and ATP). It has acquired more
than a 90% share in TDC A/S via a voluntary buyout offer. The
remaining shares will be purchased via a squeeze out mechanism to
achieve 100% ownership. Fitch expects the deal to be funded with
EUR2.7 billion (DKK20.5 billion) of equity together with EUR2.8
billion (DKK20.9 billion) of debt.

Capital Structure: Following the change in ownership, TDC's new
owners plan to refinance the acquisition debt initially raised by
DKT and its intermediate holding companies (collective known as
HoldCo), as well as existing debt at TDC, the operating entity
(OpCo). Fitch expects total OpCo debt to amount to EUR4.9
billion, including a new EUR3.9 billion senior secured term loan
B. Fitch expects a significant portion of existing senior
unsecured debt at TDC to be refinanced. If not all existing TDC
senior unsecured bondholders decide to exercise their change of
control put options, Fitch expects these bonds will become
subordinated to the new senior secured debt, which would also
include revolving credit and capex facilities. This would reduce
the recovery prospects of existing bonds if TDC went into
financial distress.

Fitch intends to analyse any HoldCo debt together with debt at
TDC, the OpCo level, as it sees both the OpCo and HoldCo tied
together from a credit perspective. Fitch does not expect to see
significant barriers to prevent cash flow being upstreamed from
the OpCo to the HoldCo. Any HoldCo debt would be structurally
subordinated to both senior secured and unsecured debt at the
OpCo. Fitch has downgraded TDC's existing senior unsecured debt
to 'BB-', and put the instrument rating on Rating Watch Evolving
(RWE). The recovery prospects, and hence the ratings of the
instruments, may change subject to the final mix of secured and
unsecured debt at the OpCo level.

Spike in Leverage: Fitch expects the group's FFO adjusted net
leverage to increase to 6.7x by end-2018 from 3.6x at end-2017
following the acquisition. TDC's leverage previously benefited
from 50% equity credit from DKK5.6 billion of hybrid instruments.
The planned refinancing of these hybrids will remove this equity
credit. Fitch believes that the company should be able to
decrease leverage below 6.5x within the next 18-24 months with a
combination of stable EBITDA generation, lower capex and
potentially reduced dividends.

Leverage Management: Fitch believes that the company retains
substantial flexibility in managing its leverage. Fitchs
estimates its pre-dividend free cash flow (FCF) margin will
remain strong, at high single-digits in 2018-2021. The increase
in interest expenses on the back of higher debt will be mitigated
by lower capex intensity, which Fitch estimates at around 17%-18%
in 2018-2021 compared with 20%-22% in 2015-2017. Shareholder
remuneration is another way for the new owners of TDC to manage
leverage and FCF as they should have more flexibility with
dividend policy.

Fixed-Line Supportive: TDC owns both the incumbent copper network
and around half of the cable infrastructure in Denmark. This
gives it a stronger domestic fixed-line position than its
European peers. Fitch views the position as structurally
supportive for the company's long-term credit profile due to the
lack of a competing fixed-line infrastructure. Combined with its
number one domestic market position, this enables TDC to sustain
slightly higher leverage than peers. Current competitive
pressures are more prevalent in the mobile and business segments.

Progress on Reducing Declines: TDC's domestic EBITDA declined by
4.6% yoy in 2017 after 12.7% and 10.5% yoy declines in 2016 and
2015, respectively, indicating that its strategy to reduce costs
and focus on bundled product value and quality-based
differentiation in conjunction with price increases is working.
Fitch expects that the new shareholders will not dramatically
change the company's operating strategy in the short to medium
term and TDC's EBITDA should continue to benefit from operating
cost reduction programme in 2018. Consistently strong performance
in Norway should also contribute to improving EBITDA for the
group.

Network Separation Plan: The shareholders intend to split the
company into two, creating a customer-facing service unit and a
wholesale network company. The latter should become a utility-
like regulated wholesale telecom operator generating stable long-
term returns. Fitch anticipates these changes are likely to take
a few years. Fitch has not incorporated these long-term changes
into Fitch's rating and treat such a development as event risk,
due to a large number of uncertainties including regulation, the
terms of any network separation and impact on capital structure.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

DKT's ratings reflect its leading position within the Danish
telecoms market. The company has strong in-market scale and share
that spans both fixed and mobile segments. Ownership of both
cable and copper-based local access network infrastructure
reduces the company's operating risk profile relative to domestic
European incumbent peers, which typically face infrastructure-
based competition from cable network operators.

DKT is rated lower than other peer incumbents like Royal KPN N.V
(BBB/Stable) due to notably higher leverage, which puts it more
in line with cable operators with similarly high leverage such as
VodafoneZiggo (B+/Stable), UnityMedia (B+/Stable), Telenet (BB-
/Stable) and Virgin Media (BB-/Stable). DKT's incumbent status,
leading positions in both fixed and mobile markets and its unique
infrastructure ownership justify higher leverage thresholds
compared to the cable peers.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within its Rating Case for the Issuer

  - Stabilisation of revenue in 2018 with a largely flat dynamics
onwards

  - Broadly stable EBITDA margin at around 40-41% in 2018-2021

  - Capex at around 17% of revenue in 2018-2021 (including
spectrum)

  - Conservative dividend policy to support the initial
deleveraging

  - No M&A

KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS

  - The recovery analysis assumes that the company would be
considered a going concern in bankruptcy and that it would be
reorganised rather than liquidated.

  - Fitch has assumed a 10% administrative claim.

  - The going-concern EBITDA estimate of DKK6.6 billion reflects
Fitch's view of a sustainable, post-reorganisation EBITDA level
upon which Fitch bases the valuation of the company.

   - The going-concern EBITDA is 20% below LTM 2017 EBITDA,
assuming likely operating challenges at the time of distress.

- An enterprise value (EV) multiple of 6x is used to calculate a
post-reorganisation valuation and reflects a conservative mid-
cycle multiple.

  - Fitch estimates the total amount of debt for claims at EUR6.8
billion, which includes debt instruments at OpCo and HoldCo level
as well as drawings on available credit facilities.

  - Fitch incorporates EUR3.9 billion of prior ranking debt (term
loan B) and assume EUR1.0 billion of remaining senior unsecured
debt at OpCo. Fitch calculates the recovery prospects for the
senior unsecured debt at 'RR3/51%' which implies a one-notch
uplift from the IDR for a 'BB-' instrument rating. Fitch has
placed the senior unsecured debt on RWE because the proportion
between secured and unsecured debt could change, subject to a
share of existing unsecured bondholders exercising their change
of control put option. Senior unsecured notes at OpCo level have
priority over instruments at HoldCo due to structural
subordination.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments that May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  - Expectation that FFO-adjusted net leverage will fall below
5.7x on a sustained basis

  - A strong and stable FCF generation, reflecting a stable
competitive and regulatory environment

Developments that May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  - FFO-adjusted net leverage above 6.5x on a sustained basis

  - Further declines in the Danish business putting FCF margins
under pressure into mid to low single digits

LIQUIDITY

Comfortable Liquidity: Fitch expects DKT and its subsidiaries to
have a comfort liquidity position upon deal completion, which
will be supported by EUR600 million of credit facilities (RCF and
capex). The maturity profile is yet to be established, but given
the major refinancing of the existing instruments, Fitch expects
the first large debt payout to be only in three to five years.
The company's liquidity profile is also supported by strong pre-
dividend FCF generation.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

TDC A/S
  - Long-Term IDR downgraded to 'B+' from 'BBB-'; off RWN;
Outlook Stable;

  - Short-Term IDR downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'; off RWN;

  - Senior unsecured rating downgraded to 'BB-/RR3' from 'BBB-;
Rating Watch revised from Negative to Evolving

  - Subordinated hybrid securities rating withdrawn at 'BB', RWN.
The rating is no longer considered by Fitch to be relevant to the
agency's coverage as the instruments are expected to be called.

DKT Holdings ApS

  - Long-Term IDR assigned at 'B+(EXP)'; Outlook Stable.


