/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/180621.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, June 21, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 122


                            Headlines


G E R M A N Y

WEPA HYGIENEPRODUKTE: Moody's Affirms Ba3 CFR, Outlook Negative


I R E L A N D

BBVA Consumer 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating to Cl. D Notes
CFHL-2 2015: Moody's Affirms Rating on Class E Notes at 'Ba3'
KANTOOR 2018 DAC: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating to Class E Notes
LIBRA DAC: DBRS Assigns Provisional BB Rating to Class E Notes
LIBRA DAC: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes


I T A L Y

ARAGORN NPL 2018: DBRS Assigns CCC Rating to Class B Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

E-MAC DE 2005-I: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class D Notes
MAXEDA DIY: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B-' ICR


P O R T U G A L

MADEIRA: DBRS Assigns BB LT Issuer Rating, Trend Stable
BANCO COMMERCIAL: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Long-Term Issuer Rating


R O M A N I A

DIGI COMMUNICATIONS: Moody's Affirms B1 CFR, Outlook Now Stable


R U S S I A

INTERNATIONAL BANK OF SAINT-PETERSBURG: S&P Affirms 'B-/B' ICR


S P A I N

AYT DEUDA I: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws D(sf) Rating on C Notes
IM SABADELL PYME 10: Moody's Confirms B2 Rating on Class B Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BLIPPAR: Says Report about Friction with Investors is False
ENLIST BRANDS: Put Up for Sale Following Cashflow Woes
HOUSE OF FRASER: Lenders Agree to Extend Loans Ahead of CVA Vote
MATTRESSMAN: Enters Into CVA, Westwood Store to Close
NEW LOOK: Iceland to Take Possession of Stratford Mall Store

NEWDAY 2015-1: DBRS Confirms B (high) Rating on Class F Notes
TRINIDAD 2018-1 PLC: DBRS Puts Prov. B(low) Rating to Cl. F Notes

* UK: Legal Sector Insolvencies on Track to Double in 2018


                            *********



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G E R M A N Y
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WEPA HYGIENEPRODUKTE: Moody's Affirms Ba3 CFR, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba3 corporate family
rating (CFR) and Ba3-PD probability of default rating (PDR) of
WEPA Hygieneprodukte GmbH (WEPA), as well as the B1 rating (LGD4)
of the senior secured bonds due 2024 issued by WEPA.
Concurrently, Moody's has changed the outlook on the ratings to
negative from stable.

"Today's rating action reflects the increasing uncertainty about
WEPA's ability to sustainably return its EBITDA margin in the low
teens in the percentage terms in the next 12-18 months in an
environment of increasing and persistently high pulp prices. An
improved margin and EBITDA generation is needed for the company
to deleverage towards the levels that are commensurate with a Ba3
rating", says Martin Fujerik, Moody's lead analyst for WEPA. "The
debt-funded buyout of the remaining stake in WEPA's Northwood
joint venture will further increase leverage, even though not
materially, and weaken WEPA's liquidity profile, notwithstanding
the good strategic rationale of this acquisition", explains Mr.
Fujerik.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Operational performance of WEPA, as well as other non-integrated
tissue producers in Europe, is currently under pressure. This is
primarily because pulp prices have increased significantly in
2017 and through 2018, being currently at an all-time high, and,
contrary to the rating agency's previous expectations, they
continue to rise further. Since many of WEPA's contracts are
negotiated on a yearly basis, WEPA can only pass those increases
to its customers with a material delay. As a consequence the
company's EBITDA margin, as adjusted by Moody's, markedly
deteriorated to 10.5% for the 12 months to March 2018 period from
14.4% in 2016 and its Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA increased to
5.5x from 4.1x and is likely to deteriorate further towards 6.0x
in the second quarter of 2018, which Moody's expects to be the
weakest quarter in terms of leverage. This is well above the 4.5x
level commensurate with the agency's expectation for a Ba3 rating
and positions WEPA weakly in the Ba3 rating category.

While WEPA's first quarter 2018 results remained broadly in line
with the rating agency expectations set late last year, Moody's
now believes that pulp prices will remain high well above
historical average in the next two to three years, given that
demand for pulp continues to be strong and there is limited new
pulp capacity coming to the market between 2019 and 2021.

While passing through a part of the high pulp prices to WEPA's
customers in the short term appears possible, supported, for
instance, by a recent decision of some of the WEPA's key
customers to increase tissue prices to the end customers, it
remains uncertain whether WEPA will be able to structurally
return its EBITDA margin towards the level achieved in 2016 in
the next 12-18 months amid persistently high pulp prices. The
margin improvement, and, hence, an increase in absolute EBITDA
level, is needed for WEPA to reduce its leverage ratio below 4.5x
(on Moody's adjusted basis) and could be achieved by a successful
cost pass through, but also through product mix shifts towards
products that are fully or partially based on recycled paper,
which is currently not experiencing price inflation.

The uncertainty about WEPA's ability to deleverage in the next
12-18 months is further exacerbated by WEPA's decision to buy out
the remaining shares of its partner in its tissue plant joint
venture in Northwood (the UK). While Moody's recognises a good
strategic rationale behind the transaction, which will strengthen
WEPA's position in the UK tissue market with good growth
prospects and above average profitability, the financing of this
transaction by debt will increase its leverage by roughly 0.2x,
as calculated by the company. Even though the leverage increase
is not dramatic, it comes at a time when WEPA's leverage is
already stretched well above the current rating level as well as
well above the company's own net leverage target of around 3.0x
(4.3x for the 12 months to March 2018 period).

In addition, being financed by a combination of drawings under
WEPA's currently undrawn EUR125 million revolving facility (RCF)
and drawdowns under its ABS programme, it will weaken the
company's liquidity profile, which however Moody's still views as
adequate at this point. This is because WEPA is going to have
relatively limited capacity over the next two to three quarters
under its springing net leverage covenant that is tested when the
RCF is drawn by at least 35%. Even though Moody's does not expect
WEPA to trigger the test after the transaction is consumed
(unlikely before the end of June, when the leverage is likely to
peak), the distance to the testing level will decrease
significantly, leaving relatively little capacity for weaker-
than-expected performance.

WEPA's ability to pay down the RCF drawings will depend on its
ability to pass on increased pulp prices to its customers as well
as discipline with regards to further capital investments beyond
the previous expansion programme that WEPA is currently
finalising. In any case, Moody's does not expect WEPA to generate
meaningful positive free cash flows in 2018 even without further
expansionary capital investments.

In addition WEPA's ABS programme matures in the first quarter of
2019, exposing it to a refinancing risk, but the rating agency
understands that the company is in the final rounds to negotiate
an extension in maturity and size, which Moody's factored in the
affirmation of the Ba3 rating.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

The ratings could be downgraded if WEPA is unable to improve its
Moody's adjusted EBITDA margin into low teens in % terms, leading
to Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA staying above 4.5x beyond 2019. A
negative rating action could also be triggered by a further
weakening of liquidity profile.

The ratings could be upgraded if Moody's adjusted Debt/EBITDA
were to be sustainably maintained around 3.5x with sustainable
EBITDA margins of above 13% and consistently positive free cash
flow generation.

Headquartered in Arnsberg (Germany), WEPA is among the leading
producers and suppliers of tissue paper products in Europe. The
company focuses on private-label consumer tissue products, which
generate almost 90% of group sales, with the remainder of sales
generated primarily by tissue solutions for away-from-home
applications. The company operates 11 production sites across
Europe and has around 3,300 employees. WEPA generated around EUR1
billion of sales in 2017. The company operates in Europe, with an
established footprint in Germany, Italy, Benelux, France, Poland
and the UK. WEPA was founded in 1948 by Paul Krengel. Currently,
three Krengel families hold equal shares in the company.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Paper and
Forest Products Industry published in March 2018.


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I R E L A N D
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BBVA Consumer 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating to Cl. D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned the following provisional ratings
to the Class A Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes and Class D
Notes (together with the unrated Class E Notes and Class Z Notes,
the Notes) to be issued by BBVA Consumer Auto 2018-1, FT. (the
Issuer):

-- Class A Notes: AA (low) (sf)
-- Class B Notes: A (sf)
-- Class C Notes: BBB (sf)
-- Class D Notes: BB (sf)

The rating of the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final
maturity date. The ratings of the Class B Notes, the Class C
Notes and the Class D Notes address the ultimate payment of
interest and ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final
maturity date.

The ratings will be finalized upon receipt of an execution
version of the governing transaction documents. To the extent
that the documents and information provided to DBRS to date
differ from the executed version of the governing transaction
documents, DBRS may assign a different final rating to the Notes.

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

   -- Transaction capital structure, including form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

   -- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
which they have invested.

   -- The Originator/Servicer's capabilities with respect to
originations, underwriting and servicing.

   -- DBRS conducted an operation risk review on Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria SA (BBVA) premises and deems it to be an
acceptable servicer.

   -- The transaction parties' financial strength with regard to
their respective roles.

   -- The sovereign rating of the Kingdom of Spain, currently at
"A".

   -- The consistency of the transaction's legal structure with
DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology, the presence of legal opinions that
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer and non-
consolidation of the Issuer with the seller.

The transaction cash flow structure was analyzed in Intex
DealMaker.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


CFHL-2 2015: Moody's Affirms Rating on Class E Notes at 'Ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two Notes
in CFHL-2 2015. The rating action reflects the better than
expected collateral performance and the increased levels of
credit enhancement for the affected Notes.

EUR32.5M Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug
23, 2017 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

EUR27M Class D Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 23,
2017 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the three Notes that had
sufficient credit enhancement to maintain the current rating on
the affected Notes.

EUR415M (Current Outstanding Amount 353.1M) Class A2-A Notes,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2017 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR72M Class B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23,
2017 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

EUR27.5M (Current Outstanding Amount 22.9M) Class E Notes,
Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2017 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is prompted by the decreased key collateral
assumption, namely the portfolio Expected Loss ("EL") assumption,
due to better than expected collateral performance and the deal
deleveraging resulting in an increase in credit enhancement for
the affected tranches.

