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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, August 9, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 157


                            Headlines


F R A N C E

ELIOR GROUP: Moody's Affirms Ba2 CFR & Alters Outlook to Negative
PEUGEOT SA: DBRS Confirms BB (High) Issuer Rating, Trend Positive


G E O R G I A

HALYK BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDR & Alters Outlook to Pos.


G E R M A N Y

ATLAS RIGID: S&P Assigns 'B' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

RIVOLI PAN EUROPE 1: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to D(sf)


I T A L Y

A-BEST 15: DBRS Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to BB
BANCA CARIGE: Moody's Cuts Long-Term Issuer Rating to Caa3
QUADRIVIO SME 2018: DBRS Rates Two Note Classes BB(High)


N E T H E R L A N D S

DUTCH PROPERTY 2017-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
PANGAEA ABS 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on 3 Note Classes


P O L A N D

GETBACK SA: S&P Withdraws 'D/D' Issuer Credit Ratings


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: FRC Faces Pressure from MPs on Audit Report
CYAN BLUE 2: S&P Withdraws 'B' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
FORCE INDIA: Set to Exit Administration Following Rescue Deal
GEMGARTO 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes C Rating on Class X Notes
HOMEBASE: New Owners to Reveal Store Closure Plans Next Week

HOUSE OF FRASER: S&P Raises LT Issuer Credit Rating to 'CCC-'
INTERSERVE PLC: Reports GBP6-Mil. Loss in First Half 2018
WENDEX VEHICLE: Enters Administration, Seeks Buyer for Business


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F R A N C E
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ELIOR GROUP: Moody's Affirms Ba2 CFR & Alters Outlook to Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba2 corporate family
rating and the Ba2-PD probability of default rating of Elior
Group S.A., and changed the outlook on the ratings to negative
from stable.

"The negative outlook reflects our expectation that Elior's
credit metrics will remain weak for the current ratings in the
next 12-18 months as well as our view that its strategic plan to
improve profitability and cash flow generation in the next three
years entails high execution risks", says Eric Kang, Moody's lead
analyst for Elior. "That said, we continue to view Elior's
business profile as solid, supported notably by its leading
market positions, broadly stable end markets and high growth
prospects in the large US market", adds Mr Kang.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's expects Elior's credit metrics to remain outside the
guidance for a Ba2 CFR for a longer period of time than the
rating agency's initial expectation after the company announced a
downward revision to its guidance for the fiscal year ended
September 2018 (FY2018) in May 2018. The lower guidance was due
to weaker-than-expected performance in Contract Catering in
France, slower-than-expected ramp-up of new contracts, and
external factors i.e. adverse weather in key geographies and
strikes in France.

While the company's new strategic plan to improve profitability
and cash flow makes sense, it is based on a slower pace of
recovery than Moody's initially expected. Under this three-year
plan to FY2021, the company aims to (1) grow sales organically by
above 3% p.a. on average and through bolt-on acquisitions in the
US, (2) grow management-adjusted EBITA at twice the rate of
organic sales growth driven by operating leverage and greater
cost discipline, (3) generate cumulative operating free cash flow
of EUR750 million over the period (before tax and interests).
However, the improvements will likely materialise from FY2020 at
the earliest as the company indicated that FY2019 will be a year
of stabilisation.

The slower pace of recovery will therefore result in limited
deleveraging in the next 12-18 months from the high Moody's-
adjusted debt/EBITDA of approximately 4.5x as of September 2018
based on Moody's estimate. The expected decrease from the current
level of 5.0x as of March 31, 2018 is mainly driven by (1) lower
debt due to the fact that the first semester is a seasonal peak
in terms of working capital needs, and (2) a reduction in non-
recurring items that Moody's views as normal course of business
such as costs of restructuring, reorganisation and project exits,
and M&A costs. Those items amounted to EUR48 million in the last
12 months ended March 2018 but are expected to reduce to EUR20-30
million in FY2018 according to the company's guidance. The main
adjustment to debt relates to the company's off-balance sheet
securitisation facility which was utilised by EUR237 million as
of March 31, 2018.

Moody's expects Elior to generate retained cash flow (operating
cash flow before working capital, and after tax, interests, and
dividend) of around 14%-16% of net debt (on a Moody's-adjusted
basis) in FY2018-FY2019. While this is adequate for the current
rating, free cash flow (retained cash flow after working capital
and capex) in the near term will be very limited in the rating
agency's view. Moody's expects free cash flow / debt of below 1%
(on a Moody's-adjusted basis) in FY2018-FY2019 because of high
capex of c. EUR300 million p.a. expected during this period due
to construction works following the renewal of the contracts on
French motorways in FY2016 and FY2017, other new contracts in
Concession Catering and IT development. The company expects capex
to reduce from FY2020 following completion of these heavy
investments.

In Moody's view, the new strategic plan also entails high
execution risks as the competitive environment in France is
likely to remain fierce. The company's decision to adopt a more
disciplined approach in bidding for new contracts and contract
renewals in Contract Catering in France is strategically sound
but will need to be carefully managed in order to avoid a
significant impact on bidding success rate, which would
subsequently affect revenue and earnings growth. The company will
also need to offset labour and food inflation, notably in the US
and the UK, albeit Moody's understands that most of the company's
contracts include indexation clauses which would help mitigating
at least part of the inflationary pressures.

More positively, the rating also incorporates the company's
strong market positions in its two core divisions, track record
of positive organic sales growth, increasing geographic diversity
from acquisitions in the US, high retention rates of over 90% in
Contract Catering, and long term contracts in Concession
Catering.

Lastly, Moody's continues to view industry fundamentals for the
company's end markets as solid with high growth prospects in
fast-expanding geographies where the company does not hold number
1 or number 2 market positions such as the US, the UK and India.
There could also be growth opportunities in the small and medium
enterprises segment currently underserved by the company.

LIQUIDITY

Elior's liquidity is adequate despite weak free cash flow. It has
cash balances of EUR126 million as of March 31, 2018 and access
to two revolving credit facilities (RCFs) of EUR300 million and
USD250 million respectively, of which EUR150 million and USD60
million were utilised respectively as of March 31, 2018.

The company also operates two receivable securitisation
programmes. The first one matures in July 2021 with a maximum
amount of EUR360 million, split between an on-balance sheet
compartment and off-balance sheet compartment. As of March 31,
2018, EUR101.1 million and EUR237 million of receivables were
securitised on an on- and off-balance sheet basis respectively.
The second one matures in September 2019 with a maximum of GBP30
million (fully on-balance sheet). As of March 31, 2018, GBP18.8
million of receivables were securitised.

The company recently upsized one of its two RCFs to EUR450
million from EUR300 million, and concurrently extended the
maturities of most term loans and RCFs to May 2023. The nearest
maturity is the USD100 million private placement due in May 2022.

Lastly, Moody's expects the company to maintain adequate headroom
under its net leverage maintenance covenant tested semi-annually.
The company's net leverage as defined in the debt indenture was
3.48x as of March 31, 2018 compared to a target covenant 4.5x at
half year-end, which reduces to 4.0x at full year-end to reflect
the company's cash flow seasonality.

RATING OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the current weak credit metrics for
the Ba2 rating as well as high execution risks related to the
company's strategic plan to improve profitability and cash flow
generation in the next three years. A stabilisation of the
outlook would be contingent on the company demonstrating in the
next 12-18 months that it will successfully deliver on its
strategic objectives, which would subsequently lead to credit
metrics more commensurate with the current Ba2 rating.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE

Negative pressure on the rating could occur in the event of (1)
further deterioration or limited improvement in operating
performance, leading to Moody's expectation that the Moody's-
adjusted leverage will not reduce towards 4.0x by FY2020, or (2)
weakening liquidity including negative free cash flow for an
extended period or tightening covenant headroom.

