TCRLA_Public/090403.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                      L A T I N  A M E R I C A

           Friday, April 3, 2009, Vol. 9, No. 66

                            Headlines

A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A

STANFORD INT'L BANK: Owner Needs Cash to Pay Legal Fees


B E R M U D A

MARI HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 17
MARI LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 17


B R A Z I L

TELEMAR NORTE: May Benefit From Eletronet Purchase, Analysts Say


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ABSOLUTE SYNTHETIC: Placed Under Voluntary Liquidation
BDT INVEST ET AL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 16
BLUE STAR: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 6
CORAL SEA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 14
DURAT AL: Placed Under Voluntary Liquidation

ENRON BRAZIL ET AL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 7
ENRON CARIBE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 7
ENRON COMMERCIAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 7
ENRON DEVELOPMENT ET AL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 7
ENRON DO BRAZIL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 7

ENRON LNG: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 7
INVESTCORP WASHINGTON: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 6
KINTYRE TRADERS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 16
PAC FUNDING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 16
PANTHERA/FUNDING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 17

SUDELEY LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 15
THE PAMONA ET AL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 10
UBS DYNAMIC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 16
UBS GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 16
UBS U.S. EQUITY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 16


J A M A I C A

AIR JAMAICA: OCG Submits Report on Heathrow Slot Sale
JUTC: Fare Increase for Commuters Implemented


M E X I C O

COMERCI: Has Until Today to Finalize Debt Restructuring Proposal
GMAC FINANCIERA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight MXMAC Certs.
GRUPO MEXICO: To Close Cananea Mine and Fire Workers on Strike
HIPOTECARIA CREDITO: Moody's Downgrades Class A Ratings to 'Ba1'
VITRO SAB: Incurs US$343 Million Consolidated Net Loss in 4Q 2008

VITRO SAB: Finacity Facilitates Funding of Units' Receivables
* MEXICO: Moves Sugar Mills Sale Date on Low Offers
* MEXICO: Gov't to Cut Economic Growth Forecast for This Year


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

CL FIN'L: CLICO (Guyana) Suspends Chief Executive Officer


                         - - - - -


===============================
A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A
===============================

STANFORD INT'L BANK: Owner Needs Cash to Pay Legal Fees
-------------------------------------------------------
Stanford International Bank Limited (SIBL) owner Robert Allen
Stanford, while claiming innocence on any involvement with the
“massive Ponzi scheme” complaint by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, urged the court for a case dismissal and the
unfreezing of his assets by receiver Ralph Janvey, so he can hire
a lawyer, CaribbeanWorldNews reports.  The report relates Mr.
Stanford stated that due to the asset freeze imposed by the SEC he
was unable to retain counsel.

The SEC, on Feb. 17, charged Mr. Stanford and three of his
companies for orchestrating a fraudulent, multi-billion dollar
investment scheme centering on an US$8 billion Certificate of
Deposit program.  Mr. Stanford's companies include Stanford
International Bank Limited (SIBL), Stanford Group Company, and
investment adviser Stanford Capital Management.  The SEC also
charged SIBL chief financial officer James Davis as well as Laura
Pendergest-Holt, chief investment officer of Stanford Financial
Group (SFG), in the enforcement action.

According to the report, Mr. Stanford has so far responded to the
SEC complaint on his own, denying the allegations of fraud but
admitting to details included in the complaint that describe the
activities and structure of his firm.  CaribbeanWorldNews relates
Mr. Stanford admitted he is a citizen of both Antigua and the
United States, confirmed that Mr. Davis and Ms. Pendergest-Holt
served as the firm’s director and financial officer and chief
investment officer, respectively.  However, the report notes Mr.
Stanford denied the SEC allegations that the majority of the
bank’s assets are managed exclusively by Stanford and Mr. Davis,
and that SIBL's assets had no independent oversight.

                  About Stanford International

Domiciled in Antigua, Stanford International Bank Limited --
http://www.stanfordinternationalbank.com/-- is a member of
Stanford Private Wealth Management, a global financial services
network with US$51 billion in deposits and assets under management
or advisement.  Stanford Private Wealth Management serves more
than 70,000 clients in 140 countries.



=============
B E R M U D A
=============

MARI HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 17
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of MaRI Holdings Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by April 17, 2009, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on March 25, 2009.

The company's liquidator is:

         Mike Morrison
         KPMG Advisory Limited
         Crown House
         4 Par-La-Ville Road, Hamilton
         Bermuda


MARI LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 17
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of MaRI, Ltd. are required to file their proofs of
debt by April 17, 2009, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on March 25, 2009.

The company's liquidator is:

         Mike Morrison
         KPMG Advisory Limited
         Crown House
         4 Par-La-Ville Road, Hamilton
         Bermuda



===========
B R A Z I L
===========

TELEMAR NORTE: May Benefit From Eletronet Purchase, Analysts Say
----------------------------------------------------------------
Analysts say Telemar Norte Leste SA may benefit from the purchase
of bankrupt company Eletronet SA, Paulo Winterstein of Bloomberg
News reports.

Telemar is in talks to buy bankrupt Eletronet SA from AES Corp.
and Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras SA, Bloomberg News says citing
newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo.  The companies haven’t agreed on a
price, Estado said as cited by Bloomberg News.

“The deal with Eletronet could be positive from a strategic point
of view, depending on the price,” Banco Brascan analyst Beatriz
Battelli told Bloomberg News in a phone interview.

Headquartered in Brazil, Telemar Norte Leste SA is involved in
the telecommunications sector.  It operates a fixed-line and
mobile telephone service in Brazil under the name Oi.  The company
also offers Internet network, through the service Oi Velox, and
cable television, through Oi TV, to both individual and corporate
customers.  Telemar Norte Leste SA operates in the states of Rio
de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Espirito Santo, Bahia, Sergipe, Alagoas,
Pernambuco, Paraiba, Rio Grande do Norte, Ceara, Piaui, Maranho,
Para, Roraima, Amapa and Amazonas.

Its subsidiaries include TNL PCS (Oi), Telemar Internet Ltda and
Serede Servicos de Rede SA, among others.  The Company is owned by
Tele Norte Leste Participacoes SA. In 2008,  the Company launched
the third generation (3G) service.  As of January 2009, Telemar
Norte Leste SA acquired Brasil Telecom Participacoes SA.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America on
Sept. 2, 2008, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its
outlooks on Tele Norte Leste Participacoes SA and Telemar Norte
Leste SA (collectively, Telemar), and Amazonia Celular SA to
positive from stable, while affirming the 'BB+' long-term
corporate credit ratings on the companies.  S&P also
affirmed its 'brAA+' national scale corporate credit rating on
Tele Norte Leste Participacoes SA.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================

ABSOLUTE SYNTHETIC: Placed Under Voluntary Liquidation
------------------------------------------------------
On February 26, 2009, the sole shareholder of Absolute Synthetic
CDO Limited passed a written resolution that voluntarily wind up
the company's operations.

