/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/040123.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                   L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Friday, January 23, 2004, Vol. 5, Issue 16

                          Headlines


A R G E N T I N A

AGUAS ARGENTINAS: Government Demands Boost in Capital Expansion
CTI MOVIL: Signs Accord With Finland's Nokia
EL PAZ: Court Approves Reorganization Petition
EMED: Reorganization Process Initiated
METROGAS: Extends Debt Offer Terms to February 10

PARMALAT ARGENTINA: Seeks To Revise Loan Payment Schedules
TELECOM ARGENTINA: Fitch Issues Comment on Debt Restructuring
TGS: Moving to Increase Pipeline Capacity
TRANSENER: Dolphin Fund Wants Full Participation
TRANSPORTE TRASA: Court Declares Company Bankrupt


B E R M U D A

LORAL SPACE: To Initiate Limited Service On Satellite In March


B O L I V I A

* Bolivia - Releases IMF Statement at Donors' Meeting


B R A Z I L

BANCO SANTOS: S&P Downgrades Ratings to 'B'; Outlook Negative
PARMALAT BRASIL: FIDC Unattached to Parmalat SpA
PARMALAT BRASIL: Unibanco Exposure Totals BRL20 Mln
PARMALAT BRASIL: Committee To Begin Research Probe Today


C H I L E

COCA-COLA EMBONOR: Fitch Affirms 'BBB-' International Rating


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

* IMF Welcomes Monetary Policy Action in the Dominican Republic


E C U A D O R

ANDINATEL/PACIFICTEL: One Bidder Left in Contracts Tender


J A M A I C A

KAISER ALUMINUM: To Sell Alpart Interests in Jamaica


M E X I C O

DESC: Fitch Assigns `B+' Senior Secured Rating
GRUPO TMM: Details Related Issues to VAT Certificate
INDUSTRIAS UNIDAS: S&P Rates Proposed $175M Notes 'B+'
MEXICANA: Strikes Codeshare Agreement With American Airlines
TFM: KCS Releases TFM Details of 1997 Tax Audit Summary

XIGNUX: Moody's Cuts Debt Ratings


T R I N I D A D   &   T O B A G O

BWIA: TTSE Rejects Request For Share Suspension


U R U G U A Y

PARMALAT URUGUAY: Seeks to Reschedule Bank Loan Payments


     - - - - - - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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AGUAS ARGENTINAS: Government Demands Boost in Capital Expansion
---------------------------------------------------------------
Argentina's President Nestor Kirchner told local water utility
Aguas Argentinas to increase its investments, otherwise, the
government would react, relates Dow Jones.

"Unfortunately, the water service has been privatized, but if
they want to conserve it (the privatization), let them invest
and, if not, we'll start talking to them in a different way," Mr.
Kirchner said.

No company "can be placing conditions during any negotiation on
the provision of such a fundamental good as water and the
government knows on what side it has to be: not one foot here and
the other there, but two feet on the side of the people," the
President added.

Last month, Kirchner's government demanded that Aguas Argentinas,
which is owned by French giant Suez SA (SZE), present a formal
plan of investments for 2004.

According to local press reports, Aguas Argentinas had been told
to invest ARS100 million ($1=ARS2.89) in 2004 or the government
will cancel its concession contract, but the company later denied
that.

Aguas Argentinas has also been handed some ARS10.7 million in
fines in recent months because of a range of service problems
over the past couple of years.


CTI MOVIL: Signs Accord With Finland's Nokia
--------------------------------------------
Finnish cellular telecommunications equipment manufacturer Nokia
signed a contract to set up a telecommunications network for
Argentine wireless telecommunications firm CTI Movil, Argentine
daily La Nacion reveals. Financial details of the deal were not
provided.

CTI, a unit of Mexican America Movil, recently obtained approval
from the court for its out-of-court debt agreement (APE). As a
result, the accord subscribed between CTI and the majority of the
holders of a US$262.8-million bond issue will be mandatory to all
of the holders of these notes.

CTI offered to repurchase debt for cash at 13% of face value,
price that grew to 14.1% adding certain due interest payments.
Even though this was an aggressive offer, it was accepted by
almost 99% of the bondholders. Through this process, the Company
managed to reduce its debt by US$263 million paying only US$37
million.


EL PAZ: Court Approves Reorganization Petition
----------------------------------------------
Court No. 1 of the Civil and Commercial Tribunal of Necochea in
Argentina approved a motion for "Concurso Preventivo" filed by
local company El Paz S.A., reports local news portal Infobae. The
court assigned local accountant Armando Antonelli as the
Company's receiver.

The credit verification period ends on April 30 this year.
Creditors must present their claims to the Company's receiver
before the said date. The receiver will prepare the individual
and general reports, which contain the results of the
verification process.

The informative assembly, which is one of the last parts of a
reorganization process, will be on December 12 this year.

CONTACT:  El Paz S.A.
          Calle 517 No. 2851
          Necochea

          Armando Antonelli
          Calle 57 No. 3028
          Necochea


EMED: Reorganization Process Initiated
--------------------------------------
EMED Emergiencias Medicas S.R.L. will undergo reorganization with
Mr. Jose Ignacio Lluna as receiver. Argentine news source Infobae
indicates that Court No. 1 of the Civil and Commercial Tribunal
of Necochea approved the Company's motion for "Concurso
Preventivo".

Creditors are required to file their claims before March 3 this
year. The Company's receiver will examine the claims and prepare
the individual and general reports. The source, however, did not
mention whether the court has set the deadlines for the filing of
these reports.

The informative assembly will be held on September 8 this year.
This is one of the last parts of the reorganization process.

CONTACT:  E.M.E.D. Emergencias Medicas S.R.L.
          Calle 69 No. 836
          Necochea

          Jose Ignacio Lluna
          Calle 56 Nro. 2863
          Necochea


METROGAS: Extends Debt Offer Terms to February 10
-------------------------------------------------
Argentine natural gas distributor Metrogas SA (METR.BA) (NYSE:
MGS) informed the Buenos Aires stock exchange that it has again
moved the deadline forward for its offer to clean up about US$440
million in debt. The offer, in the form of an out-of-court
settlement known as an APE by its Spanish acronym, was scheduled
to expire on Jan. 20. However, the said deadline failed to see
the required approval to go to the courts prompting Metrogas to
extend it to Feb. 10.

As of Jan. 20, creditors representing about US$101.6 million, or
23% of the debt burden, had signed on to the proposal. The figure
is higher than the US$100.5 million the Company reported as of
Dec. 22 but far from the two-thirds needed to go to the courts.

The Company is offering to buy back up to US$100 million of its
debts at face value. Creditors can also swap their debt for new
notes coming due in nine years that pay 3% interest for the first
two years, 4% for the next two years, 5% for the following two
years and 6% for the remaining years.

The recent extension is the third since the Company launched a
proposal with new repayment terms on Nov. 7.


PARMALAT ARGENTINA: Seeks To Revise Loan Payment Schedules
----------------------------------------------------------
Parmalat Argentina S.A. seeks to reschedule loan payments with
banks, Bloomberg News reports, citing a company statement. The
move comes after its Italian parent Parmalat Finanziaria S.p.A.
filed for bankruptcy protection after revealing a multibillion-
dollar gap in its finances.

"With respect to the financial situation of the local unit, we've
already started contact with creditor banks for renegotiation of
the most immediate obligations," Bloomberg quoted the Company's
statement as saying.

Eliana Hansen, the Argentine unit's spokesperson declined to
reveal more details.


TELECOM ARGENTINA: Fitch Issues Comment on Debt Restructuring
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings views Telecom Argentina Stet-France Telecom S.A.'s
(Telecom) recently announced plan as a concrete step towards the
completion of its debt restructuring. On Jan. 9 2004, Telecom
announced a proposal to restructure all of its outstanding
unsecured debt, totaling $2.6 billion, under the framework of an
Acuerdo Preventivo Extrajucial (APE). The APE is an out of court
restructuring agreement governed by Argentine law that requires a
minimum participation by two-thirds of a company's creditors. In
addition, Telecom's wireless subsidiary Telecom Personal S.A.
(Telecom Personal) announced a proposal to restructure all of its
unsecured debt, totaling $590 million.