=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


STEINHOFF INT'L: Warns of Additional Writedowns, Faces Lawsuits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Janice Kew and John Bowker at Bloomberg News report that
Steinhoff International Holdings NV warned of impairments beyond
the EUR6 billion (US$7.2 billion) reported in December and said
it's facing at least five lawsuits.

Steinhoff said in a statement on May 10 auditors at PwC have told
the owner of Conforma in France and Mattress Firm in the U.S.
that the overstatement of profits and the handling of off-
balance-sheet entities will result in "material additional" asset
writedowns, Bloomberg relates.

The full extent will be presented alongside first-half financials
next month, Bloomberg discloses.  The company is also
investigating the roles played by those previously at the helm,
with former Chief Executive Officer Markus Jooste likely to be
top of the list, Bloomberg notes.

Steinhoff faces a make-or-break meeting with lenders next week
about how it plans to restructure at least EUR10.4 billion of
debt, Bloomberg relays.  The company has relied on asset sales to
shore up its balance sheet so far, but warned at its annual
general meeting last month that the policy is unsustainable,
Bloomberg recounts.

"If they can't agree on the restructuring plan, then it probably
means no more Steinhoff," Bloomberg quotes Charles Allen, a
retail analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence, as saying by phone.
"If they can show they have businesses with decent cash flows and
balanced sheets, then they may well be able to get banks
backing."

Steinhoff International is a South African international retail
holding company that is dual listed in Germany.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


EPIPHERO PLC: Moody's Raises Rating on Class A Notes to B3
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the
following notes issued by EPIHIRO PLC:

EUR1623M (Current outstanding balance of 785.6M) Class A Notes,
Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 27, 2018 Caa2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EPIHIRO PLC, issued in May 2009, is a collateralised loan
obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of "secured and unsecured
bond loans" which have been advanced by Alpha Bank AE ("Alpha
Bank" (Caa3 / NP)) to medium and large enterprises located in
Greece. Bond loans are products specific to the Greek market and
preferred by "Societe Anonyme" companies instead of traditional
loans, for the reason that they present certain tax advantages.
Term loans may also be added in the portfolio. Alpha Bank acts as
the Seller and Servicer of the underlying loans and as Greek
Account Bank in respect of the Collection Account Bank and
Reserve Account Agreement opened in the name of the Issuer. The
transaction's reinvestment period has been extended several times
since closing and is now scheduled to end in January 2019.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action on the notes is primarily a result of: i) the
raising of Greece's Country Ceiling Bond Rating (to Ba2 from B3)
and its Country Ceiling Bank Deposit Rating (to B3 from Caa2),
coupled with; ii) an analysis of the reinvestment criteria which
apply to the transaction; and iii) Moody's assessment of the
counterparty risks in the EPIHIRO transaction.

The transaction remains in its reinvestment period and Moody's
considered in its rating analysis the Pool Eligibility Criteria
governing the addition of loans to the portfolio. This analysis
was then supplemented by the application of the relevant Country
Ceilings and an assessment of the counterparty risks in the
transaction.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2017.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

The transaction is managed to model (using CDOROM) by the Seller
with reference to the CDOROM Condition. In its base case, Moody's
assumed that the Moody's Metric determined by the Cash Manager as
part of the CDOROM Condition would be at the trigger level of the
test. The trigger level of the test is equivalent to a model-
indicated B2 rating on the Class A Notes.

Counterparty Exposure:

Moody's rating action took into consideration the notes' exposure
to relevant counterparties, such as Alpha Bank acting as Greek
Account Bank, using the methodology "Moody's Approach to
Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured Finance" published in
July 2017. In particular, Moody's assessed the default
probability of Alpha Bank by referencing the bank's deposit
rating and assessed the account bank exposure of the Class A
Notes as strong, concluding that the maximum achievable rating in
this transaction is B3 (sf). As a result the rating of the Class
A notes has been capped at B3 (sf).

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Moody's quantitative analysis entails an evaluation of scenarios
that stress factors contributing to sensitivity of ratings and
take into account the likelihood of severe collateral losses or
impaired cash flows.

The Notes' rating is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying loan portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The evolution of the
associated counterparties risk (specifically any upgrade or
downgrade of the ratings of the Greek Account Bank), the level of
credit enhancement and Greece's country risk could also impact
the Notes' ratings.


HELLENIC REPUBLIC: DBRS Hikes 'B' Long-Term Issuer Ratings to B
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited upgraded the Hellenic Republic's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency -- Issuer Ratings from CCC (high) to B
and maintained the Positive trend. DBRS also upgraded the Short-
Term Foreign and Local Currency -- Issuer Ratings from R-5 to R-4
and maintained the Stable trend.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

The upgrade is driven by the strong reform progress made by
Greece since 2010 when it signed its first memorandum of
understanding (MoU) with official institutions; good signs of
economic recovery in 2017 and three consecutive years of fiscal
over-performance. Moreover, policy risks from a shift in
political power are now lower. Since the previous DBRS rating
review last November, the third review of the Third Economic
Adjustment Programme (the Third Programme), was concluded and the
fourth and final review is now underway -- these are additional
encouraging signs. Improvements in the 'Fiscal Management' and
'Political Environment' building blocks of our methodology
underpin the upgrade.

The Positive trend reflects expectations in coming months of
potentially credit-positive outcomes with respect to an exit from
the Third Programme and negotiations over debt relief. DBRS also
will consider the frequency and depth of post-programme
monitoring to ensure adequate frameworks for policy continuity.

RATING DRIVERS

Triggers for a rating upgrade could include: (1) continued
successful implementation of fiscal and structural reforms; (2) a
clearer view of financing beyond the Third Programme (3) material
debt relief measures.

By contrast, the Positive trend could be returned to Stable due
to some combination of: (1) a lack of cooperation between Greece
and its institutional creditors; (2) renewed financial-sector
instability.

RATING RATIONALE

In 2017 GDP Growth Returned Underpinned by Policy Certainty,
Supporting Improvement in the Banks

Economic confidence is supported by the successful conclusion of
the third review, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) approved
the fourth tranche of EUR6.7 billion of financial assistance for
Greece on 27 March. The first sub-tranche (EUR5.7bn) covered debt
service needs, contributed to the Public Debt Management Agency
(PDMA) cash buffer and to arrears clearance. The second sub-
tranche for arrears clearance (EUR1.0 billion) will be released
most likely before the conclusion of the fourth programme. The
fourth and final review of the programme consists of 88 key
deliverables focusing on energy market reform and privatizations
and is expected to be completed in June. A total of approximately
EUR18.0 billion, including the tranches described above, is
expected to be disbursed to Greece by the end of the programme in
August.

After a prolonged period of recession, the Greek economy moved to
expansionary territory in 2017, with real GDP increasing by 1.4%.
The main drivers were goods and services exports and investment,
while consumption and goods and services imports had a negative
impact on growth. The growth rate was below the 1.8% estimated by
the government in the 2018 budget, however, it is the strongest
growth Greece recorded in its decade-long crisis. According to
the IMF's latest forecast, real GDP growth is expected to reach
2% this year with private consumption and investment being the
main contributors, on the back of the significant improvement in
the labor market and the business climate. On the back of the
labor market reforms, the unemployment rate has been falling
reaching 21.5% in 2017, but remaining the highest in the
(European Union) EU. The IMF projects a decline to 15% in 2021.

Greece's banks' profitability continues to improve helped by more
positive economic developments. However, high levels of impaired
assets prevail, with a non-performing exposure ratio of 43.1% at
end-December 2017. This year, reduced reliance on the ECB's
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) is reflected in the decline
in the ceiling from EUR24.8bn in mid-December to EUR14.7bn
according to most recent data. This demonstrates banks' improved
liquidity including access to wholesale markets. Also, deposits
placed by the private sector increased at an annual rate of 6.3%
in March. Capital controls introduced in June 2015 have been
eased; credit to the domestic private sector is stabilizing.
Results of a new round of ECB stress tests is expected to be
published on 5th May.

