/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/190222.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Friday, February 22, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 39

                           Headlines



I T A L Y

ALITALIA SPA: Italian Gov't. Still Wants Major Role in Rescue
CORDUSIO 4: Fitch Ups Class E Debt Rating to 'Bsf', Outlook Stable


K A Z A K H S T A N

TSESNABANK: S&P Ups Issuer Credit Ratings to B-/B, Outlook Stable


L U X E M B O U R G

ABLV BANK: Suspension of Payments Extended Until July 4


R U S S I A

JSC INVESTGEOSERVIS: Fitch Cuts IDRs to B-, Places on Watch Neg.
VOZROZHDENIE BANK: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Deposit Ratings


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DEBENHAMS PLC: Lenders to Grant More Credit to Avert Ashley Bid
LB HOLDINGS: March 6 Proofs of Debt Deadline Set
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS: March 6 Proofs of Debt Deadline Set
MEDIA PROTOCOL: Crypto-currency Fluctuations Prompt Liquidation


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOOK REVIEW: GROUNDED: Destruction of Eastern Airlines

                           - - - - -


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I T A L Y
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ALITALIA SPA: Italian Gov't. Still Wants Major Role in Rescue
-------------------------------------------------------------
Chiara Albanese, Daniele Lepido and Tommaso Ebhardt at Bloomberg
News report that Italy's government wants to continue to play a
major role at troubled carrier Alitalia SpA, after Delta Air Lines
Inc. and U.K. discounter EasyJet Plc said they're interested in
joining a rescue plan for the company.

According to Bloomberg, Ansa news agency, citing union sources,
reported that after the two airlines confirmed on Feb. 13 that they
could potentially team up to run Alitalia along with state railway
Ferrovie dello Stato, Economic Development Minister Luigi Di Maio
said the Treasury could end up owning a stake larger than 15%.

State-owned Ferrovie will take the lead in the latest bid to revamp
the carrier, almost two years after the airline was placed in
administration for the second time in a decade, Bloomberg states.

Ansa reported Mr. Di Maio, whose Five Star Movement has campaigned
to save jobs at distressed companies around the country, sees
"great potential" for Alitalia, Bloomberg notes.  Mr. Di Maio, who
effectively runs the government along with fellow Deputy Premier
Matteo Salvini, said the state's involvement will safeguard
employment at the carrier, Bloomberg relays.

Ferrovie said on Feb. 13 that discussions among the potential
partners will focus on "defining the main aspects of the new
Alitalia plan", Bloomberg recounts.  EasyJet has confirmed talks on
"forming a consortium to explore options" for the Italian carrier's
future, Bloomberg states.

The clock is ticking for Alitalia as it burns through a EUR900
million- (US$1 billion) state loan, Bloomberg discloses.  The
airline halved its loss before certain items to EUR154 million last
year, Bloomberg relays, citing union Uil Trasporti.  Now, it's
seeking international partners to stay afloat in a market where
fares are under pressure and industry consolidation has left the
Italian airline dwarfed by rivals, Bloomberg notes.

Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte's office said in a statement the
government stands ready to participate in establishing a "new
Alitalia," provided that the new business plan is sustainable and
meets European norms, according to Bloomberg.

EasyJet cautioned that there is no certainty the talks will lead to
a transaction.

Delta, as cited by Bloomberg, said on Feb. 13 that it submitted a
non-binding letter of interest to Ferrovie concerning "a consortium
approach in a future Alitalia together with EasyJet."  Neither
airline disclosed details on their possible roles in resuscitating
the Italian airline, Bloomberg states.

The two foreign carriers are weighing a joint purchase of as much
as 40% of Alitalia, Bloomberg relays, citing people familiar with
the matter.

State-appointed administrators have been running Alitalia since
2017, after former shareholder Etihad Airways pulled the plug on
funding and workers rejected a EUR2 billion recapitalization plan
tied to 1,600 job cuts from a workforce of 12,500, Bloomberg notes.