Successful completion of its debt restructuring under the current
terms would significantly improve the credit quality of Telecom
as it would reduce debt levels and lengthen maturities. Under the
terms of the proposal, Telecom's consolidated debt levels after
the restructuring would decline to $1.8 billion from $3.2
billion. These debt levels should be manageable because Telecom
is expected to continue to generating annual EBITDA of
approximately $600 million.

Under the proposal, noteholders who participate in the
restructuring will be offered three options to exchange their
notes. For each $1,058 of principal (including the capitalization
of accrued but unpaid interest expense), each noteholder would
receive either: a) a combination of $169 principal amount of 4-
year floating notes due 2008, $730 principal amount of 10-year
step up notes due 2014, and $159 principal amount of paid-in-kind
notes due 2017; b) a combination of $541 principal amount of 5-
year fixed rate notes due 2009 and a cash payment of $338; or c)
a cash payment of between 65% and 75% of $1,058 to be determined
under a 'modified Dutch auction' process.

Each of the three options offered under the APE will be subject
to specific limits. Completion of the APE under the current terms
will require Telecom to use $700 million of cash ($601 million
under options b and c, $55 million for unpaid interest accrued
between December 2003 and June 2004, and $25 million for
restructuring fees). At September 2003, Telecom had $652 million
of cash balances.

Telecom Argentina defaulted on its debt in the first half of
2002. The company restructured a small portion of its defaulted
debt on June 2, 2003 by repurchasing notes with cash at a 45%
discount. This transaction reduced debt levels by $289 million
($209 million held by Telecom and $80 million by Telecom
Personal).

Fitch currently maintains international scale debt ratings of
'DD' for Telecom. Fitch will continue to monitor progress of the
restructuring and its ultimate impact on the credit quality of
Telecom.

Telecom is one of the largest diversified telecommunication
providers, offering fixed-line, wireless, internet and data
services. At September 2003, the company had 3.6 million fixed-
lines in service (a 45% market share), 2.4 million wireless
subscribers and 194,000 internet users.

CONTACT:  Fitch Ratings
          Guido Chamorro
          Chicago
          Phone: 312-368-5473

          Dolores Teran
          Buenos Aires
          Phone: 4327-2444

          Media Relations:
          James Jockle
          New York
          Phone: 212-908-0547


TGS: Moving to Increase Pipeline Capacity
-----------------------------------------
Argentine gas transporter TGS will expand the capacity of its
940km Gasoducto Cordillerano pipeline by 11.8% to 1.3 million
cubic meters of natural gas a day (mcm/d), says local newspaper
El Cronista. The project, which awaits President Nestor
Kirchner's approval by supreme decree, will require an investment
of ARS22 million (US$7.56mn). However, the utility need not worry
about where to get funds as the government will finance 100% of
the project as repayment for a ARS22-million debt with TGS.

President Kirchner is expected to sign the supreme decree "in the
next few days," a TGS spokesperson said.

Workers hired by TGS and its suppliers will start work on the
expansion "immediately" after the decree is published and
construction should take five months, ready for the increased gas
demand during the winter.


TRANSENER: Dolphin Fund Wants Full Participation
------------------------------------------------
Argentine investment fund, Dolphin Fund, is looking to take full
control of the Transaner. The fund recently became a minority
owner in local electricity company Transener.

Dolphin Fund recently completed the acquisition of a 7.14% stake
in Citelec, owner of Transener, from a private equity fund called
The Argentine Investment Company (Taico) in a US$4-million deal.

Transener is Argentina's leading transporter of high voltage
electricity. Its two largest shareholders are Argentine energy
company Petrobras Energia SA and Britain's National Grid Transco
PLC. Unnamed sources say the two shareholders are interested in
divesting their Transener holdings.

Transener is battling with debts totaling US$250 million.


TRANSPORTE TRASA: Court Declares Company Bankrupt
-------------------------------------------------
Transporte Trasa S.R.L. entered bankruptcy on orders from the
Civil and Commercial Tribunal of Salta in Argentina. Court No. 2
handles the Company's case, reports Infobae.

The Company's receiver, Estudio F.C.F. y Asociados, will examine
and authenticate creditors' claims until February 6 this year.
The individual reports are due at the court on March 24, followed
by the general report on May 10. The individual reports contain
the results of the verification process, while the general report
is a consolidation of the individual reports.

The Company's assets will be liquidated at the end of the
bankruptcy process to repay its creditors. Payments will be based
on the results of the verification process.

CONTACT:  Transporte Trasa S.R.L.
          Ave V Zambrano 120
          Salta

          Estudio F.C.F. y Asociados
          20 de Febrero 631
          Salta



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B E R M U D A
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LORAL SPACE: To Initiate Limited Service On Satellite In March
--------------------------------------------------------------
Loral Space & Communications (OTCBB: LRLSQ) will begin limited
service on its Telstar 14/Estrela do Sul 1 satellite in March. As
previously reported, the Telstar 14/Estrela do Sul 1
communications satellite fully deployed its South solar array but
only partially deployed its North solar array. An investigation
into the cause of the anomaly and the implementation of any
corrective actions is ongoing.

Space Systems/Loral, the manufacturer of the satellite, is
raising the satellite to geostationary orbit. Telstar 14/Estrela
do Sul is generating enough power to operate a minimum of 17 Ku-
band transponders, making it capable of meeting immediate
customer requirements, as well as Brazilian government
requirements.

The satellite, to be operated by Loral Skynet do Brasil at 63
degrees West longitude, was sent into space on January 10, 2004
on a Boeing Sea Launch Zenit-3SL rocket from the Odyssey Launch
Platform, positioned on the equator in the Pacific Ocean. It is
insured for partial and total losses up to a maximum of $250
million.

Loral Space & Communications is a satellite communications
company. It owns and operates a global fleet of
telecommunications satellites used by television and cable
networks to broadcast video entertainment programming, and by
communication service providers, resellers, corporate and
government customers for broadband data transmission, Internet
services and other value-added communications services. Loral
also is a world-class leader in the design and manufacture of
satellites and satellite systems for commercial and government
applications including direct-to-home television, broadband
communications, wireless telephony, weather monitoring and air
traffic management.

CONTACT:  Jeanette Clonan
          John McCarthy
          (212) 697-1105
          Web site: www.loral.com



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B O L I V I A
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* Bolivia - Releases IMF Statement at Donors' Meeting
-----------------------------------------------------
Anoop Singh
Director, Western Hemisphere Department
Washington, D.C.

Introduction

1. The IMF welcomes very much this first meeting of the Bolivia
Support Group. Against the background of recent political and
economic instability in Bolivia, and the continuing risks in
these areas, this group has the urgent task of providing timely
and appropriate international support for the authorities'
efforts to stabilize the economic and financial situation in
Bolivia and pave the way for sustained growth with reduced
poverty.

2. The challenges are compelling. Bolivia is the poorest country
in South America, with real GDP per capita having fallen over the
past five years. Social indicators regressed over this period.
Bolivia's poverty rate of almost two-thirds remains the highest
in South America, with more than a third of the population in
extreme poverty, especially the sizable indigenous population.
Open unemployment has been rising and about half the labor force
is under-employed.

3. Both external and domestic factors explain Bolivia's
deterioration following the period of economic reforms and
recovery in the early 1990s. A succession of external shocks in
recent years combined with persisting macroeconomic
vulnerabilities and stalled reforms to produce a vicious circle
of economic decline, rising social discontent, reform fatigue,
and political fragmentation.

4. Bolivia's new government is now trying to reverse these
trends. It needs to succeed for the sake of the Bolivian
population and also for the sake of regional stability. Reversing
the economic and social trends, and establishing a new basis for
growth and equity will take time. International support will be
crucial for this process to take hold.