While unlikely in the near term given the rating action, the
rating could be upgraded over time following a visible
improvement in earnings growth which will result in the Moody's-
adjusted leverage falling towards 3.5x on a sustainable basis,
with free cash flow/debt of around 5%. An upgrade will also
require the company to demonstrate a more conservative financial
policy with regards to leverage and debt-financed acquisitions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016.

COMPANY PROFILE

Headquartered in France, Elior is a global player in contract and
concession catering and support services. In the last twelve
months ended March 31, 2018, the company generated revenues of
EUR6.5 billion.


PEUGEOT SA: DBRS Confirms BB (High) Issuer Rating, Trend Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Limited confirmed the Issuer Rating of Peugeot SA (PSA or
the Company) at BB (high). Concurrently, pursuant to DBRS's
Criteria: Recovery Ratings for Non-Investment Grade Corporate
Issuers, DBRS also confirmed PSA's Senior Unsecured Debt rating
at BB (high), given the associated recovery rating of RR4, which
remains unchanged. The trend on the ratings has been changed to
Positive from Stable, recognizing the Company's ongoing
improvement in its earnings and cash flow generation. DBRS notes
further that PSA's earnings momentum (which incorporates not only
ongoing cost reductions but also organic revenue growth) has not
been meaningfully impeded by its 2017 acquisition of the Opel and
Vauxhall (OV) automotive subsidiaries (from General Motors
Company (GM), in addition to the acquisition of the associated
financial services operations from GM Financial Company), the
post-acquisition performance of which has been readily exceeding
DBRS's expectations. As such, the Company's credit metrics and
financial risk assessment (FRA) have improved to levels that
exceed the currently assigned ratings.

PSA's favorable financial performance in 2017 through H1 2018
reflects stable automotive conditions in its core European market
(which, as a function of last year's OV acquisition, now
represents more than three quarters of the Company's global sales
volumes), bolstered by PSA's successful product offensive in the
sport utility vehicle segment, which has resulted in considerably
positive product mix effects. Earnings also continue to benefit
from the Company's cost-reduction activities, with these
contributing factors being only partly offset by external
challenges in the form of higher raw material costs and adverse
foreign exchange developments. In addition to the solid
performance of the automotive operations, the Company's
consolidated results reflect improved earnings of its automotive
equipment and financial services businesses.

Moreover, performance of the recently acquired OV operations has
readily surpassed DBRS's expectations. After incurring
consecutive losses under GM that date back to 1999, OV incurred
only a moderate recurring operating loss of EUR 179 million over
the last five months of 2017 (the acquisition of the automotive
businesses having closed as of August 1, 2017). However, in H1
2018, OV generated a recurring operating profit of EUR 502
million, representing a sound operating margin of 5%. OV's
improved performance significantly reflects fixed cost reductions
that have exceeded targets thus far. Going forward, DBRS expects
OV's operating result to remain positive amid reasonable regional
industry conditions, ongoing cost reductions (facilitated by the
agreement between the Company and OV's German unions reached in
May 2018 outlining voluntary headcount reductions and deferred
wage increases) and projected firmer pricing enabled by OV's
forthcoming product offensive and more disciplined sales
practices.

Regarding industry headwinds stemming from ongoing trade/tariff
challenges, DBRS notes that PSA, on balance, is currently less
affected than many of its automotive peers. While the Company
faces uncertainties linked with Brexit, primarily affecting its
Luton and Ellesmere Port assembly facilities in the United
Kingdom (acquired through the OV acquisition), PSA is only
slightly exposed to the trade disputes between the United States
and China, with the Company having a relatively modest presence
in China and no presence at all in North America (although PSA
has publicly disclosed its intent to re-enter the U.S. market
over the medium to long term).

Notwithstanding ongoing challenges facing the Company including,
among others, commodity cost pressures, tightening emissions
controls and additional restructuring activities, DBRS recognizes
PSA's materially stronger FRA and, assuming its recent operating
performance remains essentially on track, anticipates upgrading
the Company's ratings within early 2019.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


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G E O R G I A
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HALYK BANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDR & Alters Outlook to Pos.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Halyk Bank Georgia's Outlook to
Positive from Stable while affirming the bank's Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating at 'BB-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS and SUPPORT RATING

HBG's IDRs and Support Rating are driven by the potential support
the bank may receive, if needed, from its sole shareholder, HBK.
The one-notch difference between HBK's and HBG's IDRs reflects
the cross-border nature of the parent-subsidiary relationship,
and the so far limited track record and contribution of the
Georgian subsidiary to overall group performance. The Positive
Outlook on HBG mirrors that on the parent.

Fitch has not assigned a Viability Rating to HBG because of its
high management and operational integration with HBK and
significant reliance on parent funding.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

HBG's support-driven Long-Term IDR is sensitive to changes in
Fitch's assessment of support from HBK.

The rating actions are as follows:

Halyk Bank Georgia

Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB-', Outlook revised to Positive
from Stable

Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'

Support Rating: affirmed at '3'


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G E R M A N Y
=============


ATLAS RIGID: S&P Assigns 'B' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it assigned its 'B' long-term issuer
credit rating to Germany-based rigid plastic packaging
manufacturer Atlas Rigid GmbH (Atlas) and to its subsidiaries
Atlas Packaging GmbH and Atlas Rigid North America Inc. The
outlook is stable.

S&P said, "We also assigned our 'B' issue and '3' recovery
ratings to the EUR50 million senior secured revolving credit
facility (RCF) and EUR317 million senior secured term loan B. The
recovery rating indicates our expectation of meaningful (50%-70%;
rounded estimate: 55%) recovery of principal in the event of a
payment default.

"Finally, we assigned our 'CCC+' issue and '6' recovery ratings
to the EUR70 million second-lien facility. The recovery rating
indicates our expectation of negligible (0%-10%; rounded
estimate: 0%) recovery of principal in the event of payment
default.

"The ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings we assigned
on June 28, 2018."

The rating on Atlas primarily reflects the group's strong niche
positions in the fragmented rigid plastic packaging segment.
Atlas' products are mostly sold to blue-chip food manufacturers
and include a broad range of mainly thermoformed but also
injection molded packaging solutions.

Atlas' products relate to dairy products and spreads (48% of 2017
sales), processed and finished foods (20%), foodservice (14%),
and other segments (18%). In the financial year ending Dec. 31,
2017 (FY2017), the group generated sales of around EUR558 million
and S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA of EUR74 million,
resulting in an adjusted EBITDA margin of 13.2%.

S&P assesses Atlas' business risk profile as weak. The rigid
plastics industry is very competitive and there is limited
product differentiation. Atlas' ability to produce standardized
products at low cost and in large volumes, and to serve customers
in multiple locations and on a timely basis, are key competitive
advantages. Atlas' business risk profile is also underpinned by
its technical expertise, and design and innovation ability. The
group's competitive cost model reflects the low cost of its
manufacturing and ongoing cost improvement efforts. The group
also benefits from longstanding customer relationships, mainly
with blue-chip customers.

Atlas has a well-invested asset base. It has 18 manufacturing
sites, mostly in Central and Western Europe. Atlas' customer base
is somewhat concentrated and partly mirrors the concentrated
nature of the food industry. Its largest customer accounts for
over 7% of revenues and its top 10 customers generate 39% of
sales. Most of its products are sold in Western Europe, with the
U.S. and Turkey jointly accounting for less than 10% of revenues.
In terms of distribution, 80% of Atlas' sales are made directly
to fast-moving consumer food groups (for example, Danone SA,
Unilever PLC, and Arla Foods); 15% to the food services industry
(including Bunzl PLC and McDonald's Corp.); and 5% to retailers
(such as Carrefour SA, Tesco PLC, Coop Group, and Lidl Stiftung &
Co. KG).

