/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/180516.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, May 16, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 096


                            Headlines


B E L G I U M

IDEAL STANDARD: Moody's Affirms Ca-PD PDR, Ca CFR


G R E E C E

GREECE: Negotiations with Bailout Inspectors Resume in Athens


I R E L A N D

MILLTOWN PARK CLO DAC: Moody's Rates Class E Notes '(P)B2'
* IRELAND: Corporate Insolvencies Down 14% in First Quarter 2018


I T A L Y

ENEL SPA: Moody's Rates Hybrid Notes 'Ba1', Outlook Stable
MOBY SPA: Moody's Cuts CFR to Caa1 & Alters Outlook to Stable


K A Z A K H S T A N

TSESNABANK: S&P Affirms 'B+/B' ICR, Outlook Negative


M A C E D O N I A

SKOPJE: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

DRYDEN 62: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes
GREEN STORM 2018: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba1 Rating to Class E Notes


P O L A N D

ZABRZE: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDRs at 'BB+', Outlook Stable


R U S S I A

KRASNOYARSK: Fitch Affirms IDRs at 'BB+', Outlook Stable
OTKRITIE: Bailout Costs Expected to Rise Higher Than US$27BB
VOLZHSKIY: Fitch Upgrades IDRs to 'BB-' Then Withdraws Rating


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CARILLION PLC: Used Suppliers to Prop Up Failing Business Model
HBOS: Former Chief Executives Tried to Hide Fraudulent Lending
THRONES 2015-1: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+sf'
ZPG PLC: Moody's Reviews Ba3 CFR & Sr. Notes Rating for Downgrade


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B E L G I U M
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IDEAL STANDARD: Moody's Affirms Ca-PD PDR, Ca CFR
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Ideal Standard
International S.A.'s Ca-PD probability of default rating (PDR),
appending the "/LD" designation. Concurrently, Moody's has
affirmed the company's Ca corporate family rating (CFR). The
outlook on the ratings has been changed to stable from negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The appending of the PDR with a "/LD" designation indicates a
limited default, reflecting the release on April 4, 2018 of the
senior secured notes issued by Ideal Standard International S.A.,
namely the senior secured notes series AAA, series AA, series A,
series, B, and series C, as well as the original senior secured
notes. The conversion of these notes to equity was completed
ahead of their maturity due on May 1, 2018. In Moody's view, this
refinancing transaction constitutes a distressed exchange under
Moody's definition of default. The "/LD" designation will be
removed after three business days, after which Moody's will
withdraw all ratings. Moody's has decided to withdraw the ratings
for its own business reasons.

The ratings affirmation reflects the fact that the release of the
senior secured notes totaling EUR695.2 million as of September
30,  2017 will only moderately reduce the company's adjusted
gross leverage (as adjusted by Moody's mainly for pension
liabilities, operating leases, and capitalized development costs)
as preferred equity certificates (PECs, unrated) and shareholder
loans (unrated) issued by Ideal Standard totaling EUR2,238
million as of September 30, 2017 will remain outstanding after
the refinancing. The PECs and shareholder loans are classed as
debt under its shareholder loan methodology introduced in 2013.
Pro forma for the transaction, adjusted gross leverage will thus
remain very high at 33.5x as of September 30, 2017 compared to
42.9x prior to the refinancing.

The stable outlook reflects the fact that Ideal Standard benefits
from an improved liquidity profile following the refinancing
transaction with the PECs and shareholder loans benefitting from
long-dated maturities. The stable outlook also reflects Moody's
expectation that Ideal Standard will maintain an adequate
liquidity position over the next 18 months supported by its cash
balance of EUR73.8 million as of September 30, 2017 which will
mitigate potential continued negative free cash flow over the
coming quarters.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Consumer
Durables Industry published in April 2017.

Headquartered in Belgium, Ideal Standard is a manufacturer of
bathroom fixtures, fittings and furniture, including ceramic
fixtures (sinks, toilets), brass fittings (taps), acrylic
fixtures (spa and whirlpool tubs) and furniture (towel racks,
toilet seats). The company operates under the brand names of
Ideal Standard, Armitage Shanks, Jado, Porcher, Vidima and
Ceramica Dolomite among others. In 2016, the company generated
EUR739 million revenues, operating through 20 manufacturing
plants in Europe and in Egypt and employed almost 10,000 people.
The company was acquired on March 28, 2018 by an entity managed
and advised by Anchorage Capital Group, L.L.C. (Anchorage
Capital) and CVC Credit Partners, who became the sole
shareholders of the Group.


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G R E E C E
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GREECE: Negotiations with Bailout Inspectors Resume in Athens
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that bailout inspectors have
returned to Athens as Greece races to comply with the final terms
of its rescue program, which ends in August.

Negotiations resumed Monday, May 14, with Greece still facing
dozens of measures to address in the next ten days to remain on
track for an agreement next month on the terms of bailout debt
repayment after the program ends, the AP relates.

Athens is seeking a full return to financing itself on
international bond markets following eight years of dependence on
loans from other eurozone countries and the International
Monetary Fund, the AP discloses.  But some creditors favor a more
gradual approach, the AP notes.


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I R E L A N D
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MILLTOWN PARK CLO DAC: Moody's Rates Class E Notes '(P)B2'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Milltown
Park CLO DAC:

EUR 1,750,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR 248,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR 22,000,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

EUR 20,000,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2031, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

EUR 26,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

EUR 19,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

EUR 25,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

EUR 12,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will
endeavour to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if
any) may differ from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the
notes in 2031. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Blackstone / GSO
Debt Funds Management Europe Limited, has sufficient experience
and operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Milltown Park CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 96% of the
portfolio must consist of secured senior obligations and up to 4%
of the portfolio may consist of unsecured senior obligations,
second lien loans, mezzanine obligations, high yield bonds and
first lien last out loans. The portfolio is expected to be 78%
ramped up as of the closing date and to be comprised
predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western
Europe.

Blackstone / GSO Debt Funds Management Europe Limited will manage
the CLO. It will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage
in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's 4.6 years reinvestment period. Thereafter,
purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from unscheduled
principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk and
credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR37,100,000 of subordinated notes. Moody's
will not assign a rating to this class of notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, will divert interest and principal proceeds
to pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in August 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. Blackstone / GSO Debt Funds
Management Europe Limited's investment decisions and management
of the transaction will also affect the notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
August 2017. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR400,000,000

Diversity Score: 40

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2820

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.45%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.5 years

As part of its analysis, Moody's has addressed the potential
exposure to obligors domiciled in countries with local currency
government bond ratings of A1 or below. According to the
portfolio constraints, the total exposure to countries with a
local currency country risk bond ceiling ("LCC") below Aa3 shall
not exceed 10% and per Eligibility Criteria obligors domiciled in
countries with a LCC below A3 is not allowed.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the rating assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Here is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3243 from 2820)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3666 from 2820)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2


* IRELAND: Corporate Insolvencies Down 14% in First Quarter 2018
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Times reports that corporate insolvencies among Irish
companies have fallen by 14% in the first three months of the
year.

Most of the businesses that were involved -- 118, or 59% -- went
into liquidation voluntarily, The Times relays, citing statistics
published by Deloitte, the financial services company.  The total
number of insolvencies was down by 31 when compared with the same
period last year, The Times discloses.

According to The Times, there were 54 receiverships recorded up
to the end of March, with a further 13 liquidators appointed.
Just three examinership appointments were made during the period,
The Times states.  That meant that only 1% of all insolvencies so
far this year were examinerships, and the number was down from
the 12 appointments made in the opening quarter of last year, The
Times notes.


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I T A L Y
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ENEL SPA: Moody's Rates Hybrid Notes 'Ba1', Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba1 long-term rating to
the Capital Securities (the junior subordinated "Hybrid"), to be
issued in two tranches by Enel S.p.A. ("Enel"). The rating
outlook is stable in line with that of Enel. The size and
completion of the Hybrid are subject to market conditions.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba1 rating assigned to the Hybrid is two notches below Enel's
senior unsecured rating of Baa2, reflecting the features of the
Hybrid. It is very long-dated, deeply subordinated and Enel can
opt to defer coupons on a cumulative basis. The rating is in line
with those of the existing hybrid notes issued by the company.