Stronger GDP Boosts Employment Growth to Help Achieve Primary
Fiscal Surplus

Greece has managed to restore its fiscal sustainability. Since
2010, it went through an unprecedented fiscal adjustment, with
the cumulative improvement in the primary balance exceeding 16
percentage points in 2017. In 2017, Greece delivered a primary
surplus of 4%, well above the 1.75% target set by the programme.
Under the programme definition, the primary surplus surpassed the
target by a wide margin for the third consecutive year. The
target for the primary surplus is set at 3.5% a year in 2019-
2022. DBRS considers that the fiscal reforms undertaken under the
adjustment programs have restored Greece's fiscal sustainability,
however, its durability is contingent on sustained economy
recovery. Privatization efforts have accelerated recently with
the sale of 67% of Thessaloniki Port to a German-led consortium
of investors. However, there are still delays and obstacles in
the implementation of others (Hellenikon, DESFA). Progress on the
privatization programme is required for the successful conclusion
of the fourth and final review of the programme.

Debt Sustainability is Expected to be Addressed with Medium Term
Debt Relief

Using conventional stock analysis Greece's gross general
government debt-to-GDP ratio is extremely high at 178.6% at end-
2017. Primary fiscal surpluses and nominal GDP growth should help
facilitate a reduction in the stock ratio, from a peak of 191.3%
in 2018 to 165.1% in 2023, according to the IMF. In addition,
medium-term debt relief measures under discussion, could make a
meaningful difference to the level of Greece's annual financing
needs. Greece returned to capital markets in July 2017 and again
in February this year, as well as in April successfully
auctioning 12-month T-bills for the first time since 2010. The
authorities have accumulated a cash buffer to cover debt service
payments until end-2019. All these developments are critical in
the assessment of Greece's exit from the Third Programme in
August. DBRS will closely monitor plans for the frequency and
content of post-programme monitoring as crucial to ensuring
reforms stay on track through political cycles.

Since the Crisis the External Imbalances Have Receded
Substantially

Greece's current account deficit has been on an improving trend,
falling by almost 12 percentage points since 2009. The current
account deficit in 2017 was 0.8% of GDP compared with a deficit
high of 12.3% of GDP in 2009. In 2018, the current account is
expected to be around the 2017 levels, supported by the strong
performance of exports of goods and services. Greece's exports of
goods have increased by 58% since 2009 in nominal terms. The
strong services balance also contributed, increasing to a surplus
of 9.8% of GDP in 2017 from a surplus of 4.8% of GDP in 2009.
This is mainly attributed to the improvement in the travel
balance, with tourist revenues increasing by 10.8% in 2017 due to
an increase in the number of inbound visitors and a rise in the
expenditure per trip. Foreign arrivals increased by 9.7% in 2017
and are expected to grow even more strongly in 2018 mainly driven
by increased air connectivity and the extension of the tourist
season.

From a stock perspective, Greece's negative net international
investment position (NIIP) remains high at 141.4% of GDP at end-
2017 up from 88.8% in 2011, mostly reflecting public sector
external debt. It is expected to remain at high levels because of
the long-term horizon of foreign official-sector loans to the
public sector. A current account close to balance, if sustained,
should prevent a material deterioration in the external borrowing
position.

DBRS Currently Sees a Durable Commitment to Reforms

Greece's political landscape changed drastically during the
crisis years, resulting in five national elections, eight prime
ministers and four coalition governments. The SYRIZA-ANEL
coalition government elected in September 2015, despite the slim
parliamentary majority, is the longest-serving since the onset of
the debt crisis in 2009. However, the legislation of a number of
unpopular measures had a negative impact on popular support for
SYRIZA. The latest opinion polls show that the center-right, New
Democracy is leading by almost 10 percentage points. In the event
the IMF assess the need to frontload the implementation of
pension cuts and tax increases to ensure that the primary surplus
of 3.5% is achieved, the government could face additional
pressure. However, DBRS believes, that the increased political
stability observed over the last two years is likely to be
maintained after the end of the current adjustment programme and
we do not expect any policy reversals under a potential New
Democracy-led government.

RATING COMMITTEE SUMMARY

The DBRS Sovereign Scorecard generates a result in the BB
(high) -- BB (low) range. Additional considerations factored into
the Rating Committee decision include the high debt stock and
concerns about longer term debt sustainability. The main points
discussed during the Rating Committee include the political,
economic and fiscal outlook; debt sustainability and developments
with official institutions.

KEY INDICATORS

Fiscal Balance (% GDP): 0.8 (2017); 0.8 (2018F); 0.9 (2019F)
Gross Debt (% GDP): 178.6 (2017); 179.5 (2018F); 177.9 (2019F)
Nominal GDP (EUR billions): 177.2 (2017); 184.8 (2018F); 192.4
(2019F)
GDP per Capita (EUR): 16,641 (2017); 17,307 (2018F); 18,120
(2019F)
Real GDP growth (%): 1.4 (2017); 2.0 (2018F); 2.0 (2019F)
Consumer Price Inflation (%): 1.1 (2017); 0.7 (2018F); 1.1
(2019F)
Domestic Credit (% GDP): 132.0 (Sep-2017)
Current Account (% GDP): -1.1 (2017); -0.8 (2018F); -0.6 (2019F)
International Investment Position (% GDP): -139.5 (2016); -141.4
(2017)
Gross External Debt (% GDP): 248.2 (2016); 228.6 (2017)
Governance Indicator (percentile rank): 62.5 (2016)
Human Development Index: 0.87 (2015)

Notes: All figures are in Euros unless otherwise noted. Public
finance statistics reported on a general government basis unless
specified. Governance indicator represents an average percentile
rank (0-100) from Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability and
Government Effectiveness indicators (all World Bank). Human
Development Index (UNDP) ranges from 0-1, with 1 representing a
very high level of human development.


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I R E L A N D
=============


HARVEST CLO XV: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Harvest
CLO XV Designated Activity Company:

EUR 3,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR 233,400,000 Class A-1A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2030, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR 30,000,000 Class A-1B-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2030, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR 15,000,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR 41,600,000 Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

EUR 5,000,000 Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

EUR 31,500,000 Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

EUR 24,200,000 Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

EUR 23,100,000 Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

EUR 13,500,000 Class F-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will
endeavour to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if
any) may differ from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the notes address the expected
loss posed to noteholders. The provisional ratings reflect the
risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the
transaction's legal structure, and the characteristics of the
underlying assets.

The Issuer will issue the refinancing notes in connection with
the refinancing of the following classes of notes: Class A Notes,
Class B Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and
Class F Notes due 2029 (the "Original Notes"), previously issued
on 12 May 2016 (the "Original Closing Date"). On the refinancing
date, the Issuer will use the proceeds from the issuance of the
refinancing notes to redeem in full its respective Original
Notes. On the Original Closing Date, the Issuer also issued EUR
42 million of subordinated notes, which will remain outstanding.
In addition, the Issuer will issue EUR5 million of additional
subordinated notes on the refinancing date. The terms and
conditions of the subordinated notes will be amended in
accordance with the refinancing notes' conditions.

The interest payment and principal repayment of the Class A-2-R
(junior (P)Aaa (sf) rated) notes are subordinated to interest
payment and principal repayment of the Class X notes, the Class
A-1A-R notes and Class A-1B-R notes. Class A-1A-R and Class A-1B-
R ( both senior (P)Aaa (sf) rated) notes' payment are pro rata
and pari-passu.

As part of this reset, the Issuer has increased the target par
amount by EUR50 million to EUR450 million, has set the
reinvestment period to 4 years and the weighted average life to
8.5 years. In addition, the Issuer will amend the base matrix and
modifiers that Moody's will take into account for the assignment
of the definitive ratings.

Harvest XV is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of secured senior loans or senior secured
bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured
senior loans, second-lien loans, high yield bonds and mezzanine
loans. The underlying portfolio is approximately 88% ramped as of
the pricing date.