Experience in 2003

5. Let me begin by briefly recalling the events of 2003. Bolivia
faced social and political instability in February as well as,
more recently, in October. Despite these systemic events, the
authorities acted quickly on both occasions to restore financial
stability, helped by international support. In particular, the
IMF's Stand-By Arrangement of March 2003 has provided a framework
for macroeconomic stabilization, continuing reforms, and
international support.

6. Thus, despite the political and social setbacks, the
authorities were able to make significant progress in key
economic areas. Two important reform measures were passed: a new
tax code and a new law for corporate restructuring. More
recently, the authorities acted quickly to resolve insolvencies
in two banks, succeeding in restoring financial stability.
However, fiscal pressures increased during the year, especially
in the wake of the October unrest, and the fiscal deficit rose
significantly above the program target to 8 percent of GDP.
Nevertheless, helped by international support, macroeconomic
stability has been broadly maintained-with inflation still in the
low single-digit range-and growth remained positive for the year
as a whole (although, at 2« percent, below the program target).

7. However, there were important costs from the events of 2003.
Fiscal distortions and pressures have increased, necessitating
recourse to central bank financing. The banking system remains
vulnerable. Delays associated with public opposition to a project
to build an LNG pipeline to export to the U.S. market has
resulted in the loss of this prospect-as the buyer has entered
into a long-term contract with another country-and Bolivia will
need to find new markets for its abundant natural gas reserves to
assure medium-term viability.

The Government's Objectives and Strategy for 2004

8. Fund staff is now discussing with the Bolivian authorities the
policies and objectives for 2004 that could be supported by an
extension of the SBA through September 2004. The extension of the
SBA is intended to provide a framework to catalyze urgent
external assistance, while giving the authorities time to develop
a full set of medium-term policies that could be supported by a
new three-year PRGF arrangement-whose timeframe, structure, and
concessionality are better suited to addressing Bolivia's needs.

9. The key goals for 2004 include further progress toward fiscal
consolidation at a pace calibrated to take account of the serious
political constraints on the government while giving increased
priority to pro-poor spending; further progress toward corporate
restructuring; and establishing a viable framework for the
exploitation of Bolivia's hydrocarbon resources.

Macroeconomic Policies

10. The fiscal program for 2004 aims at lowering the fiscal
deficit to below 7 percent of GDP-current projections are based
on a deficit of 6 3/4 percent of GDP. The authorities recognize
the need to raise the fiscal effort in a carefully sequenced way.
Revenues in 2004 will benefit from the full-year effects of
legislation approved in late 2003, including the new tax code and
law 843 (which expanded the tax base of hydrocarbon products),
and the tax regularization scheme. In addition, the authorities
will seek approval of revisions to the hydrocarbons' law aimed at
addressing social concerns about the appropriate level of
taxation of oil and gas production, while maintaining Bolivia as
an attractive environment for foreign investors. The program also
builds in phased increases in excise taxes and increased taxation
of the wealthy, with some measures expected to take place in the
weeks ahead.

11. On the spending side, the 2004 program aims at increasing
pro-poor spending by at least 0.6 percent of GDP to about 12_
percent of GDP, while containing nonpoverty-related spending. It
will be particularly important to improve the prioritization and
effectiveness of public spending, given that expenditure levels
are already high compared with other PRGF-eligible countries. In
this context, the authorities intend to appoint a commission to
conduct a comprehensive review of expenditures to improve their
poverty orientation. Efforts to reduce spending in 2004 would
include a temporary wage freeze in the civil service; improved
targeting of subsidies; and a major reprioritization of public
programs. Reductions in overall spending, however, would be
difficult to accomplish because of increases in some components,
including: (i) interest payments, owing to the high domestic
financing in 2003; (ii) local government spending as
implementation capacity improves; and (iii) pension payments, as
remaining eligible pensioners are incorporated into the system.
As such, despite the planned economies, total spending is
projected to remain at about 33 percent of GDP in 2004. Financing
of the deficit is discussed below.

12. The authorities are committed to prudent monetary and
exchange rate policies. Monetary policy will continue to be
geared to ensuring low inflation, while rebuilding international
reserves and supporting a continued return of confidence in the
banking system. The authorities are confident of maintaining
competitiveness in the context of Bolivia's crawling peg regime.

Financial and Corporate Policies

13. In coordination with the World Bank, the IDB, and the CAF, as
well as the Fund, the Bolivian authorities are developing a
strategy to address corporate and financial balance sheet
problems, while avoiding public bailouts of shareholders or
unviable institutions. In this connection, a new decree is
expected to be issued in the weeks ahead, formally creating a
fund which will strengthen the solvency of the financial system
by assisting banks in merger or acquisition operations, as well
as in debt-workout processes. The authorities anticipate applying
the new corporate workout framework in a number of key cases.

Exploitation of Natural Gas Reserves

14. Against the background of the setback on the LNG pipeline,
the authorities are developing an alternative strategy to develop
Bolivia's rich hydrocarbon reserves. Following the revisions to
the hydrocarbons' law that the government intends to submit to
Congress in the weeks ahead, a referendum on gas exports is
expected to be held by end-March. Discussions are also underway
with a number of other potential buyers on the possibility of
alternative energy projects.

Financing Requirements in 2004 and Debt Sustainability

15. Based on the fiscal framework outlined above, and after
exhausting available non-inflationary sources of domestic
financing, Bolivia faces a net external budgetary financing need
of at least US$462 million, above that of 2003 (see attached
Table 1). This estimate assumes upfront implementation of revenue
measures and, for that reason, should be regarded as a minimum
estimate, given the risks that the authorities are weighing
before deciding on the precise sequencing of the implementation
of the revenue measures. Given scheduled amortization of US$222
million, our best estimate of required gross disbursements in
2004 is, therefore, at least US$684 million. Of this amount,
about US$579 million has already been identified, leaving a
minimum of US$105 million still to be secured. Needless to say,
given Bolivia's debt situation, the remaining financing need
should be met as far as possible on highly concessional terms,
preferably in the form of grants.

16. The importance of increased levels of grant financing is
underlined by Bolivia's highly indebted situation and the
prospects for achieving medium-term sustainability. Against the
background of recent setbacks, these prospects will depend
critically on Bolivia putting together a strong domestic
consensus to exploit its abundant gas reserves, as well as
finding alternative markets for such exports.

17. At this stage, we have revised our medium-term projections
based on a cautious assumption on the likely scale of such gas
exports. On this preliminary basis, Bolivia's public debt is
projected to increase further in net present value terms from
48.4 percent of GDP at end-2003 to almost 55 percent of GDP by
2008, before beginning to decline steadily over the medium term
to below 50 percent of GDP by 2015. The results are highly
dependent on three critical assumptions: (i) a steady reduction
of the fiscal deficit to 4 percent of GDP by 2007 (in part
through the implementation of an expenditure reform, starting in
2005) and to about 1-2 percent in the outer years of the
projection; (ii) financing the bulk of the fiscal deficit with
highly concessional resources; and (iii) implementing energy
projects that generate additional fiscal revenues of about 1
percent of GDP by 2008.

Program Risks

18. Before closing, let me discuss briefly a number of
significant risks to the program mainly associated with the
highly fragile social and political conditions. In particular,

- High expectations on the part of large segments of the
population for rapid progress in addressing social grievances and
turning around the economy may easily be disappointed in a
context of significant financial constraints.

- Moreover, the authorities' limited political support in
congress could complicate the implementation of the reform
agenda.

- There are also risks associated with the exploitation of
Bolivia's hydrocarbon resources, which is critical for medium-
term viability. A negative outcome of the referendum on gas
exports cannot be ruled out. Moreover, even with a positive
outcome, having lost the California market, the authorities will
face significant challenges to create the conditions for large
energy projects to be implemented in the next few years.

19. Addressing these risks will require that the government reach
out to the Bolivian people through a process of national dialogue
to explain their program, including the importance of fiscal
discipline and the efficient exploitation of the country's
natural resources to pave the way for a sustained revival of the
economy. It will also be important for the government to
intensify its efforts to strengthen social safety nets and to
prioritize pro-poor spending. The provision of external financing
that would provide room for the government to carefully phase in
adjustment measures would also reduce the political risks
associated with the program.