In Moody's view, the Hybrid has equity-like features which allow
it to receive basket "C" treatment (i.e. 50% equity and 50% debt)
for financial leverage purposes.

As the Hybrid's rating is positioned relative to another rating
of Enel, a change in either (1) Moody's relative notching
practice or (2) the senior unsecured rating of Enel could affect
the Hybrid's rating.

Enel's Baa2 rating is underpinned by (1) its large scale and
geographic diversity, which helps dampen earnings volatility; (2)
the strategic emphasis on investment in regulated and contracted
businesses; (3) and a gradually improving macroeconomic backdrop
in Italy and Spain.

The rating also factors in: (1) the progress made on
deleveraging, as reflected in estimated 2017 FFO/net debt of
approximately 21.6%; and (2) the 2018-2020 Strategic Plan which
continues the group's focus on operational efficiency, organic
growth and financial flexibility. At the same time it takes
account of potential risks including pressure on Italian retail
margins from competition or regulatory/political intervention,
slower than planned capital investment build out, power price
weakness in Europe, and a rising dividend pay-out.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook is based upon Enel's ongoing delivery of its
Strategic Plan and maintenance of its improved financial profile.
Following FFO/net debt of 20.9% and RCF/net debt of 15.2% in
2016, Moody's estimates 2017 credit ratios remain comfortably
aligned with guidance for the rating. This includes FFO/net debt
of around 20% and retained cash flow (RCF)/net debt in the mid-
teens, and takes account of the dilutive effect of sizeable
minorities in core businesses.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Enel's ratings could be upgraded if (1) progress on delivery of
its strategy were to result in a sustainable strengthening of the
group's financial profile - as would be reflected in credit
metrics including FFO/net debt in the mid-20s in percentage
terms, and RCF/net debt in the high teens; and (2) its domestic
political and economic backdrop were to become more settled.

Conversely, Enel's ratings could be downgraded if recent
deleveraging momentum were to be reversed whether because a
significant downturn in the company's operating environment and
performance, or higher than expected debt-funded investment were
to result in a deterioration in the group's financial profile
such that FFO/net debt and RCF/net debt weakened to the mid to
upper-teens and low double digits in percentage terms
respectively.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Unregulated
Utilities and Unregulated Power Companies published in May 2017,
and Government-Related Issuers published in August 2017.

Enel S.p.A. (Enel, the group), is the principal electric utility
in Italy and is owned 23.6% by the Italian State. In 2017 it
generated EBITDA of EUR15.6 billion.


MOBY SPA: Moody's Cuts CFR to Caa1 & Alters Outlook to Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Italian ferry operator
Moby S.p.A.'s corporate family rating (CFR) to Caa1 from B2 and
its probability of default rating (PDR) to Caa1-PD from B2-PD.
The outlook on the ratings has been changed to stable from
negative. Concurrently, Moody's has downgraded the rating
assigned to the EUR300 million worth of senior secured notes to
B3 from B1.

"Our decision to downgrade Moby by two notches reflects continued
erosion of the company's credit metrics, the limited prospects
for a turnaround in performance, and liquidity concerns as the
company faces potentially significant cash outflows over the next
12 to 18 months on the back of an Italian anti-trust fine and an
ongoing investigation by the European Commission," says Guillaume
Leglise, a Moody's Assistant Vice President and lead analyst for
Moby.

RATINGS RATIONALE

CFR DOWNGRADE TO Caa1

The CFR downgrade to Caa1 reflects Moby's increased business risk
resulting from an intense competitive environment and Moody's
view that Moby's liquidity profile is more stretched than it used
to be despite material cash balances. Moby had a large amount of
cash on balance sheet at the end of December 2017, at EUR233
million. However, Moby faces material mandatory debt repayments
under its amortizing bank loan, with a repayment of EUR40 million
already done in February 2018 and EUR50 million due in February
2019.

On top of that, there are material uncertainties related to the
phasing of potential payments to be made under the Italian anti-
trust fine and the ongoing European Commission (EC)
investigation, which could overwhelm its financial resources
though with an undetermined timing. Moody's also notes that
Moby's auditors have issued a going-concern audit opinion based
among others on these significant uncertainties.

The Italian anti-trust regulator determined in March that Moby
had abused its dominant position in shipping goods on three
routes between continental Italy and Sardinia, and subsequently
imposed a fine of EUR29 million. Moby has 90 days to pay the fine
but indicated that it will appeal the decision. An appeal to the
administrative court may result in the suspension of the payment.
If the payment of the EUR29 million fine is upheld on appeal, it
will further constrain the company's liquidity profile.

In addition, the ongoing EC investigation into Tirrenia -- CIN's
subsidies received since 2012 carries significant uncertainties.
The timing and outcome of the EC investigation remains uncertain.
But Moody's cautions that should the EC outcome require a
reduction in the subsidies, Moby could be asked to reimburse the
excess subsidies received in the past, which could weigh on
Moby's liquidity profile, though Moody's would expect this to be
offset by a reduction in the deferred payments.

Moby has a EUR180 million deferred payment still outstanding, in
connection with the acquisition of Tirrenia's assets from the
government in July 2012. The deferred payment is divided into
three instalments: EUR55 million due in April 2016, EUR60 million
due in April 2019 and EUR65 million due in April 2021. However,
the first instalment of EUR55 million which was due in April 2016
has been suspended by Moby pending the outcome of the ongoing EC
investigation. Moody's cautions when the EC investigation will
conclude, this first instalment will become due immediately.
Nevertheless, should the Tirrenia-CIN's annual subsidies be
reduced to less than EUR55 million (vs. EUR72.7 million under the
current agreement), the EUR180 million of deferred payments would
be cancelled.

Under a possible scenario of a payment of the anti-trust fine
combined with a conclusion of the EC investigation, both
occurring within the next 12 months, Moody's believes that Moby's
liquidity could weaken significantly. Also, Moody's notes that
Moby has almost fully drawn on its EUR60 million revolving credit
facility (RCF) at year-end 2017, which leaves limited financial
flexibility to the company.

More positively, Moby has successfully complied with its net
leverage covenant testing at end-December 2017 and has secured an
agreement with its banks to amend the covenant threshold for the
next 2 testing periods (until December 2018). As such the company
has regained an adequate leeway under its net leverage covenant.

Moody's rating action also factors in Moody's expectations that
trading conditions will remain challenging for Moby due to an
intense competitive environment, notably in Sardinia. As such,
Moody's does not expect a material recovery of Moby's earnings
and cash flows in 2018.

Moby reported an EBITDA of EUR135 million in 2017, which includes
a capital gain of EUR21.5 million mostly related to the sale of
two vessels. When excluding this non-recurring item, Moby's
EBITDA fell by 6.9% to EUR113 million. Despite positive growth in
volumes and increased revenues, Moby's earnings were impacted by
increased fuel price, resulting from higher consumption due to
the launch of new routes in 2017, and higher operating expenses
related to the launch of several new initiatives (Corsica, Malta
and cruising in the Baltics) during 2017. Consequently, Moody's
estimates the company's leverage (measured as Moody's-adjusted
gross debt/EBITDA) to stand at around 5.7x at year-end 2017.

While the company expects the new initiatives to break even in
2018-19 (compared to an EBITDA impact of EUR22.6 million in
2017), Moody's estimates that profits on these start-up ventures
will take time to materialize and will not materially support
Moby's overall profitability in the next 12 to 18 months. As
such, Moody's expects Moby's leverage to remain around 5.5x in
the next 12 to 18 months, owing to still challenging trading
conditions.

Lastly, the Caa1 rating reflects Moody's assessment of the
company's financial policy and corporate governance standards.
While Moody's acknowledges that the company has not paid any
dividends to its family owners in the past few years, the rating
agency cautions that some transactions with related parties, in
particular with the chairman of the board in 2016 and 2017 (as
disclosed in the company's audited financial statements), may not
be in the interest of creditors at a time when the company's
financial profile has deteriorated.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects the fact that the company currently
maintains a material cash cushion and that the various risks
facing the company may not have immediate implications on the
credit metrics and liquidity. This is due notably to uncertain
timing and potential appeals, and the fact that a negative
outcome on the EC investigation could be offset by a reduction of
the deferred payments. Positive pressure will remain constrained
by the expectation that Moby's profitability will only gradually
and modestly recover, owing in particular to sustained
competitive pressure. As such, earnings growth prospects, free
cash flow generation and improvement in liquidity appear limited
in the next 12 to 18 months.