Investcorp Credit Management EU Limited manages the CLO. It
directs the selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral
on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity,
including discretionary trading, during the transaction's 4 years
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk and credit improved
obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in August 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. Investcorp's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modelled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
August 2017. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.

Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR450,000,000

Diversity Score: 42

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2890

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.65%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 44%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.5 years

Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to obligors
domiciled in countries with local currency country risk ceiling
(LCC) of A1 or below. As per the portfolio constraints, exposures
to countries with LCC of A1 or below cannot exceed 10%, with
exposures to LCC of Baa1 to Baa3 limited to 5% and with exposures
to LCC below Baa3 further limited to 0%.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the provisional ratings
assigned to the rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes
increased default probability relative to the base case. Below is
a summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3324 from 2890)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-1A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-1B-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class F-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3757 from 2890)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-1A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class A-1B-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Class A-2-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0


HARVEST CLO XV: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)' Rating to Class F-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Harvest CLO XV DAC expected ratings,
as follows:

Class X: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

Class A-1A-R: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

Class A-1B-R: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

Class A-2-R: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

Class B-1-R: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

Class B-2-R: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

Class C-R: 'A(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

Class D-R: 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

Class E-R: 'BB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

Class F-R: 'B-(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

Subordinated notes: not rated

The assignment of the final ratings is contingent on the receipt
of final documents conforming to information already reviewed.

Harvest CLO XV DAC is a securitisation of mainly senior secured
loans (at least 90%) with a component of senior unsecured,
mezzanine, and second-lien loans. Net proceeds of EUR 467.3
million from the notes are being used to redeem the old notes,
with a new identified portfolio comprising the existing
portfolio, as modified by sales and purchases conducted by the
manager. The portfolio will be actively managed by Investcorp
Credit management EU Limited. The refinanced CLO envisages a
further four-year reinvestment period and an 8.5-year weighted
average life (WAL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B' Portfolio Credit Quality: Fitch views the average credit
quality of obligors to be in the 'B' range. The Fitch-weighted
average rating factor (WARF) of the current portfolio is 33.43,
below the indicative maximum covenanted WARF of 35 for assigning
the final ratings.

High Recovery Expectations: At least 90% of the portfolio will
comprise senior secured obligations. Fitch views the recovery
prospects for these assets as more favorable than for second-
lien, unsecured and mezzanine assets. The Fitch-weighted average
recovery rate of the current portfolio is 64.35%, above the
minimum covenant of 62.4%, corresponding to the matrix point of
WARF 35 and a weighted average spread (WAS) of 3.65%.

Limited Interest Rate Exposure: Up to 5% of the portfolio can be
invested in fixed-rate assets, while there are 7.8% fixed rate
liabilities. Fitch modelled both 0% and 5% fixed-rate buckets and
found that the rated notes can withstand the interest rate
mismatch associated with each scenario.

Diversified Asset Portfolio: The covenanted maximum exposure to
the top 10 obligors for assigning the expected ratings is 20% of
the portfolio balance. This covenant ensures that the asset
portfolio will not be exposed to excessive obligor concentration.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 125% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and with this increase added to all rating default levels,
would lead to a downgrade of up to two notches for the rated
notes. A 25% reduction in recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of up to three notches at the 'A' and 'BB' rating level
and two notches for all other rating levels.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other
Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations and/or
European Securities and Markets Authority-registered rating
agencies. Fitch has relied on the practices of the relevant
groups within Fitch and/or other rating agencies to assess the
asset portfolio information.
Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


NOVO BANCO: DBRS Hikes LT Issuer Rating to B, Trend Positive
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has upgraded Novo Banco, S.A.'s (NB or the
Bank) Long-Term Issuer Rating to B from CCC (high), its Short-
Term Issuer rating to R-4 from R-5 and its Long Term Critical
Obligations Ratings (COR) to BB. The trend on the long-term
ratings is now Positive while the trend on the short-term ratings
is Stable. At the same time, DBRS has confirmed the Short-Term
COR at R-4 with a Stable trend. The Bank's Intrinsic Assessment
(IA) has been upgraded to B and the Support Assessment remains at
SA3. See the full list of ratings in the table at the end of this
press release. This rating action concludes the review on the
ratings that was initiated on October 17, 2017 and extended on
January 17, 2018.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

The upgrade of NB's Long-Term Issuer Rating to B takes into
consideration the Bank's strengthened capital and improved
funding and liquidity position. It also considers the improvement
in its risk profile, particularly in terms of the acceleration of
the reduction in non- performing loans (NPLs) and the reinforced
coverage levels on these assets. The ratings, however, continue
to recognize the challenges the bank faces, particularly in
relation to asset quality and profitability. These include its
very weak asset quality with a very high NPL ratio, which albeit
improving, remains considerably weaker than most European banks.

The positive trend on NB's Long-Term Issuer Rating reflects
DBRS's expectations that, helped by the new ownership by Lone
Star, and the contingent capital agreement available for NB from
the Resolution Fund on a certain pool of assets, the bank is in a
better position to accelerate its balance sheet clean-up, reduce
NPLs, improve efficiency and strengthen its franchise position in
Portugal, where it continues to have a leading position in small
and medium size enterprises (SMEs) and corporate segments.

The upgrade of NB's COR to BB, with a Positive Trend, reflects
that given the Bank's improved capital and funding position as
well as potential support from its new private shareholder, DBRS
considers the risk of applying further resolution measures to NB
has reduced and therefore the risk of default on these
instruments has also reduced.

RATING DRIVERS

Positive rating pressure on the long-term ratings could arise if
the Bank continues to improve its risk profile, primarily through
a further reduction in Non-performing loans. Positive rating
pressure would also require progress in core profitability and
further evidence that its deposit base has stabilized.

Downward rating pressure to the long-term ratings, although
unlikely considering its current trend, could arise from a
weakening of the Bank's funding and liquidity position as well as
a material deterioration of the Bank's asset quality, also
negatively impacting capital.

DBRS anticipates that as the Bank's credit profile and IA
improves further, the COR could be upgraded further.

RATING RATIONALE

Since its inception NB has reported annual losses primarily as a
result of its weak risk profile and asset quality. In 2017 NB
reported a net loss of EUR 1.4 billion. DBRS notes however, that
commissions grew strongly, helping to partly offset the continued
pressure on net interest income (NII) from the low interest rate
environment. Impairment charges for loans and other assets were
up nearly 50% Year-on-Year (YoY) totaling EUR 2.1 billion,
largely from loans. These impairments were, however, partly
offset by EUR 792 million compensation paid to Novo Banco from
the Portuguese Resolution Fund related to the Contingent Capital
Agreement agreed upon conditions of the sale to Lone Star.
According to this, the Resolution Fund will compensate NB, up to
a limit of EUR 3.89 billion for losses that may be recognized in
some of its problematic assets, in the event that its capital
ratios decrease below a predefined threshold.

NB's asset quality remains weak but DBRS recognizes that the Bank
has successfully reduced NPLs at a good pace, as evidenced by the
15% reduction YoY in 2017. Nevertheless, the Bank's NPL ratio (as
defined by the European Banking Authority, EBA) remains elevated
at 30.5% at end-2017, much higher than the average of its
domestic peers and most European banks. However, helped by the
capital increase, NPL coverage levels materially improved to 59%
at end-2017, from 49% a year earlier. Whilst these coverage
levels are above most domestic peers' levels, DBRS considers them
essential to cover for NB's larger than peers' proportion of
uncollateralized exposures.

NB's funding and liquidity position improved in 2017, helped by
the capital increase, good growth of customer deposits and a
reduction of net funding from the European Central Bank (ECB).
Despite the improvement, DBRS considers NB's funding and
liquidity as still vulnerable to deposit and investor confidence
and this is a key consideration for the ratings. Total customer
deposits were up 16% in 2017 or EUR 4.1 billion, supported by
both organic growth and the bondholders' acceptance of the
commercial offer of deposits following the completion of the
liability management exercise (LME), completed in October 2017.
Helped by asset deleveraging, capital injections and the results
of the LME the Bank continued to reduce its net usage of ECB
funds in 2017 to EUR 2.8 billion, compared to EUR 5.1 billion at
end-2016.