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions:

As part of the rating action, Moody's reassessed its lifetime
loss expectation for the portfolio reflecting the collateral
performance to date.

The performance of the transaction has continued to be stable
since 2015. Total delinquencies have risen modestly in the past
year, with 90 days plus arrears currently standing at 0.09% of
current pool balance. Cumulative defaults currently stand at
0.37% of original pool balance.

Moody's decreased the EL assumption to 0.74% from 0.94% of
original pool balance due to the better than expected collateral
performance.

Moody's has also assessed loan-by-loan information as a part of
its detailed transaction review to determine the credit support
consistent with target rating levels and the volatility of future
losses. As a result, Moody's has maintained the MILAN CE
assumption at 8.6%.

Increase in Available Credit Enhancement:

Sequential amortization and a non-amortising reserve fund led to
the increase in the credit enhancement available in this
transaction, despite gradual amortisation of Class E.

The credit enhancement for the most senior tranche affected by
Moody's upgrade, Class C, increased from 9.93% to 11.35% since
last rating action in August 2017.

Moody's rating actions took into consideration the Notes'
exposure to relevant counterparties, such as servicer, account
banks and swap provider.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2017.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
these ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that
become less relevant or typically remain unchanged during the
surveillance stage.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) performance of the underlying collateral that
is better than Moody's expected, (2) deleveraging of the capital
structure and (3) improvements in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk (2) performance
of the underlying collateral that is worse than Moody's expected,
(3) deterioration in the Notes' available credit enhancement and
(4) deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.


KANTOOR 2018 DAC: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB Rating to Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned provisional ratings to the
following classes of notes to be issued by Kantoor Finance 2018
DAC (the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Kantor Finance 2018 DAC is a EUR 247.8 million securitization
(the Transaction) of two Dutch senior commercial real estate
loans (the PPF loan and the Iron loan) including the pari passu
capital expenditure (capex) facility associated with the Iron
loan, all advanced by the Goldman Sachs Bank U.S.A. (together
with Goldman Sachs International, GS). The loans are secured
against 18 predominantly office assets located in the Netherlands
(the Portfolio) owned by PPF Group and Aventicum Capital
Management (the Sponsors).

The PPF Loan served to refinance an existing portfolio of seven
office properties, one office/leased hotel and one retail
property across the Netherlands and owned by PPF since 2014. The
allocated loan amount of the portfolio is EUR 184.97 million,
which results in a day-one loan-to-value (LTV) of 61.0% based on
CB Richard Ellis's (CBRE) valuation of EUR 302.99 million and
dated 27 February 2018. As at 1 June 2018 (the PPF cut-off date),
the properties were 77.3% occupied (or 84.1% when excluding the
vacant property located at Hofplein 19, Rotterdam, which is
currently under refurbishment) by 91 different tenants and PPF
has projected a 2018 net operating income (NOI) of EUR 20.08
million, which implies a net initial yield (NIY) of 6.6% and a
conservative day-one debt yield (DY) of 10.9%. DBRS's net cash
flow assumption is EUR 16.2 million. The loan carries a floating
interest rate equal to the three-month Euribor (subject to zero
floors) plus a margin of 2.4% and is fully hedged with an
interest rate cap strike of 1.5% to be purchased from HSBC Bank
Plc. The expected loan maturity is in May 2023, and the loan
amortizes by 1.0% p.a. in Years 2 to 4 and 2.0% p.a. in Year 5.

The Iron loan served to fund the acquisition of nine office
properties also located in the Netherlands. The properties were
acquired through a couple of transactions: the first six-office
portfolio (Iron I) was purchased in October 2017 from Kildare
Partners (the Graafsebaan 67 was sold after acquisition), and the
second four-office portfolio (Iron II) was acquired in March and
April 2018 from Angelo Gordon and ASR Real Estate. GS provided
the Sponsor with EUR 36.4 million of acquisition financing and a
EUR 4.5 million pari passu-ranking capex facility through two
different tranches for the Iron I and Iron II portfolios. The LTV
of the loan is 71.1% based on total loan amount and EUR 88.4
million current market value (MV) or 66.0% based on term loan
only. As at 1 June 2018 (the Iron loan cut-off date, together
with the PPF loan cut-off date, the cut-off date), the portfolio
is 85.7% occupied by 70 tenants, with the largest five tenants
accounting for 41.9% of the EUR 8.5 million gross rental income
(GRI). Based on a sponsor-projected 12-month NOI of EUR 5.9
million, the loan benefits from a moderate day-one DY of 10.2%,
the NIY is 6.7%. DBRS's net cash flow assumption is EUR 4.8
million. The loan bears interest at a floating interest rate
equal to the three-month Euribor (subject to zero floor) plus a
margin of 3.40% and 3.50% for the Iron I and Iron II tranches,
respectively. The transaction is also fully hedged with an
interest rate cap strike of 0.5% to be provided by Natixis,
London Branch. The expected loan maturity is five years from the
first utilization date, in October 2022, and the loan structure
includes amortization of 1.0% p.a. in Years 2 to 4 and 2.0% p.a.
in Year 5.

The transaction benefits from a liquidity facility, which will
total EUR 14.3 million, or 6.1% of the total outstanding balance
of the notes, and will be provided by [*] (the Liquidity Facility
Provider). The liquidity facility can be used to cover interest
shortfalls on the class A, class B, class C and class D notes.
According to DBRS's analysis, the commitment amount, as at
closing, will be equivalent to approximately [29] months and [19]
months' coverage for the covered notes, based on the weighted-
average interest rate cap strike rate of 1.25% p.a. and the
Euribor cap after loan maturity of [5%] p.a., respectively.

Iron loan will mature on 15 November 2022 while PPF loan will
mature six months later on 15 May 2023. Neither loan has an
extension option. Meanwhile, the Transaction is expected to repay
by 22 May 2023, one week after the maturity of PPF loan. Should
the notes fail to be repaid by then, this will constitute, among
others, a special servicing transfer event and the Transaction
has envisaged a [five] year tail period to allow the special
servicer to work out the loan(s) by [May 2028] the latest.

Class E is subjected to an available funds cap where the
shortfall is attributable to an increase in the weighted-average
margin of the notes.

The Transaction includes a class X diversion trigger event,
meaning that if the loans' financial covenants are breached, any
interest and prepayment fees due the class X note holders will
be, instead, paid directly in the Issuer transaction account and
credited to the class X diversion ledger. However, only following
the expected note maturity or the delivery of a note acceleration
notice, such funds can potentially be used to amortize the notes.

To maintain compliance with applicable regulatory requirements,
GS will retain an ongoing material economic interest of not less
than 5% of the securitization via an issuer loan that is to be
advanced by Goldman Sachs Bank USA.

The ratings will be finalized upon receipt of execution version
of the governing transaction documents. To the extent that the
documents and information provided to DBRS as of this date differ
from the executed version of the governing transaction documents,
DBRS may assign a different final rating to the rated notes.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


LIBRA DAC: DBRS Assigns Provisional BB Rating to Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned provisional ratings to the
following classes of notes to be issued by Libra (European Loan
Conduit No.31) DAC (the Issuer):

-- Class A1 at AAA (sf)
-- Class A2 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Libra (European Loan Conduit No.31) DAC is the securitization of
a EUR 282.5 million (67.5% loan-to-value or LTV) floating-rate
senior commercial real estate loan advanced by Morgan Stanley
Bank N.A. (together with the arranger Morgan Stanley & Co.
International PLC, Morgan Stanley) to refinance the existing
indebtedness of Starwood Capital and M7 Real Estate (together,
the Sponsor). In addition, there is a EUR 31.4 million (75% LTV)
mezzanine loan, which is structurally and contractually
subordinated to the senior facility and is not part of the
contemplated transaction.

The part of the senior loan expected to be sold to the Issuer is
equal to EUR 232.5 million or 82% of the senior loan. However,
the Issuer will advance EUR 11.6 million (5% of the senior loan)
back to Morgan Stanley in the form of a vertical risk retention
(VRR) loan interest to comply with the risk retention
requirements. Therefore, only EUR 220.9 million of the senior
loan (79% of the total senior loan) will be securitized in the
transaction. DBRS understands that the EUR 1,606 over issuance
proceeds will be distributed to note holders on the first
interest payment date.

The senior loan carries a floating interest rate equal to the
three-month Euribor (subject to a zero floor) plus a margin of
2.0%. The senior facility is fully hedged with interest rate caps
that have a weighted-average strike rate of 1.0% in the first
three years and 1.5% in the last two years (assuming the loan
extension options have been exercised). The caps are provided by
Wells Fargo Bank, NA (London branch).

The collateral securing the loan is composed of 49 light-
industrial properties and one office property (the Portfolio)
located in Germany and the Netherlands. As of January 2018, the
Portfolio generated a net operating income of EUR 28.8 per annum
(p.a.), which implies a net initial yield of 6.9% and a senior
day-one debt yield of 10.2% (or 9.2% including the mezzanine
loan). The properties located in Germany were valued at EUR 218.5
million (52.2% of the market value or MV) by Jones Lang LaSalle
GmbH while the properties in the Netherlands were valued at EUR
200.1 million (47.8% of the MV) by Knight Frank.

The transaction will refinance a logistics portfolio originally
acquired by the Sponsor in 2014 and 2015, which was financed at
that time by Deutsche Bank and Bank of America Merrill Lynch
through two loans securitized in Deco 2015-Charlemagne S.A. and
Taurus 2015-3 EU DAC, respectively.

The initial expected loan maturity date is January 20, 2021.
However, the borrower can exercise two one-year extension options
provided that a predetermined list of conditions is met including
that (1) there are no payment defaults, (2) the transaction is
compliant with the required hedging conditions and (3) the
mezzanine facility has been extended for at least the same time
period. The senior loan benefits from limited scheduled
amortization: (1) 0.5% p.a. in the second and third year of the
loan term and (2) 1.0% p.a. in the fourth and fifth year of the
loan term (if extended).