The stable outlook also reflects the recent financial covenants
reset, which provides an adequate headroom at this point.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The downgrade of the rating assigned to the EUR300 million senior
secured notes to B3 from B1 reflects the two-notch downgrade of
the CFR. However, the notes are rated one notch above the CFR.
This uplift reflects the significant amount of obligations which
are junior to the senior notes and bank facilities in the capital
structure, notably the EUR180 million deferred payments due by
Tirrenia-CIN. These deferred payments are unsecured obligations
and are subordinated to the issuer's notes and credit facilities
instruments with respect to the collateral enforcement proceeds.
However, Moody's cautions that in case of a very adverse decision
from the EC investigation, the one-notch uplift could be removed
as the unsecured liabilities would disappear from the financing
structure.

The notes rank pari passu with the issuer's EUR150 million worth
of secured term loan due 2021 and the EUR60 million RCF due 2021.
The notes are secured on a first-priority basis by most of the
group's assets (including mortgages over Moby and Tirrenia-CIN's
vessels) and benefit from a guarantor package including upstream
guarantees from Moby and Tirrenia-CIN, representing more than 90%
of the group's EBITDA.

The PDR of Caa1-PD reflects the use of a 50% family recovery
assumption, consistent with a capital structure including a mix
of bond and bank debt.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS DOWN/UP

An upgrade is unlikely at this stage in light of Moody's action.
Over time, upward pressure on the rating could develop if Moby
restores its profitability and materially improves its free cash
flow generation, with leverage remaining sustainably below 6x.
Also, a rating upgrade would require liquidity to strengthen,
supported, for instance, by more ample covenant headroom, and
more visibility over potential future cash outflows in relation
to the Italian antitrust fine and the EC investigation.

Conversely, Moody's could downgrade the ratings if Moby's free
cash flow generation deteriorates as a result of a further drop
in operating performance or higher-than-expected capital
expenditure. In addition, the ratings could be downgraded if
Moby's liquidity were to deteriorate further; for instance (1)
because of very adverse scenario under the appeal of the
antitrust court process or EC investigation, (2) if the company
cannot maintain continuous access to its revolving credit
facility, or (3) its headroom under financial covenants is
weakening.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Shipping
Industry published in December 2017.

Domiciled in Milan, Italy, Moby S.p.A. is a maritime
transportation operators focusing primarily on passengers and
freight transportation services in the Tyrrhenian Sea, mainly
between continental Italy and Sardinia. Through Moby and its main
subsidiary Tirrenia-CIN, the company operates a fleet of 64
ships, of which 47 are ferries and 17 tugboats. In 2017, the
company recorded revenues of EUR586 million and EBITDA of
EUR131.8 million.


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K A Z A K H S T A N
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TSESNABANK: S&P Affirms 'B+/B' ICR, Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+/B' long- and short-term
issuer credit ratings on Kazakhstan-based Tsesnabank. The outlook
is negative. S&P also affirmed its 'kzBBB-' long-term Kazakhstan
national scale rating on the bank.

S&P said, "We also affirmed our 'B+' long-term global scale issue
rating and 'kzBBB-' long-term Kazakhstan national scale issue
rating on the bank's senior unsecured notes.

"The affirmation reflects that we do not believe Tsesnabank's
combined capital and risk profile has materially strengthened,
despite capital ratios improving over 2017. This is because we
see potential risks in the bank's loan portfolio, and its capital
includes a large capital gain, which currently has limited loss-
absorption capacity."

Higher capitalization by year-end 2017 was largely supported by
issuance of Kazakhstani tenge (KZT)100 billion (about $300
million) subordinated debt in the fourth quarter. The
subordinated debt was provided by the National Bank of Kazakhstan
for 15 years to Tsesnabank and four other large Kazakh banks as
part of the program to increase the financial stability of the
Kazakh banking sector. As a result, in 2017 the bank's total
adjusted capital was boosted by a KZT64 billion one-off capital
gain through its profit and loss account. S&P believes that this
capital gain, which accounted for a sizable one-third of the
bank's total adjusted capital at year-end 2017, limits the bank's
potential loss-absorption capacity, given that this capital gain
will be realized over time.

S&P said, "Consequently, our assessment of Tsesnabank's risk-
adjusted capital (RAC) ratio improved to 4.3% by year-end 2017
from 3.9% at year-end 2016. We expect Tsesnabank's RAC ratio to
remain in the 4.0%-4.5% range over 2018-2019, based on our
expectation of moderate loan growth of about 5% per year, no
shareholder capital injections, and low earnings contribution to
the capital base. The forecast RAC ratio in 2018-2019 is also
supported by Tsesnabank's complete disposal of its 28% stake in
Bank CenterCredit in March 2018, which we previously deducted
from its total adjusted capital.

"We expect the contribution of retained earnings to Tsesnabank's
capital to remain limited in our forecast in 2018-2019. We expect
the bank's net interest margin to remain depressed, due to tough
competition in the sector. We also forecast cost of risk at about
2%-3% in the next two years, in line with the system average,
weighing on the bottom line.

"In addition, we consider the composition and parameters of
Tsesnabank's loan portfolio to be in line with the average for
the Kazakh and Russian banking systems and not of lower risk than
other large Kazakh banks." S&P considers Tsesnabank is subject to
the following potential risks:

-- Loans to companies involved in growing and trading
    agricultural products accounting for about one-quarter of
    total loans.

-- High individual loan concentrations as a percentage of total
    capital, although in line with peers'.

-- Long-term maturity of loans: 80% of the bank's total loans
    have remaining maturities of over one year.

-- Foreign currency-denominated loans made up more than 50% of
    total loans as of year-end 2017, which is twice the system
    average, but a significant decrease from 67% two years
    earlier. S&P doesn't believe that all companies with foreign
    currency loans have export revenues and are fully hedged
    against potential tenge depreciation.

-- Reduction in interest income received in cash: In 2017, this
    figure dropped to 68% from 83% in 2016. This implies likely
    deterioration of credit quality of the bank's loans and a
    sizable share of loans with delayed interest payments.

Tsesnabank continues to report one of the lowest levels of non-
performing loans (loans over 90 days overdue) in the Kazakh
banking sector: 5.5% of total loans at year-end 2017, according
to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In
addition, 9% of loans were restructured as of year-end 2017. S&P
considers Tsesnabank's provisions of about 9% of total loans as
of year-end 2017 to be low in the context of the abovementioned
risk elements of its loan portfolio.

The negative outlook on Tsesnabank reflects the pressure we see
on the bank's combined risk position and capitalization over the
next 12 months from a possible need to create material additional
provisions to address potential deterioration of its asset
quality as loans season.

S&P said, "We could take a negative rating action on Tsesnabank
in the next 12 months, if its asset quality materially
deteriorates beyond peer levels necessitating the bank to create
substantial IFRS provisions, thus putting material pressure on
the bank's capitalization and resulting in our forecast RAC ratio
declining below 3%. We would also view negatively a reduction in
its liquidity cushion, which could be caused by resumed growth in
lending (which is targeted by the Kazakh government), that is not
supported by sufficient funding inflows.

"We could revise the outlook to stable in the next 12 months if
we observe strengthening of the bank's loss-absorption capacity,
either through larger capital buffers or increased provisions,
which is not in our base case in the next 12 months. At the same
time, we would need to see a positive trend in profitability and
liquidity."



=================
M A C E D O N I A
=================


SKOPJE: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
On May 11, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-' issuer
credit rating on the Macedonian capital, the Municipality of
Skopje. The outlook is stable.

OUTLOOK

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that Skopje will
maintain a healthy operating performance and sustainable debt
level, with adequate liquidity balances. Furthermore, in our
base-case scenario, we assume stability in the management
practices and team."

Downside Scenario

S&P said, "We could lower our rating on Skopje within the next 12
months if we lowered our long-term rating on Macedonia (BB-
/Stable/B), or if Skopje's liquidity position became structurally
weaker. Rating pressure could also arise from relaxed control of
operating expenditures and increased investments, which in turn
would weaken the city's budgetary performance and push deficits
after capital accounts to more than 5% of revenues."