NB's capital position materially improved with the capital
injection in 4Q17 and the Bank's CET1 (phased-in) ratio improved
to 12.8% and the CET1 (fully-loaded) ratio to 12.0% at end-2017.
However, DBRS continues to see NB's capitalization as weak in the
context of the Bank's large stock of unreserved NPLs and ongoing
operating losses. The unreserved NPL ratio/ CET1 (phased-in) were
a high 97.9% at end-2017, although much improved from a 141% at
end-2016.

The Grid Summary Grades for Novo Banco S.A. are as follows:
Franchise Strength -- Good/Moderate; Earnings -- Weak; Risk
Profile -- Very Weak; Funding & Liquidity -- Weak; Capitalization
-- Weak.

Notes: All figures are in Euros unless otherwise noted.


NOVO BANCO: Moody's Upgrades CR Assessment to B2(cr)
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to Baa1 from Baa2 the
mortgage covered bonds issued by Novo Banco, S.A. (deposits Caa1
positive, adjusted baseline credit assessment caa2; counterparty
risk (CR) assessment B2(cr)), governed by the Portuguese covered
bond legislation.

RATINGS RATIONALE

This rating action follows Moody's upgrade of Novo Banco's CR
assessment to B2(cr) from B3(cr) on May 7, 2018. As a result, the
covered bond (CB) anchor for the programme, is now one notch
higher.

The Timely Payment Indicator (TPI) of Probable-High now restricts
the rating of the covered bonds at Baa1. The programme holds
sufficient over-collateralisation (OC) to achieve the new rating.

KEY RATING ASSUMPTIONS/FACTORS

Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process:
an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's uses its Covered Bond Model (COBOL) to
determine a rating based on the expected loss on the bond. COBOL
determines expected loss as (1) a function of the probability
that the issuer will cease making payments under the covered
bonds (a CB anchor event); and (2) the stressed losses on the
cover pool assets following a CB anchor event.

The CB anchor for this programme is the CR assessment plus one
notch. The CR assessment reflects an issuer's ability to avoid
defaulting on certain senior bank operating obligations and
contractual commitments, including covered bonds.

The cover pool losses for this programme are 18.1%. This is an
estimate of the losses Moody's currently models following a CB
anchor event. Moody's splits cover pool losses between market
risk of 13.1% and collateral risk of 5%. Market risk measures
losses stemming from refinancing risk and risks related to
interest-rate and currency mismatches (these losses may also
include certain legal risks). Collateral risk measures losses
resulting directly from cover pool assets' credit quality.
Moody's derives collateral risk from the collateral score, which
for this programme is currently 7.5%.

The over-collateralisation in the cover pool is 10%, of which
Novo Banco provides 5.3% on a "committed" basis. Under Moody's
COBOL model, the minimum OC consistent with the Baa1 rating is
6%, of which 3% needs to be in "committed" form to be given full
value. These numbers show that Moody's is relying on
"uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator"
(TPI), which measures the likelihood of timely payments to
covered bondholders following a CB anchor event. The TPI
framework limits the covered bond rating to a certain number of
notches above the CB anchor.

For the mortgage covered bonds issued by Novo Banco, Moody's has
assigned a TPI of Probable-High.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The CB anchor is the main determinant of a covered bond
programme's rating robustness. A change in the level of the CB
anchor could lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the covered
bonds. The TPI Leeway measures the number of notches by which
Moody's might lower the CB anchor before the rating agency
downgrades the covered bonds because of TPI framework
constraints.

The TPI assigned to Novo Banco mortgage covered bonds is
Probable-High. the TPI Leeway for this programme is 0 notches.
This implies that Moody's might downgrade the covered bonds
because of a TPI cap if it lowers the CB anchor by one notch, all
other variables being equal.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain circumstances, such as (1) a country ceiling or sovereign
downgrade capping a covered bond rating or negatively affecting
the CB Anchor and the TPI; (2) a multiple-notch downgrade of the
CB Anchor; or (3) a material reduction of the value of the cover
pool.

RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds" published in December 2016.




=========
S P A I N
=========


BCC CAJAMAR: DBRS Finalizes 'CC' Rating on EUR240.0MM Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized its ratings on the following notes
issued by IM BCC Cajamar PYME 2, FT (the Issuer):

-- EUR760.0 million Series A Notes rated at A (high) (sf)
-- EUR240.0 million Series B Notes rated at CC (sf) (together
    with the Series A Notes, the Notes)

The transaction is a cash flow securitization collateralized by a
portfolio of term loans originated by Cajamar Caja Rural, S.C.C
(Cajamar or the Originator) to small- and medium-sized
enterprises and self-employed individuals based in Spain. As of
April 25, 2018, the transaction's securitized portfolio consisted
of 18,622 loans to 15,168 obligor groups, totaling EUR 1,000
million.

The rating on the Series A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate repayment of principal on or before the
Legal Maturity Date in June 2057. The rating on the Series B
Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest and principal on
or before the Legal Maturity Date.

Interest and principal payments on the Notes will be made monthly
on the 22nd of each month, with the first payment date on June
22, 2018. The Notes will pay a fixed interest rate equal to 0.5%
until 22 November 2019. After that, the Notes will pay an
interest rate of Euribor one-month plus a 0.20% and 0.30% margin
for the Series A and Series B notes, respectively.

The final pool exhibits low borrower concentration. The largest
obligor group represents 0.60% of the portfolio balance and the
top ten and top twenty borrowers represent 4.85% and 8.02% of the
outstanding pool balance, respectively. As per DBRS's Industry
classification, the pool exhibits a high industry concentration
in Farming/Agriculture, which represents 29.59% of the pool
balance, followed by Food/Drug retailers and Food Products at
8.12% and 6.78%, respectively. There is a high concentration of
borrowers in Andalusia (30.24% of the portfolio balance), which
is expected given that Andalusia is the home region of the
Originator. Additionally, 13.05% of the outstanding balance of
the portfolio corresponds to refinance loans, which have a higher
default expectation.

These ratings are based upon DBRS's review of the following
items:

The Series A Notes benefit from a total credit enhancement of
27.00%, which DBRS considers to be sufficient to support the A
(high) (sf) rating. The Series B Notes benefit from a credit
enhancement of 3.00%. Credit enhancement will be provided by
subordination and the Reserve Fund.

The Reserve Fund has a balance of EUR 30.0 million, 3.00% of the
aggregate balance of the Notes, and is available to cover
shortfalls in the senior expenses and interest in the Series A
Notes. Once the Series A Notes are fully paid, the Reserve Fund
will be available to cover interest on Series B throughout the
life of the Notes. The Reserve Fund will only be available as a
credit support for the Notes at the Legal Final Maturity or at a
fund liquidation date.

The transaction does not include any mechanisms to address
commingling risk. As such, DBRS's analysis includes a stress
equivalent to the interruption of interest and principal proceeds
for a period of six months, assuming that senior expenses and
interest on the Series A Notes would be paid from the Cash
Reserve for this period.

DBRS determined these ratings as follows, as per the principal
methodology specified below:

  -- The probability of default (PD) for the portfolio was
determined using the historical performance information supplied.
The historical data has been provided separately for refinance
loans and "normal" loans. DBRS compared the historical data
analysis with the internal PD distribution of the portfolio and
concluded that the portfolio credit quality was worse than the
bank's loan book which was used for historical performance data.
DBRS adjusted the annual PD for the loans of the portfolio that
have lower internal ratings (i.e., ratings 0, 1 and 2)
considering as defaulted from day one loans with a 0 and 1 rating
and a PD of 20.0% for those loans with a rating of 2. For the
remaining portfolio, DBRS assumed an annual PD of 2.18% for the
standard loans and an annual PD of 7.22% for refinance loans
based on the historical performance data provided.