The transaction will benefit from an EUR [10.5] million liquidity
facility (LF) to be provided by Wells Fargo Bank, NA (London
branch). The LF can be used to cover interest shortfalls on
Classes A through D. According to DBRS's analysis, the LF amount
will be equivalent to approximately [20] months' and [ten]
months' coverage on the covered notes, based on the interest rate
cap strike rate of 1.5% per annum post initial loan maturity date
and the Euribor cap after loan maturity of 4.25% per annum,
respectively.

In addition to the liquidity facility, the transaction will
feature a senior expenses reserve to cover senior expenses. DBRS
notes that the senior expense reserve will be funded to EUR
200,000, which should cover the senior fees of one interest
period in case the available LF has been reduced to zero upon
full repayment of the Class A1, A2, B, C and D notes.

Class E is subject to an available funds cap where the shortfall
is attributable to an increase in the weighted-average margin of
the notes.

Morgan Stanley will retain 5% material interest in the
transaction through the VRR loan. Moreover, Morgan Stanley will
retain an additional EUR [50] million of the senior loan. All
amounts payable to the VRR loan interest owners (the VRR loan
interest amounts) in respect of the VRR loan interest will rank
pari passu with corresponding amounts payable in respect of the
notes.

The ratings will be finalized upon receipt of execution version
of the governing transaction documents. To the extent that the
documents and information provided to DBRS as of this date differ
from the executed version of the governing transaction documents,
DBRS may assign a different final rating to the rated notes.

NOTES: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


LIBRA DAC: S&P Assigns Prelim BB- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings has assigned its preliminary ratings on Libra
(European Loan Conduit No. 31) DAC's class A1, A2, B, C, D, and E
notes. At closing Libra will also issue unrated class X notes.

The transaction is backed by one senior loan, which Morgan
Stanley & Co. International PLC (Morgan Stanley) originated in
January 2018 to facilitate the refinancing of the light
industrial portfolio initially acquired by MStar Europe L.P.
(95%-owned by Starwood Fund IX and 5%-owned by M7 Real Estate
Ltd.).

The senior loan backing this true sale transaction equals
EUR282.5 million and is secured by 49 light industrial properties
and one office building in Germany and in the Netherlands (these
assets provided the collateral for the Bilux loan securitised in
TAURUS 2015-3 EU DAC CMBS and for the MStar Europe loan
securitised in DECO 2015 CHARLEMAGNE S.A).

The securitized loan balance will be 82% of the senior loan
(EUR282.5 million) with Morgan Stanley holding a EUR50 million
interest that will rank pari passu with the securitized loan. The
issuer will create a EUR11.63 million (representing 5% of the
securitised senior loan) vertical risk retention loan interest
(VRR loan) in favour of Morgan Stanley to satisfy E.U. and U.S.
risk retention requirements.

LOAN OVERVIEW

Morgan Stanley arranged and underwrote the single loan to
facilitate the refinance of a portfolio of 50 assets located in
major cities across Germany and the Netherlands.

The loan, which matures in January 2021 and has two one-year
extension options amortizes at 0.125% quarterly during years two
and three and at 0.250% quarterly during years four and five. Its
event of default covenants are triggered at an 80% LTV ratio or
at a 7.25% debt yield ratio during years one and two and at 7.75%
during years three to five. An 8.33% debt yield ratio would
trigger a mandatory cash trap event in years one and two while an
8.89% ratio would trigger it during years three to five. An LTV
ratio higher than 74.25% would also trigger a mandatory cash
trap.

S&P said, "In our analysis, we evaluated the underlying real
estate collateral securing the loan to generate an expected case
value. Our analysis focused on sustainable property cash flows
and capitalization rates. We assumed that a real estate workout
would be required throughout the five-year tail period (the
period between the maturity date of the loan that matures last
and the transaction's final maturity date) needed to repay
noteholders, if the respective borrowers defaulted. We then
determined the loan recovery proceeds applying a recovery
proceeds rate at each rating level. This analysis begins with the
adoption of base market value declines and recovery rate
assumptions for different rating levels. At each rating category,
we adjusted the base recovery rates to reflect specific property,
loan, and transaction characteristics.

"We aggregated the derived recovery proceeds above for each loan
at each rating level, and compared them with the proposed capital
structure. Following our credit analysis, we consider the
available credit enhancement for each class of notes to be
commensurate with our preliminary ratings on the notes."

  RATINGS LIST

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Libra (European Loan Conduit No. 31) DAC EUR220.9 Million
  Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

  Class           Rating      Amount

  A1              AAA (sf)     113.7
  A2              AA (sf)       23.7
  B               AA- (sf)      12.4
  C               A- (sf)       28.5
  D               BBB- (sf)     22.9
  E               BB- (sf)      19.7
  X               NR             0.1

  NR--Not rated.


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I T A L Y
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ARAGORN NPL 2018: DBRS Assigns CCC Rating to Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned the following ratings to the notes
issued by Aragorn NPL 2018 S.r.l. (the Issuer):

-- BBB (low) (sf) to the EUR 509,524,000 Class A notes
-- CCC (sf) to the EUR 66,822,000 Class B notes

The notes are backed by a EUR 1.7 billion portfolio by gross book
value (GBV) consisting of unsecured and secured non-performing
loans originated by Credito Valtellinese S.p.A. and Credito
Siciliano S.p.A. (the Originators). The majority of loans in the
portfolio defaulted between 2014 and 2017 and are in various
stages of resolution. The receivables are serviced by Cerved
S.p.A. and Credito Fondiario S.p.A. (Credito Fondiario). Credito
Fondiario also operates as the Master Servicer in the
transaction.

Approximately 82% of the pool by GBV is secured and 73.0% (by
GBV) of the pool benefits from a first-ranking lien. The secured
loans included in the portfolio are backed by properties
distributed across Italy, with concentrations in the regions of
Lombardy, Sicily, Lazio and Marche. In its analysis, DBRS assumed
that all loans are worked out through an auction process, which
generally has the longest resolution timeline.

Interest on the Class B notes, which represent mezzanine debt,
may be repaid prior to the principal of the Class A notes (up to
a cap of 7%, with the remainder being paid junior to the Class A
notes) unless certain performance related triggers are breached.

The securitization includes the possibility to implement a ReoCo
structure.

The ratings are based on DBRS's analysis of the projected
recoveries of the underlying collateral, the historical
performance and expertise of the Special Servicers, the
availability of liquidity to fund interest shortfalls and
special-purpose vehicle expenses, the cap agreement and the
transaction's legal and structural features. DBRS's BBB (low)
(sf) and CCC (sf) rating stresses assume a haircut of
approximately 17.7% and 0.0% respectively to the Special
Servicers' business plan for the portfolio.

DBRS analyzed the transaction structure using Intex DealMaker.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


E-MAC DE 2005-I: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of four Notes in
E-MAC DE 2005-I B.V., E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V., E-MAC DE 2006-II B.V.
and E-MAC DE 2007-I B.V. At the same time Moody's affirmed the
ratings of eight Notes. These four E-MAC transactions are backed
by mortgage loans granted to German residents and CMIS Investment
B.V. (not rated) (previously GMAC RFC Investment B.V.) acts as
issuer administrator.

Issuer: E-MAC DE 2005-I B.V.

EUR259.2M (Current Outstanding 0.4M) Class A Notes, Affirmed A2
(sf); previously on Jul 27, 2017 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR18.6M Class B Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2017 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR9.9M Class C Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on May
6, 2016 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

EUR9.3M Class D Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 6,
2016 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V.

EUR437M (Current Outstanding 17.6M) Class A Notes, Affirmed A3
(sf); previously on Jul 27, 2017 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

EUR27M Class B Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb
13, 2017 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

EUR17.5M Class C Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 13,
2017 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: E-MAC DE 2006-II B.V.

EUR465.7M (Current Outstanding 31.7M) Class A2 Notes, Affirmed A2
(sf); previously on Jul 27, 2017 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR35M Class B Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep
22, 2016 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: E-MAC DE 2007-I B.V.

EUR19.5M (Current Outstanding 2.4M) Class A1 Notes, Affirmed A2
(sf); previously on Jul 27, 2017 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR443.3M (Current Outstanding 54.3M) Class A2 Notes, Affirmed A2
(sf); previously on Jul 27, 2017 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR39.1M Class B Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep
22, 2016 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's upgrades reflect 1) deal deleveraging resulting in an
increase in credit enhancement for the affected tranches and 2)
decreased key collateral assumptions, namely the portfolio
Expected Loss ("EL") assumption due to better than expected
collateral performance in E-MAC DE 2006-II B.V. and E-MAC DE
2007-I B.V. Moody's affirmed the ratings of the Notes that had
sufficient credit enhancement to maintain current rating on the
affected tranches.

Increase in Available Credit Enhancement

The upgraded Notes benefit from substantial increase in available
credit enhancement since the last rating action. Sequential
amortization led to the increase in the credit enhancement
available in the affected tranches.

For instance, the credit enhancement for Class C in E-MAC DE
2005-I B.V. has increased to 23.0% in May 2018 from 17.4% since
the last rating action in May 2016. The credit enhancement for
Class B in E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V. increased to 20.5% from 18.2%
since the last rating action in February 2017. The credit
enhancement for Class B in E-MAC DE 2006-II B.V. increased to
28.0% from 21.8% since the last rating action in September 2016.
The credit enhancement for Class B in E-MAC DE 2007-I B.V.
increased to 15.5% from 6.9% since the last rating action in
September 2016.

Moody's affirmed the ratings of eight Notes which have sufficient
credit enhancement to maintain their current ratings.

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions

As part of the rating action, Moody's reassessed its lifetime
loss expectation for the portfolio reflecting the collateral
performance to date.

For E-MAC DE 2006-I B.V., Moody's increased its EL assumption to
13.0% as a percentage of the original pool balance from 12.7%
given the delinquencies levels remain at high level, with 90 days
plus arrears standing at 19.2% in May 2018.

For E-MAC DE 2006-II B.V. and E-MAC DE 2007-I B.V., Moody's
decreased the EL assumption to 11.6% and 12.9% from 12.5% and
14.0% of original pool balance respectively due to the improving
performance.