CORDUSIO 4: Fitch Ups Class E Debt Rating to 'Bsf', Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one tranche of Cordusio RMBS 2 S.r.l.
(Cordusio 2) and one tranche of Cordusio RMBS Securitisation
S.r.l. - Series 2007 (Cordusio 4), and affirmed the others. Fitch
has also affirmed Cordusio RMBS UCFin S.r.l. 2006 Series (Cordusio
3).

The transactions are securitisations of Italian residential
mortgage loans originated and serviced by the UniCredit group
(BBB/Negative/F2).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Performance Remains Stable

The rating actions reflect the stable performance over the past
year. Fitch expects this trend to continue.

As of November 30, 2018, loans in arrears by more than three months
were reported at between 1.0% (Cordusio 2) and 1.3% (Cordusio 3 and
Cordusio 4), broadly in line with the Italian RMBS average. Gross
cumulative defaults stood at 2.4%, 6.0% and 5.3% of the original
portfolio balance for Cordusio 2, Cordusio 3 and Cordusio 4,
respectively. Cordusio 2 is the best performer in the series.
Cordusio 3 and Cordusio 4 have showed similar performance trends so
far.

Fitch has applied a performance adjustment factor (PAF) of 50% to
take into account the observed performance. According to its
European RMBS criteria, Fitch can apply a PAF of 50% where the
portfolio is seven years or more seasoned, exhibits a weighted
average indexed loan to value ratio below 50% and has withstood
significant economic stress, which is the case for the Cordusio
series.

Cash Reserves Back to Target

The reserve funds for Cordusio 3 and Cordusio 4 have continued to
replenish and are now at their targets. At the previous
surveillance review in March 2018, the Cordusio 3 and 4 reserves
were at 78% and 40% of their targets, respectively.

Increasing Credit Protection

Credit enhancement (CE) continues to build up on the notes as a
result of sequential amortisation and the non-amortising cash
reserves for Cordusio 3 and Cordusio 4. The class A notes in
Cordusio 2, Cordusio 3 and Cordusio 4 had 69.1%, 40.7% and 30.9%
CE, respectively, as of December 2018, compared with 51%, 34% and
26% as of December 2017.

Over the past 18 months, recoveries have outpaced new defaults,
unlike the majority of previous years where new defaults were
greater than recoveries. Negative Euribor, which has meant no
interest payments on the class A and B notes across the Cordusio
series for some time, has also contributed to restore excess
spread.

Increased CE and positive excess spread in Cordusio 2 and Cordusio
4 support the upgrade of Cordusio 2's class C notes and Cordusio
4's class E notes.

Payment Interruption Risk

In Fitch's view, Cordusio 4 is still exposed to payment
interruption risk, despite its cash reserve now being at target.
The reserve fund of Cordusio 4 can also be used to provision for
defaults and so may not be available when needed to pay interest on
the notes. Fitch expects further drawings on the cash reserve due
to credit losses and the remaining balance of the reserve fund to
not provide adequate interest coverage for the rated notes.

For this reason, in line with Fitch's counterparty risk criteria,
Cordusio 4's notes cannot achieve ratings more than five notches
higher than the servicer's rating and, in any case, not higher than
the 'Asf' category. Hence, unmitigated payment interruption risk
constrains the rating of Cordusio 4's class A3 and B notes.

Although the reserve of Cordusio 3 could also be used to provision
for defaults, its larger size as a percentage of the rated notes
compared with Cordusio 4 and the fact that it has never been fully
depleted, means Fitch believes that interest coverage on the notes
is adequate. Fitch also found that for Cordusio 2, payment
interruption risk is mitigated by the reserve fund, which is only
available for liquidity purposes.

Sovereign Cap

Italian securitisations can achieve a maximum rating of 'AAsf', six
notches above Italy's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR,
BBB/Negative). This is the case for Cordusio 2's class A2 and B
notes and Cordusio 3. The Negative Outlook on these tranches
mirrors that on the sovereign.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings of Cordusio 4's class A3 and B notes are exposed to
unmitigated payment interruption risk. With the amortisation of the
notes and if the reserve fund continues to be at its target, thus
improving the interest coverage ratio on the notes, the rating of
these tranches could be upgraded to the 'AAsf' rating category.

