/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/120629.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Friday, June 29, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 128 Headlines A R G E N T I N A ARGEN-KILL SA: Files For Bankruptcy CAUCETV SA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 17 CORD BLOOD: Agrees to Pay BioCells Sellers $60,000 in 2012 FEYNA SRL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 2 INSTITUTO PARA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 30 TRANSPORCATE SA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 10 B A G O T A BANCO DAVIVIENDA: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' Subordinated Debt Rating B A R B A D O S REDJET: Finance Minister Denies US$8 Million Fund Commitment B R A Z I L * BRAZIL: Moody's Cuts Standalone BCA of 8 Financial Institutions C A Y M A N I S L A N D S 1908 HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 16 DB KAMCHATKA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31 GGICO MIDDLE EAST: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31 GIH HF I: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31 GREEN LEAF: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31 LF CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 9 PARKWOOD HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 16 REMITTANCE LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 19 YELLOW HAMMER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31 ZEBRA FINANCE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31 M E X I C O VITRO SAB: Must Have Stay Immediately to Halt Asset Seizures P U E R T O R I C O COMPREHENSIVE CARE: Expects to Report Profit in Second Quarter T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O ALEXANDRA RESORT: In Receivership Instead of Exploring Options X X X X X X X X * Moody's Cuts Ratings on Lat-Am Units of BBVA & Banco Santander * Moody's Cuts Ratings on Spanish Banks' North American Units - - - - - ================= A R G E N T I N A ================= ARGEN-KILL SA: Files For Bankruptcy ----------------------------------- Argen-Kill SA filed for bankruptcy. The company has defaulted on its payments last May 24. CAUCETV SA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 17 ------------------------------------------------- Nestor Delfor Monti, the court-appointed trustee for Caucetv SA's bankruptcy proceedings, will be verifying creditors' proofs of claim until Aug. 17, 2012. Mr. Monti will present the validated claims in court as individual reports. The National Commercial Court of First Instance No. 6 in Buenos Aires, with the assistance of Clerk No. 12, will determine if the verified claims are admissible, taking into account the trustee's opinion, and the objections and challenges that will be raised by the company and its creditors. The Trustee can be reached at: Nestor Delfor Monti Av. Cordoba 1525 Argentina CORD BLOOD: Agrees to Pay BioCells Sellers $60,000 in 2012 ---------------------------------------------------------- Cord Blood America, Inc., entered into an agreement with Sebastian Nicolas Neuspiller, Diego Esteban Rissola, Jorge Alejandro Jurado, Mauro Leonardo Bruno, and Alejandro Jorge Rico Douglas, from whom the Company purchased its majority ownership interest in Biocordcell Argentina S.A., an Argentine corporation, in 2010. The Agreement operates as a settlement between the parties as to the amount of compensation owed by the Company to BioCells as "earn-out" compensation under the Stock Purchase Agreement entered into between the parties on or around Sept. 20, 2010. Under the Stock Purchase Agreement, for the earn-out the Company could have owed the Sellers up to $705,000 plus a sum equal to 20% of the amount of BioCells Net Profit for fiscal year 2011 exceeding $577,000. The terms of the Agreement limit the cash payout to the sellers during 2012 to $60,000. Additionally, the Agreement provides for future cash amounts, not to exceed $440,000, to be paid through CBAI's percentage portion of dividends earned solely based on BioCells' operating performance in 2012 and 2013. This structure should also reverse a portion of the previous accrual related to the 2011 earn-out amount on the balance sheet booked for year ending 2011, and negates any further balance sheet liability which could have been recorded upwards of $455,000 if no such agreement was reached. "I am most pleased that the sellers of BioCells, through Diego Rissola, President of BioCells, and Cord Blood America management were not only able to reach an agreement on the final year of the earn-out, but also use the extensive dialogue to strengthen several components of the relationship that will leverage the two entities in the years ahead," said Chairman and President Joseph Vicente. Mr. Vicente in addition said: * BioCells is a financially self sufficient operation. It is important to note that CBAI has not invested any money into the working capital of BioCells since its acquisition in September 2010. Additionally, BioCells carries no long term debt or loan balances on its balance sheet. "We are at a point in our life cycle where each subsidiary and/or investment needs to demonstrate its financial independence; we hold out BioCells as a model of such achievement," Mr. Vicente said. * From 2009 to 2011, BioCells increased the number of new enrollments over 15% per annum, primarily through organic growth. The company currently stores approximately 5,000 umbilical cord blood samples for families at its facility headquartered in Buenos Aires, Argentina. * In addition to the already strong organic growth engine in Argentina, BioCells is fast establishing a footprint in other markets throughout South America. In the last six months, it has added franchise operations in Brazil, Paraguay, Mexico and Panama. It will take some time for this franchise model to bear results, but this new sales channel provides BioCells with an additional opportunity to expand quickly into these emerging markets and seize the front end of the growth curve. Key to this strategy of expansion is the co-branding of the CBAI name via the use of company trademarks with these franchises. "It is exciting to see the ever increasing recognition by the Latin American population of the value of storing stem cells. We believe our relationship with BioCells places us in a unique position to continue to expand our knowledge and presence in South America and Central America for this growing population, as we also continue to expand our efforts in reaching the Hispanic population in the United States," Mr. Vicente concluded. About Cord Blood America Based in Las Vegas, Nevada, Cord Blood America, Inc., is primarily a holding company whose subsidiaries include Cord Partners, Inc., CorCell Co. Inc., CorCell Ltd.; CBA Professional Services, Inc. D/B/A BodyCells, Inc.; CBA Properties, Inc.; and Career Channel Inc, D/B/A Rainmakers International. Cord specializes in providing private cord blood stem cell preservation services to families. BodyCells is a developmental stage company and intends to be in the business of collecting, processing and preserving peripheral blood and adipose tissue stem cells allowing individuals to privately preserve their stem cells for potential future use in stem cell therapy. Properties was formed to hold the corporate trademarks and other intellectual property of CBAI. Rain specializes in creating direct response television and radio advertising campaigns, including media placement and commercial production. After auditing the 2011 results, Rose, Snyder & Jacobs, LLP, in Encino, California, expressed substantial doubt substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern. The independent auditors noted that the Company has sustained recurring operating losses, continues to consume cash in operating activities, and has insufficient working capital and an accumulated deficit at Dec. 31, 2011. Cord Blood reported a net loss attributable to the Company of $5.97 million in 2011, compared with a net loss attributable to the Company of $8.09 million in 2010. The Company's balance sheet at March 31, 2012, showed $7.41 million in total assets, $7.31 million in total liabilities and $101,042 in total stockholders' equity. FEYNA SRL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 2 ----------------------------------------------- Mario Leizerow, the court-appointed trustee for Feyna SRL's bankruptcy proceedings, will be verifying creditors' proofs of claim until Aug. 2, 2012. Mr. Leizerow will present the validated claims in court as individual reports. The National Commercial Court of First Instance No. 22 in Buenos Aires, with the assistance of Clerk No. 43, will determine if the verified claims are admissible, taking into account the trustee's opinion, and the objections and challenges that will be raised by the company and its creditors. The Trustee can be reached at: Mario Leizerow Av. Santa Fe 2206 Argentina INSTITUTO PARA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 30 ----------------------------------------------------- Ines B. Petrone, the court-appointed trustee for Instituto para el Desarrollo de la Micro y Peque¤a Empresa (Idemi's bankruptcy proceedings, will be verifying creditors' proofs of claim until July 30, 2012. Ms. Petrone will present the validated claims in court as individual reports. The National Commercial Court of First Instance No. 2 in Buenos Aires, with the assistance of Clerk No. 3, will determine if the verified claims are admissible, taking into account the trustee's opinion, and the objections and challenges that will be raised by the company and its creditors. The Trustee can be reached at: Ines B. Petrone Mercedes 313 Argentina TRANSPORCATE SA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 10 ------------------------------------------------------ Susana Mabel Costa, the court-appointed trustee for Transporcate SA's bankruptcy proceedings, will be verifying creditors' proofs of claim until July 10, 2012. Ms. Costa will present the validated claims in court as individual reports. The National Commercial Court of First Instance No. 19 in Buenos Aires, with the assistance of Clerk No. 38, will determine if the verified claims are admissible, taking into account the trustee's opinion, and the objections and challenges that will be raised by the company and its creditors. The Trustee can be reached at: Susana Mabel Costa Alicia Moreau de Justo 2030 Argentina =========== B A G O T A =========== BANCO DAVIVIENDA: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' Subordinated Debt Rating ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba1 long term foreign currency debt rating to Banco Davivienda S.A.'s proposed ten-year subordinated debt issuance of up to US$500 million. The proposed debt is expected to be eligible for Tier 2 capital treatment under Colombian law. The issuance is expected to be a non-preferred, non-convertible subordinated debt with no coupon deferral option. The outlook on the rating is negative. The following rating was assigned to Davivienda's proposed ten- year subordinated debt issuance of up to US$500 million: Long term foreign currency subordinated debt rating of Ba1, negative outlook Ratings Rationale Moody's noted that the Ba1 subordinated debt rating assigned to the Tier 2 capital-eligible notes reflects one notch of subordination from Davivienda's Baa3 long term global local currency deposit rating, in line with Moody's standard notching practices. The last rating action regarding Davivienda was on 30 January 2012, when all ratings were affirmed and the outlook changed to negative, from stable, following the announcement of the acquisition of HSBC's bank, insurance, and financial and service companies in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras. The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Guidelines for Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and Subordinated Debt published in November 2009, Bank Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings: Global Methodology published in March 2012. Davivienda is headquartered in Bogota, Distrito Capital and is the third largest bank in Colombia. As of year-end 2011, the bank had US$18.9 billion in assets and US$2.5 billion in shareholders' equity. =============== B A R B A D O S =============== REDJET: Finance Minister Denies US$8 Million Fund Commitment ------------------------------------------------------------ RJR News reports that Barbados Minister of Finance Chris Sinckler is denying that he made a commitment to inject US$8 million dollars in failed low budget airline Airone Caribbean/Airone Ventures Limited (Redjet). Making his budget presentation in Parliament, Mr. Sinckler said the Government did not mislead REDjet or renege on any promise to lend financial assistance, according to RJR News. The report notes that Mr. Sincker said that Redjet was a private entity and not a Government department and therefore had no right to any direct financial assistance from the State. Mr. Sinckler said he was responding to unfortunate statements and commentaries that have emerged in recent weeks following the collapse of REDjet, the report notes. RJR News says that the airline stopped flying to Jamaica and other regional destinations in March due to severe financial problems. REDjet (Airone Caribbean/Airone Ventures Limited) is a startup low-cost carrier (LCC) based at the Grantley Adams International Airport in Christ Church, Barbados, near Bridgetown. Incorporated in Barbados, the privately owned airline features a fleet of McDonnell Douglas MD-82 and MD-83 aircraft. * * * As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on March 26, 2012, RJR News related that REDjet's decision to suspend all flights came a day after the airline announced the addition of its new route to Antigua and Barbuda. REDjet officials are calling on the Barbadian government for close to $8,000,000 in assistance, and to receive the same subsidies as other airlines, RJR News noted. The report disclosed that Mr. Maharaj said governments cannot continue to expose themselves as a guarantor to private enterprises. =========== B R A Z I L =========== * BRAZIL: Moody's Cuts Standalone BCA of 8 Financial Institutions ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the standalone bank financial strength ratings (BFSR) or lowered the standalone baseline credit assessments (BCA) of eight Brazilian financial institutions by one to three notches. The long-term global local currency (GLC) deposit ratings or issuer ratings of 11 financial institutions were downgraded by one to two notches, while the deposit rating of one bank was confirmed. In addition, the short- term deposit ratings of six banks were downgraded by one notch. These rating actions conclude the reviews initiated on 24 February and March 15, 2012. The revised standalone ratings of three banks carry a positive outlook. A positive outlook has also been assigned to the supported local currency ratings of twelve issuers, while the outlook on the deposit rating of one bank is negative. The rating actions took place in the context of Moody's ongoing global review of all banks whose standalone assessments are higher than the rating of the country in which they are domiciled as discussed in the rating implementation guidance "How Sovereign Credit Quality May Affect Other Ratings" published on 13 February 2012, and further detailed in the special comment "Banks and Sovereigns: Risk Correlations Constrain Standalone Bank Credit Assessments" published on 30 April 2012. The repositioning of the ratings also incorporates Moody's recent rating actions taken on the affected banks' parent banking groups, as discussed in the press release entitled "Moody's downgrades firms with global capital markets operations" dated 21 June 2012. Moody's ratings assigned to other 39 banks in Brazil were unaffected by this global review because their standalone assessments are at or below the rating of the sovereign. A list of the Affected Credit Ratings is available at: http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_143528 Ratings Rationale Downgrade of Standalone Ratings The downward revision of the eight affected banks' standalone ratings takes into account (i) the extent to which their business depend on the domestic macroeconomic and financial environment; (ii) the degree of reliance on market-based, and therefore more confidence-sensitive, funding; and (iii) their direct or indirect exposures to domestic sovereign debt, compared with their capital bases. The standalone credit assessments of four of the eight banks were lowered to the Baa2 level of the Brazilian government debt rating, reflecting Moody's view that their creditworthiness ultimately cannot be completely de-linked from the credit strength of the government. The key drivers for these actions were (i) the high level of balance sheet exposure to domestic sovereign debt, compared to their capital buffers; (ii) their primarily domestic banking operations, with macroeconomic exposures similar to those of the sovereign government, and (iii) low level of cross-border diversification of their operations. Moody's review indicated that there are little, if any, reasons to believe that these banks would be insulated from a government debt crisis. More particularly, Moody's notes their significant direct exposure to the Brazilian government securities, equivalent to 167% of tier 1 capital on average based on latest publicly available consolidated data (March 2012). The following Brazilian banks' standalone ratings and credit assessments were downgraded to the level of the sovereign debt rating: Banco do Brasil S.A. (BB)-- to C-/baa2 from C+/a2 Banco Safra S.A. (Safra) -- to C-/baa2 from C-/baa1 Banco Santander (Brasil) (Santander Brazil) -- to C-/baa2 from C/a3 HSBC Bank Brasil -- Banco Multiplo S.A. (HSBC Brazil) -- to C- /baa2 from C/a3 The standalone credit assessments of three of the eight banks were lowered, albeit to levels still higher