EL assumption for E-MAC DE 2005-I B.V. remained unchanged at 9.9%
as a percentage of the original pool balance as the performance
of the securitised pool remains in line with Moody's assumption.

Moody's has also assessed loan-by-loan information as a part of
its detailed transaction review to determine the credit support
consistent with target rating levels and the volatility of future
losses. Moody's updated the MILAN CE in consideration of the
Minimum Expected Loss Multiple EL, a floor defined in Moody's
updated methodology for rating EMEA RMBS transactions. For E-MAC
DE 2005-I B.V. and E-MAC DE 2007-I B.V., Moody's has increased
the portfolio credit MILAN assumption to 33% from 28%; For E-MAC
DE 2006-I B.V. and E-MAC DE 2006-II B.V., Moody's has increased
the portfolio credit MILAN assumption to 35% from 28% given the
high LTV ratio of the current portfolio and the large regional
concentration in East Germany in excess of the benchmark.

In those four E-MAC transactions, the reserve funds have been
fully drawn, however the transactions still benefit from the
available liquidity. Moody's also considered how the liquidity
available in those transactions in case or shortfall and other
mitigants support continuity of note payments in case of servicer
default.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2017.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
these ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that
become less relevant or typically remain unchanged during the
surveillance stage.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) performance of the underlying collateral that
is better than Moody's expected, (2) deleveraging of the capital
structure and (3) improvements in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) performance of the underlying collateral that
is worse than Moody's expected, (2) deterioration in the notes'
available credit enhancement (3) deterioration in the credit
quality of the transaction counterparties and (4) increase in
sovereign risk.


MAXEDA DIY: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B-' ICR
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook to stable from positive on
for Maxeda DIY Group B.V., the holding company for Benelux-based
do-it-yourself (DIY) retailer Maxeda. S&p affirmed the 'B-'
long-term issuer credit rating on Maxeda.

S&P said, "At the same time, we affirmed our 'B+' long-term issue
rating on Maxeda DIY Holding B.V.'s EUR50 million super senior
revolving credit facility (RCF). The recovery rating remains at
'1', reflecting our expectation of very high recovery (90%-100%;
rounded estimate: 95%) in the event of default.

"We also affirmed our 'B-' long-term issue rating of Maxeda DIY
Holding B.V.'s EUR475 million senior secured notes. The '4'
recovery rating continues to reflect our expectation of 30%-50%
recovery prospects (rounded estimate: 45%).

"The outlook revision to stable follows Maxeda's reports of
improved but weaker-than-expected cash flows in fiscal 2018
(ended Jan. 31, 2018). We believe that Maxeda will still show
slightly negative reported FOCF in fiscal 2019, and that its S&P
Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA will improve to 6.0x from
6.3x in fiscal 2018. Our base-case estimates for both metrics
over the coming two years are weaker than our previous forecasts
but remain within the thresholds for the current 'B-' rating."

Despite extraordinary events such as labor strikes and roadworks
that limited accessibility to Maxeda's stores in Belgium and
hampered sales in fiscal 2018, the company improved its cost-
saving measures and deleveraged slightly from levels seen in
fiscal 2017. However, delayed delivery on working capital
improvement measures resulted in weaker cash flow than we
expected previously. Furthermore, for the next two fiscal years,
we do not anticipate additional gains from sale and lease-back
transactions, as the company saw in fiscal 2018. Positively,
Maxeda has sufficient liquidity, and its creditworthiness will
likely be underpinned by its entrenched position in the growing
DIY sector overall thanks to a favorable macroeconomic
environment in Benelux.

S&P said, "We anticipate that Maxeda will maintain its position
as the leading DIY retailer in Belgium and the No. 2 player in
the Netherlands, supported by market share gains against other
established players in the Benelux DIY sector. At the same time,
we believe competition will likely remain fierce, though,
exacerbated by pressure from the expansion of international
competitors, discounters, and the continued shift of consumer
spending online. Furthermore, we expect that competition will
restrain sales growth potential."

Maxeda's modest overall scale, limited geographic diversity, and
high degree of operating leverage--exposed to the seasonality of
the company's offering and sticky wage costs--mean it remains
susceptible to any downturn in housing market and macroeconomic
conditions. Although we expect some further expansion in margins,
in our opinion, earnings visibility remains low, limited by
sluggish overall sales growth and continued restructuring costs.
This, combined with material capital expenditures (capex), will
hinder FOCF generation over the next 12 months.

S&P said, "We expect Maxeda's credit metrics to strengthen
somewhat in fiscal 2019, with S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to
EBITDA declining to about 6.0x (equivalent to 5.0x if excluding
the EUR175 million of preference shares, which we consider debt-
like), compared with 6.3x in fiscal 2018. We also forecast a
subtle improvement in adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to
debt, set to reach 10.0%-11.0% from an estimated 9.5%-10.0% last
fiscal year. In addition, Maxeda's EBITDAR coverage (reported
EBITDA plus rent to cash interest plus rent) will increase toward
1.5x. Our forecast metrics for Maxeda are weaker than those of
the company's peers with the same financial risk profile.

"We treat the EUR175 million preference shares issued by ultimate
parent Maxeda DIY Group B.V as debt-like and include them in our
adjusted metrics. At the same time, we recognize their cash-
preserving nature and deep subordination in the capital
structure.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation of moderate
deleveraging and still-slightly negative FOCF generation over the
next 12 months. These modest improvements will stem from higher
operating earnings and improving working capital management. This
should result in adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 6.0x (and 5.0x
excluding preference shares) and an EBITDAR interest plus rent
cover of around 1.5x.

"We could take a negative rating action if Maxeda fails to
markedly improve reported FOCF from the approximately negative
EUR24 million reported last fiscal year. Rating pressure will
also arise if we observe that Maxeda's capital structure becomes
unsustainable because of insufficient deleveraging, for example
if adjusted debt to EBITDA exceeds 7x or EBITDA interest plus
rent coverage falls toward 1x. This could occur if the company
unexpectedly lost further market share, faced continued decrease
in sales or further setbacks in the execution of its cost
savings, or if working capital management initiatives resulted in
a depleting cash position and a weakening liquidity.

"We could take a positive rating action if we see sustained
improvement in earnings and financial metrics, with reported FOCF
turning materially and sustainably positive. A positive rating
action would also hinge on a reduction in adjusted leverage to
below 6.0x (equivalent to below 5.0x excluding preference shares)
and with a sustained EBITDAR coverage ratio of at least 1.5x.
Ratings upside would also require continued commitment from the
financial sponsors to maintain a financial policy supportive of
improved credit metrics as well as at least adequate liquidity."


===============
P O R T U G A L
==============


MADEIRA: DBRS Assigns BB LT Issuer Rating, Trend Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned a Long-Term-Issuer Rating of BB and
a Short-Term-Issuer Rating of R-4 to the Autonomous Region of
Madeira (Madeira). The trend on all the ratings is Stable.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

Madeira's ratings are underpinned by (1) a stabilizing financial
performance and slowly decreasing debt metrics supported by
improving economic indicators; (2) the financial oversight and
support to the regional government from the Republic of Portugal
(rated BBB, Stable, by DBRS); (3) Madeira's enhanced control over
its indirect debt as well as commercial liabilities in the last
few years through a recentralization of these liabilities onto
its own balance sheet.

The Long-Term-Issuer Rating is currently constrained at BB by
Madeira's very high direct and indirect debt levels. This is
despite DBRS's expectation that debt metrics are likely to
continue improving over the medium-term, albeit at a reduced
pace. The region's geographical location as an archipelago in the
Atlantic Ocean and the government's still large exposure to
regional companies also remain key challenges to Madeira's
overall credit profile.

RATING DRIVERS

Upward rating pressure could materialize if any or a combination
of the following occur: (1) the Portuguese sovereign rating is
upgraded; (2) Madeira substantially reduces its indebtedness; (3)
Madeira's economic indicators continue to improve and the region
manages to further diversify its economy; or (4) there are
indications of a further strengthening of the relationship
between the region and the central government.

Negative downward pressure on the ratings could materialize if
any or a combination of the following occur: (1) the sovereign
rating is downgraded; (2) Madeira fails to stabilize its
financial performance and debt metrics over the medium term; (3)
there are indications that the financial support and oversight
currently provided by the central government weaken; or (4) there
is a reversal in the reduction of the region's indirect and
guaranteed debt.

RATING RATIONALE

Strengthening Fiscal Performance and Slowly Declining Very High
Debt Metrics

Madeira's overall fiscal performance has markedly improved in the
last five years. In particular, expenditure control and some
growth in tax revenues, reflecting tax hikes and economic growth,
have allowed the region to deliver stronger financial
performance. The region's deficit represented 13% of operating
revenues at the end of 2017, down from 74% at the end of 2013.
While the 2013 financial performance largely reflected one-off
measures with substantial capital injections into public
companies, DBRS notes that the region's financial performance has
remained under pressure since then, despite its steady
improvement.

Solid gross domestic product (GDP) growth and strengthened fiscal
performance have allowed Madeira to decrease its extremely high
debt ratios since 2012. While in an international comparison, the
region's debt to operating revenues at 569% at the end of 2017
remains very high, its downward trend is viewed positively.
However, Madeira's debt ratios continue to represent, in DBRS's
view, the main drag on the region's ratings.

Enhanced Oversight and Sovereign Guarantees Support the Rating

DBRS acknowledges that the region has taken substantial steps to
increase transparency and monitoring around its indirect and
guaranteed debt, but also to reduce its DBRS-adjusted debt stock.
In addition, the national government's support via the Portuguese
Treasury and Debt Management Agency (IGCP) is a positive credit
feature for the region as it strengthens its overall debt
management. Nevertheless, the sustained growth in Madeira's
direct debt obligations and the very high debt stock it has
accumulated over time continue to weigh on the region's ratings.

The explicit guarantees provided by the central government for
the refinancing of the regional debt and DBRS's expectation that
this support will continue going forward are positive credit
features supporting Madeira's ratings. The region's refinancing
needs will therefore fully benefit from the national government's
explicit guarantee in 2018. Going forward, while the region's
financial performance is expected to slowly improve, further debt
reductions will be critical for the region to strengthen its
credit profile further.