Concluding Remarks

20. The Fund remains committed to working with the Bolivian
authorities and international donor community to put in place a
program that would ensure fiscal sustainability, growth, and
poverty reduction. The Bolivian authorities are making their best
efforts to implement an ambitious program in a very difficult
political environment. Strong support by donors is urgently
required to support such a program. At a minimum, US$105 million
is required to meet financing needs in 2004, and a higher amount
would provide some necessary latitude for the authorities to
phase the adjustment in more gradually, thus reducing risks.
Based on sufficient indications of financing forthcoming at
today's meeting and good progress in implementing the necessary
measures, the Fund would be able to complete the next review and
program extension and augmentation by end-February.

CONTACT: IMF EXTERNAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
          Public Affairs:
          Phone: 202-623-7300
          Fax: 202-623-6278

          Media Relations:
          Phone: 202-623-7100
          Fax: 202-623-6772



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BANCO SANTOS: S&P Downgrades Ratings to 'B'; Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered the foreign currency
long-term credit rating on Banco Santos S.A. to 'B' from 'B+'.
The outlook remains negative. The downgrade of Banco Santos'
rating reflects the worsening in the quality of the loan
portfolio, marked by significant (though gradually reducing)
concentration and its track record of unstable earnings
generation, mainly due to the bank's nonrecurring gains. Although
some specific losses have been mitigated by direct or indirect
shareholder support, the bank's need to rely on such support is a
negative factor. The outlook remains negative, incorporating the
risks associated with its partial dependence on results from
treasury operations and a further deterioration in asset quality.

The credit quality of Banco Santos' portfolio, of loans mainly to
middle market companies, deteriorated substantially until
September 2003. The transition from lower to higher risk
classifications (credits classified as C, D, and E--as per local
regulations) was more intense in 2003. Credits classified as D to
H, for instance, went up by 155% when compared with December
2002. The nonperforming loans (NPL) ratio based on loans
classified from E to H reached 5.9% in September 2003 (from 3.6%
in 2002 and 0.2% in December 2001). Banco Santos reacted to this
deterioration by securitizing Brazilian real (BrR) 120 million of
problem loans in the fourth quarter of 2003. This will allow a
recovery in the ratios on the December 2003 balance sheet.
Nevertheless, the bank's recent lending track record remains
relevant. Furthermore, the loan portfolio has shown a continuous
growth trend, with an above-average increase of 15% in September
2003 and 40% in December 2002, which adds to concerns about the
quality of the new loans.

Banco Santos has had major fluctuations in profitability and has
a track record of constant capital injection needs. While the
bank is still expected to report full-year 2003 profits at a
level similar to those of 2002, this should be bolstered by
nonrecurring gains, including the gain on the sale of problem
loans. At year-end 2002, there was a reduction in the bank's
capital (unrealized losses) of BrR85 million, due to the price
fluctuation in the market and the new mark-to-market rules. This
was offset by a cash capital injection by the shareholder of
about BrR90 million. In 2001, the bank had losses of BrR57
million in its trading operations, which was offset by the sale
of a subsidiary to the holding company under the shareholder--an
indirect capital injection. Even though these movements reveal
the benefits of continuous commitment from the shareholder, it
also shows the difficulty of generating more stable, recurring
profits.

Santos shows a risk-weighted assets-to-capital ratio of 12.2%,
which is above minimum requirements from local regulators of 11%.
Nevertheless, the intrinsic quality of the capital is negatively
affected by the group's high double leverage--measured by
permanent assets at the bank's parent company to its equity. The
double leverage resulted from the shareholder's decision to
capture funds at the parent company level, and subsequently
inject capital in the bank in 2001. Its double leverage is in a
downtrend (it reduced to 1.2x in 2003 from 1.4x in 2001), and the
restoration of the bank's capital base quality may depend on
future positive net income generation and/or further capital
injections.

Santos is a small to midsize bank, supported by ongoing
investments in technology and product innovation--which
differentiates it from its competitors. All senior executives
have good experience within both the Brazilian and foreign
financial markets.

ANALYST:  Claudio Gallina
          Sao Paulo
          Phone: (55) 11-5501-8938

          Daniel Araujo
          Sao Paulo
          Phone: (55) 11-5501-8939


PARMALAT BRASIL: FIDC Unattached to Parmalat SpA
------------------------------------------------
In the wake of the default of Italy's Parmalat SpA, certain
questions arise regarding the fate of the rating on the Brazilian
credit receivables fund, Parmalat - Fundo de Investimento em
Direitos Creditorios (the Parmalat FIDC), by Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services.

Standard & Poor's downgraded Parmalat Finanziaria SpA and
Parmalat SpA (Parmalat Italy) to 'D' and withdrew their ratings,
as well as those of related entities, Dec. 19, 2003. On Dec. 22,
2003, however, Standard & Poor's affirmed its 'brAAAf' Brazilian
national scale fund rating on the Parmalat FIDC. The affirmation
was based on the lack of direct impact that these events had on
the creditworthiness of the Parmalat FIDC. How is this possible?
The following answers to FAQs shed light on the relationship
between the Parmalat FIDC and the Italian company, Parmalat SpA.

FAQs

What Is a Brazilian Fundo de Investimento em Direitos Creditorios
(an FIDC)?

An FIDC is a financial vehicle that works under the financial
structure and administrative shell of a fund, in both open- and
closed-end types, but is a bankruptcy- remote entity that
demonstrates uniqueness of both structured transactions and
investment funds. Additionally, each fund manager can incorporate
a combination of credit portfolios (representing at least 50% of
the fund's total assets) and debt securities as an underlying
asset of the fund.

Compared with fixed-income securities, FIDCs do not promise
investors (shareholders) specific interest payments or principal
repayments. Thus, each shareholder only expects to receive a
targeted return on their investment (in the case of the Parmalat
FIDC, the targeted return is the Brazilian Spot Depositos
Interfinanceiros index plus 1.7%), and based on the performance
and the characteristics of the fund they can choose at any time
to redeem their shares.

The legal and administrative framework for credit receivables
funds was created Dec. 17, 2001, by the Security Exchange
Commission of Brazil's (Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios)
regulation Instrucao 356.

What Distinguishes Brazilian National Scale FIDC Ratings From
Other Standard & Poor's Ratings?

Standard & Poor's assigns credit quality ratings to FIDCs, fixed-
income funds, and other managed pools of fixed-income assets. The
credit quality rating assigned to a fund addresses the level of
protection its portfolio holdings provide against losses from
credit defaults.

Standard & Poor's Brazilian national scale credit quality
ratings, which range from 'brAAAf' (highest level of protection)
to 'brCCCf' (least protection), are based on an analysis of the
fund's overall portfolio credit quality, interest rate risk,
credit quality, liquidity, concentration, and currency risk.
Standard & Poor's Brazilian national scale credit ratings carry a
"br" prefix to denote "Brazil" and the scale's focus on Brazilian
financial markets. The Standard & Poor's Brazilian national
credit rating scale is not directly comparable with Standard &
Poor's global scale or with any other national rating scale
operated by Standard & Poor's or its affiliates, reflecting its
unique structure that is tailored to the needs of the Brazilian
financial markets.

On the other hand, a Standard & Poor's credit rating on a debt
obligation addresses an issuer's ability to pay interest and
principal on the obligation, according to the terms and
conditions of the obligation. This applies to ratings on debt
securities in the U.S. and across the globe, including emerging
markets. Standard & Poor's role when rating a debt obligation is
to analyze associated credit risks and any protections for those
credit risks to assess the likelihood that an issuer will meet
all of its promised payment obligations.

Standard & Poor's credit quality and credit ratings do not
address market risks such as the risk of early repayment of
principal or early redemption of shares to investors.

What Are the Key Analytical Considerations Factored Into the
Rating on the Parmalat FIDC?