than the debt ratings of the Brazilian government. Their BCAs now exceed the sovereign rating by one notch. Moody's says that these exceptions reflect factors that help mitigate the risk correlations with the respective domestic government's creditworthiness, including moderate levels of cross border diversification and high levels of business and earnings diversification, despite these banks' overall high levels of sovereign debt holdings. The following Brazilian banks' standalone ratings and credit assessments were downgraded to one notch above the level of the sovereign debt rating: Banco Bradesco S.A. to C-/baa1 from B-/ a1 Banco Itau Unibanco S.A. to C-/baa1 from B-/ a1 Banco Itau BBA S.A. to C-/baa1 from B-/ a1 The standalone rating and credit assessment of Banco Votorantim S.A. was downgraded to one notch below the level of the sovereign debt rating to reflect the bank's poor financial performance, including weak asset quality and profitability, and the prospects of ongoing challenges to its financial strength. GLOBAL LOCAL CURRENCY DEPOSIT AND ISSUER RATINGS The local currency deposit or issuer ratings of 11 financial institutions declined by one to two notches to reflect the combination of the lowering of their standalone assessments and /or the lower ratings of their parent banks. The deposit rating of one bank was confirmed. The issuer ratings of six firms were downgraded by two notches, although the rating of one firm remains two notches above the level of the sovereign debt ratings. The short-term ratings of six banks were downgraded to Prime 2, from Prime 1, in line with the lowering of their long term deposit ratings. Moody's deposit ratings incorporate assumptions about potential external support from a parent institution, or regional or national government. These assumptions reflect both the capacity and the willingness of such a third party to support a bank in the event of stress, and can lead to a subsidiary's deposit and debt ratings being lifted above its standalone credit assessment. The degree of uplift from such support assumptions depends on a bank's systemic importance as a deposit-taker and lender, as well as its relevance to the parent banking group, among other considerations. Moody's assessment of parental support to the Brazilian subsidiaries of international banks incorporates a bank's strategic fit within its parent group, and the strategic and operational interdependence with its parent. The analysis also looks into the effects of reduced credit strength and sustained decline in the capacity of parent groups to support their cross border subsidiaries, and the positioning of each bank's standalone credit assessment relative to its parent's standalone profile. The deposit ratings of three of the four banks whose standalone profiles are now positioned at the same level as the sovereign rating continue to benefit from one to two notches of uplift due to government and parental support assumptions. One bank benefits from four notches of uplift due to Moody's assumptions of parental support by a higher-rated parent bank. The deposit ratings of other three banks also benefit from one notch of uplift, in this case due to assumptions of government support, because of their systemic importance. Downgrade Of Debt Ratings The long-term senior , subordinated, or junior debt ratings of seven financial institutions have been downgraded by one to two notches, in line with the lowering of their deposit and issuer ratings. Their debt ratings follow Moody's guidelines for rating bank hybrid securities and subordinated debt, and is based on the supported deposit ratings for subordinated debt, or adjusted BCA in the case of junior subordinated debt. List Of Rating Actions The following rating actions were taken: Banco Bradesco Banco Bradesco S.A.'s (Bradesco) long-term deposit rating was downgraded by two notches to A3, from A1, and now incorporates one notch of uplift derived from Moody's assumption of the probability of government support because of its systemic importance. The short-term rating was lowered to Prime 2, from Prime 1. These actions are the result of the downgrade of Bradesco's standalone BCA by three notches to baa1, from a1. Both standalone and supported ratings carry a positive outlook reflecting the positive outlook on Brazil's Baa2 debt rating. The standalone baa1 credit assessment is one notch above that of the sovereign debt rating and reflects Bradesco's relative resilience to Brazilian sovereign risk, as evidence by (i) the bank's diversified earnings base, including its sizable insurance operation that contribute one third to the bank's results; (ii) its broad based domestic core funding sources ; and (iii) its well-established franchise in Brazil and strong credit fundamentals relative to global peers. Itau-Unibanco Itau-Unibanco S.A.'s (IU) and Banco Itau BBA S.A.'s (IBBA) long- term deposit ratings were downgraded by two notches to A3, from A1, and now incorporate one notch of uplift derived from Moody's assumption of the high probability of government support because of its systemic importance. The short-term ratings were lowered to Prime 2, from Prime 1. These actions are the result of the downgrade of IU's and IBBA's standalone BCA's by three notches to baa1, from a1. Both standalone and supported ratings carry a positive outlook reflecting the positive outlook on the Brazil's Baa2 debt rating. The standalone baa1 credit assessment for both banks is one notch above that of the sovereign debt rating and reflects IU's and IBBA's relative resilience to Brazilian sovereign risk, as evidence by (i) geographic diversification and international operations that provide moderate asset diversification; (ii) high levels of earnings diversification, including those derived from fee-generating businesses; and (iii) their broad based core funding sources. The local currency issuer and debt ratings of IU's leasing entities, Itaubank Leasing S.A Arrendamento Mercantil, Dibens Leasing S.A. Arrendamento Mercantil, and BFB Leasing S.A. Arrendamento Mercantil, have also been downgraded by two notches, following the downgrade of Itau Unibanco's ratings. Itau-Unibanco Holding S.A.'s (IUH) issuer rating was downgraded to Baa1, from A2, notched off the supported ratings of its two main operating banking subsidiaries (IU and IBBA) taking into consideration structural subordination. The short-term rating was lowered to Prime 2, from Prime 1. The issuer rating of Itausa S.A. was also downgraded by two notches, to Baa2, from A3, to reflect the downgrade of Itau Unibanco's ratings. Banco Do Brasil Banco do Brasil's (BB) long-term deposit rating was downgraded by one notch to A3, from A2, and now incorporates one notch of uplift derived from Moody's assumption of the probability of government support because of its systemic importance. The short-term rating was lowered to Prime 2, from Prime 1. This action is the result of the downgrade of BB's standalone BCA by three notches to baa2, from a2. The supported long-term deposit and debt ratings carry a positive outlook reflecting the positive outlook on the Brazil's Baa2 debt rating. The standalone baa2 credit assessment is at the same level of sovereign debt rating, reflecting the high level of sovereign linkage, particularly because of its government ownership and its public role. Banco Votorantim Banco Votorantim S.A.'s (Banco Votorantim) long-term deposit rating was downgraded by two notches to Baa2, from A3, and continues to incorporate one notch of uplift derived from the support of its shareholder, Banco do Brasil. This action is the result of the downgrade of Banco Votorantim's standalone BCA by one notch to baa3, from baa2, and the downgrade of the deposit rating of its shareholder BB to A3, from A2. All ratings carry stable outlook. The downgrade of Banco Votorantim's standalone rating primarily reflects the material asset quality deterioration since 3Q11 and weakened performance as the bank restructures its consumer finance activities. As a result, loan origination has decline, which in turn, weakens the bank's profitability, and thus, its ability to replenish capital. The stable outlook on the ratings acknowledges the strategic repositioning of the consumer operation, and the improved balance sheet protection provided by higher reserves and the recently announced capital injection of R$2 billion. Hsbc Bank Brasil HSBC Bank Brasil S.A.'s (HSBC Brazil) long-term deposit rating was confirmed at A1, despite the (i) the one notch downgrade on the bank's standalone rating to C-, from C, that now maps to a standalone credit assessment of baa2, lowered from a3; and (ii) the one notch downgrade on the parent HSBC Holdings' plc instrinsic standalone financial strength to a1, from aa3, announced on June 21, 2012. The local currency deposit rating carries a stable outlook, while the foreign currency rating remains constrained by Brazil's foreign currency deposit ceiling and has a positive outlook, in line with the positive