RATING COMMITTEE SUMMARY

The DBRS European Sub-Sovereign Scorecard generates a result in
the BB (high) - BB (low) range. The main points discussed during
the Rating Committee include: the relationship between the
central government and the autonomous region of Madeira, the debt
metrics and financial performance of the region, the region's
economic growth and its governance.

KEY INDICATORS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF PORTUGAL

The following national key indicators were used for the sovereign
rating. The Republic of Portugal's rating was an input to the
credit analysis of the Autonomous Region of Madeira.

Fiscal Balance (% GDP): -3.0 (2017); -0.7 (2018F); -0.2 (2019F)
Gross Debt (% GDP): 125.7 (2017); 122.2 (2018F); 118.4 (2019F)
Nominal GDP (EUR billions): 193.0 (2017); 200.4 (2018F); 207.9
(2019F)
GDP per Capita (EUR): 18,790 (2017); 19,376 (2018F); 20,000
(2019F)
Real GDP growth (%): 2.7 (2017); 2.3 (2018F); 1.9 (2019F)
Consumer Price Inflation (%): 1.4 (2017); 1.4 (2018F); 1.4
(2019F)
Domestic Credit (% GDP): 262.6 (Sep-2017)
Current Account (% GDP): 0.5 (2017); 0.7 (2018F); 0.7 (2019F)
International Investment Position (% GDP): -105.7 (2017)
Gross External Debt (% GDP): 211.0 (2017)
Governance Indicator (percentile rank): 85.6 (2016)
Human Development Index: 0.84 (2015)

Notes: All figures are in Euros (EUR) unless otherwise noted.


BANCO COMMERCIAL: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Long-Term Issuer Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed the ratings of Banco Commercial
Portuguese, S.A. (BCP or the Bank), including its Long-Term
Issuer Rating of BB (high), the Short-Term Issuer Rating of R-3,
the BBB / R-2 (high) Critical Obligations Ratings (COR), and the
Dated Subordinated Notes of BB (low). The trend on all ratings
has been changed to Positive from Stable. The Intrinsic
Assessment (IA) for the Bank is BB (high), while its Support
Assessment remains SA3. A full list of the rating actions is
included at the end of this press release.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

The confirmation of BCP's Issuer Rating at BB (high) reflects
BCP's improvement in its risk profile and profitability in
Portugal in the last twelve months. The ratings also reflect the
Bank's strong franchise in Portugal, and well established
international franchise in Poland and Mozambique. It also takes
into account the Bank's good funding and liquidity position and
its adequate capitalization. The ratings however, continue to
recognize the Group's high Non-Performing loans (NPLs) and its
unreserved NPL ratio, which is higher than most European banks as
well as its modest capital buffers over minimum regulatory
requirements.

The Positive trend reflects DBRS's expectations that, helped by
good economic conditions in Portugal, its strong franchise
position in Portugal and improving risk management, BCP will
further reduce NPLs and cost of risk. The latter should
ultimately translate into a higher capacity to generate capital
organically through retained earnings.

RATING DRIVERS

The ratings could be upgraded if the Bank continues to reduce
NPLs at a meaningful rate and to improve profitability in
Portugal, through core revenue growth and lower cost of risk.
Negative rating pressure could arise if there is a significant
deterioration in asset quality and capital, and the Trend could
also return to stable if the Bank is unable to deliver planned
reductions in NPLs.

RATING RATIONALE

BCP's underlying profitability improved further in 2017, a trend
which has continued in 1Q18. The improvement was primarily driven
by its activities in Portugal through steady growth of core
revenues and significantly lower year-on-year (YoY) impairments
and provisions on loans and other assets. However, the Group's
profitability remains negatively affected by the high cost of
risk, which stood at 83 bps in 1Q18 (as calculated by DBRS). BCP
reported net attributable income of EUR 86 million in 1Q18, up
70% YoY. BCP's profits in Portugal grew significantly YoY to EUR
46 million and for the first time in many years the contribution
from domestic operations outpaced the contribution from
international operations, which was primarily from Poland.

DBRS considers BCP has made significant progress in improving its
risk profile, and in reducing its NPLs in the last 15 months. The
reduction of NPLs accelerated in 2017 and this trend has
continued in 1Q18, helped by active management of the portfolio,
but also benefitting from some improvement in the Portuguese
economy. The Group has announced that it plans to reduce NPLs to
EUR 6.1 billion by end-2018 (a EUR 1.5 billion reduction of NPLs
during the year). Total NPLs (as defined by the European Banking
Authority, EBA) reduced by EUR 1.7 billion in 2017 (down 18% YoY)
and a further EUR 501 million in 1Q18 (down 6.5%). As a result,
DBRS considers BCP's NPL plan for 2018 to be achievable. Despite
the good pace of NPL reduction, BCP's NPL ratio was still high at
14% at end-March 2018, albeit improved from 18.1% at end-2016 and
23% at end-2013, its peak level. The unreserved NPL/ CET1
(phased-in) ratio was 77% at end 1Q18. This has improved from 82%
at end-2017, but still remains high.

The Group's main source of funding is its retail deposit base,
largely underpinned by its strong domestic franchise and stable
deposit base in Poland. Customer deposits accounted for around
82% of the Group's total funding at end-March 2018. Customer
deposits have generally been increasing, benefitting from the
improving confidence of customers in the bank after its capital
increase. The Group has a sound loan to deposit ratio of 91% at
end-March 2018 which compares well with peers.

BCP's capitalization improved significantly in 2017 following the
rights issue in 1Q18 and the repayment of the State CoCos.
Furthermore, regulatory capital also benefitted in 2017 from
improved retained earnings and the issuance of Tier 2 instruments
in December 2017. DBRS considers BCP's capital ratios are above
minimum requirements but considers the capital buffers to be
relatively modest. Under the Supervisory Review and Evaluation
Process (SREP), BCP is required to maintain a minimum Overall
Capital requirement (OCR) for CET1 (phased-in) of 8.81% and of
12.31% for Total Capital (phased-in) for 2018. At end-1Q18, its
CET1 (phased-in) ratio was 11.9% and total capital ratio (phased-
in) was 13.6%. The fully loaded CET1 ratio was 11.78% at end-
1Q18.

BCP is one of the largest banking groups in Portugal where it
maintains strong market shares for loans and deposits of around
17.4% and 17.6% respectively at end-March 2018. The Bank is also
present internationally in Poland and Mozambique, whose
activities represented around 28% of total Group's consolidated
assets at end-March 2018.

The Grid Summary Grades for Banco Commercial Portuguese, S.A. are
as follows: Franchise Strength - Good; Earnings - Moderate; Risk
Profile - Moderate/Weak; Funding & Liquidity - Good/Moderate;
Capitalization - Moderate/Weak.

Notes: All figures are in EUR unless otherwise noted.


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


DIGI COMMUNICATIONS: Moody's Affirms B1 CFR, Outlook Now Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors has changed to stable from positive the outlook
on Digi Communications N.V. ("Digi" or "DCS"), the parent company
for RCS & RDS S.A. ("RCS&RDS"), a leading pay-TV and
communications services provider in Romania and Hungary.
Concurrently, the agency has affirmed the B1 corporate family
rating (CFR), B1-PD probability of default rating and the B1
senior secured debt rating at DCS.

Moody's decision to change DCS' ratings outlook to stable from
positive reflects (1) the increase in the leverage at DCS due to
the recent debt-financed acquisition of Invitel Tavkozlesi Zrt
(Hungarian subsidiary of telecom provider Invitel Group) for
EUR135.4 million, although scheduled debt amortizations and
EBITDA growth will likely support future de-leveraging absent
further debt financed acquisitions or material shareholder
returns; (2) the expectation of negative or marginally positive
free cash flow generation in 2018 and the lack of publicly
defined medium-term financial policy leverage ratio target; as
well as (3) the prolonged uncertainty associated with the
resolution of the bribery and money laundering accusations facing
DCS and some of its senior management representatives.

"While DCS' leverage remains close to the boundaries defined for
a ratings upgrade, the deleveraging process will be slower than
originally expected due to Invitel Tavkozlesi Zrt's debt-financed
acquisition and so far there has been no evidence of positive
free cash flow generation due to continued high capex. The stable
outlook on the rating reflects that DCS is well positioned in the
rating category, with some headroom for deviation in the event of
operating underperformance," says Gunjan Dixit, a Moody's Vice
President - Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for DCS.

RATINGS RATIONALE

DCS' B1 corporate family rating continues to reflect (1) the
company's smaller size relative to rated peers in Europe; (2) its
concentration in Romania notwithstanding some geographical
diversification and exposure to emerging market risks; (3) de-
leveraging largely reliant on EBITDA growth until the company
returns to material free cash flow generation; and (4) the
company's reduced yet some exposure to foreign exchange risks.

More positively, the rating also reflects (1) RCS&RDS's strong
market positions within the Romanian cable TV and internet
markets; (2) its track record of RGU growth; (3) competitive
benefits from its modern network; (4) the company's access to
attractive premium programming; and (5) intensification of the
company's revenue growth momentum over the last couple of years
primarily helped by the increase in lower-margin mobile business
in Romania.

Over the past years, Digi has been growing its revenues strongly
in the high single digits. However, Moody's expects Digi's
organic revenue growth rate to reduce to around 3-4% in future
years driven by market maturity, although Invitel Tavkozlesi
Zrt's acquisition will continue to support high single digit
reported revenue growth in 2018/19. In Q1 2018, Digi has
evidenced year-on-year reduced revenue growth of 2.7% driven by
the impact of the much lower revenues from handsets as a
consequence of the change made by Digi in the commercial offering
of handsets from the end of Q1 2017. Company 'adjusted' EBITDA
margin in Q1 2018 has nevertheless seen a year-on-year
improvement (to 33.3% vs. 28.7%) mainly due to the mobile
business profitability catch up and the almost neutral impact of
the energy activity in the current period in Romania. The
company's capex has been higher than Moody's expectations in 2017
(at 26.5% of revenues) and also in Q1 2018 (at 33% of revenues)
leading to continued constrained free cash flow generation.