Upside Scenario

S&P said, "We could raise our rating on Skopje if, in the next 12
months, we raised our rating on Macedonia and, at the same time,
the city markedly exceeded our base-case expectations.
Additionally, any ratings upside would be contingent on the
city's management strengthening its long-term planning and
budgeting."

RATIONALE

The rating on Skopje is constrained by the volatile and
unbalanced institutional framework under which the municipality
operates in Macedonia. Following the resolution of the mandate
issue, and local elections, S&P believes that the political
environment has returned to normality. The rating continues to be
supported by the city's relatively stable debt levels and its
control over operating expenditures, which are likely to be
reflected in a positive operating balances, despite weak revenue
growth. More uncertainties affect future capex, which could
elevate the city's debt. The city's liquidity remained strong in
2017, but, because the size and timing of future sales is hard to
predict, owing to low visibility on unsold office space and
likely sales prices, S&P anticipate a gradual weakening of the
municipality's liquidity over 2018-2020 and lower associated
operating and capital revenues.

The local election produced a new administration, and there has
been a smooth transition

Following the change in the national government in May 2017 and
the approval of a bill extending local governments' mandates
until new elections could be held, a political impasse was
resolved. Local elections were held in October 2017, after a
five-month delay. Petre Shilegov, vice-president of the Social
Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), prevailed with 50.3% of
votes, against the incumbent mayor Koce Trajanovski, member of
the coalition of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organization-Democratic Party, known as VMRO-DPMNE. The majority
party, SDSM, now holds 21 seats in the city assembly, out of 45,
and it has formed a coalition.

As vice-president of SDSM, the new mayor has relatively strong
ties with central government officials, and is actively involved
in enacting the central government's pro-EU agenda. As a matter
of fact, both levels of government have communicated little to no
interest in pursuing many of the projects initiated by the prior
administration under the name of 'Skopje 2014', which were to a
great extend geared at increasing the city's prestige.

S&P said, "Our view of Skopje's limited revenue and expenditure
flexibility is due to the central government's control over
municipalities' finances within the context of the Macedonian
municipal framework. A high proportion of revenues depends on
central government decisions, such as setting the base or range
for most local tax rates, as well as the distribution
coefficients. Furthermore, the predictability of Macedonia's
institutional set-up is affected by the central government's
fiscal policy. We note that there are plans for further fiscal
decentralization, to transfer more responsibility to Macedonian
municipalities for policing, health care, and tax collection."
However, this has not progressed markedly in recent years,
although it remains an agenda item for the current government.
The provision of most services is funded with earmarked transfers
from the central government's budget, and local governments have
very limited autonomy in managing their revenues and
expenditures. In addition, given the city infrastructure gap,
scaling down capex may also be challenging.

The transparency of medium-term plans is weak, in our opinion.
The audits for Skopje's accounts are mandated by an independent
government body reporting to parliament. The volatility of the
real estate market further constrains the predictability of the
municipality's budgetary performance, especially regarding
construction taxes and land sales. Historically, about one-third
of Skopje's revenues is derived, both directly and indirectly,
from real estate-related development.

S&P said, "The city's financial management is a weakness for the
rating, in our view, as the municipality lacks tested medium-term
financial planning for the core budget and its enterprises, and
outcomes on annual budgets very often differ markedly from
planned volumes. Capital revenues are routinely overestimated
while capex turns out well below the budgeted amount. We
understand that, to some extent, this reflects considerations
outside of the Skopje administration's direct control, such as
delays owing to lengthy public procurement procedures, or lower
volumes of real estate sales." Nonetheless, greater budgetary
precision would enhance Skopje's planning capabilities. The city
produces multiyear forecasts, but the track record of their
implementation is limited. The city government has a relatively
tight grip on operating expenditures and is currently closely re-
evaluating its investment program. Moreover, it arranges funding
for capital projects in advance from multilateral financial
institutions directly and via the state treasury.

Skopje has low income and wealth levels in an international
comparison. S&P said, "We project national GDP per capita to
average just US$6,800 over 2018-2020. Nevertheless, we
acknowledge the relative strength of the city's economy within
the country, hosting the manufacturing facilities of export-
oriented foreign companies, as well as national companies that
tend to be headquartered in Skopje. We also expect the local
economy to gradually expand in line with the national economy,
achieving annual GDP growth of about 2.8% over 2018-2020. We
believe that these steady economic developments are likely to
buoy the city's budget performance. We project the operating
surplus will gradually narrow toward 14% of operating revenues by
2020 from exceptional 23.5% in 2017."

Another year of positive financial performance in 2017, but
uncertainty lurks just around the corner Skopje showed another
strong budgetary year in 2017, surpassing our prior expectations
on stronger revenue intake and lower expenditure growth. However,
lower sales of land and a sustained level of capex turned the
balance after capital accounts negative. Moreover, though better
than our initial expectations, tax revenues declined against
2016. This was partially compensated by higher transfers from the
central government. S&P expects revenues to be overall stable,
with the tax revenue trend generally negative over 2018-2020,
reflecting uncertainty and a weak performance of the construction
tax. Other revenues will likely increase at a higher pace,
however, counterbalancing the laxity of tax revenues overall.
Operating expenditures have developed in line with expectations,
while Skopje greatly underspent on goods and services in 2017.
S&P expects 2018 expenditures to increase at a higher pace. On
the other hand, S&P believes investment expenditures will
decrease, partially because of the reversal of some Skopje 2014
projects and the rationalization of investment projects. Capital
revenues should remain volatile and are likely to underperform
the city's budget. Overall, this leads S&P to expect deficits
after capital accounts under our forecast through 2020 at an
average of about 3%.

These deficits are likely to lead to a reduction in Skopje's
accumulated liquidity reserves, as well as some debt funding. The
central government has allowed Macedonian municipalities to take
on debt only in recent years, and borrowing limits are gradually
being relaxed. S&P said, "We forecast that, due to an estimated
net debt repayment in 2018, Skopje's tax-supported debt will
initially decrease somewhat. We expect the city to turn to a
higher level of gross borrowing to fund its deficits and debt
repayments. As a result, we forecast tax-supported debt will
return to over 30% of consolidated operating revenues by year-end
2020 in our base-case scenario."

Skopje's municipal company sector constitutes a credit weakness,
in S&P's view. Several municipal companies have investment needs
and large payables. Additional contingent liabilities may come
from the municipality's plans to foster infrastructure
development through public-private partnerships.

Skopje's debt service coverage ratio is high, with cash holdings-
-adjusted for the deficit after capital accounts--substantially
exceeding 200% of debt service falling due over the coming 12
months. S&P said, "Nonetheless, we believe this ratio is volatile
and inflated by cash accumulated through 2015 sales of office
income and fees from land sales. With lower expected sales of
commercial space and a decline in operating revenues, we
anticipate a gradual reversal of the municipality's strong
liquidity position to adequate levels. We believe that the city
will be able to manage the cash balance at a minimum of
Macedonian denar 200 million (about US$3.9 million)."
Additionally, the city's internal cash flow-generating capability
remains strong, with an operating balance before interest
exceeding annual debt service by 4x. Skopje holds its cash in an
account at the state treasury.

These positive factors are countered by the city's access to
external liquidity, which S&P views as limited, owing to the
relatively immature local banking system and capital markets for
municipal debt.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  RATINGS LIST

                                     Rating
                                To                From
  Skopje (Municipality of)
   Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency    BB-/Stable/--     BB-/Stable/--


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DRYDEN 62: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Dryden 62
Euro CLO 2017 B.V.:

EUR 240,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR 5,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

EUR 37,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2031, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

EUR 27,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

EUR 20,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

EUR 29,000,000 Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

EUR 13,000,000 Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will
endeavour to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if
any) may differ from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the rated notes address the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2031. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, PGIM Limited has
sufficient experience and operational capacity and is capable of
managing this CLO.

Dryden 62 is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior secured
bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured
senior loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and high
yield bonds. The portfolio is expected to be at least 80% ramped
up as of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly of
corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.

PGIM Limited will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four years and a half
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the seven classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR 44.1M of Subordinated Notes which will not
be rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in August 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. PGIM Limited's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modelled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
August 2017. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.

Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Par amount: EUR400,000,000

Diversity Score: 42

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2820

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.4%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 41.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.5 years

Moody's has analysed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries. As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling of A1 or below. For countries which are not member of the
European Union, the foreign currency country risk ceiling applies
at the same levels under this transaction. Following the
effective date, and given the portfolio constraints and the
current sovereign ratings in Europe, such exposure may not exceed
10% of the total portfolio. As a result and in conjunction with
the current foreign government bond ratings of the eligible
countries, as a worst case scenario, a maximum 10% of the pool
would be domiciled in countries with local or foreign currency
country ceiling of Baa1. The remainder of the pool will be
domiciled in countries which currently have a local or foreign
currency country ceiling of A3 or above. Given this portfolio
composition, the model was run with different target par amounts
depending on the target rating of each class as further described
in the methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a function of the
exposure size to peripheral countries and the target ratings of
the rated notes and amount to 1.5% for the Class A notes, 1.0%
for the Class B, 0.75% for the Class C, and 0% for Class D,Class
E and F notes.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the provisional ratings assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Here is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3243 from 2820)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3666 from 2820)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -4

Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3


GREEN STORM 2018: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba1 Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to the
following classes of Notes to be issued by Green STORM 2018 B.V.:

EUR [ ] million Senior Class A Mortgage-Backed Notes due 2065,
Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR [ ] million Mezzanine Class B Mortgage-Backed Notes due 2065,
Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)

EUR [ ] million Mezzanine Class C Mortgage-Backed Notes due 2065,
Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

EUR [ ] million Junior Class D Mortgage-Backed Notes due 2065,
Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

EUR [ ] million Subordinated Class E Notes due 2065, Assigned
(P)Ba1 (sf)

Green STORM 2018-I B.V. is a revolving securitisation of Dutch
prime residential mortgage loans. Obvion N.V. (not rated) is the
originator and servicer of the portfolio. At the provisional pool
cut-off date, the portfolio consists of [1,867] loans with a
total principal balance of EUR[450.5] million (net of savings
policies).

The transaction is aligned with Obvion's mission to increase and
promote energy-efficient residential housing. Obvion employs an
objective methodology and criteria to evaluate and select the
environmentally best 15% of the Dutch residential buildings for
Obvion's Green RMBS, based on accepted energy-labelling standards
for new residential buildings that have been in place in the
Netherlands since 1995.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings on the Notes take into account, among
other factors: (1) the performance of the previous transactions
launched by Obvion N.V.; (2) the credit quality of the underlying
mortgage loan pool; (3) legal considerations; and (4) the initial
credit enhancement provided to the senior Notes by the junior
Notes and the reserve fund.

The expected portfolio loss of [0.70]% and the MILAN CE of [8.2]%
serve as input parameters for Moody's cash flow and tranching
model, which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution.

MILAN CE for this pool is [8.20]%, which is somewhat higher than
preceding revolving STORM transactions and in line with other
prime Dutch RMBS revolving transactions, owing to: (i) the
availability of the NHG-guarantee for [16.21]% of the loan parts
in the pool, which can reduce during the replenishment period to
[14]%, (ii) the replenishment period of 5 years where there is a
risk of deteriorating the pool quality through the addition of
new loans, although this is mitigated by replenishment criteria,
(iii) the Moody's weighted average loan-to-foreclosure-value
(LTFV) of [87.11]%, which is similar to LTFV observed in other
Dutch RMBS transactions, (iv) the proportion of interest-only
loan parts ([46.58]%) and (v) the weighted average seasoning of
[4.91] years. Moody's Notes that the unadjusted current LTFV is
[87.03]%. The difference is due to Moody's treatment of the
property values that use valuations provided for tax purposes
(the so-called WOZ valuation).

The risk of a deteriorating pool quality through the addition of
loans is partly mitigated by the replenishment criteria which
includes, amongst others, that the weighted average CLTMV of all
the mortgage loans, including those to be purchased by the
Issuer, does not exceed [85]% and the minimum weighted average
seasoning is at least [40] months. Further, no new loans can be
added to the pool if there is a PDL outstanding, if loans more
than 3 months in arrears exceeds [1.5]% or the cumulative loss
exceeds [0.4]%.

The key drivers for the portfolio's expected loss of [0.70]%,
which is in line with preceding STORM transactions and with other
prime Dutch RMBS transactions, are: (1) the availability of the
NHG-guarantee for [16.21]% of the loan parts in the pool, which
can reduce during the replenishment period to [14]%; (2) the
performance of the seller's precedent transactions; (3)
benchmarking with comparable transactions in the Dutch RMBS
market; and (4) the current economic conditions in the
Netherlands in combination with historic recovery data of
foreclosures received from the seller.

The transaction benefits from a non-amortising reserve fund,
funded at [1.02]% of the total Class A to D Notes' outstanding
amount at closing, building up to [1.3]% by trapping available
excess spread. The initial total credit enhancement for the Aaa
(sf) provisionally rated Notes is [6.50]%, [5.48]% through note
subordination and the reserve fund amounting to [1.02]%.

The transaction also benefits from an excess margin of [50] bps
provided through the swap agreement. The swap counterparty is
Obvion N.V. and the back-up swap counterparty is COOPERATIEVE
RABOBANK U.A. ("Rabobank"; rated Aa3/P-1). Rabobank is obliged to
assume the obligations of Obvion N.V. under the swap agreement in
case of Obvion N.V.'s default. The transaction also benefits from
an amortising cash advance facility of [2.0]% of the outstanding
principal amount of the Notes (including the Class E Notes) with
a floor of [1.45]% of the outstanding principal amount of the
Notes (including the Class E Notes) as of closing.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2017.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

STRESS SCENARIOS:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: At the time the ratings were
assigned, the model output indicated that Class A Notes would
have achieved Aaa (sf), even if MILAN CE was increased to 11.48%
from 8.20% and the portfolio expected loss was increased to 1.05%
from 0.70% and all other factors remained the same.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Significantly higher losses compared with Moody's expectations at
close due to either a change in economic conditions from its
central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic performance factors
would lead to rating actions.

For instance, should economic conditions be worse than forecast,
the higher defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in a downgrade of the ratings.
Downward pressure on the ratings could also stem from (1)
deterioration in the Notes' available credit enhancement; or (2)
counterparty risk, based on a weakening of a counterparty's
credit profile, particularly Obvion N.V. and Rabobank, which
perform numerous roles in the transaction.

Conversely, the ratings could be upgraded: (1) if economic
conditions are significantly better than forecasted; or (2) upon
deleveraging of the capital structure.

The provisional ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the Notes. In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal with respect to the Notes by the
legal final maturity. Moody's ratings only address the credit
risk associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have
not been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.


===========
P O L A N D
===========


ZABRZE: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDRs at 'BB+', Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Polish City of Zabrze's Long-Term
Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BB+'
and National Long-Term rating at 'BBB+(pol)'. The Outlooks are
Stable.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's view that Zabrze's operating
performance will remain modest. The ratings also incorporate the
city's moderate direct debt and its substantial indirect risk.
The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's view that despite expected
modest operating results in the medium term, direct debt ratios
will remain in line with a 'BB+' rating, even if approaching the
trigger for a lower rating.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fiscal Performance: Neutral/ Stable

Fitch notes that 2018 will be challenging for the city given less
dynamic revenue growth than other Fitch-rated Polish cities,
combined with opex pressure stemming from state-initiated
educational reform, and the increase of service prices due to
increased salaries following the general market trend. Due to
local elections scheduled for 2018 it is unlikely that the city
will make permanent spending cuts or significantly increase local
taxes and fees.

Fitch expects city's 2018 operating results to remain at the 2017
level and then to gradually improve, reflecting stronger tax
revenue amid a growing national economy and broadening of the
city's tax base. In 2017, Zabrze reported a weak operating
performance, with operating margin at 3.3% and the operating
balance covering 50% of debt service. Zabrze's operating
performance was slightly lower than projected by Fitch, mainly
due to some additional one-off operating spending. Operating
expenditure grew by 1.6% above operating revenue growth of 0.8%
(after excluding '500+' transfers).