The Parmalat FIDC is a closed-ended fund whose main underlying
assets originally consisted of trade receivables directly
originated by Parmalat Brasil S.A. and Batavia S.A., both
indirectly controlled subsidiaries of Parmalat SpA, in Brazil.
These receivables were originated through the sale of shipped
products to specified obligors, cash, and other specified
investments. Senior shares of the fund total Brazilian reais
(BrR) 110.5 million and were sold to investors Nov. 27, 2003.
Subordinated shares amount to BrR19.5 million and were retained
by the originators. The fund has a defined final maturity of
three years, which began Nov. 27, 2003. Under the terms and
conditions of the Parmalat FIDC, the fund's manager is able to
include credit receivables and other fixed-income securities in
the fund's portfolio at any time.

The credit enhancement mechanism determined for the 'brAAAf'
rating affords credit support for the Parmalat FIDC's senior
shares and is provided in the form of structural subordination.
The subordination level was originally set by the fund's sponsor
at 15%, while Standard & Poor's requirement consisted of the
larger of a floor subordination of 12% and a variable (dynamic)
subordination calculated regularly. The key strengths of the
Parmalat FIDC's senior shares observed during Standard & Poor's
rating analysis were the following:

-- The experience of Parmalat Brasil and Batavia as trade
receivables originators;

-- The robust cash flow structure in the form of
senior/subordinated shares;

-- The credit quality of the trade receivables supporting the
senior shares, which have a good historical performance record in
terms of payment;

-- The dynamic reserve (credit enhancement mechanism) included in
the structure to cover related credit risks (initial
subordination of 15% for the senior shares);

-- The capability of Banco Itau S.A., as custodian of the
transaction, to manage and perform servicing and reporting on the
transaction; and

-- The legal structure of the transaction, which has adequate
provisions for legally safeguarding the shareholders.

Has the Recent Default of Parmalat SpA Affected the Performance
of the Parmalat FIDC?

The Dec. 19, 2003, default of Parmalat SpA has not directly
affected the performance or creditworthiness of the Parmalat
FIDC. The Parmalat FIDC is a bankruptcy-remote Brazilian credit
receivables fund that has no legal or direct financial connection
with Parmalat SpA or any of its subsidiaries. The fund has
sufficient receivables isolated from the originators to provide
the appropriate level of credit enhancement for a 'brAAAf'
rating.

Other factors that keep the creditworthiness of the Parmalat FIDC
unaffected by Parmalat SpA's default are:

-- The servicer of the receivables is Banco Itau, an entity
unaffiliated with the originators (which are not rated by
Standard & Poor's);

-- The receivables represent sales of products that have already
been delivered;

-- The fund stopped purchasing new receivables Dec. 19, 2003;

-- The fund's outstanding receivables (representing less than 10%
of the fund's portfolio as of Jan. 14. 2004) are short-term in
nature and are due to be paid within approximately 15 days; and

-- The fund manager is now allocating all collections to the
fund's permitted investments.

What Has Happened Since the Jan. 6, 2004, Parmalat FIDC
Shareholder Meeting?

Because of the events that affected Parmalat SpA and its
subsidiaries, the fund's sponsor, Intrag DTVM Ltda, called for an
extraordinary shareholders' meeting to take place Jan. 6, 2004.
The only resolution reached during that meeting was that another
meeting would be held Jan. 19, 2004, during which shareholders
will decide whether the fund should continue operating or be
redeemed early (repayment of shareholders).

Since the Parmalat FIDC started operating Nov. 27, 2003, Standard
& Poor's has been receiving several servicing reports and
additional portfolio information from the servicer, as requested.
These reports confirm that the fund's portfolio performance is in
line with the historical payment performance of the originators'
client base. Additionally, no early amortization or liquidation
event has occurred. As of the date of the present report, credit
receivables represent less than 10% of the fund's total assets.
The remaining holdings of the fund are permitted investments not
related to Parmalat SpA or any of its subsidiaries. These
permitted investments consist of overnight investments in 'brAA'
rated financial institutions, government bonds, or shares of
other fixed-income funds rated or assessed by Standard & Poor's.

What Could Happen to the Rating on the Fund After the Upcoming
Jan. 19, 2004, Shareholders' Meeting?

Standard & Poor's opinion of the Parmalat FIDC's credit risk has
not changed significantly since its Dec. 22, 2003, rating
affirmation. Nevertheless, the impact of Parmalat SpA's default
could affect the originators' ability to continue generating
healthy receivables to be sold to the fund.

In addition, the originators' ability to generate new receivables
depends on the potential for recovery of their credit and
financial situation, which at the moment remains uncertain.
Consequently, Standard & Poor's would likely lower its rating on
the Parmalat FIDC significantly if the fund's shareholders decide
during the Jan. 19, 2004, meeting to continue with the fund's
operations and purchase new receivables from Parmalat Brasil and
Batavia. The downgrade would reflect the uncertainty of the true
credit and legal risks of the new receivables. Nevertheless, it
is Standard & Poor's opinion that the Parmalat FIDC's
shareholders are likely to liquidate the fund, in which case the
rating would be maintained until liquidation and then withdrawn,
assuming there are no other changes to the fund's performance or
Standard & Poor's opinion of its future performance.

Contact:  Structured Finance Latin America in New York
          Juan P. De Mollein
          Phone: (1) 212-438-2536
          Email: juan_demollein@standardandpoors.com

          Diane Audino
          Phone: (1) 212-438-2388
          Email: diane_audino@standardandpoors.com

          Sergio Garibian, Investment Services, Sao Paulo
          Phone: (55) 11-5501-8944
          Email: sergio_garibian@standardandpoors.com


PARMALAT BRASIL: Unibanco Exposure Totals BRL20 Mln
---------------------------------------------------
Unibanco-Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros SA (Unibanco), one of
Brazil's four largest privately-owned banks, said Wednesday its
total exposure to Parmalat Brasil Industria de Alimentos comes to
BRL20 million (US$ 1= BRL 2.84), relates Dow Jones.

Unibanco's statement came in response to reports that its
exposure to Parmalat Brasil was BRL300 million.

The bank, which is one of Parmalat Brasil's smallest creditors,
further said it had already provisioned against the value.


PARMALAT BRASIL: Committee To Begin Research Probe Today
--------------------------------------------------------
Brazil's lower house set up a committee to dig into the accounts
of Parmalat Brasil, reports Bloomberg News. The committee, which
will be made up of 21 legislators, was set up after Parmalat
group's jailed accountant in Italy said some of the missing funds
may be in Brazil.

According to deputy Waldemir Moka, who requested for the creation
of the committee, the investigation will begin today.



=========
C H I L E
=========

COCA-COLA EMBONOR: Fitch Affirms 'BBB-' International Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirmed the 'BBB-' foreign and local international
currency credit ratings of Coca-Cola Embonor (Embonor).
Approximately $160 million of notes due in 2006 are affected by
this rating action. The Rating Outlook for Embonor's
international ratings remains Stable.

In conjunction with this rating action, Fitch downgraded
Embonor's national scale rating to 'A- (Chl)' from 'A (aChl)'.
The series B ($40 million) Chilean peso denominated bonds are
affected by this rating action.

These rating actions follow the announcement by Embonor that it
has reached an agreement to sell its 60.45% stake in the Peruvian
bottler of Coca-Cola products, Embotelladora Latinoamericana S.A.
(ELSA), to Corporacion Jose R. Lindley S.A. (JRL) for $130
million. Proceeds from the sale of the company's stake in ELSA
are expected to be used to reduce outstanding debt of Embonor to
slightly less than $200 million from $305 million. On a pro forma
basis, which accounts for the debt reduction plus the loss of
cash operating profits (EBITDA) from Peru, this would improve the
company's EBITDA-to-total debt ratio to about 4.2x from
approximately 5.3x during 2003. Net debt-to-EBITDA would also
improve to about 4.1x from 5x.