The Romanian telecommunications market will likely witness
consolidation following the acquisition announcement in May 2018
of UPC Holding B.V.'s (Ba3, negative) business in Romania by of
Vodafone Group plc (Baa1, RUR-down), amongst other Central and
Eastern European business of Liberty Global plc (Ba3 stable). If
this deal successfully closes in 2019 then the competitive
landscape for Digi could become more challenging. Furthermore,
there could be potential for further consolidation in the market
which creates future uncertainty. Digi may also need to pay for
mobile spectrum acquisition in the future but the company has not
achieved free cash flow generation so far. There is also limited
clarity on the level of future dividends should there be
sustained free cash flow generation in the business.

Despite good EBITDA growth, Moody's adjusted gross debt/ EBITDA
for DCS has reached around 3.6x as of Q1 2018 (pro-forma for
Invitel Tavkozlesi Zrt's acquisition and the associated debt
increase) compared to 3.3x, prior to the debt-financed
acquisition of Invitel Tavkozlesi Zrt. While DCS' should remain
on path to de-leveraging in the absence of further debt-financed
acquisitions or material shareholder returns facilitated by
scheduled debt repayments and EBITDA growth, Moody's cautiously
recognizes that the company lacks a publicly defined medium-term
financial policy leverage ratio target. The debt covenants allow
for additional debt incurrence limiting the company's ability to
incur and assume debt and/or require it to maintain a total
leverage ratio of at or below 3.75x (this ratio stood at 2.6x at
the end of Q1 2018) up to June 2019, when the covenant drops to
3.25x.

Moody's considers Digi's current liquidity profile as somewhat
weak yet adequate. As of March 31, 2018, DCS had a cash balance
of only EUR16 million. This cash, together with cash generated
from operations and reliance on the EUR179 million of syndicated
facility raised in Q12018, should be adequate to cover the
company's business needs over the next 12-18 months. EUR135.4
million of the EUR179 million of syndicated facility is used to
fund the acquisition of Invitel Tavkozlesi Zrt while rest will be
used for general corporate purposes during 2018. Besides the
scheduled term-loan amortizations, the company's next relevant
maturity is in 2019 when its fully drawn RON revolving credit
facility of around EUR35 million equivalent falls due. Moody's
would expect Digi to re-finance this RCF in a timely manner to
ensure ample liquidity buffer. This is followed by the maturity
of the 2021 RON bank debt facilities A1 and A2 (of over EUR300
million equivalent as of Q12018). In October 2023, the company
will have to repay EUR350 million worth of senior secured notes.
These notes are also callable from October 2019 onwards. Moody's
would expect the company to pro-actively address all of its
liquidity needs.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's expectation that DCS
will continue to maintain (at least) stable EBITDA margin, grow
its revenues modestly, and maintain credit metrics in line with
the parameters defined for the B1 rating.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Upward pressure on the rating could develop if (1) DCS delivers
on its business plan, such that its debt/EBITDA ratio (as
adjusted by Moody's) remains well below 3.5x; (2) the company
generates positive free cash flow (after capex and dividends) on
a sustained basis; (3) the bribery and money laundering
accusations facing DCS and some of its senior management
representatives are resolved without being detrimental to the
business; and (4) a track record of proactive liquidity
management.

Conversely, downward pressure could be exerted on the rating if
DCS's operating performance weakens such that its debt/EBITDA
ratio (as adjusted by Moody's) rises towards 4.5x and the company
generates negative free cash flow on a sustained basis. A
weakening of the company's liquidity profile (including a
reduction in headroom under financial covenants) could also lead
to downward pressure on the rating.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Pay
Television - Cable and Direct-to-Home Satellite Operators
published in January 2017.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Affirmations:

Issuer: Digi Communications N.V.

Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed B1

Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed B1-PD

BACKED Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Digi Communications N.V.

Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

Digi Communications N.V. is the parent company of RCS&RDS S.A., a
leading pay- TV and communications services provider in Romania
and Hungary. The company successfully completed an IPO in May
2017 and is listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange. It generated
revenues of EUR917 million and reported EBITDA of EUR288 million
in 2017. DCS is ultimately controlled by Romanian entrepreneur
Zoltan Teszari, president of the board and founder of the
company.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


INTERNATIONAL BANK OF SAINT-PETERSBURG: S&P Affirms 'B-/B' ICR
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-/B' long- and short-term
issuer credit ratings on Russia-based International Bank of
Saint-Petersburg (IBSP). The outlook is negative.

S&P said, "The ratings reflect our view that the IBSP has
continued to reduce its dependence on short-term wholesale
funding in 2018. As a result, its share in its funding base fell
to about 3% in May 2018 from 8% in December 2017, reducing the
pressure on IBSP's liquidity. However, we note that much of
IBSP's liquidity buffer (about $118 million of equivalent as of
May 1, 2018) is tied to bonds issued by nonresident banks,
although we understand these are not encumbered.

Although IBSP continues to gradually improve its margins, and its
funding costs continue to decline, progress in revitalizing the
franchise has been slow. The anticipated shift towards midsize
enterprises has not yet fully materialized, and S&P understands
that efforts to develop its risk management framework are still
in the early stages. Therefore, the business remains concentrated
on a few large customers.

S&P said, "We continue to view IBSP's capital and earnings as
neutral for the ratings, since we anticipate the bank's risk-
adjusted capital will be at about 5.5% after accounting for a
negative earnings buffer, which measures the bank's ability to
cover normalized losses. Our forecast factors in the
discrepancies between Russian and IFRS accounts in the
provisioning for nonresident exposures. We understand that IBSP
aims to obtain additional standby letters of credit for these
exposures, in addition to those obtained in late 2017. We also
understand that IBSP aims to use additional capital injections in
both 2018 and 2019 to create additional provisions under Russian
accounting standards. We factor these injections into our
forecast, given the owner's strong track record of providing
additional capital to the bank. We view IBSP's exposure to risks
as a weakness for the ratings, mirroring the bank's high name and
sector concentration, weak asset quality indicators, and
significant exposure to foreign currency risk.

"The negative outlook on the IBSP reflects our view that the
bank's financial profile will remain under pressure in the next
12-18 months, owing to its large concentration of loan exposures,
tough operating environment for banks in Russia, and high
competition for corporate clients in the Russian market.

"We could lower the ratings if the bank fails to unwind its
exposures to nonresident commodity traders in 2018, or if
regulatory risks related to these exposures intensify. We
understand that this could occur if the bank fails to complete
the scheduled capital injections in 2018 or 2019. A loss of
clients' confidence, or large credit events, especially on its
large construction exposures, could also trigger a downgrade. We
may also lower the ratings if IBSP fails to improve its margins
over the next six to eight months.

"We may revise the outlook to stable if IBSP successfully reduces
its net risk on nonresident exposures and finds a new niche in
the Russian market."


=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT DEUDA I: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws D(sf) Rating on C Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on all classes of notes
in AyT Deuda Subordinada I Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos (AyT
Deuda Subordinada I) following S&P's review of the transaction.
At the same time, S&P withdrew its ratings on these classes of
notes following the liquidation of the transaction's remaining
collateral.

The issuer had until the legal final maturity on Nov. 17, 2019 to
liquidate the existing collateral to be able to redeem the notes.
On Jan. 11, 2018, the issuer was able to liquidate the remaining
collateral for an amount of approximately EUR52.45 million, which
it used to redeem the class A notes and part of the class B
notes.

S&P said, "Following our review, we affirmed our 'CC (sf)'
ratings on the class A notes as they have been fully redeemed.

"As the class B and C notes were not paid in full, we affirmed
our ratings of 'D (sf)' on these classes of notes. We then
withdrew the ratings on all three classes of notes."

AyT Deuda Subordinada I closed in November 2006. It is a cash
flow collateralized debt obligation (CDO) of subordinated debt
issued by Spanish savings banks.

  RATINGS LIST

  AyT Deuda Subordinada I Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
  EUR298 mil asset-backed floating-rate notes
                                       Rating
  Class             Identifier         To                 From
  A                 ES0312284005       CC (sf)            CC (sf)
  B                 ES0312284013       D (sf)             D (sf)
  C                 ES0312284021       D (sf)             D (sf)

  Ratings Subsequently Withdrawn

  AyT Deuda Subordinada I Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
  EUR298 mil asset-backed floating-rate notes
                                       Rating
  Class             Identifier         To             From
  A                 ES0312284005       NR             CC (sf)
  B                 ES0312284013       NR             D (sf)
  C                 ES0312284021       NR             D (sf)

  NR--Not rated


IM SABADELL PYME 10: Moody's Confirms B2 Rating on Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of two
tranches and affirmed the ratings of two tranches in two Spanish
ABS-SME deals.

Issuer: IM SABADELL PYME 10, FONDO DE TITULIZACION

EUR1448.1M (Current Outstanding Amount 613.1M) Class A Notes,
Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2016 Definitive Rating
Assigned Aa3 (sf)

EUR301.9M Class B Notes, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Apr
24, 2018 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: IM SABADELL PYME 11, FONDO DE TITULIZACION

EUR1567.5M (Current Outstanding Amount 1427.5M) Class A Notes,
Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 19, 2017 Definitive Rating
Assigned Aa3 (sf)

EUR332.5M Class B Notes, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously on
Apr 24, 2018 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

The two transactions are backed by small to medium-sized
enterprise (ABS SME) loans extended to borrowers located in
Spain. IM Sabadell PYME 10, Fondo de Titulizacion and IM Sabadell
PYMES 11, Fondo de Titulizacion were originated by Banco
Sabadell, S.A. (Baa2/Prime-2).

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's rating action concludes the review of Notes placed on
review for upgrade on April 24.

These Notes were placed on review following the upgrade of the
Government of Spain's sovereign rating to Baa1 from Baa2 and the
raising of the country ceiling of Spain to Aa1 from Aa2.