The company's liquidator is:

          Walkers SPV Limited
          c/o Anthony Johnson
          Walker House, 87 Mary Street, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9002, Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 914-6314


BDT INVEST ET AL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 16
-----------------------------------------------------------
DMS Corporate Services Ltd. fixed April 16, 2009, as the deadline
to file proofs of debt for the creditors of:

   -- BDT Invest Asia Fund (Accumulator) Limited;
   -- BDT Invest Asia Fund (Distributor) Limited;
   -- BDT Invest Asia Fund (GP) Limited;
   -- BDT Invest Japan Fund (Accumulator) Limited;
   -- BDT Invest Japan Fund (Distributor) Limited; and
   -- BDT Invest Japan Fund (GP) Limited.

The companies commenced wind up proceedings on February 27, 2009.

The Liquidator can be reached at:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Bernadette Bailey-Lewis
          dms Corporate Services Ltd.
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344, Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 946 7666


BLUE STAR: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 6
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Blue Star Fund are required to file their proofs
of debt by April 6, 2009, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on February 24, 2009.

The company's liquidator is:

          Hugh Dickson
          c/o Peter Bigwood
          PO Box 1370GT, Grand Cayman KY1- 1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 815 8242
          Facsimile: (345) 949 7120


CORAL SEA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 14
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Coral Sea Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by April 14, 2009, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Juan A. Bacardi
          P.O. Box N-9915, Nassau
          Bahamas


DURAT AL: Placed Under Voluntary Liquidation
--------------------------------------------
On February 8, 2009, the sole shareholder of Durat Al Doha passed
a written resolution that voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

The company's liquidators are:

          Ali Taymoor
          Mohammad Al-Mana
          Qatar Islamic Bank
          Grand Hamad Street
          Doha, Qatar


ENRON BRAZIL ET AL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 7
------------------------------------------------------------
S.L.C. Whicker fixed April 7, 2009, as the deadline to file proofs
of debt for the creditors of:

   -- Enron Brazil Power Holdings I Ltd;
   -- Enron Brazil Power Holdings XI Ltd; and
   -- Enron Brazil Power Investments XI Limited

The companies commenced liquidation proceedings on Feb. 17, 2009.

The Liquidator can be reached at:

          S.L.C. Whicker
          c/o Jeffrey Stower
          PO Box 493, Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 345-914-4444
          Facsimile: 345-949-7164


ENRON CARIBE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 7
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Enron Caribe VI Holdings Ltd are required to file
their proofs of debt by April 7, 2009, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind up proceedings on February 17, 2009.

The Liquidator can be reached at:

          S.L.C. Whicker
          c/o Jeffrey Stower
          PO Box 493, Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 345-914-4444
          Facsimile: 345-949-7164


ENRON COMMERCIAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 7
----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Enron Commercial Finance Ltd are required to file
their proofs of debt by April 7, 2009, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind up proceedings on February 17, 2009.

The Liquidator can be reached at:

          S.L.C. Whicker
          c/o Jeffrey Stower
          PO Box 493, Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 345-914-4444
          Facsimile: 345-949-7164


ENRON DEVELOPMENT ET AL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 7
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S.L.C. Whicker fixed April 7, 2009, as the deadline to file proofs
of debt for the creditors of:

   -- Enron Development Funding Ltd; and
   -- Enron Development Management Ltd.

The companies commenced wind up proceedings on February 17, 2009.

The Liquidator can be reached at:

          S.L.C. Whicker
          c/o Jeffrey Stower
          PO Box 493, Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 345-914-4444
          Facsimile: 345-949-7164


ENRON DO BRAZIL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 7
---------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Enron Do Brazil Holdings Ltd are required to file
their proofs of debt by April 7, 2009, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind up proceedings on February 17, 2009.

The Liquidator can be reached at:

          S.L.C. Whicker
          c/o Jeffrey Stower
          PO Box 493, Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 345-914-4444
          Facsimile: 345-949-7164


ENRON LNG: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 7
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Enron LNG Shipping Company are required to file
their proofs of debt by April 7, 2009, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind up proceedings on February 17, 2009.

The company's liquidator is:

          S.L.C. Whicker
          PO Box 493, Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          c/o Jeffrey Stower
          P.O. Box 493, Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 345-914-4444
          Facsimile: 345-949-7164


INVESTCORP WASHINGTON: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 6
---------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Investcorp Washington Corner Distressed
Opportunity Master Fund Limited are required to file their proofs
of debt by April 6, 2009, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on February 26, 2009.

The company's liquidator is:

          Paget-Brown Trust Company Ltd.
          c/o Evania Ebanks
          Telephone: (345)-949-5122
          Facsimile: (345)-949-7920
          P.O. Box 1111, Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands


KINTYRE TRADERS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 16
----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Kintyre Traders Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by April 16, 2009, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind up proceedings on February 17, 2009.

The Liquidator can be reached at:

          Avalon Ltd.
          c/o Mourant De Feu & Jeune
          Attorneys-at-Law for the Company
          c/o P.O. Box 1348, Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (+1) 345 949 4123
          Facsimile: (+1) 345 949 4647


PAC FUNDING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 16
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of PAC Funding Corporation are required to file
their proofs of debt by April 16, 2009, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind up proceedings on February 27, 2009.

The company's liquidators are:

          Bronwynne R. Arch
          Beverly Bernard
          P.O. Box 1109, Grand Cayman KY-1102
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 949-7755
          Facsimile: 949-7634


PANTHERA/FUNDING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 17
-----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Panthera/Funding III Cayman Limited are required
to file their proofs of debt by April 17, 2009, to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind up proceedings on February 20, 2009.

The company's liquidators are:

          E. Andrew Hersant
          Christopher Humphries
          c/o Stuarts Walker Hersant
          P.O. Box 2510, Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 3344
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2888


SUDELEY LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 15
----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Sudeley Limited are required to file their proofs
of debt by April 15, 2009, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on February 22, 2009.

The company's liquidator is:

          Talal Mohammad Abdulraheem Mehyar
          Mecca Street, PO Box 9988
          Amman 11191, Jordan
          e-mail: talalmehyar@gmail.com
          Tel: + (962) 77 7 500506
          Fax: + (962) 6 5412259


THE PAMONA ET AL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 10
-----------------------------------------------------------
Chris Johnson fixed April 10, 2009, as the deadline to file proofs
of debt for the creditors of:

   -- The Pamona Capital III Fund; and
   -- The Pamona Capital IV Fund

The companies commenced wind-up proceedings on Feb. 27, 2009.

The Liquidator can be reached at:

          Chris Johnson
          c/o John D'Cunha
          PO Box 2499, Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 0820
          Facsimile: (345) 946 0864


UBS DYNAMIC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 16
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of UBS Dynamic Alpha Strategies Fund 3B Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by April 16, 2009, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on February 27, 2009.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stuart Sybersma
          c/o Jessica Turnbull, Deloitte & Touche
          P.O. Box 1787, Grand Cayman KY1-1109
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 7500
          Facsimile: (345) 949 8258
          e-mail: jturnbull@deloitte.com


UBS GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 16
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of UBS Global Frontier Portfolio, Ltd. – U.S. are
required to file their proofs of debt by April 16, 2009, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on February 27, 2009.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stuart Sybersma
          c/o Jessica Turnbull, Deloitte & Touche
          P.O. Box 1787, Grand Cayman KY1-1109
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 7500
          Facsimile: (345) 949 8258
          e-mail: jturnbull@deloitte.com


UBS U.S. EQUITY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 16
----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of UBS U.S. Equity Alpha Fund Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by April 16, 2009, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on February 27, 2009.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stuart Sybersma
          c/o Jessica Turnbull, Deloitte & Touche
          P.O. Box 1787, Grand Cayman KY1-1109
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949 7500
          Facsimile: (345) 949 8258
          e-mail: jturnbull@deloitte.com



=============
J A M A I C A
=============

AIR JAMAICA: OCG Submits Report on Heathrow Slot Sale
-----------------------------------------------------
The Office of the Contractor General (OCG) has concluded its
investigation on Air Jamaica Limited's controversial GBP5-million
slot sale to Virgin Atlantic Airlines at London's Heathrow Airport
in 2007, Radio Jamaica News reports.

The report recalls the investigation was initiated by Contractor
General Greg Christie last April after Air Jamaica CEO Don Wehby
raised concern about impropriety and a lack of transparency in the
sale of state assets.  Questions were raised about breach of the
Government's Procurement Guidelines, mismanagement and a breach of
accounting procedures, Radio Jamaica relates.

According to Radio Jamaica, the Bruce Golding administration had
taken issue with the decision by the previous government to divest
the Heathrow slots.  The report relates Finance Minister Audley
Shaw maintained that they were sold too cheaply and accused the
People's National Party administration of gross dereliction of
duty in the manner it disposed of the slots.

Radio Jamaica says copies of OCG's 196 page investigation report
has been sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions and the
Attorney-General; Finance Minister, the Financial Secretary; the
President of Air Jamaica, as well as the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate.

                        About Air Jamaica

Headquartered in Kingston, Jamaica, Air Jamaica Limited --
http://www.airjamaica.com/-- was founded in 1969.  It flies
passengers and cargo to almost 30 destinations in the Caribbean,
Europe, and North America.  Air Jamaica offers vacation packages
through Air Jamaica Vacations.  The company closed its intra-
island services unit, Air Jamaica Express, in October 2005.

The Jamaican government owned 25% of the company after it went
private in 1994.  However, in late 2004, the government assumed
full ownership of the airline after an investor group turned over
its 75% stake.  The Jamaican government does not plan to own Air
Jamaica permanently.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 6, 2008, Moody's Investors Service placed the debt ratings of
Air Jamaica Limited, B1 senior unsecured notes guaranteed by the
Government of Jamaica, on review for possible downgrade.  The
review coincides with Moody's action placing the ratings of the
Government of Jamaica under review for downgrade on November 4,
2008.


JUTC: Fare Increase for Commuters Implemented
---------------------------------------------
Commuters began paying increased fares for express and premium
services offered by the state-run Jamaica Urban Transit Company
(JUTC) on Wednesday, Radio Jamaica News reports.  The report
relates the company's fares for regular bus service remain
unchanged.

According to the report, JUTC said the adjustments are due to
increased operational costs to provide the services.

Jamaica Urban Transit Company (JUTC) was established in 1998 to
provide a centrally managed state-of-the-art public bus service.
The government invested US$6 billion aiming to have an efficient
transport system and for the Jamaican people.

                          *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 13, 2009, Radio Jamaica News said the Jamaican cabinet
approved the granting of a government guarantee for Jamaica Urban
Transit Company to secure a US$425 million loan facility from the
Bank of Nova Scotia.  The fund, the report related, will be used
to restructure the bus company's increasing debts.

According to Radio Jamaica, JUTC has defaulted on loan obligations
with RBTT Bank and Petrocaribe Development Fund, among others, due
to cash flow problems.



===========
M E X I C O
===========

COMERCI: Has Until Today to Finalize Debt Restructuring Proposal
----------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports Comerci a.k.a Controladora Comercial Mexicana SAB
de CV has until today, April 3, to strike a deal with its
creditors before a standstill agreement that has prevented further
legal disputes in court expires.  However, a source close to the
negotiations told Reuters Comerci could reach a new deal and push
the deadline for after Easter Week.

The company, which had US$2 billion of liabilities as of October,
made a restructuring proposal to creditors on March 19, Hugh
Collins at Bloomberg News relates.

According to Reuters's source, Barclays, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan
and Merrill Lynch, which are seeking to recover the money they
loaned Comerci, met with the retailer's key negotiators last week
in New York and presented the company with a new proposal, which
includes ways to pay back to all Comerci creditors.

Comerci's new plan eyes asset sales in two to three years, except
its venture with CostCo Wholesale Corp which it considers a “key
asset”, the source said as cited by Reuters.

Reuters recalls Comerci defaulted in October after massive
derivatives losses sent its debt soaring above US$2 billion.  On
Oct. 9, 2008, Comerci filed for protection under Mexico's
bankruptcy code Ley de Concurso Mercantil.  According to Bloomberg
News, Mexican companies posted losses tied to derivatives
contracts in the second half of last year as the peso plunged to
record lows against the U.S. dollar and prices of commodities such
as natural gas fell.

Meanwhile, Anthony Harrup at Dow Jones Newswires reports Comerci
said it made a net loss of 4.28 billion pesos (US$310 million) in
the fourth quarter after it made a provision of MXN11.85 billion
in the fourth quarter against derivatives claims.

Sales rose 5% in the fourth quarter to MXN14.41 billion as it
opened 11 new stores while same-store sales rose 0.13% from the
fourth quarter of 2007, the retailer said in a stock exchange
filing obtained by Dow Jones.

Higher expenses related to electricity, store expansions and the
dollar cost of leased equipment contributed to a 24% drop in
operating profit to MXN742 million, while operating cash flow fell
16% to MXN1.01 billion, the company said as cited by Dow Jones.

Comerci a.k.a Controladora Comercial Mexicana SAB de CV
(MXK:COMERCIUBC) --- http://www.comerci.com.mx/--- is a Mexican
holding company that, through its subsidiaries, operates several
chains of retail stores, as well as a chain of family restaurants
under the Restaurantes California brand name.  In addition, CCM
owns a 50% interest in the Costco de Mexico, a joint venture with
Costco Wholesale Corporation, which operates a chain of membership
warehouses in Mexico.  The Company's store chains include
Comercial Mexicana, City Market, Mega, Bodega CM, Sumesa and
Alprecio, among others.  As of December 31, 2007, CCM operated 214
commercial units and 71 restaurants across Mexico.  The Company's
retail outlets sell a variety of food items, including basic
groceries and perishables, and non-food items, which include
electronics, home furnishings, personal hygiene products and
clothing.  CCM is a parent of Tiendas Comercial Mexicana SA de CV,
Tiendas Sumesa SA de CV, Restaurantes California SA de CV and
Costco de Mexico SA de CV, among others.


GMAC FINANCIERA: Moody's Downgrades Ratings on Eight MXMAC Certs.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico has downgraded the global scale and national
scale ratings of eight certificates from five mortgage-backed
securitizations issued under the MXMAC and MXMACCB programs
established in Mexico by GMAC Financiera S.A. de C.V.  GMAC
acquired and aggregated the underlying collateral for
securitization.  The affected transactions include collateral from
different originators,: MXMACCB 06U (primarily Hipotecaria Credito
y Casa, S.A. de C.V.), MXMACFW 06U and 06-2U (primarily
Hipotecaria Su Casita, S.A. de C.V.), MXMACFW 07U and 07-2U
(primarily Credito Inmobiliario S.A. de C.V. and Hipotecaria Su
Casita), MXMACFW07-3U and 07-4U (Hipotecaria Su Casita, Credito
Inmobiliario, and Hipotecaria Credito y Casa), and MXMACFW07-6U
(primarily Hipotecaria Su Casita).  The pools consist of first-
lien, fixed-rate loans denominated in UDIS and granted primarily
to low-income and middle-income borrowers ("interes social" and
"nivel residencial medio").

The affected certificates and rating actions are:

  -- MXMACCB 06U (Class A certificates) downgraded to Baa3 from
     Baa1 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to Aa3.mx from Aaa.mx
      (National Scale Rating).

  -- MXMACFW 06U (Class A certificates) downgraded to Caa1 from
     Baa3 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to Caa1.mx from
     Aa3.mx (National Scale Rating); MXMACFW 06-2U (Class B
     certificates) downgraded to Ca from Ba1 (Global Scale, Local
     Currency) and to Ca.mx from A1.mx (National Scale Rating).

  -- MXMACFW 07U (Class A certificates) downgraded to Ba3 from
     Baa3 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to A3.mx from Aa3.mx
      (National Scale Rating); MXMACFW 07-2U (Class B
     certificates) downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 (Global Scale,
     Local Currency) and to Caa1.mx from A1.mx (National Scale
     Rating).

  -- MXMACFW07-3U (Class A certificates) downgraded to Ba3 from
     Baa3 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to A3.mx from Aa3.mx
      (National Scale Rating); MXMACFW07-4U (Class B certificates)
     downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 (Global Scale, Local Currency)
     and to Caa1.mx from A2.mx (National Scale Rating).

  -- MXMACFW07-6U (Class B certificates) downgraded to Caa3 from
     Ba2 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to Caa3.mx from A2.mx
      (National Scale Rating).

The rating actions are primarily based on the weak historical
performance of the mortgage portfolios backing the transactions
and Moody's projection of lifetime cumulative gross defaults and
expected losses on the pools.  The underlying pools for each of
the affected transactions have displayed a sharp ramp-up of
delinquencies greater than 90 days that is significantly beyond
Moody's initial expectations considering the seasoning of the
transactions.

As of February 2009, delinquencies greater than 90 days, including
real estate owned (REO), as a percentage of the original pool
balance for each of the underlying pools were:

  -- MXMACCB 06U: 10.4% after 36 months of seasoning, versus 6.9%
     as of 6 months ago

  -- MXMACFW 06U and 06-2U: 20.4% after 29 months of seasoning,
     versus 12.0% as of 6 months ago

  -- MXMACFW 07U and 07-2U: 11.2% after 24 months of seasoning,
     versus 6.0% as of 6 months ago

  -- MXMACFW07-3U and 07-4U: 10.3% after 20 months of seasoning,
     versus 5.3% as of 6 months ago

  -- MXMACFW07-6U: 12.5% after 18 months of seasoning, versus 5.5%
     as of 6 months ago

As indicated by these statistics, the month-to-month deterioration
in performance has been severe in recent months, with
delinquencies greater than 90 days (including REOs) almost
doubling over a 6-month period for most of the underlying pools.
However, accumulated losses to date represent less than 1% of the
original pool balance in all cases given the relatively low number
of reported REO sales to date.  Further, all of the MXMACFW
transactions have outstanding pool balances (including REOs)
ranging from 81% to 92% of the original pool balance, although
MXMACCB 06U has a lower pool factor of 73.2%.  Given the weak
performance trends to date, the relatively short period of time
since the transactions' closing dates, and the high pool factors
for each of the transactions, Moody's expects significantly higher
life-time cumulative gross defaults as a percentage of the
original pool (ranging between the mid-20% to mid-40% range across
the affected transactions) as compared to the level of gross
defaults observed to date.

After estimating projected lifetime gross default rates as a
percentage of the original pool balance, Moody's determined the
expected net losses associated with these projected defaults by
applying a severity of loss assumption on the projected defaulted
loan balance (assumed severities range between mid-40% to high-60%
across the affected transactions).  Moody's updated expected loss
projections as a percentage of the outstanding total pool balance
collateralizing each of the certificates are: MXMACCB 06U (17%),
MXMACFW 06U and 06-2U (35%), MXMACFW 07U and 07-2U (29%),
MXMACFW07-3U and 07-4U (30%), MXMACFW07-6U (31%).  These loss
projections compare with estimated lifetime available credit
enhancement (including subordination, overcollateralization,
remaining excess spread and partial credit guarantee, where
applicable) ranging between the mid-20% to mid-30% range for the
affected senior Class A certificates and approximately 30% for the
affected subordinated certificates (credit enhancement expressed
as a percent of the outstanding pool balance).

                      Monitoring Methodology

When monitoring the performance of residential mortgage backed
securitizations in Mexico, a projected lifetime cumulative gross
default rate is determined as a percentage of the current mortgage
pool balance.  To arrive at this rate, Moody's considers (1) the
actual gross default experience to date, (2) a short-term
projection of additional gross defaults over a period of up to one
year, and (3) a long-term projection of incremental future gross
defaults expected to occur afterwards.

In evaluating the level of gross defaults experienced to date,
Moody's generally considers "defaulted loans" to include all loans
that are currently more than 90 days delinquent, in foreclosure or
in real estate owned status.  It is assumed that the vast majority
of these loans will ultimately result in a true default, leading
to a foreclosure sale, a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, a short-
sale, or a repossession of the property associated with the
defaulted loan.

In evaluating the projected level of gross defaults at the end of
the short-term projection period (generally one year in the
future), a performance-based projection is performed using the
pool's historical performance trends to extrapolate gross defaults
and prepayments as of the end of the short-term projection period.
The projected default rate is determined by linearly interpolating
the historical trends in the defaulted loan rate for the pool over
the most recent nine months.  As a result, it is assumed that
securitizations that have experienced high defaults and
considerable month-over-month performance deterioration over the
past nine months will continue to experience similar performance
deterioration during the short-term projection period.  This
short-term stress addresses currently increasing pressures in the
Mexican economy, such as increasing unemployment, that have
already impacted the performance of mortgage loans.

After estimating the cumulative gross default rate and the pool
factor as of the end of the short-term projection period, Moody's
estimates the trajectory of cumulative gross defaults through the
remaining pool factor (i.e. long-term projection period).  In
order to estimate the incremental defaults projected for the
remaining pool, a Pool Factor Reduction percentage and a Gross
Default-to-Liquidation ratio are calculated as of the end of the
short-term projection period.  The Pool Factor Reduction
percentage represents the proportion of the original pool that is
projected to have either paid down (i.e. via principal
amortization) or defaulted as of the end of the short-term
projection period.  The Gross Default-to-Liquidation ratio is
calculated as the cumulative gross default rate assumed as of the
end of the short-term projection period pool divided by the Pool
Factor Reduction percentage.  This Gross Default-to-Liquidation
ratio estimates the percentage of the projected Pool Factor
Reduction amount attributable to cumulative gross defaults as of
the end of the short-term projection period.

To illustrate with an example, assume a transaction with a
projected Pool Factor Reduction of 30% at the end of a one year
short-term projection period, meaning that the original pool
balance was reduced by 30% due to a combination of principal
paydowns and cumulative gross defaults.  Further assume that of
the total 30% reduction, 5 percentage points were due to
cumulative gross defaults, while the remaining 25 percentage
points were due to principal paydowns.  In this case, the Gross
Default-to-Liquidation ratio is 17%, calculated as 5% (gross
defaults) divided by 30% (pool factor reduction).

Moody's then estimates the incremental gross defaults on the pool
factor remaining as of the end of the short-term projection period
(assuming remaining pool factor equals the original pool factor of
100% minus the Pool Factor Reduction percentage).  The approach
generally assumes that the remaining pool, which has a "current"
delinquency status at the end of the short-term projection period,
will experience a lower rate of gross defaults.  The short-term
projection results in stressed assumptions regarding the build-up
in cumulative gross defaults to account for the more challenging
employment situation currently in Mexico, particularly for
securitizations with relatively high levels of defaults to date
such as those affected by this rating action.  Moody's expects
that performance should not be as stressed after this projection
period.  To reflect this, Moody's generally assumes a factor that
is a fraction of the Gross Default-to-Liquidation ratio calculated
as of the end of the short-term projection period.

To arrive at the projected lifetime cumulative gross default rate,
Moody's adds the incremental defaults projected to occur after the
short-term projection period to the cumulative gross defaults
projected as of the end of the short-term projection period.  The
lifetime projected cumulative gross default rate is then adjusted
as a percentage of the current pool and a small haircut is applied
to reflect that some of these defaulted loans may cure.

After determining the projected lifetime gross default rate as a
percentage of the pool balance, Moody's determines the expected
net losses associated with these defaulted loans by applying a
severity of loss assumption on the defaulted pool balance
(generally ranging between 40% and 75%).  Moody's generally
assumes a severity assumption that is similar to what was used to
originally rate the securitization.

                          Rating Action

The complete rating action is:

Master Servicer: GMAC Financiera S.A. de C.V., Sociedad Financiera
de Objeto Limitado.

Issuer: Banco J.P. Morgan, S.A. Institucion de Banca Múltiple,
J.P. Morgan Grupo Financiero, Division Fiduciaria, acting only in
its capacity as trustee

  -- MXMACCB 06U (Class A certificates) downgraded to Baa3 from
     Baa1 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to Aa3.mx from Aaa.mx
      (National Scale Rating); the last rating action occurred on
     January 8, 2009, when the Baa1 and Aaa.mx ratings were placed
     on review for possible downgrade.

Master Servicer: GMAC Financiera S.A. de C.V., Sociedad Financiera
de Objeto Limitado.

Issuer: HSBC Mexico, S.A., Institucion de Banca Múltiple, Grupo
Financiero HSBC, Division Fiduciaria, acting only in its capacity
as trustee.

  -- MXMACFW 06U (Class A certificates) downgraded to Caa1 from
     Baa3 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to Caa1.mx from
     Aa3.mx (National Scale Rating); the last rating action
     occurred on January 8, 2009, when the Baa3 and Aa3.mx ratings
     were placed on review for possible downgrade.

  -- MXMACFW 06-2U (Class B certificates) downgraded to Ca from
     Ba1 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to Ca.mx from A1.mx
      (National Scale Rating); the last rating action occurred on
     July 25, 2008, when the Ba1 and A1.mx ratings were maintained
     on review for possible downgrade.

  -- MXMACFW 07U (Class A certificates) downgraded to Ba3 from
     Baa3 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to A3.mx from Aa3.mx
      (National Scale Rating); the last rating action occurred on
     January 8, 2009, when the Baa3 and Aa3.mx ratings were placed
     on review for possible downgrade.

  -- MXMACFW 07-2U (Class B certificates) downgraded to Caa1 from
     Ba2 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to Caa1.mx from A1.mx
      (National Scale Rating); the last rating action occurred on
     January 8, 2009, when the Ba2 and A1.mx ratings were placed
     on review for possible downgrade.

  -- MXMACFW07-3U (Class A certificates) downgraded to Ba3 from
     Baa3 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to A3.mx from Aa3.mx
      (National Scale Rating); the last rating action occurred on
     February 18, 2009, when the Baa3 rating was downgraded from
     Baa1, the Aa3.mx rating was downgraded from Aa1.mx, and the
     Baa3 and Aa3.mx ratings were maintained on review for
     possible downgrade; the February 18, 2009 downgrades were due
     solely to downgrades in the financial strength ratings of the
     financial guaranty insurance policy provider (MBIA Insurance
     Corp.), whereas the review for possible downgrade was due to
     performance concerns.

  -- MXMACFW07-4U (Class B certificates) downgraded to Caa1 from
     Ba2 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to Caa1.mx from A2.mx
      (National Scale Rating); the last rating action occurred on
     January 8, 2009, when the Ba2 and A2.mx ratings were placed
     on review for possible downgrade.

  -- MXMACFW07-6U (Class B certificates) downgraded to Caa3 from
     Ba2 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to Caa3.mx from A2.mx
      (National Scale Rating); the last rating action occurred on
     January 8, 2009, when the Ba2 and A2.mx ratings were placed
     on review for possible downgrade.


GRUPO MEXICO: To Close Cananea Mine and Fire Workers on Strike
--------------------------------------------------------------
Grupo Mexico is closing its Southern Copper Corp-operated Cananea
copper mine and seeking government approval to fire the miners
that have been on strike since 2007, Reuters News reports, citing
Grupo Mexico spokesman Juan Rebolledo.  The report recalls on July
2007, workers walked out from their jobs at Cananea due to
contracts and safety disputes.

According to the report, Grupo Mexico officials said the company
is invoking a section of the labor code that would allow it to
fire the strikers because the mine can no longer operate due to
damage to its facilities.  "The cause is force majeure (due to)
the damage caused to the mine. ... Federal labor legislation
includes the possibility that the company can terminate labor
relations when this occurs," the report quoted company spokesman
Juan Rebolledo as saying.

A Grupo Mexico lawyer Salvador Rocha, Reuters notes, said a
hearing on the company's request is tentatively set for April 14
and the whole process should be completed by July.

Reuters says Mr. Rocha said the company may reopen the mine in a
later date if investment made economic sense, however, it will not
rehire the strikers at that time, but will employ new workers.

                       About Grupo Mexico

Headquartered in Mexico, Grupo Mexico SAB de CV --
http://www.gmexico.com-- comprised companies involved in the
exploration, mining and processing of metallic and non-metallic
minerals and the mining of coal, as well as the provision of
multi-use and freight railway services.  The activities of the
company’s Mining division are bundled into its wholly owned
subsidiary, Americas Mining Corporation (AMC) that operates mines
and metallurgic plants and has exploration projects in Peru,
Mexico and Chile.  The Company’s Railroad division is represented
by its 75%-owned subsidiary, Infraestructura y Transportes Mexico
SA de CV (ITM), engaged in the freight transportation, logistics
and multimodal services, through Grupo Ferroviario Mexicano, SA
(Ferromex) and Ferrosur SA de CV.  In addition, during 2008, the
company increased its participation in Southern Copper Corporation
(SCC).


HIPOTECARIA CREDITO: Moody's Downgrades Class A Ratings to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico has downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1 (Global Scale,
Local Currency) and to A1.mx from Aaa.mx (Mexican National Scale)
the ratings of Class A certificates CREYCB 06U.  Moody's also
downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to
Caa1.mx from A1.mx (Mexican National Scale) the ratings of Class B
certificates CREYCB 06-2U of Hipotecaria Credito y Casa, S.A. de
C.V., Sociedad Financiera de Objeto Limitado.

Moody's rating action is primarily based on the weak historical
performance of the mortgage portfolio backing this transaction and
Moody's projection of lifetime cumulative gross defaults and
expected losses on the pool.  The underlying pool has continued to
show a sharp ramp-up of delinquencies that are beyond Moody's
initial expectations.  As of February 2009, and after 27 months of
seasoning, delinquencies greater than 90 days were 16.0% and
delinquencies greater than 180 days were 9.2%.  These same ratios
were 9.6% and 4.2%, respectively, six months ago.

As indicated by these statistics, the month-to-month deterioration
in performance has been severe in recent months, with
delinquencies greater than 90 days growing by 67% over a 6-month
period.  Given the weak performance trend to date, the relatively
short period of time since closing and the high pool factor for
the transaction, Moody's expects lifetime cumulative gross
defaults as a percentage of the original pool (in the mid-40%) to
be significantly higher than the cumulative gross defaults
realized to date.

After estimating the projected lifetime gross default rates as a
percentage of the original pool balance, Moody's determined the
expected net losses associated with these projected defaults by
applying a severity of loss assumption on the projected defaulted
loan balance (assumed severity was 50%).  Moody's updated expected
loss projections as a percentage of the outstanding total pool
balance is 24%.  This loss projection compares with estimated
lifetime available credit enhancement (including subordination,
overcollateralization, and remaining excess spread) of
approximately 30% for the senior Class A certificates and
approximately 25% for the subordinated Class B certificates
(credit enhancement expressed as a percent of the outstanding pool
balance).

Moody's last rating action on the certificates was on January 08,
2009 when the ratings were placed on review for possible
downgrade.

                      Monitoring Methodology

When monitoring the performance of residential mortgage backed
securitizations in Mexico, a projected lifetime cumulative gross
default rate is determined as a percentage of the current mortgage
pool balance.  To arrive at this rate, Moody's considers (1) the
actual gross default experience to date, (2) a short-term
projection of additional gross defaults over a period of up to one
year, and (3) a long-term projection of incremental future gross
defaults expected to occur afterwards.

In evaluating the level of gross defaults experienced to date,
Moody's generally considers "defaulted loans" to include all loans
that are currently more than 90 days delinquent, in foreclosure or
in real estate owned status.  It is assumed that the vast majority
of these loans will ultimately result in a true default, leading
to a foreclosure sale, a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, a short-
sale, or a repossession of the property associated with the
defaulted loan.

In evaluating the projected level of gross defaults at the end of
the short-term projection period (generally one year in the
future), a performance-based projection is completed using the
pool's historical performance trends to extrapolate gross defaults
and prepayments as of the end of the short-term projection period.
The projected default rate is determined by linearly interpolating
the historical trends in the defaulted loan rate for the pool over
the most recent nine months.  As a result, it is assumed that
securitizations that have experienced high defaults and
considerable month-over-month performance deterioration over the
past nine months will continue to experience similar performance
deterioration during the short-term projection period.  This
short-term stress addresses currently increasing pressures in the
Mexican economy, such as increasing unemployment, that have
already impacted the performance of mortgage loans.

After estimating the cumulative gross default rate and the pool
factor as of the end of the short-term projection period, Moody's
estimates the trajectory of cumulative gross defaults through the
remaining pool factor (i.e. long-term projection period).  In
order to estimate the incremental defaults projected for the
remaining pool, a Pool Factor Reduction percentage and a Gross
Default-to-Liquidation ratio are calculated as of the end of the
short-term projection period.  The Pool Factor Reduction
percentage represents the percentage of the original pool that is
projected to have either paid down (i.e. via principal
amortization) or defaulted as of the end of the short-term
projection period.  The Gross Default-to-Liquidation ratio is
calculated as the cumulative gross default rate assumed as of the
end of the short-term projection period pool divided by the Pool
Factor Reduction percentage.  This Gross Default-to-Liquidation
ratio estimates the percentage of the projected Pool Factor
Reduction amount attributable to cumulative gross defaults as of
the end of the short-term projection period.

To illustrate with an example, assume a transaction with a
projected Pool Factor Reduction of 30% at the end of a one year
short-term projection period, meaning that the original pool
balance was reduced by 30% due to a combination of principal
paydowns and cumulative gross defaults.  Further assume that of
the total 30% reduction, 5 percentage points were due to
cumulative gross defaults, while the remaining 25 percentage
points were due to principal paydowns.  In this case, the Gross
Default-to-Liquidation ratio is 17%, calculated as 5% (gross
defaults) divided by 30% (pool factor reduction).

Moody's then estimates the incremental gross defaults on the pool
factor remaining as of the end of the short-term projection period
(assuming remaining pool factor equals the original pool factor of
100% minus the Pool Factor Reduction percentage).  The approach
generally assumes that the remaining pool, which has a "current"
delinquency status at the end of the short-term projection period,
will experience a lower rate of gross defaults.  The short-term
projection results in stressed assumptions regarding the build-up
in cumulative gross defaults to account for the more challenging
employment situation currently in Mexico, particularly for
securitizations with relatively high levels of defaults to date
such as the one affected by this rating action.  Moody's expects
that performance should not be as stressed after this projection
period.  To reflect this, Moody's generally assumes a factor that
is a fraction of the Gross Default-to-Liquidation ratio calculated
as of the end of the short-term projection period.

To arrive at the projected lifetime cumulative gross default rate,
Moody's adds the incremental defaults projected to occur after the
short-term projection period to the cumulative gross defaults
projected as of the end of the short-term projection period.  The
lifetime projected cumulative gross defaults is then adjusted as a
percentage of the current pool and a small haircut is applied to
reflect that some of these defaulted loans may cure.

After determining the projected lifetime gross default rate as a
percentage of the pool balance, Moody's determines the expected
net losses associated with these defaulted loans by applying a
severity of loss assumption on the defaulted pool balance
(generally ranging between 40% and 75%).  Moody's generally
assumes a severity assumption that is similar to what was used to
originally rate the securitization.

                           Rating Action

The complete rating action is:

Issuer: Banco Invex, S.A., acting only in its capacity as trustee.

  -- CREYCB 06U (Class A certificates) - ratings downgraded to Ba1
     from Baa1 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to A1.mx from
     Aaa.mx (National Scale Rating).  The last rating action was
     on January 08, 2009 when the ratings were placed on review
     for possible downgrade.

  -- CREYCB 06-2U (Class B certificates) - ratings downgraded to
     Caa1 from Ba2 (Global Scale, Local Currency) and to Caa1.mx
     from A1.mx (National Scale Rating).  The last rating action
     was on January 08, 2009 when the ratings were placed on
     review for possible downgrade.



VITRO SAB: Incurs US$343 Million Consolidated Net Loss in 4Q 2008
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. posted a US$343 million consolidated net loss
in the fourth quarter 2008 from a US$48 million net income in the
same period in 2007.  The variation, Vitro said, is mainly the
result of a US$423 million increase in total financing result
derived from a non-cash change in the mark-to-market1 claimed by
its derivative counterparties coupled with a lower EBIT.

The company's consolidated net sales for the fourth quarter 2008
decreased 18.2% YoY to US$538 million from US$659 million in 2007,
mostly affected by a 28.2% peso depreciation during the quarter.
Glass Containers sales for the fourth quarter decreased YoY by
18.5% while Flat Glass sales declined 18.0% over the same time
period.  During the fourth quarter, domestic, export and foreign
subsidiaries’ sales decreased 13.2%, 24.4%, and 20.3% YoY
respectively.

Consolidated EBIT for the quarter decreased 81.5 percent YoY to
US$15 million from US$79 million last year.  EBIT margin decreased
9.4 percentage points to 2.7 percent from 12.1 percent.  For
fiscal year 2008, consolidated EBIT decreased 33.7 percent to
US$160 million from US$242 million in year 2007.  During this same
period of time, EBIT margin decreased 3.3 percentage points to 6.1
percent from 9.4 percent.

EBIT for the quarter at Glass Containers decreased by 61.0 percent
YoY, while at Flat Glass EBIT decreased to negative US$6 million
from US$20 million in 4Q’07.

Consolidated EBITDA for the quarter decreased 41.8 percent to
US$59 million from US$101 million in 4Q’07.  The EBITDA margin
declined 4.4 percentage points YoY to 10.9 percent from 15.3
percent due to lower volumes which also impacted fixed-cost
absorption.  For fiscal year 2008, consolidated EBITDA declined
15.9 percent to US$329 million from US$391 million in year 2007.
2008 EBITDA includes US$26 million EBITDA from Comegua for first
eleven months of the year.  Comegua was deconsolidated since
December 2008.

During the quarter, EBITDA at Glass Containers decreased 34.2
percent YoY to US$50 million from US$76 million while EBITDA at
Flat Glass decreased 75.9 percent YoY to US$7 million from US$30
million.

As of December 31, 2008, the company's balance sheet showed total
current assets of US$730 million and total current liabilities of
US$2.04 billion.

The company's balance sheet as of end-December 2008 also showed
total assets of US$2.46 billion, total liabilities of US$2.25
billion and total shareholder's equity of US$238 million.

Consolidated gross debt as of December 31, 2008 totaled
US$1.4 billion, a QoQ increase of US$7 million and a YoY increase
of US$91 million.

                           About Vitro

Headquartered in Monterrey, Mexico, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. (BMV:
VITROA; NYSE: VTO), through its two subsidiaries, Vitro Envases
Norteamerica, SA de C.V. and Vimexico, S.A. de C.V., is a global
glass producer, serving the construction and automotive glass
markets and glass containers needs of the food, beverage, wine,
liquor, cosmetics and pharmaceutical industries.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 11, 2009, Fitch Ratings downgraded Vitro, S.A.B. De C.V's
Long-term Issuer Default Rating to 'D' from 'C '; Long-term
foreign currency IDR to 'D' from 'C'; National scale long-term
rating to 'D(mex)' from 'C(mex)'; and Certificados Bursatiles
issuances to 'D(mex)' from 'C(mex)'.

In addition, Fitch affirmed the rating on the company's US$300
million senior notes due 2012 at 'CC/RR4'; US$225 million senior
notes due 2013 at 'CC/RR4'; and US$700 million senior notes due
2017 at 'CC/RR4'.



VITRO SAB: Finacity Facilitates Funding of Units' Receivables
-------------------------------------------------------------
Finacity Corporation said it facilitated the funding of a two-
tranche trade receivables securitization for two subsidiaries of
Vitro Envases Norteamerica S.A. (VENA), a unit of Vitro S.A.B. de
C.V.

According to a March 31 press release, Finacity Corporation acted
as the Structurer, Master Servicer, Servicer and Bond
Administrator, and successfully facilitated a transaction that
provided VENA with enhanced liquidity from receivables assigned
from VENA subsidiaries Compania Vidriera, S.A. de C.V., which
conducts a substantial majority of VENA's glass container
operations in Mexico, and Industria del Alcali, S.A. de C.V.,
which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of soda ash,
sodium bicarbonate, calcium chloride and salt.

Finacity Corporation said it split VENA's funding into two
tranches.  The senior tranche is a MXN 550,000,000 variable rate
investment grade bond.  The senior tranche is funded by a domestic
investor in Mexico.  The subordinate tranche is an unrated
US$19,000,000 fixed rate bond funded by a multinational investor
with recourse back to Vitro S.A.B.

"This is a very important transaction for Vitro S.A.B. and
demonstrates the market's confidence in Vitro S.A.B.´s future.
This important step is appropriate to ensure Vitro's long-term
success and confirms that we are taking the right decisions to
successfully face the challenging environment.  We strongly
believe in the company's potential," commented Claudio Del Valle,
Vitro's Executive Finance and Administration President.

"We are proud and pleased to have served Vitro S.A.B.'s needs in
their home country through such a complex transaction," said
Adrian Katz, Finacity's Chief Executive Officer.  "The structure
we created for Vitro S.A.B. demonstrates Finacity Corp's
flexibility and breadth of execution capabilities for our clients
both in Mexico and globally."

                    About Finacity Corporation

Finacity Corporation --  http://www.finacity.com.-- specializes
in the provision of efficient, securitization-based trade
receivables funding, state-of-the-art servicing, detailed
transaction transparency and reporting solutions.  The company's
offerings can include both domestic and international receivables
for its clients.  Finacity Corporation's strategic partners and
investors include ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS), Bank of America, Euler
Hermes ACI, Avenue Capital, Ecoban and Kleiner Perkins Caufield &
Byers.

                           About Vitro

Headquartered in Monterrey, Mexico, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. (BMV:
VITROA; NYSE: VTO), through its two subsidiaries, Vitro Envases
Norteamerica, SA de C.V. and Vimexico, S.A. de C.V., is a global
glass producer, serving the construction and automotive glass
markets and glass containers needs of the food, beverage, wine,
liquor, cosmetics and pharmaceutical industries.

                           *    *    *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 11, 2009, Fitch Ratings downgraded Vitro S.A.B. De C.V's
Long-term Issuer Default Rating to 'D' from 'C '; Long-term
foreign currency IDR to 'D' from 'C'; National scale long-term
rating to 'D(mex)' from 'C(mex)'; and Certificados Bursatiles
issuances to 'D(mex)' from 'C(mex)'.

In addition, Fitch affirmed the company's US$300 million senior
notes due 2012 at 'CC/RR4'; US$225 million senior notes due 2013
at 'CC/RR4'; and US$700 million senior notes due 2017 at 'CC/RR4'.


* MEXICO: Moves Sugar Mills Sale Date on Low Offers
---------------------------------------------------
The Mexican government will postpone the sale of its 13 state-
owned mills after rejecting bids that were around 70% below
estimates, Bloomberg News reports, citing Agriculture Minister
Alberto Cardenas.  “I wish we could sell at least these four” the
report quoted Mr. Cardenas as saying, noting the current economy
makes the divestitures more difficult.

Bloomberg News relates Mexico wants to sell the mills to fuel
spending in the industry as it seeks to boost production by 13% by
2012.  The report notes Mr. Cardenas said: “These mills require
large investments to make the most of them, and of course, we
don’t have a large enough budget to invest.”  Each plant may need
as much as 800 million pesos (US$57.5 million) for upgrades, he
said.

According to the report, Mr. Cardenas said it looks like the
government-owned mill are the least profitable and least
productive.  “We don’t want the government to own any sugar mills,
it’s not our activity, that should be a private-sector activity,”
the report quoted Mr. Cardena as saying.

Bloomberg News recalls the government expropriated 27 mills in
2001 after talks fell apart with producers on providing loans for
upgrades.  The report relates Grupo Azucarero Mexico SA, owner of
six mills at the time, went bankrupt, and protests by sugar-cane
cutters for $500 million in back pay led to mill closures.  At
present, Mexico has 57 mills, the report says.


* MEXICO: Gov't to Cut Economic Growth Forecast for This Year
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Mexican government plans to cut its economic growth forecast
for this year, saying gross domestic product will contract 2.8% as
the United States, its main trading partner, enters into
recession, Bloomberg News reports.

Bloomberg News, citing a Finance Ministry report, relates the
country's investment may fall 8.4% and consumption may drop 2.2%.
Mexico will miss out on 145.5 billion pesos (US$10.5 billion) of
oil revenue in 2009 because of falling crude prices, although
hedges contracted on oil prices will bring in 129.7 billion pesos,
the report says.

According to Bloomberg News, economists have cut growth forecasts
as reports show shrinking investment, declining remittances from
Mexicans living abroad, and a slowdown in manufacturing.

The Finance Ministry report, Bloomberg News notes, said the
economy will resume growing in 2010 with a 2 percent expansion.



===============================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
===============================

CL FIN'L: CLICO (Guyana) Suspends Chief Executive Officer
---------------------------------------------------------
CLICO Life and General Insurance Company South America Limited
(CLICO Guyana), a unit of CL Financial Limited, suspended its
Chief Executive Officer Geeta Singh-Knight, citing decisions she
made without the knowledge of the board, Stabroek News reports.

The report relates in a letter signed by CLICO (Guyana) Director
Winston Ramalho, the company condemned Ms. Singh-Knight’s decision
to dismiss 40 full-time and three part-time staff, and her
instruction to remove CL Financial Chairman Lawrence Duprey’s name
as a signatory to local bank accounts without consulting, and or a
grant of approval by the Board of Directors.  Stabroek News notes
Ms. Singh-Knight was instructed in the letter to surrender to Mr.
Ramalho the company vehicle, computer, company documents and or
files which are also in her possession.

According to the report, the company also filed a motion with the
High Court to limit the actions of Judicial Manager Maria van Beek
within the boundaries of court-approved decision after Ms. van
Beek instructed Ms. Singh-Knight to disregard the letter of
suspension and to remain in her office.

In the move to the court, the report relates, Clico (Guyana)
sought these series of orders:

   * An order under Section 70 of the Insurance Act
     that the order of Judicial Management dated Feb. 25,
     2009 appointing the Commissioner of Insurance Judicial
     Manager of Clico Life and General Insurance Co.
     (S.A.) Ltd be cancelled on the ground that it is
     undesirable that the Order should remain in force;
     alternatively

   * An Order varying the Order of Court dated the Feb. 25,
     2009 by the deletion of that portion or part of the
     afore said Order which reads: “it is further ordered
     that the Commissioner of Insurance be appointed
     Judicial Manager for the purpose of Judicial
     Management as Ordered.”

   * That the Court issue directions under Section 69
     (5)of the Insurance Act to the Judicial Manager as
     to whether Geeta Singh-Knight is authorized to act as
     and to perform the duties of Chief Executive Officer
     of Clico Life and General Insurance Company (S.A.)
     Limited whilst the said Company is under Judicial
     Management.

   * An Order that the closure of offices of Clico Life
     and General Insurance Company (S. A.) Limited by
     Ms. Singh-Knight purporting to perform the functions
     of Chief Executive Officer is a nullity.

Stabroek News relates Mr. Ramalho, in his affidavit in support of
the motion, said there are no limitations on the judicial
manager’s functions and duties and as such the said functions and
duties are completely uncircumscribed.  In addition, Mr. Ramalho
said that the effect of placing the entire company under judicial
management has caused the company substantial financial loss as in
those areas of business, the existing policies cannot be renewed
or continued.

                       About CL Financial

According to Wikipedia, CL Financial Limited is the largest
privately held conglomerate in Trinidad and Tobago and one of the
largest privately held corporations in the entire Caribbean.
Founded as an insurance company, Colonial Life Insurance Company
(CLICO) by Cyril Duprey, it was expanded into a diversified
company by his nephew, Lawrence Duprey.  CL Financial is now one
of the largest local conglomerates in the region, encompassing
over 65 companies in 32 countries worldwide with total assets
standing at roughly US$100 billion.

                          *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 20, 2009, the Trinidad and Tobago Express said Central Bank
Governor Ewart Williams disclosed that an examination of insurance
company CLICO, dissolved finance house CLICO Investment Bank and
other CL Financial companies, showed a deficit between $6 billion
and $8 billion.

Tobago President George Maxwell Richards, The Express related,
signed bailout bills for CL Financial, giving the government the
authority to control the company's unit, Colonial Life Insurance
Company, and giving the central bank extensive powers to treat
with CL Financial's collapse and the consequent systemic crisis.

According to the Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, the government used
$1 billion of taxpayers money to help protect depositors and
policyholders.

T&T Newsday related Governor Williams pleaded with policy holders
not to withdraw money from Clico, amid the unit's increasing
$10 billion debt.



                            ***********

Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to
publication.  Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual
trades.  Prices for actual trades are probably different.  Our
objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly
traded securities.  Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer
or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind.  It is
likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds
some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities
about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies
with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on
the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical
cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a
firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance
sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at
which equity securities trade in public market are determined by
more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR-LA. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick,
Maryland USA.  Marie Therese V. Profetana, Marites O. Claro, Joy
A. Agravente, Pius Xerxes V. Tovilla, Rousel Elaine C. Tumanda,
Valerie C. Udtuhan, Frauline S. Abangan, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.


Copyright 2009.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


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