The rigid plastic manufacturing industry is very competitive and
challenging. Atlas is exposed to continuous pricing pressure from
customers, which it largely offsets with ongoing cost
improvements and a continual shift toward higher-margin products
and customers. In 2017, profitability was hit by unusually sudden
and large resin price increases. Atlas is typically able to pass
such increases on to its customers with a three-to-four month
delay, as 66% of its contracts include contractual pass-through
mechanisms. However, the contractual adjustment mechanism (an
average price calculation) does not guarantee full insulation.

The group also has some exposure to foreign currency movements --
particularly fluctuations in the Turkish lira and pound sterling
against the euro -- due to its manufacturing operations in Turkey
and the U.K.

S&P said, "We assess Atlas' financial risk profile as highly
leveraged. Our assessment reflects our expectation that adjusted
leverage will be 5.9x in December 2018. In 2018 and 2019, S&P
expects free operating cash flow (FOCF) to debt to remain modest
and below 5% of debt."

S&P's base case assumes:

-- Eurozone GDP growth of 2% in 2018 and 1.7% in 2019, supported
    by domestic demand, exports, and low unemployment.

-- GDP growth of 2.6% in 2018 in the U.S., underpinned by low
    borrowing costs, anticipated fiscal stimulus, low
    unemployment rates, a weaker dollar, and sound business and
    consumer confidence.

-- A slight revenue increase of 2% in FY2018 and FY2019 to
    reflect additional sales to existing customers, particularly
    in the dairy and detergent segments. S&P expects that
    revenues will increase modestly thereafter.

-- Stable adjusted EBITDA margins at 13.2% in FY2018 and FY2019.
    S&P expects that the group will achieve this by offsetting
    continued pricing pressures with cost-cutting initiatives and
    favorable changes in its client and product mix.

-- Adjusted EBITDA of EUR75.3 million for FY2018, reflecting
    reported EBITDA of EUR70.4 million, adjusted for EUR4.9
    million of added operating leases.

-- Capital expenditure (capex) of approximately EUR35 million-
    EUR40 million in FY2018 and FY2019. The asset base is well-
    invested. Most of this capex will relate to growth and
    maintenance capex in Eastern Europe and France. The growth
    capex largely reflects new make-to-order contracts with
    customers.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

-- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of 5.9x at end-2018 and 5.8x at end-
    2019.

-- Adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of around 12% in
    December 2018 and December 2019.

-- FOCF to debt below 5% throughout 2018 and 2019.

S&P said, 'The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Atlas
will continue to capitalize on its solid client relationships and
leading niche positions. In the next 12 months, we expect
adjusted leverage to remain close to 5.9x and FFO to debt to
remain close to 12%. We also expect FOCF to remain minimal.

"We could lower the rating if Atlas experienced unexpected
customer losses or margin pressures due to raw material prices,
adverse foreign-exchange movements, or delays in the
implementation of its cost rationalizations. These would prevent
Atlas from materially reducing leverage and result in negative
cash flows, with debt to EBITDA persistently above 7.0x. We could
also lower the rating if the group's financial policy became more
aggressive, for example through the implementation of dividend
recaps.

"We view an upgrade as unlikely in the near term, given Atlas'
high leverage and financial sponsor ownership. Any upside would
most likely be caused by a material improvement in the financial
metrics, with a decline in debt to EBITDA to below 5.0x and a
commitment from the sponsor to sustainably maintain debt to
EBITDA below 5.0x."


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I R E L A N D
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RIVOLI PAN EUROPE 1: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to D(sf)
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered to 'D (sf)' its credit ratings on
RIVOLI Pan Europe 1 PLC's class B and C notes. S&P has
subsequently withdrawn its ratings on these two classes of notes,
effective in 30 days' time.

The downgrades reflect the issuer's failure to repay the
remaining note principal balance on Aug. 3, 2018, the legal final
maturity date.

The transaction is now backed by one loan secured by one office
property located in France.

RIVE DEFENSE LOAN (100% OF THE POOL)

The securitized loan has an outstanding balance of EUR57.6
million, which represents a 50% pari passu piece of a whole loan.
The other 50% pari passu piece does not form part of this
securitization. The loan was transferred into special servicing
in December 2012 after the borrower failed to repay at the
scheduled loan maturity date. The loan maturity date was extended
to April 2018 during the workout period.

As of the August 2018 interest payment date, the loan was secured
by an office property located in Nanterre, 6 kilometers northwest
of central Paris. The property is currently in the process of
being sold, but did not sell by the legal final maturity date. As
the sale is in process, the French note maturity has been
extended to Aug. 2, 2019, in order for the sale of the property
to be
completed.

RATING RATIONALE

S&P said, "Our ratings in RIVOLI Pan Europe 1 address timely
payment of interest and repayment of principal no later than the
legal final maturity date.

"The issuer failed to repay the notes on Aug. 3, 2018.
Consequently, we have lowered to 'D (sf)' our ratings on the
class B and C notes in line with our criteria. The ratings will
remain at 'D (sf)' for a period of 30 days before the withdrawals
become effective."

  RATINGS LIST

  RIVOLI Pan Europe 1 PLC
  EUR479.8 mil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes

                                  Rating
  Class        Identifier         To           From
  B            XS0278739874       D (sf)       CCC+ (sf)
  C            XS0278741771       D (sf)       CCC- (sf)


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I T A L Y
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A-BEST 15: DBRS Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to BB
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited took the following rating actions on the
Notes issued by Asset-Backed European Securitization Transaction
Ten S.r.l. (A-BEST 10), Asset-Backed European Securitization
Transaction Twelve S.r.l. (A-BEST 12), Asset-Backed European
Securitization Transaction Fourteen S.r.l. (A-BEST 14) and Asset-
Backed European Securitization Transaction Fifteen S.r.l. (A-BEST
15):

A-BEST 10:

-- Class B Notes upgraded to AAA (sf)
-- Class C Notes upgraded to AAA (sf)
-- Class D Notes upgraded to AAA (sf)

A-BEST 12:

-- Class A Notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes upgraded to AA (high) (sf)

A-BEST 14:

-- Class A Notes confirmed at AA (sf)
-- Class B Notes confirmed at A (sf)
-- Class C Notes confirmed at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D Notes confirmed at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E Notes upgraded to BB (low) (sf)
-- Commingling Reserve Facility confirmed at BBB (high) (sf)

A-BEST 15:

-- Class A Notes confirmed at AA (sf)
-- Class B Notes confirmed at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C Notes confirmed at BBB (sf)
-- Class D Notes confirmed at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E Notes upgraded to BB (sf)
-- Commingling Reserve Facility confirmed at BBB (sf)

The rating actions follow an annual review of the transactions
and are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance in terms of delinquencies and defaults.

-- Probability of Default (PD), Recovery Rate (RR), and
Prepayment Loss assumptions.

-- The credit enhancement (CE) available to the Notes to cover
the expected losses at their respective rating levels.

All four transactions are securitizations of portfolios of
Italian auto loans originated and serviced by FCA Bank S.p.A.
(FCA Bank), a joint venture that is 50% owned by Fiat Group and
50% owned by Credit Agricole Consumer Finance.