  -- The assumed weighted-average life (WAL) of the portfolio was
5.26 years.

  -- The PD and WAL were used in the DBRS Diversity Model to
generate the hurdle rate for the target ratings.

  -- The recovery rate was determined by considering the market
value declines for Spain, the security level and type of the
collateral. For the Series A Notes, DBRS applied a 54.79%
recovery rate for secured loans and a 16.30% recovery rate for
unsecured loans. For the Series B Notes, DBRS applied a 73.62%
recovery rate for secured loans and a 21.50% recovery rate for
unsecured loans.

  -- The break-even rates for the interest rate stresses and
default timings were determined using the DBRS Cash Flow tool.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CAU: May Face Closure, About 700 Jobs at Risk
---------------------------------------------
Sarah Butler at The Guardian reports that the Argentine
restaurant group Gaucho is considering the closure of its casual
dining steakhouse Cau with the potential loss of about 700 jobs.

It is understood that the privately owned group has appointed
advisory firm KPMG to help assess options for the future of Cau,
which has 22 restaurants around the country, The Guardian
relates.

The restaurant chain, which serves up burgers and brunch with a
Buenos Aires theme alongside steak dinners, has suffered sales
declines in double digits for more than a year amid heavy
competition and a squeeze on consumer spending, The Guardian
discloses.

According to The Guardian, a company spokesperson said: "As part
of a comprehensive strategic review, the group's new management
team, with the support of its shareholders, is at the early
stages of exploring a number of financial restructuring options.
No decisions have yet been made."

Gaucho is understood to be considering closing Cau via a company
voluntary arrangement (CVA), The Guardian relays, citing Sky
News.


DREW CONSTRUCTION: Enters Administration, Ceases Trading
--------------------------------------------------------
Daily Echo reports that Drew Construction has ceased trading just
months after completing two high-profile projects in the county.

The company has gone into administration in a move that has sent
shockwaves through the local community, Daily Echo discloses.

According to Daily Echo, at least 20 jobs are thought to be at
risk following the demise of the 110-year-old company.

Customers hit by the company's collapse include Sovereign Housing
Association, Daily Echo relates.


HOUSE OF FRASER: Posts GBP43.9MM Loss for Year-Ended Dec. 2017
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Woods at The Telegraph reports that troubled department store
chain House of Fraser has dived to a near-GBP44 million loss as
sales suffered from falling consumer confidence and the rapid
rise of online shopping.

The retailer swung from a GBP1.5 million profit to a GBP43.9
million pre-tax loss for the year ending December 2017, with
sales sinking 6% to GBP787.8 million, The Telegraph discloses.

House of Fraser's dismal fortunes were laid bare by new owner
C.banner in an announcement to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, The
Telegraph notes.

China's C.banner, which owns Hamleys toy shop, is buying a 51%
stake in House of Fraser from majority shareholders Nanjing
Cenbest and plans to invest GBP70 million of fresh capital, The
Telegraph relays.

According to The Telegraph, C.banner said: "The Brexit referendum
and the UK's resultant decision to leave the European Union and
the terrorist attacks in London, combined with a rapidly evolving
retail market, produced a period of uncertainty and volatility
that resulted in a difficult trading environment for the whole
retail industry in the UK."

However, the firm plans to seize House of Fraser's "growth
potential" and return the retailer to stable financial ground
once a restructuring drive is complete, The Telegraph states.

Store closures and potential job losses are front and center of
the C.banner deal, with House of Fraser looking to shore up its
fortunes by launching a Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA),
according to The Telegraph.

A decision on whether to progress with the overhaul will be
confirmed in early June, with the deal set to complete by the end
of that month, The Telegraph relates.


ITHACA ENERGY: Moody's Assigns Caa1 Rating to US$350MM Sr. Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned Caa1 rating to the
proposed $350 million senior unsecured notes to be issued by
Ithaca Energy (North Sea) plc. The notes are guaranteed by Ithaca
Energy Inc. (Ithaca) and certain Ithaca's subsidiaries. Ithaca's
Corporate Family Rating (CFR) is B3 and probability of default
rating (PDR) is B3-PD. The outlook on all ratings is negative. A
stabilisation of the outlook could be considered upon successful
completion of the planned refinancing.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Ithaca announced the launch of $350 million notes due 2023 to
refinance existing notes. This is part of a refinancing package
which includes the refinancing of its existing Reserve Based
Lending (RBL) facility and retirement of the existing term loan.
The successful completion of the refinancing of the different
instruments would be credit positive for the company as this
would improve liquidity and extend maturities from 2019 to
December 2022 and beyond and could lead to a stabilisation of the
outlook.

The company announced the launch of $350 million senior notes due
2023 to refinance the existing $300 million senior notes maturing
in July 2019. The company has agreed and expects to sign an
amendment and extension of its existing Reserve Based Lending
(RBL) facility, thereby increasing its size to $350 million from
the current $245 million and extending its maturity to December
2022 from May 2019. Ithaca has also signed a subordinated
shareholder loan with its parent, Delek Group Ltd. (unrated) for
$100 million maturing in May 2024. As part of the refinancing,
the company also expects to cancel and repay its existing $140
million term loan. A stabilisation of outlook could be considered
if all these elements are successfully completed.

The refinancing would enable the company to eliminate the high
refinancing risk it faces and provides more time to focus on
growing the production and improving the reserve life of its
fields. In addition it would reduce Ithaca's absolute gross debt
by $146 million, partially due to debt repayment combined with
the issuance of a $100 million shareholder loan, which will be
considered as 100% equity in Moody's debt analysis. As a result,
the company should be able to reduce its adjusted gross
debt/EBITDA in 2018-19 to around 3.0x from its peak of 5.1x in
2017.

Ithaca's B3 rating, however, still remains constrained by the
small scale and highly concentrated reserves base with a weak
reserve life of 4.5 years with 23 million BOE of 1P (proved)
reserves (excluding Wytch Farm) at the end of 2017 versus 5.1
million BOE of 2017 production. A successful refinancing would
give the company more time to convert its 2P (proved and
probable) reserves (13.3 years reserve life) into 1P reserves.
Ithaca's business profile also remains constrained by the lower
production in 2017 of 13.9 kboepd and Moody's lower production
expectations in 2018-19, at around 14-16 kboepd from 18-22 kboepd
previously expected, as a result of the lower production from the
Stella field. Timely development of the Greater Stella Area
satellite fields will be important to the company's production
and cash flow growth in 2018-19 and beyond. Moody's believes that
the additional capex required to develop and bring these Greater
Stella satellite fields into production should not be material as
these are tie-backs to existing Stella infrastructure,
demonstrating limited execution risks.

Rating Outlook

The negative outlook reflects the lower production step up at
Stella, with lower production in 2017-18 than previous
expectations, and the refinancing risks that the company faces
given its high debt maturities of $305 million in May 2019 and
$300 million in July 2019.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

Timely development of the Greater Stella Area satellite fields,
sustainable production of 25,000 BOE/day, further debt reduction
from free cash flow with adjusted RCF/Total Debt rising above 25%
and sustained investment in new development projects to increase
the 1P reserve base could support an upgrade.

What Could Change the Rating - Down

Further significant delays in Stella field ramp-up and declining
free cash flow generation, resulting in a weaker liquidity
profile could cause a rating downgrade. Rating could also be
downgraded if there is a declining 1P reserve life or adjusted
RCF/Total Debt falling below 15% on a sustained basis.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Independent
Exploration and Production Industry published in May 2017.

Ithaca Energy Inc. is a UK-based independent exploration and
production company with all of its assets and production in the
United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) region of the North Sea.
The company has pursued growth via acquisitions of producing
field interests and appraisal and development of assets that have
potential for step outs in contiguous areas. In 2017, Ithaca's
production averaged at 13,900 BOE/day. Ithaca was acquired by
Delek Group Ltd. (unrated) in 2017 and is now a 100% owned
subsidiary of Delek.