outlook on the ceiling. The short-term deposit ratings were confirmed at Prime 1. The standalone baa2 credit assessment is at the same level of sovereign debt rating. Banco Santander (Brasil) Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A.'s (Santander Brazil) long-term deposit rating was downgraded by two notches to Baa1, from A2, and incorporates one notch of uplift derived from Moody's assumption of the probability of government support because of its systemic importance. The short-term rating was lowered to Prime 2, from Prime 1. These actions are the result of the downgrade of Santander Brazil's standalone BCA by two notches to baa2, from a3, and the downgrade of the BCA of its parent Banco Santander - Spain to baa2 from a3, announced on 25 June 2012 (refer to press release "Moody's downgrades Spanish banks"). The standalone and supported ratings carry a stable outlook, except for the foreign currency deposit rating that has a positive outlook and remains constrained by Brazil's foreign currency deposit ceiling. The standalone baa2 credit assessment is at the same level of sovereign debt rating. Banco Safra Banco Safra's (Safra) long-term deposit rating was downgraded by one notch to Baa2, from Baa1, repositioned at the level of the sovereign debt rating. This action is the result of the lowering of Safra's standalone BCA by one notch to baa2, from baa1. The long-term deposit and debt ratings carry a positive outlook reflecting the positive outlook on the Brazil's Baa2 debt rating. Ing Bank -- Sao Paulo Branch ING Bank N.V. Sao Paulo Branch's (ING Brazil) long-term global local currency deposit rating was downgraded by one notch to A2, from A1, as a result of the downgrade of its parent bank, ING Bank N.V. of the Netherlands, of which ING Brazil is legally structured as an branch. The outlook on the rating is negative in line with the outlook of ING Bank N.V.'s long-term deposit rating. Bm&Fbovespa BM&FBovespa S.A.'s (BMFBovespa) long-term local currency issuer rating was downgraded to A3, from A1, with a stable outlook, and is now two notches above the sovereign debt level. The rating action reflects (i) the exchange's diversified sources of earnings, both by products and geography, with sizable portion originated from international investors; (ii) little earnings dependence from government-related sources; (ii) BMFBovespa's robust free cash flow generation ability and superior financial metrics, including low leveraged operation; (iii) its central risk management infrastructure and the consistency to support the exchange's particular size, business model and risk profile, and (iv) dominant status as the only standardized cash equities and futures exchange and central clearinghouse in Brazil. Downgrade Of Insurance Ratings Itau Seguros Group Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Itau Seguros' and Itau Vida e Previdencia's global local currency (GLC) insurance financial strength (IFS) ratings to Baa1 (positive outlook) from A2 (review down) and has affirmed the companies' Aaa.br/Stable IFS ratings on the Brazilian national scale. Concurrently, Moody's America Latina Ltda. has downgraded the GLC subordinated debt rating of Itauseg Participacoes S.A. (the insurers' intermediate holding company) to Baa3 (positive outlook) from Baa1 (review down) while affirming its Aaa.br (stable outlook) national scale rating. The rating actions follow the rating downgrades of Itau Unibanco S.A. and Itau Holding S.A. (the insurers'ultimate parent companies) and conclude a review initiated on February 24, 2012. According to Moody's, Itau Seguros' stand-alone credit profile now stands at Baa1, as compared with A3 previously, the change primarily reflecting a reduced assessment of the group's financial flexibility, given the lowering of the parent' companies' ratings. Conversely Itau Vida e Previdencia's stand-alone credit profile now stands at Baa2, considering both a reduced assessment of the group's financial flexibility, but also the insurer's very high investment exposure to Brazil sovereign credit risk relative to its capital base, which - in consideration of the recently- published Ratings Implementation Guidance on how sovereign credit quality can affect other ratings - effectively results in a lowering of the company's the stand-alone credit profile to the level of Brazil's sovereign debt rating. Because of Itau Vida e Previdencia's significant product and distribution integration with its banking affiliates, as well as its brand-sharing with the parent, Moody's insurance financial strength rating for the company reflects 1 notch of uplift from parental support from Itau Unibanco. The affirmation of the insurers' Aaa.br national scale IFS ratings, with a stable outlook, reflects the fact that their Baa1 global IFS ratings continue to map exclusively to the Aaa.br national scale rating. The downgrade of Itauseg Participacoes S.A's subordinated debt rating is based on the downgrade of the insurance subsidiaries' global ratings, and application of the 2- notch spread between the debt and IFS ratings. The affirmation of the national scale subordinated debt rating at Aaa.br, the higher of two possible alternatives on Moody's GLC-NS mapping for Brazil, reflects Moody's view that the holding company remains strong relative to other Brazilian issuers within the Baa3 rating category. =========================== C A Y M A N I S L A N D S =========================== 1908 HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 16 ---------------------------------------------------- The creditors of 1908 Holdings Ltd are required to file their proofs of debt by July 16, 2012, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced wind-up proceedings on May 18, 2012. The company's liquidator is: H&J Corporate Services (Cayman) Ltd. Telephone: (345) 949 7555 Anderson Square, 5th Floor Shedden Road PO Box 866 Grand Cayman KY1-1103 Cayman Islands DB KAMCHATKA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31 --------------------------------------------------- The creditors of DB Kamchatka Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by July 31, 2012, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012. The company's liquidator is: David Dyer Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited PO Box 1984, Boundary Hall Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue Grand Cayman KY1-1104 Cayman Islands GGICO MIDDLE EAST: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31 -------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of GGICO Middle East Equity Fund Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by July 31, 2012, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012. The company's liquidator is: David Dyer Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited PO Box 1984, Boundary Hall Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue Grand Cayman KY1-1104 Cayman Islands GIH HF I: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31 ----------------------------------------------- The creditors of GIH HF I Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by July 31, 2012, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012. The company's liquidator is: David Dyer Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited PO Box 1984, Boundary Hall Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue Grand Cayman KY1-1104 Cayman Islands GREEN LEAF: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31 ------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Green Leaf Holdings are required to file their proofs of debt by July 31, 2012, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012. The company's liquidator is: David Dyer Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited PO Box 1984, Boundary Hall Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue Grand Cayman KY1-1104 Cayman Islands LF CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 9 ------------------------------------------------ The creditors of LF Capital Holdings Ltd are required to file their proofs of debt by July 9, 2012, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012. The company's liquidator is: CDL Company Ltd. P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205 Cayman Islands PARKWOOD HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 16 -------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Parkwood Holdings Ltd are required to file their proofs of debt by July 16, 2012, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced wind-up proceedings on May 18, 2012. The company's liquidator is: H&J Corporate Services (Cayman) Ltd. Telephone: (345) 949 7555 Anderson Square, 5th Floor Shedden Road PO Box 866 Grand Cayman KY1-1103 Cayman Islands REMITTANCE LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 19 ----------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Remittance Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by July 19, 2012, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 5, 2012. The