A-BEST 10

The transaction portfolio is non-revolving, and the Class A Notes
was fully repaid in June 2018. DBRS expects the remaining Notes
will be repaid within the next 12 months. As of 22 June 2018,
loans more than 90 days delinquent as a percentage of the
outstanding portfolio balance were at 0.14%. The cumulative
default ratio was 0.38% of the portfolio balance at the
transaction closing. The performance is well within DBRS's
expectations. Based on the remaining portfolio's composition,
DBRS has updated the PD and RR assumptions to 2.1% and 12.6%,
respectively.

The CE available to the remaining rated Notes has increased
significantly as the transaction continues to deleverage. As of
the 10 July 2018 payment date, the CE to the Class B, C and D
Notes increased to 75.5%, 56.5% and 47.0%, respectively.

A-BEST 12

The transaction's revolving period ended in October 2017 the
transaction is now amortizing. As of 22 June 2018, loans more
than 90 days delinquent increased slightly to 0.18%. The
cumulative default ratio as a percentage of the portfolio balance
at the transaction closing plus replenished loan balance was
0.38%. The transaction's performance is also within DBRS's
expectations. Based on the remaining portfolio's composition,
DBRS has updated the PD and RR assumptions to 2.4% and 12.5%,
respectively.

The CE available to the Class A and B Notes increased to 21.9%
and 7.8% from 14.0% and 5.0%, respectively, following the
deleveraging of the transaction.

A-BEST 14

The transaction closed in May 2016, and the Notes were retrenched
in November 2016 and April 2018. Currently, the transaction is in
the revolving period, which is scheduled to end in May 2020. As
of June 22, 2018, loans more than 90 days delinquent were 0.06%
of the outstanding pool balance. The cumulative default ratio as
a percentage of the portfolio balance at the transaction closing
plus replenished loan balance was 0.18%. The performance is
within DBRS's expectations. DBRS has maintained the PD and RR
assumptions at 3.0% and 12.9%, respectively.

As the transaction is revolving, the CE available to the Class A,
B, C, D and E Notes remains at 10.0%, 7.0%, 5.0%, 2.4% and 1.3%,
respectively, same as at the April 2018 amendment.

A-BEST 15

The transaction closed in May 2017 and went through restructuring
in December 2017 when the Notes coupons were amended to floating
rates and an interest rate swap was implemented into the
structure. Currently, the transaction is in the revolving period,
which will end in May 2019. As of June 22, 2018, loans more than
90 days delinquent were 0.11% of the outstanding pool balance.
The cumulative default ratio as a percentage of the portfolio
balance at the transaction closing plus replenished loan balance
was 0.11%. The performance is within DBRS's expectations. DBRS
has maintained the PD and RR assumptions at 3.0% and 12.9%,
respectively.

As the transaction is revolving, the CE available to the Class A,
B, C, D and E Notes remains at 9.0%, 8.5%, 4.2%, 2.7% and 1.7%,
respectively.

The source of CE to each set of Notes is their respective
subordinated Notes. The increase in the CE prompted the upgrades
of the Notes in A-BEST 10 and 12.

Each transaction benefits from a non-amortizing Cash Reserve
currently at their respective target amounts. A-BEST 10 has a
Cash Reserve of EUR 7.0 million, A-BEST 12 EUR 11.2 million, A-
BEST 14 EUR 23.1 million, and A-BEST 15 EUR 14.0 million. The
Cash Reserve is available to cover senior expenses and interest
on the Notes, but do not provide CE until the last payment date
when the Notes are to be paid in full.

The Commingling Reserve in each transaction was funded by FCA
Bank at the transaction closing. It can only be drawn when the
Servicer could not perform daily transfer of the collections as a
result of the FCA Bank default or when the FCA Bank could not
indemnify the transaction any non-payment of the insurance
premium. DBRS confirmed the rating of the Commingling Reserve
Facility in A-BEST 14 at BBB (high) (sf), and the rating of the
one in A-BEST 15 at BBB (sf) in this rating review. The ratings
of the Commingling Reserve Facilities incorporate the credit
qualities of FCA Bank, the Account Bank where the funds are
deposited, the Class C Notes, and the Class D Notes to assess the
likelihood of a facility drawing and the timely interest payments
to the facility.

In this review, DBRS reduced its assumption on the loss of
insurance premium payment not covered by the Commingling Reserve
due to borrower prepayments, following the upgrade of FCA Bank's
DBRS private rating. The rating upgrade of FCA Bank reduces the
likelihood that FCA Bank will not indemnify the lost insurance
premium payment. Consequently, DBRS reduced the relevant loss
stress in the cash flow analysis to 50% in the BBB (high) (sf)
rating scenario and to 25% in the BBB (sf) and BBB (low) (sf)
rating scenarios and eliminated the stress in non-investment
grade rating scenarios. The reduced loss stress prompted the
upgrades of the Class E Notes in A-BEST 14 and A-BEST 15.

Elavon Financial Services DAC (Elavon) acts as the Account Bank
in A-BEST 10, 12 and 14. The DBRS private rating of Elavon meets
the Minimum Institution Rating criteria given the rating assigned
to the respective senior Notes, as described in DBRS's "Legal
Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
methodology.

BNP Paribas Securities Services, Milan Branch, is the Account
Bank in A-BEST 15. Its DBRS private rating meets the Minimum
Institution Rating criteria given the rating assigned to the
Class A Notes, as described in DBRS's "Legal Criteria for
European Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

UniCredit Bank AG (UniCredit) is the swap counterparty in A-BEST
10. The DBRS private rating of UniCredit is below the first
rating threshold, given the ratings assigned to the Notes, and
UniCredit is ready to post collateral when the swap is in-the-
money for the Issuer, as described in DBRS's "Derivative Criteria
for European Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

FCA Bank is the swap counterparty in A-BEST 12 and 15. UniCredit
and Credit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank S.A. are the
joint standby swap counterparties in A-BEST 12. Credit Agricole
Corporate & Investment Bank S.A. is the sole standby swap
counterparty in A-BEST 15. The DBRS private rating of FCA Bank
does not meet the first rating threshold given the rating
assigned to the senior Notes as described in DBRS's "Derivative
Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
methodology. The swap counterparty risk is mitigated through the
existence of the standby swap counterparties.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.

The Affected Ratings is available at https://bit.ly/2Mquwjq


BANCA CARIGE: Moody's Cuts Long-Term Issuer Rating to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the baseline credit
assessment of Banca Carige S.p.A. to caa2 from caa1, its long-
term issuer rating to Caa3 from Caa2 and its long-term deposit
rating to Caa1 from B3. Moody's also placed all of Carige's long-
term ratings and assessments under review for further downgrade.
The ratings were downgraded in light of the recent corporate
governance tensions which in Moody's view are an impediment to
the bank's effective restructuring. The downgrade and review for
further downgrade also reflect the heightened risk that Carige
could be placed in resolution following the European Central
Bank's rejection of the bank's capital conservation plan. The
long-term counterparty risk ratings were downgraded by two
notches to B3 and placed on review for further downgrade. This
follows the downgrade of the BCA and also corrects a prior error.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Carige's BCA and ratings were downgraded to reflect the emergence
of material weaknesses in the bank's corporate governance in
recent weeks. Between June and August 2018, Carige's chairman and
several members of the board of directors resigned and in July
2018 the minority shareholder POP 12 S.a.r.l. requested a
shareholders' meeting to dismiss the bank's entire board. The
downgrades also reflect the bank's failure to achieve regulatory
approval for its CCP, failure to issue subordinated debt, and its
breach of total regulatory capital requirements.