The rating actions are also prompted by the upgrade of Banco
Sabadell, S.A.'s LT Counterparty Risk Assessment to Baa1(cr) from
Baa2(cr).

In addition, credit enhancement (CE) levels for Class A and Class
B Notes in IM Sabadell PYMES 10, Fondo de Titulizacion have
increased to 47.02% from 30.26% and 10.15% from 6.53%
respectively over the past 12 months. In IM Sabadell PYMES 11,
Fondo de Titulizacion the Class A and Class B CE level increased
to 24.18% from 22.40% and 5.29% from 4.90% respectively at
closing in December 2017.

Despite the increase in credit enhancement, the ratings of the
class A notes in both transactions are capped at Aa3(sf) as a
result of the issuer account bank exposure. In relation to the
class B notes of each transaction, Moody's concluded that the
current ratings were consistent with the loss level expectations
of the portfolio after considering the performance of the
underlying collateral and the decrease in sovereign risk.

Counterparty Exposure

Moody's rating actions took into consideration the Notes'
exposure to relevant counterparties, such as servicer and account
banks.

Moody's considered how the liquidity available in the
transactions and other mitigants support continuity of Notes
payments, in case of servicer default, using the CR Assessment as
a reference point for servicers.

Moody's also matches banks' exposure in structured finance
transactions to the CR Assessment for commingling risk, with a
recovery rate assumption of 45%.

Moody's also assessed the default probability of the account bank
providers by referencing the bank's deposit rating.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating SME Balance Sheet Securitizations"
published on August 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) performance of the underlying collateral that
is better than Moody's expected, (2) deleveraging of the capital
structure, (3) improvements in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties and (4) a decrease in sovereign risk.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk (2) performance
of the underlying collateral that is worse than Moody's expected,
(3) deterioration in the notes' available CE and (4)
deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================



BLIPPAR: Says Report about Friction with Investors is False
-----------------------------------------------------------
Sophie Tobin at Seven Hills, a spokesperson for Blippar, an
augmented reality start, told Troubled Company Reporter Europe
editors yesterday that Blippar and its CEO Ambarish Mitra have
the full confidence and support of the board and its investors.
Ms. Tobin told us that our reliance on a report by Matthew Field
at The Daily Telegraph about friction between investors and
management was flawed.  Ms. Tobin advised that The Telegraph
retracted its report after receiving formal complaints from
Blippar's lawyers.


ENLIST BRANDS: Put Up for Sale Following Cashflow Woes
------------------------------------------------------
Catherine Deshayes at Business-Sale reports that men and
womenswear fashion line Enlist Brands has been put up for sale,
following a series of cashflow problems.

Insolvency practitioners Hudson Weir have been assigned to manage
the administration process for the company, Business-Sale
relates.

The founders cited the onset of Brexit amongst other factors as
the reasons for the firm's poor success, Business-Sale discloses.

According to Business-Sale, co-founder Mario Arena said: "What
hit us first was Brexit and the outcome from that.  The cost of
goods went up drastically and other things contributed to it.
It's been a very tough retail environment and there has been no
summer."

"We did have some amazing forward orders, [but] unless someone
comes and purchases the brand or the trade mark it will probably
be wound up in the next week."

The company has been in talks with a number of potential buyers
hailing from China, Holland and the UK, but a formal agreement
has not yet been reached, Business-Sale states.


HOUSE OF FRASER: Lenders Agree to Extend Loans Ahead of CVA Vote
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alys Key at City A.M. reports that House of Fraser's lenders have
agreed to extend the retailer's loans, piling further pressure
onto this week's vote on the chain's restructuring plans.

According to City A.M., the extension is conditional on a
proposed company voluntary arrangement (CVA) gaining enough
support at a creditors' meeting this Friday, June 22.

It will give House of Fraser more than a year to get its house in
order, with a GBP125 million term loan and a GBP100 million
revolving credit facility, City A.M. relays, citing Press
Association.

The agreement, which follows talks between the retailer and HSBC
and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, is also conditional
on the GBP70 million cash injection promised by Hamleys owner
C.Banner, City A.M. states.

It adds even more pressure for creditors to vote the CVA through,
with both the cash injection and the loan agreement riding on at
least 75% approval, City A.M. notes.

The CVA proposes to close more than half of House of Fraser's
stores, leading to the loss of around 6,000 jobs, City A.M.
discloses.


MATTRESSMAN: Enters Into CVA, Westwood Store to Close
-----------------------------------------------------
Kathy Bailes at The Isle of Thanet News reports that the
Mattressman store at The Link retail park in Westwood will shut
by July 2 as one of 14 closures across the country.

According to The Isle of Thanet News, the bed and bedroom
furniture business has entered a company voluntary arrangement
which will mean shops in East Anglia and the Midlands remain safe
but those in other areas of the country will close down with the
loss of some 130 jobs nationwide.

The restructuring agreement will mean the company can continue
trading but on a smaller scale, The Isle of Thanet News notes.

The process is being overseen by insolvency specialists McTear
Williams and Wood, The Isle of Thanet News discloses.

The company will continue to trade and has said all outstanding
orders should be fulfilled but where it is not possible customers
will receive their money back, The Isle of Thanet News relates.

The firm, as cited by The Isle of Thanet News, said the decision
has been made due to a slump in sales.


NEW LOOK: Iceland to Take Possession of Stratford Mall Store
------------------------------------------------------------
Tim Clark at Drapers Online reports that food retailer Iceland is
to take on New Look's store in London's Stratford Mall after the
landlord activated a break clause on the lease under the terms of
the company voluntary arrangement (CVA).

According to Drapers Online, the retailer has been served notice
on the store, which was not earmarked for closure under the terms
of its CVA that was agreed in March.

Iceland said it would be taking possession of the store in August
and a supermarket would open in November, Drapers Online relates.

The Stratford Mall store is one of a number of shops included in
New Look's CVA that were due to have their rents cut, but were
not part of the 60-strong list of stores set for closure, Drapers
Online notes.

The Stratford Mall store would have required a 40% rent
reduction, Drapers Online states.


NEWDAY 2015-1: DBRS Confirms B (high) Rating on Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed its ratings on the Notes issued by
NewDay Funding 2015-1 plc. (NewDay 2015-1), NewDay Funding 2015-2
plc. (NewDay 2015-2), NewDay Funding 2016-1 plc. (NewDay 2016-1),
NewDay Funding 2017-1 plc. (NewDay 2017-1), NewDay Funding Loan
Note Issuer VFN-F1 V1 (NewDay VFN-F1 V1) and NewDay Funding Loan
Note Issuer VFN-F1 V2 (NewDay VFN-F1 V2) as follows:

NewDay 2015-1:

-- Class A Notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes confirmed at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C Notes confirmed at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D Notes confirmed at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E Notes confirmed at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F Notes confirmed at B (high) (sf)

NewDay 2015-2:

-- Class A Notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes confirmed at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C Notes confirmed at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D Notes confirmed at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E Notes confirmed at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F Notes confirmed at B (high) (sf)

NewDay 2016-1:

-- Class A Notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes confirmed at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C Notes confirmed at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D Notes confirmed at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E Notes confirmed at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F Notes confirmed at B (high) (sf)

NewDay 2017-1:

-- Class A Notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes confirmed at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C Notes confirmed at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D Notes confirmed at BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes confirmed at BB (sf)
-- Class F Notes confirmed at B (high) (sf)

NewDay VFN-F1 V1:

-- Class A Notes confirmed at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E Notes confirmed at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F Notes confirmed at B (high) (sf)

NewDay VFN-F1 V2:

-- Class A Notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes confirmed at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C Notes confirmed at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D Notes confirmed at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E Notes confirmed at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F Notes confirmed at B (high) (sf)

The ratings address the timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal on each Note's final redemption date. A
deferral of interest payments on the Notes is permitted and will
not result in an event of default.

The confirmations follow a review of the transactions and are
based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance in terms of delinquencies and charge-
offs.

-- Portfolio Principal Payment Rate, Charge-off Rate and Yield
Rate assumptions.

-- The credit enhancement (CE) available to the Notes to cover
the expected losses at their respective rating levels.

The Notes are backed by a portfolio of own-brand credit card
receivables in the United Kingdom originated or acquired and
serviced by NewDay Ltd. NewDay 2015-1 is currently in its
Accumulation Period and all other series are in their respective
Revolving Period.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE AND ASSUMPTIONS

As of April 2018, receivables more than 90 days delinquent
represented 4.2% of the outstanding portfolio balance, a slight
increase from 3.8% as of the last review. At the same time, the
Gross Charge-Off Rate was 15.3%, the portfolio Gross Yield Rate
was 35.1%, and the Total Payment Rate decreased to 11.3% from
12.7% as of the last review. The performance is within DBRS's
expectations and DBRS has maintained the Gross Charge-Off Rate,
the Portfolio Yield Rate, and the Monthly Principal Payment Rate
assumptions at 16.0%, 28.0% and 8.0%, respectively.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

As all series are either in an Accumulation Period or Revolving
Period, the CE to all the Notes remain the same as at the series
Issuance Date or, for the NewDay VFN-F1 series, according to the
Advance Rate specified in the documents.

HSBC Bank Plc. acts as the Account Bank for all the transactions.
DBRS's private rating of the Account Bank is consistent with the
Minimum Institution Rating criteria given the rating assigned to
the Class A Notes, as described in DBRS's "Legal Criteria for
European Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.


TRINIDAD 2018-1 PLC: DBRS Puts Prov. B(low) Rating to Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned the following provisional ratings
to the notes expected to be issued by Trinidad Mortgage
Securities 2018-1 PLC (TMS18 or the Issuer):

-- Class A notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C notes at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E notes at BB (low) (sf)
-- Class F notes at B (low) (sf)

The rating assigned to the Class A notes addresses the timely
payment of interest to the note holders and the ultimate payment
of principal on or before the legal final maturity date. The
ratings on the Class B, C, D, E and F notes address the ultimate
payment of both principal and interest on or before the legal
final maturity date. Deferral of interest is permitted on the
Class B to F notes, as per the transaction documents, provided
that any deferred interest is repaid in full, plus an interest
accrued thereon by the legal final maturity date. However,
deferral of interest is not permitted when a class of notes is
the senior-most outstanding. DBRS does not rate the Class G, H, X
or Z notes that are expected to be issued.