company's liquidator is: Walkers SPV Limited Walker House, 87 Mary Street, George Town Grand Cayman KY1-9005 Cayman Islands c/o Jennifer Chailler Telephone: (345) 814 6847 H&J Corporate Services (Cayman) Ltd. Anderson Square, 5th Floor Shedden Road PO Box 866 Grand Cayman KY1-1103 Cayman Islands YELLOW HAMMER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31 ---------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Yellow Hammer Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by July 31, 2012, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012. The company's liquidator is: David Dyer Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited PO Box 1984, Boundary Hall Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue Grand Cayman KY1-1104 Cayman Islands ZEBRA FINANCE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31 ---------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Zebra Finance Company Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by July 31, 2012, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012. The company's liquidator is: David Dyer Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited PO Box 1984, Boundary Hall Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue Grand Cayman KY1-1104 Cayman Islands =========== M E X I C O =========== VITRO SAB: Must Have Stay Immediately to Halt Asset Seizures ------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Rochelle, the bankruptcy columnist for Bloomberg News, reports that Vitro SAB will be able to appeal directly to the U.S. Court of Appeals in New Orleans from a ruling on June 13 by a U.S. bankruptcy judge in Dallas refusing to enforce the glassmaker's Mexican reorganization plan in the U.S. Unless Vitro convinces the appeals court to impose a stay pending appeal, bondholders will be able to begin seizing assets of the company and subsidiaries after June 29. According to the report, Vitro is appealing because a bankruptcy judge in Dallas ruled that the Mexican reorganization was "manifestly contrary" to U.S. law and public policy. In the opinion of the bankruptcy judge, the Mexican plan improperly allowed Vitro subsidiaries to chop down their guarantees on $1.2 billion in defaulted bonds without having been in bankruptcy themselves. On Wednesday, the 5th Circuit in New Orleans granted a direct appeal, allowing the parties to skip an intermediate appeal to a federal district judge. Vitro came up short because the circuit court, in the same order June 27, refused to accelerate the appeal. Carolyn King, one of the three circuit judges who made Wednesday's ruling, would have held oral argument quickly after the last brief was filed. She also would have called on the bankruptcy judge "to decide promptly" on additional "strong objections" the bankruptcy judge said he didn't reach because he already found the Mexican reorganization defective. Until the circuit court accepted the appeal, there was a watershed hearing scheduled June 28 in Dallas where Vitro would have asked District Judge Royal Furgeson to enjoin the bondholders from attaching assets. The bankruptcy judge refused to stop attachment of assets after June 29. On learning that the circuit court granted the direct appeal, Judge Furgeson canceled the June 28 hearing, thus requiring Vitro to move quickly in the circuit court for a stay pending appeal. Before Judge Furgeson canceled the stay hearing, holders of 60 percent of the defaulted bonds filed papers urging the district court not to impose a stay. According to the report, the bondholders argued the subsidiaries could fend off asset seizure by filing their own bankruptcies. The bondholders urge the courts to follow the general rule that special circumstances are required before one company's bankruptcy becomes reason for halting legal action against a non-bankrupt affiliate. The bondholders also contend the subsidiaries could obtain a stay by filing bonds in the lawsuits in New York State court where the creditors are obtaining judgments on the defaulted bonds. The appeal in the Circuit Court is Vitro SAB de CV v. Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Noteholders (In re Vitro SAB de CV), 12-90055, 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals (New Orleans). Vitro's motion in district court for a stay pending appeal was In re Vitro SAB de CV, 11-3554, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas (Dallas). About Vitro SAB Headquartered in Monterrey, Mexico, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. (BMV: VITROA; NYSE: VTO), through its two subsidiaries, Vitro Envases Norteamerica, SA de C.V. and Vimexico, S.A. de C.V., is a global glass producer, serving the construction and automotive glass markets and glass containers needs of the food, beverage, wine, liquor, cosmetics and pharmaceutical industries. Vitro is the largest manufacturer of glass containers and flat glass in Mexico, with consolidated net sales in 2009 of MXN23,991 million (US$1.837 billion). Vitro defaulted on its debt in 2009, and sought to restructure around US$1.5 billion in debt, including US$1.2 billion in notes. Vitro launched an offer to buy back or swap US$1.2 billion in debt from bondholders. The tender offer would be consummated with a bankruptcy filing in Mexico and Chapter 15 filing in the United States. Vitro said noteholders would recover as much as 73% by exchanging existing debt for cash, new debt or convertible bonds. Concurso Mercantil & Chapter 15 Proceedings Vitro SAB on Dec. 13, 2010, filed its voluntary petition for a pre-packaged Concurso Plan in the Federal District Court for Civil and Labor Matters for the State of Nuevo Leon, commencing its voluntary concurso mercantil proceedings -- the Mexican equivalent of a prepackaged Chapter 11 reorganization. Vitro SAB also commenced parallel proceedings under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 10-16619) in Manhattan on Dec. 13, 2010, to seek U.S. recognition and deference to its bankruptcy proceedings in Mexico. Early in January 2011, the Mexican Court dismissed the Concurso Mercantil proceedings. But an appellate court in Mexico reinstated the reorganization in April 2011. Following the reinstatement, Vitro SAB on April 14, 2011, re-filed a petition for recognition of its Mexican reorganization in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 11- 11754). The Vitro parent received sufficient acceptances of its reorganization by using the US$1.9 billion in debt owing to subsidiaries to vote down opposition by bondholders. The holders of US$1.2 billion in defaulted bonds opposed the Mexican reorganization plan because shareholders could retain ownership while bondholders aren't being paid in full. Vitro announced in March 2012 that it has implemented the reorganization plan approved by a judge in Monterrey, Mexico. In the present Chapter 15 case, the Debtor seeks to block any creditor suits in the U.S. pending the reorganization in Mexico. Chapter 11 Proceedings A group of noteholders opposed the exchange -- namely Knighthead Master Fund, L.P., Lord Abbett Bond-Debenture Fund, Inc., Davidson Kempner Distressed Opportunities Fund LP, and Brookville Horizons Fund, L.P. Together, they held US$75 million, or approximately 6% of the outstanding bond debt. The Noteholder group commenced involuntary bankruptcy cases under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code against Vitro Asset Corp. (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Case No. 10-47470) and 15 other affiliates on Nov. 17, 2010. Vitro engaged Susman Godfrey, L.L.P. as U.S. special litigation counsel to analyze the potential rights that Vitro may exercise in the United States against the ad hoc group of dissident bondholders and its advisors. A larger group of noteholders, known as the Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Noteholders -- comprised of holders, or investment advisors to holders, which represent approximately US$650 million of the Senior Notes due 2012, 2013 and 2017 issued by Vitro -- was not among the Chapter 11 petitioners, although the group has expressed concerns over the exchange offer. The group says the exchange offer exposes Noteholders who consent to potential adverse consequences that have not been disclosed by Vitro. The group is represented by John Cunningham, Esq., and Richard Kebrdle, Esq. at White & Case LLP. A bankruptcy judge in Fort Worth, Texas, denied involuntary Chapter 11 petitions filed against four U.S. subsidiaries. On April 6, 2011, Vitro SAB agreed to put Vitro units -- Vitro America LLC and three other U.S. subsidiaries -- that were subject to the involuntary petitions into voluntary Chapter 11. The Texas Court on April 21 denied involuntary petitions against the eight U.S. subsidiaries that didn't consent to being in Chapter 11. Kurtzman Carson Consultants is the claims and notice agent to Vitro America, et al. Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC, is the Debtors' operations and financial advisor. The official committee of unsecured creditors appointed in the Chapter 11 cases of Vitro America, et al., has selected Sarah Link Schultz, Esq., at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, in Dallas, Texas, and Michael S. Stamer, Esq., Abid Qureshi, Esq., and Alexis Freeman, Esq., at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, in New York, as counsel. Blackstone Advisory Partners L.P. serves as financial advisor to the Committee. The U.S. Vitro companies sold their assets to American Glass Enterprises LLC, an affiliate of Sun Capital Partners Inc., for US$55 million. U.S. subsidiaries of Vitro SAB are having their cases converted to liquidations in Chapter 7, court records in January 2012 show. In December, the U.S. Trustee in Dallas filed a motion to convert the subsidiaries' cases to liquidations in Chapter 7. The Justice Department's bankruptcy watchdog said US$5.1 million in bills were run up in bankruptcy and hadn't been paid. On June 13, 2012, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Harlin "Cooter" Hale in Dallas entered a ruling that precluded Vitro from enforcing its Mexican reorganization plan in the U.S. The judge ruled that the Mexican reorganization was "manifestly contrary" to U.S. public policy because it bars the bondholders from holding Vitro operating subsidiaries liable to pay on their guarantees of the bonds. The Mexican plan reduced the debt of subsidiaries on $1.2 billion in defaulted bonds even though they weren't in bankruptcy in any country. ===================== P U E R T O R I C O ===================== COMPREHENSIVE CARE: Expects to Report Profit in Second Quarter -------------------------------------------------------------- Comprehensive Care Corporation expects to report a profit for the second quarter of 2012, with revenues for the quarter of approximately $18 million. Revenues for the same quarter in 2011 were $18.6 million. However, during that quarter, the Company posted a loss of $4 million. Commenting on the expected results for the quarter, Robert J. Landis, CompCare's Chief Financial Officer, stated, "The Company is particularly excited about our second quarter expected results since, if realized, it will be the first time in many years that the Company has been able to post a profit for two consecutive quarters. The improvement in results from the second quarter of 2011 to the second quarter of 2012, we believe, is primarily attributable to our Pharmacy Management Program which is now achieving traction and our cost reduction efforts to streamline our internal systems. Part of the shift in the pharmacy program occurred from our establishing Company-owned clinics in areas where we experience high patient utilization and cost. The clinics have the effect of reducing those costs and providing us with a greater opportunity to directly service the needs of the patients. Based on our best current available information, for example, the Company expects to realize a profit in its at-risk pharmacy operations in April, and this trend continues in May where preliminary numbers indicate an increase profit in the Company's at-risk pharmacy operations. While there can be no assurances that this trend will continue or that there might not be subsequent positive or negative adjustments to the April and May results, the upward trend is what we were looking for since we believe that it indicates the viability of the overall program. Other aspects of the Pharmacy Management Program are in the process of being implemented and will occur shortly." Mr. Landis continued, "Another aspect of the Pharmacy Management Program that contributed to a successful second quarter was the signing of a Third Amendment (the "Amendment") to a material agreement with one of our existing, at-risk pharmacy clients. As a result of the Amendment, the Company received a $2.2 million, retroactive, cash adjustment to pharmacy prescriptions, which were originally charged to the Company. Additionally, the Amendment shifts the financial responsibility for a significant number of prescriptions from the Company to the client for the remainder of 2012. We expect this financial responsibility shift to further reduce the Company's pharmacy expenses throughout the year, and although there can be no guarantees that these expectations will be achieved, we expect the shift to further enhance the Company's profitability in its pharmacy operations for the remainder of 2012." "Additionally, we were able to implement administrative, cost- saving measures that also contributed to a profitable second quarter," Mr. Landis said. On June 20, 2012, CompCare de Puerto Rico, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Comprehensive Care, entered into a Third Amendment to the original agreement with MSO of Puerto Rico, Inc., to provide its health plan members mental health, substance abuse treatment, and pharmacy management services. Pursuant to the Amendment, the parties agreed to revise their method of operations and clarified their respective financial responsibilities for the payment of certain prescriptions during the period May 1, 2012, through Dec. 31, 2012, defined in the Amendment as the "Collaboration Period" and thereafter, during the period defined as the "Post-Collaboration Period." The Company's financial responsibility for psychotropic prescription drugs will be limited to the costs of psychotropic drugs prescribed for current mental health conditions. The parties also agreed to settle, for $2.2 million, all Pharmacy Adjustments previously identified as they relate to drugs which were not prescribed for mental health conditions, which drugs were previously charged to the Company, for all periods prior to April 1, 2012. The $2.2 million was paid to the Company's providers by MSO on behalf of the Company. A copy of the Amendment is available for free at http://is.gd/E4CetU About Comprehensive Care Tampa, Fla.-based Comprehensive Care Corporation provides managed care services in the behavioral health, substance abuse, and psychotropic pharmacy management fields. Following the 2011 results, Mayer Hoffman McCann P.C., in Clearwater, Florida, expressed substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern. The independent auditors noted that the Company has suffered recurring losses from operations and has not generated sufficient cash flows from operations to fund its working capital requirements. Comprehensive Care reported a net loss of $14.08 million in 2011, compared with a net loss of $10.47 million in 2010. The Company's balance sheet at March 31, 2012, showed $15.02 million in total assets, $31.27 million in total liabilities and a $16.25 million total stockholders' deficiency. =============================== T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O =============================== ALEXANDRA RESORT: In Receivership Instead of Exploring Options -------------------------------------------------------------- Turks & Caicos Sun reports that Washington Misick Hotelier Washington Misick said he is "disappointed" that the Lord Ashcroft-owned British Caribbean Bank (BCB) chose to place the Alexandra Resort and Spa into receivership instead of exploring other options. "I am disappointed that BCB chose receivership rather than a number of possible work-out options available to it," the report quoted Mr. Misick as saying. BCB placed the ARS in receivership, and appointed a receiver/manager of the property, according to Turks & Caicos Sun as saying. "MML is both solvent and profitable. ARS, like many other properties, has been hit hard by the international phenomenon of high levels of inventory; penal interest rates, and sluggish sales. A good faith solution is possible, but requires creative compromise; I look forward to working with the receiver to find a win-win compromise. It bears mentioning that no other business operated by me is in any way affected by the receivership of the ARS," Mr. Misick said, the report relays. Alexandra Resort and Villas Limited is the development arm of Alexandra Resort and Spa (ARS). It is owned by Washington, his brother, former Premier Michael Misick and Sherlock Walkin. Washington said that the subsidiary of ARS, Millennium Management Ltd. (MML) manages the resort. =============== X X X X X X X X =============== * Moody's Cuts Ratings on Lat-Am Units of BBVA & Banco Santander ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has repositioned the ratings of six Latin American banking subsidiaries of Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. (BBVA) and Banco Santander, S.A. (Santander). These rating actions follow the downgrades of the parent banks' standalone financial strength ratings (BFSRs) and baseline credit assessments (BCAs), which remain on review for downgrade, given the weakening of the Spanish government's creditworthiness. The long-term global local currency deposit ratings of Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Colombia S.A. and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Paraguay S.A. have been downgraded by one notch, while those of Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Chile have been downgraded by two notches. The deposit rating of BBVA Colombia has been placed on review for further downgrade in line with the outlook on its parent's ratings. The global local currency deposit ratings of Banco Santander Chile, Banco Santander Uruguay S.A., and Banco Santander Rio S.A. have also been placed on review for downgrade. The short-term global local currency deposit ratings of BBVA Chile and BBVA Colombia were downgraded by one notch, while the short- term global local currency ratings of Santander Chile and Santander Uruguay were placed on review for downgrade. The foreign currency deposit ratings of Santander Chile were placed on review for downgrade as they are equivalent to their local currency ratings, while those of BBVA Chile were downgraded by two notches. Those of the remaining four banks were unaffected by this action. The global long-term foreign currency debt ratings of BBVA Chile were downgraded, while the debt ratings of Santander Chile and Santander Rio were placed on review for downgrade. The local currency national scale debt ratings of Santander Rio were also placed on review for downgrade. The rating downgrades and continuing reviews take into account the potential effects on the Latin American subsidiaries of Santander and BBVA of credit pressures at the parent level that affect Moody's assumptions regarding the probability of parental support to be incorporated in the subsidiaries' ratings. The reviews will also focus on how subsidiaries' stand alone credit profiles may be affected by their close ties to the respective parent bank, including financial, branding and managerial linkages. Moody's rating actions on Santander's and BBVA's subsidiaries in Brazil and Mexico are detailed in separate press releases. Overview Of The Rating Actions Banco Santander Chile (Santander Chile) Bank financial strength rating of B-, on review for downgrade Long-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Aa3, on review for downgrade Short-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Prime-1, on review for downgrade Foreign currency senior and subordinated debt ratings of Aa3 and A1, on review for downgrade Banco Santander S.A. (Uruguay) (Santander Uruguay) Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Baa3, on review for possible downgrade Short-term global local currency deposit rating of Prime-3, on review for possible downgrade Long-term Uruguayan national scale local currency deposit rating of Aa1.uy, on review for possible downgrade Banco Santander Rio S.A. (Santander Rio) Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Ba3, on review for downgrade Long-term Argentinean national scale local currency deposit rating of Aaa.ar, on review for downgrade Long-term global local currency senior debt rating of Ba3, on review for downgrade Long-term Argentinean national scale local currency senior debt rating of Aaa.ar, on review for downgrade Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Chile (BBVA Chile) Long-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings to Baa1, stable, from A2 Short-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings to Prime-2, stable, from Prime-1 Long-term foreign currency senior debt rating to Baa1, stable, from A2 Long-term Mexican national scale debt rating of Aaa.mx affirmed, stable Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Colombia S.A. (BBVA Colombia) Long-term global local currency deposit rating to Baa2, on review for further downgrade, from Baa1 Long-term global foreign currency deposit rating of Baa3 affirmed, stable Short-term global local currency deposit rating to Prime-3 from Prime-2 Short-term global foreign currency deposit rating of Prime-3, affirmed Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Paraguay S.A. (BBVA Paraguay) Long-term global local currency deposit rating to Ba2, stable, from Ba1 Long-term global foreign currency deposit rating of B2 affirmed, stable Long-term global foreign currency debt rating of Ba3 affirmed, stable A list of the Affected Credit Ratings is available at: http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_143530 Rating Rationale Santander Chile The review for downgrade of Santander Chile's standalone B- BFSR and BCA of a1 is driven by the downgrade of the standalone rating of its 67.2% parent, Santander, to baa2 on review for further downgrade from a3. As a result, Santander Chile's Aa3 global local and foreign currency deposit ratings have also been placed on review for downgrade, together with the bank's Aa3 and A1 foreign currency senior and subordinated debt ratings, respectively, as they are derived from the global local currency deposit rating. The bank's Prime-1 global local and foreign currency short term deposit ratings were also placed on review for downgrade. The review for downgrade of Santander Chile's standalone BFSR and BCA reflects the bank's degree of strategic and operational interdependence with its parent, whose standalone credit profile has been lowered. While Moody's recognizes a satisfactory level of ring-fencing from risks elsewhere in the Santander Group, the correlation in the areas of reputation and investor confidence give reason to reassess the positioning of the standalone rating at multiple notches above the parent's and in light of the continuing review of the parent's ratings. Moody's will assess the positioning of Santander Chile's BCA relative to that of the parent, taking into account its (i) funding or operating dependence; (ii) profitability and liquidity; (iii) exposure to the parent and common client relationships; and (iv) regulatory barriers that control the distribution of capital resources from the subsidiary to its parent. The review for downgrade of Santander Chile's ratings is driven by the outlook on the parent's BCA and indicates that these ratings are likely to be lowered if the parent bank's standalone rating is lowered. Because Santander Chile's BCA is higher than that of its parent bank, its deposit ratings do not benefit from uplift due to parent support assumptions. Santander Chile's Aa3 deposit and senior debt ratings currently derive one notch of uplift from the bank's a1 BCA based on Moody's assessment of a very high probability of government support if needed, due to the importance of the bank's deposit and lending franchise in Chile. Santander Rio Santander Rio's Ba3 global local currency deposit rating and Aaa.ar local currency deposit rating on the Argentinean national scale have been placed on review for downgrade in line with the action on the standalone rating of its 95.7% Spanish parent, Santander. Moody's Latin America has also placed the Ba3 global local currency debt rating and Aaa.ar local currency debt rating on the Argentinean national scale on review for downgrade. The bank's global local and foreign currency short-term deposit ratings of Not Prime were affirmed. The review for downgrade of Santander Rio's global and national scale deposit and debt ratings is based on the downgrade and continuing review of the parent's baa2 standalone rating, which may reduce the level of parental support incorporated in the subsidiary's ratings. Currently Santander Rio's ratings benefit from three notches of uplift reflecting Moody's assessment of a high probability of parental support in case of need. The review of the national scale ratings derives directly from the review of the global ratings. Santander Uruguay Moody's has placed Santander Uruguay's Baa3 and Prime-3 long-term and short-term global local currency deposit ratings on review for downgrade, indicating the weakening of the parent bank's BCA. Moody's Latin America has also placed the bank's Aa1.uy local currency deposit rating on the Uruguayan national scale on review for downgrade. The bank's Ba2 and Not Prime foreign currency deposit ratings are unaffected by this rating action and remain constrained by the Uruguayan country ceiling. SantanderUruguay's deposit ratings benefit from one notch of uplift from the bank's ba1 BCA based on Moody's assessment of a moderate probability of parental support in case of need. Bbva Chile BBVA Chile's deposit and debt ratings have been downgraded to Baa1 from A2, in line with the downgrade of the BCA of its 68.2% parent, BBVA, to baa3, on review for further downgrade, from a3. BBVA Chile's global local and foreign currency short-term ratings were also downgraded, to Prime-2 from Prime-1. The rating outlook is now stable for these ratings. The foreign currency senior debt rating assigned to the bank's issuances of Certificados Bursatiles in the Mexican market has therefore also been downgraded to Baa1 from A2. Moody's de Mexico's Aaa.mx debt rating on the Mexican National Scale was unaffected by this action and has therefore been affirmed. BBVA Chile's D+ and baa3 standalone BFSR and BCA, which are at the parent level, have also been affirmed, with stable outlooks. BBVA Chile's ratings now hinge on the bank's standalone strength together with Moody's assessment of the probability of government support, as they no longer derive uplift from parental support assumptions. The Baa1 global scale deposit and senior debt ratings now benefit from two notches of uplift due to government support from the bank's baa3 BCA versus four notches previously, reflecting the importance of BBVA Chile's deposit and lending franchise. Bbva Colombia Moody's has downgraded BBVA Colombia's long-term global local currency deposit rating to Baa2 on review for downgrade from Baa1, and short-term global local currency deposit rating to Prime-3 from Prime-2, in line with the action on the standalone ratings of its 95.43% parent, BBVA. BBVA Colombia's global local currency deposit rating of Baa2 continues to benefit from two notches of uplift from the bank's BCA of ba1, reflecting Moody's assessment of a very high probability of both parental and government support if necessary, the latter in light of the bank's considerable market shares in deposits and loans and the fact that it is the largest mortgage lender in Colombia. Bbva Paraguay The downgrade of BBVA Paraguay's global local currency deposit rating, to Ba2 from Ba1, is in line with the downgrade of the standalone ratings of the 99.98% parent, BBVA. BBVA Paraguay's Ba2 deposit rating now incorporates two notches of uplift from the bank's b1 BCA reflecting Moody's view of the probability of both parental and government support, compared with three notches previously. The rating now receives one notch of uplift due to parental support, versus two previously, and one notch reflecting government support. BBVA Paraguay's foreign currency deposit and debt ratings of B2 and Ba3, respectively, have been affirmed with stable outlook, along with the respective Not Prime short-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings, and remain constrained by the Paraguayan foreign currency country ceilings for deposits of B2 and debt of Ba3. Last Rating Actions Moody's last rating action on Santander Chile was on 9 February 2012, when Moody's assigned a (P)Aa3 rating to the bank's global medium-term note program. Moody's last rating action on BBVA Chile was on 7 November 2011, when Moody's assigned new global and Mexican national scale debt ratings of A2 and Aaa.mx to the bank's issuances of Certificados Bursatiles. Moody's last rating action taken on BBVA Colombia was on 18 July 2011, when Moody's assigned first-time ratings. Moody's last rating action taken on BBVA Paraguay was on 18 May 2012, when Moody's downgraded the standalone rating and affirmed the supported debt ratings, with stable outlook. * Moody's Cuts Ratings on Spanish Banks' North American Units ------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has downgraded certain long-term supported ratings of Banco Santander S.A.'s (Santander) and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.'s (BBVA) North American bank subsidiaries. Following the downgrades, Moody's placed the subsidiaries' long- and short-term ratings, including their standalone bank financial strength ratings (BFSR)/baseline credit assessments (BCA), on review for downgrade. The actions follow the downgrades of Santander (standalone BFSR/BCA to C-/baa2 from C/a3, on review for further downgrade) and BBVA (standalone BFSR/BCA to D+/baa3 from C/a3, on review for further downgrade). These actions are discussed in the press release "Moody's downgrades Spanish banks," dated 25 June 2012 and available on moodys.com. List of Affected Ratings Subsidiaries of Santander: - Santander Holdings USA, Inc.: all long- and short-term ratings (senior at Baa2) placed on review for downgrade - Sovereign Bank, N.A.: long-term bank deposit, senior debt and issuer ratings downgraded to Baa1 from A3; subordinate debt rating downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1; all long- and short-term ratings, including the standalone BFSR/BCA of C-/baa1, placed on review for downgrade - Sovereign Real Estate Investment Trust: non-cumulative preferred stock rating downgraded to Ba1 (hyb) from Baa3; placed on review for further downgrade - Sovereign Capital Trust IV: Ba1 (hyb) preferred stock rating placed on review for downgrade - Sovereign Capital Trust V: (P)Ba1 preferred stock rating placed on review for downgrade - Sovereign Capital Trust VI: Ba1 (hyb) preferred stock rating placed on review for downgrade - Banco Santander Puerto Rico: long-term bank deposit, senior debt and issuer ratings downgraded to Baa1 from A3; all long- and short-term ratings placed on review for downgrade; the standalone BFSR/BCA of C-/baa1, which was placed on review for downgrade on 10 April 2012 because of Puerto Rico's difficult operating environment, remains on review Subsidiaries of BBVA: - BBVA USA Bancshares, Inc.: long-term issuer rating downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1 and placed on review for further downgrade - Compass Bank: long-term bank deposit, senior debt and issuer ratings downgraded to Baa2 from A3; subordinate debt rating downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1; all long- and short-term ratings, including the standalone BFSR/BCA of C-/baa2, placed on review for downgrade - Phoenix Loan Holdings: non-cumulative preferred stock rating downgraded to Ba2 (hyb) from Baa3 and placed on review for further downgrade - Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Puerto Rico: long-term bank deposit, senior debt and issuer ratings downgraded to Baa2 from A3; subordinate debt rating downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1; all long- and short-term ratings placed on review for downgrade; the standalone BFSR/BCA of C-/baa2, which was placed on review for downgrade on April 10, 2012, remains on review Ratings Rationale The downgrades reflect the potential adverse effects of Santander's and BBVA's lower capacity to support their subsidiaries in North America, reflected by their lower standalone ratings. The downgrades of the parents' ratings were driven by the reduced creditworthiness of the Spanish sovereign, as captured by Moody's recent three-notch downgrade of Spain's government bond rating (Baa3, on review for further downgrade), which implies a weaker credit profile for Spanish banks. This results from the banks' multiple linkages with the sovereign, including (i) the impact of the government's financial position on the domestic economy; and (ii) the large exposures of most banks to their domestic government and to other counterparties that depend on the credit strength of the government. The downgrade of Santander's and BBVA's standalone ratings, which are now one notch below the respective standalone ratings of their North American bank subsidiaries, means that the subsidiaries' ratings will no longer benefit from any uplift from parental support, with the exception of Santander Holdings USA, Inc. and its capital trust subsidiaries. Previously, Santander's North American bank subsidiaries benefited from one notch of parental support uplift, while BBVA's North American subsidiaries benefited from two notches of uplift. The ratings of Santander Holdings USA, Inc. and its capital trust subsidiaries continue to benefit from one notch of uplift given the parent's continued capacity to support these subsidiaries. This is reflected by Santander's higher standalone rating of baa2, one notch above Santander Holdings USA, Inc.'s intrinsic financial strength of baa3. Moody's has also attached a hybrid (hyb) indicator to the non- cumulative preferred stock ratings of Sovereign Real Estate Investment Trust & Phoenix Loan Holdings. Rationale For Reviews For Downgrade Following the downgrades, all of the North American subsidiaries' ratings were placed on review for downgrade. The reviews reflect the potential adverse effects from weakening creditworthiness at the parent level on the standalone financial strength of their subsidiaries. During its reviews of the bank subsidiaries' standalone ratings, Moody's will focus on the independence and resilience of the North American banks' financial strength in the event that the parents' creditworthiness is further affected and their ratings lowered. Generally, Moody's is comfortable with subsidiaries' standalone ratings exceeding those of their parents, but this is typically limited by linkages between the subsidiary and the parent bank. The extent to which the regulatory framework in the US insulates the subsidiaries from potential adverse developments in Spain will also be factored into Moody's review of the ratings. *********** Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to publication. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each Thursday's edition of the TCR-LA. Submissions about insolvency- related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2012. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$625 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300. * * * End of Transmission * * *