The review for downgrade on Carige's BCA and ratings reflects the
heightened risk of regulatory action, including its resolution,
following the ECB's decision, communicated by Carige on July 20,
not to approve the bank's CCP. Carige reported a total capital
ratio of 11.9% at end-June, below its Overall Capital Requirement
of 13.125%; stated that some of the capital strengthening actions
planned such as asset disposals and subordinated debt issuance
had not taken place; and that the ECB has requested a new CCP to
be presented before end-November.

During the review period, Moody's will consider the potential for
Carige to be able to develop a CCP which meets ECB approval.
Should the bank fail to implement the restructuring actions
planned, the ratings could be downgraded to reflect the bank's
reduced viability on a stand-alone basis and more likely
resolution. The review will also consider the evolution of loss-
absorbing liabilities protecting senior debt, deposits and
counterparty obligations.

The downgrade of the CRRs reflects, in part, the correction of an
error in the previous rating action. When Moody's assigned CRRs
to Carige in the June 22, 2018 rating action, the agency assumed
a degree of subordination to the CRR that was too high. The error
has now been corrected, and today's rating action reflects this
change.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP

Given the review for downgrade, rating upgrades are unlikely. Any
upgrade would require stronger capital levels, comfortably above
regulatory requirements, and the execution of a credible
restructuring plan for the bank's turnaround.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS DOWN

Moody's could downgrade Carige's ratings and assessments should
the agency believe that the bank's actions over the coming weeks
and the regulator's responses, or lack thereof, increase the
likelihood of the bank being placed under resolution. Moody's
could also downgrade Carige's deposit rating or CRRs if shrinking
senior debt were to increase the loss-given-failure for junior
deposits or counterparty obligations.

Issuer: Banca Carige S.p.A.

Downgrades:

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Downgraded to caa2 from
caa1; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

Baseline Credit Assessment, Downgraded to caa2 from caa1; Placed
Under Review for further Downgrade

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Downgraded to B2(cr) from
B1(cr); Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

Long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, Downgraded to B3 from B1;
Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

Long-term Issuer Rating, Downgraded to Caa3 RUR from Caa2 STA;
Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

Long-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Downgraded to Caa1 RUR from B3
NEG; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

Affirmations:

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, Affirmed NP

Short-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Affirmed NP

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, Changed To RUR From Negative(m)

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in August 2018.


QUADRIVIO SME 2018: DBRS Rates Two Note Classes BB(High)
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned new ratings to the following notes
issued by Quadrivio SME 2018 S.r.l. (the Issuer or Quadrivio SME
2018):

   -- EUR 320,000,000 Class A1 Asset Backed Floating Rate Notes
due January 2050, rated AAA (sf)

   -- EUR 400,000,000 Class A2 Asset Backed Floating Rate Notes
due January 2050, rated AAA (sf)

  -- EUR 200,000,000 Class A3 Asset Backed Floating Rate Notes
due January 2050, rated AAA (sf)

  -- EUR 102,200,000 Class B Asset Backed Floating Rate Notes due
January 2050, rated AA (high) (sf)

   -- EUR 100,000,000 Class C1 Asset Backed Floating Rate Notes
due January 2050, rated BB (high) (sf)

   -- EUR 89,800,000 Class C2 Asset Backed Floating Rate Notes
due January 2050, rated BB (high) (sf)

The ratings on the Class A1, Class A2 and Class A3 Notes
(together, the Class A Notes) address the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
Final Maturity Date. The ratings on the Class B, Class C1 and
Class C2 Notes address the ultimate payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal on or before the Final Maturity
Date, in accordance with the transaction documentation. The
Issuer also issued EUR 260,000,000 Class J Notes which were not
rated by DBRS.

Quadrivio SME 2018 is a cash flow securitization collateralized
by a portfolio of performing loans to small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SME), entrepreneurs, artisans and producer families
based in Italy. The loans were granted by Credito Valtellinese
S.p.A. (Credito Valtellinese or the Originator) and by Credito
Siciliano S.p.A. before being merged into Credito Valtellinese in
June 2018.

The economic effect of the transfer of the portfolio from the
Originator to the Issuer took place on July 7, 2018 (the
Effective Date). As of the Effective Date, the portfolio
consisted of 10,668 loans extended to 9,080 borrowers, with an
aggregate par balance of EUR 1.46 billion, of which EUR 69.31
million was in arrears for less than 30 days.

In a pre-enforcement scenario, the structure allows for interest
on the Class A1, Class A2 and Class A3 Notes to be paid pari
passu and pro rata, whereas the principal is paid sequentially.
Interest on the Class B Notes and the Class C1 and Class C2 Notes
(together, the Class C Notes) is paid in priority to the
principal on the Class A Notes. Both interest and principal on
the Class C Notes are paid pari passu and pro rata.

The transaction incorporates triggers on the performance of the
portfolio to defer interest payments on the Class B and Class C
Notes after the principal payments on the Class A Notes.

The Class A Notes benefit from a total credit enhancement (CE) of
37.8% provided by subordination of the Class B, Class C and Class
J Notes and the cash reserve. The Class B and the Class C Notes
benefit from a CE of 30.8% and 17.7%, respectively.

The transaction includes a cash reserve, which is available to
cover senior fees and interest on the Class A and Class B Notes.
The cash reserve will amortize subject to the target level being
equal to 1% of the outstanding balance of the Class A and Class B
Notes.

The transferred portfolio, totaling EUR 1.46 billion, consists of
senior unsecured loans representing 50.3% of the outstanding
portfolio balance and mortgage-backed loans representing 49.7%.
The historical performance data indicates that mortgage-backed
loans have a higher historical probability of default than the
unsecured loans. This behavior is in line with other SME loan
originators. The higher probability of default (PD) for mortgage
loans is compensated by higher recoveries expectations compared
with unsecured loans.

The portfolio exhibits a significant geographical concentration
in the Italian regions of Lombardy and Sicily, which account for
49.1% and 22.7% of the portfolio outstanding balance,
respectively. This geographical concentration reflects the bank's
significant presence in these two regions.

The portfolio exhibits a moderate sector concentration. The top
three sector exposures, according to DBRS's industry
classifications are Building & Development, Farming & Agriculture
and Business Equipment & Services, which represent 24.5%, 11.1%
and 8.2% of the outstanding portfolio balance, respectively. The
portfolio does not have a significant borrower concentration, as
the top one, five and ten borrowers only account for 1.2%, 3.5%
and 5.6% of the outstanding portfolio balance, respectively.

Credito Valtellinese acts as the servicer, and Securitization
Services S.p.A. acts as the back-up servicer for this
transaction. The back-up servicer will step in within 30 days if
the servicer's appointment has been terminated. To account for
the warm back-up servicer arrangements, DBRS has factored a
commingling loss in its cash flow analysis, in line with other
Italian SME collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions.

DBRS determined these ratings as follows, as per the principal
methodology specified below:

   -- The PD for the portfolio was determined using the
historical performance information supplied. DBRS assumed an
annualized PD of 6.8% and 2.9% for mortgage and non-mortgage
loans, respectively.

  -- The assumed weighted-average life (WAL) of the portfolio was
3.9 years.

  -- The PDs and WAL were used in the DBRS Diversity Model to
generate the hurdle rate for the assigned ratings.

  -- The recovery rate was determined by considering the market
value declines for Europe, the security level and type of the
collateral. Recovery rates of 52.2% and 13.4% were used for the
secured and unsecured loans, respectively, at the AAA (sf) rating
level; 60.4% and 15.6% at the AA (high) (sf) rating level,
respectively; and 78.3% and 21.3% at the BB (high) (sf) rating
level, respectively.