While the sale of the company's operations in Peru positively
affects Embonor's credit protection measures, Fitch views this
transaction to be slightly negative in terms of the company's
overall credit quality because it diminishes the strategic
importance of the company to The Coca-Cola Company (KO or Coca-
Cola). Fitch Ratings believes, however, that KO, which paid
approximately US$300 million to acquire a 45.5% economic stake in
Embonor, would provide financial support to the company if needed
to preserve its reputation for supporting bottlers in which it
has a significant economic stake. Absent Coca-Cola's large
ownership stake in the company, it is likely the international
bonds would be rated below investment grade given the pro forma
credit measurements.

The investment grade credit ratings also take into consideration
Embonor's relatively strong business position in its Chilean and
Bolivian territories. The company had market shares of
approximately 58.4% and 53.3% in these markets during 2003.
Embonor accounts for approximately 35% of KO's sales in Chile and
approximately 95% of its sales in Bolivia.

The slight weakening of the overall credit quality in Fitch's
opinion has resulted in a downgrade of the company's national
scale rating to 'A- Chl' from 'A Chl' given the more robust
nature of the national rating scale, in which the top-tiered
Chilean corporates are rated between 'AAA' and 'A-'.

ELSA accounted for 95% of Coca-Cola's sales in Peru during 2002.
KO has shown significant interest in improving its position in
Peru since 1999 when it purchased a 20% stake in JRL, the largest
bottler of Inca Cola, which is the second most popular soft drink
in Peru. At the time KO purchased its stake in JRL, it also
formed a strategic partnership with Inca Kola. The agreement
between Coca-Cola and Inca Kola requires the partnership to
distribute and market Inca Kola and its affiliated brands in
Peru, and calls for The Coca-Cola Company to distribute and
market these brands globally. In conjunction with this agreement,
KO purchased a 50% stake in Inca Kola's brands.

CONTACT:  Fitch Ratings
          Joe Bormann
          Chicago
          Phone: 312-368-3349

          Rina Jarufe
          Chile
          Phone: +56-2-206-7171

          Media Relations:
          James Jockle
          New York
          Phone: 212-908-0547



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

* IMF Welcomes Monetary Policy Action in the Dominican Republic
---------------------------------------------------------------
Marcelo Figuerola, the IMF Mission Chief for the Dominican
Republic, made on Wednesday the following statement:

"The Central Bank has embarked on a strengthening of monetary
control to increase demand for peso-denominated assets and reduce
the inflation rate significantly in 2004. Auctions of Central
Bank certificates are helping reverse the significant expansion
of the monetary base experienced in recent months. In addition,
the Central Bank has, this week, raised its policy interest rates
to make them generally positive in real terms, and we welcome
this action which will be further supportive of the authorities'
inflation-control efforts.

"Recent monetary policy actions need to be seen in the broader
context of the authorities' efforts to stabilize the economy and
restore sustained growth. Thus, the authorities are making
significant progress in implementing measures in other policy
areas aimed at early conclusion of the first review of the
country's Stand-By Arrangement with the Fund."

CONTACT:  INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
          700 19th Street, NW
          Washington, D.C. 20431 USA

          IMF EXTERNAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
          Public Affairs:
          Phone: 202-623-7300
          Fax: 202-623-6278

          Media Relations:
          Phone: 202-623-7100
          Fax: 202-623-6772



=============
E C U A D O R
=============

ANDINATEL/PACIFICTEL: One Bidder Left in Contracts Tender
---------------------------------------------------------
The tender of three-year contracts to manage Ecuador's state-
owned telecoms operators Andinatel and Pacifictel is left with
only one potential bidder, Business News Americas reports, citing
a spokesperson for the state holding company Fondo de Solidaridad
(FS). The Eurocom consortium, which is made up of Telecom
Management Partner (TMP), a subsidiary of Norway's Telenor
(Nasdaq: TELN), and local telecoms company Fononet, submitted
qualification documents to FS on Monday.

Earlier, the tender had attracted seven bidders, one of which is
Interstate. But Eurocom took over Interstate's participation.
This mechanism for taking over participations was established in
the bidding rules, which is why some law firms had originally
registered, presumably on behalf of other potential bidders, the
FS spokesperson said.

Another former potential bidder, Telecom International Management
Group, withdrew from the tender after FS rejected its request for
a 30-day extension. The said bidder had asked the extension
saying it needed extra time to find a new partner after the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company withdrew from its
consortium.

The other five potential bidders - Telecom Italia, Spain's
Telefonica, Colombia's Empresas Publicas de Medellin, and law
firms Corral & Rosales and Baesuno - withdrew for "technical"
reasons, the spokesperson said, without providing further
details.

FS has extended until January 30 the deadline for qualifying
Eurocom, which, if successful, will have to present its economic
bid for the contracts on February 5, the spokesperson said. If
the economic bid is accepted, Eurocom would take over operations
at the two companies on March 1.

The privatization of the companies is part of the conditions for
a loan package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).



=============
J A M A I C A
=============

KAISER ALUMINUM: To Sell Alpart Interests in Jamaica
----------------------------------------------------
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation signed an agreement to
sell its 65% interest in Alpart, a partnership that owns bauxite
mining operations and an alumina refinery in Jamaica, to Glencore
AG. Net cash proceeds are expected, at a minimum, to be in the
range of $160 million to $170 million, subject to certain closing
and post-closing adjustments.

The transaction, which is subject to several closing conditions
as noted below, includes the interests of Kaiser and certain of
its subsidiaries in Alpart and also may include certain alumina
sales contracts that are typically sourced from Kaiser's share of
alumina production at Alpart. The purchase price could increase
significantly depending on which contracts, if any, are
ultimately included in the transaction. Kaiser will be
responsible for prepayment of its approximately $14 million share
of Alpart's outstanding CARIFA loan, which becomes due in full
upon consummation of the transaction. The agreement also provides
for Glencore to supply Kaiser with alumina of up to 200,000
metric tonnes in 2004 and up to 100,000 metric tonnes in 2005 at
an agreed percentage of London Metal Exchange aluminum prices.

Kaiser expects that, at the minimum end of the expected range of
proceeds, the transaction will result in a pre-tax book loss in
the range of $50 million.

The transaction is subject to approval by the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, where Kaiser plans
to file a related motion and a copy of the agreement as promptly
as practicable. Kaiser anticipates requesting the Court to rule
on the motion during a regularly scheduled hearing on Feb. 23,
2004. The transaction is also conditioned upon approval by the
lenders under Kaiser's Post-Petition Credit Agreement, as more
fully discussed in the company's most recent Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q. Subject to the satisfaction of these and certain other
conditions, Kaiser expects the transaction to close late in the
first quarter or early in the second quarter of 2004.

Until such time as the transaction closes, Kaiser will retain
management responsibility for Alpart and will involve appropriate
Glencore personnel on transitional issues.

Separately, under Alpart's existing partnership arrangement,
Hydro Aluminium a.s., which currently owns the remaining 35% of
Alpart, will have 30 days following Kaiser's receipt of Court
approval to elect to purchase Kaiser's interests at the price
specified in the agreement. If Hydro were to exercise this right,
Glencore would be entitled to receive from Kaiser reimbursement
of certain expenses incurred in negotiating the agreement,
subject to a limit of $250,000.

"This is another step toward our stated goal of emerging from
Chapter 11 in mid 2004," said Jack A Hockema, president and chief
executive officer of Kaiser Aluminum.

"Our relationship with the Government of Jamaica, the people of
Jamaica and, particularly, two generations of Alpart employees
has been a rewarding experience," he said. "In light of
Glencore's extensive investments in the alumina industry,
including its interests in Jamaica, and its strong financial
profile, we believe this transaction will give Alpart employees
and other constituents a sound opportunity for future investment
and growth."

The Alpart refinery has substantially completed an expansion
program to increase the plant's capacity to 1.65 million metric
tonnes per year. It also controls bauxite reserves having an
annual production capacity of 3.5 million metric tonnes, which it
mines through a joint venture. Approximately 1,200 employees are
involved in refinery and mining operations.

Glencore AG is a subsidiary of Glencore International AG, a
privately owned company organized under the laws of Switzerland.
Together with its subsidiaries, Glencore is a leading,
diversified natural resources group with worldwide activity in
the mining, smelting, refining, processing and marketing of
metals and minerals, energy products and agricultural products.
These activities are supported by strategic investments in
industrial assets.

Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation is a leading producer of
fabricated aluminum products, alumina and primary aluminum. It is
the operating subsidiary of Kaiser Aluminum Corporation
(OTCBB:KLUCQ).

CONTACT:  Kaiser Aluminum Corporation
          5847 San Filipe, Ste, 2500
          Houston, TX 77057-3268
          Phone: 713-267-3777
          Fax: 713-267-3701
          Home page: http://www.kaiseral.com
          Contact:  Scott Lamb
                    Phone: 713-332-4751

                    George T. Haymaker Jr., Chairman
                    Jack A. Hockema, President & CEO
                    John T. La Duc, EVP & CFO



===========
M E X I C O
===========

DESC: Fitch Assigns `B+' Senior Secured Rating
----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings assigned a senior secured foreign and local
currency rating of 'B+' to Desc, S.A. de C.V. (Desc) and
downgraded the senior unsecured debt rating to 'B' from 'B+'.
Fitch also downgraded Desc's national scale rating to 'BBB-'(mex)
from 'BBB'(mex). Fitch took all of Desc's ratings off of Rating
Watch Negative. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

The rating actions reflect the conclusion of a debt refinancing
process with bank creditors for approximately US$720 million or
70% of the company's debt. The restructuring agreements will
refinance the majority of Desc's short-term debt and prior
syndicated loans. The final terms of the restructuring include a
five-year tenor with a 30-month grace period beginning in January
2004, a US$40 million pre-payment to bank creditors and higher
interests rates, which may be reduced based on improvements in
financial ratios. Under the new loan agreements, Desc has granted
security in the form of fixed assets and equity shares of the
holding and operating companies. Under contractual covenants of
credit agreements with the International Finance Corporation and
under the dine senior notes due 2007, creditors of Desc's under
these agreements will also be granted security so that the
majority of Desc's existing debt will be secured. The new
national scale rating on Desc's medium term notes (Pagares de
Mediano Plazo) due 2006 and 2007 considers the structural
subordination of these instruments to the reminder of Desc's
indebtedness.

Desc is one of Mexico's largest industrial conglomerates, with
operations in automotive parts, chemicals (petrochemicals,
phosphates, laminates, additives and particleboard), food
(production and sale of pork and branded food products) and real
estate (acquisition and development of land for upper-income
commercial, residential and tourism).

CONTACT:  Giovanna Caccialanza, CFA
          New York
          Email: +1-212-908-0898

          Alberto Moreno
          Monterrey, Mexico
          Phone: +528-18-335-7239

          Media Relations:
          James Jockle
          New York
          Phone: +1-212-908-0547


GRUPO TMM: Details Related Issues to VAT Certificate
----------------------------------------------------
Grupo TMM, S.A. (NYSE:TMM and BMV:TMM A, or "the Company")
announced Tuesday that the "Servicio de Administracion
Tributaria" or "SAT" ("Tax Administrative Entity") made a
provisional attachment of the Special VAT Certificate that the
Mexican Treasury delivered to its subsidiary TFM, S.A. de C.V. on
January 20, 2004, in compliance with the August 13, 2003, Mexican
Federal Tribunal of Fiscal and Administrative Justice ("Fiscal
Court") resolution.

The fiscal authorities state that the documents that support the
amount that the Special VAT Certificate represents do not comply
with applicable tax requirements. It is important to note, that
it was the Federal Government of Mexico, through the authorities
in charge of the privatization process of the Mexican Railroad
System who delivered the same documents at the time of the
privatization.

The Company will oppose through all possible legal means the
SAT's action, as it is arbitrary, lacks consistency and puts at
risk the rule of law of Mexico for taxpayers, which should be the
pillar of the fiscal system in Mexico, as well as the rights of
and legal certainty to individuals that participate in bidding
processes of public assets or services.

Headquartered in Mexico City, Grupo TMM is a Latin American
multimodal transportation company. Through its branch offices and
network of subsidiary companies, Grupo TMM provides a dynamic
combination of ocean and land transportation services. Grupo TMM
also has a significant interest in TFM, which operates Mexico's
Northeast railway and carries over 40 percent of the country's
rail cargo.

CONTACT:  GRUPO TMM
          Brad Skinner (Investor Relations)
          Phone: 011-525-55-629-8725
                 203-247-2420
          Email: brad.skinner@tmm.com.mx


INDUSTRIAS UNIDAS: S&P Rates Proposed $175M Notes 'B+'
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned Wednesday its 'B+'
rating to Industrias Unidas S.A. de C.V.'s (IUSA) proposed 10-
year $175 million notes due 2014. The company's 'B+' local and
foreign currency long-term corporate credit ratings were
affirmed. The outlook is negative.

"The notes benefit from the joint and several guarantee of IUSA's
restricted subsidiaries that represent 92% of the company's total
assets and 40% of the company's EBITDA as of Sept. 30, 2003,"
said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Jose Coballasi. "Proceeds
will be used to pay existing debt."

IUSA is one of Mexico's largest diversified industrial companies,
offering a large variety of products through integrated
manufacturing and distribution operations located principally in
Mexico and the U.S. The company's operations are conducted by
seven principal business groups: copper tubing, wire and cable,
copper alloys, electrical products, watt-hour meters, valves and
controls, and diversified assets group.

IUSA's efforts to increase its market share have resulted in
lower average prices for its products and higher working capital
requirements, which have led to an increase in the use of debt
and a reduction in the company's operating cash flow generation.
The impact of the aforementioned factors in the company's
financial performance is reflected in the trend of its key
financial ratios. For the past 12 months ended Sept. 30, 2003,
IUSA posted EBITDA interest coverage, total debt to EBITDA, and
FFO to total debt ratios of 1.8x, 4.2x, and (1.0%), respectively.

IUSA's liquidity is tight given its weak free operating cash flow
generation. During 2003, the company's free operating cash flow
generation has been negative and has resulted in an increased use
of debt. Nevertheless, the proposed issue will provide the
company additional financial flexibility through a more
comfortable maturity schedule and the prepayment of secured debt
issued in the Mexican capital markets in 2002. As of Sept. 30,
2003, the company had about $18 million in cash and equivalents
and faced short-term debt maturities of $85 million, which
include the company's CP program. As a result, IUSA depends on
its efforts to refinance its short-term debt maturities
successfully.

The outlook is negative. Continued weakness in the company's key
financial indicators and liquidity could lead to a downgrade.
Nevertheless, a sustained improvement in its financial and
operating performance, particularly its free operating cash flow
generation and overall liquidity, could lead to a stable outlook.

ANALYST:  Jose Coballasi
          Mexico City
          Phone: (52) 55-5279-2014

          Santiago Carniado
          Mexico City
          Phone: (52) 55-5279-2013


MEXICANA: Strikes Codeshare Agreement With American Airlines
------------------------------------------------------------
Two of the world's major airlines -- American Airlines and
Mexicana de Aviacion -- will enter into a new, robust codesharing
arrangement in April that will offer customers around the globe
better options for travel between the United States and Mexico.

Mexicana has been serving the United States for more than 70
years. American has been serving Mexico for more than 60 years.
Once linked, the two airlines will build upon the pioneering
spirit that has made them the premier airlines in their
respective marketplaces.

The two carriers will also enter into a reciprocal frequent-flyer
arrangement that will enable members to accrue and redeem miles
in American's AAdvantage(R) program or Mexicana's Frecuenta(R)
program on each other's network, including more than 500 round-
trip flights per week between both countries.

"American's vast network is one of the primary reasons people
choose us for their travel needs," said Gerard Arpey, American's
president and CEO. "Through this agreement with Mexicana, we're
further strengthening the breadth of our route system and
increasing flight options for our passengers. In cooperation with
Mexico's finest airline, we're able to further honor our
commitment to providing our customers with the products and
services they value."

"We're very pleased to announce the leading alliance in North
America," said Fernando Flores, Mexicana's chairman and CEO. "Our
commitment to our passengers has always been to offer the best
services and connectivity. Now that we are working with American
Airlines, I'm confident that Mexicana will solidify its
longstanding stature as the leading Mexican international
airline."

The agreement, which is pending governmental approval, provides
for codesharing on transborder flights, connecting service to
points within Mexico and the U.S., and select international
flights beyond the United States.

Through this relationship with American Airlines, Mexicana
customers will soon be able to enjoy enhanced service to the most
important markets in the United States, Europe and Asia as well
as new destinations in the Caribbean.

American passengers will soon see new flight availability for up
to 21 new cities in Mexico, including such popular destinations
as Merida, Oaxaca, Veracruz and Tampico. Additionally, American
will be able to place its code on 27 new, nonstop transborder
markets.

"This agreement will not only support our current network but
also future growth opportunities into Mexico," Arpey said. "In
fact, we will be launching new service from our Dallas/Fort Worth
hub to Cozumel and Ixtapa/Zihuatanejo on Jan. 31 as well as
adding more frequencies on our service to Los Cabos in Baja
California Sur."

"Mexicana has always responded to the needs of its passengers and
the dynamics of the marketplace," said Flores. "While our
comprehensive agreement with American is of extreme importance to
us, we will continue to develop our network in the United States,
and the rest of the continent, to offer travelers our extensive
system of bilateral alliances around the world. Furthermore, our
fleet renovation program continues in order to offer our clients
the best flight experience."

Mexicana de Aviacion is Mexico's leading international airline.
Its fleet is considered to be one of the youngest in the world.
It also offers more than 55 destinations in North, Central and
South America and the Caribbean. Mexicana offers great benefits
in accruing and redeeming miles, access to Executive Lounges
(Salones Ejecutivos), wide possibility for connections and
coordinated timetables in an extensive route network.

American Airlines is the world's largest carrier. American,
American Eagle and the AmericanConnection regional carriers serve
more than 250 cities in over 40 countries with more than 3,900
daily flights. The combined fleet numbers more than 1,000
aircraft. American's award-winning Web site, AA.com, provides
users with easy access to check and book fares, plus personalized
news, information and travel offers. American Airlines is a
founding member of the oneworld Alliance.

CONTACT:  Mexicana de Aviacion
          Adolfo Crespo, or Nayeli Garcia, Public Relations
          Phone: +011-5255-5448-3000 x2678

          American Airlines
          Gus Whitcomb or Martha Pantin, Corporate Communications
          Phone: +1-817-967-1577
          Home page: http://www.amrcorp.com


TFM: KCS Releases TFM Details of 1997 Tax Audit Summary
-------------------------------------------------------
Kansas City Southern (KCS) (NYSE:KSU) announced Wednesday that
TFM, S.A. de C.V. ("TFM") was served on January, 20, 2004, with
an official letter notifying TFM of the Mexican Government's
findings and conclusions arising from its tax audit of TFM's tax
return for the fiscal year ended December 31, 1997 ("Tax Audit
Summary"). In the Tax Audit Summary, the Mexican Government
notified TFM of its conclusion that the documentation provided by
TFM in support of the value added tax payment and depreciation of
the TFM Concession Title and the assets reported on TFM's 1997
tax return do not comply with the formalities required by the
applicable tax legislation. The Tax Audit Summary also creates a
provisional administrative attachment of the value added tax
refund certificate received by TFM on January 19, 2004, from the
Mexican Federal Treasury in the amount of 2,111,111,790.00 pesos.

By the terms of the Tax Audit Summary, TFM has 20 business days
to present evidence to the Mexican Government in support of its
position. KCS is currently reviewing the Tax Audit Summary with
its legal advisors and with TFM officers. KCS will, following the
completion of its legal review of the Tax Audit Summary, take the
appropriate actions to support TFM's right to claim on its 1997
tax return depreciation and tax credits arising from the
Northeast Railroad Company's, TFM's predecessor in interest,
purchase of the assets and concession title from the Mexican
National Railway Company as part of the privatization of the
Mexican national railway system in 1997.

KCS is a transportation holding company that has railroad
investments in the United States, Mexico and Panama. Its primary
holding is The Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCSR).
Headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri, KCSR serves customers in
the central and south central regions of the U.S. KCS' rail
holdings and investments are primary components of a NAFTA
Railway system that links the commercial and industrial centers
of the United States, Canada and Mexico.


XIGNUX: Moody's Cuts Debt Ratings
---------------------------------
Moody's Investor Services downgraded the debt ratings of
Monterrey, Mexico-based industrial conglomerate Xignux, and
initiated a review of the ratings for possible further downgrade.

Below are the ratings downgraded (to/from) and placed under
review for further downgrade:
                                        To       From

- Senior Implied Rating                 B2        B1

- US$126 million outstanding amount
  of Senior Unsecured Notes due 2004    B3        B2

- Senior Unsecured Issuer Rating        Caa1      B3

The rating actions consider the fact that despite recent
improvements in operating conditions, Xignux's debt protection
measures remain weak with limited free cash flow available for
debt reduction, while refinancing risk is high.

Moody's explained that Xignux's revised ratings reflect
heightened credit risk as a result of a low free cash flow
relative to the high debt levels, a high level of short term debt
resulting in a tight maturity profile, and a limited liquidity
position vis-a-vis near - term cash requirements.

Moreover, the company remains exposed to commodity price
fluctuations, and a tough competitive environment in all of its
core business lines. Conversely, Xignux's ratings are supported
by its leading position in key sectors of the Mexican economy,
joint ventures with large international partners, and some recent
improvement in performance trends.

Xignux had total debt of around US$590 million, which at the end
of 2003 represented more than 4X consolidated EBITDA. In
addition, the free cash flow generation represents around 6% of
total debt.



=================================
T R I N I D A D   &   T O B A G O
=================================

BWIA: TTSE Rejects Request For Share Suspension
-----------------------------------------------
Trinidad national carrier BWIA failed to get an approval from the
Trinidad and Tobago stock exchange (TTSE) over a request to
suspend trading of its shares, the Trinidad Guardian reports.

"The TTSE has considered the application and it has agreed not to
comply with the request to have the shares suspended," TTSE
chairman Kathleen Dhannyram said without giving any reasons for
denying the request.

But according to the Trinidad Guardian, the TTSE may approve the
request if BWIA can provide additional information to convince
the TTSE of the need for the suspension.

BWIA made a similar request from the Barbados stock exchange,
which, unlike TTSE, immediately suspended the Company's shares.

BWIA sought the suspension of the trading of its shares as part
of a wider restructuring exercise for the airline. According to
it, the suspension would facilitate any necessary shifts in the
equity levels held by various shareholders without impacting on
the daily operations of the airline.

However, sources within financial and aviation circles suggested
suspension would be a forerunner to the State regaining control
of the cash-strapped carrier.

The Government owns 49% of BWIA's shares and holds 15% in trust
for the unions that represent the employees.

Trade and Industry Minister Ken Valley said the Government
thought it was necessary to settle BWIA's share price before it
could negotiate with any potential investors while it consults
with the airline's shareholders.



=============
U R U G U A Y
=============

PARMALAT URUGUAY: Seeks to Reschedule Bank Loan Payments
--------------------------------------------------------
The Uruguay unit of Parmalat Finanziaria S.p.A. wants to
reschedule loan payments with eight banks, Bloomberg News
reports, citing the Parmalat Uruguay president Jorge Gutman.

The Company's loans came with a guarantee from its Italian
parent, which has entered bankruptcy, hence the need to
reschedule debt payments. As much as 40% of the Company's US$26
million of debt will come due this year, the source adds.

"We are currently negotiating with the banks and have had good
acceptance because it's viable business," Bloomberg quoted the
executive. The Company posted sales of US$44 million last year,
and the figure is expected to climb to as high as US$48 million.

Its Italian parent, Parmalat Finanziaria SpA, filed for
bankruptcy protection in December 24 after revealing a
multibillion-dollar gap in its finances. Prosecutors in Italy and
market regulators from the U.S. and Europe are investigating the
disappearance of the funds, says Dow Jones.




               ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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