In 2017, the shrinking current balance led to a deterioration of
the debt payback ratio (debt to current revenue) to 30 years.
Fitch expects that the payback ratio will remain at 2017 level
this year, and that it will improve to below 20 years in the
medium term. From 2019, the city's operating performance could be
supported by additional revenue from property tax following the
completion of several private investments in the city. The city
has also some ability to increase its revenue as local tax rates
are below the maximum legal limit.

Until 2019 the city's capital spending on its shareholdings will
be high, at about PLN50 million annually, reducing Zabrze's capex
financing flexibility for other purposes. Fitch estimates the
city's total capital expenditure will average around PLN140
million annually or 14% of total expenditure. Fitch expects capex
to be at least half funded by capital revenue (mainly by EU
grants) and from new debt.

Debt: Neutral/Stable

Direct debt will gradually grow as a result of financing the
city's investments but will remain below 65% of current revenue
or PLN552 million in 2020 (2017: PLN440 million) Indirect risk
(debt of PSE and guarantees) should gradually decline (2017:
PLN332 million) in line with the city's medium-term goal. Fitch
expects that net overall risk to current revenue to gradually
improve in the medium term to around 90% in 2020 from 107% in
2017.

Management: Neutral/Stable

Zabrze's authorities are following a moderate development
strategy. This balances financing needs for a high standard of
municipal services and investment projects to improve living in
the city against the burden for citizens from the local taxes and
fees it sets. Consequently, Zabrze's local tax and fee rates are
moderate, and the city has non-compulsory spending in its budget.
One of the administration's challenges still remains the football
club, as it needs continuous financial assistance and results in
high indirect risk.

Economy: Neutral/ Stable

Zabrze is a medium-sized city by Polish standards (176,000
inhabitants), located in the Slaskie Region and part of the Upper
Silesian Agglomeration (two million inhabitants). GDP per capita
in 2015 (last available data) for the Gliwicki sub-region, where
Zabrze is located was 120% of the national average but this
probably overestimates Zabrze's performance. The city's
unemployment rate of 6.6% in 2017 was in line with the national
rate. Zabrze's local economy is dominated by industry and
construction (45.8% of the sub-region's GVA in 2015), above 35%
of the average for Poland.

Institutional Framework: Neutral/Stable

Fitch assesses the regulatory regime for Polish LRGs as neutral.
LRGs' activities and financial statements are closely monitored
and reviewed by the central administration. Disclosure in the
LRGs' accounts is more than adequate. The main revenue sources
such as income tax revenue, transfers and subsidies from the
central government are centrally distributed according to a
legally defined formula, which limits the central government's
scope for discretion.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings could be downgraded if net overall risk grows above
130% of current revenue accompanied by weak operating
performance, leading to a debt payback ratio exceeding 20 years.

A sustained improvement in Zabrze's operating performance leading
to a debt payback ratio of below 10 years, coupled with net
overall risk stabilisation below 100% of current revenue would
lead to an upgrade.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


KRASNOYARSK: Fitch Affirms IDRs at 'BB+', Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Krasnoyarsk Region's Long-
Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at
'BB+' with a Stable Outlook and Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR
at 'B'. The region's senior debt long-term rating has been
affirmed at 'BB+'.

The affirmation reflects the improved budgetary performance in
2017 accompanied by expected stabilisation of debt metrics. The
ratings also factor in the strong albeit concentrated local
economy and evolving institutional framework for Russian
subnationals.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fiscal Performance Assessed as Neutral

Fitch expects the region's operating balance to consolidate at
10%-12% of operating revenue over the medium term. This will be
supported by further expansion of the region's strong tax base on
the back of the national economic recovery and continuous cost-
effective management. In 2017 the operating margin improved to
11.5% from 6.9% in 2016 due to increases of both taxes and
current transfers from the federal budget while opex growth was
contained at the inflation level.

According to Fitch's rating case, the region's deficit before
debt will be moderate in the medium term at 2%-3% of total
revenue despite material capex justified by the final stage of
preparation for the Universiade 2019 - an international sport
student event to be held in the region.

The deficit before debt narrowed significantly to 2.1% in 2017
from a high average of 14% in 2013-2016. This was due to a
stronger operating balance and support from the federal
government in the form of capital transfers earmarked for
Universiade preparation.

Debt and Other Long-Term Liabilities Assessed as Neutral
Fitch expects direct risk will remain moderate over the medium
term, within the range of 50%-55% of current revenue. Despite
some growth in absolute terms, direct risk declined relative to
current revenue to 50.5% in 2017 from 53.6% in 2016. The debt
payback improved to 6.3 years in 2017 from 19.5 years in 2016
mostly due to a higher current balance.

Issued debt dominates direct risk, composing 64% of the total. It
is followed by budget loans, which make up 24% of the portfolio,
while the remainder is medium-term bank loans. Like the majority
of Russian regions, Krasnoyarsk participates in the budget loans
restructuring programme initiated by the federal government in
the end-2017. According to the programme, the maturity of RUB23.4
billion budget loans, which were granted to the region in 2015-
2017, were prolonged until 2024 with most of payments to be made
closer to the end of maturity.

Nevertheless, the region remains exposed to refinancing pressure
with around half of its debt due in 2018-2020. Fitch estimated
the weighted average life of debt at 3.9 years in 2017, which is
short compared with international peers. The 2018 maturities
constitute RUB15.5 billion, or 16% of the total debt. Most of the
maturing debt is domestic bonds, and the region plans to
refinance this with a new bond issue.

Economy Assessed as Neutral

The regional economy, which is based on rich natural resources,
is strong in the national context. Its wealth metrics are above
the national median with GRP per capita at 172% of the national
median in 2015. Meanwhile, the region's economy remains
concentrated as the top 10 taxpayers composed around 50% of the
region's tax revenue in 2015-2017. The region's prime industries,
which are are non-ferrous metallurgy, oil and gas mining and
hydro-power generation, follow the business cycles and commodity
price fluctuations, which expose the region's revenue to
volatility. According to preliminary data, GRP grew 3% in 2017
after two years of contraction. The regional government expects
modest growth of GRP at 1%-2% in 2018-2020, which is close to
Fitch's forecast of 2% growth for the national economy in 2018-
2019.

Management and Administration Assessed as Neutral

The management leads a prudent and coherent budgetary policy.
Krasnoyarsk has a three-year budget, i.e. for 2018-2020, which
targets both infrastructure and social development. Among the
most important investment projects is preparation for the
Universiade 2019, but also construction of new schools and three
large healthcare facilities. Debt management is sound, with
domestic bonds dominating the portfolio.

Institutional Framework Assessed as Weakness

The region's credit profile remains constrained by the weak
institutional framework for Russian local and regional
governments (LRGs), which has a shorter record of stable
development than many of its international peers. This leads to
lower predictability of Russian LRGs' budgetary policies, which
are subject to the federal government's continuous reallocation
of revenue and expenditure responsibilities within government
tiers.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

An operating balance above 10% of operating revenue on a
sustained basis accompanied by sound debt metrics, with a direct
risk-to-current balance (2017: 6.3 years) below the weighted
average life of debt (2017: 3.9 years) could lead to an upgrade.

Resumed deterioration of budgetary performance leading to
operating balance insufficient to cover interest expenditure
accompanied by growth of direct risk above 65% of current revenue
could lead to a downgrade.


OTKRITIE: Bailout Costs Expected to Rise Higher Than US$27BB
------------------------------------------------------------
Max Seddon at The Financial Times reports that the man in charge
of resolving Russia's largest ever banking failure has warned
that the costs of saving top-10 lenders Otkritie and B&N may rise
higher than the US$27 billion budgeted.

Otkritie was Russia's largest private sector bank by assets until
last summer, when its balance sheet shrank by a third in a run on
deposits before the central bank stepped in to nationalize it,
the FT notes.  It is to merge with B&N Bank, a top-10 lender that
was nationalized a month later, the FT states.

Mikhail Zadornov, Otkritie's chief executive since January, told
the FT that Russia's central bank may face further costs in
addition to the RUR626 billion (US$10 billion) spent so far on
recapitalizing Otkritie and B&N and the RUR1.1 trillion it is
paying to ringfence their bad assets in a "bad bank".

Mr. Zadornov said Otkritie and B&N had returned most of the
RUR1.1 trillion the central bank lent them to boost liquidity
last year, half of it an emergency RUR500 billion bridge loan,
and were negotiating with their former owners to secure the
surrender of other assets pledged to the bank, the FT relates.

Sergei Khachaturov, a former deputy chief executive of struggling
insurer Rosgosstrakh and owner of its bank, was arrested last
month, the FT recounts.  Mr. Khachaturov, whose older brother
Danil owned Rosgosstrakh until Otkritie took it over last year,
is the first person to be charged over the bank's collapse, the
FT discloses.  He denies any wrongdoing, according to the FT.


VOLZHSKIY: Fitch Upgrades IDRs to 'BB-' Then Withdraws Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the Russian City of Volzhskiy's Long-
Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to
'BB-' from 'B+'. The Outlook is Stable. The agency has also
affirmed the city's Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B'. The
region's senior unsecured debt ratings have been upgraded to 'BB-
' from 'B+'.

At the same time, the agency has withdrawn the city's ratings for
commercial reasons, and will no longer provide ratings or
analytical coverage for the issuer.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of the city's IDRs reflects the following rating
drivers and their relative weights:

HIGH

Budgetary Performance (Neutral/Stable)

The city demonstrated improved operating results in 2016-2017
with an operating margin averaging 6.7% and a surplus before debt
variation for the third consecutive year. This was due to
operating revenue growth driven by personal income tax and
increased property use charges amid strict control of operating
expenditure. Fitch expects Volzhskiy will maintain a close-to-
balance budget in the medium term and an operating margin at
about 5%, which should be sufficient to cover interest
expenditure.

This will support a sustainably positive current margin at 2%-3%,
having been volatile in the past. The ratings remain constrained
by the small size of Volzhskiy's budget, which leads to lower
shock resilience compared with peers. The city's fiscal
flexibility is also limited due to its high dependence on the
decisions of the regional and federal authorities.

MEDIUM

Debt and Liquidity (Neutral/Stable)

The city's direct risk accounted for a moderate 30.5% of current
revenue at end-2017, having demonstrated a continuous decrease
since 2013 when it peaked at 43.7%. Fitch expects the city's
direct risk will remain moderate at below 30% in 2017-2019 due to
management's intention to achieve a balanced budget in the medium
term.

The city is exposed to ongoing refinancing pressure despite its
moderate overall debt burden, given its weak cash position and
short-term repayment profile. The bulk of the city's debt (RUB693
million or 69% of total direct risk at May 1, 2018) is
represented by bank loans due 2018-2019. The remaining debt is
represented by RUB120 million outstanding domestic bonds with
final maturity in 2019, and RUB190.7 million treasury facilities.

The latter is a short-term 90-days loan, provided by federal
treasury at 0.1% annual interest rate. The city uses this funding
to cover intra-year cash mismatches and it has to be redeemed by
year-end, when the city usually attracts revolving credit lines
with commercial banks. This approach allows the city to save on
interest payments, which reduced almost 30% yoy in 2017.

LOW

Economy (Neutral/Stable)

With 325,970 inhabitants, Volzhskiy is the second-largest city in
the Volgograd region after the regional capital, the City of
Volgograd. The socio-economic metrics of Volgograd region are
close to the median for Russian regions, and Fitch assumes
Volzhskiy possesses stronger economic metrics than the regional
ones. The city's economy is dominated by processing industries
(metallurgy, chemical industry) and together with the City of
Volgograd, forms a strong regional industrial agglomeration. The
city's administration expects that major economic sectors
including industrial production, trade and catering will
demonstrate moderate growth at 1%-2% in the medium term, which is
in line with Fitch's expectation for the gradual recovery of
Russia's economy.

Institutional Framework (Weakness/Stable)

The city's credit profile remains constrained by the weak
institutional framework for Russian local and regional
governments (LRGs), which has a shorter record of stable
development than many of its international peers. Weak
institutions lead to lower predictability of Russian LRGs'
budgetary policies, which are subject to the federal government's
continuous reallocation of revenue and expenditure
responsibilities within government tiers.

Management Assessed as Neutral

The city's budgetary policy is dependent on the decisions of the
regional and federal authorities. This leads to a steady flow of
earmarked current transfers received from the regional budget,
which averaged for 48% of operating revenue in 2015-2017. The
city demonstrates prudent debt management aiming at limiting
fiscal deficit and maintenance of moderate debt.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Not applicable.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CARILLION PLC: Used Suppliers to Prop Up Failing Business Model
---------------------------------------------------------------
Gill Plimmer at The Financial Times reports that MPs
investigating the collapse of Carillion revealed new evidence on
May 14 that the outsourcer used suppliers to "prop up its failing
business model" ahead of their final report into the scandal this
week.

The work and pensions committee published a letter from Santander
bank that showed Carillion used small businesses from builders to
school meal providers as a line for credit, the FT relates.

It showed that Santander has written off GBP91 million that
Carillion owed suppliers through a so-called "early payment
facility" operated by the bank, the FT discloses.

Santander, as cited by the FT, said it withdrew the facility in
December, just weeks before the company was forced into
liquidation.

Thousands of other Carillion subcontractors are owed money, with
the full extent of the damage yet to unravel, the FT notes.

The evidence has been provided ahead of the final report on the
company's collapse which is set to be released [today] after
weeks of hearings, the FT states.

Carillion collapsed in January holding just GBP29 million in cash
and at least GBP5 billion of debt, becoming the largest
construction bankruptcy in UK corporate history, leaving
creditors and the group's pensioners facing steep losses and
putting thousands of jobs at risk, the FT recounts.
Carillion had signed up to a "supply chain finance" initiative,
which David Cameron, as prime minister, said would support the
cash flow of small businesses, the FT relays.  The scheme -- also
known as the early repayment facility -- allowed suppliers to be
paid in advance in return for a discount on their bill, according
to the FT.

In reality, Carillon had doubled its payment periods to 120 days
and told suppliers that they could access the money within 30
days but only by paying a fee to the banks providing the finance,
the FT says.  It was effectively able to keep the cash on its
books by holding on to money owed to suppliers, the FT discloses.

In addition, the company classified the debt as money "owed to
creditors" on its balance sheet rather than borrowings, the FT
states.  This meant that it did not negatively affect its debt to
equity ratio and could continue to pay dividends, the FT relays,
citing credit rating agencies Moody's and Standard & Poor's.

Headquartered in Wolverhampton, United Kingdom, Carillion plc --
http://www.carillionplc.com/-- is an integrated support services
company.  The Company operates through four business segments:
Support services, Public Private Partnership projects, Middle
East construction services and Construction services (excluding
the Middle East).


HBOS: Former Chief Executives Tried to Hide Fraudulent Lending
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lucy Burton at The Telegraph reports that a leaked internal
report on the collapse of ailing lender HBOS has alleged two of
the mortgage bank's former chief executives tried to hide details
of fraudulent lending that targeted struggling small businesses.

According to The Telegraph, James Crosby, who ran HBOS until
2006, is among the senior executives accused of trying to cover
up fraud alongside his successor Andy Hornby, the boss at the
time of its collapse and now an executive at gambling operator
GVC Holdings.

Two sources confirmed the contents of the report, which were
first reported by the Mail on Sunday, The Telegraph notes.

The 160-page document was unearthed days after Conservative MP
Kevin Hollinrake told a parliamentary hearing that he had
obtained the dossier, known internally as the Project Turnbull
report, The Telegraph relates.

Referring to the report directly, Mr. Hollinrake, as cited by The
Telegraph, said it contained allegations that senior managers
within the bank had taken "clear, deliberate and documented
action" to conceal fraud just before Lloyds' disastrous takeover
of HBOS in 2008.

Those named in the report for alleged "non-disclosure" include
Mr. Hornby and Mr. Crosby as well as former chairman Sir Dennis
Stevenson, ex-corporate bank boss Peter Cummings and accounting
giant KPMG, The Telegraph discloses.

The review was completed in 2013 by an executive who has now left
the bank, The Telegraph states.

A KPMG spokesman denied the allegations and said they had "no
basis in fact", The Telegraph relays.