The ratings of Cordusio 2's class C notes, Cordusio 3's class C and
D notes and Cordusio 4's class E notes are reliant on recoveries
from outstanding defaults. Recoveries are volatile. Recovery cash
flows consistently lower and slower than Fitch's assumptions may
put pressure on these tranches' ratings.

The ratings are also sensitive to changes in Italy's Long-Term IDR.
Changes to Italy's IDR and the rating cap for Italian structured
finance transactions, currently 'AAsf', could trigger rating
changes on the notes rated at this level.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions' initial
closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions over the
years is consistent with the agency's expectations given the
operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that the
asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating analysis
was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The following information was used in the analysis.

  - Loan-by-loan data obtained from the European Data Warehouse as
at the cut-off date of November 30, 2018

  - Transaction investor report and payment report provided by
UniCredit Bank AG, London Branch as of the payment date of December
31, 2018

  - Servicing reports provided by UniCredit S.p.A. as at the
cut-off date of 30 November 2018

The rating actions are as follows:

Cordusio 2

  - Class A2 (ISIN IT0004087174): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook  
-Negative

  - Class B (ISIN IT0004087182): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook  
Negative

  - Class C (ISIN IT0004087190): upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBB+sf';
Outlook Stable

Cordusio 3

  - Class A2 (ISIN IT0004144892): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
Negative

  - Class B (ISIN IT0004144900): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
Negative

  - Class C (ISIN IT0004144934): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook
Stable

  - Class D (ISIN IT0004144959): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
Stable

Cordusio 4
  
  - Class A3 (IT0004231244): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable

  - Class B (IT0004231285): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable

  - Class C (IT0004231293): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

  - Class D (IT0004231301): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

  - Class E (IT0004231319): upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf'; Outlook
Stable



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K A Z A K H S T A N
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TSESNABANK: S&P Ups Issuer Credit Ratings to B-/B, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had raised to 'B-/B' from 'SD'
(selective default) its long- and short-term issuer credit ratings
on Tsesnabank. The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P raised the Kazakhstan national scale rating
to 'kzBB-' from 'SD'.

On Feb. 6, 2019, Kazakhstan-based securities firm First Heartland
Securities purchased 99.8% of Tsesnabank's ordinary shares and
recapitalized the bank for KZT70 billion. Alongside the purchase,
government-backed Problem Loans Fund bought an additional KZT604
billion loans from Tsesnabank at book value, therefore providing
substantial liquidity support to the bank.

The upgrade follows the recent ownership change, recapitalization
by the new owner, significant clean-up of Tsesnabank's operations,
and additional asset sale to the Problem Loans Fund. S&P said, "We
believe this will support the bank's capacity to sustain its
financial commitments. The 'B-/B' ratings reflect our view that
Tsesnabank's immense funding pressure has eased and we do not
expect any further deposit withdrawals, either from corporate or
retail clients. We assess the bank's stand-alone credit profile at
'b-', higher than 'CCC' category, because we believe that the bank
no longer meets the definitions for the 'CCC' category. However,
material uncertainties remain regarding the bank's strategy, as we
believe the new owner would need some time to restore Tsesnabank's
earnings generation capacity and market position."  

Funding and liquidity are now neutral to the ratings. S&P said, "In
our view, the immense funding pressure has eased and we do not
expect further deposit withdrawals, either from corporate or retail
clients, following the massive support provided. We estimate a
comfortable post-clean-up loan-to-deposit ratio of around 22%."

S&P said, "We understand the bank's residual portfolio is now 90%
provisioned, which has resulted in a common equity reduction to
Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) 71 billion from KZT 212 billion as of
year-end 2018. We still see high uncertainty regarding the bank's
future capital position, growth targets, client focus, and dividend
policy.

"We believe that the bank's current balance sheet structure implies
a low level of credit and market risk; we estimate that liquid
assets contribute more than 65% of the bank's total assets.
However, the bank's risk position remains pressured by the unproven
track record of its business model and execution risks related to
the new owner's strategy. Given the significant decrease in the
amount of loans and deposits, we believe that its systemic
importance has reduced and we therefore no longer incorporate an
additional notch for potential extraordinary support in the ratings
on the bank."

The stable outlook balances Tsesnabank's massive clean-up and
on-balance-sheet risk reduction with its ongoing exposure to
uncertainties related to future strategy, as well as execution
risks. In S&P's view, it may take a prolonged period of time to
convert Tsesnabank into a sustainably profitable financial
institution.

S&P said, "We could take a positive rating action in the next 12
months if we see the bank's business position restored alongside a
clear strategy implemented by the new owners. This would allow
Tsesnabank to strengthen its capital base and not create
significant credit or market risks for the entity.

"We could lower the ratings in the next 12 months if we believe
Tsesnabank's new strategy implies a higher risk appetite that would
erode its creditworthiness through additional provisioning needs or
other sources of earnings volatility. We could also take a negative
rating action if we see continuing deposit outflows and rising
pressure on the bank's funding and liquidity position, although
this is not our current base-case expectation."




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L U X E M B O U R G
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ABLV BANK: Suspension of Payments Extended Until July 4
-------------------------------------------------------
Eric Collard and Alain Rukavina, the court-appointed administrators
of ABLV BANK LUXEMBOURG SA, disclosed that by order dated February
7, 2019, the District Court of Luxembourg, hearing commercial
cases:

   -- ordered the extension of the suspension of payments procedure
[as provided in Part II, title II of the law dated December 18,
2015, on the reorganization measures and winding-up proceedings, as
amended ("the law")] of the public limited company ABLV BANK
LUXEMBOURG SA, having its registered office at 26 A, boulevard
Royal, L-2449 Luxembourg and entered in the Commercial and
Companies Register in Luxembourg under Section B, number 162 048,
until midnight of July 4, 2019;

   -- the same order has imposed the publication of the decision;

   -- the costs of the publication of the judgment have to be born
by ABLV Bank Luxembourg SA;

   -- the order shall be provisionally enforceable.

In accordance with article 122 (12) of the law "the CSSF and the
bank are entitled to file appeal within 15 days from the
notification of the decision (. . .) by way of declaration to the
secretary of the District of Luxembourg (. . .)".




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JSC INVESTGEOSERVIS: Fitch Cuts IDRs to B-, Places on Watch Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded JSC Investgeoservis's (IGS) Long-Term
Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'B-'
from 'B+' and has placed ratings on Rating Watch Negative on
concerns over IGS's near-term liquidity.

The rating action reflects uncertainties over IGS's liquidity
position and its view that its cash balances and committed credit
lines may not be sufficient to cover upcoming debt maturities and
working capital movements. The refinancing risk is compounded in
Fitch's opinion by a potential covenant breach under some IGS's
bank agreements as the performance in 2018 was affected by several
technical accidents and delays in 2H18. These covenants are tested
based on full-year IFRS results, which are yet to be released. The
company's liquidity position will be largely dependent on its
ability to maintain existing lines and attract additional funding.


Fitch understands from management that IGS is negotiating
additional credit lines with existing and potential new banks.
Fitch will aim to resolve the Rating Watch Negative as soon as it
have more information on IGS's liquidity, including its ability to
raises new funding and receive waivers for the potential covenant
breaches.

IGS is a privately owned oilfield services provider operating
predominantly in the Yamal region and specialising in natural
gas-rich wells. PAO Novatek (BBB/Stable) is IGS's main customer.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Weak 2018 Performance: Fitch understands from management that IGS
experienced a series of non-related technical delays and accidents
in 2H18, which have resulted in cost overruns and delayed receipt
of proceeds under some of its contracts. Although IGS's IFRS
results for 2018 have not been released, Fitch expects the
company's performance to have been worse than forecast in its
previous rating case. While Fitch would expect IGS's performance to
improve in 2019 and beyond, it will aim to gain more clarity on the
specific incidents that affected the company's profitability in
2018 as this potentially demonstrates more cash flow volatility
than previously anticipated.

Liquidity & Refinancing Risk: Projected liquidity reserves are
tight and leave limited headroom for any headwinds in 2019.
Additionally, Fitch's revised estimates show that IGS's funds from
operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage for 2018 could have exceeded
6x compared with its 4x trigger for a negative rating action,
mainly on the FFO contraction. The rise in leverage is likely to be
captured in the looming covenant tests on the company's IFRS 2018
results and could translate in some breaches and heightened
refinancing risk. Fitch understands that the company is in talks
with existing and new lenders regarding refinancing upcoming
maturities and extension of new credit lines.

Based on the available information, Fitch projects that in 2019 and
beyond IGS's leverage should stabilise at below 3x in 2019, which
it believes is broadly commensurate with the 'B' rating category.
IGS's policy is to maintain net debt to EBITDA below 2x through the
cycle, and not higher than 3x in any given year.

Limited Scale and Geographical Diversification: IGS's small scale
and geographical concentration constrain the rating in the 'B'
rating category. The company has a fleet of 30 drilling rigs and
Fitch estimates its shares of the Russian onshore market at about
2%. This is partly mitigated by IGS's stronger position in the
Yamal region where its market share by volume was an estimated 15%
in 2018. Fitch's rating case assumes limited competitive pressures
in the region as the dominant player, Gazprom Burenie, mainly
caters to Gazprom PJSC (BBB-/Positive).

Reliance on Novatek: IGS has diversified away from Novatek, its
only customer prior to 2014, but its exposure to the company
remains high with Novatek accounting for 69% of revenue in 2018.
IGS's customer base also includes Rosneft Oil Company, PJSC Gazprom
Neft (BBB-/Positive) and other upstream companies.

Fitch's base case assumes that the revenue stream from Novatek will
be above 70% in the next several years. This is mitigated by the
long-standing relationship between both companies, IGS's
specialisation in complex gas wells and relatively high switching
costs, as moving equipment in Russia's north is time-consuming and
expensive. Management told Fitch that Novatek and other customers
continue to cooperate with the company, as confirmed by the
recently won tenders and IGS's strong order backlog for 2019.

Limited Revenue Visibility: IGS's order book is predominantly
short-term, which is mitigated by its long-term record of
cooperation with Novatek. Contracts agreed for 2019 cover about 90%
of the revenue forecast under Fitch's base case, though upstream
companies in Russia can cut their orders with limited penalties to
be paid. Fitch expects the backlog for 2020 to increase in the
coming months.

In mitigation, Fitch deems drilling volume reduction unlikely in
the medium term in Russia as local oil and gas producers, and
Novatek in particular, are set to continue intensive drilling to
develop its greenfields and stabilise production declines in
brownfields. Novatek also expects to take a final investment
decision on its Arctic LNG 2 project this year, which is likely to
increase demand for drilling services in the region.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Fitch has downgraded IGS's ratings from 'B+' to 'B-' and placed the
ratings on Rating Watch Negative in view of the company's weakened
near-term liquidity position. Fitch will aim to resolve the Rating
Watch Negative as soon as it has more information on IGS's
liquidity situation, including access to new credit lines and
waivers for potential covenants breaches.

Other than liquidity, IGS's ratings are constrained by its
relatively small scale and dependence on a single customer,
Novatek, as well as a short-term order book and high fluctuation of
working capital. Eurasia Drilling Company Limited (BB+/Stable) is
rated higher mainly because of its larger scale and better
geographical diversification, as well as no liquidity constraints.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

  - Financial performance improving in 2019 and beyond following
weaker performance in 2018;

  - Novatek remaining IGS's key customer at least in the medium
term;

  - Average price indexation of low single digits annually;

  - Positive working capital inflow in 2018 partially reversed in
2019;

  - Liquidity situation gradually improving on refinancing of
existing maturities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments that May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to a
Positive Rating Action:

  - Improved liquidity with near-term maturities and projected
working capital outflows comfortably covered by available committed
facilities as well as evidence of waivers received from the banks
for potentially breached covenants.

Developments that May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to a
Downgrade to 'CCC+' or below:

  - Deteriorating liquidity due to the inability to secure funding
or extensions on maturing debt obligations and obtain waivers from
bilateral lenders on the potential covenant breach.

  - Evidence of Novatek or other large customers reducing their
cooperation with IGS.

LIQUIDITY

Weak Liquidity: Fitch believes that IGS has minimal liquidity
headroom, and that its cash balances and committed credit lines may
not be sufficient to cover upcoming debt maturities and working
capital outflow. Based on the management accounts, Fitch estimates
that the company's cash position and potentially available credit
lines at end-2018 covered only half of its short-term debt.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs: Downgrade from 'B+' to
'B-', Ratings Placed On Rating Watch Negative

VOZROZHDENIE BANK: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Deposit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the long-term local and foreign
currency deposit ratings of Vozrozhdenie Bank at Ba2, its long-term
Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessment) at Ba2(cr), and its
local- and foreign-currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
(CRR) at Ba2. At the same time, the rating agency downgraded the
bank's Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) to b3 from b2 and its
adjusted BCA to b2 from b1. The short-term CR Assessment of Not
Prime(cr), short-term deposit ratings and short-term CRR of Not
Prime (NP) were affirmed.

The outlooks on the long-term local and foreign currency deposit
ratings were changed to developing from positive and stable,
respectively, reflecting uncertainty regarding the strategy and
shareholder structure of the bank within VTB Group.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's affirmation of Vozrozhdenie Bank's ratings reflects the
rating agency's assessment of a high probability of support from
its 96.3% shareholder Bank VTB, PJSC (Bank VTB; Baa3 stable, b1) as
well as a very high probability of support from the government of
Russia (Baa3 stable). According to the recent public statements by
Bank VTB's CEO Andrey Kostin, Vozrozhdenie Bank will remain part of
VTB Group, however, a legal merger of Vozrozhdenie Bank with Bank
VTB is no longer Bank VTB's base case scenario, with other
possibilities on the agenda.

Moody's downgrade of the bank's BCA to b3 from b2 reflects (1) a
severe deterioration in its reported asset quality metrics and IFRS
capital position in Q3 2018 (the problem loan ratio increased to
21.5% of gross loans from 14.7% in Q2 2018, and the Basel III Tier
1 ratio declined to 5.4% from 11.0% in Q2 2018), and (2)
uncertainty regarding the bank's strategy and shareholder structure
on a 12 to 18 month horizon.

OUTLOOK

Moody's changed the bank's outlook to developing from positive(m),
taking into account the variety of possible scenarios with respect
to its shareholder structure, legal status and strategy.

WHAT COULD MOVE RATINGS UP OR DOWN

Vozrozhdenie Bank's ratings could be upgraded if a definitive
decision were made to merge the bank with Bank VTB. An upgrade of
the bank's BCA could result from a significant recovery of the
bank's asset quality and capital position, potentially leading to
higher ratings

If Bank VTB were to reduce its direct stake in Vozrozhdenie Bank
rather than merging with it, Moody's may downgrade the ratings, if
the agency concluded that external support was likely to be weaker
as a result. Vozrozhdenie Bank's BCA could be downgraded if the
bank's solvency and/or liquidity profile were to worsen further,
potentially leading to lower ratings.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published
in August 2018.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Vozrozhdenie Bank

Affirmations:

  - Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed Ba2(cr)

  - Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

  - Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating, Affirmed Ba2

  - Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating, Affirmed NP

  - Long-term Bank Deposits (Local Currency), Affirmed Ba2, Outlook
  Changed To Developing From Positive

  - Long-term Bank Deposits (Foreign Currency), Affirmed Ba2,
Outlook Changed To Developing From Stable

  - Short-term Bank Deposits, Affirmed NP

Downgrades:

  - Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Downgraded to b2 from b1

  - Baseline Credit Assessment, Downgraded to b3 from b2

Outlook Action:

  - Outlook Changed To Developing From Positive(m)



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U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
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DEBENHAMS PLC: Lenders to Grant More Credit to Avert Ashley Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
Katie Linsell at Bloomberg News reports that Debenhams Plc's
lenders are prepared to grant the struggling department store chain
more credit in an effort to ward off a potential low-ball buyout
from billionaire shareholder Mike Ashley.