ITHACA ENERGY: S&P Rates New $350MM Unsecured Notes Due 2023 CCC+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it assigned its 'CCC+' issue rating
to U.K.-based oil producer Ithaca Energy (North Sea) PLC's new
$350 million senior unsecured notes due 2023. This rating is
consistent with that on the existing senior notes.

S&P said, "The '6' recovery rating reflects our expectation of
negligible recovery (0%-10%; rounded estimate 5%) on the proposed
issue in the event of default. While our assumption for Ithaca's
enterprise value supports a higher recovery rating, we
incorporate into our rating qualitative factors, such as the
concentration risk and the high portion of probable reserves of
the total (proven plus probable; 2P) reserves.

"We understand that most of the proceeds will be used to repay
the existing $300 million senior unsecured notes due 2019."

Issue Ratings--Recovery Analysis

S&P said, "We understand that the company is planning to
refinance its current capital structure. The proposed new
instruments will include a $350 million reserve-based lending
(RBL) facility due in December 2022, a $350 million senior
unsecured notes due in 2023, and a $100 million subordinated
shareholder loan provided by the owner, Delek Group. The RBL will
benefit from an extensive security package, including a pledge
over the company's reserves, ranking ahead of the senior
unsecured notes in the case of default. On the other hand, the
newly signed $100 million shareholder loans is a subordinated
debt, ranking behind the proposed senior unsecured notes. The
revised capital structure is expected to reduce the pro forma net
debt of Ithaca at the end of Q1 2018 to $454 million, improving
liquidity and financial flexibility.

"The rating is underpinned by the company's current oil and gas
reserves and our valuation of these reserves under S&P Global
Ratings' assumptions. Our assumptions incorporate value from the
2P reserves, although on a reduced basis. At the end of 2017, the
total amount of 2P reserves was 71.7 million barrels of oil
equivalent (mmboe), split between 27.2 mmboe proven and 44.5
mmboe probable. We assume the company would be able to maintain
its current reserves by converting its probable reserves into
proven reserves and replacing depleted fields with new ones. This
assumption would also support a periodic refinancing of the
existing RBL.

"In our hypothetical default scenario, we assume a payment
default by Ithaca in 2021. This theoretical scenario, used for
the purposes of the recovery analysis, assumes operational issues
in the Greater Stella Area fields, as well as weaker production
rates and a sustained period of low commodity prices, which are
symptomatic of past defaults in this sector.

"Under our simplified recovery waterfall, we reach a recovery of
about 20%, equivalent to a recovery rating of '5'. However, the
outcome reflects additional qualitative factors, including the
portion of the probable reserves out of the total enterprise
value, high concentration in one area, and the shift of the
reserves toward lower valued gas from the current higher valued
oil (which was only partly incorporated in our gross recovery
value).

In S&P's hypothetical default scenario, its assumptions are:

-- Year of default: 2021
-- Jurisdiction: U.K.

In S&P's hypothetical default scenario, its simulated waterfall
is:

-- Gross recovery value: $392 million
-- Net recovery value for waterfall after admin expenses (5%):
$372 million
-- Estimated first lien debt claims(1): $309 million
-- Estimated senior unsecured debt: $365 million
-- Recovery range: 0%-10% (rounded estimate 5%)(2)
-- Recovery rating: 6

(1) All debt amounts include six months of prepetition interest.
(2) Rounded estimate of 20% before incorporating the qualitative
factors.


MAYFAIR HOLDINGS: Steinhoff Ex-CEO Taps Rescue Practitioners
------------------------------------------------------------
Loni Prinsloo at Bloomberg News report that Steinhoff
International Holdings NV ex-Chief Executive Officer Markus
Jooste's personal investment company has hired two business-
rescue practitioners as it embarks on an asset-sale to repay
creditors.

Mayfair Holdings Pty Ltd. named Piers Marsden and Leslie Matuson
of Johannesburg-based Matuson & Associates as directors,
Bloomberg relays, citing a statement by South Africa's Companies
and Intellectual Property Commission.  Mayfair has been given
until the end of the year by lenders to sell assets and pay back
loans that were backed by Steinhoff shares, which have collapsed
in value amid an accounting scandal, Bloomberg discloses.

Mr. Jooste quit as Steinhoff CEO and as a director of Mayfair in
December, Bloomberg recounts.


PERMANENT TSB: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating, Trend Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has confirmed the ratings of permanent tsb
p.l.c. (PTSB or the Bank) at BB, including its Long-Term Issuer
Rating, and its Long-Term Senior Debt and Long-Term Deposits
ratings, and the Short-Term Debt and Short-Term Deposits ratings
at R-4. The Issuer Rating of Permanent TSB Group Holdings p.l.c.
(the Group) was confirmed at BB (low). The Bank's Intrinsic
Assessment (IA) remains at BB and the Support Assessment remains
unchanged at SA3. The trend on the Short-Term Issuer Rating of
Permanent TSB Group Holdings p.l.c. (the Group) remains unchanged
at Stable. The trend on all other ratings remains Positive.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

The confirmation of the ratings reflects the stabilization of the
Bank's core profitability, including the reporting of a positive
net income result in 2017, and continuous, albeit modest
improvements in reducing impaired loans.

The Positive trend reflects ongoing upward pressure on the
ratings resulting from expectation that the Bank's profitability
will continue to improve, in line with the improved lending
volumes and higher margins. The positive economic conditions in
Ireland should also support asset quality improvements, although
DBRS will monitor closely the Bank's NPL strategy execution in
2018.

RATING DRIVERS

Further track record i) in improving core profitability and
continued bottom line profitability and ii) evidence that asset
quality metrics will continue to improve, without significantly
impacting capital, could have positive rating implications.

Given the positive trend, downward pressure is unlikely in the
medium term. However, i) a reversal of recent improvements in
core profitability and/or ii) a reversal of asset quality
improvements, could have negative rating implications.

RATING RATIONALE

PTSB's ratings are underpinned by the Bank's meaningful market
positions in the Republic of Ireland (RoI). Its franchise is
focused on domestic personal retail and retail SME banking with
total assets of EUR 22.8 billion at end-2017. The Group serves
it's circa 1.1 million customers through a network of 77 branches
across the Republic of Ireland and various digital channels.

The Group was able to return to bottom line profitability in
2017, due to the reduction in exceptional items. On a pre-
provision basis, however, PTSB's results were relatively stable
compared to 2016. The Group reported operating profit before
impairments and exceptional items of EUR 114 million in 2017,
marginally down from EUR 120 million in 2016.

PTSB's retail credit risk remains very weak. The Bank reported
non-performing loans of EUR 5.3 billion at end-2017, down from
EUR 5.9 billion at end-2016, comprising predominately of domestic
residential mortgage loans. This reduction was a result of cures
due to successful restructuring and the targeted voluntary
surrender for buy-to-let loans (BTL). However, the NPL ratio
remained very high at 25.6% of gross loans with a coverage ratio
42%, flat year-on-year (YoY).

Additionally, PTSB launched in February 2018 project Glass, which
is a sale process of EUR 3.7 billion NPLs. This project accounts
of almost 70% of the Group's total NPL stack and DBRS notes that
if successfully completed this would be a significant credit
positive.

PTSB's funding profile remained strong in 2017, following the
deleveraging the year before. At end-2017, customer accounts
totaled EUR 17.0 billion, unchanged since 2016. The Group
continues to increase its customer deposits which accounted for
83% of total funding at end-2017, up from 80% at end-2016. The
loan to deposit ratio was also positively impacted by the
deleveraging and continued to improve in 2017 to 108%, down from
the 111% ratio at end-2016 and 125% in 2015.

PTSB's capital ratios remain solid as both the RWAs and the
capital remained relatively flat. At end-2017 the Group's fully
loaded Basel III Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio was 15%, up 10
basis points (bps) YoY. The Group's transitional CET1 ratio was
17.1% (2016: 17.2%) and this compares to a minimum requirement of
9.8% as per the Single Supervisory Mechanism following the
Group's Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP). On a
leverage ratio basis, the Group demonstrated further improvement
and at end-2017 the fully loaded leverage ratio was 7.1%, up 30
bps YoY, and the transitional leverage ratio was 8.0%, up 20 bps
YoY.

Notes: All figures are in Euros unless otherwise noted.


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U Z B E K I S T A N
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IPOTEKA BANK: S&P Affirms 'B+/B' ICRs, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+/B' long- and short-term
issuer credit ratings on Uzbekistan-based Ipoteka Bank JSCM. The
outlook remains stable.

S&P said, "The affirmation reflects our view that over the next
one to two years Ipoteka Bank will maintain its strong link with
the government and continue playing an important role for
Uzbekistan's economy by providing financing to a number of
government-related entities (GREs) and by implementing
government-led projects in the construction and mortgage sectors.
We also think that Ipoteka Bank will maintain its sizable market
share and stable customer base, while its credit profile will
continue to benefit from ongoing government support in the form
of capital, funding, and state guarantees."

In 2017, the bank received Uzbekistani sum (UZS) 685 billion
(about $85 million) of capital support from the Fund for
Reconstruction and Development of Uzbekistan (FRDU) and Ministry
of Finance. The received support, to a large extent, offset
pressure on the bank's capital adequacy ratios, following the
significant devaluation of the Uzbek sum. The received capital
also included resources provided by the Ministry of Finance to
support implementation of the government-led program for housing
construction and mortgage lending in urban areas, a program in
which Ipoteka Bank plays a pivotal role. As a result of the
government support, the bank's risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio
increased to 6.4% as of year-end 2017 from 4.3% a year earlier.
S&P said, "We expect that the bank's RAC ratio will gradually
deteriorate to 5.5%-5.7% over the next 12-18 months, because
organic growth will likely exceed internal capital generation.
Nevertheless, we consider that the bank's capital and earnings
will likely remain a neutral rating factor, even if the
government provides no additional capital support in the next two
years."

Last year, the bank's loan portfolio grew by about 127%, largely
fueled by local currency devaluation. S&P said, "Nevertheless, we
note that over the past five years, the bank's organic growth
sustainably exceeded the system average due to a significant
amount of government-directed lending, which we estimate at close
to 55% of the bank's loan portfolio as of year-end 2017.
Government-directed lending remains the key reason for high
single-name concentrations in the bank's loan portfolio: As of
year-end 2017, the 20 largest borrowers represented about 65% of
the bank's loan book (about 5.1x of its total equity).
Nevertheless, we note that a material part of these loans remains
guaranteed by the government, which, to a large extent, mitigates
credit risk for the bank. Moreover, over the past five years, the
bank has demonstrated lower credit losses than peers, with an
average cost-of-risk of about 40 basis points (bps) versus 100
bps-150 bps for other state-owned banks in the country. We expect
the bank will likely maintain good asset quality and relatively
low credit losses in the next two years, which reflects its
prudent risk management and selective approach to lending."

S&P said, "We expect the bank's funding profile will remain
stable, with a predominant share of funds provided by various
government structures as well as state and public organizations.
As of year-end 2017, about 31% of the bank's liabilities
represented funds were provided by the FRDU to finance various
projects of the bank's largest borrower, while funds from
Ministry of Finance and other state organizations represented
another 32%. In our view, this highlights the bank's involvement
in various government-led projects and its dependence on ongoing
funding from the government. We think that the bank's liquidity
management will remain prudent, with sufficient liquidity sources
to meet the bank's obligations. As of year-end 2017, cash
balances and short-term placements covered around 20% of
liabilities, which is a sufficient liquidity buffer taking into
account a large share of project-related funds in the bank's
liabilities.

"In our view, Ipoteka Bank has high systemic importance in
Uzbekistan. We also consider the bank to be a GRE with a
moderately high likelihood of receiving extraordinary government
support, if needed. However, given we do not rate Uzbekistan, our
long-term rating on the bank does not include any uplift for
potential government support.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Ipoteka Bank's close
ties with the government and its involvement in a number of
state-sponsored programs, together with the capital provided by
the government to date, would support the bank's credit profile
at the current level in the next 12-18 months.

"We could lower our ratings on the bank if it expands
significantly more than we currently expect, with growth not
supported by additional capital from the government lowering the
bank's RAC ratio to below 3.0% or its regulatory capital adequacy
ratios to below the minimum regulatory requirements. Similarly,
we could consider a negative rating action if the bank's risk
position deteriorated, with the amount of problem loans
increasing significantly more than we currently expect.

"In our view, the creditworthiness of Uzbek state banks,
including Ipoteka Bank, is closely linked to that of Uzbekistan
(not rated). Accordingly, we are unlikely to raise the ratings on
Ipoteka Bank before we see improvements in the sovereign's
creditworthiness. In our view, the likelihood of an upgrade
triggered by improvements in bank-specific factors appears
limited over the next year."


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* BOOK REVIEW: Macy's for Sale
------------------------------
Author: Isadore Barmash
Paperback: 180 pages
List price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry
Order your personal copy today at
http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/macys_for_sale.html

Isadore Barmash writes in his Prologue, "This book tells the
story of Macy's managers and their leveraged buyout, the newest
and most controversial device in the modern financial armament"
when it took place in the 1980s. At the center of Barmash's story
is Edward S. Finkelstein, Macy's chairman of the board and chief
executive office. Sixty years old at the time, Finkelstein had
worked for Macy's for thirty-five years. Looking back over his
long career dedicated to the department store as he neared
retirement, Finkelstein was dismayed when he realized that even
with his generous stock options, he owned less than one percent
of Macy's stock. In the years leading up to his unexpected, bold
takeover, Finkelstein had made over Macy's from a run-of-the-mill
clothing retailer into a highly profitable business in the lead
of the lucrative and growing fashion and "lifestyle" field.
To aid him in accomplishing the takeover and share the rewards
with him, Finkelstein had brought together more than three
hundred of Macy's top executives. To gain his support for his
planned takeover, Finkelstein told them, "The ones who have done
the job at Macy's are the ones who ought to own Macy's." Opposing
Finkelstein and his group were the Straus family who owned the
lion's share of Macy's and employees and shareholders who had an
emotional attachment to Macy's as it had been for generations,
"Mother Macy's" as it was known. But the opponents were no match
for Finkelstein's carefully laid plans and carefully cultivated
alliances with the executives. At the 1985 meeting, the
shareholders voted in favor of the takeover by roughly eighty
percent, with less than two percent opposing it.

The takeover is dealt with largely in the opening chapter. For
the most part, Barmash follows the decision making by
Finkelstein, the reorganization of the national company with a
number of branches, the activities of key individuals besides
Finkelstein, Macy's moves in the competitive field of clothing
retailing, and attempts by the new Macy's owners led by
Finkelstein to build on their successful takeover by making other
acquisitions. Barmash allows at the beginning that it is an
"unauthorized book, written without the cooperation of the buying
group." But as he quickly adds, his coverage of Macy's as a
business journalist and his independent research for over a year
gave him enough knowledge to write a relevant and substantive
book. The reader will have no doubt of this. Barmash's narrative,
profiles of individuals, and analysis of events, intentions, and
consequences ring true, and have not been contradicted by
individuals he writes about, subsequent events, or exposure of
material not public at the time the book was written.

First published in 1989, the author places the Macy's buyout in
the context of the business environment at the time: the
aggressive, largely laissez-faire, Reagan era. Without being
judgmental, the author describes how numerous corporations were
awakened from their longtime inertia, while many individuals were
feeling betrayed, losing jobs, and facing uncertain futures.
Isadore Barmash, a veteran business journalist and author, was
associated with the New York Times for more than a quarter-
century as business-financial writer and editor. He also
contributed many articles for national media, Reuters America,
and the Nihon Kenzai Shimbun of Japan. He has published 13 books,
including a novel and is listed in the 57th edition of Who's Who
in America.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
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Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
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prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
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                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
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Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
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