  -- The break-even rates for the interest rate stresses and
default timings were determined using DBRS's cash flow tool.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DUTCH PROPERTY 2017-1: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed its ratings on the following bonds
issued by Dutch Property Finance 2017-1 B.V. (the Issuer):

-- Class A confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B confirmed at AA (sf)
-- Class C confirmed at A (sf)
-- Class D confirmed at BBB (sf)
-- Class E confirmed at BB (sf)

The rating of the Class A notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and ultimate payment of principal on or before the legal
final maturity date. The ratings of the Class B, Class C, and
Class D and Class E notes address the ultimate payment of
interest and principal on or before the legal final maturity
date.

The confirmations follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

   -- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies, defaults
and losses.

   -- Portfolio default rate (PD), loss given default (LGD) and
expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables.

   -- Current available credit enhancement to the notes to cover
the expected losses at their respective rating levels.

Dutch Property Finance 2017-1 B.V. is a securitization of
mortgage loans secured against buy-to-let residential properties
and commercial real estate properties located in the Netherlands.
The mortgage loans were originated by the RNHB mortgage business.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of July 2018, loans that were two- to three-months in arrears
represented 0.3% of the outstanding portfolio balance, down from
0.5% in October 2017. As of July 2018, the 90+ delinquency ratio
was 0.6%, down from 1.0% in October 2017, and the cumulative loss
ratio was 0.2%.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS

DBRS conducted a loan-by-loan analysis of the remaining pool of
receivables and has maintained its base case PD and LGD
assumptions at 10.8% and 13.8%, respectively.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

As of the July 2018 payment date, credit enhancement to the Class
A notes was 30.1%, up from 25.7% at the DBRS initial rating.
Credit enhancement to the Class B notes was 17.6%, up from 15.0%
at the DBRS initial rating. Credit enhancement to the Class C
notes was 13.0%, up from 11.1% at the DBRS initial rating. Credit
enhancement to the Class D notes was 8.2%, up from 7.0% at the
DBRS initial rating. Credit enhancement to the Class E notes was
5.9%, up from 5.0% at the DBRS initial rating. Credit enhancement
is provided by subordination of junior classes and a non-
amortizing reserve fund.

The transaction benefits from a non-amortizing reserve fund of
EUR 17.0 million. The reserve fund is available to cover senior
fees, interest and principal (via the principal deficiency
ledgers) on the rated notes.

Elavon Financial Services DAC, U.K. Branch acts as the account
bank for the transaction. The DBRS private rating of Elavon
Financial Services DAC, U.K. Branch is consistent with the
Minimum Institution Rating, given the rating assigned to the
Class A notes, as described in DBRS's "Legal Criteria for
European Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC (trading as NatWest Markets) acts
as the swap counterparty for the transaction. DBRS's Long-Term
Critical Obligations Rating of NatWest Markets Plc. at 'A' is in
line with the First Rating Threshold as described in DBRS's
"Derivative Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


PANGAEA ABS 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded the senior tranche of ABS 2007-1 B.V
and affirmed the others, as follows:

Class B: upgraded to 'Asf' from ' BBBsf ''; Outlook Stable

Class C: affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

Class D: affirmed at 'Csf'

Class E: affirmed at 'Csf'

Class F: affirmed at 'Csf'

Class S1: 'Csf' withdrawn

The transaction is a managed cash securitisation of structured
finance assets, primarily mortgage-backed securities. The
portfolio is actively managed by Investec Principal Finance.

The upgrade of the class B and affirmation of the class C notes
reflects an increase in credit enhancement (CE), due to the
transaction's deleveraging. The deleveraging is mainly driven by
principal amortisation and prepayments. These ratings, however,
reflect the sensitivity of timely payment of interest on these
notes to principal amortisation and prepayments of the portfolio.
As of the June 2018 trustee report, the interest proceeds were
not enough to pay down the fees and interest on the notes and the
principal proceeds were used to pay down the interest on the
class B and C notes.

The rating on the class B notes has been capped as per Fitch
Global Structured Finance Rating Criteria on account of
uncertainty of principal proceeds due to a highly concentrated
portfolio. The rating on the class C notes is also capped at the
current rating level. As per the Global Structured Finance Rating
Criteria Fitch may only assign investment-grade ratings if
deferrals of interest are not expected.

The rating of the class D, E and F notes reflects accumulation of
further deferred interest over the past 12 months and the
sensitivity of these notes to defaults and increased obligor
concentration.

The rating on the class S1 notes has been withdrawn as they have
been split into individual notes and are no longer outstanding.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement

CE has significantly increased due to transaction's deleveraging
over the last 12 months. The portfolio has repaid by EUR36
million over the past year, resulting in full repayment of the
class A and partial repayment of class B notes, while increasing
the available CE to the two senior class B and C notes to 94.5%
and 54.6% from 51.98% and 29.55%, respectively, based on the
performing portfolio. However, timely payment of interest on
class B and class C is vulnerable to portfolio amortisation as
interest may not be enough to cover the high fees and interest on
the class B and C notes as was the case on the June 2018 payment
date.

High Obligor Concentration

The portfolio is concentrated with 20 performing assets, down
from 32 last year, due to the natural amortisation of the
portfolio. Consequently, the largest asset exposure is now 14.1%
of the performing portfolio and the 10 largest issuers represent
79.3% of the performing portfolio.

High Defaulted Asset Concentration

The defaulted asset balance is slightly lower at EUR 43.1million
versus EUR 43.8 million a year ago on account of some recoveries
from the defaulted assets and no new defaults. However, defaulted
assets still represent around 48.9% of the total portfolio. Only
the class B and C notes are fully collateralised, which means the
interest payment on the rated noted balance of EUR 73.7 million
is supported by only a performing portfolio of EUR45.1 million.

Cash Flow Analysis

Fitch used a customised proprietary cash flow model to replicate
the principal and interest waterfalls and the various structural
features of the transaction, and to assess their effectiveness.
Fitch has considered the amortisation schedule to assume some
principal proceeds in each period to cover the liabilities during
this period. Fitch has assumed the currently amortising assets to
continue to pay down. Out of the 20 performing assets only eight
were amortising in last 12 months. However, it is not possible to
predict the actual timing of the principal amortisation and with
the portfolio being more concentrated than last year the
uncertainty of timing has increased. The timely payment of
interest is highly sensitive to the amortisation and prepayment
of the portfolio, which is the key rating factor. If principal
proceeds are insufficient to pay off interest it may lead to an
event of default.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Neither a 25% increase in the obligor default probability or a
25% reduction in expected recovery rates will impact the ratings
of the notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other
Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations and/or
European Securities and Markets Authority-registered rating
agencies. Fitch has relied on the practices of the relevant
groups within Fitch and/or other rating agencies to assess the
asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


===========
P O L A N D
===========


GETBACK SA: S&P Withdraws 'D/D' Issuer Credit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has withdrawn its 'D' long-term
and 'D' short-term issuer credit ratings on the Polish debt
collector and purchaser GetBack S.A. at the issuer's request.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BHS GROUP: FRC Faces Pressure from MPs on Audit Report
------------------------------------------------------
Oliver Gill at The Telegraph reports that an influential group of
MPs, led by the so-called "scourge of BHS", has demanded to know
when accounting regulators will publish a closely-guarded report
into the doomed retailer's 2014 audit.

Frank Field, the Labour MP who has led the parliamentary inquiry
into the collapsed high street stalwart, has written to the chief
executive of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), The Telegraph
relates.

According to The Telegraph, the chairman of the Work and Pensions
Committee asked when the FRC report into PwC's audit of BHS and
its holding company Taveta will be made public.

In June, the FRC issued PwC with a record GBP6.5 million fine --
which was reduced from GBP10 million on early settlement grounds
-- for its accounting sign-off, The Telegraph recounts.


CYAN BLUE 2: S&P Withdraws 'B' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings withdrew its 'B' long-term issuer credit
rating on U.K.-based online gaming company Cyan Blue Holdco 2
(Sky Bet). At the same time, S&P withdrew its 'B' issue rating
and '4' recovery rating on the senior secured term loan B issued
by Cyan Blue Holdco 3 following the full redemption of the loan.

The withdrawal follows the redemption of Sky Bet's debt after the
successful acquisition of Sky Bet by Canadian online gaming
company The Stars Group Inc. (B+/Stable/--). In S&P's view, the
acquisition is consistent with The Stars Group's strategy of
expanding into the online sports betting market from its existing
online poker market, and also improves the group's scale and
product diversity, which underpins the company's cash flow growth
in the highly competitive online gaming market.

The outlook on Sky Bet was stable at the time of the withdrawal.


FORCE INDIA: Set to Exit Administration Following Rescue Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------
Alan Baldwin at Reuters reports that the Force India Formula One
team will come out of administration after a rescue deal
involving a consortium of investors led by Canadian billionaire
Lawrence Stroll, administrators and management said in a
statement on Aug. 7.

According to Reuters, the administrators and management said
creditors would be paid in full and all 405 jobs at the
Silverstone-based team, that was co-owned by embattled Indian
businessman Vijay Mallya and finished fourth last year, were
safe.

Apart from Mr. Stroll, the investors were named as Canadian
entrepreneur Andre Desmarais, Jonathan Dudman, John Idol,
telecoms investor John McCaw Jr., Michael de Picciotto and
Stroll's business partner Silas Chou, Reuters discloses.

Force India's driver lineup is Mexican Sergio Perez and
Mercedes-backed Frenchman Esteban Ocon but Stroll, 19, now looks
likely to move from Williams next season given his father's
involvement, according to Reuters.

Joint administrator Geoff Rowley -- geoff.rowley@frpadvisory.com
-- said funding to support the team would be made available
immediately with "significantly more" once the company emerged
from administration, Reuters relates.

The team went into administration at the end of last month, with
Mr. Perez triggering the process, Reuters recounts.

The Mexican had said he was owed more than US$4 million as part
of sponsorship deals brought to the team, while engine provider
Mercedes was due some EUR13 million (US$15.15 million), Reuters
notes.


GEMGARTO 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes C Rating on Class X Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized its provisional ratings to the
notes issued by Gemgarto 2018-1 PLC as follows:

-- Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes rated AA (sf)
-- Class C Notes rated A (high) (sf)
-- Class D Notes rated A (low) (sf)
-- Class E Notes rated BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X Notes rated C (sf) (together, the Rated Notes)

The ratings assigned to the Class A to E Notes address the timely
payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal on or
before the legal final maturity date. The rating assigned to the
Class X Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest and
principal. The Class F Notes and Class Z Notes are not rated by
DBRS.

Gemgarto 2018-1 PLC (the Issuer) is a bankruptcy-remote special-
purpose vehicle incorporated in the United Kingdom. The notes
will be used to fund (i) the purchase of a U.K. owner-occupied
mortgage portfolio, originated by Kensington Mortgage Company
Limited (KMC), and (ii) a credit entry to a pre-funding principal
ledger. KMC, a North View Group company, is an established lender
and servicer in the U.K. KMC is owned by funds managed by The
Blackstone Group and TPG.

The mortgage portfolio will be serviced by KMC, which will also
act as the cash/bond administrator, with CSC Capital Markets UK
Limited in place as the back-up servicer facilitator. Wells Fargo
Bank is the standby cash/bond administrative counterparty and
will be delegated certain cash administrative duties.

At closing, the Issuer credited part of the initial Class A to F
Notes' proceeds to the pre-funding principal ledger and part of
the Class X Notes' proceeds to the pre-funding revenue ledger,
which can subsequently be applied to purchase additional loans
prior to the first payment date. The additional loans must
conform to portfolio-wide covenants, which mitigate additional
credit risk. Negative carry is partially mitigated by a partial
reserve fund release on the first payment date, providing that
0.1% of the Class A to F Notes' proceeds at closing will flow
through the revenue priority of payments on the first payment
date.

The transaction structure is designed to permit replenishment of
the collateral portfolio prior to the step-up date provided that
the Class A Notes is amortized in line with the target notional
amount. DBRS notes that the target notional amount should be
viewed as a soft target; accordingly, if the Issuer is unable to
amortize the Class A Notes in line with the expectation, then no
replenishment period ending event or an event of default on the
Class A Notes is triggered.

During the replenishment period, the Issuer will first allocate
principal funds toward the amortization of the Class A Notes
until principal funds are sufficient to amortize the Class A
Notes to the target notional amount before applying principal
proceeds to purchase additional loans. DBRS has analyzed a
stressed collateral portfolio to represent potential
deterioration in the characteristics that can impact the
transaction, subject to portfolio-wide covenants.

The closing portfolio, as of July 15, 2018, consisted of 1,197
mortgage loans with a total portfolio balance of GBP 212.2
million. The average loan per borrower was GBP 176,506. The
weighted-average (WA) seasoning of the portfolio was 0.3 years
with a WA remaining term of 26.7 years. The portfolio includes
14.8% of help-to-buy (HTB) loans, which are standard mortgages,
but the HTB borrowers are supported by government loans (the
equity loans, which rank in a subordinated position to the
mortgages). HTB loans are used to fund the purchase of new-build
properties with a minimum deposit of 5% from the borrowers. The
WA current loan-to-value of the portfolio is 75.4%, which
increased to 78.8% in DBRS's analysis to include the HTB equity
loan balances.

The entire portfolio is currently paying fixed interest rates,
which will become floating rates upon completion of the initial
fixed period. Interest rate risk is hedged through an interest
rate swap. Approximately 9.9% of the portfolio by loan balance
comprises loans originated to borrowers with at least one prior
County Court Judgment and 4.7% are either interest-only-loans
for-life or loans that pay on a part-and-part basis. DBRS notes
that affordability for these loans is assessed on a capital-plus-
interest basis. All loans in the portfolio are owner-occupied.

Credit enhancement for the Class A Notes is 18% at closing and is
provided by the subordination of the Class B Notes to the Class F
Notes (excluding the Class X Notes). The credit enhancement
includes a cash reserve fund that is available to support the
Class A to Class E Notes (and Class X Notes upon redemption of
the Class E Notes). The cash reserve is fully funded at closing
to 2.1% of the aggregate initial balance of the Class A to Class
F Notes and will reduce to 2% size following the first payment
date. The 0.1% release amount is intended to mitigate negative
carry from pre-funding period.

The Class A Notes and the Class B Notes benefit from further
liquidity support provided by a liquidity reserve fund, which can
support the payment of senior fees and interest on the Class A
and Class B Notes once it is funded (subject to a 10% Class B
principal deficiency ledger condition). The liquidity reserve was
not funded on the closing date but will be funded from principal
receipts to 2% of the outstanding balance of the Class A and
Class B Notes on subsequent payment dates if the general reserve
fund falls below 1.5% of the outstanding Class A to F Notes.
Additionally, principal receipts may be used to provide liquidity
support to payments of senior fees and interest on the Class A to
E Notes subject to principal deficiency ledger conditions when a
class is not the senior-most outstanding.

The Class X Notes are primarily intended to amortize using
revenue funds. However, if excess spread is insufficient to fully
redeem the Class X Notes when the Class E Notes are paid-down,
principal funds will be used to amortize the Class X Notes in
priority to the Class F Notes. In DBRS's cash flow analysis, the
Class F Notes are rendered partially collateralized as principal
funds are diverted to amortize the Class X Notes. Such an event
leads to a PDL debit; however, DBRS's analysis finds there is
insufficient excess spread to reduce the PDL balances and ensure
the Class F Notes are fully collateralized. DBRS concludes that
full repayment of the Class F Notes is considered unlikely in
extreme scenarios such as large-scale redemptions or repurchases
events.

The Issuer has entered into a fixed-floating swap with BNP
Paribas, London Branch to mitigate the fixed interest rate risk
from the mortgage loans and the three-month LIBOR payable on the
notes. The fixed-floating swap documents reflect DBRS's
"Derivative Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

The Account Bank, Cash Manager, Principal Paying Agent, Agent
Bank and Registrar is Citibank N.A., London Branch. The DBRS
private rating of the Account Bank is consistent with the
threshold for the Account Bank outlined in DBRS's "Legal Criteria
for European Structured Finance Transactions" methodology, given
the rating assigned to the Class A Notes.

DBRS based its ratings primarily on the following analytical
considerations:

   -- The transaction's capital structure, form and sufficiency
of available credit enhancement and liquidity provisions.

   -- The credit quality of the mortgage loan portfolio and the
ability of the servicer to perform collection activities. DBRS
calculated portfolio default rate (PD), loss given default (LGD)
and expected loss (EL) outputs on the mortgage loan portfolio

   -- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repays the Rated Notes according to the
terms of the transaction documents. The transaction cash flows
were analyzed using PD and LGD outputs provided by the European
RMBS Insight Model and using Intex DealMaker.

   -- The structural mitigants in place to avoid potential
payment disruptions caused by operational risk, such as downgrade
and replacement language in the transaction documents.

   -- The transaction's ability to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the notes.

   -- The consistency of the legal structure with DBRS's "Legal
Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
methodology and the presence of legal opinions that address the
assignment of the assets to the Issuer.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.


HOMEBASE: New Owners to Reveal Store Closure Plans Next Week
------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that the new owners of Homebase will reveal
plans to close up to 60 stores next week, putting about 1,500
jobs at risk.

Restructuring company Hillco, which bought the DIY chain for
GBP1 in May, will outline plans for a rescue deal next week, BBC
relays, citing reports.

Hillco bought the struggling chain from Australian firm
Wesfarmers after its disastrous foray into the UK market, BBC
recounts.

Homebase has about 250 stores and 11,500 employees, BBC
discloses.

The closure plan was first revealed by Sky News, which said that
Hillco is to propose an insolvency mechanism known as a Company
Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) early next week, BBC notes.

BBC understands that about 60 outlets have been identified for
closure, which have on average about 25 staff per store.


HOUSE OF FRASER: S&P Raises LT Issuer Credit Rating to 'CCC-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term issuer credit rating on
U.K. department store retailer House of Fraser (UK & Ireland)
Ltd. to 'CCC-' from 'SD'.

S&P said, "At the same time, we raised our long-term issue rating
on the group's GBP175 million senior secured floating-rate notes
(of which GBP164.9 million remain outstanding) to 'CCC-' from
'D'.

"At the same time, we placed all of these ratings on CreditWatch
with negative implications.

"The rating reflects our opinion that, despite successfully
extending the maturities of its debt, we believe there is an
elevated risk that House of Fraser will face a near-term
liquidity or insolvency event, unless it is able to secure
additional sources of cash in the coming months. The ratings are
based on our assessment of the revised terms of the group's
capital structure following the implementation of its scheme of
arrangement with its secured debt lenders, a transaction we
considered a distressed exchange and therefore tantamount to a
default.

"While the extension of the maturities on the group's financial
debt until October 2020 has provided some short-term liquidity
relief, we believe the withdrawal of C.Banner's offer to acquire
a majority stake in the company -- and the withdrawal of GBP70
million of associated cash equity relief -- means the risk of
near-term liquidity pressure is now severe. Given House of
Fraser's high leverage, and worsening liquidity position, we view
the group's ability to remain current on its obligations and
finance working capital as weak.

"At the same time, we understand the group is still negotiating
with several interested parties regarding possible liquidity
support or a change in ownership, and so we do not consider a
default to be inevitable.

"Given it is nearly fully drawn on all of its committed
facilities, we consider House of Fraser's liquidity position
distressed, despite the extension of the group's near term debt.
Any further changes in payment terms with suppliers could bring
about an imminent payment crisis, in our opinion.

"We understand that House of Fraser remains current on its
payment obligations at the time of publication.

"The CreditWatch placement reflects the possibility that we could
lower the ratings on House of Fraser and its rated debt,
potentially by several notches, if it is unable to secure
external cash support and prevent a near-term liquidity or
insolvency event, or if it undertakes a large scale
restructuring. We could keep the ratings on CreditWatch for
longer than our typical three-month horizon.

"We could reassess the ratings if we expect the company to
receive additional sources of liquidity, facilitating completion
of its near-term operational objectives."


INTERSERVE PLC: Reports GBP6-Mil. Loss in First Half 2018
---------------------------------------------------------
Rhiannon Curry at The Telegraph reports that troubled outsourcer
Interserve has slipped to a GBP6 million loss in the first half
as the cost of restructuring the company's finances begins to
take its toll.

The company was forced to refinance the business to the tune of
GBP300 million earlier this year after narrowly avoiding
breaching its loan covenants, The Telegraph relates.

As a result, it has been hammered during the first six months of
the year by higher costs of borrowing, at around GBP31 million
for the first half of 2018 compared to around GBP5 million in the
same period last year, The Telegraph discloses.

Revenues for the company were down 9.7% to almost GBP1.49 billion
as major infrastructure projects in the UK were not repeated and
a trade blockade in Qatar delayed a number of contract awards and
created supply pressures, The Telegraph states.

According to The Telegraph, under its so-called Fit for Growth
program, Interserve has been exiting businesses it considers non-
core and renegotiating some contracts in a bid to concentrate the
company on more profitable activities.

The company, which is one of the world's largest private
contractors employing 80,000 people globally, has been under
greater scrutiny since Carillion entered liquidation earlier this
year putting around 43,000 jobs at risk, The Telegraph relays.

It has fought to remain on track after an energy-from-waste
contract cost it far more than it had been expecting, and margins
were squeezed elsewhere, The Telegraph notes.

Interserve is one of the biggest private contractors, providing
security, probation, healthcare and construction services.  It
employs 80,000 people, including 25,000 in the UK, and also
cleans the London Underground and manages army barracks.


WENDEX VEHICLE: Enters Administration, Seeks Buyer for Business
---------------------------------------------------------------
Business-Sale reports that London-based car rental service,
Wendex Vehicle Rental, has been placed in administration and is
currently on the lookout for a buyer to rescue the business.

Insolvency practitioners and restructuring specialists CVR Global
have been called in, and partners Charles Turner --
cturner@cvr.global -- Simon Lowes -- slowes@cvr.global -- and
Nicholas Parsk -- nparsk@cvr.global -- have been assigned as
joint administrators, Business-Sale relates.

According to Business-Sale, the business will continue trading
through the administration process, and until a new buyer is
sought.

The company experienced an annual turnover increase from GBP2.8
million in 2015 to GBP4 million in 2017, Business-Sale discloses.
However, due to a series of awaited payments from a number of its
customers, the business has found itself in trouble over the past
year, Business-Sale notes.

Wendex Vehicle Rental was established 20 years ago with the
business of hiring out vehicles to the public.  The company owns
nearly 500 vehicles, from taxis to luxury cars including
Bentleys, Mercedes, Lamborghinis and Rolls Royces.  It also runs
a repair workshop from its central London location to maintain
and manage its fleet of cars.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


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