TMS18 is expected to be a securitization of three distinct
residential-mortgage portfolios, each originated by a different
lender. The sub-portfolios each have different loan, borrower
and/or property characteristics. The provisional mortgage
portfolio, which includes both buy-to-let (BTL) and owner-
occupied mortgages, aggregates to GBP 271.1 million (as of April
2018).

The largest subset (61.0% of the total portfolio by outstanding
balance) was originated by Magellan Home loans Limited (MHL) and
is a newly originated owner-occupied collection of loans,
including credit repair mortgages. Credit repair loans (19.4% of
the portfolio) are granted to borrowers with heavy adverse
features because of impaired credit histories, including past
bankruptcies, individual voluntary agreements (IVAs) and/or
county court judgments (CCJs). Alongside the credit repair loans,
MHL has included complex-prime products in the transaction. These
products are more aligned with typical U.K. non-conforming (NCF)
mortgages, albeit without interest-only loans or those granted to
borrowers who self-certify income.

Thrones 2013-1 Plc. (T13) - a mixed BTL and owner-occupied
portfolio - originated between 2003 and 2008 by Heritable Bank
PLC (30.4% of the pool) will also be included in the transaction.
Heritable Bank went into administration in October 2008, and the
T13 asset portfolio was purchased by funds managed by Mars
Capital Finance Limited (MCFL) in May 2013. DBRS currently rates
the T13 securitization transaction, which is to be called on the
first optional redemption date falling in July 2018.

The remainder of the collateral is the Camael portfolio (8.6% of
the pool). Camael was originated by Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co
Ltd (formerly Marfin Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd and trading as
Laiki Bank or Marfin Popular Bank). The portfolio consists of
residential and commercial mortgages, both BTL and owner-
occupied. All mortgages are British pound sterling denominated
and secured by one or more properties located in the United
Kingdom. The originator of this portfolio collapsed in 2012 and
was rescued by the government of Cyprus. In March 2013, the
originator's 'good' assets (including Camael loans) were
transferred to Bank of Cyprus before being acquired by MCFL in
2014.

The transaction structure envisages the Issuer purchasing further
MHL-originated mortgages before the first interest payment date
(the pre-funded mortgages). These assets will be purchased using
funds standing to the credit of the pre-funding ledger, which is
expected to be funded at closing by an over-issuance of RMBS
notes. DBRS has assumed a worst-case pre-funding portfolio given
the conditions and has stressed the negative carry arising from
the pre-funding reserve. Any funds that are not applied to
purchase additional loans will be applied to amortize the rated
notes, pro-rata.

As of April 30, 2018, the provisional portfolio consisted of
1,805 loans with an average outstanding balance of GBP 152,553,
aggregating to GBP 271.1 million. Approximately 20.6% of the
loans by outstanding balance are BTL mortgages. As is common in
the U.K. mortgage market, the BTL loans are largely scheduled to
pay interest only on a monthly basis, with principal repayment
concentrated in the form of a bullet payment at the maturity date
of the mortgage. In total, 28.8% of the portfolio by loan amount
is interest only, all of which are either T13 or Camael loans.

The mortgages are relatively high yielding, with a weighted-
average coupon of 5.0% and a weighted-average reversionary margin
of 3.8%, assuming the standard variable rate (SVR) is set at the
floor of 2.5% over LIBOR. Approximately 14.2% of the mortgage
portfolio has prior CCJs and 14.3% have either a prior bankruptcy
or IVAs amongst other features. The Camael loans have no
information provided regarding borrower characteristics
(including adverse credit history, employment status and income
amongst others). DBRS has assumed the worst-case scenarios for
the missing Camael portfolio borrower characteristics. The
weighted-average current loan-to-value ratio of the portfolio is
67.7% (including DBRS haircuts to valuations for commercial
properties and/or non-surveyor valuations).

The transaction is structured to initially provide 25.5% of
credit enhancement to the Class A notes. This includes
subordination of the Class B to H notes (the Class X and Z notes
are not collateralized by mortgages) as well as the non-
amortizing general reserve fund (GRF), which is expected to be
3.5% of the mortgage-backed notes at issuance. The GRF will be
funded from the issuance of the Class Z notes and can be applied
to cover shortfalls in senior fees, interest on the senior-most
outstanding class of notes and to clear principal deficiency
ledger (PDL) balances on the rated notes' sub-ledgers. Further
liquidity support is provided by the liquidity reserve fund
(LRF), which will not be initially funded, but will be funded
from closing in a senior position atop the pre-enforcement
principal priority of payments to 4% of the Class A notes if the
GRF falls below 2% of the outstanding balance of the Class A to H
notes. The LRF only provides liquidity support to the Class A
notes and is applied after revenue collections and the GRF. If
drawn from, the LRF is replenished from the pre-enforcement
revenue priority of payments and release amount from available
principal funds.

Principal funds can be diverted to pay revenue liabilities,
insofar as a shortfall in senior fees and interest due on the
senior-most outstanding class of notes persist after applying
revenue collections and exhausting both reserve funds.

If principal funds are diverted to pay revenue liabilities, the
amount will subsequently be debited to the PDL. The PDL comprises
eight sub-ledgers that will track principal used to pay interest,
as well as realized losses, in a reverse sequential order
that begins with the Class H sub-ledger.

The fixed-rate assets and the floating-rate liabilities give rise
to interest rate risk. This is partially hedged using an interest
rate cap (IRC), provided by NatWest Markets PLC. The IRC is
struck at 2% with a pre-determined notional of the outstanding
balance of the fixed-rate loans, assuming no prepayments. There
is also basis risk in the transaction that arises as there are
loans linked to the SVR that is set by the legal-title holders.
This basis risk is mitigated through a transaction floor on the
SVR. The floor, which has been analyzed by DBRS, is three-month
LIBOR plus 2.5%.

Monthly mortgage receipts are deposited into the collections
account at Barclays Bank PLC and held in accordance with the
collection account declaration of trust. The funds credited to
the collection account are swept on a weekly basis to the
Issuer's account. The collection account declaration of trust
provides that interest in the collection account is in favor of
the Issuer over the seller. Commingling risk is considered
mitigated by the collection account declaration of trust and the
regular sweep of funds. The collection account bank is subject to
a DBRS investment-grade downgrade trigger. Citibank, N.A., London
branch is the Issuer's account provider. The transaction
documents include account bank rating triggers and downgrade
provisions that lead DBRS to conclude that both account banks
satisfy DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

At closing, the Issuer will purchase the beneficial title to the
mortgage portfolio from the beneficial-title seller (BTS). Legal
title will remain with the two legal-title holders - MHL for
Magellan loans and MCFL for Camael and T13 assets. The legal-
title holders will hold the title to the mortgages on trust for
the Issuer. Certain perfection events will trigger the Issuer to
acquire the title to the mortgages.

The mortgage sale agreement includes various asset warranties,
which are considered in line with U.K. RMBS transaction standard,
albeit with certain awareness limitations. However, DBRS
considers the remedial action following a breach of asset
warranty to be weaker than standard. The asset warranties are
time limited (no claims can be made following 60 months from the
closing date), which is atypical for a newly originated U.K.
mortgage portfolio. Furthermore, the repurchase obligation is
primarily held with the BTS (Magellan Funding No. 2 DAC), a
special-purpose vehicle. As such, no guarantee is provided that
the BTS has sufficient resources to either indemnify or
repurchase loans, as applicable. No quantitative adjustment has
been made by DBRS in the analysis of TMS18 because of the asset
warranty review. DBRS has observed similar time limitation and
awareness clauses in other U.K, RMBS transactions; however, these
are typically seasoned portfolios. The seasoning (ten and 11
years for Camael and T13, respectively) is a risk mitigant for
the Camael and T13 portfolios; however, as the Magellan portfolio
consists of recent originations, there is a limited track record,
and to DBRS's knowledge no Magellan loan has been repossessed to
date.

DBRS reviewed the transaction opinion, financial regulation
opinion (review of the lender's standard form documentation) and
an additional third-party report (including a platform review and
sample re-underwriting review) to understand the possibility of
asset warranty breaches in this transaction. DBRS will monitor
the transaction and will be notified of asset warranty breaches.

As part of its cash flow assessment, DBRS applied two default
timing curves (front-ended and back-ended), prepayment curves
(low, medium and high assumptions) and interest rate stresses as
per the DBRS "Interest Rate Stresses for European Structured
Finance Transactions" methodology. DBRS applied an additional 0%
constant principal repayment stress. The cash flows were analyzed
using Intex DealMaker.

The legal structure and presence of legal opinions were deemed
consistent with the DBRS "Legal Criteria for European Structured
Finance Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.


* UK: Legal Sector Insolvencies on Track to Double in 2018
----------------------------------------------------------
Georgia Owen at Today's Conveyancer reports that recent analysis
has revealed that legal sector insolvencies could be on track to
double in 2018 if Q1 trends continue.

The first three months of this year saw 20 firms which provided
legal services declared as insolvent, Today's Conveyancer relays,
citing a review of data from the Insolvency Service, conducted by
firm Gibson Hewitt.  This is more than double the total of nine
from the corresponding period last year, Today's Conveyancer
notes.

According to Today's Conveyancer, of those which took place in Q1
of this year, the most common reason was voluntary liquidations
by administrators at approximately 50%, with a quarter going into
administration.  Fifteen-percent were compulsory liquidations and
the remaining 10% were company voluntary arrangements, Today's
Conveyancer states.

The analysis also revealed that the number of insolvencies in the
sector has been rising on a quarterly basis, with quarters three
and four of last year seeing respective totals of 13 and 15 firms
declared as insolvent, Today's Conveyancer discloses.

Commenting on the review, director of Gibson Hewitt, Lynn Gibson,
as cited by Today's Conveyancer, said: "The three months from
January through to March 2018 saw the highest number of
insolvencies in the legal sector for some time."



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *