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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, May 23, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 101


                            Headlines


D E N M A R K

TDC A/S: Moody's Rates New EUR3.9BB TLB Ba3, Outlook Stable
TDC A/S: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to EUR3.9BB Sr. Sec. Term Loan


F R A N C E

EVEREST BIDCO: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable


G R E E C E

ESTIA MORTGAGE I: Fitch Hikes Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'BB-'


I R E L A N D

WINDERMERE XIV: Fitch Cuts 4 Tranches to Dsf, Withdraws Ratings


I T A L Y

TAURUS 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on Class E Notes


L A T V I A

BALTIC DAIRY: Zemgale Court Files Insolvency Application


L U X E M B O U R G

UNIGEL LUXEMBOURG: S&P Rates $200MM Senior Secured Notes 'B+'


N E T H E R L A N D S

BRIGHT BIDCO: Moody's Lowers Corporate Rating to B1
BRIGHT BIDCO: S&P Lowers ICR to 'B' on Planned Dividend Recap
CONTEGO CLO III: Fitch Assigns B-sf Rating to Class F Notes
DELFT 2017: DBRS Hikes Class E Notes Rating to 'BB(sf)'


P O L A N D

KORPORACJA BUDOWLANA: Files for Bankruptcy in Gdansk Court



S L O V E N I A

NOVA LJUBLJANSKA: S&P Raises ICR to BB+, Outlook Developing


S P A I N

FONCAIXA FTGENCAT: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class E Notes at CCsf
GRUPO BANCO: DBRS Hikes Rating on Series B Notes to CCC (sf)


U K R A I N E

KYIV: S&P Affirms 'B-' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ATOTECH UK: S&P Affirms 'B' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA: Reveals Financial Condition After Bankruptcy
CARILLION PLC: Paid GBP8MM to Slaughter and May for Crisis Advice
DURHAM B: S&P Assigns Prelim BB (sf) Rating to Class F-Dfrd Certs
INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB/B' IDRs, Outlook Neg.

SHUROPODY: Plans to Enter Into CVA for Second Time
SMALL BUSINESS 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class D Notes


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D E N M A R K
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TDC A/S: Moody's Rates New EUR3.9BB TLB Ba3, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned Ba3 ratings to the new
EUR3.9 billion Term Loan B (TLB) and revolving credit facility
("RCF") and capex facility totaling EUR500 million, raised by
Danish telecom operator TDC A/S, which is 91% owned by DKT
Holdings ApS (B1, stable). Moody's expect the consortium to
execute its rights to squeeze-out the remaining 9% of TDC's share
capital by June 2018. The outlook on the ratings is stable.

All other ratings of DKT and TDC remain unchanged.

The assignment of ratings to these new credit facilities follows
the announcement of TDC's takeover by DKT and is part of the
exercise aimed at structuring a permanent capital structure for
TDC. The new capital structure will be comprised of c. EUR1.0
billion of existing unsecured notes or EUR1.0 billion of backstop
facility and the EUR3.9 billion TLB, both at TDC level, EUR1.4
billion worth of high yield bonds at the level of an intermediate
holding company named DKT Finance ApS, bank facilities (RCF &
Capex) amounting to EUR600 million and EUR2.7 billion of equity.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba3 rating assigned to the TLB, RCF and capex facilities is
one notch above the B1 corporate family rating of DKT, taking
into consideration the proximity to the company's operating
assets and the benefits of the security package, including
pledges over the shares of GET (TDC's subsidiary in Norway). As a
result, TDC's existing unsecured notes, rated B1, are effectively
subordinated to the new credit facilities. The bonds expected to
be rolled-over do not benefit from the guarantee package of the
TLB and are effectively unguaranteed and unsecured.

The debt at TDC level is structurally senior to the EUR1.4
billion high yield bonds and the EUR100 million RCF at the Holdco
level (DKT Finance ApS).

The B1 CFR assigned to DKT reflects the combination of the
group's strong business profile and expectation of improved
operating performance, offset by the impact on the group's credit
metrics from the substantial debt incurred to finance the buyout.
Moody's expects that the group will continue to be managed with a
somewhat aggressive financial profile under its current ownership
structure with limited expected deleveraging. The group will be
highly leveraged as a result of the debt incurred to finance the
buyout. On a pro-forma basis, Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA in
2017 will be approximately 6.1x on a consolidated level, compared
to 3.5x pre-transaction.

The B1 CFR also reflects (1) the strength of TDC's operations in
Denmark, with strong market shares in mobile, TV, broadband and
fixed voice; (2) TDC's highly advanced fixed and mobile network
infrastructure; (3) TDC's ownership of the majority of the
critical telecom infrastructure in Denmark; (4) Moody's
expectation that EBITDA should stabilise in 2018 due to the
favourable impact of cost savings across the group; (5) Moody's
expectation that cash conversion should improve supported by
lower capex; and (6) its good liquidity.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that TDC's
operating performance will gradually improve through a
combination of an improving pricing environment in mobile, more
focused and agile marketing strategy, efficiency gains and capex
optimisation. The outlook also reflects Moody's expectation that
DKT will execute its strategy, which will enable the company to
stabilise its operating performance in 2018 and deliver growth
from 2019 onwards. It also recognises Moody's expectation that
the group is likely to continue be managed towards a leveraged
financial profile over time.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

DKT's corporate family rating could be upgraded as a result of
improvements in its credit metrics, such as adjusted debt/ EBITDA
improving to below 5.0x on a sustainable basis, and adjusted
retained cash flow/gross debt improving sustainably to a level in
the mid-teens, in an improved business environment.

The ratings could be lowered if: (1) the company was to deviate
from the execution of its new strategy; (2) the company was to
embark on an aggressive expansion/acquisition programme, most
likely outside its existing footprint, leading to higher
financial, business and execution risk; or (3) its credit metrics
were to deteriorate, including adjusted retained cash flow/gross
debt falling to below 8% or adjusted gross debt/EBITDA trending
towards 6.0x on an ongoing basis.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Assignments:

Issuer: TDC A/S

Senior Secured Bank Credit Facilities, Assigned Ba3

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was
Telecommunications Service Providers published in January 2017.

COMPANY PROFILE

DKT Holdings ApS is a holding company of TDC A/S, the principal
provider of fixed-line, mobile, broadband data and cable
television offerings in Denmark. The company also provides
telecom services, including TV, mobile and broadband, to
customers in Norway. In 2017, the company generated revenue and
EBITDA of DKK20.3 billion and DKK8.2 billion, respectively.


TDC A/S: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Rating to EUR3.9BB Sr. Sec. Term Loan
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB-' issue rating to the EUR3.9
billion senior secured term loan to be issued by Danish telecom
operator TDC A/S (B+/Stable/B). The recovery rating is '2',
reflecting our expectation of about 70% recovery in the event of
payment default. The total amount will likely be split into a
euro tranche and a U.S. dollar tranche, the relative sizing of
which will be determined during syndication. S&P's 'B+' issue
ratings and '3' recovery ratings on TDC's existing senior
unsecured notes are unchanged.

KEY ANALYTICAL FACTORS

-- The issue rating on the proposed senior secured term loan is
    'BB-', with a recovery rating of '2'. Recovery prospects
    reflect the secured nature of the loan, but are constrained
    by the weak security package and overall debt quantum at TDC.

-- The term loan's security package consists of pledges over
    shares held in TDC by its direct parent, DK Telekommunikation
    ApS, share pledges over TDC's Norwegian subsidiary Get, and
    bank accounts and intra-group receivables of all three
    entities.

-- S&P said, "In our view, however, the senior secured nature of
    the term loan and the pledge of shares in TDC offer creditors
    almost no advantage over unsecured noteholders with respect
    to their ability to extract value from operating assets at
    TDC. This is because the senior secured term loan and the
    unsecured notes will not be part of the same intercreditor
    agreement. Therefore, we assume that term loan lenders will
    not be able to enforce a priority claim over unsecured
    creditors in a default scenario. At the same time, we
    estimate that the residual value for equity holders at TDC
    will be zero and the share pledges over TDC will not produce
    additional recovery value. In contrast, we assume that the
    share pledge over Get, an almost debt-free asset that
    unsecured noteholders hold no claims against, will result in
    additional recovery for term loan lenders. We assume that TDC
    will retain ownership of Get and therefore include this asset
    as part of the group in our hypothetical default scenario."

-- S&P said, "Consequently, for purposes of our recovery
    modelling, we treat the senior secured term loan and the EUR1
    billion unsecured notes that we expect will remain
    outstanding, as having the same ranking with respect to TDC's
    assets, which encompass the group's Danish operations.
    However, we treat the senior secured term loan as having a
    priority claim to Get's assets. In our recovery, we therefore
    attribute a certain percentage of our consolidated enterprise
    value at default to Get, and allocate this value exclusively
    to secured term loan lenders. We nevertheless assume equal
    ranking for the remaining value from TDC excluding Get."

-- S&P said, "We view the documentation of the proposed EUR3.9
    billion term loan as issuer-friendly. The only maintenance
    covenant is a 7.3x springing net leverage covenant on the
    EUR500 million revolving facilities, which applies if the
    revolving credit facility included in these facilities is at
    least 40% drawn. Debt incurrence is subject to a general
    basket of EUR675 million over the life of the facility, and
    is permitted with unlimited amounts if net leverage in TDC's
    consolidation perimeter is below 4.25x. Distributions are
    subject to a 4.25x net leverage test and a general basket
    totaling EUR565 million over the life of the facilities.

-- The issue rating on the senior unsecured notes is 'B+', with
    a recovery rating of '3'. Recovery prospects reflect that the
    notes are structurally closer to the group's operating assets
    than the EUR1.4 billion in new debt to be issued at DKT
    Finance ApS, but are constrained by the unsecured nature of
    the debt, the overall debt quantum at TDC, and the junior
    nature of the claim to the value of Get relative to the
    senior secured term loan.

-- S&P said, "In our simulated default scenario, we assume that
    tough competition from other telecom operators in the
    broadband and mobile segments, paired with loss of TV
    customers to over-the-top services, would result in
    substantial pressure on EBITDA. Together with continued high
    capex, this would lead to a hypothetical payment default in
    2022."

-- S&P said, "We value DKT Holdings Aps, the ultimate parent of
    the group including TDC, as a going-concern because of its
    incumbent network operator position with ownership of the
    leading mobile, fixed broadband and cable TV networks in
    Denmark, and its established market position across all
    subsegments of telecom services."

SIMPLIFIED DEFAULT ASSUMPTIONS

-- Year of default: 2022

-- Minimum capex (share of sales): 6% (9%-10% including the
    operational adjustment, based on S&P views of minimum capex
    requirements for cable and telecom operators).

-- No cyclicality adjustment, in line with our standard
    assumption for the telecom and cable industry.

-- Operational adjustment: +15% (to reflect minimum capex higher
    than 6% of sales).

-- EBITDA at emergence: Danish krone (DKK) 4.9 billion (about
    EUR665 million)

-- Enterprise value multiple: 6.0x Jurisdiction: Denmark

SIMPLIFIED WATERFALL

-- Gross enterprise value (EV) at default: DKK29.6 billion

-- Net EV after administrative costs (5%): DKK28.2 billion
   (about EUR3.8 billion)

-- Priority claims: nil

-- Estimated senior secured debt claims at TDC: DKK33.2 billion
    (about EUR4.5 billion) [1][2]

-- Value available for secured claims: DKK24.0 billion (about
    EUR3.2 billion)

-- Recovery prospects: 70%-90% (rounded estimate 70%)

-- Recovery rating: 2

-- Estimated senior unsecured debt claims at TDC: DKK7.6 billion
    (about EUR1.0 billion) [1]

-- Value available for unsecured claims: DKK4.2 billion (about
    EUR560 million)

-- Recovery prospects: 50%-70% (rounded estimate 55%)

-- Recovery rating: 3

[1] All debt amounts include six months of prepetition interest.
[2] Revolving facilities assumed to be 85% drawn at default.


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F R A N C E
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EVEREST BIDCO: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has assigned its preliminary 'B'
long-term issuer credit rating to Everest Bidco SAS, parent of
Exclusive Group (EG), France-based distributor of cybersecurity
solutions. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "In addition, we assigned our preliminary 'B' issue
rating to Everest Bidco SAS' proposed EUR500 million first-lien
term loan. The recovery rating is '3', indicating our expectation
of meaningful recovery (rounded estimate: 65%) in the event of a
payment default.

"The final ratings will depend on our receipt and satisfactory
review of all final transaction documentation, including debt and
equity instruments. Accordingly, the preliminary rating should
not be construed as evidence of the final rating. If the terms
and conditions of the final transaction depart from the material
we have already reviewed, or if the transaction does not close
within what we consider to be a reasonable time frame, we reserve
the right to withdraw or revise our ratings.

"The rating reflects our expectation that the company will
maintain high leverage under the control of its new financial
sponsor owner, Permira. The rating is also constrained by EG's
relatively limited scale and narrow product portfolio compared
with those of larger rated peers, and by its dependence on a few
vendors. A further constraint is EG's structurally low EBITDA
margin, which is inherent to the distribution business, albeit
higher than the average for larger competitors.

"Theses weaknesses are mitigated by supportive industry
fundamentals, EG's good track record, and our expectation of
positive, although modest, free cash flow generation of EUR30
million-EUR35 million over 2018-2020, thanks to low capex and
limited working capital requirements. We forecast that positive
revenue and EBITDA growth will lead to adjusted gross debt to
EBITDA gradually declining to about 5.2x in 2020 from 6.2x in
2018."

EG was established in 2003 and has expanded very quickly both
organically and externally. EG offers a full range of value-added
cybersecurity solutions and services sourced mainly from U.S.
vendors seeking distribution partners outside their home market
in Europe and Asia-Pacific. EG benefits from a network of
resellers, expertise in sourcing and selecting disruptive
cybersecurity vendors, a go-to market strategy, supply chain
management, training, technical support, and maintenance
services. Generalist peers typically lack this expertise.

In S&P's view, EG's business risk profile is constrained by its:

-- Niche position in a fragmented and highly competitive
    enterprise IT security and datacenter market;

-- Subsequent narrower revenue base than peers';

-- Strong reliance on a few vendors and therefore lack of
    product diversity;

-- Concentration in Europe (particularly in the U.K., France,
    Germany, and the Netherlands); and

-- Modest pricing power.

S&P said, "Our view of financial risk reflects EG's high leverage
and private equity ownership. Gross debt pro forma the proposed
issuance amounts to EUR650 million. We add to EG's reported debt
about EUR46 million of operating leases. Given that the group is
controlled by a financial sponsor, we use its gross debt in
calculating its credit metrics.

"We determine the group credit profile at the level of Everest
Bidco's parent company, AlexanderTopco (Lux). However, we base
the analysis on the consolidated financial statements at the
Everest Bidco level, which we understand are representative of
the entire group, since there are no assets other than the stake
at Everest Bidco or liabilities at AlexanderTopco.

"We assess the group's liquidity as adequate, since we anticipate
in our base case that its sources of liquidity will cover its
uses by more than 1.4x for the next 12 months. However, we do not
view EG as having a generally high standing in credit markets at
this stage, or, in particular, the ability to absorb high-impact,
low-probability events without refinancing.

"The stable outlook reflects our anticipation that EG will
leverage on its positions in the expanding cybersecurity industry
and consistently generate EBITDA growth and positive FOCF. We
anticipate that its adjusted debt to EBITDA will remain between
5.5x and 6.5x and FOCF to debt above 3% in 2018-2019.

"We could lower the rating if declining EBITDA margins prevented
EG from gradually improving its credit metrics or if FOCF to debt
declined below 3%. In our view, operating underperformance,
increasing competition within existing geographies, or loss of
key vendors, could lead to lost contracts and weakening of EG's
EBITDA base."

Ratings upside is remote, given the company's private-equity
ownership. S&P could raise the rating if pro rata adjusted
leverage falls below 4.5x and pro rata FOCF to debt well exceeds
7%, and it is confident those levels would be sustained.


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ESTIA MORTGAGE I: Fitch Hikes Rating on 2 Note Classes to 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded nine tranches of four Greek RMBS
transactions originated by Piraeus Bank S.A. (Piraeus, RD/RD/ccc)
and Consignment Deposit & Loans Fund (CDLF) and removed them from
Rating Watch Positive (RWP) as follows:

Estia Mortgage Finance Plc (Estia I)
Class A (XS0220978737): upgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'Bsf'; off RWP;
Outlook Positive
Class B (XS0220978901): upgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'Bsf'; off RWP;
Outlook Positive

Estia Mortgage Finance II Plc (Estia II):
Class A (XS0311458052): upgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'Bsf'; off RWP;
Outlook Positive

Grifonas Finance No. 1 Plc (Grifonas)
Class A (XS0262719320): upgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'Bsf'; off RWP;
Outlook Positive
Class B (XS0262719759): upgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'Bsf'; off RWP;
Outlook Positive
Class C (XS0262720252): upgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'Bsf'; off RWP;
Outlook Positive

Kion Mortgage Finance Plc (Kion)
Class A (XS0275896933): upgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'Bsf'; off RWP;
Outlook Positive
Class B (XS0275897311): upgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'Bsf'; off RWP;
Outlook Positive
Class C (XS0275897741): upgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'Bsf'; off RWP;
Outlook Positive

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sovereign Upgrade

The upgrades follow the upgrade of Greece's Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'B'. Greek securitisations can now achieve a maximum
rating of 'BB-sf'. Consequently, the class A notes of all four
transactions and the class B and C notes of Grifonas and Kion are
capped at 'BB-sf'. The Positive Outlook on these notes is aligned
with that on the sovereign rating.

Sufficient Credit Protection

Fitch views the available credit enhancement across the tranches
as sufficient to withstand the associated rating stresses, which
is reflected in the upgrades.

Updated Greek RMBS Asset Assumptions

The rating actions reflect the application of Fitch's updated
RMBS asset assumptions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Further changes to the Greece's IDR, and the rating cap for Greek
structured finance transactions, currently 'BB-sf', could trigger
rating changes on the notes rated at this level.

Asset deterioration beyond Fitch's expectations could lead to
negative rating action.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


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WINDERMERE XIV: Fitch Cuts 4 Tranches to Dsf, Withdraws Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded four tranches of Windermere XIV CMBS
and affirmed one other. The ratings have simultaneously been
withdrawn due to default of all tranches.

EUR74 million class B (XS0330752782) downgraded to 'Dsf' from
'Csf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) 100%; withdrawn

EUR63.4 million class C (XS0330752949) downgraded to 'Dsf' from
'Csf'; RE revised to 70% from 90%; withdrawn

EUR26.8 million class D (XS0330753244) downgraded to 'Dsf' from
'Csf'; RE0%; withdrawn

EUR35.6 million class E (XS0330753590) downgraded to 'Dsf' from
'Csf'; RE0%; withdrawn

EUR1.6 million class F (XS0330753673) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%;
withdrawn

Windermere XIV is a securitisation of one commercial mortgage
loan (down from eight loans at closing in November 2007)
originated by subsidiaries of Lehman Brothers Inc. Fitch will no
longer provide coverage or ratings of the transaction.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade reflects the occurrence of two independent events
of default on the notes. Failure to redeem all outstanding
amounts by bond maturity on April 23, 2018 coincided with non-
payment of interest on the most senior tranche and all
subordinated tranches. The former resulted from absence of
collateral sales for the last remaining loan, EUR201.5 million
Fortezza II. The latter was caused by a combination of margin
compression, transaction costs and exhaustion of the liquidity
facility.

In January 2018, the special servicer stated that a borrower-led
attempt to sell the 11 remaining Italian office properties
resulted in lower-than-expected bids (based on a valuation of
EUR152.9 million dated 2015). Both parties are in discussions
about the next steps. BNP Paribas is acting as sales agent and
the appointment of an Italian based real-estate workout and
recovery specialist is being considered.

Fitch assumes that the assets will be disposed of within two
years, during which time limited credit is given to the ongoing
low interest rates in the form of cash sweep amortisation. The
majority of the underlying leases (74% by rent) are to Italian
government entities. Given the short remaining lease term
(weighted averaging 1.44 years from January 2018), extending the
government leases would help maximise recoveries (whether by cash
sweep or disposals). The downward revision of Fitch's Recovery
Estimate on the class C notes reflects greater uncertainty
regarding the timing and manner of loan resolution.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Not applicable.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


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TAURUS 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized its provisional ratings on the
following classes of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate
Notes Due May 2030 (collectively, the Notes) issued by Taurus
2018-1 IT S.R.L. (the Issuer):

-- Class A Notes rated AA (low) (sf)
-- Class B Notes rated A (sf)
-- Class C Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- Class D Notes rated BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E Notes rated BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Taurus 2018-1 IT S.r.l. is a securitization of three Italian
senior commercial real estate loans: the Camelot loan, the Bel
Air loan and the Logo loan. The Camelot and Bel Air loans were
advanced by Bank of America Merrill Lynch International Limited
(BAML), Milan Branch, and the Logo loan was advanced by Bank of
America Merrill Lynch International (BAML). The loans were sold
to the Issuer at issuance. The loans were granted as acquisition
financing to the newly established Camelot Fund and Bel Air Fund
(the Camelot and Bel Air borrower) and as refinancing facility to
Milano Mega S.r.l. (the Logo borrower).

The Camelot and Logo loans are backed by Italian logistic assets
and the Bel Air loan is backed by Italian retail properties. The
logistic assets are sponsored by the Blackstone Group L.P.
(Blackstone) and managed by Logicor, while the retail assets are
sponsored by the Partners Group L.P., which bought the properties
from Blackstone in January 2018. They are managed by Kryalos
Asset Management (together with Kryalos SGR S.p.A., Kryalos).

At the time of the provisional ratings the anticipated issuance
amount was EUR 300 million, or 83.4% of the aggregated loan
amount, which is EUR 359.6 million. However, BAML has since
increased the securitization portion to EUR 341,654,000, or 95.0%
of the aggregated loan amount. As all classes of notes were
increased proportionally.

The Camelot loan is the largest of the three senior loans, having
an initial EUR 215 million loan balance, of which EUR 5.256
million was set aside for the acquisition of the Massalengo I
extension project scheduled to be completed by the end of 2018.
The extension project funds will not be released by the facility
agent until then. Although the extension project is expected to
add EUR 8.15 million in value to the Camelot portfolio, DBRS does
not give credit to any property under construction. The resulting
loan-to-value (LTV) for the Camelot loan is 70.9% based on the
released loan amount or 72.7% based on the whole-loan amount. The
Bel Air loan has a EUR 110 million loan balance and the lowest
LTV of 51.0%. The Logo loan is the smallest loan in the
portfolio, with a EUR 34.6 million loan balance and a moderate
61.7% LTV as at the cut-off date. Overall, the transaction had a
day-one reported LTV of 62.4% when excluding the undrawn
acquisition debt for the Massalengo I extension or 63.4% when
including all loan amounts. The market value (MV) of the whole
transaction was estimated to be EUR 567.6 million when excluding
the Massalengo I extension or EUR 578.8 million when including
the development project.

The logistic assets securing the Camelot and Logo loans are
located in key logistics and commercial centers of Northern
Italy. More specifically, EUR 179.5 million MV is concentrated in
Milan while EUR 70.4 million MV is in Verona; these two locations
make up 71.0% of the total logistics MV exposure. The retail
assets securing the Bel Air loan, however, are more concentrated
in the center and south of Italy with Sicily, Puglia and Lazio
provinces contributing 80.0% of the MV. In terms of net rental
income (NRI), the logistics properties contribute 64.3% while the
retail assets make up the remaining 35.8%. Based on a NRI of EUR
37.1 million, reported as of 31 December 2017, the overall debt
yield (DY) of the transaction was 10.3% or 10.5% based on a
netted loan amounts of EUR 354.3 million.

Each loan bears interest at a floating rate equal to three-month
Euribor (subject to zero floor) plus a margin set at 3.15% for
the Camelot loan, 2.5% for the Bel Air loan and 2.75% for the
Logo loan. The expected maturity dates for the Camelot and Logo
loans are 15 February 2020 and 15 May 2020, respectively, with
three one-year extension options subject to certain conditions.
The Bel Air loan is expected to repay by 15 May 2021; however,
the borrower can also extend the loan on two occasions; each
extension would last one year, subject to satisfaction of the
extension conditions. There is a tail period of seven years
starting from 2023, which is the expiration year of all the
extension options.

A prepayment fee is payable by the borrowers in case of early
repayment. For the Camelot and the Logo loan, the prepayment fee
is equal to one-year make-whole interest, unless the prepayment
is resulting from permitted property disposal of no less than 15%
of the loan amount at cut-off. With regards to the Bel Air loan,
a two-year interest make-whole prepayment fee will apply unless
the total prepaid amount is less than EUR 35 million.

Similar to other Blackstone sponsored loans, there are no default
covenants for the Camelot and the Logo loan, but only cash trap
covenants based on LTV and DY tested every interest payment date.
The Camelot loan has a fixed-LTV cash trap covenant at 80% and
increasing DY covenant. The Logo loan has one LTV cash trap
covenant set at 72% and DY covenant set at 9%. It should be noted
that both Camelot loan and the Logo loan have a higher DY
covenant post permitted change of control or permitted structural
change. The Bel Air loan has a default covenant of 70% LTV and 9%
DY in before year three and 10% DY after. This loan also has
tightening-LTV cash trap covenants set at 65% for the first three
years and 60% during the loan extension period; the same applies
to the loan's DY covenant, increasing from 10% during the initial
loan term to 11% should the loan be extended.

All three loans are interest-only loans and any prepayment or
repayment proceeds will form a part of principal receipts. The
principal receipts from property disposals will always be
allocated sequentially to the Notes. Other principal receipts
coming from the Bel Air and/or Logo loans will be distributed to
the note holders sequentially. Whereas such principal receipt
from the Camelot loan will be distributed 90% pro rata and 10%
reverse sequential unless the Camelot loan is the only
outstanding loan, in which case the principal receipts will be
paid pro rata.

The transaction includes a mechanism to divert excess spread to
revenue receipts, being the Class X interest diversion. During
the life of the transaction, should the Camelot and Logo loans'
LTVs increase to more than 85% and 77% respectively, or should
the DY decrease to less than 8.25% and 9% respectively, a class X
interest diversion trigger event will happen. While the class X
interest diversion trigger event is continuing, the class X note
holders will not receive any interest payments, and excess spread
would be held by the Issuer or be diverted to form part of the
revenue receipts if a loan failure event is continuing or the
notes were enforced..

The class D and E notes are subjected to an available funds cap
where the shortfall is attributable to an increase in the
weighted-average margin of the notes.

The transaction benefits from a liquidity facility, which amounts
to EUR 17 million and is provided by Bank of America N.A., London
Branch (the Liquidity Facility Provider). The liquidity facility
can be used to cover interest shortfalls on the class A and class
B notes, or the most senior class of notes other than classes A
and B. According to DBRS's analysis, the commitment amount, as at
closing, will be equivalent to approximately 22 months of
coverage on the covered notes.

To maintain compliance with applicable regulatory requirements,
Bank of America Merrill Lynch International Ltd. Milan Branch and
Bank of America Merrill Lynch International Ltd. each retained an
ongoing material economic interest of not less than 5% of the
relevant loan that they have advanced.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


===========
L A T V I A
===========


BALTIC DAIRY: Zemgale Court Files Insolvency Application
--------------------------------------------------------
On May 9, 2018, the Zemgale District Court in Bauska has filed an
application for insolvency of Z/S "Jumis" to SIA Baltic Dairy
Board.

SIA Baltic Dairy Board (hereinafter - the Company) confirms the
existence of the debt, however, due to the restructuring of the
Company's production, as by 2018 the Company concentrates its
activities/production on the biotechnology product, i.e. the
production of a variety of GOS (galacto-oligosaccharides) in the
form of syrup and powder, there is currently a limited ability to
pay to creditors.

The regulatory framework of the Latvian legislation envisages
legal instruments for the restoration of the solvency of
financially distressed entities, and the Board of the Company is
currently actively working on the implementation of a set of
legal measures, including economic, organizational and
technological measures aimed at restoring the Company's ability
to meet its obligations in full.

In addition, the Board of the Company informs that the
implementation of the legal protection process is also
contemplated in the event that the measures implemented will not
provide the expected results for the restoration of solvency and
the Board will decide on the need for long-term measures to
stabilize the financial situation by comparing the interests of
the Company and creditors and applying the legal protection
procedures specified in the Insolvency Law.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


UNIGEL LUXEMBOURG: S&P Rates $200MM Senior Secured Notes 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its long-term 'B+' global scale
corporate credit rating and 'brA-' national scale rating to
Unigel Participacoes S.A. (Unigel). The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we assigned our 'B+' issue-level
rating on Unigel Luxembourg S.A.'s $200 million senior secured
notes maturing in 2024, which are fully and unconditionally
guaranteed by Unigel and the subsidiary guarantors (Acrilonitrila
do Nordeste S.A., Companhia Brasileira de Estireno, Proquigel
Qu°mica S.A., and Plastigas de Mexico S.A.). The '3' recovery
rating on the notes indicates our expectation of meaningful
recovery (rounded estimate: 65%) in the event of default.

"The ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings we assigned
on March 5, 2018. Instead of the expected seven-year $400 million
senior unsecured debt, the company issued five-year $200 million
secured notes. Other differences from the previous expected
scenario are a slightly more expensive all-in cost (including
hedging) and inclusion of certain restrictions on dividend
payments. Although from a liquidity perspective, this change
doesn't affect the final rating, we believe the company's
financial flexibility has weakened somewhat compared to the
original expected issuance, given that almost all of the
company's assets are pledged to the current debt. Please refer to
the liquidity section for further details.

"Our ratings on Unigel reflect the company's overall limited
scale in the commoditized styrenics and acrylics markets, even
though its leading position in Latin America partially offsets
its small size. Unigel produces methyl methacrylate (MMA) and
acrylonitrile in two units in the Bahia state, polystyrene in the
Sao Paulo state, and cell cast acrylic sheets in Mexico--
generating EBITDA of about R$365 million in 2017. The ratings
also incorporate our expectation that Unigel will continue to
keep its leverage at more sustainable levels, especially after
selling its non-core packaging business in 2016, coupled with
reduced liquidity pressures and expected improved cash flow
generation through the successful placement of its proposed
bonds."


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


BRIGHT BIDCO: Moody's Lowers Corporate Rating to B1
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the corporate rating of
Bright Bidco B.V. (BBBV) to B1 from Ba3 and the probability of
default rating to B1-PD from Ba3-PD. Moody's also downgraded to
B1 from Ba3 the senior secured term loan B (TLB) and the $200
million senior secured revolving credit facility, both with BBBV
as the borrower. BBVA will raise an additional $300 million of
TLB debt that will also be rated B1. The outlook on ratings is
stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADE TO B1

Moody's downgraded the ratings to B1 following the company's
decision to raise $300 million of additional debt in order to
fund a $150 million dividend to shareholders and to retain around
$140 million for acquisitions. The additional debt leaves BBBV's
financial profile weaker since funds of Apollo became majority
owners of BBBV in July 2017. Moody's estimates that debt/EBITDA
will reach around 5.2x in 2018 pro-forma the dividend payout and
that depending on the type of acquisition the company will carry
out that leverage over the course of 2019 will not meaningfully
be below 4.5x. The rating agency assumes that BBBV will use the
cash earmarked for acquisitions either to buy technology or
intellectual property with no or little revenue, profit or cash
flow contribution or to spend it on a target where BBBV has
product or geographic gaps in its existing footprint.

The downgrade also reflects the relative aggressive stance of
shareholders. This is the third time in less one year that
shareholders pay out a dividend. Aggregate dividend payments will
amount to around $523 million paid since July 2017. Whereas the
first two dividend payments were within leverage perimeters
Moody's had initially expected the additional debt raised to fund
the proposed $150 million and a future, not yet announced
acquisition of roughly the same magnitude leaves leverage in 2018
and 2019 at too elevated levels above 4.5x.

The company's solid operating performance balances the weakening
capital structure. BBBV has improved its operating profitability
across a variety of end markets. The company has in Q1 2018
turned around the moderate decline in revenues in 2017 (which was
partially the result of product selectivity in General
Illumination) and has been able to expand its group EBITDA
margin. BBBV's Automotive business, by far the most important
division with about 61% revenue contribution, grew in LED and
Accessories, whilst it shrank, as expected due to the transition
to LED, in the conventional Lamps business. The future
profitability trajectory will be driven by a change of product
mix (largely the shift from conventional to LED solutions) and by
ongoing and future cost savings measures. Management has
identified other initiatives in addition to those already
commenced that it expects will yield in up to $95 million in cost
savings.

The liquidity remains strong and is bolstered by an undrawn $200
million revolving credit facility.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The outlook is stable and factors in additional future dividend
payments from excess cash. The stable outlook assumes a
continuation of the structural shift from conventional to LED
automotive lighting applications, ongoing restructuring of BBBV's
operational footprint and cost savings measures and acquisitions
with a volume of up to $140 million with moderate revenue,
profitability and cash flow contributions at best. The stable
outlook further assumes leverage between 4.5x and 5.5x and EBITA
margins at the upper end of the 10-15% corridor.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP / DOWN

Moody's could change the rating up if (1) Debt/EBITDA moves below
4.5x; (2) EBITA margins were above 15%; and (3) RCF/Net debt
above 15%.

Moody's could change the rating down if (1) Debt/EBITDA were
above 5.5x; (2) EBITA margins below 10%; and (3) RCF/Net debt
below 10%.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Manufacturing Companies published in June 2017.

Bright Bidco B.V. (BBBV) is the parent company of Lumileds
Holding B.V., a manufacturer of LED components and automotive
lighting activities that Royal Philips N.V. (Baa1 stable) wholly
owned until June 2017, when it sold an 80.1% stake to funds owned
by Apollo Global Management. Lumileds in 2017 had EUR1.95 billion
in revenue.


BRIGHT BIDCO: S&P Lowers ICR to 'B' on Planned Dividend Recap
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered to 'B' from 'B+' its long-term issuer
credit rating on Bright Bidco B.V., the holding company of the
Netherlands-based lighting manufacturer Lumileds. The outlook is
stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we lowered our issue rating on the
$1,383 million first-lien term loan B (TLB) and Bright Bidco's
$200 million revolving credit facility (RCF) to 'B'. The recovery
rating is '3', indicating our expectation of 50%-70% recovery
prospects (rounded estimate: 55%) in the event of a payment
default.

"We expect Bright Bidco's debt to increase following the new
dividend recapitalization of $150 million, after the $240 million
raised in 2017. This limits scope for deleveraging and a stronger
credit profile. The additional term loan drawings of $300 million
will have the same terms and conditions as the existing TLB.

"We forecast leverage metrics to be 7x-6x for debt to EBITDA and
11%-12% FFO to debt during 2018 and 2019. This is compared to
5.0x and 14% respectively as of Dec. 31, 2017.

"We see a continued risk that the company will pay further
dividends, funded by additional debt, as happened in both 2017
and 2018, as well as spending on bolt-on acquisitions.
Nevertheless, we expect the company to maintain a steady
operating performance, with growth in the auto LED segment being
offset by lower demand for conventional products. We expect
healthy, above average EBITDA margins to continue, as well as
positive free operating cash flow (FOCF), despite continued
research and development (R&D) spending and capital expenditure
(capex)." In S&P's base case, it assumes:

-- A continued supportive macroeconomic environment, with real
    global GDP growth of around 4% yearly in 2018 and 2019, and
    from increasing global car production of about 2% yearly.

-- Stable revenues, as S&P expects sales of conventional
    lighting products to slowly decline reflecting the transition
    in the lighting sector toward LED lighting products, which
    offer more growth potential.

-- An adjusted EBITDA margin of around 15%-17%.

-- Capex of about $150 million-$200 million yearly.

-- S&P assumes small bolt-on acquisitions, funded by up to $150
    million of drawings under the term loan, to enhance in-house
    technological capabilities and product development ramp up.

-- No additional dividends.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

-- FFO to debt of 11%-12%; and

-- Debt to EBITDA at around 7x at year-end 2018, and 6x at year-
    end 2019.

S&P said, "Our ratings reflect the company's market leading
positions in the auto (about 60% sales) and consumer electronics
(about 20% sales) end-markets, alongside players such as Germany-
based OSRAM and U.S.-based Cree. R&D and capex investments are
higher in the LED segment than in conventional lighting, which
could weigh on Bright Bidco's healthy profit margins and positive
free cash flow generation if the pace of revenue decline from the
conventional business is faster than expected.

"We view Lumileds as well positioned to weather the ongoing
gradual shift from conventional lamps to LED, driven by
regulation, cost efficiencies, increased capabilities, and
improved efficacy. This is in part thanks to Lumileds' good brand
equity in the aftermarket and its technological expertise for
LEDs. We foresee, however, some headwinds in the broader LED
industry in 2018 driven by excess capacity, which could lead to
pricing pressures. Lumileds has identified targeted cost savings
within the LED segment, some of which are earmarked for 2018."

Bright Bidco has been operating as a stand-alone entity since
April 2015. Apollo acquired Lumileds from Koninklijke Philips N.V
(Philips) on June 30, 2017 and holds 80.1% of Bright Bidco's
shares, while Philips kept the remaining 19.9%. As of Dec. 31,
2017, in arriving at our adjusted debt figure of $1.7 billion, we
add $0.4 billion to reported gross debt of $1.3 billion,
including adjustments of $166 million for a shareholder loan from
Philips, and smaller amounts for operating leases, factoring,
pensions, and debt service costs.

Bright Bidco develops and manufactures lighting products that
serve mainly the automotive (60% of 2017 sales), consumer (mobile
phones; 24%), and industrial end-markets. In 2017, the company
generated about $1.9 billion of revenues.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that
Bright Bidco will maintain a steady operating performance, with
growth in the LED segment offset by lower demand for conventional
products. We expect healthy, above average EBITDA margins to
continue, as well as positive FOCF, despite continued R&D and
capex. We see a continued risk that further dividends will be
paid, funded by additional debt, as has happened in both 2017 and
2018, as well as spending on bolt-on acquisitions. We forecast
leverage metrics to be 6x-7x for debt to EBITDA and 11%-12% FFO
to debt during 2018 and 2019.

"We could lower the ratings if the company's FFO to debt
deteriorated sustainably below 12% or if FOCF became negative.
This could stem from lower margins caused by a weakening of
market conditions or competitive position in Lumileds' auto and
smartphones end-markets, or greater-than-expected restructuring.
A large debt-financed acquisition, additional dividend
recapitalizations, or a weakening of the liquidity position could
also prompt a downgrade.

"An upgrade is unlikely over the next 12 months. We could raise
the ratings if the company demonstrated a clear path to
deleveraging, with greater than expected growth and cash flow
generation, avoiding further dividend recapitalization payments,
or major debt financed acquisitions. Debt to EBITDA and FFO to
debt would need to be maintained stronger than 5x and 12%,
respectively."


CONTEGO CLO III: Fitch Assigns B-sf Rating to Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Contego III CLO B.V. refinancing notes
final ratings, as follows:

Class X: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A-R: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B-1-R: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B-2-R: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C-R: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class D-R: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class E-R: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class F: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

Contego III CLO B.V. is a cash flow collateralised loan
obligation (CLO). Net proceeds from the notes are being used to
redeem the old notes, with a new identified portfolio comprising
the existing portfolio, as modified by sales and purchases
conducted by the manager. The portfolio is managed by Five Arrows
managers LLP. The refinanced CLO envisages a further 4.25-year
reinvestment period and an 8.5-year weighted average life (WAL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B' Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch places the average credit quality of obligors in the 'B'
category. The Fitch-weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the
current portfolio is 31.96, below the pricing maximum covenanted
WARF of 33.75.

High Recovery Expectations

At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations. Fitch views the recovery prospects for these assets
as more favourable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets. The Fitch-weighted average recovery rate (WARR) of the
current portfolio is 66.32%, above the minimum covenant of 62.2%
corresponding to the matrix WARF of 33.75 and WAS of 3.6%

Limited Interest Rate Exposure

Up to 7.5% of the portfolio can be invested in fixed-rate assets,
while fixed-rate liabilities represent 2.3% of the target par.
Fitch modelled both 0% and 7.5% fixed-rate buckets and found that
the rated notes can withstand the interest rate mismatch
associated with each scenario.

Diversified Asset Portfolio

The covenanted maximum exposure to the top 10 obligors for
assigning the final ratings is 20% of the portfolio balance. This
covenant ensures that the asset portfolio will not be exposed to
excessive obligor concentration.

Unhedged Non-euro Assets

The transaction is allowed to invest in non-euro-denominated
assets, provided these are hedged with perfect asset swaps within
30 days after settlement. Unhedged non-euro assets must not
exceed 3% of the portfolio at any time and can only be included
if, as of the trade date, the portfolio balance is above the
target par amount.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Adding to all rating levels the increase generated by applying a
125% default multiplier to the portfolio's mean default rate
would lead to a downgrade of up to three notches for the rated
notes. A 25% reduction in recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of up to four notches for the rated notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other
Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations and/or
European Securities and Markets Authority-registered rating
agencies. Fitch has relied on the practices of the relevant
groups within Fitch and/or other rating agencies to assess the
asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


DELFT 2017: DBRS Hikes Class E Notes Rating to 'BB(sf)'
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited took the following rating actions on the
bonds issued by Delft 2017 B.V. (the Issuer):

-- Class A confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B upgraded to AA (high) (sf) from AA (sf)
-- Class C upgraded to A (high) (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class D upgraded to BBB (high) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class E upgraded to BB (sf) from BB (low) (sf)

The rating on the Class A notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and ultimate payment of principal on or before the legal
final maturity date. The transaction structure includes a net
weighted-average coupon cap (Net WAC Cap) for the Class B, Class
C, Class D and Class E notes, for which the ratings address the
ability to pay principal and interest on or before the legal
final maturity date.

For the avoidance of doubt, DBRS's ratings do not address
payments of the Net WAC Cap additional amounts, which are the
amounts accrued and become payable junior in the revenue and
principal waterfalls if the coupon due on a series of notes
exceeds the applicable Net WAC Cap.

The rating actions follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies, defaults and
losses.

-- Portfolio default rate (PD), loss given default (LGD) and
expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables.

-- Current available credit enhancement to the notes to cover the
expected losses at their respective rating levels.

Delft 2017 B.V. closed on January 23, 2017 and is a
securitization backed by a static collateral portfolio previously
backing EMF-NL 2008-1 B.V., which was called on 17 January 2017.
The portfolio comprises non-conforming mortgage loans originated
by ELQ Portefeuille I B.V., which was a subsidiary of Lehman
Brothers Inc. and no longer originates loans. The Servicer of the
portfolio is Adaxio B.V. The non-conforming characteristics of
the pool include self-certified income, borrowers with negative
credit history as well as borrowers classified as unemployed,
self-employed, or pensioners.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of April 2018, loans in two- to three-month arrears
represented 1.5% of the outstanding portfolio balance, down from
1.9% in April 2017. The 90+ delinquency ratio was 5.7%, down from
6.2% in April 2017, and the cumulative loss ratio was 0.6%.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS

DBRS conducted a loan-by-loan analysis on the latest data of the
remaining pool of receivables and has updated its base case PD
and LGD assumptions to 19.8% and 35.9%, respectively, in this
review.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT AND RESERVES

Credit enhancement to each class of rated notes is provided by
their subordinated notes and the Non-Liquidity Reserve Fund. As
of the April 2018 payment date, credit enhancement to the Class A
notes was 40.5%, up from 37.2% at the DBRS initial rating. Credit
enhancement to the Class B notes was 27.3%, up from 25.0% at the
DBRS initial rating. Credit enhancement to the Class C notes was
22.1%, up from 20.3% at the DBRS initial rating. Credit
enhancement to the Class D notes was 17.0%, up from 15.5% at the
DBRS initial rating. Credit enhancement to the Class E notes was
10.7%, up from 9.7% at the DBRS initial rating.

The transaction benefits from a Reserve Fund, sized at 2% of the
aggregate initial balance of the Class A to Z notes at the
Closing Date. The Reserve Fund is divided into a Non-Liquidity
Reserve Fund and a Liquidity Reserve Fund. The Liquidity Reserve
Fund is currently at its EUR 1.7 million target amount, which is
equal to 2% of the Class A notes outstanding balance, subject to
a floor of 1% of the initial Class A notes balance when the Class
A notes are outstanding. The Liquidity Reserve Fund can be used
to pay any unpaid senior fees and interest due and payable on the
Class A notes, after the application of available revenue and the
Non-Liquidity Reserve Fund. The Non-Liquidity Reserve Fund is
currently at its EUR 1.4 million target amount, which is the
difference between the target amounts for the Reserve Fund and
the Liquidity Reserve Fund.

ABN AMRO Bank N.V. acts as the Account Bank for the transaction.
The Account Bank reference rating of AA (low) - being one notch
below the DBRS public Long-Term Critical Obligations Rating of
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. of AA, is consistent with the Minimum
Institution Rating given the rating assigned to the Class A
notes, as described in DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European
Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


===========
P O L A N D
===========


KORPORACJA BUDOWLANA: Files for Bankruptcy in Gdansk Court
----------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Korporacja Budowlana Dom SA on May 21 filed
for bankruptcy in the District Court in Gdansk.

Korporacja Budowlana Dom SA manufactures and sells prefabricated
concrete elements in Poland.


===============
S L O V E N I A
===============


NOVA LJUBLJANSKA: S&P Raises ICR to BB+, Outlook Developing
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has raised its long-term issuer
credit rating on Slovenian-government-owned Nova Ljubljanska
Banka D.D. (NLB) to 'BB+' from 'BB'. The outlook is developing.

S&P said, "We affirmed the 'B' short-term issuer credit rating.
The upgrade of NLB follows our review of Slovenia's banking
sector risks, which led us to revise the anchor that starts our
rating on Slovenian banks to 'bbb-' from 'bb'.

"In our view, the economic environment in Slovenia has improved,
implying lower credit risks for banks operating in the country.
Slovenia is experiencing a solid, broad-based recovery, following
the deep banking crisis in 2012-2014. Real GDP growth accelerated
to 5.0% in 2017, the highest annual increase since 2008. What's
more, strong domestic consumption, high net exports, and a
revival of corporate investments continue to fuel the country's
growth momentum.

As a result of solid household consumption and investment
activity, real estate prices are picking up. House prices
increased by almost 10% in 2017, after roughly 7% in 2016. S&P
said, "Yet, we currently see only an intermediate risk of a
buildup of major imbalances, considering that real estate prices
remain significantly below the pre-crisis peak. In addition,
affordability ratios, such as house price to rent and house price
to income are relatively low. Because we think investment and
mortgage lending will likely increase, we will continue to
monitor the possible effect on the construction and real estate
sectors.

We believe credit conditions pose higher risk for Slovenian
banks, but that they have improved considerably. Since the second
half of 2017, the corporate sector has resumed borrowing and
undertaking leveraged investments following years of
deleveraging." Accordingly, the corporate debt-to-GDP ratio
reduced substantially to only 49% in 2017, after a very high 85%
in 2009. This drop demonstrates the structural strengthening of
corporate balance sheets in recent years. In addition, most non-
viable firms exited Slovenia's economy over the past five years,
improving the overall quality and productive capital of the
private sector. Together with the restructuring of nonperforming
loans in some of the most vulnerable sectors, like construction
and real estate, S&P thinks Slovenian banks' credit risks have
declined materially.

However, S&P is mindful that the country's open economy and close
integration into Europe's core supply chains in a number of key
industries, such as automotive, pharmaceuticals, and electrical
equipment, makes export-oriented Slovenian firms vulnerable to
international trade tensions.

S&P said, "In our view, Slovenian banks' earnings capacity stands
to benefit from the improved economic environment. In 2017, high
new loan disbursements offset flattened net interest margins, and
recoveries of bad assets resulted in sound profitability, with
the average return on equity at 9.7% compared with 7.9% the
previous year. The material decline of nonperforming loans and
banks' continued derisking have improved the financial sector's
quality, in our view. For example, the nonperforming exposure
(NPE) ratio (according to the European Banking Authority's
definition) reached a low 5.4% in March 2018, having more than
halved since June 2015 when it was 14.2%. This represents one of
the fastest declines in Central Eastern Europe and brings the NPE
ratio in Slovenia closer to the EU average of 4%.

"Moreover, we regard as positive the strengthened regulatory
framework, following harmonization with that in Western European
countries after the transfer of supervisory oversight for roughly
75% of the banking system to the Single Supervisory Mechanism in
2014. Nevertheless, we remain concerned about the high share of
state-owned banks, which was the main reason for the banking
sector downturn in 2013-2014 and led to looser business
practices, pricing efficiency, and corporate governance
standards.

"We could reassess Slovenia's industry risk in the next 6-24
months if we see tangible progress in privatizing the banking
sector. We believe this would support more prudent banking
supervision without intervention from the government. We
currently expect that, after the general election on June 3,
2018, the new government will pursue the privatization of state-
owned banks."

NOVA LJUBLJANSKA BANKA D.D. (NLB)

S&P said, "We raised our long-term rating on NLB due to reduced
economic risk in Slovenia, which led us to revise the anchor for
the bank upward to 'bb+' from 'bb'. This differs from the 'bbb-'
anchor for Slovenian banks because, as of year-end 2017, 45% of
NLB's exposure was to foreign countries, most of which have a
similar or weaker economic environment than Slovenia's. In our
view, the reduced economic risk in Slovenia strengthens NLB's
stand-alone credit profile, in particular, asset quality and
earnings generation capacity in the bank's core domestic business
lines."

NLB is the largest bank in Slovenia and continues to benefit from
its leading position. With a market share of 25% in domestic
deposits and a client base of 700,000 in 2017, the bank is the
most important player and a price-setter in the country, in S&P's
view. Last year, its six subsidiaries in five southeastern
European (SEE) economies were very profitable and contributed to
the group's record-high aftertax profit of EUR225 million. NLB
continues to be successful with its business transformation by
divesting noncore business lines and subsidiaries, reducing its
large stock of nonperforming loans, and substantially improving
risk management and corporate governance standards.

S&P said, "In our view, the bank's capital profile remains
adequate. We forecast NLB's risk-adjusted capital ratio will
improve to just below 10% in the next 12-24 months after 9.0% in
2017. This is the result of a continued decline of high-risk
nonperforming loans, improved credit risk conditions, and a
gradual buildup of capital from earnings, despite what we view as
NLB's aggressive dividend payout policy. Since its bailout in
2013, the European Commission has set the amount NLB can pay out
as dividends.

"We continue to regard NLB's risk position as a neutral rating
factor. Risk management, as well as lending and governance
standards, have improved considerably since the bailout. In 2017,
the bank's NPE ratio (according to the European Banking Authority
definition) was 6.7%, only somewhat higher than the domestic
average of 6.0%. We note that the inflow of NPEs is limited, and
we expect NPEs will continue to decline over the next two years.
The bank's NPE coverage ratio of 74.7% in 2017 is higher than the
EU average and mitigates the risk of unexpected losses, in our
view."

NLB's funding and liquidity profile remains solid. The bank
benefits from a diversified and stable retail deposit base and
very strong liquidity reserves, which comprised 41% of total
assets at year-end 2017.

S&P said, "In our view, a key latent risk to NLB's
creditworthiness is the uncertainty regarding its required
partial privatization, which was due by December 2017. This is
according to the commitments of the Slovenian government in
relation to the European Commission's decision in December 2013
on state aid of almost EUR2.32 billion to NLB. This figure
consisted of three capital injections totaling EUR2.19 billion
and the transfer of EUR0.13 billion of impaired assets to the
country's workout bank. The Commission started an investigation
on Jan. 26, 2018, to assess whether the state aid was unlawful
because of the owner's breach of the agreed commitment to a
partial sale of NLB. We understand that the Slovenian government
must respond to the formal investigation and third-party comments
by June 16, 2018, after which we expect to have more clarity on
the possible outcomes.

"In our base-case scenario, the Slovenian government is likely to
start the privatization process for NLB this year. We currently
consider that the Commission is unlikely to take harsh
disciplinary actions against the bank directly, given NLB's
importance to the Slovenian financial system and its major role
in SEE markets. A potential severe measure, such as a mandatory
repayment of the state aid, could threaten NLB's medium-term
viability. This could have far-reaching repercussions for the
financial sector in Slovenia and some SEE economies, in our
view."

OUTLOOK

The developing outlook indicates that S&P could affirm, raise, or
lower its ratings on NLB over the next 6-12 months, during which
time it expects that the privatization issue will have been
resolved, and the government's plan for a likely IPO will have
become clearer.

Downside scenario

S&P said, "We could lower the ratings by several notches if,
albeit unlikely, the European Commission takes measures that
disrupt NLB's operations. For example, repayment of the state's
previous capital injections could hit the bank's financial
profile and weaken its medium-term viability. We could also lower
the ratings if NLB were to expand aggressively into riskier SEE
countries."

Upside scenario

S&P said, "We could raise the ratings if remaining uncertainties
regarding the bank's privatization dissipate, allowing the bank
to focus on progress with its transformation. This could lead to
a stronger business and risk profile, provided we see a
supportive business, risk, capital, and funding strategy from
potential new shareholders.

"Given our view of a positive trend for banking industry risk in
Slovenia, we could raise our long-term rating on NLB to 'BBB-',
assuming there is no longer a risk of privatization."

  BICRA SCORE SNAPSHOT*
  Slovenia                      To                 From
  BICRA Group                   5                  6

  Government Support            Uncertain          Uncertain

  Economic Risk                 5                  6
    Economic resilience         Intermediate       Intermediate
    Economic imbalances         Intermediate       Intermediate
  Credit risk in the economy    High               Very high
  Economic risk trend           Stable             Positive
  Industry Risk                 6                  6
  Institutional framework       High               High
  Competitive dynamics          High               High
    Systemwide funding          Intermediate       Intermediate
  Industry risk trend           Positive           Positive

  RATINGS SCORE SNAPSHOT
                                To                 From
  Nova Ljubljanska Banka D.D.   BB+/Developing/B   BB/Positive/B

  SACP                          bb+                bb
  Anchor                        bb+                bb
   Business position            Adequate (0)       Adequate (0)
   Capital and earnings         Adequate (0)       Adequate (0)
   Risk position                Adequate (0)       Adequate (0)
   Funding and                  Average and (0)   Average and (0)
  Liquidity                     Strong             Strong
  Support                       (0)                (0)
   ALAC support                 (0)                (0)
   GRE support                  (0)                (0)
   Group support                (0)                (0)
   Sovereign support            (0)                (0)

  Additional Factors            (0)                (0)

*Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) economic risk
and industry risk scores are on a scale from 1 (lowest risk) to
10 (highest risk).

  Ratings List
  Upgraded; Ratings Affirmed
                                  To                 From
  Nova Ljubljanska Banka D.D.
   Issuer Credit Rating           BB+/Developing/B
BB/Positive/B


=========
S P A I N
=========


FONCAIXA FTGENCAT: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class E Notes at CCsf
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Foncaixa FTGENCAT 4, FTA's class B and
D notes and affirmed the rest as follows:

Class A(G) notes: affirmed at 'A+sf' Outlook Stable
Class B notes: upgraded to 'A-sf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C notes: affirmed at 'BBBsf' Outlook Positive
Class D notes: upgraded to 'B+sf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook Stable
Class E notes: affirmed at 'CCsf', Recovery Estimate revised to
10% from 0%

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increasing Credit Enhancement

Continued deleveraging has contributed to an increase in credit
enhancement (CE) over the last 12 months across all tranches. CE
increased for the class B, class C and D notes to 20.1%, 12.9%
and 6.3%, from 14.8%, 9.1% and 3.9%, respectively.

Improving Spanish Economy

Fitch expects performance of Spanish SME portfolios to improve,
as reflected by the reduction of the Spanish country benchmark to
3.5% from 4% in the latest update of the agency's SME Balance
Sheet Securitisation Rating Criteria published on 23 February
2018.

Strong Recovery Rates

While delinquencies of 5% are high relative to peers, this is
mitigated by high recoveries from the portfolio (72% weighted
average recovery rate). This is explained by 89.6% of the
portfolio loans being backed by first-lien mortgages.
Furthermore, the weighted average loan-to-value for these
collateralised loans is modest at 47.7%.

Low Concentration despite Seasoning

The underlying portfolio is highly seasoned with a portfolio
factor - defined as outstanding portfolio balance divided by
initial portfolio balance - of 12.9%; however, concentration
levels remain low with the top 10 obligors representing 6.3% of
the current balance. The largest industry concentration is real
estate with 22.1%. This obligor and industry concentration is
reflected by a 10% portfolio correlation in Fitch's Portfolio
Credit Model (PCM).

Significant Swap Counterparty Support

The transaction features an unusual swap whereby on a net basis,
the issuer receives interest on defaulted loans, providing
significant support to the transaction during stressed scenarios.
Fitch did not give credit to the support provided by the swap in
scenarios above the swap counterparty rating (Caixabank,
BBB/Positive/F2). As a result, the class C and D notes' ratings
cannot withstand stresses above 'BBBsf' in the absence of the
swap support.

Payment Interruption Risk Rating Cap

The ratings of the class A(G) and B notes are capped at 'A+sf',
due to payment interruption risk. Under the Structured Finance
and Covered Bonds Counterparty Rating Criteria Caixabank can
support the notes at five notches above the counterparty's rating
up to 'A+sf'. Payment interruption risk is otherwise not
mitigated due to lack of additional liquidity support other than
the reserve fund, which is expected to be depleted before the
notes are amortised.

Class E Notes Under-collateralised

The class E notes can only be paid with excess spread when the
reserve fund is fully funded. The reserve fund will be the only
available form of payment for the class E notes when other notes
fully amortise. As a result, the class E notes remain under-
collateralised and their likely default is reflected by the
'CCsf' rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the default rate or decrease in the recovery
rate may result in significant rating downgrades for class B and
D notes. Changes in the rating for Caixabank may result in rating
action for the class C notes, as they are currently credit-linked
to Caixabank's rating.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.


GRUPO BANCO: DBRS Hikes Rating on Series B Notes to CCC (sf)
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited upgraded the following ratings on IM Grupo
Banco Popular Leasing 3, FT (the Issuer):

-- Series A Notes upgraded to AA (sf) from AA (low)
-- Series B Notes upgraded to CCC (sf) from CC (sf)

The upgrades follow an annual review of the transaction and are
based on the following analytical considerations:

  -- The overall portfolio performance as of the April 2018
payment date, particularly with regard to low levels of
delinquencies and cumulative net losses;

  -- Updated default rates and expected loss assumptions for the
remaining collateral pool, following the upgrade of the Kingdom
of Spain's (Spain) Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency - Issuer
Rating to A from A (low);

   -- The current available credit enhancement (CE) to the Series
A and Series B Notes (the Notes) to cover expected losses assumed
in line with the AA (sf) and CCC (sf) rating levels,
respectively.

The rating on the Series A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and ultimate repayment of principal payable on or before
the legal maturity date in August 2050. The rating on the Series
B Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest and repayment
of principal payable on or before the legal maturity date in
August 2050.

The Issuer is a securitization collateralized by a portfolio of
commercial lease contracts granted by Banco Popular Espa§ol S.A.
(BPE) and Banco Pastor, S.A. (Banco Pastor) to Spanish
corporates, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and self-
employed individuals. The transaction follows the standard
structure under the Spanish law and closed in May 2017.

As at 23 April 2018, the balance of the Series A Notes was EUR
539.9 million and the balance of the Series B Notes was EUR 220.0
million. The EUR 759.9 million portfolio (excluding defaulted
receivables) includes claims derived from commercial real estate
(23.2%) and non-real estate leases (76.8%).

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As at the April 2018 payment date, contracts delinquent by one,
two and three months represented 1.1%, 0.8% and 0.5% of the
outstanding portfolio, respectively, while delinquencies greater
than three months were 1.7%. Gross cumulative defaults were EUR
116,393.8.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS

DBRS kept its expected probability of default (PD) and its base
case recovery rate (RR) assumptions at 6.8% and 13.1%,
respectively. However, the sovereign-adjusted PD and RR
assumptions have been updated to 7.0% and 13.1%, reflecting
DBRS's upgrade of Spain's Long-Term Foreign Currency rating to A
with a Stable trend on April 6, 2018 (see DBRS's press release
entitled "DBRS Upgrades the Kingdom of Spain to A, Stable
Trend").

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

CE for the Series A Notes is provided by the subordination of the
Series B Notes and the Reserve Fund, while CE for the Series B
Notes is provided by the reserve fund. As at the April 2018
payment date, Series A Notes' CE was 33.3% and Series B Notes' CE
was 4.3%, up from 23.0% and 3.0%, respectively, in May 2017. The
CE increase has prompted rating upgrades.

The transaction structure includes a EUR 33.3 million non-
amortizing reserve fund, which is available to cover senior
expenses and missed payments (interest and principal) on the
Series A Notes; following the full repayment of the Series A
Notes, this account will be available to cover any payment
shortfalls on the Series B Notes.

Banco Santander SA (Santander) is the Issuer's account bank. The
account bank reference rating of A (high), which is one notch
below the DBRS's Long-Term Critical Obligations Rating of
Santander at AA (low), is consistent with the Minimum Institution
Rating, given the ratings assigned to the Notes, as described in
DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


KYIV: S&P Affirms 'B-' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
On May 18, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' long-term
issuer credit rating on the Ukrainian capital city of Kyiv. The
outlook is stable.

OUTLOOK

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectations that
Kyiv's strong budgetary performance and ample cash buffers will
enable it to withstand uncertainties coming from Ukraine's very
volatile institutional framework and also provide financial
support to its government-related entities (GREs) if needed. The
outlook also factors in our assumption that the city will keep
its tax-supported debt low."

Downside Scenario

S&P said, "We might lower the rating if we were to lower our
sovereign ratings on Ukraine, if the city's tax-supported debt
were to increase materially above what we envisage in our base-
case scenario, or if the city's liquidity were to deteriorate."

Upside Scenario

S&P believes that, for the moment, there is no upside potential
for its rating on Kyiv.

RATIONALE

S&P said, "We expect Kyiv to continue reporting a strong but
declining operating surplus, as well as moderate deficits after
capital accounts, which will allow the city to keep tax-supported
debt below a low 30% of consolidated operating revenues through
year-end 2020. We think that these factors will counterbalance
the very volatile and centralized Ukrainian institutional
framework for local and regional governments (LRGs), the city's
low wealth levels, and a weak payment culture with a track record
of defaults."

Volatile institutional framework, low wealth levels, and weak
financial management limit creditworthiness

S&P said, "We assess Kyiv's economy as weak compared with peers,
mostly due to still relatively low wealth levels by international
standards.

"At the same time, Kyiv's economy is well diversified and is
Ukraine's most prosperous. Kyiv contributes more than 20% of
national GDP and enjoys the lowest unemployment rate in Ukraine.
We project that Kyiv's economic growth will likely mirror that of
the national economy, continuing its gradual recovery at 3% on
average in 2018-2020. Nevertheless, for Ukrainian LRGs, including
Kyiv, we use national GDP per capita (about US$2,300) as a proxy,
given their high dependence on transfers from the central
government and the very centralized public finance system.

Under Ukraine's institutional framework, Kyiv's budgetary
flexibility and performance are significantly affected by the
central government's decisions regarding key taxes, transfers,
and expenditure responsibilities. The framework changes
frequently, which substantially affects the stability of both the
city's revenue sources and its spending mandates. The visibility
on future systemic changes remains low, therefore undermining
reliable long-tern planning at the municipal level. Most of the
taxes are regulated by the central government, which means that
modifiable revenues make up less than 20% of Kyiv's operating
revenues. S&P said, "Moreover, we believe that the city's ability
to adjust modifiable revenues is limited. On top of that, Kyiv's
substantial investment requirements and high share of social
spending continue to restrict its spending flexibility. We expect
a slight increase in capital spending in the next few years,
mainly related to infrastructure and transport, although somewhat
lower than its peak in 2017."

S&P said, "We consider that the quality of financial management
also constrains our rating on the city. We observe only emerging
long-term planning, as well as weak management of debt and
liquidity, frequent deviations from legislated budgets, and weak
oversight over the city's GREs. Moreover, the city restructured
its debt in 2015, which resulted in nonpayment of domestic and
international debt the same year. The domestic debt was repaid
from the city's own cash reserves the following year."

Budgetary performance will likely gradually weaken due to
spending pressures, but the debt burden will remain low

S&P said, "Although we believe that in the coming three years
Kyiv will generally maintain its solid operating budgetary
performance, we expect a gradual weakening of balances owing to
accumulated underfinancing of public services, ongoing minimum
wage increases, and somewhat slower revenue growth. Our forecast
assumes that the operating budgetary surplus will drop to about
11% of operating revenues on average in 2018-2020. This compares
with an exceptionally strong 16% posted in 2014-2017, when Kyiv's
revenues benefitted significantly from high inflation-driven tax
revenue growth and additional revenue sources allocated to LRGs
in the context of the local government reform; with expenditure
growth simultaneously lagging somewhat. Central government grants
(mostly earmarked public wage-related transfers), which
contribute up to one-quarter of operating revenues, will continue
to support the city's finances."

Weaker operating balances and existing capital spending pressures
will dent the city's balances after capital accounts. After a few
years of containing investment costs, the city has committed to a
number of large infrastructure projects (such as bridge and metro
line construction). This was already reflected in 2017 capital
expenditures, which almost doubled from 2016 levels.

S&P said, "We therefore expect the city to post moderate budget
deficits after capital accounts starting from 2019. At the same
time, we note that service underfunding and capital spending
pressures will remain high, which, together with frequently
changing fiscal rules imposed on LRGs, makes the city's budgetary
performance very volatile and difficult to forecast.

"Owing to only modest deficits after capital accounts, we expect
that tax-supported debt will remain low and will not likely
exceed 30% of consolidated operating revenues through 2020. Due
to the rapid growth of revenues and repayments of local-currency
bonds, Kyiv's debt burden has decreased significantly to 28% in
early 2018 from its peak levels of almost 60% in 2014.

At present the city's direct debt consists of intergovernmental
debt liabilities to the central government only. These mirror the
term of the foreign debt (Eurobonds) that the central government
assumed from the city in 2015. The formal issuer of these bonds
is now the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance. Given that the city's
intergovernmental debt is denominated in U.S. dollars, S&P notes
that Kyiv's debt burden will be subject to exchange rate
volatility.

According to an agreement between the city and the central
government, if the city invests in municipal transport
infrastructure, the government will write off an equal amount
from the city's intergovernmental obligations. Some of Kyiv's
obligations will likely be reduced ahead of schedule after the
city's completion of construction projects. The settlement will
take place in 2019-2020. S&P said, "We therefore project the city
will not need to resort to market borrowings to refinance or
repay these intergovernmental obligations. At the same time, we
believe that, should this agreement be derailed or cancelled,
Kyiv could postpone some of its capital expenditures to generate
funds to honor intergovernmental settlements. The other scenario
might imply the central government rolling over these
liabilities. We note that we do not consider it a default when a
local government fails to honor intergovernmental."

S&P said, "In addition to direct debt, our assessment of Kyiv's
total debt burden (tax-supported debt) includes liabilities of
municipal GREs, which require budget assistance from the city
budget. In particular we factor in all debt of GREs explicitly
guaranteed by Kyiv (Kyivpastrans, Kyivmetro, GVP energy saving
company) as well as the commercial debt of the water utility,
since repayments of most of these liabilities are made directly
from Kyiv's budget. Since 2016, we have also included in tax-
supported debt liabilities coming from the lawsuit against Kyiv's
subway company Kyivmetro."

In 2009, Kyivmetro signed a lease purchase agreement for 100
subway cars with Russian leasing provider Ukrrosleasing. Later in
2011, the metro management signed an amendment to this agreement
with Ukrrosleasing, which changes the currency of this obligation
from Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH) to U.S. dollars. Kyivmetro's debt
increased significantly when the hryvnia depreciated in 2014-
2015, after which the company's management was changed. The
current metro management doesn't accept the amended agreement, as
a result not making any lease payments in 2014-2016. In 2016, the
leasing provider filed a court case against Kyivmetro that
obliged it to repay the leasing debt (around UAH2 billion, or 13%
of the city's tax-supported debt). S&P incorporates this lease
payment into Kyiv's tax-supported debt, since the city might be
required to support Kyivmetro.

Following years of budget surpluses, Kyiv has accumulated a
significant amount of cash reserves. As of March, free cash stood
at UAH6 billion (about 11% of total annual spending), providing
the city with an exceptional liquidity buffer should budgetary
performance weaken or a portion of contingent liabilities migrate
to Kyiv's balance sheet. S&P said, "We conservatively apply a 50%
haircut to the city's cash reserves, since the city keeps them in
the central treasury and we believe that access to these reserves
could be interrupted, given the central government's track record
with regard to default. Nevertheless, we assume that, in the next
12 months, Kyiv's average free cash reserves will comfortably
cover debt service by more than 120%. However, we believe that
the coverage ratio might fall sharply when the city's
intergovernmental debt liability is due. At the same time, we
believe that the city's access to external liquidity remains
uncertain, owing to the weaknesses of the Ukrainian capital
market and its banking sector."

S&P said, "We assess Kyiv's contingent liabilities as high, owing
to accumulated payables at the level of the city's utility and
transportation companies, which still run significant arrears.
These liabilities come from the fact that tariffs for municipal
services are set by the central government below their cost
recovery, with the state not fully compensating the gap. We
expect that the city might provide financial assistance by
increasing subsidies or injecting capital, though the potential
support would not exceed 30% of Kyiv's operating revenues. We
also include in the city's contingent liabilities the $101
million relating to the remaining amount of Eurobonds that the
city hasn't yet restructured. Although the city will have to meet
these obligations, we believe that the payments won't materially
impact the city's liquidity position."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  RATINGS LIST

                                  Rating
                                  To                    From
  Kyiv (City of)
   Issuer Credit Rating
    Foreign and Local Currency    B-/Stable/--     B-/Stable/--


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ATOTECH UK: S&P Affirms 'B' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'B' long-term issuer
credit rating on Atotech UK Topco Ltd. (Atotech), the holding
company of the Germany-headquartered Atotech group, a
manufacturer of specialty chemicals and equipment for high-tech
electroplating applications. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we affirmed our 'B' issue rating on
the group's term loan B due 2024, which will be upsized to $1.6
billion, and $250 million revolving credit facility (RCF) due
2022. The recovery rating on the term loan and the RCF remains
'3', indicating our expectation of meaningful recovery prospects
(50%-70%; rounded estimate: 50%) in the event of payment default.
In addition, we affirmed our 'CCC+' issue rating on the $425
million senior unsecured notes due 2025. We also assigned a
'CCC+' issue rating to the new $300 million payment-in-kind (PIK)
toggle notes due 2023. The recovery rating on both notes is '6',
reflecting our expectations of negligible recovery (0%-10%;
rounded estimate: 0%)."

The PIK notes will be issued by Alpha 2 B.V., while the co-
issuers of all other debt instruments are Alpha 3 B.V. and Alpha
US Bidco, Inc., subsidiaries of Alpha 2 B.V. All the three
issuers are financing subsidiaries of Atotech.

S&P said, "The affirmation reflects our view that, following an
increase in S&P Global Ratings' adjusted debt to EBITDA to about
7.0x in 2018 from 6.2x in 2017 (excluding one-off inventory step-
up costs) and compared with our previous forecast of 5.7x-5.9x,
due to $500 million higher debt load to finance planned dividend
payment, Atotech will manage a moderate deleveraging to 6.6x-6.8x
in 2019 and further to below 6.5x from 2020. The deleveraging
will be primarily driven by increasing EBITDA on the back of
favorable market conditions and higher operating efficiency as a
result of its extensive cost-optimization programs.

"Atotech's operating performance in 2017 is in line with our
expectations. On the back of strong market demand and cost
savings achieved from the extensive cost efficiency programs,
Atotech generated sales of $1.19 billion (+8.2% year on year) and
adjusted EBITDA of $329 million (+16%, excluding one-off
transactions and inventory step-up costs). The solid financial
results in the first quarter of 2018, with sales growth of 10%
and EBITDA up by about $25 million year on year, shows a
continued strong operating performance. Atotech benefits from
favorable growth trends in both of its segments: General Metal
Finishing (GMF), driven by growth in automotive production,
especially in China, and Electronics, fueled by solid demand for
the next generation high density interconnected (HDI) and print
circuit board (PCB) used for smartphones. We expect the positive
market trend will continue in 2018 and 2019, and Atotech will
progress further on its cost-optimization programs, which will
result in a consistent strengthening of its EBITDA margin. In
addition, we expect Atotech will continue to generate healthy
free operating cash flow (FOCF), supported by various measures
targeting a more efficient management of capital expenditures
(capex) and working capital. This leads us to expect a moderate
deleveraging over the next years.

"Nevertheless, our assessment of Atotech's financial risk profile
is constrained by its private equity ownership, which resulted in
an aggressive financial policy, notably in terms of high leverage
tolerance and incentives to maximize shareholder returns. This is
underlined by its plan to do a one-off debt-financed dividend
distribution of $500 million, which will exhaust the headroom
under current ratings. We view the company's financial risk
profile as highly leveraged."

Atotech's fair business risk profile reflects its leading
position in the niche plating chemicals market, its strong
customer retention -- underpinned by the strategy of offering
integrated solutions ranging from chemicals to equipment --
robust research and development (R&D), and solid technical
capabilities. As a result, Atotech enjoys a track record of
relatively high and stable profit margins.

Atotech holds a leading market position globally in electronics
plating, notably in PCB, with a 28% market share (its closest
competitor, Platform Specialty, holds 21%), and joint-No. 1 in
GMF, with a 19% market share (Platform Specialty also holds 19%).
Atotech's leadership is underpinned by its consistently high R&D
investments, which ensure that its customers receive the latest
technology and innovation. The group's track record of well-
established, long-term relationships with customers is supported
by the offering of customized production solution and equipment,
as well as R&D collaboration in Atotech's extensive network of
technology centers, which further strengthen customer loyalty and
create barriers to entry for competitors. Finally, we recognize
Atotech's earnings stability, as demonstrated during the 2008-
2009 financial crisis, during which Atotech maintained high
EBITDA margins of more than 20%.

S&P said, "However, our assessment of Atotech's business profile
is constrained by the company's relatively small size, with
revenues of about $1.2 billion in 2017 and narrow product
portfolio. More than 80% of sales were generated from plating
chemicals, with plating equipment generating most of the
remaining sales. Atotech has substantial exposure to cyclical end
markets, notably communication and automotive, and has limited
revenue visibility due to the lack of long-term contracts with
customers, although this is partly mitigated by the favorable
growth trends in its key markets and strong client
relationships."

In S&P's base case for Atotech, it assumes:

-- Revenue growth of 1%-2% in 2018 and about 3% in 2019,
    reflecting S&P's expectation of continuous favorable market
    demand for plating in consumer electronics. This demand is
    driven by innovation of next generation smartphones as well
    as for automotive industries. It is also driven by production
    growth and the desire for environmentally friendly solutions.
    However, this is partly offset by the decline in equipment
    sales in 2018, which reflects a normalization from
    exceptionally strong project wins in 2017.

-- Reported EBITDA margins of about 28% in 2018-2019, supported
    by topline growth and continued cost efficiencies in
    procurement and asset utilization.

-- Capex of about $65 million-$70 million in 2018-2019.

-- One-off dividend of $500 million in 2018. No dividends from
    2019. No acquisitions or disposals. We understand that the
    sponsor intends to expand the company organically and that
    potential acquisitions would be selective bolt-ons related to
    complementary products and technology.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

-- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 7.0x in 2018 and 6.6x-6.8x
    in 2019.

-- Significantly positive FOCF in 2018-2019.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that despite the
large debt-financed shareholder distribution in 2018, Atotech's
solid EBITDA generation should enable leverage to fall below 7.0x
debt to EBITDA within 12 months post transaction. However, this
would be at the weak end of the 6.0x-7.0x range commensurate with
the rating, leading to minimal headroom for underperformance. We
also anticipate that Atotech will generate substantial positive
FOCF, and that its liquidity and headroom under financial
covenants will remain adequate.

"We could lower the rating if Atotech's reported EBITDA
deteriorated substantially without near-term recovery prospects,
for example owing to materially weaker margins or end-market
demand, or an adverse foreign-exchange impact. Such a decline
would push Atotech's leverage to above 7x for 2019 on a gross-
adjusted basis without near-term recovery prospects, even though
we would still expect the group to generate positive FOCF. We
could also lower the rating if Atotech experienced difficulties
in repatriation of cash from its Chinese subsidiaries, which, if
prolonged, could constrain liquidity. Rating pressure could also
emerge if the private equity sponsor adopted an even more
aggressive financial policy, for example, further shareholder
distribution in the next two years.

"We could raise the rating as a result of a continuous
strengthening in EBITDA, enabling a ratio of adjusted debt to
EBITDA comfortably below 6x on a sustainable basis. This could
happen, for example, if Atotech's market share expanded faster
than we anticipate or if reported margins continuously improved
on the back of cost efficiencies. An upgrade would also hinge on
a more supportive financial policy, especially the private equity
sponsor's commitment to sustainably maintaining leverage at a
level commensurate with a higher rating."


CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA: Reveals Financial Condition After Bankruptcy
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Aliya Ram and Cynthia O'Murchu at The Financial Times report that
Cambridge Analytica, the UK business at the centre of an
international privacy scandal, has revealed information about its
financial condition for the first time after it and a related
company, SCL USA, filed for bankruptcy in the US.

The documents show that a web of companies related to the now-
defunct Cambridge Analytica -- including its parent SCL Group --
have filed for bankruptcy or "similar proceedings" after they
were engulfed in controversy over the use of Facebook user
information in political campaigns, the FT relates.

SCL USA had assets worth up to US$50,000 but liabilities of US$1
million to US$10 million, owed to creditors including Facebook,
which allowed the data of up to 87 million users to be leaked to
Cambridge Analytica through an app four years ago, the FT
discloses.

According to the FT, Cambridge Analytica said it had assets worth
between US$100,000 and US$500,000 and liabilities of US$1 million
to US$10 million in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing in New York.

The documents revealed that other linked businesses -- including
SCL Analytics, SCL Commercial, SCL Social and SCL Elections --
have "a bankruptcy case or similar proceeding" filed at the High
Court in London, the FT states.

SCL Group, which was founded in 2005 to use data for defence and
political consulting, was also listed as having a bankruptcy case
in London after filing for insolvency earlier this month, the FT
notes.


CARILLION PLC: Paid GBP8MM to Slaughter and May for Crisis Advice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Barney Thompson at The Financial Times reports that Carillion
racked up a bill of more than GBP8 million for legal advice from
City firm Slaughter and May from the point where its dire
financial position started to emerge in May 2017 to the company's
collapse eight months later.
In a letter to the joint parliamentary committee that
investigated the demise of Carillion, Steve Cooke, Slaughter and
May's senior partner, outlined the work the firm performed for
the outsourcer from July 2016, including working on restructuring
options and a potential rights issue, the FT relates.

The letter, dated February 20, was only released after the MPs'
committee published its damning report into the debacle last
week, the FT notes.

According to the FT, Rachel Reeves, the Labour MP who chairs the
Commons business committee, said that after the accountancy
giants "it was Carillion's legal advisers who took the big
payouts in the company's dying days".

Of the law firms that were paid on Jan. 12, the last business day
before the Carillion's liquidation, "highest paid of all was
Slaughter and May, whose 17-year relationship was rewarded with a
parting gift of more than GBP1 million," the FT quotes Ms. Reeves
as saying.  "Worse still, the company received more than
GBP400,000 from the Official Receiver for helping wind up the
company, a huge sum that might better have been returned to
suppliers or employees rather than City lawyers."

The report also shows that law firms including Willkie Farr &
Gallagher, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Clifford Chance and
Akin Gump all received money from Carillion on Jan. 12, although
the sums were smaller, the FT relays.

From May 2017 until mid-January, Carillion was billed GBP6.9
million by Slaughter and May for advice on the sale or proposed
sale of an array of assets, as well as on its discussions with
the government, the pensions trustees and regulator, creditors
and potential joint venture partners, the FT discloses.


DURHAM B: S&P Assigns Prelim BB (sf) Rating to Class F-Dfrd Certs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings has assigned preliminary credit ratings to
Durham Mortgages B PLC's class A to F notes. At closing, the
issuer will also issue unrated class Z1, Z2, X, R notes, X
certificates, and Y certificates.

We based our credit analysis on the preliminary pool, which
totals GBP2.36 billion. The pool comprises first-lien U.K. buy-
to-let mortgage loans that Bradford & Bingley PLC, Mortgage
Express PLC, GMAC-RFC Ltd., Kensington Mortgage Company Ltd., and
Close Brothers Ltd. originated. The loans are secured on
properties in England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland and
were originated between 1997 and 2009. On the closing date, the
issuer will purchase the beneficial interest in the portfolio
from the seller (Cornwall Home Loans Ltd.), using the notes'
issuance proceeds. The legal title of each loan will remain with
Bradford & Bingley and Mortgage Express and will move to Topaz
Finance (or, as the case may be, one or more wholly owned
subsidiaries of Topaz Finance) on the transfer date, which will
be nine months after closing (or earlier if a perfection trigger
occurs).

Bradford & Bingley will be the interim servicer of the loans in
the pool with a delegation to Computershare Mortgage Services
Ltd. and Homeloan Management Ltd. until the transfer date. After
that, Topaz Finance will become the long-term servicer for the
assets. Topaz is a subsidiary of Computershare Mortgage Services.
We reviewed Computershare Mortgage Services' servicing and
default management processes and are satisfied that it is capable
of performing its functions in the transaction. In S&P's cash
flow modeling, it stressed a 0.5% servicing fee on day one
because, in our opinion, this reflects the likely cost of
replacing the servicer.

S&P said, "Our preliminary ratings address the timely receipt of
interest and ultimate repayment of principal to the class A
notes. While not the most senior class, the preliminary ratings
on the class B to F notes are interest-deferred ratings and
address the ultimate repayment of principal and interest. When
these notes become the most senior class, our ratings will
address the ultimate repayment of principal and timely payment of
interest. For the most senior class of notes, a deferral of
interest would constitute an event of default under the terms and
conditions of the notes.

"Our preliminary ratings reflect our assessment of the
transaction's payment structure, cash flow mechanics, and the
results of our cash flow analysis to assess whether the notes
would be repaid under stress test scenarios. Subordination, the
general reserve, and excess spread will provide credit
enhancement to the rated notes. Taking these factors into
account, we consider that the available credit enhancement for
the rated notes is commensurate with the preliminary ratings
assigned."

  RATINGS LIST
  Durham Mortgages B PLC
  Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating Rate Notes (Including
  Unrated Notes And Certificates)

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Class              Rating        Amount
                                  (mil. GBP)

  A                  AAA (sf)         TBD
  X certificates     NR               TBD
  B-Dfrd             AA (sf)          TBD
  C-Dfrd             A (sf)           TBD
  D-Dfrd             A- (sf)          TBD
  E-Dfrd             BBB- (sf)        TBD
  F-Dfrd             BB (sf)          TBD
  VFN                NR               TBD
  Z1-Dfrd            NR               TBD
  Z2                 NR               TBD
  X-Dfrd             NR               TBD
  R                  NR               TBD
  Y certificates     NR               TBD

  VFN--Variable funding note.
  NR--Not rated.
  TBD--To be determined.


INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB/B' IDRs, Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed International Personal Finance plc's
(IPF) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior debt
ratings at 'BB', and Short-Term IDR at 'B'. The Outlook on the
Long-Term IDR is Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT

IPF's IDRs reflect the concentration of its funding within
potentially confidence-sensitive wholesale sources, and its
business model's vulnerability to regulators' imposition of rate
caps and other such operating restrictions in its principal
markets. They also take into account IPF's low balance sheet
leverage by conventional finance company standards, and its
management's experience in conducting unsecured consumer lending
in emerging markets.

The Negative Outlook reflects two uncertainties in Poland, IPF's
largest market: a challenge to the group's past tax provisions,
and the potential introduction of a tighter regulatory limit on
the maximum non-interest costs chargeable for consumer loans.
Each of these issues emerged over a year ago, and has yet to be
resolved. In Fitch's opinion, neither has shown a material
increase in likelihood of a negative outcome for the group, but
the impact of continued non-resolution could become more
detrimental for IPF as its funding maturity dates draw closer.

In January 2017 the Polish Tax Chamber challenged IPF in relation
to both intra-group transfer pricing and the timing of taxation
of home collection fees, following an audit of the 2008 and 2009
financial years of its subsidiary, Provident Polska. IPF has
rebutted the claims, on the basis of professional advice and the
agreed treatment of prior years, and has appealed. The timetable
for the appeal process is uncertain. In order to appeal, IPF was
first obliged to pay the amount assessed (GBP37 million), which
has been recognised in IPF's balance sheet as a non-current
financial asset, as opposed to being charged against reserves.
Provident Polska's 2010 and 2011 financial years are currently
being audited, and subsequent years remain open to potential
future audit. Should IPF also need to appeal future decisions,
further payments could be needed, giving rise to uncertainties in
relation to the amount and timing of such cash outflows.

In December 2016 the Polish Ministry of Justice published a
proposal to tighten the rate cap introduced less than a year
earlier on consumer loans in Poland. Despite initiating a 14-day
consultation period for the draft bill, there has been no update
from the Ministry of Justice since, so IPF and its competitors
continue to operate under the original cap. In the absence of a
cancellation of the proposal, it remains Fitch's view that
enactment of such a law in IPF's largest market could have a
material impact on its business, notwithstanding management's
significant experience in modifying its product offerings in such
scenarios, both in Poland and in other markets.

IPF's funding is spread across a range of bonds and bank
facilities, but each is subject to the inherent associated
refinancing risks. At end-FY17 the group had substantially
committed undrawn bank facilities totalling GBP189 million (2016:
GBP 152 million), and an average period to maturity on its bonds
and committed borrowing facilities of 2.6 years (2016: 3.3
years). Should its available funding headroom be diminished,
IPF's liquidity is boosted by the fairly short duration of much
of its lending, enabling it to run down the size of its loan book
relatively quickly if required.

The geographic spread of IPF's operations provides a degree of
protection against regulatory shocks in any one market, but in
recent years the prevalence of caps on permissible interest rates
and on service fees has increased. This has highlighted the
susceptibility of the group's operating model to such
interventions, particularly in relation to its traditional home-
collected credit business, which carries the high overheads of
collection agents. To complement its home-collected credit
business, IPF has invested significantly in developing its online
platform, IPF Digital, where credit issued in FY17 grew by 44%
(at constant exchange rates) to GBP231 million. However, IPF
Digital does not yet contribute a net profit, as early-stage
costs in newer countries of operation offset the positive
contribution from markets where the IPF Digital business is more
established.

IPF's customers typically fall outside bank lending criteria, and
so carry higher impairment risk. In FY17, impairment as a
proportion of revenue was 24.4%, consistent with FY16. However,
loans are priced to compensate for this, with FY17 pre-tax profit
(including small loss from discontinued operations) of GBP97.7
million amounting to 7.6% of average total assets, consistent
with a higher rating under Fitch's benchmark ratios for finance
and leasing companies. Earnings reduced in the group's now mature
Northern Europe home credit markets, but continued to grow in
Southern Europe and Mexico, and were supplemented by a GBP3.2
million positive contribution from collections outperformance in
Slovakia and Lithuania, where the group has ceased new business.

IPF's ratio of debt to tangible equity strengthened in FY17 to
1.7x (2016: 1.9x), despite a 9% rise in borrowings to GBP678
million (2016: GBP623 million) as its loan book expanded.
However, the associated growth in capital was driven more by
GBP51.3 million of gains on foreign currency translation than by
the year's GBP36.6 million of net income, GBP27.6 million of
which was distributed in dividends. Leverage is low for a lending
business, but necessarily tailored to reflect the impairment
risks within the customer base.

The rating of IPF's senior unsecured notes is in line with the
group's Long-Term IDR, reflecting Fitch's expectation for average
recovery prospects given that IPF's funding is predominantly
unsecured.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT

The ratings could be downgraded if IPF were to lose its Polish
tax case, thereby requiring an associated charge against its
capital and reserves, or if Poland were to proceed with a tighter
rate cap law, placing an additional constraint on IPF's business
model within its largest market. The inability to maintain
headroom on funding lines ahead of their refinancing dates,
thereby restricting management's capacity to execute its business
plan, could also have a negative impact on the ratings.

In the normal course of its business, IPF's ratings also remain
sensitive to new regulatory restrictions in markets other than
Poland, and to any deterioration in asset quality as its product
mix evolves, for example as the Digital proportion of the loan
book grows.

Fitch could revise the Negative Outlook to Stable if the
uncertainties relating to the Polish tax issue and potential
tighter rate cap are resolved without material adverse impact on
IPF, and the group is able to maintain sufficient headroom on its
funding lines to be able to develop the business in line with
management plans. An upgrade is unlikely while these issues
remain unsettled, but the ratings could benefit over time from
successful development of IPF Digital into a provider of stable
recurring earnings streams less susceptible to regulatory
pressures on its business model than the group's high cost home
collected credit operations.

The senior debt rating is primarily sensitive to a change in
IPF's Long-Term IDR.

In accordance with Fitch's mapping table, IPF's Short-Term IDR is
only sensitive to a downgrade of IPF's Long-Term IDR to below 'B-
'.

CRITERIA VARIATION

The analysis supporting IPF's 'BB' IDR includes a variation from
Fitch's "Global Non-Bank Financial Institutions Rating Criteria".
Fitch's impaired and nonperforming loans benchmark ratio for
asset quality is usually calculated as gross impaired loans as a
proportion of gross loans, but in IPF's case Fitch uses net
impaired customer receivables as a proportion of net customer
receivables, in accordance with the company's accounting
disclosure.


SHUROPODY: Plans to Enter Into CVA for Second Time
--------------------------------------------------
Tim Clark at Drapers Online reports that Shuropody is planning to
enter into a company voluntary arrangement (CVA) for the second
time in just over a year.

Shuropody is a foot clinic and comfort footwear retailer.


SMALL BUSINESS 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized its provisional ratings to the
Class A Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes and Class D Notes
(collectively, the Rated Notes) issued by Small Business
Origination Loan Trust 2018-1 DAC (SBOLT 2018-1 or the Issuer):

-- GBP 128.07 million Class A Notes at A (high) (sf)
-- GBP 12.39 million Class B Notes at A (sf)
-- GBP 14.46 million Class C Notes at BBB (sf)
-- GBP 14.46 million Class D Notes at BB (high) (sf)

The transaction is a cash flow securitization collateralized by a
portfolio of term loans and originated through the Funding Circle
Ltd lending platform (Funding Circle or the Originator) to small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and sole traders based in the
United Kingdom (U.K.). All the loans are fully amortizing and
unsecured. As of 18 April 2018, the transaction's portfolio
included 4,007 loans to 3,928 obligors, totaling GBP 206.5
million.

The rating on the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate repayment of principal payable on or
before the Legal Maturity Date in December 2026. The ratings on
the Class B, Class C Notes and Class D Notes address the ultimate
payment of interest and principal payable on or before the Legal
Maturity Date in May 2026 in accordance with transaction
documentation.

The total purchase price of the portfolio was GBP 221,904,201;
although, the par value of the outstanding portfolio principal
balance transferred is GBP 206,572,566. DBRS considered only the
outstanding portfolio principal balance (at par) for its
analysis.

The portfolio has some exposure to the "Business Equipment &
Services" industry, representing 31.3% of the outstanding
balance. The portfolio included loans with no industry
classification (7.5%), for which DBRS assumed to be part of the
largest industry concentration. The "Building & Development"
(17.4%) and "Farming/Agriculture" (6.8%) sectors have the second-
and third-largest exposures based on the DBRS Industry
classification.

The portfolio exhibits low obligor concentration. The top obligor
and the largest ten obligor groups represent 0.22% and 1.85% of
the outstanding balance, respectively. The top three regions for
borrower concentration are the South East, London and Midlands,
representing approximately 24.2%, 15.2% and 13.5% of the
portfolio balance, respectively.

The historical data provided by Funding Circle reflects the
portfolio composition, which includes unsecured loans for which
Funding Circle internally categorizes borrowers into six risk
bands (A+, A, B, C, D and E). DBRS assumed a weighted-average
annualized probability of default (PD) rate of 7.2% for this
portfolio. For its analysis, DBRS calculated the PDs for each
risk band in order to capture any negative or positive pool
selection, in addition to applying an additional stress (50%) to
the PD of loans classified as refinancing loans in the portfolio.
The assumed PDs for A+, A, B, C, D and E risk bands are 2.9%,
5.4%, 8.6%, 9.0%, 13.4% and 20.0%, respectively.

Funding Circle acts as the platform servicer. It is also
responsible for the underwriting processes associated with
originations. While Funding Circle services the receivables, the
loans were funded by the seller, P2P Global Investments PLC,
which is an institutional investor.

The transaction incorporates separate interest and principal
waterfalls. The interest waterfall includes a principal
deficiency ledger (PDL) concept for each class of notes. This PDL
concept results, according to DBRS's cash flow analysis and the
terms of the transaction documents, in the timely payment of
interest for the Class A Notes and ultimate payment of interest
for the Class B, Class C and Class D Notes in the respective
rating stress scenarios. The transaction documents permit the
deferral of interest on non-senior bonds and this is not
considered an event of default.

At closing, the Class A Notes benefit from a total credit
enhancement of 39.8%, the Class B Notes benefit from a credit
enhancement of 33.8%, Class C Notes benefit from a credit
enhancement of 26.8%, and Class D Notes benefits from a credit
enhancement of 19.8%. Credit enhancement is provided by
subordination and the Cash Reserve Account (1.75% of initial
portfolio).

The rating of the Notes is based on DBRS's review of the
following items:

   -- The transaction includes a pro rata amortization unless
certain sequential trigger amortization events are breached.

   -- The portfolio is static and consists of senior unsecured
loans with maturities between six months and five years. All
loans are amortizing, contributing to a short weighted-average
life (WAL) of 2.04 years. No adjustments were applied by DBRS as
no permitted variations of the terms of the loans including
maturity extensions are allowed.

   -- Despite that historical performance data for Funding Circle
is available from 2010, the data does not capture downturn
periods of an economic cycle. While it is not clear how Funding
Circle borrowers would perform during adverse economic periods,
DBRS used proxy data to estimate expected stressed performance
during adverse periods of a cycle when determining its base case
PDs for each of the six risk bands.

   -- Funding Circle originates loans for a broad range of
borrower risk profiles and categorizes borrowers according to six
internal risk bands: A+, A, B, C, D and E. The portfolio includes
borrowers from all risk bands resulting in a DBRS WA PD of 7.2%
which is significantly higher than for a typical SME portfolio in
the U.K.

  -- The transaction benefits from an interest rate cap which
limits the interest rate risk between the floating-rate notes and
the portfolio comprised solely of fixed-rate loans.

  -- The transaction benefits from a back-up servicer which
reduces servicer continuity risk.

DBRS determined its ratings as per the principal methodology
specified below and based on the following analytical
considerations:

  -- The PD for the portfolio was determined using the historical
performance information supplied as well as stressed assumptions
for adverse periods of a credit cycle. For this transaction DBRS
assumed an average annualized PD of 7.2%.

  -- The weighted-average life (WAL) of the portfolio was 2.04
years.

  -- The PD and WAL were used in the DBRS Diversity Model to
generate the hurdle rates for the assigned ratings.

   -- The recovery rate was determined taking into consideration
that all loans in the portfolio are senior unsecured. For the
Class A and Class B Notes, DBRS applied a 23.4% recovery rate.
For the Class C Notes, DBRS applied an 24.0% recovery rate and
for Class D a 32.9% recovery rate. These are lower than those
outlined in the principal methodology amid the uncertainty about
the asset base of Funding Circle borrowers during adverse
economic periods.

   -- The break-even rates for the interest rate stresses and
default timings were determined using the DBRS cash flow tool.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *