/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/191004.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Friday, October 4, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 199

                           Headlines



G E R M A N Y

E-CARAT 10: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class F Notes


I R E L A N D

AIB GROUP: Moody's Gives Ba3(hyb) Rating to Additional Tier 1 Notes
DUBLIN BAY 2018-1: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class E Notes
ENFIELD COACHES: High Court Appoints Provisional Liquidator
EUROPEAN RESIDENTIAL 2019-PL1: DBRS Gives Prov. B(high) on  F Notes
ST. PAUL'S CLO II: Fitch Assigns B-sf Rating on Cl. F-RRR Debt

ST. PAUL'S CLO II: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes


I T A L Y

BANCA FARMAFACTORING: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' LongTerm Issuer Rating
BRIGNOLE CQ 2019-1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB(low) Rating on Cl. E Notes


L U X E M B O U R G

CRC BREEZE: Fitch Affirms CC Rating on Class B Notes
CRYSTAL ALMOND: Fitch Gives B(EXP) Rating to New Secured Notes


M O N A C O

DYNAGAS LNG: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 CFR on Loan Repayment


P O L A N D

PKO BP: Files Motion for Bankruptcy Announcement


P O R T U G A L

EVORA FINANCE: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to Caa1


R U S S I A

CREDIT BANK MOSCOW: Moody's Affirms Ba3 LongTerm Deposit Ratings
SAVDOGAR BANK: Moody's Affirms B2 LT Deposit Rating, Outlook Neg.
SOVCOMBANK PJSC: Moody's Ups Deposit Ratings to Ba2, Outlook Stable
VOCBANK JSC: Restructuring Launched Following Administration


S P A I N

SABADELL CONSUMO 1: DBRS Finalizes B(high) Rating on Class D Notes


U K R A I N E

KERNEL: S&P Affirms 'B' LT Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BENNETTS: Paul Hurst Buys Business Out of Administration
FERGUSON MARINE: Scottish Gov't Draws Up Nationalization Plan
FINSBURY SQUARE 2019-3: DBRS Gives Prov. CCC Rating on X Notes
FOUR SEASONS: Fails to Pay Millions of Pounds of Rent This Month
TAURUS UK 2019-2: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on Class E Notes

THOMAS COOK: Charity at Risk of Closure Following Collapse
THOMAS COOK: Lobbies Against Levy to Cover Repatriation Costs


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Mentor X

                           - - - - -


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G E R M A N Y
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E-CARAT 10: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
DBRS finalized its provisional ratings on the following classes of
notes (together, the Rated Notes) issued by E-CARAT 10 (the
Issuer):

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- Class C Notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D Notes at A (sf)
-- Class E Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F Notes at BB (sf)
-- Class G Notes at B (high) (sf)

The Class H Notes are not rated by DBRS.

The Rated Notes are backed by a pool of retail auto loan
receivables associated with a portfolio of loans related to new and
used vehicles originated by Opel Bank GmbH (Opel Bank, the Seller
and Servicer) and granted to German borrowers. The transaction
includes a one-year revolving period where new receivables may be
purchased by the Issuer subject to specific eligibility criteria
and portfolio concentration limits.

The structure differs from previous E-CARAT transactions originated
by Opel Bank in Germany in various ways including the incorporation
of a mixed pro rata/(potentially sequential) amortization mechanism
during the normal redemption period.

The Issuer has been established by France Titivation (the
Management Company) and BNP Paribas Securities Services (the
Custodian) in accordance with the applicable provisions of the
French Monetary and Financial Code and the Issuer Regulations.

The ratings address timely payment of scheduled interest and
ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final maturity date
for the Class A Notes. The ratings address ultimate payment (then
timely as the most senior class) of interest and ultimate repayment
of principal by the legal final maturity date for the Class C,
Class D, Class E, Class F notes and Class G Notes. The ratings are
based on the following considerations:

   -- The transaction capital structure, including form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement;

   -- Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support
DBRS-projected expected cumulative net losses and residual value
losses under various stress scenarios;

   -- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
which they have invested;

   -- Opel Bank's capabilities with regard to originations,
underwriting, servicing and its financial strength;

   -- DBRS conducted an operational risk review of Opel Bank’s
premises in Rüsselsheim, Germany and deems it to be an acceptable
servicer;

   -- The transaction parties' financial strength with regard to
their respective roles;

   -- The credit quality of the collateral and historical and
projected performance of the Seller's portfolio.

   -- The sovereign rating of Germany, currently rated AAA with a
Stable trend by DBRS; and

   -- The consistency of the transaction's legal structure with
DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology and the presence of legal opinions that
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer.

Notes: All figures are in Euros unless otherwise noted.




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I R E L A N D
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AIB GROUP: Moody's Gives Ba3(hyb) Rating to Additional Tier 1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba3(hyb) rating to the "high
trigger" additional tier 1 EUR500 million note to be issued by AIB
Group plc the holding company of Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c.

This perpetual non-cumulative AT1 security ranks junior to all
liabilities of AIB Group and ranks senior to common shares. Coupons
may be cancelled on a non-cumulative basis at the issuer's option
and on a mandatory basis subject to the availability of
distributable items and regulatory discretion. The principal of the
security will be written-down if AIB's Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1)
ratio falls below 7%. The principal amount can be written-up at the
sole discretion of the bank.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba3(hyb) rating assigned to the security is based on multiple
risks, including the likelihood of AIB's capital ratio reaching the
conversion trigger, the likelihood of coupon suspension on a
non-cumulative basis and the probability of a bank-wide failure and
loss severity, if any or all these events occur. Moody's assesses
the probability of a trigger breach using an approach that is
model-based, incorporating the bank's creditworthiness, its most
recent reported CET1 ratio and qualitative considerations,
particularly with regard to how the bank may manage its CET1 ratio
on a forward-looking basis. Moody's rates these notes to the lower
of the model-based outcome and AIB's non-viability security rating,
which also captures the risk of coupon suspension on a
non-cumulative basis. Moody's approach to rating high-trigger
contingent capital securities is described in its "Banks" rating
methodology, published on August 2018.

AIB has a Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) of baa3, which
incorporates the bank's overall intrinsic credit strength and the
most recently published group level fully-loaded CET1 ratio, which
was 17.3% at end-June 2019. AIB's BCA, its group-level fully-loaded
CET1 ratio and some forward-looking assumptions on its regulatory
ratio, were used as inputs to the model, which corresponds to an
output of Ba1(hyb).

The model output was then compared to the issuer's non-viability
security rating, Ba3(hyb), which is positioned based on Moody's
Advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis and also captures both
the probability of impairment associated with non-cumulative coupon
suspension as well as the probability of a bank failure. The 'high
trigger' security rating is constrained by the rating on the
non-viability security, leading to the assignment of a Ba3(hyb)
rating to AIB Group's 'high trigger' AT1 securities.

In addition, Moody's ran a model sensitivity analysis on AIB that
factors in changes to the group and bank's CET1 ratio. The outcome
of this sensitivity analysis confirms that a Ba3(hyb) rating is
resilient under the main plausible scenarios.

OUTLOOK

AT 1 capital securities do not carry outlook. However, the positive
outlook on the long-term senior unsecured debt ratings of AIB and
AIB Group, A3 and Baa3, respectively, reflects its view that both
ratings would move in line with a potential further upgrade of the
BCA. Such a BCA upgrade could be warranted over the outlook
horizon, should the bank succeed in reducing its problem loans at
the expected rate of decline while maintaining its strong
profitability, capital and liquidity metrics.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The rating of AIB Group's AT1 notes is currently constrained by the
rating on the issuer's non-viability security, which in turn could
be upgraded if AIB's baa3 BCA were to be upgraded. AIB's BCA could
be upgraded because of (1) a further reduction in non-performing
loans; (2) an improvement in stressed-capital resilience above its
expectations; or (3) sustained improvement in its core
profitability.

Conversely, downward pressure on the rating of this instrument
could develop if AIB's BCA was downgraded, due to significant
weakening in asset risk, capital or profitability, although
unlikely given the positive outlook on the senior unsecured debt
rating of AIB and AIB Group. In addition, Moody's would also
reconsider the rating in the event of an increased probability of a
coupon suspension.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in August 2018.


DUBLIN BAY 2018-1: DBRS Confirms BB(low) Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH confirmed its ratings on the bonds issued by
Dublin Bay Securities 2018-1 DAC (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B notes at AA (sf)
-- Class C notes at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D notes at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E notes at BB (low) (sf)

The rating assigned to the Class A notes addresses the timely
payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal on or before
the final maturity date. The ratings assigned to the Class B to
Class E notes address the ultimate payment of interest and
principal.

The confirmations follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies, defaults and
losses.

-- Probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD) and
expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables.

-- Current available credit enhancement to the notes to cover the
expected losses at their respective rating levels.

The Issuer is a bankruptcy-remote special-purpose vehicle (SPV)
incorporated in the Republic of Ireland. The issued notes were used
to fund the purchase of Irish residential mortgage loans originated
by Bank of Scotland plc. Bank of Scotland sold the portfolio in May
2018 to Erimon Home Loans Ireland limited, a bankruptcy-remote SPV
wholly owned by Barclays Bank plc. The mortgage portfolio consists
of first-lien mortgage loans collateralized by owner-occupied and
buy-to-let residential properties located in the Republic of
Ireland.

On September 2, 2019, DBRS transferred the ongoing coverage of the
ratings assigned to the Issuer to DBRS Ratings GmbH from DBRS
Ratings Limited. The lead analyst responsibilities for this
transaction have been transferred to Shalva Beshia.

Both DBRS Ratings Limited and DBRS Ratings GmbH are registered with
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) under
Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies, as
amended, and are registered Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organization (NRSRO) affiliates in the United States and
Designated Rating Organization (DRO) affiliates in Canada.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of June 2019, loans with two to three months in arrears
represented 0.9% of the outstanding portfolio balance. The share of
loans with 90+ delinquency was 2.8%, increasing rapidly from 0% at
closing nine months ago. DBRS continues to monitor the transaction
performance closely.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS

DBRS conducted a loan-by-loan analysis of the remaining pool of
receivables and has updated its base case PD and LGD assumptions to
4.1% and 20.0%, respectively.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

Credit enhancement for the Class A notes is 20.7%, up from 19.7% at
closing. Credit enhancement for the Class B notes is 15.5%, up from
14.7 at closing. Credit enhancement for the Class C notes is 12.6%,
up from 12.1% from closing. Credit enhancement for the Class D
notes is 10%, up from 9.6% at closing. Credit enhancement for the
Class E notes is 6.1%, up from 6.0% at closing.

The transaction benefits from a reserve fund of EUR 0.7 million and
a Liquidity Reserve Fund of EUR 3.0 million. The reserve fund is
available to support the Class A to Class E notes. The reserve fund
was fully funded at close at 1.5% of the initial balance of the
rated notes less the liquidity reserve fund. The liquidity reserve
fund is sized at 1.5% of the Class A balance and provides liquidity
support to cover revenue shortfalls on senior fees and interest on
the Class A notes. The notes are additionally provided with
liquidity support from principal receipts, which can be used to
cover interest shortfalls on the most senior class of notes,
provided that a debit is applied to the principal deficiency
ledgers in reverse sequential order.

The Issuer Account Bank, Paying Agent and Cash Manager is Citibank,
N.A., London Branch (Citibank). Based on the DBRS private rating of
the Issuer Account Bank, the downgrade provisions outlined in the
transaction documents, and other mitigating factors inherent in the
transaction structure, DBRS considers the risk arising from the
exposure to Citibank to be consistent with the rating assigned to
the Class A notes, as described in DBRS's "Legal Criteria for
European Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in Euros unless otherwise noted.


ENFIELD COACHES: High Court Appoints Provisional Liquidator
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that Revenue has succeeded in its High
Court application to have a provisional liquidator appointed to Co
Meath-based bus company Enfield Coaches Ltd.

Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys on Oct. 2 appointed insolvency
practitioner Aidan Murphy, of Crowe Ireland, as provisional
liquidator to Enfield Coaches, The Irish Times relates.

According to The Irish Times, Arthur Cunningham, for the Collector
General of the Revenue Commissioners, told the High Court that his
client was owed EUR39,000 as unpaid PAYE, PRSI and interest.

Counsel said the Collector General was seeking the appointment due
to concerns over the transfer of assets, namely three buses, from
the company to what it believed was a related company called M4
Direct Travel Ltd., The Irish Times discloses.

Another matter of concern, counsel said, was that late last month,
the company called a creditors meeting with a view to appointing a
liquidator to the firm, The Irish Times notes.

Counsel said that meeting broke up and a liquidator was not
appointed, The Irish Times relays.  Another creditors meeting is
due to take place later this month, according to the report.

In all the circumstances, counsel said, as cited by The Irish
Times, that Enfield Coaches was unable to pay its debts and this
was an appropriate case where a provisional liquidator should be
appointed by the court.

Following counsel's submissions, Mr. Murphy's appointment as
provisional liquidator was confirmed by Mr. Justice Humphreys, The
Irish Times notes.

The matter will return before the court later this month, The Irish
Times disclose.

Enfield Coaches Ltd. provides coach and related transport
services.


EUROPEAN RESIDENTIAL 2019-PL1: DBRS Gives Prov. B(high) on  F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH assigned the following provisional ratings to the
notes to be issued by European Residential Loan Securitization
2019-PL1 DAC (ERLS 2019-PL1 DAC or the Issuer):

-- Class A notes rated AAA (sf)
-- Class B notes rated AA (sf)
-- Class C notes rated A (high) (sf)
-- Class D notes rated BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E notes rated BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F notes rated B (high) (sf)

The Class Z and Class X notes are not rated by DBRS and will be
retained by the seller.

Classes A to F (collectively, the Rated Notes) comprise the
collateralized notes. The rating on the Class A notes addresses the
timely payment of interest and ultimate repayment of principal on
or before the final maturity date. The rating on the Class B notes
addresses the timely payment of interest once most senior and the
ultimate repayment of principal on or before the final maturity
date. The ratings on the Class C, D, E and F notes address the
ultimate payment of interest and repayment of principal by the
final maturity date.

The transaction benefits from a non-amortizing reserve fund, which
is split into a general reserve and liquidity reserve. The general
reserve will provide liquidity and credit support to the Rated
Notes. The liquidity reserve is amortizing and will provide
liquidity support to the Class A notes. Amortized amounts of the
liquidity reserve will form part of the general reserve.

The mortgage portfolio comprises owner-occupied and buy-to-let
mortgage loans. The outstanding balance of the mortgage portfolio
is approximately EUR 676 million as of July 31, 2019.

Proceeds from the issuance of the Rated Notes will be used to
purchase first-charge performing and re-performing Irish
residential mortgage loans. The mortgage loans were originated by
Permanent TSB p.l.c. (PTSB) and are primarily secured by Irish
residential properties. Lone Star International Finance DAC (Lone
Star) through the seller acquired the mortgage loans in 2018. The
legal opinion received by DBRS addresses the transfer of loans from
the seller to the Issuer but does not address the initial sale of
loans from PTSB to the seller. DBRS has received a report on the
due diligence carried out at the time of the initial sale from PTSB
to the seller, which amongst other things includes review of
standard form documentation, a searches tracker review and a
physical review of s small number of loan files from the portfolio.
Furthermore, DBRS understands that the claw back period in Ireland
after a sale of assets is limited to one year under most
circumstances and notes that the first portfolio sale was in July
2018.

Servicing of the mortgage loans is conducted by Start Mortgages DAC
(Start), which are also expected to continue as administrator of
the assets for the transaction. Hudson Advisors Ireland DAC
(Hudson) will be appointed as the Issuer administration consultant
and, as such, will act in an oversight and monitoring capacity.

In the mortgage portfolio, approximately 13% of the loans have been
restructured as split loans (aggregate current balance of EUR 88
million) with an affordable-interest-accruing-balance (aggregating
to EUR 47.6 million) and the remaining warehoused loans to be
repaid only at maturity and bearing no interest (aggregating to EUR
40.2 million). For the split loans, a borrower can default during
the life of the loan (e.g., due to payment difficulties).
Additionally, a borrower who has managed to maintain payment during
the life of the loan, and hence repays the interest-bearing portion
of the split mortgage in full, may be unable to make a bullet
repayment of the non-interest-bearing warehoused loan at the point
of loan maturity. In its analysis, DBRS accounts for defaults and
losses arising from both scenarios.

The probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) on the
interest-bearing loans was estimated by taking into account both
the interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing (i.e., warehoused)
loans. Additionally, borrowers who do not default on the loan
during its loan term may not have the funds available to make a
bullet repayment on the warehoused portion of the loan at maturity.
Moreover, such warehoused loan is deemed unaffordable by the
borrower at the time of the restructure of the loan. Hence, DBRS
assumed a 100% default probability for the non-interest-bearing
warehoused loan. Since the borrower would have fully repaid the
interest-bearing portion of the loan in such a scenario, the
exposure at default for such loans will only be equal to the
warehoused loan portion. DBRS has taken this into account when
estimating the LGD for such defaults. Losses from both scenarios
were taken into account for the cash flow analysis.

The weighted-average current loan-to-value indexed (WACLTV(ind)) of
the portfolio is 79.7%, with 20.9% of the loans in negative equity.
The credit enhancement for the notes is primarily on account of the
subordinated collateralized notes and the availability of the
general reserve. The Class A notes' credit enhancement is expected
to be 49.2%, that for the Class B notes is 39.7%, for the Class C
notes is 34.2%, for the Class D notes is 29.5%, for the Class E
notes is 24.6% and for the Class F notes is 18.5%.

The senior-most outstanding notes and notes where the respective
principal deficiency ledger balance is less than 10% of the
outstanding balance can also receive liquidity support from
principal receipts. An interest rate cap with a notional of EUR 300
million for seven years may provide further liquidity support to
the notes and partially mitigate basis risk exposure of the Issuer.
The basis risk exposure of the Issuer is on account of loans where
the interest rate is linked to the standard variable rate (24.9% of
the mortgage portfolio), loans paying interest linked to the
European Central Bank rate (69.9% of the mortgage portfolio), and,
in comparison, the interest rate on the notes is linked to
one-month Euribor.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction capital structure and form and sufficiency of
available credit enhancement.

-- The credit quality of the mortgage portfolio and the ability of
the servicer to perform collection and resolution activities. DBRS
calculated the PD, LGD and expected loss (EL) outputs on the
mortgage portfolio. The PD, LGD and EL are used as an input into
the cash flow tool. The mortgage portfolio was analyzed in
accordance with DBRS's "Master European Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities Rating Methodology and Jurisdictional Addenda".

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class
E and Class F notes according to the terms of the transaction
documents. The transaction structure was analyzed using Intex
DealMaker.

-- The sovereign rating of the Republic of Ireland, rated A (high)
with a Stable trend (as of the date of this press release).

-- The legal structure and, subject to the comments about the
first portfolio sale above, presence of legal opinions addressing
the assignment of the assets to the Issuer and the consistency with
DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in Euros unless otherwise noted.


ST. PAUL'S CLO II: Fitch Assigns B-sf Rating on Cl. F-RRR Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigned St.Paul's CLO II DAC's refinancing notes
final ratings.

St. Paul's CLO II DAC Reset

                 Current Rating      Prior Rating

Class A-RRR;  LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

Class B-RRR;  LT AAsf New Rating;  previously at AA(EXP)sf

Class C-RRR;  LT Asf New Rating;   previously at A(EXP)sf

Class D-RRR;  LT BBBsf New Rating; previously at BBB(EXP)sf

Class E-RRR;  LT BBsf New Rating;  previously at BB(EXP)sf

Class F-RRR;  LT B-sf New Rating;  previously at B-(EXP)sf

Class X;      LT AAAsf New Rating; previously at AAA(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

St. Paul's CLO II DAC is a securitisation of mainly senior secured
obligations. Net proceeds from the refinancing notes and the newly
issued class X notes will be used to redeem the existing notes,
except the subordinated notes, which are not refinanced. The legal
final maturity for all classes will be extended by six months. The
portfolio is managed by Intermediate Capital Managers Limited. The
CLO will feature a two- year reinvestment period and a 6.5 year
weighted average life (WAL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch places the average credit quality of obligors in the 'B'/'B-'
range. The Fitch-weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the
identified portfolio is 33.8

High Recovery Expectations

At least 90% of the portfolio comprises senior secured obligations.
Recovery prospects for these assets are typically more favourable
than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine assets. The
Fitch-weighted average recovery rating (WARR) of the identified
portfolio is 66.1%.

Diversified Asset Portfolio

There are four Fitch test matrices corresponding to two top 10
obligor limits (16.0% and 20.0%) and two maximum fixed-rate asset
limits (0% and 10%). The manager can interpolate within and between
these matrices. The transaction also includes limits on maximum
industry exposure based on Fitch's industry definitions. The
maximum exposure to the three largest (Fitch-defined) industries in
the portfolio is covenanted at 40%. These covenants ensure that the
asset portfolio will not be exposed to excessive concentration.

Portfolio Management

The transaction features a two-year reinvestment period and
includes reinvestment criteria similar to other European
transactions. Fitch's analysis is based on a stressed-case
portfolio with the aim of testing the robustness of the transaction
structure against its covenants and portfolio guidelines.

Cash Flow Analysis

Fitch used a customised proprietary cash flow model to replicate
the principal and interest waterfalls and the various structural
features of the transaction, and to assess their effectiveness,
including the structural protection provided by excess spread
diverted through the par value and interest coverage tests.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 125% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and with this increase added to all rating default levels,
would lead to a downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes.
A 25% reduction in recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of up
to four notches for the rated notes.


ST. PAUL'S CLO II: S&P Assigns B-(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its credit ratings to St. Paul's CLO II
DAC's class X, A, B, C-Dfrd, D-Dfrd, E-Dfrd, and F-Dfrd notes
(collectively, the 2019 notes). At closing, the issuer also issued
unrated subordinated notes.

The transaction is a reset of St. Paul's CLO II.

S&P's ratings on the 2019 notes reflect its assessment of:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans and
bonds that are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which is bankruptcy remote
in lines with S&P's legal criteria.

Under the transaction documents, the rated notes pay quarterly
interest unless there is a frequency switch event. Following this,
the notes will permanently switch to semiannual payment. The
portfolio's reinvestment period ends on Oct. 15, 2021.

On the Oct. 1, 2019, closing date, the issuer used the issue
proceeds of the 2019 notes to redeem the original notes at their
full par amount plus accrued interest.

S&P said, "In our cash flow analysis, we used the EUR401 million
target par amount, the covenanted weighted-average spread (3.75%),
the covenanted weighted-average coupon (4.50%; where applicable),
and the weighted-average recovery rates at each rating level.

"We applied various cash flow stress scenarios, using four
different default patterns, in conjunction with different interest
rate stress scenarios for each liability rating category.

"The documented downgrade remedies are in line with our current
counterparty criteria. The issuer is bankruptcy remote, in
accordance with our legal criteria.

"Under our structured finance sovereign risk criteria, we consider
that the transaction's exposure to country risk is sufficiently
mitigated at the assigned ratings.

"Following our analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, we believe our ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for the class X
to E-Dfrd notes. Our credit and cash flow analysis indicates that
the available credit enhancement could withstand stresses
commensurate with the same or higher rating levels than those we
have assigned. However, as the CLO is still in its reinvestment
phase, during which the transaction's credit risk profile could
deteriorate, we have capped our assigned ratings on the notes."

  Ratings List

  St. Paul's CLO II DAC

  Class         Rating*       Amount
                            (mil. EUR)
  X             AAA (sf)        2.00
  A             AAA (sf)      245.00
  B             AA (sf)        44.90
  C-Dfrd        A (sf)         24.90
  D-Dfrd        BBB (sf)       23.30
  E-Dfrd        BB (sf)        22.90
  F-Dfrd        B- (sf)        11.20
  Sub notes     NR              62.0




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I T A L Y
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BANCA FARMAFACTORING: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' LongTerm Issuer Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following first-time ratings
and assessments to Banca Farmafactoring S.p.A.: a standalone
Baseline Credit Assessment of ba3; deposit ratings of Baa3/Prime-3;
a long-term issuer rating of Ba1; Counterparty Risk Ratings of
Baa3/Prime-3 and Counterparty Risk Assessments of
Baa3(cr)/Prime-3(cr). The outlook on BFF's long-term deposit
ratings and issuer rating is positive.

RATINGS RATIONALE

  -- BCA

BFF's BCA of ba3 reflects the bank's activities mostly in factoring
receivables from public administration bodies. While BFF's main
market is still Italy, the chartered bank aims to diversify its
geographical footprint throughout Europe including Spain, Portugal,
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Greece, and Croatia. While BFF
will remain a "monoline" centered on factoring of receivables
towards the public sector, it aims to diversify the range of
products, for example by extending loans, which may generate new
risks. The BCA reflects the bank's sound asset risk, strong
profitability, modest capitalization, high reliance on wholesale
funding and high asset encumbrance. The BCA also takes into account
the bank's rapid growth both through acquisitions and organically
in Italy and in foreign markets in Europe, as well as the bank's
narrow business focus.

Moody's considers BFF's asset risk to be sound, with a reported
gross problem loans ratio of just above 3% at end-June 2019. The
bulk of BFF's exposures are to public sector entities, mostly
commercial receivables which Moody's considers to be of higher
quality than most corporate lending. The recovery rate from loans
classified as non-performing is high given that public entities
eventually repay their debt yet with delays. It is also reflected
in the low level of credit cost reported by the bank in 2018 (15
basis points).

BFF has good internal capital generation with a reported net profit
of EUR38 million in 1H19, equivalent to a Moody's-calculated net
income to tangible assets ratio of 1.7%, but fast loan growth, high
risk weight on its loans to public administration (100%), and high
dividend distributions (100% payout ratio in 2018) have led the
CET1 ratio to gradually decrease over recent years to 11.6% at
end-June 2019 from a much higher 27% in 2014. The total capital
ratio of 16.1% at end-June 2019 includes EUR100 million Tier 2 debt
issued by the bank in 2017. BFF is committed to maintaining its
total capital above 15% and would curtail lending and cut dividends
if this ratio were to fall below this threshold. BFF's main sources
of revenue come from the discount applied on purchased receivables
and the late payment interest (LPI) charged to the public
administration.

BFF is primarily wholesale funded, with around EUR2.5 billion of
drawn credit lines from financial institutions and repurchase
agreements; and EUR550 million of bonds issued to institutional
investors. This results in a high market funds to tangible banking
assets ratio of above 60% at end-June 2019. Meanwhile the bank has
been developing its online deposit gathering, with funds of EUR879
million in June 2019. Most of BFF's liquid assets are financed via
secured transactions and hence encumbered, but the bank's liquidity
benefits from the availability of committed credit lines from
several financial institutions, and the bank reported a Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (LCR) of 499% and Net Stable Funding Ration (NSFR)
of 107% at end-June 2019.

-- DEPOSITS AND ISSUER RATING

The bank's long-term Baa3 deposit and Ba1 issuer ratings reflect
the ba3 BCA, as well as extremely low and very low
loss-given-failure respectively in a resolution scenario, according
to Moody's advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis, driven by
the relatively high volume of senior unsecured debt and the
moderate level of subordinated debt outstanding. This results in an
uplift of three notches for deposit rating and two notches for
issuer rating from the bank's BCA.

Moody's assessment of a low probability of government support for
BFF does not result in any further uplift to the ratings.

OUTLOOK

The positive outlook on BFF's long-term deposit ratings and issuer
rating reflects the possibility for a higher BCA and higher ratings
should BFF sustain its fundamentals at current levels, which
entails amongst other things maintaining its Common Equity One
(CET1) at or above its current level.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP

BFF''s BCA could be upgraded following sustained evidence of sound
profit generation whilst maintaining sound asset risk and sound
capital ratios. The BCA would also benefit from a funding profile
less reliant on wholesale funding and stronger liquidity. An
upgrade of the BCA would likely lead to an upgrade of BFF's deposit
ratings and issuer rating.

BFF's issuer rating could also be upgraded following a material
increase in the bank's stock of subordinated debt.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS DOWN

Given the positive outlook, a downgrade is unlikely. However, BFF's
BCA could be downgraded if the stock of problem loans increased
materially and led to material losses that would erode
capitalisation and if its liquidity profile weakened. A downgrade
of the BCA would lead to a downgrade of BFF's deposit ratings and
issuer rating.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Banca Farmafactoring S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, assigned Baa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, assigned P-3

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, assigned Baa3(cr)

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, assigned P-3(cr)

Long-term Bank Deposits, assigned Baa3 Positive

Short-term Bank Deposits, assigned P-3

Long-term Issuer Rating, assigned Ba1 Positive

Baseline Credit Assessment, assigned ba3

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, assigned ba3

Outlook Action:

Outlook assigned Positive

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published
in August 2018.


BRIGNOLE CQ 2019-1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB(low) Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned a provisional rating of BB (low) (sf)
to the Class E Notes to be issued by Brignole CQ 2019-1 S.r.l. (the
Issuer).

The provisional rating referenced above is based on information
provided to DBRS by the Issuer and its agents as of the date of
this press release. The rating can be finalized upon review of
final information, data and an executed version of the governing
transaction documents. To the extent that the documents and the
information provided to DBRS as of this date differ from the
executed version of the governing transaction documents, DBRS may
assign different final ratings to the rated notes.

The transaction represents the issuance of Class A, Class B, Class
C, Class D and Class E floating-rate notes (the Rated Notes)
together with Class X and Class R backed by a pool of approximately
EUR 172 million of fixed-rate receivables related to Italian
salary- and pension-assignment loans as well as payment delegation
loans granted by Creditis Servizi Finanziari S.p.A. (the originator
and servicer) to individuals residing in Italy.

On September 24, 2019, DBRS assigned provisional ratings to the
Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D notes to be issued under this
transaction. DBRS does not rate the Class X and the Class R notes.

The transaction envisages a six-month revolving period during which
time the originator may offer additional receivables that the
Issuer will purchase provided that certain conditions set out in
the transaction documents are satisfied. The revolving period may
end earlier than scheduled following certain events, including
performance triggers. At the end of the revolving period, the Notes
will amortize on a sequential basis. The transaction benefits from
a EUR 1.7 million cash reserve funded with part of the proceeds of
subscription of the Class X notes, which can be used to cover
shortfalls in senior expenses, interest under the Class A, Class B,
Class C and Class D notes and to offset defaults, thus providing
credit enhancement. The cash reserve does not cover Class E
interest and reduces to zero being released to the transaction
revenues when Class D is fully amortized. The Rated Notes
(including the Class E Notes) pay interest indexed to one-month
Euribor plus a margin, and the interest rate risk arising from the
mismatch between the floating-rate notes and the fixed-rate
collateral is hedged through an interest rate cap with an eligible
counterparty based on a fixed amortization schedule based on the
initial portfolio assuming a 6% constant prepayment rate after the
revolving period.

DBRS does not rate the Class X or the Class R notes.

The rating of the Class E Notes addresses ultimate payment of
interest and ultimate payment of principal by the final maturity
date.

The ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction capital structure, including form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support DBRS's
projected expected net losses under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested.

-- The seller, originator and servicer's capabilities with respect
to originations, underwriting, servicing and financial strength.

-- DBRS conducted an operational risk review on Creditis Servizi
Finanziari S.p.A.'s premises and deems it to be an acceptable
servicer.

-- The appointment upon closing of a backup servicer and
capabilities with respect to servicing.

-- The transaction parties' financial strength with regard to
their respective roles.

-- The credit quality, diversification of the collateral and
historical and projected performance of the seller's portfolio.

-- The sovereign rating of the Republic of Italy, currently rated
BBB (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS.

-- The consistency of the transaction's legal structure with
DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology, the presence of legal opinions that
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer and
non-consolidation of the Issuer with the seller.

Notes: All figures are in Euros unless otherwise noted.




===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================

CRC BREEZE: Fitch Affirms CC Rating on Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed CRC Breeze Finance S.A.'s class A notes at
'CCC' and class B notes at 'CC'.

The notes were issued to purchase a portfolio of wind farms in
France and Germany.

RATING RATIONALE

The ratings reflect potentially insufficient cash in the debt
service reserve account (DSRA) to service the bonds until maturity,
indicating that default is has become a real possibility. Revenue
under-performance has continued as a result of wind yield being
consistently below expectations, despite benefiting from fixed
feed-in tariffs. Fitch expects continued cash flow pressure due to
a rise in operating and maintenance costs and a decrease in turbine
availability as the assets age.
The bonds' equally sized semi-annual principal repayments in any
given year do not take into account summer and winter wind
seasonality, which results in less cash being available for the
autumn debt service. The class B bonds' DSRA has no funds and the
class A bonds' DSRA is partially depleted. Its forecasts indicate
that neither DSRA will be replenished as flows into them are
subordinated to the repayment of the class B bond deferrals,
currently approximately EUR23 million (around 45% of the original
class B notional). Fitch perceives a default as probable for the
class B notes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Aging Turbines Trigger More Maintenance - Operation Risk: Weaker
Historically turbine availability has been high, at and even
slightly exceeding Fitch's expectation of 96.5%. CRC Breeze Finance
SA has also demonstrated better cost control in the recent years,
after initially underestimating the budget prior to entering into
the transaction. However Fitch considers that a decrease in turbine
availability in the coming years is likely, given that the turbines
are aging and will need more maintenance, and this has been
reflected in Fitch's rating case. At the same time, operating costs
are expected to increase. Fitch also views the absence of
performance incentives of the operators as credit-negative.

Initial Wind Estimates Largely Overestimated - Volume Risk: Weaker
The external initial wind study grossly overestimated Breeze II's
wind resources. A new study prepared in 2010 revised the wind
forecast down by 17%. However, actual wind yield is also lower than
the revised wind estimates. Fitch now considers historical data as
a more reliable basis for its volume projections, as a result of
actual wind yield repeatedly falling short of expectations.

Limited Exposure to Merchant Pricing - Price Risk: Midrange
The wind farms are remunerated through fixed feed-in-tariffs
embedded in German and French energy regulations. German tariffs
are set for 20 years and French tariffs for 15 years. This exposes
the project to merchant pricing, at approximately 10% of the
portfolio's generation capacity during the last three to four
years, increasing to more than 20% at the last payment date.

Partially Depleted DSRA on Class A - Debt Structure: Midrange
Large Amounts of Deferrals on Class B - Debt Structure: Weaker
The class A bonds rank senior, are fully amortising and carry a
fixed interest rate. However, equally sized semi-annual principal
repayments together with the potential leakage of cash to pay
semi-annual class B payments ignoring wind seasonality weaken the
debt structure.

The low wind volumes have impacted the project's liquidity, which
remains tight. Fitch does not expect it to improve materially.
Several drawdowns on the class A notes' DSRA have occurred, meaning
that debt service can still be maintained to an extent during weak
wind seasons but the reserve is significantly eroded, at EUR6.5
million versus the initial balance of EUR13.3 million. A
replenishment of this reserve is very unlikely, as it is
subordinated to the repayment of the entire balance of deferrals on
the class B bonds. Additional drawings on the class A notes' DSRA
would further affect the debt structure.

The class B notes' DSRA is depleted and large amounts of scheduled
payments on the class B bonds, which include principal and
interest, were repeatedly deferred over the years. In May 2019 the
total amount of deferrals was approximately EUR23 million, which
may be repaid until the class A bonds reach their maturity, but the
subordination to the class A notes makes this unlikely.

Financial Profile

Fitch's rating case produces average and minimum debt service
coverage ratios of 0.91x and 0.72x, respectively, for the class A
bonds, highlighting that there is no financial cushion. The equally
sized semi-annual principal repayments ignoring summer and winter
wind seasonality mean that there is less cash available for the
autumn debt service. This increases the likelihood of further
drawdowns on the partially depleted class A notes' DSRA. Fitch
concludes that there may not be sufficient cash in the reserve to
service the class A notes until maturity. This positions the rating
at 'CCC'.

The balance of principal deferrals on the class B bonds currently
stands at around 45% of the notional, which indicates a highly
probable default. However, CRC Breeze Finance SA can defer the
payments of the class B bonds until 2026, when the class A matures,
resulting in the credit risk profile of the class B bonds
corresponding to a 'CC' rating.

PEER GROUP

Like Breeze Finance SA, CRC Breeze Finance SA consists of a
portfolio of onshore wind farms predominately located in Germany
and, to a lesser extent, in France. As a result they share the same
regulatory framework, with fixed feed-in-tariffs. They have equally
suffered from considerable over-estimation of their wind resources.
Additionally, the seasonality of wind yield, combined with equal
semi-annual principal repayments, has led to shortfalls at the
autumn payment dates. This has resulted in deferrals on the class B
notes and drawings on the class A notes' DSRA for both
transactions.

Compared with Breeze Finance SA, whose class B bonds mature in
2027, CRC Breeze Finance SA class B's scheduled maturity is 2016
but payments can be deferred until the class A bonds reach their
maturity in 2026. However, Fitch does not see this as a significant
benefit relative to Breeze Finance SA as the high amount of
deferrals, their subordination to the class A notes and the fully
depleted class B notes' DSRA mean a full repayment of the class B
bonds remains unlikely. Fitch believes that the ratings of the two
transactions should be aligned as a result, at 'CCC' for the class
A notes and 'CC' for the class B notes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action:

  - Class A: weak wind conditions, a material decline in turbine
availability or a lasting increase in operating costs triggering
further significant drawdowns on the class A notes' DSRA.

- Class B: default becoming imminent or inevitable.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action:

  - An upgrade of either class appears unlikely at this point.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

CRC Breeze Finance SA is a Luxembourg special purpose vehicle that
issued three classes of notes on May 8, 2006 for an aggregate
issuance amount of EUR470 million to finance the acquisition of a
portfolio of wind farms located in Germany and France, as well as
establishing various reserve accounts. The notes are scheduled to
be repaid from the cash flow generated by the sale of the energy
produced by the wind farms, mainly under regulated tariffs.

CREDIT UPDATE

Performance Update

There were no drawdowns under the DSRA during last year given the
good levels of production during last winter and strong cost
control, but Fitch expects further drawdowns in the future. The
current class A reserve balance is below 50% of the target
balance.

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

Fitch Cases

Fitch's base and rating cases are based on historical average
production. This assumption changes over time in Fitch's reviews,
as CRC Breeze Finance SA yields more historical data. Fitch's
rating case also includes an additional 15% stress on costs.


CRYSTAL ALMOND: Fitch Gives B(EXP) Rating to New Secured Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigned Crystal Almond S.a.r.l.'s prospective new
senior secured notes an expected rating of 'B'(EXP)/'RR4. It has
affirmed Crystal Almond Intermediary Holdings Limited's Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating at 'B' with Stable Outlook.

The assignment of final rating is contingent on the receipt of
final documents conforming to information already received.

The proceeds from the new EUR500 million senior secured notes will
be used to refinance the existing EUR275 million notes and to cover
the transaction costs. The remaining cash will provide the company
additional flexibility in managing its capex programme and 5G
spectrum investment as well as paying dividends to shareholders.
Fitch expects that the company may start paying higher dividends
starting 2019; however, Fitch believes that management will take a
prudent approach to leverage by maintaining it below its downgrade
threshold of 4.0x funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage
in 2019-2022.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Leverage to Increase but Moderate: Fitch projects that FFO adjusted
net leverage to be at 3.7x-3.9x in 2020-2022, increasing from 3.2x
in 2019, driven by dividend payments and 5G spectrum capex. The new
notes' documentation allows the company to pay dividends from the
proceeds provided that leverage remains below 3.5x net debt/EBITDA
as per the company's definition. Fitch expects Wind Hellas to start
paying higher dividends in 2019 but at the same time take a prudent
approach to leverage to retain flexibility for organic expansion
via higher capex, potential M&A opportunities and spectrum
auctions.

Moderate Capex, Improving FCF: Fitch estimates Wind Hellas' cash
flow generation to gradually improve, driven by EBITDA growth and
moderate capex. Fitch expects pre-dividend FCF to turn positive in
2019. This is a reversal from past years of negative FCF. Fitch
expects stabilisation of organic capex to lower levels in 2019-2021
following a period of heavy investment in its mobile network, fibre
rollout and its launch of TV offerings. Wind Hellas'
network-sharing agreement with Vodafone has delivered material cost
and capex efficiencies as well as better service quality. Fitch
expects the company to benefit further from the expansion of this
agreement to 4G from 2G/3G.

Improved Competitive Position: Wind Hellas is firmly positioned to
take advantage of increasing demand for data services. The company
is catching up with its competitors in 4G network coverage and
continues to improve its overall service quality. An ability to
offer high-quality triple-play bundles supports customer retention
while investing in Next Generation Access (NGA) networks deployment
gives Wind Hellas greater exposure to fixed broadband market
growth. Further consolidation in the Greek fixed telecoms market
could create a more rational competitive environment with three
fixed-mobile convergent operators, including Wind Hellas.

Growing Telecoms Market: Greece's telecom market is one of the
laggards in Europe in smartphone penetration, data usage and fixed
fibre network deployment. For the past several years, Greece has
been catching up, and Fitch expects this positive trend to continue
against an improving macroeconomic backdrop. Fitch expects Greek
GDP growth of 2.3% in 2019 and 2.2% in 2020.

Service Improvement: Wind Hellas has upgraded its network
infrastructure, improved the customer experience, while controlling
costs. This has led to revenue and EBITDA growth, and market share
gains, particularly since early 2017. While the mobile market
remains competitive, Wind Hellas has seen greater penetration of
higher-value bundles among its prepaid customer base. A rising
proportion of bundles with fixed and pay TV will likely improve
retention among subscribers.

Fixed-line Capex Visibility Improves: In the fixed-line segment
capex visibility has improved following the Greek government's
decision to divide the country into three regions to OTE, Vodafone
and Wind Hellas for fibre rollout. This approach protects the
companies from network overlap and allows them to benefit from
either selling faster internet to customers or wholesaling their
lines to their peers. The main risk to these investments is low
take-up rates, which remain sensitive to the macro environment.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Wind Hellas is the third-largest mobile and fixed-line operator in
Greece behind OTE and Vodafone Greece. Its ratings reflect the
company's improving performance in both the fixed and mobile
segments due to continued development of and increasing demand for
telecom services. Compared with telco peers in the 'B' and 'BB'
categories such as eircom Holdings Limited (B+/Stable), Tele
Columbus AG (B/Negative), DKT Holdings ApS (B+/Stable) and LLC T2
RTK Holding (BB/Positive), Wind Hellas is smaller in scale and has
below-average margins. At the same time Wind Hellas benefits from
lower leverage relative to peers. FCF generation is a main
constraint on Wind Hellas' ratings; however, it is expected to
improve. Execution risk on cost control and expected revenue growth
is more pronounced than at peers and to some extent depends on
continued Greek macroeconomic growth.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer include:

  - Low single-digit service revenue growth in 2019-2021, driven by
mobile customers' shift towards post-paid, improving average
revenue per user, migration of fixed-line subscribers to NGA, and
increasing take-up of pay TV

  - EBITDA margin at 25% in 2019 and gradually improving in
2020-2021

  - Capex plan and spectrum payments reflect buildout of network
and pay-TV investment, as well as 5G spectrum auction

  - Excess cash on the balance sheet to be paid out via dividends
in the next three to four years

  - No M&A

KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS

The recovery analysis assumes that Wind Hellas would be considered
a going concern in bankruptcy and that it would be reorganised
rather than liquidated.

  - A 10% administrative claim.

  - The going-concern EBITDA estimate of EUR90 million reflects
Fitch's view of a sustainable, post-reorganisation EBITDA level
upon which Fitch bases the valuation of the company.

  - The going-concern EBITDA is 32% below LTM 2Q19 EBITDA, assuming
likely operating challenges at the time of distress.

  - An enterprise value multiple of 4x is used to calculate a
post-reorganisation valuation and reflects a conservative mid-cycle
multiple.

  - Fitch reflects the total amount of debt for claims post
refinancing at EUR575 million, which includes the senior secured
notes at intermediary holding company Crystal Almond S.a.r.l as
well as the full commitment amount of the new EUR75 million super
senior revolving credit facility (RCF)

  - Its calculations factor in EUR75 million of prior-ranking debt
(RCF) and EUR500 million of senior secured notes. The recovery
prospects for senior secured notes is 'RR4'/50%. The 'RR4' Recovery
Rating implies a zero-notch uplift from the IDR for a 'B'
instrument rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  - Continued growth in service revenue supported by sustainable
market positions

  - A sustained FCF margin in the low- to mid-single digits

  - FFO adjusted net leverage sustained below 3.0x

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  - Adverse changes in competitive and/or macroeconomic environment
jeopardising revenue growth

  - Fixed charge coverage trending below 2.0x (2018: 2.3x)

  - Persistently negative FCF

  - FFO adjusted net leverage sustained above 4.0,x driven, among
other factors, by excessive shareholder distributions

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Comfortable Liquidity: Fitch expects that a combination of
improving EBITDA and declining capex will support neutral-to-
positive FCF generation in 2019-2021. Currently comfortable
liquidity should be strengthened further by a new RCF of EUR75
million due 2024 which will replace the existing EUR30 million RCF
due 2020.




===========
M O N A C O
===========

DYNAGAS LNG: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 CFR on Loan Repayment
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service withdrawn the corporate family rating of
Caa1 and probability of default rating of Caa1-PD of Dynagas LNG
Partners LP. At the time of withdrawal, there was no instrument
rating outstanding. Prior to the withdrawal the outlook on the
ratings was stable.

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings following the recent repayment of
Dynagas's term loan B.




===========
P O L A N D
===========

PKO BP: Files Motion for Bankruptcy Announcement
------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Ursus SA w Restrukturyzacji said on Oct. 2 PKO
BP has filed motion for announcing that company's bankruptcy.

According to Reuters, the company is currently under the process of
accelerated arrangement proceedings.

Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski Spolka Akcyjna (PKO BP) is
Poland's largest bank founded in 1919.




===============
P O R T U G A L
===============

EVORA FINANCE: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class B Notes to Caa1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of Class A and B
Notes in Evora Finance. The rating action reflects increased levels
of credit enhancement for the affected Notes.

  EUR123 million Class A Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously
  on Dec 20, 2017 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

  EUR19.5 million Class B Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf);
  previously on Dec 20, 2017 Definitive Rating Assigned
  Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is prompted by an increase in credit enhancement
for the affected tranches.

Increase in Available Credit Enhancement

The recovery process of the defaulted loans has so far produced
higher cash-flows in a shorter time than expected, resulting in
credit enhancement for the affected Notes increasing to 88.74% from
78.81% for Class A and to 84.75% from 75.46% for Class B after last
payment date.

Reported combined Cumulative Collection Ratio as indicated in the
Servicer Report immediately preceding May 2019 payment date stood
at 178.63% and NPV Cumulative Profitability Ratio as of the same
reporting date stood at 136.50%.

Counterparty Exposure

The rating action took into consideration the Notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as servicer, account banks or
interest rate cap provider.

Even if it has not been used up to now, the Reserve Fund could be
used up to pay interest on Class A Notes in absence of sufficient
regular cashflows generated by the portfolio. In this case there
would not be sufficient liquidity available to make payments on the
Class A Notes in the event of servicer disruption. The
insufficiency of liquidity in conjunction with the lack of a
back-up servicer means that continuity of Class A Notes payments is
not ensured in case of servicer disruption. This risk is
commensurate with the single-A rating assigned to the most senior
Note.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securitizations Backed by Non-Performing and
Re-Performing Loans" published in February 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include: (1) the recovery process of the defaulted loans
producing significantly higher cash-flows in a shorter time frame
than expected; (2) improvements in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties; and (3) a decrease in sovereign risk.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include: (1) significantly lower or slower cash-flows
generated from the recovery process on the NPLs due to either a
longer time for the courts to process the foreclosures and
bankruptcies, a change in economic conditions from its central
scenario forecast or idiosyncratic performance factors. For
instance, should economic conditions be worse than forecasted and
the sale of the properties would generate less cash-flows for the
issuer or it would take a longer time to sell the properties, all
these factors could result in a downgrade of the ratings; (2)
deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties; and (3) increase in sovereign risk.




===========
R U S S I A
===========

CREDIT BANK MOSCOW: Moody's Affirms Ba3 LongTerm Deposit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Credit Bank of Moscow's Ba3
long-term local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings as well as
senior unsecured foreign-currency debt ratings, the outlook remains
stable.

Concurrently, Moody's affirmed the bank's b2 Baseline Credit
Assessment and Adjusted BCA. Moody's also affirmed CBM's
Ba2(cr)/Not Prime(cr) long-term and short-term Counterparty Risk
Assessment (CR Assessment), its Ba2/Not Prime long-term and
short-term local and foreign currency Counterparty Risk Ratings, as
well as Not Prime short-term local- and foreign-currency deposit
ratings. The Caa2(hyb) subordinated debt rating was also affirmed.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of CBM's ratings and assessments is driven by the
relatively stable financial profile of the bank through 2018 and
the first half of 2019, reflected by the problem asset disposal on
the one hand and weakened profitability on the other hand, along
with broadly stable capital adequacy metrics. The bank's BCA of b2
remains constrained by the weaknesses in its risk governance
stemming from its elevated risk appetite as identified by Moody's,
whereby the bank's creditworthiness is increasingly affected by the
provision of very extensive financing to a small number of highly
leveraged customers.

In 2018 CBM disposed of a number of impaired exposures, thus
bringing problem lending (defined as stage 3 and POCI loans) to
5.8% of gross loans (2.5% of net loans) as of June 30, 2019 from
11.6% (defined as impaired and 90 days overdue) at the end of 2017.
Several large problem loans were fully or partially sold, in
particular, loans to a pharmacy chain and a real estate development
company.

However, in Moody's view, high-risk lending is higher than this and
broadly corresponds to CBM's distressed and high credit risk
assets, which together accounted for 14.2% of gross loans (10.6% of
net loans) as of June 30, 2019. Among the largest problem and
high-risk exposures are loans to local car dealers and oil
refineries. The loan loss reserves covered 103% of stage 3 loans
but only 42% of high credit risk and distressed loans as of
mid-2019.

In the first six months of 2019, CBM reported net income of RUB2.2
billion, a return on average assets (ROAA) of 0.2% (full-year 2018:
27.2 billion and 1.3%, respectively). In the first half of 2019,
the bank's profitability was adversely affected by: (1) contracted
net interest margin (NIM); (2) foreign exchange loss; and (3)
elevated provisioning charges due to problems of one corporate
borrower (an oil refinery). The bank's NIM narrowed to 1.6% in H1
2019 from 2.3% in 2018 and 2.6% in 2017 largely owing to interest
rate risk and an increased share of low-margin reverse repo
transactions (50% of assets). Moody's expects some improvement of
the bank's net financial result in the next 12-18 months largely
owing to NIM recovery and stabilization of foreign-currency
revenues and provisioning charges.

On June 30, 2019, CBM's tangible common equity was 10.3% of
risk-weighted assets (RWAs), virtually flat compared to year-end
2018. The rating agency expects CBM's capital metrics will steadily
strengthen given its improving internal capital generation capacity
coupled with modest expected RWA growth and dividend payouts in the
next 12-18 months.

Moody's understands that concentrated corporate accounts, as well
as interbank deposits (28% of total liabilities as of June 30,
2019), are the sources of funding for reverse repo transactions on
the asset side. This implies that any outflow of large corporate
deposits will be offset by either a reduction in reverse repos or
additional interbank borrowings, given the high credit quality of
securities received as collateral under reverse repos. After
adjusting the liquidity buffer (64% of assets as of June 30, 2019)
for the amount of reverse repos, the rating agency estimates the
adjusted liquidity ratio at about 31% of the bank's adjusted total
assets and recognizes that about RUB700 billion of bonds received
under reverse repos as of August 1, 2019 were unpledged and could
be used to raise funding, if needed.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

CBM's BCA could be downgraded if the bank's credit profile weakens
as a consequence of an unexpected deterioration in its liquidity or
loss-absorption capacity. The bank's supported ratings could be
downgraded if the government's capacity or propensity to render
support to systemically important banks were to diminish.

CBM's BCA could be upgraded if there were a sustained improvement
in the bank's solvency metrics, in particular, its asset quality
and/or profitability, or the bank reduces its concentrations in its
loan portfolio, reverse repos and customer deposits, or there is an
evidence that the risk governance practices materially improved.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Credit Bank of Moscow

Affirmations:

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b2

Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b2

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed Ba2(cr)

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, Affirmed Ba2

Short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, Affirmed NP

Long-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Affirmed Ba3 Stable

Short-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Affirmed NP

Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Caa2 (hyb)

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba3 Stable

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, Remains Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published
in August 2018.


SAVDOGAR BANK: Moody's Affirms B2 LT Deposit Rating, Outlook Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed Savdogar Bank's B2 long-term
foreign-and local-currency deposit ratings and changed the outlook
on the long-term deposit ratings to negative from stable. Moody's
also affirmed Savdogar Bank's Baseline Credit Assessment and
Adjusted BCA at b2, its long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment at
B1(cr), and local- and foreign-currency long-term Counterparty Risk
Ratings (CRR) at B1. The short-term CR Assessment of Not Prime(cr),
short-term deposit ratings and short-term CRR of Not Prime (NP)
were also affirmed.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The outlook change on Savdogar Bank's long-term deposit ratings to
negative from stable is driven by: (1) the deterioration of the
bank's liquidity cushion through 2019; as well as (2) the
continuing rapid loan book growth exerting downward pressure on the
bank's capital adequacy.

According to local GAAP reports, as of September 1, 2019, the
bank's share of liquid assets stood at 8.4% of total assets, a
decline from 11.3% as of end-2018 and 30.0% as of end-2017. The
deterioration was driven by the gross loan book growth of 25% in
2018 and 35% over the first eight months of 2019, respectively, as
well as repayment of interbank loans.

The bank relies heavily on customer deposits (78% of total
liabilities) largely represented by corporates as well as long-term
funding (9.1% of liabilities) from the Government of Uzbekistan to
finance a number of state programs. The coverage of the bank's
customer deposits by liquid assets declined to 13% as of September
1 from 16.3% at the end of 2018 and 38.6% at the end of 2017. The
relatively weak liquidity position is partially offset by short
duration of the loan portfolio which allows to collect about UZS30
billion from repayments every month, an equivalent of 3.3% of the
bank's total assets.

Another driver behind the outlook change to negative from stable is
Savdogar Bank's capital adequacy decline owing to rapid loan book
and risk-weighted assets (RWA) growth. According to local GAAP
reports, the bank's loan portfolio and RWAs increased 35% and 40%,
respectively, over the first eight months of 2019. As a result the
bank's regulatory total capital adequacy ratio fell from 17.8% at
the end of 2018 to 13.2% as of September 1, 2019, slightly above
the minimal threshold of 13%.

Moody's estimates that in case of further rapid loan book expansion
and in the absence of capital contributions Savdogar Bank's
tangible common equity (TCE) could decline to 11.7% of RWA by the
end of 2020 from 17.7% reported as of end-2018.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP / DOWN

Given the negative outlook, an upgrade is unlikely over the next
12-18 months. Nevertheless, Moody's could change the outlook on
Savdogar Bank's long-term ratings to stable, if the bank materially
strengthens its liquidity cushion and achieves a better match
between its RWA and equity growth.

Moody's could downgrade Savdogar Bank's BCA and long-term deposit
ratings if the bank fails to increase its liquidity buffer to at
least 10% of total assets by the end of 2019, as well as in case of
a material deterioration of the bank's capital adequacy as a result
of its rapid loan book and RWA growth in the absence of additional
capital contributions from the shareholders.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Savdogar Bank

Affirmations:

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b2

Baseline Credit Assessment, Affirmed b2

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed B1(cr)

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, Affirmed B1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, Affirmed NP

Long-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Affirmed B2, Outlook changed to
Negative from Stable

Short-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Affirmed NP

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, Changed To Negative From Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published
in August 2018.


SOVCOMBANK PJSC: Moody's Ups Deposit Ratings to Ba2, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded Sovcombank PJSC's Baseline
Credit Assessment and adjusted BCA to ba2 from ba3, its long-term
local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings to Ba2 from Ba3, its
long term Counterparty Risk Ratings to Ba1 from Ba2 and its
long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment to Ba1(cr) from Ba2(cr).

The rating agency also affirmed the bank's short-term local and
foreign-currency deposit ratings and short term CRR of Not Prime
and its short-term CR Assessment of Not Prime (cr).

All long term deposit ratings carry a stable outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of Sovcombank's long-term deposit ratings to Ba2 from
Ba3 is driven by the upgrade of its BCA to ba2 from ba3 which
reflects Sovcombank's continued strong financial performance and
strengthened risk profile in recent years, as the bank improved its
business diversification, reduced exposure to market risk and
improved its funding profile.

Moody's also expects that, following its merger with RosEvrobank in
2018, Sovcombank's growth strategy will be less aggressive compared
to recent years, and the bank will be focusing on organic growth
because of limited opportunities for M&A deals in the Russian
banking sector.

As at June 30, 2019, the bank's problem loans (stage 3 and POCI)
accounted for 2.7% of gross loans (or 3.6%, adjusting for bonds
included in the loan book) and were fully (127%) covered by loan
loss reserves. Moody's expects that the bank's asset quality will
remain supported by good asset diversification with significant
exposure to creditworthy customers from corporate sector and
increased focus on secured retail loans, which accounted for around
65% of total retail portfolio in Q2 2019.

In H1 2019, Sovcombank's Tier 1 common capital and Total capital
adequacy ratios increased to 13.1% and 15% respectively up from
11.5% and 13.8% at the end of 2018. Moody's expects Sovcombank's
capital position to remain robust in the long term, supported by
its strong internal capital generation.

Sovcombank continues to report good profitability, reducing its
reliance on one-off gains. For H1 2019, it posted net profit of RUB
13billion, which translated into a strong annualized Return on
Average Assets of 2.6% and Return on Equity of 22.6%. The bank's
core revnues from net interest income and fees and commissions
accounted for 97% of its operating income in H1 2019, compared to
76% in 2017. Moody's expects that Sovcombank's robust recurring
profitability will sustain in the long term, supported by its
healthy net interest margin (around 6%) and strong fees and
commissions, which contributed around 33% to total operating income
in 2018-H12019.

Sovcombank significantly decreased its exposure to market risk,
reducing its fixed income portfolio measured at fair value through
profit and loss to 22% of its asset base from 50% at end-2017. This
portfolio predominantly consisted of Russian Eurobonds rated Baa-Ba
and bear limited credit risk.

The rating action also reflects Sovcombank's improved funding
profile as the bank in recent years increased reliance on stable
customer deposits which accounted for 80% of Sovcombank's total
liabilities. At the same time, the bank significantly decreased its
reliance on repo-related funding (backed by its portfolio of
fixed-income securities) to 11.7% of total liabilities as at June
30, 2019 from 30% at the end of 2017, and Moody's expect its
funding structure to remain broadly stable over the next 12-18
months.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

A further upgrade in the bank's BCA could result from improvement
in Russia's operating environment, which would support further
strengthening of Sovcombank's credit profile. Deposit ratings may
be upgraded if the bank is designated a systemically important bank
and benefits from government support uplift. Conversely, the
ratings could be downgraded if there were a sharp deterioration in
the operating environment in Russia that would lead to a
substantial deterioration of the bank's asset quality,
capitalization or liquidity.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Sovcombank PJSC

Upgrades:

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to ba2 from ba3

Baseline Credit Assessment, Upgraded to ba2 from ba3

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Upgraded to Ba1(cr) from
Ba2(cr)

Long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, Upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2

Long-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Upgraded to Ba2 from Ba3, Outlook
Remains Stable

Affirmations:

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, Affirmed NP

Short-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Affirmed NP

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, Remains Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published
in August 2018.


VOCBANK JSC: Restructuring Launched Following Administration
------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia decided to restructure Joint-stock Company
Volga-Oka Commercial Bank (Reg. No. 312, further referred to as JSC
VOCBANK) through a merger with Public Joint-stock Company Moscow
Industrial Bank (Reg. No. 912, further referred to as PJSC MIN
BANK).

Amendments were introduced to the plans for the Bank of Russia's
participation in bankruptcy prevention measures for JSC VOCBANK and
PJSC MIN BANK which provide for their restructuring.

Previously, the Bank of Russia considered sales of JSC VOCBANK
shares to the interested investors; however, the regulator received
no applications.

In accordance with the decision of the Provisional Administration
of JSC VOCBANK No. 9-VA, dated September 20, 2019, the
restructuring of JSC VOCBANK has been launched through its merger
with PJSC MInBank.




=========
S P A I N
=========

SABADELL CONSUMO 1: DBRS Finalizes B(high) Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized its provisional ratings on the Class
A, Class B, Class C and Class D Notes (the Rated Notes) issued by
Sabadell Consumo 1 Fondo de Titulizacion (the Issuer), as follows:

-- AA (low) (sf) to the Class A Notes
-- A (sf) to the Class B Notes
-- BBB (sf) to the Class C Notes
-- B (high) (sf) to the Class D Notes

The Class E, Class F and Class Z Notes are not rated by DBRS.

The rating assigned to the Class A Notes addresses the timely
payment of interest and ultimate repayment of principal by the
final maturity date. The ratings assigned to the Class B, Class C
and Class D Notes address the ultimate payment of interest and
repayment of principal by the final maturity date.

The ratings are based on the following considerations:

-- The transaction's capital structure including available credit
enhancement in the form of subordination, liquidity support and
excess spread.

-- Sufficient credit enhancement levels to support DBRS's expected
defaults and recoveries under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay the Rated Notes.

-- The financial strength of Banco de Sabadell S.A. (the seller)
and its capabilities with respect to originations, underwriting and
servicing.

-- The operational risk review of the seller, which is deemed by
DBRS to be an acceptable servicer.

-- The transaction parties' financial strength regarding their
respective roles.

-- The credit quality and concentration of the collateral and
historical and projected performance of the seller's portfolio.

-- The sovereign rating of the Kingdom of Spain, currently rated
"A" with a Stable trend by DBRS.

-- The consistency of legal structure with DBRS's "Legal Criteria
for European Structured Finance Transactions" methodology and the
presence of legal opinions that address the true sale of the assets
to the Issuer.

The transaction cash flow structure was analyzed in Intex
DealMaker.

Notes: All figures are in Euros unless otherwise noted.




=============
U K R A I N E
=============

KERNEL: S&P Affirms 'B' LT Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term issuer and issue
credit ratings on the existing senior unsecured notes due in 2022
on Ukraine-based sunflower oil and grains group Kernel. S&P also
assigned its 'B' issue rating to the proposed senior unsecured
notes.

S&P said, "The rating affirmation reflects our view that Kernel
should be able to execute its large capital expenditure (capex)
program over the next 12 months, and return to positive FOCF by the
end of FY2021. Contrary to our previous base case, we now
anticipate FOCF will remain deeply negative ($160 million-$180
million) in FY2020 (and for a third year in a row) and adjusted
debt to EBITDA will be close to 4.0x. During FY2019, the execution
of the group's capex program delayed by the group's biomass energy
generation program, which we understand is broadly resolved. As a
result, we forecast a return to positive FOCF of $125 million-$145
million in 2021, as long as there are no hurdles in the execution
of the capex program over the next 12 months, and crushing margins
stay at similar levels, with no further negative impact from Avere,
the group's trading unit.

"Our rating on Kernel is no longer capped by our transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment on Ukraine, following upgrade of
the sovereign rating, and is at the same level as the long-term
foreign currency rating on Ukraine.

"Kernel will have higher working capital needs over the next 12
months due to the planned commissioning of its new transgrain
terminal in November (with an annual throughput capacity of 4
million tons of grain) at the port of Chornomorsk. As the group
anticipates lower grain volumes in 2020, following the
exceptionally favorable weather conditions in 2018/2019, we
understand that it will engage in open market purchases to fulfill
the resulting excess capacity from the commissioning. The group
will use the proceeds from the proposed bond issuance, which we
understand will amount to about $300 million-$350 million, to
finance these needs and potentially repay drawn short-term
pre-export facilities. The bond issuance will temporarily increase
debt leverage in the capital structure, but will also improve the
debt maturity profile, with a strong reduction in short-term debt.
Overall, we do not see large refinancing risks until 2022.

"We anticipate reported operating margins will bounce back to
9.0%-10.0% over the next 12-24 months, supported by our forecast of
stable crushing margins ($60.0-$70.0 per ton), and still favorable
growth prospects across key exports markets. However, we anticipate
revenue growth will moderate as the historically high growth
registered in 2019 was supported by the record amount of sunflower
(about 15.3 million tons) and grains produced and exported by
Ukraine. Kernel alone exported about 3.1 million tons of sunflower
oil and 10 million tons of grains. During 2019, reported operating
margins weakened to about 8.2% (9.3% in 2018) due to headwinds at
Avere, which was responsible for the procurement and sale of
approximately 4.4 million tons of grains. During the year, Kernel
acquired Ukraine's largest private railcar operator, RTK-Ukraine,
which allows the group to cover its future transport infrastructure
needs, and contain rising logistics costs. Kernel also acquired a
minority stake (5.85%) in ViOil Holding in Western Ukraine, which
is in line with its strategy to play a role in the consolidation of
the sector.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that despite forecast
negative FOCF this year due to a large capex expansion program,
Kernel should be able to maintain stable production volumes and
EBITDA margin thanks to a contained operating cost base and stable
oilseed crushing margins of $60-$70 per ton. We think that this
should enable Kernel to maintain adjusted debt to EBITDA of
3.5x-4.0x over the next 12-18 months.

"We could lower the rating on Kernel if we were concerned that the
group's adjusted debt to EBITA would increase over 4.0x, most
likely stemming from lower-than-anticipated growth prospects in its
key export markets. We would also view negatively signs of
inability to manage the liquidity position this year, given the
very heavy capex program.

"We are unlikely to consider raising the ratings on Kernel over the
next 12 months because we expect FOCF will be largely negative as a
result of the company's heavy investment in increasing its
production and export capacity.

"Nevertheless, we could consider raising the ratings on Kernel if
FOCF returns to positive territory and adjusted debt to EBITDA
moves closer to 3.0x, most likely stemming from
stronger-than-anticipated export volumes and operating cost
savings, following RTK's acquisition. Under such a scenario, an
upgrade is also contingent on Kernel comfortably passing our
sovereign stress test, including the T&C assessment."




===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

BENNETTS: Paul Hurst Buys Business Out of Administration
--------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Bennetts, a shop billed as the "world's
oldest department store", is to be bought out of administration by
a local businessman.

Bennetts has been in Derby since 1734 but went into administration
in February, BBC recounts.

According to BBC, administrators said a sale had been agreed with
Paul Hurst, who already owns one of the city's oldest pubs.

However, Mr. Hurst, as cited by BBC, said it may not be possible to
keep the store in its current location in Iron Gate.

The deal, which comes weeks after a previously-agreed sale to
London Sole Limited fell through, is due to be completed by the end
of this month, BBC discloses.

He said he would be creating a new retail website for Bennetts but
warned there would not be a physical store in the short-term, BBC
notes.


FERGUSON MARINE: Scottish Gov't Draws Up Nationalization Plan
-------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Macnab at The Scotsman reports that the Scottish Government
is ready to take the Ferguson Marine shipyard into public ownership
after three offers from commercial firms were rejected.

The future of the Clyde yard was plunged into doubt earlier this
year, after a bitter stand-off with publicly-owned ferry firm Cal
Mac over construction of two new ships, The Scotsman relates.
Costs on the original GBP97 million contract spiralled with neither
side prepared to meet the additional bill, resulting in
administrators being called in, The Scotsman recounts.

According to The Scotsman, Finance Secretary Derek Mackay has
already set out plans to nationalize the yard top secure the 300
jobs at stake, but interest was invited from commercial operators
which resulted in three indicative offers.  But administrators have
concluded these are either not capable of being executed or do not
represent a better outcome for creditors than a sale of the
business to the Scottish Government, The Scotsman discloses.

But Mr. Mackay confirmed on Oct. 2 he has started legal discussion
with administrators to conclude the process of taking the Ferguson
Marine shipyard into public ownership, The Scotsman relays.

Following a sale of business process, administrators have concluded
that three indicative offers for the business received from
commercial parties are either not capable of being executed or do
not represent a better outcome for creditors than a sale of the
business to the Scottish Government, The Scotsman notes.  According
to The Scotsman, administrators are now in discussion with Scottish
Ministers to agree final terms of a sale and expect this to be
executed within the next four weeks.


FINSBURY SQUARE 2019-3: DBRS Gives Prov. CCC Rating on X Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH assigned the following provisional ratings to the
notes expected to be issued by Finsbury Square 2019-3 plc (the
Issuer):

-- Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes rated AA (sf)
-- Class C Notes rated A (low) (sf)
-- Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes rated BB (high) (sf)
-- Class X Notes rated CCC (sf)

The rating on the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and ultimate repayment of principal on or before the final
maturity date. The ratings on the Classes B, C, D and E notes
address the timely payment of interest once most senior and the
ultimate repayment of principal on or before the final maturity
date. The rating on the Class X notes addresses the ultimate
payment of interest and repayment of principal by the final
maturity date. DBRS does not rate the Class F Notes and Class Z
Notes.

The Issuer is a securitization collateralized by a portfolio of
owner-occupied (72.4% of the provisional portfolio balance) and
buy-to-let (27.6%) residential mortgage loans granted by Kensington
Mortgage Company Limited (KMC) in England, Wales and Scotland.

The Issuer is expected to issue six tranches of mortgage-backed
securities (the Class A Notes to Class F Notes) to finance the
purchase of the initial portfolio and to fund the pre-funding
principal reserve. Additionally, the Issuer is expected to issue
two classes of non-collateralized notes, the Class X Notes and
Class Z Notes, whose proceeds will be used to fund the general
reserve fund (GRF) and the pre-funding revenue reserve as well as
to cover initial costs and expenses. The Class X Notes are
primarily intended to amortize using revenue funds; however, if
excess spread is insufficient to fully redeem the Class X Notes,
principal funds will be used to amortize the Class X Notes in
priority to the Class F Notes.

The structure envisages a pre-funding mechanism where the seller
has the option to sell recently originated mortgage loans to the
Issuer, subject to certain conditions. The acquisition of these
assets shall occur before the first payment date using the proceeds
standing to the credit of the pre-funding reserves.

The GRF, expected to be funded at closing with GBP [•]
(equivalent to [2.15%] of the balance of the Class A Notes to the
Class F notes), will be available to provide liquidity and credit
support to the Class A to Class E Notes. From the first payment
date onwards, the GRF required balance will be [2.0%] of the
balance of the Class A Notes to the Class F notes and, if its
balance falls below 1.5% of the balance of the Class A Notes to
Class F notes, principal available funds will be used to fund the
liquidity reserve fund (LRF) to a target of [2.0%] of the balance
of the Class A Notes and Class B Notes. The LRF will be available
to cover interest shortfalls on the Class A Notes and Class B notes
as well as senior items on the Pre-Enforcement Revenue Priority of
Payment. The availability for paying interest on the Class B Notes
is subject to a 10% principal deficiency ledger condition.

As of July 31, 2019, the provisional portfolio consisted of 1,292
loans extended to 1,247 borrowers with an aggregate principal
balance of GBP 198.8 million. Loans in arrears between one and
three months represent 2.2% of the outstanding principal balance of
the portfolio and loans three or more months' delinquent were
2.0%.
The provisional portfolio includes 3.2% of help-to-buy (HTB) loans,
whose borrowers are supported by government loans (i.e., the equity
loans, which rank in a subordinated position to the mortgages). HTB
loans are used to fund the purchase of new-build properties with a
minimum deposit of 5% from the borrowers. The weighted-average
current loan-to-value ratio of the provisional portfolio is 70.4%,
which increased to 71.2% in DBRS's analysis to include the HTB
equity loan balances.

Of the provisional portfolio, 62.1% relates to a fixed-to-floating
product, where borrowers have an initial fixed-rate period of one
to five years before switching to floating-rate interest indexed to
three-month LIBOR. Interest rate risk is expected to be hedged
through an interest rate swap. Approximately 10.3% of the
provisional portfolio by loan balance comprises loans originated to
borrowers with at least one prior County Court Judgment and 31.4%
are either interest-only loans for life or loans that pay on a
part-and-part basis.

The Issuer is expected to enter into a fixed-floating swap with BNP
Paribas, London Branch (BNP London) to mitigate the fixed-interest
rate risk from the mortgage loans and SONIA payable on the notes.
Based on the DBRS private rating on BNP London, the downgrade
provisions outlined in the documents and the transaction structural
mitigants, DBRS considers the risk arising from the exposure to BNP
London to be consistent with the ratings assigned to the rated
notes as described in DBRS's "Derivative Criteria for European
Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

Citibank, N.A., London Branch (Citibank London) will hold the
Issuer's Transaction Account, the GRF, the LRF, the pre-funding
reserves and the Swap Collateral Account. Based on the DBRS private
rating on Citibank London, the downgrade provisions outlined in the
documents and the transaction structural mitigants, DBRS considers
the risk arising from the exposure to Citibank London to be
consistent with the ratings assigned to the rated notes as
described in DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

DBRS based its provisional ratings on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction capital structure as well as form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement to support
DBRS-projected expected cumulative losses under various stressed
scenarios.

-- The credit quality of the portfolio and DBRS's qualitative
assessment of KMC's capabilities with regard to originations,
underwriting and servicing.

-- The transaction's ability to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay the noteholders according to the terms and
conditions of the notes.

-- The transaction parties' financial strength to fulfill their
respective roles.

-- The transaction's legal structure and its consistency with
DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology as well as the presence of the
appropriate legal opinions that address the assignment of the
assets to the Issuer.

-- DBRS's sovereign rating on the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland of AAA with a Stable trend as of the date of
this press release.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.


FOUR SEASONS: Fails to Pay Millions of Pounds of Rent This Month
----------------------------------------------------------------
Gill Plimmer at The Financial Times reports that Four Seasons,
Britain's second biggest care home operator, failed to pay millions
of pounds of rent this month with no warning to landlords, raising
concerns over the care of thousands of elderly residents.

Four Seasons, which runs 320 homes housing 16,000 residents, has
been fighting for survival since 2017 after its owner, Guy Hands'
private equity firm Terra Firma, defaulted on an interest payment,
the FT discloses.

Its biggest creditor is the US hedge fund H/2 Capital Partners,
which holds most of its GBP730 million debt and is the most likely
buyer of the 185 freehold sites in a deal expected to be completed
by the end of the year, the FT notes.

According to the FT, Four Seasons said in a stock market
announcement on Sept. 30 that it was seeking to renegotiate rents
on the remaining 135 leasehold homes.  It then failed to pay rent
owed to landlords the same day, the FT relays, citing three sources
who say they received no advance warning.

The landlords are believed to be discussing whether other operators
would be interested in taking over the homes, the FT states.  But
they will also have the option of giving notice to the tenants,
potentially leaving local authorities to find alternative
accommodation, according to the FT.

Four Seasons, as cited by the FT, said the "decision to withdraw
rent payments is part of the lease negotiations which we announced
recently".  It said it was meeting some landlords this week and was
confident it would "reach an agreement that will put the group into
a more sustainable financial position for the long term".

One source close to the landlords said they had received no advance
warning over the failure to pay rent even though they had "pressed
for repeated meetings with Four Seasons to discuss options
including rent reductions", the FT notes.

The biggest landlord is the US-based fund Davidson Kempner Capital
Management, which owns about 60 Four Seasons homes, while others
include Aedifica, a Belgium-listed fund specialist, which owns
around eight but also has other care home investments in the UK,
the FT discloses.  Together the landlords earn around GBP10 million
a quarter or GBP3.375 million per month from Four Seasons,
according to the FT.


TAURUS UK 2019-2: DBRS Finalizes BB(low) Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized the following provisional ratings on
the notes issued by Taurus 2019-2 UK Designated Activity Company
(Taurus 2019-2 UK DAC; the Issuer):

-- Class A rated AAA (sf)
-- Class B rated AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C rated A (low) (sf)
-- Class D rated BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E rated BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Taurus 2019-2 UK DAC is a securitization of a 92.1% interest in a
GBP 418.1 million (63.9% loan-to-value or LTV) five-year senior
commercial real estate facility advanced by Bank of America Merrill
Lynch International DAC (BofA Merrill Lynch DAC) to refinance the
indebtedness of 126 urban logistic and multi-let industrial
properties in the United Kingdom, which are ultimately owned by
Blackstone Group Inc. (Blackstone).

The 126 assets securing the loan are held by three borrowers:
Treforest Trustee (Jersey) Limited, Sunflower UK Logistics Propco
S.a.r.l. and Sunflower Estate (GP) Limited. Additionally, Planeta
Industries S.A. has provided a co-terminus GBP 65.0 million
mezzanine term loan with an LTV of 73.9%. However, the mezzanine
loan is structurally and contractually subordinated to the senior
facility and is not part of the transaction.

Blackstone acquired the collateral for the loan from Brockton
Capital (Brockton) in August 2017 for a purchase price of
approximately GBP 560.0 million. It was subsequently securitized in
the DBRS-rated Taurus 2017-2 UK DAC transaction, which has
performed within DBRS’s expectations since issuance. Brockton
accumulated the assets by combining three portfolios it had
purchased between 2013 and 2015.

As of the 30 April 2019 cut-off date, the portfolio generated a
total of GBP 38.4 million gross rental incomes from 126 assets. The
portfolio's net rent (pre-rent free) is reported to be GBP 36.7
million, translating into a day-one debt-yield (DY) of
approximately 8.8%. As of the cut-off date, the senior loan’s
Issuer LTV was 63.9% while its market value (MV) was GBP 653.8
million.

Cushman & Wakefield (the valuer) valued the assets individually at
GBP 622.7 million (67.1% LTV) but applied a portfolio premium of
7.5% for a total value of GBP 669.5 million (62.4% LTV); however,
the Issuer has capped the premium at 5.0%, and accordingly valued
the portfolio at GBP 653.8 million (63.9% LTV). The only change in
the underlying collateral compared with the Taurus 2017-2 UK DAC
securitization was the sale of one asset, 30-64 Pennywell Road,
which is located in Bristol and had an MV of GBP 2.6 million.

The DBRS net cash flow (NCF) for the portfolio is GBP 29.0 million,
which represents a 20.9% haircut to the pre-rent-free net operating
income by the arranger. DBRS applied a blended capitalization rate
of 6.54% to the aggregate DBRS NCF to arrive at the DBRS stressed
value of GBP 443.7 million, which represents a 33.7% discount to
the MV of the portfolio provided by the valuer.

The loan carries a floating interest rate with a LIBOR benchmark
providing an interest rate coverage in the range of 2.0x at the
hedged rate and 2.5x at current LIBOR. The loan is 95.0% hedged
with a LIBOR interest cap with a strike rate of 1.75%. The cap is
provided by Bank of America N.A., London branch.

The CMBS transaction benefits from a liquidity facility provided by
Bank of America N.A., London branch that can be used to cover
interest shortfalls on the Class A and Class B notes. The initial
liquidity facility commitment amount is GBP 8.0 million and equals
3.6% of the total outstanding balance of the covered notes.
According to DBRS's analysis, the commitment amount is the
equivalent to approximately 12.6 months and 6.4 months of coverage
on the covered notes based on the cap rate of 1.75% and the LIBOR
notes cap of 5.0% after loan maturity, respectively.

In addition to the liquidity reserve, the transaction also features
a GBP 50,000 Issuer reserve to cover the Issuer's senior expenses.

The Class E notes are subject to an available funds cap where the
shortfall is attributable to interest due on the loan not being
sufficient to pay senior costs and interest due on the notes.

The loan's expected maturity is on 15 November 2021. However, the
borrower can exercise three one-year extension options provided
that the following conditions have been met: (1) there is no
payment default and (2) the transaction is compliant with the
required hedging conditions. The loan's final maturity date is on
or before 15 November 2024. A special servicing transfer event will
occur should the loan fail to be repaid by its maturity. The
transaction has a five-year tail period to allow the special
servicer to work out the loan by November 2029 at the latest, which
is the legal final maturity of the notes.

The transaction includes a Class X diversion trigger event, meaning
that if the Class X diversion triggers — set at 6.75% for DY and
78.9% for LTV — were breached, any interest and prepayment fees
due to the Class X noteholders will instead be paid directly to the
Issuer transaction account and credited to the Class X diversion
ledger. However, such funds can potentially be used to amortize the
notes only following a sequential payment trigger event or the
delivery of a note acceleration notice.

BofA Merrill Lynch DAC sold 92.1% of the senior facilities to the
Issuer and retains an ongoing material economic interest of no less
than 5.0% to maintain compliance with applicable regulatory
requirements.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.


THOMAS COOK: Charity at Risk of Closure Following Collapse
----------------------------------------------------------
Michael O'Dwyer at The Telegraph reports that a charity bankrolled
by Thomas Cook is set to close unless its trustees can pull off an
unlikely rescue plan.

According to The Telegraph, sources said the Thomas Cook Children's
Charity has been pushed to the brink by the collapse of the
178-year-old travel company.

Although existing funds are not affected by the firm's failure, the
organisation raised money primarily through Thomas Cook -- and
insiders say it is hard to see a future without that support, The
Telegraph states.

The charity is a separate entity from the Thomas Cook commercial
group and is not part of the liquidation process, The Telegraph
notes.  It raised GBP1.1 million in 2017, The Telegraph relays,
citing the most recently filed accounts.

                    About Thomas Cook Group

Thomas Cook Group Plc is the ultimate holding company of direct and
indirect subsidiaries, which operate the Thomas Cook leisure travel
business around the world.  TCG was formed in 2007 following the
merger between Thomas Cook AG and MyTravel Group plc.
Headquartered in London, the Group's key markets are the UK,
Germany and Northern Europe.  The Group serves 22 million customers
each year.

The Group operates from 16 countries, with a combined fleet of over
100 aircraft through five entities holding air operator
certificates in the UK, Germany, Denmark and Spain.  The Group has
2,800 owned and franchised retail outlets (including 555 shops in
the UK) and operates 199 own-brand hotels across the world.

As of Dec. 31, 2018, the Group had 21,263 employees, including
9,000 in the U.S.

The travel agent originally proposed a restructuring.  It was
scheduled to ask creditors Sept. 27, 2019, for approval of a scheme
of arrangement that involves (a) substantially deleveraging the
Group by converting GBP1.67 billion of RCF and Notes debt currently
outstanding into new shares (15%) and a subordinated PIK note (at
least GBP81 million) to be issued by the recapitalized Group in
proportions still to be agreed; and (b) the transfer of at least a
75% interest in the Group Tour Operator and an interest of up to
25% in the Group Airline to Chinese investor Fosun Tourism Group.

Representatives of the company filed a Chapter 15 petition in New
York on Sept. 16, 2019, to seek U.S. recognition of the UK
proceedings as foreign main proceeding.  The Chapter 15 case is In
re Thomas Cook Group Plc (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 19-12984).
Latham & Watkins, LLP is the counsel.

But after last-ditch rescue talks failed, on Sept. 23, 2019, Thomas
Cook UK Plc and associated UK entities announced that they have
entered Compulsory Liquidation and are now under the control of the
Official receiver.  The UK business has ceased trading with
immediate effect and all future flights and holidays are cancelled.
All holidays and flights provided by Thomas Cook Airlines have
been cancelled and are no longer operating.  All Thomas Cook's
retail shops have also closed. Restructuring specialist
AlixPartners was appointed to manage the process,
subject to the approval of the court.

Separate from the parent company, Thomas Cook's Indian, Chinese,
German and Nordic subsidiaries will continue to trade as normal.


THOMAS COOK: Lobbies Against Levy to Cover Repatriation Costs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Oliver Gill at The Telegraph reports that Thomas Cook lobbied
against a levy to cover repatriation costs when airlines go bust,
arguing that insolvencies were "incredibly rare" -- just months
before the firm itself collapsed.

As rules were reviewed in the wake of Monarch's collapse, Thomas
Cook said it was strongly against proposals for a 50p charge on
passengers to pay for bringing customers stuck abroad home, The
Telegraph relates.

Airlines should not be "singled out", the 178-year-old company told
the Airlines Insolvency Review in June 2018, The Telegraph
discloses.

"The insolvency of airlines is a far less common occurrence than in
other sectors," The Telegraph quotes Thomas Cook as saying.

                    About Thomas Cook Group

Thomas Cook Group Plc is the ultimate holding company of direct and
indirect subsidiaries, which operate the Thomas Cook leisure travel
business around the world.  TCG was formed in 2007
following the merger between Thomas Cook AG and MyTravel Group plc.
Headquartered in London, the Group's key markets are the UK,
Germany and Northern Europe.  The Group serves 22 million
customers each year.

The Group operates from 16 countries, with a combined fleet of over
100 aircraft through five entities holding air operator
certificates in the UK, Germany, Denmark and Spain.  The Group has
2,800 owned and franchised retail outlets (including 555 shops in
the UK) and operates 199 own-brand hotels across the world.

As of Dec. 31, 2018, the Group had 21,263 employees, including
9,000 in the U.S.

The travel agent originally proposed a restructuring.  It was
scheduled to ask creditors Sept. 27, 2019, for approval of a scheme
of arrangement that involves (a) substantially deleveraging the
Group by converting GBP1.67 billion of RCF and Notes debt currently
outstanding into new shares (15%) and a subordinated PIK note (at
least GBP81 million) to be issued by the recapitalized Group in
proportions still to be agreed; and (b) the transfer of at least a
75% interest in the Group Tour Operator and an interest of up to
25% in the Group Airline to Chinese investor Fosun Tourism Group.

Representatives of the company filed a Chapter 15 petition in New
York on Sept. 16, 2019, to seek U.S. recognition of the UK
proceedings as foreign main proceeding.  The Chapter 15 case is In
re Thomas Cook Group Plc (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 19-12984).
Latham & Watkins, LLP is the counsel.

But after last-ditch rescue talks failed, on Sept. 23, 2019, Thomas
Cook UK Plc and associated UK entities announced that they have
entered Compulsory Liquidation and are now under the control
of the Official receiver.  The UK business has ceased trading with
immediate effect and all future flights and holidays are cancelled.
All holidays and flights provided by Thomas Cook
Airlines have been cancelled and are no longer operating.  All
Thomas Cook's retail shops have also closed.  Restructuring
specialist AlixPartners was appointed to manage the process,
subject to the approval of the court.

Separate from the parent company, Thomas Cook's Indian, Chinese,
German and Nordic subsidiaries will continue to trade as normal.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Mentor X
-------------------------
Mentor X
The Life-Changing Power of Extraordinary Mentors

Author:  Stephanie Wickouski
Publisher:  Beard Books
Hard cover: 156 pages
ISBN: 978-1-58798-700-7
List Price:  $24.75

Long-time bankruptcy lawyer Stephanie Wickouski at Bryan Cave
Leighton Paisner impressively tackles a soft problem of modern
professionals in an era of hard data and scientific intervention in
her third published book entitled Mentor X. In an age where
employee productivity is measured by artificial intelligence and
resumes are pre-screened by computers, Stephanie Wickouski adds
spirit and humanity to the professional journey.

The title is disarmingly deceptive and book browsers could be
excused for assuming this work is just another in a long line of
homogeneous efforts on mentorship. Don't be fooled; Mentor X is
practical, articulate and lively. Most refreshingly, the book
acknowledges the most important element of human development: our
intuition.

Mrs. Wickouski starts by describing what a mentor is and
distinguishes that role from a teacher, coach, role model, buddy,
or boss. Younger professionals may be skeptical of the need for a
mentor, but Mrs. Wickouski deftly disabuses that notion by relating
how a mentor may do nothing less than change the course of a
protege's life. Newbies to this genre need little convincing
afterwards.

One of the book's worthiest contributions is a definition of mentor
that will surprise most readers. Mentors are not teachers, the
latter of which impart practical knowledge. Instead, according to
Mrs. Wickouski, her mentors "showed me secrets that I could learn
nowhere else. They showed me how doors are opened. They showed me
how to be an agent of change and advance innovative and
controversial ideas." What ambitious professional doesn't want more
of that in their life?

The practicality of the book continues as Mrs. Wickouski outlines
the qualities to look for in a mentor and classifies the various
types of mentors, including bold mentors, charismatic mentors, cold
and distant mentors, dissolute mentors, personally bonded mentors,
younger mentors, and unexpected mentors. Mentor X includes charts
and workbooks which aid the reader in getting the most out of a
mentor relationship. In a later chapter, Mrs. Wickouski provides an
enormously helpful suggestion about adopting a mentor: keep an open
mind. Often, mentors will come in packages that differ from our
expectations. They may be outside of our profession, younger, less
educated, etc. . . but the world works in mysterious ways and Mrs
Wickouski encourages readers to think about mentors broadly.

In this modern era of heightened workplace ethics, Mrs. Wickouski
articulates the dark side of mentors. She warns about "dementors"
and "tormentors" -- false mentors providing dubious and sometimes
self destructive advice, and those who abuse a mentor relationship
to further self-interested, malign ends, respectively. She
describes other mentor dysfunctions, namely boundary-crossing,
rivalry, corruption, and a few others. When a mentor manifests such
behaviors, Mrs. Wickouski counsels it's time to end the
relationship.

Mrs. Wickouski tells readers how to discern when the mentor
relationship is changing and when it is effectively over. Those
changes can be precipitated by romantic boundaries crossed,
emergence of rivalrous sentiment, or encouragement of unethical
behavior or corruption. Mrs. Wickouski aptly notes that once
insidious energies emerge, the mentorship is effectively over.

At this point, certain readers may say to themselves, "Okay, I've
got it. Now I can move on." Or, "My workplace has a formal
mentorship program. I don't need this book anymore." Or even,
"Can't modern technology handle my mentor needs, a Tinder of
mentorship, so to speak?"

Mrs. Wickouski refutes that notion. She analyzes how many mentoring
programs miss the mark. In one of the best passages in the book,
Mrs. Wickouski writes, "Assigning or brokering mentors negates the
most critical components of a true mentor–protege relationship:
the individual process of self-awareness which leads a person to
recognize another individual who will give the advice singularly
needed. That very process is undermined by having a mentor assigned
or by going to a mentoring party." She does not just criticize; she
offers a solution with three valuable tips for choosing the right
mentor and five qualities to ascertain a true mentor in the
unlimited sea of possibilities.

Next, Mrs. Wickouski distinguishes between good advice and bad
advice. She punctuates that discussion with many relevant and
relatable examples that are easy to read and colorfully enjoyable.
This section includes interviews with proteges who have had
successful mentorships. The punchline: in the best mentorships, the
parties harmoniously share personal beliefs and values. Also
important, the protege draws inspiration and motivation from the
mentor. The book winds down as usefully as it started: Mrs.
Wickouski interviews proteges, asking them what they would have
done differently with their mentors if they could turn back the
clock. A common thread seems to be that the proteges would have
gone deeper with their mentors -- they would have asked more
questions, spent more time, delved into their mentors' thinking in
greater depth.

The book wraps up lightly by sharing useful and practical
suggestions for maintenance of the mentor relationship. She answers
questions such as, "Do I invite my mentor to my wedding?" and "Who
pays for lunch?"

Mentor X is an enjoyable read and a useful book for any
professional in any industry at, frankly, any point in time.
Advanced individuals will learn much from the other side, i.e., how
to be more effective mentors. Mrs. Wickouski does a wonderful job
of encouraging use of that all-knowing aspect of human existence
which never fails us: proper use of our intuition.

Stephanie Wickouski is widely regarded as an innovator and
strategic advisor. A nationally recognized lawyer, she has been
named as one of the 12 Outstanding Restructuring Lawyers in the US
by Turnarounds & Workouts and as one of US News' Best Lawyers in
America. She is the author of two other books: Indenture Trustee
Bankruptcy Powers & Duties, an essential guide to the legal role of
the bond trustee, and Bankruptcy Crimes, an authoritative resource
on bankruptcy fraud. She also writes the Corporate Restructuring
blog.

This book may be ordered by calling 888-563-4573 or by visiting
www.beardbooks.com or through your favorite Internet or local
bookseller.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                * * * End of Transmission * * *