After extending a GBP40 million (US$52 million) loan facility to
Debenhams last week, the group of about 10 firms including hedge
funds Alcentra, Angelo Gordon & Co. and Silver Point Capital is
willing to lend further if necessary, Bloomberg relays, citing a
person familiar with the matter.

According to Bloomberg, the person, who asked not to be identified
because the conversations are private, said lenders want to make
sure Debenhams can prevent the owner of Sports Direct International
Plc from buying the company at a fire-sale price.

The person said if the lenders ultimately need to, they will take
control of the retailer, Bloomberg notes.

Debenhams, Bloomberg says, is struggling with declining sales as it
looks to refinance about GBP520 million of debt facilities while
paying millions of pounds a year in rent on leases agreed to years
ago.

The retailer isn't completely opposed to more investment from
Ashley, Bloomberg discloses.  While Debenhams rejected his offer of
a loan last year, the company invited him to play a role in the
refinancing, Bloomberg states.  The person, as cited by Bloomberg,
said the lenders may support an equity injection from him.


LB HOLDINGS: March 6 Proofs of Debt Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to Rules 14.29 of the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules
2016 (the "Rules"), Derek Anthony Howell, Gillian Eleanor Bruce,
Ian David Green, Russell Downs, and Edward John Macnamara, all of
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, the joint administrators of LB Holdings
Intermediate 2 Limited, intend to declare a third interim
distribution to unsecured creditors within two months from the last
date of proving, being March 6, 2019.

Such creditors are required on or before that date to submit their
proofs of debt to the joint administrators, PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP, 7 More London Riverside, London SE1 2RT, United Kingdom,
marked for the attention of Diane Adebowale or by email to
lehman.affiliates@uk.pwc.com

Persons so proving are required, if so requested, to provide such
further details or produce such documents or other evidence as may
appear to the joint administrators to be necessary.

The joint administrators will not be obliged to deal with proofs
lodged after the last date for proving but they may do so if they
think fit.

For further information, contact details, and proof of debt forms,
please visit https://is.gd/QxJUvB

Alternatively, please call Diane Adebowale on +44 (0) 20 7583
5000.

The Joint Administrators were appointed on September 15, 2008.


LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS: March 6 Proofs of Debt Deadline Set
-------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to Rules 14.29 of the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules
2016 (the "Rules"), Derek Anthony Howell, Gillian Eleanor Bruce,
Ian David Green, Russell Downs, and Edward John Macnamara, all of
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, the joint administrators of Lehman
Brothers Holdings Plc, intend to declare a fifth interim dividend
to unsecured creditors within two months from the last date of
proving, being March 6, 2019.

Such creditors are required on or before that date to submit their
proofs of debt to the joint administrators,  PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP, 7 More London Riverside, London SE1 2RT, United Kingdom,
marked for the attention of Diane Adebowale or by email to
lehman.affiliates@uk.pwc.com

Persons so proving are required, if so requested, to provide such
further details or produce such documents or other evidence as may
appear to the joint administrators to be necessary.

The joint administrators will not be obliged to deal with proofs
lodged after the last date for proving but they may do so if they
think fit.

For further information, contact details, and proof of debt forms,
please visit https://is.gd/8GX9cc

Alternatively, please call Diane Adebowale on +44 (0) 20 7583
5000.

The Joint Administrators were appointed on September 15, 2008.


MEDIA PROTOCOL: Crypto-currency Fluctuations Prompt Liquidation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Schirmer at Gibraltar Chronicle reports that Media Protocol,
a blockchain platform which issued its own tokens and developed
multi-crypto wallets, was placed into liquidation.

According to Gibraltar Chronicle, the business has been hit by the
mercurial fluctuations of the crypto-currency markets.

Creditors of Media Protocol were scheduled to meet liquidator Edgar
Lavarello -- edgar.c.lavarello@gi.pwc.com -- of PwC, and lawyer
James Montado of Isolas, on Feb. 1, Gibraltar Chronicle notes.
They are unlikely to receive as much as a penny on their
investments -- the extent of which are, perhaps surprisingly,
unknown, Gibraltar Chronicle states.

Some investors punted with cryptos, others with fiat currency in
sterling, euros, or US dollars, Gibraltar Chronicle discloses.

Mr. Lavarello admitted that neither PwC nor Isolas were likely to
be paid for the liquidation work, Gibraltar Chronicle relates.

"It represents the first insolvent liquidation of a crypto-related
company in Gibraltar and seems to have been a victim of the slump
in the price of the crypto-currencies Ethereum and Bitcoin,"
Gibraltar Chronicle quotes Mr. Montado as saying.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOOK REVIEW: GROUNDED: Destruction of Eastern Airlines
----------------------------------------------------------
Grounded: Frank Lorenzo and the Destruction of Eastern Airlines
Author: Aaron Bernstein
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 272 Pages
List Price: $34.95

Order a copy today at
http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/grounded.html

Barbara Walters once referred to Frank Lorenzo as "the most hated
man in America." Since 1990, when this work was first published and
Eastern Airlines' troubles were front-page news, there have been
many worthy contenders for the title. Nonetheless, readers
sensitive to labor-management concerns, particularly in the context
of corporate restructurings, will find in this book much to support
Barbara Walters' characterization.

To recap: For a few brief and discordant years, Frank Lorenzo was
boss of the biggest airline conglomerate in the free world
(Aeroflot was larger), combining Eastern, Continental, Frontier,
and People Express into Texas Air Corporation, financing his empire
with junk bonds. TAC ultimately comprised a fleet of 451 planes and
50,000 employees, with revenues of $7 billion.

But Lorenzo was lousy on people issues, famously saying, "I'm not
paid to be a candy ass." The mid-1980s were a bad time to take that
approach. Those were the years when the so-called Japanese model of
management, which emphasized cooperation between management and
labor, was creating a stir. The Lorenzo model was old school: If
the unions give you any trouble, break 'em. That strategy had
worked for him at Continental, where he'd filed Chapter 11 despite
the airline's $60 million in cash reserves, in order to exploit a
provision in Bankruptcy Code allowing him to abrogate his contracts
with the unions. But Congress plugged that loophole by the time
Lorenzo went to the mat with Charles Bryan, I AM chapter president.
Lorenzo might have succeeded in breaking the machinists alone, but
when flight attendants and pilots honored the picket lines, he
should have known it was time to deal. He didn't.

Instead he tried again for a strategic advantage through the
bankruptcy courts, by filing Chapter 11 in the Southern District of
New York where bankruptcy judges were believed to be more favorably
disposed toward management than in Miami where Eastern was
headquartered. Eastern had to hide behind the skirts of its
subsidiary, Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., a New York corporation, in
order to get into SDNY. Six minutes later, Eastern itself filed in
the same court as a related proceeding.

The case was assigned to Judge Burton Lifland, whom Eastern's
bankruptcy lawyer, Harvey Miller, knew well, but Lorenzo was
mistaken if he believed that serendipitous lottery assignment would
be his salvation. Judge Lifland a year later declared Lorenzo unfit
to run the airline and appointed Martin Shugrue as trustee. Most
hated man or not, one wonders whether the debacle was all Lorenzo's
fault. Eastern's unions, in particular the notoriously militant
machinists, were perpetual malcontents, and Charlie Bryan was an
anti-management zealot, to the point of exasperating even other IAM
officers.

The book provides a detailed account of the three-and-a-half-year
period between Lorenzo's acquisition of Eastern in the autumn of
1986 and Judge Lifland's appointment of the trustee in April 1990.
It includes the history of Eastern's pre-Lorenzo management, from
World War I flying ace Eddie Rickenbacker to astronaut Frank
Borman.

Aaron Bernstein won numerous awards during his 20-year career as a
professional journalist. He is an associated editor for Business
Week.

Aaron Bernstein is the editor of Global Proxy Watch, a corporate
governance newsletter for institutional investors. He is also a
non-resident Senior Research Fellow at the Pensions and Capital
Stewardship Project at Harvard Law School. He left BusinessWeek
magazine in 2006 after a 23-year career as an editor and senior
writer covering workplace and social issues.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
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written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                * * * End of Transmission * * *