THRONES 2015-1: Fitch Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB+sf'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the Thrones 2013-1 Class A notes and the
Thrones 2015-1 Class A, B and C notes; and upgrades the Thrones
2015-1 Class D and E notes as follows:

Thrones 2013-1 plc:

Class A (ISIN XS0957024226) affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable

Thrones 2015-1 plc:

Class A (ISIN XS1270541342): affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable

Class B (ISIN XS1270543397): affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable

Class C (ISIN XS1270545764): affirmed at 'A+sf', Outlook Stable

Class D (ISIN XS1270549675): upgraded from 'BBBsf' to 'A+sf',
Outlook Stable

Class E (ISIN XS1270551226): upgraded from 'BB-sf' to 'BB+sf',
Outlook Positive

Thrones 2013-1 is a securitisation of non-prime UK mortgage
assets originated by Heritable Bank (a subsidiary of the
Icelandic bank Landsbanki) between 2003 and 2008. Landsbanki went
into administration in 2008. In May 2013 the pool of loans was
sold to Cherub Funding Limited, and in July 2013 it was
securitised.

Thrones 2015-1 is a securitisation of non-performing and re-
performing UK mortgage loans originated by multiple non-
conforming UK lenders (13 in total) and subsequently purchased by
Mars Capital.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improved Asset Performance

Thrones 2013-1's arrears have held stable over the last 12
months, remaining low in line with comparable non-conforming
transactions. Despite remaining at higher levels than peer
transactions, Thrones 2015-1's late-stage arrears have been
steadily declining, from 22.9% in February 2017 to 13.6% as of
February 2018. The stable asset performance of Thrones 2013-1 has
led to the affirmation of the single rated tranche Class A, while
the improved performance of the Thrones 2015-1 pool has led to
the affirmation of the Class A, B and C notes and the upgrade of
the most junior tranches.

Credit Enhancement Build-up

Current credit enhancement (CE) for the Thrones 2013-1 Class A
notes has increased from 50.4% to 59.5% of the outstanding
portfolio balance over the last 12 months following the
portfolio's amortisation. The sequential amortisation of the
notes in Thrones 2015-1 has also led to an increase in the CE for
all the notes over the last 12 months. The substantial protection
of the notes provided by CE supports the affirmation of Thrones
2013-1 and of the Thrones 2015-1 Classes A, B and C notes and the
upgrade the Class D and E notes.

Liquidity Support

The Thrones 2015-1 Class C, D and E notes are capped to 'A+sf' as
they do not have enough access to liquidity support to make
timely interest payments; therefore they do not pass the 'AA-sf'
stresses in the Cash Flow Model. The Class E notes upgrade is
also constrained by the volatile asset performance and tail risk
due to interest-only concentration. The Positive Outlook on the
Class E notes indicates that should arrears continue to decline
over the next few months, this note could be upgraded, subject to
the 'A+sf' cap.

Unhedged Interest Rate Risk

The Thrones 2013-1 and 2015-1 pools are composed of respectively
84.7% and 10.7% loans paying standard variable rate (SVR). The
mismatch between the SVR received on the collateral assets and
the three-month Libor payable to the noteholders remains
unhedged. Fitch assumes the long-term SVR to be equal to the
three-month Libor plus a margin of 2%-3% (based on cross-lender
comparison) and applies haircuts to the actual mortgage rates
accordingly. The Thrones 2015-1 pool also includes 15.9% loans
linked to the Bank of England Base Rate (BBR). Fitch applies
haircuts by reducing the revenue generated by the BBR mortgages.

Sub-Prime Pools

Both pools include borrowers that, prior to origination, were
subject to country court judgment (CCJ) and bankruptcy orders. In
line with its criteria, Fitch increased the foreclosure frequency
of these classes of borrowers. Additionally, in Thrones 2015-1
the CCJ history was unknown for 19.9% of the pool. For this
category, the agency assumed the most conservative default
assumptions. Prior arrears information was not provided. The
agency used the data received at transaction closing as a proxy
and increased its foreclosure frequency estimates accordingly.


RATING SENSITIVITIES

With 100% of borrowers on variable-rate mortgages, an increase in
interest rates could lead to performance deterioration of the
underlying assets, given the weaker profile of non-conforming
borrowers in these pools. A material increase in the frequency of
defaults and loss severity on defaulted receivables could produce
loss levels greater than Fitch's base-case expectations, which in
turn could result in negative rating actions on the notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Prior to the transactions' closing, Fitch reviewed the results of
a third-party assessment conducted on the asset portfolio
information and concluded that there were no findings that
affected the rating analysis.

Prior to the transactions' closing, Fitch conducted a review of a
small targeted sample of the originators' origination files and
found the information contained in the reviewed files to be
adequately consistent with the originators' policies and
practices and the other information provided to the agency about
the asset portfolio.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


ZPG PLC: Moody's Reviews Ba3 CFR & Sr. Notes Rating for Downgrade
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed all ratings of ZPG Plc under
review for downgrade, including its Ba3 Corporate Family Rating
(CFR), Ba3-PD Probability of Default Rating (PDR) and Ba3 rating
on ZPG's GBP200 million senior unsecured notes due 2023.

The review follows the announcement on May 11, 2018 that Zephyr
Bidco Limited ("Bidco"), a wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of
funds managed by Silver Lake Management Company V LLC ("Silver
Lake"), intends to acquire ZPG for an equity valuation of GBP2.2
billion on a fully diluted basis (or 43% premium to the volume
weighted average price per ZPG share for the three month period
ended May 10, 2018).

In order for the acquisition to become effective, Silver Lake
will need to obtain approval from at least 75% in value of the
ordinary share capital votes. Currently, Silver Lake has received
irrevocable undertaking to vote in favour of the acquisition from
31.03% of ZPG's ordinary share capital votes (29.87% from DMGZ,
the majority shareholder of ZPG, and 1.16% from ZPG Directors).

A Court Meeting and General Meeting are expected to be held
around June 18, 2018 with the acquisition anticipated to become
effective during the third quarter of 2018 (Long Stop Date set
for October 17, 2018).

Westhorpe, a nominated investment vehicle of GIC, and PSP are
expected to be minority shareholders of Bidco.

RATINGS RATIONALE

As per ZPG's documents published on May 11, 2018, Silver Lake
intends to finance the acquisition via a mix of equity, GBP740
million 7-years TLB and GBP180 million 8-years second lien debt
facilities. The financing will include also a GBP150 million 6.5-
years revolving credit facility.

Moody's notes that Bidco intends to procure that ZPG redeems its
existing 3.75% senior notes due 2023 once the acquisition has
become effective.

If the acquisition is successful and funded as planned, the
company's financial metrics will deteriorate in a way that
Moody's adjusted leverage will significantly increase and that
interest coverage and cash flow will weaken. As such, Moody's
anticipates that this will likely result in a downgrade of ZPG's
ratings by several notches.

ZPG's potential increase in financial leverage has prompted the
review for downgrade, and to resolve the review, Moody's
assessment will include: (i) strategic business plan; (ii)
financial policy; (iii) details on the final financing and new
capital structure.

The review is expected to be concluded at or about the time of
the acquisition, which the company expects to complete during the
third quarter of 2018. If the acquisition does not go ahead, and
assuming no other material events, Moody's expects to confirm the
current ratings.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: ZPG Plc

On Review for Possible Downgrade:

Probability of Default Rating, Placed on Review for Possible
Downgrade, currently Ba3-PD

Corporate Family Rating, Placed on Review for Possible Downgrade,
currently Ba3

BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review
for Possible Downgrade, currently Ba3

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016.

CORPORATE PROFILE

Founded in 2007 and headquartered in London, ZPG Plc operates
some of the most relevant UK home-related digital platforms
including the #2 and #3 UK property portals Zoopla and
PrimeLocation and the price comparison websites for home services
switching (uSwitch) and for financial services products
(Money.co.uk). The company also offers software for estate agents
(PSG) and automated residential property valuation tools
(Hometrack and Calcasa) for estate agents and financial
institutions. For the last twelve months to September 2017, pro-
forma for acquisitions, ZPG reported revenue of GBP284.3 million
and company's adjusted EBITDA - which excludes exceptional
payments and share-based compensations - of GBP113.4 million. The
company generates approximately 52% of revenue from comparison
services (22% from energy vertical, 16% communications, 14%
finance) and 48% from property services (32% marketing division,
8% software, 8% data).



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


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