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                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

              Friday, June 29, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 128


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGEN-KILL SA: Files For Bankruptcy
CAUCETV SA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 17
CORD BLOOD: Agrees to Pay BioCells Sellers $60,000 in 2012
FEYNA SRL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 2
INSTITUTO PARA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 30

TRANSPORCATE SA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 10


B A G O T A

BANCO DAVIVIENDA: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' Subordinated Debt Rating


B A R B A D O S

REDJET: Finance Minister Denies US$8 Million Fund Commitment


B R A Z I L

* BRAZIL: Moody's Cuts Standalone BCA of 8 Financial Institutions


C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S

1908 HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 16
DB KAMCHATKA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
GGICO MIDDLE EAST: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
GIH HF I: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
GREEN LEAF: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31

LF CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 9
PARKWOOD HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 16
REMITTANCE LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 19
YELLOW HAMMER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
ZEBRA FINANCE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31


M E X I C O

VITRO SAB: Must Have Stay Immediately to Halt Asset Seizures


P U E R T O   R I C O

COMPREHENSIVE CARE: Expects to Report Profit in Second Quarter


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

ALEXANDRA RESORT: In Receivership Instead of Exploring Options


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Cuts Ratings on Lat-Am Units of BBVA & Banco Santander
* Moody's Cuts Ratings on Spanish Banks' North American Units


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGEN-KILL SA: Files For Bankruptcy
-----------------------------------
Argen-Kill SA filed for bankruptcy.  The company has defaulted on
its payments last May 24.


CAUCETV SA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 17
-------------------------------------------------
Nestor Delfor Monti, the court-appointed trustee for Caucetv SA's
bankruptcy proceedings, will be verifying creditors' proofs of
claim until Aug. 17, 2012.

Mr. Monti will present the validated claims in court as individual
reports.  The National Commercial Court of First Instance No. 6 in
Buenos Aires, with the assistance of Clerk No. 12, will determine
if the verified claims are admissible, taking into account the
trustee's opinion, and the objections and challenges that will be
raised by the company and its creditors.

The Trustee can be reached at:

         Nestor Delfor Monti
         Av. Cordoba 1525
         Argentina


CORD BLOOD: Agrees to Pay BioCells Sellers $60,000 in 2012
----------------------------------------------------------
Cord Blood America, Inc., entered into an agreement with Sebastian
Nicolas Neuspiller, Diego Esteban Rissola, Jorge Alejandro Jurado,
Mauro Leonardo Bruno, and Alejandro Jorge Rico Douglas, from whom
the Company purchased its majority ownership interest in
Biocordcell Argentina S.A., an Argentine corporation, in 2010.

The Agreement operates as a settlement between the parties as to
the amount of compensation owed by the Company to BioCells as
"earn-out" compensation under the Stock Purchase Agreement entered
into between the parties on or around Sept. 20, 2010.  Under the
Stock Purchase Agreement, for the earn-out the Company could have
owed the Sellers up to $705,000 plus a sum equal to 20% of the
amount of BioCells Net Profit for fiscal year 2011 exceeding
$577,000.

The terms of the Agreement limit the cash payout to the sellers
during 2012 to $60,000.  Additionally, the Agreement provides for
future cash amounts, not to exceed $440,000, to be paid through
CBAI's percentage portion of dividends earned solely based on
BioCells' operating performance in 2012 and 2013.  This structure
should also reverse a portion of the previous accrual related to
the 2011 earn-out amount on the balance sheet booked for year
ending 2011, and negates any further balance sheet liability which
could have been recorded upwards of $455,000 if no such agreement
was reached.

"I am most pleased that the sellers of BioCells, through Diego
Rissola, President of BioCells, and Cord Blood America management
were not only able to reach an agreement on the final year of the
earn-out, but also use the extensive dialogue to strengthen
several components of the relationship that will leverage the two
entities in the years ahead," said Chairman and President Joseph
Vicente.

Mr. Vicente in addition said:

   * BioCells is a financially self sufficient operation.  It is
     important to note that CBAI has not invested any money into
     the working capital of BioCells since its acquisition in
     September 2010.  Additionally, BioCells carries no long term
     debt or loan balances on its balance sheet.  "We are at a
     point in our life cycle where each subsidiary and/or
     investment needs to demonstrate its financial independence;
     we hold out BioCells as a model of such achievement," Mr.
     Vicente said.

   * From 2009 to 2011, BioCells increased the number of new
     enrollments over 15% per annum, primarily through organic
     growth.  The company currently stores approximately 5,000
     umbilical cord blood samples for families at its facility
     headquartered in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

   * In addition to the already strong organic growth engine in
     Argentina, BioCells is fast establishing a footprint in other
     markets throughout South America.  In the last six months, it
     has added franchise operations in Brazil, Paraguay, Mexico
     and Panama.  It will take some time for this franchise model
     to bear results, but this new sales channel provides BioCells
     with an additional opportunity to expand quickly into these
     emerging markets and seize the front end of the growth
     curve.  Key to this strategy of expansion is the co-branding
     of the CBAI name via the use of company trademarks with these
     franchises.

"It is exciting to see the ever increasing recognition by the
Latin American population of the value of storing stem cells.  We
believe our relationship with BioCells places us in a unique
position to continue to expand our knowledge and presence in South
America and Central America for this growing population, as we
also continue to expand our efforts in reaching the Hispanic
population in the United States," Mr. Vicente concluded.

                      About Cord Blood America

Based in Las Vegas, Nevada, Cord Blood America, Inc., is primarily
a holding company whose subsidiaries include Cord Partners, Inc.,
CorCell Co. Inc., CorCell Ltd.; CBA Professional Services, Inc.
D/B/A BodyCells, Inc.; CBA Properties, Inc.; and Career Channel
Inc, D/B/A Rainmakers International.  Cord specializes in
providing private cord blood stem cell preservation services to
families.  BodyCells is a developmental stage company and intends
to be in the business of collecting, processing and preserving
peripheral blood and adipose tissue stem cells allowing
individuals to privately preserve their stem cells for potential
future use in stem cell therapy.  Properties was formed to hold
the corporate trademarks and other intellectual property of CBAI.
Rain specializes in creating direct response television and radio
advertising campaigns, including media placement and commercial
production.

After auditing the 2011 results, Rose, Snyder & Jacobs, LLP, in
Encino, California, expressed substantial doubt substantial doubt
about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern.  The
independent auditors noted that the Company has sustained
recurring operating losses, continues to consume cash in operating
activities, and has insufficient working capital and an
accumulated deficit at Dec. 31, 2011.

Cord Blood reported a net loss attributable to the Company of
$5.97 million in 2011, compared with a net loss attributable
to the Company of $8.09 million in 2010.

The Company's balance sheet at March 31, 2012, showed $7.41
million in total assets, $7.31 million in total liabilities and
$101,042 in total stockholders' equity.


FEYNA SRL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 2
-----------------------------------------------
Mario Leizerow, the court-appointed trustee for Feyna SRL's
bankruptcy proceedings, will be verifying creditors' proofs of
claim until Aug. 2, 2012.

Mr. Leizerow will present the validated claims in court as
individual reports.  The National Commercial Court of First
Instance No. 22 in Buenos Aires, with the assistance of Clerk
No. 43, will determine if the verified claims are admissible,
taking into account the trustee's opinion, and the objections and
challenges that will be raised by the company and its creditors.

The Trustee can be reached at:

         Mario Leizerow
         Av. Santa Fe 2206
         Argentina


INSTITUTO PARA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 30
-----------------------------------------------------
Ines B. Petrone, the court-appointed trustee for Instituto para el
Desarrollo de la Micro y Peque¤a Empresa (Idemi's bankruptcy
proceedings, will be verifying creditors' proofs of claim until
July 30, 2012.

Ms. Petrone will present the validated claims in court as
individual reports.  The National Commercial Court of First
Instance No. 2 in Buenos Aires, with the assistance of Clerk
No. 3, will determine if the verified claims are admissible,
taking into account the trustee's opinion, and the objections and
challenges that will be raised by the company and its creditors.

The Trustee can be reached at:

         Ines B. Petrone
         Mercedes 313
         Argentina


TRANSPORCATE SA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 10
------------------------------------------------------
Susana Mabel Costa, the court-appointed trustee for Transporcate
SA's bankruptcy proceedings, will be verifying creditors' proofs
of claim until July 10, 2012.

Ms. Costa will present the validated claims in court as individual
reports.  The National Commercial Court of First Instance No. 19
in Buenos Aires, with the assistance of Clerk No. 38, will
determine if the verified claims are admissible, taking into
account the trustee's opinion, and the objections and challenges
that will be raised by the company and its creditors.

The Trustee can be reached at:

         Susana Mabel Costa
         Alicia Moreau de Justo 2030
         Argentina



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B A G O T A
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BANCO DAVIVIENDA: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' Subordinated Debt Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba1 long term foreign
currency debt rating to Banco Davivienda S.A.'s proposed ten-year
subordinated debt issuance of up to US$500 million. The proposed
debt is expected to be eligible for Tier 2 capital treatment under
Colombian law. The issuance is expected to be a non-preferred,
non-convertible subordinated debt with no coupon deferral option.
The outlook on the rating is negative.

The following rating was assigned to Davivienda's proposed ten-
year subordinated debt issuance of up to US$500 million:

Long term foreign currency subordinated debt rating of Ba1,
negative outlook

Ratings Rationale

Moody's noted that the Ba1 subordinated debt rating assigned to
the Tier 2 capital-eligible notes reflects one notch of
subordination from Davivienda's Baa3 long term global local
currency deposit rating, in line with Moody's standard notching
practices.

The last rating action regarding Davivienda was on 30 January
2012, when all ratings were affirmed and the outlook changed to
negative, from stable, following the announcement of the
acquisition of HSBC's bank, insurance, and financial and service
companies in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras.

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Guidelines for
Rating Bank Hybrid Securities and Subordinated Debt published in
November 2009, Bank Financial Strength Ratings: Global Methodology
published in February 2007, and Incorporation of Joint-Default
Analysis into Moody's Bank Ratings: Global Methodology published
in March 2012.

Davivienda is headquartered in Bogota, Distrito Capital and is the
third largest bank in Colombia. As of year-end 2011, the bank had
US$18.9 billion in assets and US$2.5 billion in shareholders'
equity.



===============
B A R B A D O S
===============


REDJET: Finance Minister Denies US$8 Million Fund Commitment
------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Barbados Minister of Finance Chris Sinckler
is denying that he made a commitment to inject US$8 million
dollars in failed low budget airline Airone Caribbean/Airone
Ventures Limited (Redjet).

Making his budget presentation in Parliament, Mr. Sinckler said
the Government did not mislead REDjet or renege on any promise to
lend financial assistance, according to RJR News.

The report notes that Mr. Sincker said that Redjet was a private
entity and not a Government department and therefore had no right
to any direct financial assistance from the State.

Mr. Sinckler said he was responding to unfortunate statements and
commentaries that have emerged in recent weeks following the
collapse of REDjet, the report notes.

RJR News says that the airline stopped flying to Jamaica and other
regional destinations in March due to severe financial problems.

REDjet (Airone Caribbean/Airone Ventures Limited) is a startup
low-cost carrier (LCC) based at the Grantley Adams International
Airport in Christ Church, Barbados, near Bridgetown.

Incorporated in Barbados, the privately owned airline features a
fleet of McDonnell Douglas MD-82 and MD-83 aircraft.

                       *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 26, 2012, RJR News related that REDjet's decision to
suspend all flights came a day after the airline announced the
addition of its new route to Antigua and Barbuda.  REDjet
officials are calling on the Barbadian government for close to
$8,000,000 in assistance, and to receive the same subsidies as
other airlines, RJR News noted.  The report disclosed that Mr.
Maharaj said governments cannot continue to expose themselves as
a guarantor to private enterprises.



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B R A Z I L
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* BRAZIL: Moody's Cuts Standalone BCA of 8 Financial Institutions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the standalone bank
financial strength ratings (BFSR) or lowered the standalone
baseline credit assessments (BCA) of eight Brazilian financial
institutions by one to three notches. The long-term global local
currency (GLC) deposit ratings or issuer ratings of 11 financial
institutions were downgraded by one to two notches, while the
deposit rating of one bank was confirmed. In addition, the short-
term deposit ratings of six banks were downgraded by one notch.
These rating actions conclude the reviews initiated on 24 February
and March 15, 2012.

The revised standalone ratings of three banks carry a positive
outlook. A positive outlook has also been assigned to the
supported local currency ratings of twelve issuers, while the
outlook on the deposit rating of one bank is negative.

The rating actions took place in the context of Moody's ongoing
global review of all banks whose standalone assessments are higher
than the rating of the country in which they are domiciled as
discussed in the rating implementation guidance "How Sovereign
Credit Quality May Affect Other Ratings" published on 13 February
2012, and further detailed in the special comment "Banks and
Sovereigns: Risk Correlations Constrain Standalone Bank Credit
Assessments" published on 30 April 2012. The repositioning of the
ratings also incorporates Moody's recent rating actions taken on
the affected banks' parent banking groups, as discussed in the
press release entitled "Moody's downgrades firms with global
capital markets operations" dated 21 June 2012.

Moody's ratings assigned to other 39 banks in Brazil were
unaffected by this global review because their standalone
assessments are at or below the rating of the sovereign.

A list of the Affected Credit Ratings is available at:

http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_143528

Ratings Rationale

Downgrade of Standalone Ratings

The downward revision of the eight affected banks' standalone
ratings takes into account (i) the extent to which their business
depend on the domestic macroeconomic and financial environment;
(ii) the degree of reliance on market-based, and therefore more
confidence-sensitive, funding; and (iii) their direct or indirect
exposures to domestic sovereign debt, compared with their capital
bases.

The standalone credit assessments of four of the eight banks were
lowered to the Baa2 level of the Brazilian government debt rating,
reflecting Moody's view that their creditworthiness ultimately
cannot be completely de-linked from the credit strength of the
government. The key drivers for these actions were (i) the high
level of balance sheet exposure to domestic sovereign debt,
compared to their capital buffers; (ii) their primarily domestic
banking operations, with macroeconomic exposures similar to those
of the sovereign government, and (iii) low level of cross-border
diversification of their operations.

Moody's review indicated that there are little, if any, reasons to
believe that these banks would be insulated from a government debt
crisis. More particularly, Moody's notes their significant direct
exposure to the Brazilian government securities, equivalent to
167% of tier 1 capital on average based on latest publicly
available consolidated data (March 2012).

The following Brazilian banks' standalone ratings and credit
assessments were downgraded to the level of the sovereign debt
rating:

Banco do Brasil S.A. (BB)-- to C-/baa2 from C+/a2

Banco Safra S.A. (Safra) -- to C-/baa2 from C-/baa1

Banco Santander (Brasil) (Santander Brazil) -- to C-/baa2 from
C/a3

HSBC Bank Brasil -- Banco Multiplo S.A. (HSBC Brazil) -- to C-
/baa2 from C/a3

The standalone credit assessments of three of the eight banks were
lowered, albeit to levels still higher than the debt ratings of
the Brazilian government. Their BCAs now exceed the sovereign
rating by one notch. Moody's says that these exceptions reflect
factors that help mitigate the risk correlations with the
respective domestic government's creditworthiness, including
moderate levels of cross border diversification and high levels of
business and earnings diversification, despite these banks'
overall high levels of sovereign debt holdings.

The following Brazilian banks' standalone ratings and credit
assessments were downgraded to one notch above the level of the
sovereign debt rating:

Banco Bradesco S.A. to C-/baa1 from B-/ a1

Banco Itau Unibanco S.A. to C-/baa1 from B-/ a1

Banco Itau BBA S.A. to C-/baa1 from B-/ a1

The standalone rating and credit assessment of Banco Votorantim
S.A. was downgraded to one notch below the level of the sovereign
debt rating to reflect the bank's poor financial performance,
including weak asset quality and profitability, and the prospects
of ongoing challenges to its financial strength.

GLOBAL LOCAL CURRENCY DEPOSIT AND ISSUER RATINGS

The local currency deposit or issuer ratings of 11 financial
institutions declined by one to two notches to reflect the
combination of the lowering of their standalone assessments and
/or the lower ratings of their parent banks. The deposit rating of
one bank was confirmed.

The issuer ratings of six firms were downgraded by two notches,
although the rating of one firm remains two notches above the
level of the sovereign debt ratings.

The short-term ratings of six banks were downgraded to Prime 2,
from Prime 1, in line with the lowering of their long term deposit
ratings.

Moody's deposit ratings incorporate assumptions about potential
external support from a parent institution, or regional or
national government. These assumptions reflect both the capacity
and the willingness of such a third party to support a bank in the
event of stress, and can lead to a subsidiary's deposit and debt
ratings being lifted above its standalone credit assessment. The
degree of uplift from such support assumptions depends on a bank's
systemic importance as a deposit-taker and lender, as well as its
relevance to the parent banking group, among other considerations.

Moody's assessment of parental support to the Brazilian
subsidiaries of international banks incorporates a bank's
strategic fit within its parent group, and the strategic and
operational interdependence with its parent. The analysis also
looks into the effects of reduced credit strength and sustained
decline in the capacity of parent groups to support their cross
border subsidiaries, and the positioning of each bank's standalone
credit assessment relative to its parent's standalone profile.

The deposit ratings of three of the four banks whose standalone
profiles are now positioned at the same level as the sovereign
rating continue to benefit from one to two notches of uplift due
to government and parental support assumptions. One bank benefits
from four notches of uplift due to Moody's assumptions of parental
support by a higher-rated parent bank. The deposit ratings of
other three banks also benefit from one notch of uplift, in this
case due to assumptions of government support, because of their
systemic importance.

Downgrade Of Debt Ratings

The long-term senior , subordinated, or junior debt ratings of
seven financial institutions have been downgraded by one to two
notches, in line with the lowering of their deposit and issuer
ratings. Their debt ratings follow Moody's guidelines for rating
bank hybrid securities and subordinated debt, and is based on the
supported deposit ratings for subordinated debt, or adjusted BCA
in the case of junior subordinated debt.

List Of Rating Actions

The following rating actions were taken:

Banco Bradesco

Banco Bradesco S.A.'s (Bradesco) long-term deposit rating was
downgraded by two notches to A3, from A1, and now incorporates one
notch of uplift derived from Moody's assumption of the probability
of government support because of its systemic importance. The
short-term rating was lowered to Prime 2, from Prime 1. These
actions are the result of the downgrade of Bradesco's standalone
BCA by three notches to baa1, from a1. Both standalone and
supported ratings carry a positive outlook reflecting the positive
outlook on Brazil's Baa2 debt rating.

The standalone baa1 credit assessment is one notch above that of
the sovereign debt rating and reflects Bradesco's relative
resilience to Brazilian sovereign risk, as evidence by (i) the
bank's diversified earnings base, including its sizable insurance
operation that contribute one third to the bank's results; (ii)
its broad based domestic core funding sources ; and (iii) its
well-established franchise in Brazil and strong credit
fundamentals relative to global peers.

Itau-Unibanco

Itau-Unibanco S.A.'s (IU) and Banco Itau BBA S.A.'s (IBBA) long-
term deposit ratings were downgraded by two notches to A3, from
A1, and now incorporate one notch of uplift derived from Moody's
assumption of the high probability of government support because
of its systemic importance. The short-term ratings were lowered to
Prime 2, from Prime 1. These actions are the result of the
downgrade of IU's and IBBA's standalone BCA's by three notches to
baa1, from a1. Both standalone and supported ratings carry a
positive outlook reflecting the positive outlook on the Brazil's
Baa2 debt rating.

The standalone baa1 credit assessment for both banks is one notch
above that of the sovereign debt rating and reflects IU's and
IBBA's relative resilience to Brazilian sovereign risk, as
evidence by (i) geographic diversification and international
operations that provide moderate asset diversification; (ii) high
levels of earnings diversification, including those derived from
fee-generating businesses; and (iii) their broad based core
funding sources.

The local currency issuer and debt ratings of IU's leasing
entities, Itaubank Leasing S.A Arrendamento Mercantil, Dibens
Leasing S.A. Arrendamento Mercantil, and BFB Leasing S.A.
Arrendamento Mercantil, have also been downgraded by two notches,
following the downgrade of Itau Unibanco's ratings.

Itau-Unibanco Holding S.A.'s (IUH) issuer rating was downgraded to
Baa1, from A2, notched off the supported ratings of its two main
operating banking subsidiaries (IU and IBBA) taking into
consideration structural subordination. The short-term rating was
lowered to Prime 2, from Prime 1. The issuer rating of Itausa S.A.
was also downgraded by two notches, to Baa2, from A3, to reflect
the downgrade of Itau Unibanco's ratings.

Banco Do Brasil

Banco do Brasil's (BB) long-term deposit rating was downgraded by
one notch to A3, from A2, and now incorporates one notch of uplift
derived from Moody's assumption of the probability of government
support because of its systemic importance. The short-term rating
was lowered to Prime 2, from Prime 1. This action is the result of
the downgrade of BB's standalone BCA by three notches to baa2,
from a2. The supported long-term deposit and debt ratings carry a
positive outlook reflecting the positive outlook on the Brazil's
Baa2 debt rating.

The standalone baa2 credit assessment is at the same level of
sovereign debt rating, reflecting the high level of sovereign
linkage, particularly because of its government ownership and its
public role.

Banco Votorantim

Banco Votorantim S.A.'s (Banco Votorantim) long-term deposit
rating was downgraded by two notches to Baa2, from A3, and
continues to incorporate one notch of uplift derived from the
support of its shareholder, Banco do Brasil. This action is the
result of the downgrade of Banco Votorantim's standalone BCA by
one notch to baa3, from baa2, and the downgrade of the deposit
rating of its shareholder BB to A3, from A2. All ratings carry
stable outlook.

The downgrade of Banco Votorantim's standalone rating primarily
reflects the material asset quality deterioration since 3Q11 and
weakened performance as the bank restructures its consumer finance
activities. As a result, loan origination has decline, which in
turn, weakens the bank's profitability, and thus, its ability to
replenish capital. The stable outlook on the ratings acknowledges
the strategic repositioning of the consumer operation, and the
improved balance sheet protection provided by higher reserves and
the recently announced capital injection of R$2 billion.

Hsbc Bank Brasil

HSBC Bank Brasil S.A.'s (HSBC Brazil) long-term deposit rating was
confirmed at A1, despite the (i) the one notch downgrade on the
bank's standalone rating to C-, from C, that now maps to a
standalone credit assessment of baa2, lowered from a3; and (ii)
the one notch downgrade on the parent HSBC Holdings' plc
instrinsic standalone financial strength to a1, from aa3,
announced on June 21, 2012.

The local currency deposit rating carries a stable outlook, while
the foreign currency rating remains constrained by Brazil's
foreign currency deposit ceiling and has a positive outlook, in
line with the positive outlook on the ceiling. The short-term
deposit ratings were confirmed at Prime 1.

The standalone baa2 credit assessment is at the same level of
sovereign debt rating.

Banco Santander (Brasil)

Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A.'s (Santander Brazil) long-term
deposit rating was downgraded by two notches to Baa1, from A2, and
incorporates one notch of uplift derived from Moody's assumption
of the probability of government support because of its systemic
importance. The short-term rating was lowered to Prime 2, from
Prime 1. These actions are the result of the downgrade of
Santander Brazil's standalone BCA by two notches to baa2, from a3,
and the downgrade of the BCA of its parent Banco Santander - Spain
to baa2 from a3, announced on 25 June 2012 (refer to press release
"Moody's downgrades Spanish banks"). The standalone and supported
ratings carry a stable outlook, except for the foreign currency
deposit rating that has a positive outlook and remains constrained
by Brazil's foreign currency deposit ceiling.

The standalone baa2 credit assessment is at the same level of
sovereign debt rating.

Banco Safra

Banco Safra's (Safra) long-term deposit rating was downgraded by
one notch to Baa2, from Baa1, repositioned at the level of the
sovereign debt rating. This action is the result of the lowering
of Safra's standalone BCA by one notch to baa2, from baa1. The
long-term deposit and debt ratings carry a positive outlook
reflecting the positive outlook on the Brazil's Baa2 debt rating.

Ing Bank -- Sao Paulo Branch

ING Bank N.V. Sao Paulo Branch's (ING Brazil) long-term global
local currency deposit rating was downgraded by one notch to A2,
from A1, as a result of the downgrade of its parent bank, ING Bank
N.V. of the Netherlands, of which ING Brazil is legally structured
as an branch. The outlook on the rating is negative in line with
the outlook of ING Bank N.V.'s long-term deposit rating.

Bm&Fbovespa

BM&FBovespa S.A.'s (BMFBovespa) long-term local currency issuer
rating was downgraded to A3, from A1, with a stable outlook, and
is now two notches above the sovereign debt level.

The rating action reflects (i) the exchange's diversified sources
of earnings, both by products and geography, with sizable portion
originated from international investors; (ii) little earnings
dependence from government-related sources; (ii) BMFBovespa's
robust free cash flow generation ability and superior financial
metrics, including low leveraged operation; (iii) its central risk
management infrastructure and the consistency to support the
exchange's particular size, business model and risk profile, and
(iv) dominant status as the only standardized cash equities and
futures exchange and central clearinghouse in Brazil.

Downgrade Of Insurance Ratings Itau Seguros Group

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Itau Seguros' and Itau
Vida e Previdencia's global local currency (GLC) insurance
financial strength (IFS) ratings to Baa1 (positive outlook) from
A2 (review down) and has affirmed the companies' Aaa.br/Stable IFS
ratings on the Brazilian national scale. Concurrently, Moody's
America Latina Ltda. has downgraded the GLC subordinated debt
rating of Itauseg Participacoes S.A. (the insurers' intermediate
holding company) to Baa3 (positive outlook) from Baa1 (review
down) while affirming its Aaa.br (stable outlook) national scale
rating.

The rating actions follow the rating downgrades of Itau Unibanco
S.A. and Itau Holding S.A. (the insurers'ultimate parent
companies) and conclude a review initiated on February 24, 2012.
According to Moody's, Itau Seguros' stand-alone credit profile now
stands at Baa1, as compared with A3 previously, the change
primarily reflecting a reduced assessment of the group's financial
flexibility, given the lowering of the parent' companies' ratings.
Conversely Itau Vida e Previdencia's stand-alone credit profile
now stands at Baa2, considering both a reduced assessment of the
group's financial flexibility, but also the insurer's very high
investment exposure to Brazil sovereign credit risk relative to
its capital base, which - in consideration of the recently-
published Ratings Implementation Guidance on how sovereign credit
quality can affect other ratings - effectively results in a
lowering of the company's the stand-alone credit profile to the
level of Brazil's sovereign debt rating. Because of Itau Vida e
Previdencia's significant product and distribution integration
with its banking affiliates, as well as its brand-sharing with the
parent, Moody's insurance financial strength rating for the
company reflects 1 notch of uplift from parental support from Itau
Unibanco.

The affirmation of the insurers' Aaa.br national scale IFS
ratings, with a stable outlook, reflects the fact that their Baa1
global IFS ratings continue to map exclusively to the Aaa.br
national scale rating. The downgrade of Itauseg Participacoes
S.A's subordinated debt rating is based on the downgrade of the
insurance subsidiaries' global ratings, and application of the 2-
notch spread between the debt and IFS ratings. The affirmation of
the national scale subordinated debt rating at Aaa.br, the higher
of two possible alternatives on Moody's GLC-NS mapping for Brazil,
reflects Moody's view that the holding company remains strong
relative to other Brazilian issuers within the Baa3 rating
category.



===========================
C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S
===========================


1908 HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 16
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of 1908 Holdings Ltd are required to file their
proofs of debt by July 16, 2012, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on May 18, 2012.

The company's liquidator is:

         H&J Corporate Services (Cayman) Ltd.
         Telephone: (345) 949 7555
         Anderson Square, 5th Floor
         Shedden Road
         PO Box 866 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
         Cayman Islands


DB KAMCHATKA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of DB Kamchatka Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by July 31, 2012, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012.

The company's liquidator is:

         David Dyer
         Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited
         PO Box 1984, Boundary Hall
         Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue
         Grand Cayman KY1-1104
         Cayman Islands


GGICO MIDDLE EAST: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of GGICO Middle East Equity Fund Limited are
required to file their proofs of debt by July 31, 2012, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012.

The company's liquidator is:

         David Dyer
         Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited
         PO Box 1984, Boundary Hall
         Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue
         Grand Cayman KY1-1104
         Cayman Islands


GIH HF I: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
-----------------------------------------------
The creditors of GIH HF I Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by July 31, 2012, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012.

The company's liquidator is:

         David Dyer
         Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited
         PO Box 1984, Boundary Hall
         Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue
         Grand Cayman KY1-1104
         Cayman Islands


GREEN LEAF: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
-------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Green Leaf Holdings are required to file their
proofs of debt by July 31, 2012, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012.

The company's liquidator is:

         David Dyer
         Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited
         PO Box 1984, Boundary Hall
         Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue
         Grand Cayman KY1-1104
         Cayman Islands


LF CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 9
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of LF Capital Holdings Ltd are required to file
their proofs of debt by July 9, 2012, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012.

The company's liquidator is:

         CDL Company Ltd.
         P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
         Cayman Islands


PARKWOOD HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 16
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Parkwood Holdings Ltd are required to file their
proofs of debt by July 16, 2012, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on May 18, 2012.

The company's liquidator is:

         H&J Corporate Services (Cayman) Ltd.
         Telephone: (345) 949 7555
         Anderson Square, 5th Floor
         Shedden Road
         PO Box 866 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
         Cayman Islands


REMITTANCE LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 19
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Remittance Ltd. are required to file their proofs
of debt by July 19, 2012, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 5, 2012.

The company's liquidator is:

         Walkers SPV Limited
         Walker House, 87 Mary Street, George Town
         Grand Cayman KY1-9005
         Cayman Islands
         c/o Jennifer Chailler
         Telephone: (345) 814 6847
         H&J Corporate Services (Cayman) Ltd.
         Anderson Square, 5th Floor
         Shedden Road
         PO Box 866 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
         Cayman Islands


YELLOW HAMMER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Yellow Hammer Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by July 31, 2012, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012.

The company's liquidator is:

         David Dyer
         Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited
         PO Box 1984, Boundary Hall
         Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue
         Grand Cayman KY1-1104
         Cayman Islands


ZEBRA FINANCE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 31
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Zebra Finance Company Limited are required to
file their proofs of debt by July 31, 2012, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 7, 2012.

The company's liquidator is:

         David Dyer
         Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited
         PO Box 1984, Boundary Hall
         Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue
         Grand Cayman KY1-1104
         Cayman Islands



===========
M E X I C O
===========


VITRO SAB: Must Have Stay Immediately to Halt Asset Seizures
------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Rochelle, the bankruptcy columnist for Bloomberg News,
reports that Vitro SAB will be able to appeal directly to the U.S.
Court of Appeals in New Orleans from a ruling on June 13 by a U.S.
bankruptcy judge in Dallas refusing to enforce the glassmaker's
Mexican reorganization plan in the U.S.  Unless Vitro convinces
the appeals court to impose a stay pending appeal, bondholders
will be able to begin seizing assets of the company and
subsidiaries after June 29.

According to the report, Vitro is appealing because a bankruptcy
judge in Dallas ruled that the Mexican reorganization was
"manifestly contrary" to U.S. law and public policy.  In the
opinion of the bankruptcy judge, the Mexican plan improperly
allowed Vitro subsidiaries to chop down their guarantees on $1.2
billion in defaulted bonds without having been in bankruptcy
themselves.

On Wednesday, the 5th Circuit in New Orleans granted a direct
appeal, allowing the parties to skip an intermediate appeal to a
federal district judge.  Vitro came up short because the circuit
court, in the same order June 27, refused to accelerate the
appeal.  Carolyn King, one of the three circuit judges who made
Wednesday's ruling, would have held oral argument quickly after
the last brief was filed.  She also would have called on the
bankruptcy judge "to decide promptly" on additional "strong
objections" the bankruptcy judge said he didn't reach because
he already found the Mexican reorganization defective.

Until the circuit court accepted the appeal, there was a watershed
hearing scheduled June 28 in Dallas where Vitro would have asked
District Judge Royal Furgeson to enjoin the bondholders from
attaching assets.  The bankruptcy judge refused to stop attachment
of assets after June 29.  On learning that the circuit court
granted the direct appeal, Judge Furgeson canceled the June 28
hearing, thus requiring Vitro to move quickly in the circuit court
for a stay pending appeal.  Before Judge Furgeson canceled the
stay hearing, holders of 60 percent of the defaulted bonds filed
papers urging the district court not to impose a stay.

According to the report, the bondholders argued the subsidiaries
could fend off asset seizure by filing their own bankruptcies.
The bondholders urge the courts to follow the general rule that
special circumstances are required before one company's bankruptcy
becomes reason for halting legal action against a non-bankrupt
affiliate.  The bondholders also contend the subsidiaries could
obtain a stay by filing bonds in the lawsuits in New York State
court where the creditors are obtaining judgments on the defaulted
bonds.

The appeal in the Circuit Court is Vitro SAB de CV v. Ad Hoc Group
of Vitro Noteholders (In re Vitro SAB de CV), 12-90055, 5th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals (New Orleans).  Vitro's motion in
district court for a stay pending appeal was In re Vitro SAB de
CV, 11-3554, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas
(Dallas).

                        About Vitro SAB

Headquartered in Monterrey, Mexico, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. (BMV:
VITROA; NYSE: VTO), through its two subsidiaries, Vitro Envases
Norteamerica, SA de C.V. and Vimexico, S.A. de C.V., is a global
glass producer, serving the construction and automotive glass
markets and glass containers needs of the food, beverage, wine,
liquor, cosmetics and pharmaceutical industries.

Vitro is the largest manufacturer of glass containers and flat
glass in Mexico, with consolidated net sales in 2009 of MXN23,991
million (US$1.837 billion).

Vitro defaulted on its debt in 2009, and sought to restructure
around US$1.5 billion in debt, including US$1.2 billion in notes.
Vitro launched an offer to buy back or swap US$1.2 billion in debt
from bondholders.  The tender offer would be consummated with a
bankruptcy filing in Mexico and Chapter 15 filing in the United
States.  Vitro said noteholders would recover as much as 73% by
exchanging existing debt for cash, new debt or convertible bonds.

            Concurso Mercantil & Chapter 15 Proceedings

Vitro SAB on Dec. 13, 2010, filed its voluntary petition for a
pre-packaged Concurso Plan in the Federal District Court for
Civil and Labor Matters for the State of Nuevo Leon, commencing
its voluntary concurso mercantil proceedings -- the Mexican
equivalent of a prepackaged Chapter 11 reorganization.  Vitro SAB
also commenced parallel proceedings under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 10-16619) in Manhattan
on Dec. 13, 2010, to seek U.S. recognition and deference to its
bankruptcy proceedings in Mexico.

Early in January 2011, the Mexican Court dismissed the Concurso
Mercantil proceedings.  But an appellate court in Mexico
reinstated the reorganization in April 2011.  Following the
reinstatement, Vitro SAB on April 14, 2011, re-filed a petition
for recognition of its Mexican reorganization in U.S. Bankruptcy
Court in Manhattan (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 11- 11754).

The Vitro parent received sufficient acceptances of its
reorganization by using the US$1.9 billion in debt owing to
subsidiaries to vote down opposition by bondholders.  The holders
of US$1.2 billion in defaulted bonds opposed the Mexican
reorganization plan because shareholders could retain ownership
while bondholders aren't being paid in full.

Vitro announced in March 2012 that it has implemented the
reorganization plan approved by a judge in Monterrey, Mexico.

In the present Chapter 15 case, the Debtor seeks to block any
creditor suits in the U.S. pending the reorganization in Mexico.

                      Chapter 11 Proceedings

A group of noteholders opposed the exchange -- namely Knighthead
Master Fund, L.P., Lord Abbett Bond-Debenture Fund, Inc.,
Davidson Kempner Distressed Opportunities Fund LP, and Brookville
Horizons Fund, L.P.  Together, they held US$75 million, or
approximately 6% of the outstanding bond debt.  The Noteholder
group commenced involuntary bankruptcy cases under Chapter 11 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code against Vitro Asset Corp. (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. Case No. 10-47470) and 15 other affiliates on Nov. 17, 2010.

Vitro engaged Susman Godfrey, L.L.P. as U.S. special litigation
counsel to analyze the potential rights that Vitro may exercise
in the United States against the ad hoc group of dissident
bondholders and its advisors.

A larger group of noteholders, known as the Ad Hoc Group of Vitro
Noteholders -- comprised of holders, or investment advisors to
holders, which represent approximately US$650 million of the
Senior Notes due 2012, 2013 and 2017 issued by Vitro -- was not
among the Chapter 11 petitioners, although the group has
expressed concerns over the exchange offer.  The group says the
exchange offer exposes Noteholders who consent to potential
adverse consequences that have not been disclosed by Vitro.  The
group is represented by John Cunningham, Esq., and Richard
Kebrdle, Esq. at White & Case LLP.

A bankruptcy judge in Fort Worth, Texas, denied involuntary
Chapter 11 petitions filed against four U.S. subsidiaries.  On
April 6, 2011, Vitro SAB agreed to put Vitro units -- Vitro
America LLC and three other U.S. subsidiaries -- that were
subject to the involuntary petitions into voluntary Chapter 11.
The Texas Court on April 21 denied involuntary petitions against
the eight U.S. subsidiaries that didn't consent to being in
Chapter 11.

Kurtzman Carson Consultants is the claims and notice agent to
Vitro America, et al.  Alvarez & Marsal North America LLC, is the
Debtors' operations and financial advisor.

The official committee of unsecured creditors appointed in the
Chapter 11 cases of Vitro America, et al., has selected Sarah
Link Schultz, Esq., at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, in
Dallas, Texas, and Michael S. Stamer, Esq., Abid Qureshi, Esq.,
and Alexis Freeman, Esq., at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP,
in New York, as counsel.  Blackstone Advisory Partners L.P.
serves as financial advisor to the Committee.

The U.S. Vitro companies sold their assets to American Glass
Enterprises LLC, an affiliate of Sun Capital Partners Inc., for
US$55 million.

U.S. subsidiaries of Vitro SAB are having their cases converted to
liquidations in Chapter 7, court records in January 2012 show.  In
December, the U.S. Trustee in Dallas filed a motion to convert the
subsidiaries' cases to liquidations in Chapter 7.  The Justice
Department's bankruptcy watchdog said US$5.1 million in bills were
run up in bankruptcy and hadn't been paid.

On June 13, 2012, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Harlin "Cooter" Hale in
Dallas entered a ruling that precluded Vitro from enforcing
its Mexican reorganization plan in the U.S.  The judge ruled that
the Mexican reorganization was "manifestly contrary" to U.S.
public policy because it bars the bondholders from holding Vitro
operating subsidiaries liable to pay on their guarantees of the
bonds.  The Mexican plan reduced the debt of subsidiaries on $1.2
billion in defaulted bonds even though they weren't in bankruptcy
in any country.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================


COMPREHENSIVE CARE: Expects to Report Profit in Second Quarter
--------------------------------------------------------------
Comprehensive Care Corporation expects to report a profit for the
second quarter of 2012, with revenues for the quarter of
approximately $18 million.  Revenues for the same quarter in 2011
were $18.6 million.  However, during that quarter, the Company
posted a loss of $4 million.

Commenting on the expected results for the quarter, Robert J.
Landis, CompCare's Chief Financial Officer, stated, "The Company
is particularly excited about our second quarter expected results
since, if realized, it will be the first time in many years that
the Company has been able to post a profit for two consecutive
quarters.  The improvement in results from the second quarter of
2011 to the second quarter of 2012, we believe, is primarily
attributable to our Pharmacy Management Program which is now
achieving traction and our cost reduction efforts to streamline
our internal systems.  Part of the shift in the pharmacy program
occurred from our establishing Company-owned clinics in areas
where we experience high patient utilization and cost.  The
clinics have the effect of reducing those costs and providing us
with a greater opportunity to directly service the needs of the
patients.  Based on our best current available information, for
example, the Company expects to realize a profit in its at-risk
pharmacy operations in April, and this trend continues in May
where preliminary numbers indicate an increase profit in the
Company's at-risk pharmacy operations.  While there can be no
assurances that this trend will continue or that there might not
be subsequent positive or negative adjustments to the April and
May results, the upward trend is what we were looking for since we
believe that it indicates the viability of the overall program.
Other aspects of the Pharmacy Management Program are in the
process of being implemented and will occur shortly."

Mr. Landis continued, "Another aspect of the Pharmacy Management
Program that contributed to a successful second quarter was the
signing of a Third Amendment (the "Amendment") to a material
agreement with one of our existing, at-risk pharmacy clients.  As
a result of the Amendment, the Company received a $2.2 million,
retroactive, cash adjustment to pharmacy prescriptions, which were
originally charged to the Company.  Additionally, the Amendment
shifts the financial responsibility for a significant number of
prescriptions from the Company to the client for the remainder of
2012.  We expect this financial responsibility shift to further
reduce the Company's pharmacy expenses throughout the year, and
although there can be no guarantees that these expectations will
be achieved, we expect the shift to further enhance the Company's
profitability in its pharmacy operations for the remainder of
2012."

"Additionally, we were able to implement administrative, cost-
saving measures that also contributed to a profitable second
quarter," Mr. Landis said.

On June 20, 2012, CompCare de Puerto Rico, Inc., a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Comprehensive Care, entered into a Third Amendment
to the original agreement with MSO of Puerto Rico, Inc., to
provide its health plan members mental health, substance abuse
treatment, and pharmacy management services.  Pursuant to the
Amendment, the parties agreed to revise their method of operations
and clarified their respective financial responsibilities for the
payment of certain prescriptions during the period May 1, 2012,
through Dec. 31, 2012, defined in the Amendment as the
"Collaboration Period" and thereafter, during the period defined
as the "Post-Collaboration Period."  The Company's financial
responsibility for psychotropic prescription drugs will be limited
to the costs of psychotropic drugs prescribed for current mental
health conditions.  The parties also agreed to settle, for $2.2
million, all Pharmacy Adjustments previously identified as they
relate to drugs which were not prescribed for mental health
conditions, which drugs were previously charged to the Company,
for all periods prior to April 1, 2012.  The $2.2 million was paid
to the Company's providers by MSO on behalf of the Company.  A
copy of the Amendment is available for free at http://is.gd/E4CetU

                     About Comprehensive Care

Tampa, Fla.-based Comprehensive Care Corporation provides managed
care services in the behavioral health, substance abuse, and
psychotropic pharmacy management fields.

Following the 2011 results, Mayer Hoffman McCann P.C., in
Clearwater, Florida, expressed substantial doubt about the
Company's ability to continue as a going concern.  The independent
auditors noted that the Company has suffered recurring losses from
operations and has not generated sufficient cash flows from
operations to fund its working capital requirements.

Comprehensive Care reported a net loss of $14.08 million in 2011,
compared with a net loss of $10.47 million in 2010.

The Company's balance sheet at March 31, 2012, showed $15.02
million in total assets, $31.27 million in total liabilities and a
$16.25 million total stockholders' deficiency.



===============================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
===============================


ALEXANDRA RESORT: In Receivership Instead of Exploring Options
--------------------------------------------------------------
Turks & Caicos Sun reports that Washington Misick Hotelier
Washington Misick said he is "disappointed" that the Lord
Ashcroft-owned British Caribbean Bank (BCB) chose to place the
Alexandra Resort and Spa into receivership instead of exploring
other options.

"I am disappointed that BCB chose receivership rather than a
number of possible work-out options available to it," the report
quoted Mr. Misick as saying.

BCB placed the ARS in receivership, and appointed a
receiver/manager of the property, according to Turks & Caicos Sun
as saying.

"MML is both solvent and profitable.  ARS, like many other
properties, has been hit hard by the international phenomenon of
high levels of inventory; penal interest rates, and sluggish
sales.  A good faith solution is possible, but requires creative
compromise; I look forward to working with the receiver to find a
win-win compromise.  It bears mentioning that no other business
operated by me is in any way affected by the receivership of the
ARS," Mr. Misick said, the report relays.

Alexandra Resort and Villas Limited is the development arm of
Alexandra Resort and Spa (ARS).  It is owned by Washington, his
brother, former Premier Michael Misick and Sherlock Walkin.
Washington said that the subsidiary of ARS, Millennium Management
Ltd. (MML) manages the resort.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Cuts Ratings on Lat-Am Units of BBVA & Banco Santander
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has repositioned the ratings of six
Latin American banking subsidiaries of Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria, S.A. (BBVA) and Banco Santander, S.A. (Santander).
These rating actions follow the downgrades of the parent banks'
standalone financial strength ratings (BFSRs) and baseline credit
assessments (BCAs), which remain on review for downgrade, given
the weakening of the Spanish government's creditworthiness.

The long-term global local currency deposit ratings of Banco
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Colombia S.A. and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria Paraguay S.A. have been downgraded by one notch, while
those of Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Chile have been
downgraded by two notches. The deposit rating of BBVA Colombia has
been placed on review for further downgrade in line with the
outlook on its parent's ratings. The global local currency deposit
ratings of Banco Santander Chile, Banco Santander Uruguay S.A.,
and Banco Santander Rio S.A. have also been placed on review for
downgrade.

The short-term global local currency deposit ratings of BBVA Chile
and BBVA Colombia were downgraded by one notch, while the short-
term global local currency ratings
of Santander Chile and Santander Uruguay were placed on review for
downgrade.

The foreign currency deposit ratings of Santander Chile were
placed on review for downgrade as they are equivalent to their
local currency ratings, while those of BBVA Chile were downgraded
by two notches. Those of the remaining four banks were unaffected
by this action. The global long-term foreign currency debt ratings
of BBVA Chile were downgraded, while the debt ratings
of Santander Chile and Santander Rio were placed on review for
downgrade. The local currency national scale debt ratings of
Santander Rio were also placed on review for downgrade.

The rating downgrades and continuing reviews take into account the
potential effects on the Latin American subsidiaries of Santander
and BBVA of credit pressures at the parent level that affect
Moody's assumptions regarding the probability of parental support
to be incorporated in the subsidiaries' ratings. The reviews will
also focus on how subsidiaries' stand alone credit profiles may be
affected by their close ties to the respective parent bank,
including financial, branding and managerial linkages.

Moody's rating actions on Santander's and BBVA's subsidiaries
in Brazil and Mexico are detailed in separate press releases.

Overview Of The Rating Actions

Banco Santander Chile (Santander Chile)

Bank financial strength rating of B-, on review for downgrade

Long-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings of
Aa3, on review for downgrade

Short-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings of
Prime-1, on review for downgrade

Foreign currency senior and subordinated debt ratings of Aa3 and
A1, on review for downgrade

Banco Santander S.A. (Uruguay) (Santander Uruguay)

Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Baa3, on review
for possible downgrade

Short-term global local currency deposit rating of Prime-3, on
review for possible downgrade

Long-term Uruguayan national scale local currency deposit rating
of Aa1.uy, on review for possible downgrade

Banco Santander Rio S.A. (Santander Rio)

Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Ba3, on review
for downgrade

Long-term Argentinean national scale local currency deposit rating
of Aaa.ar, on review for downgrade

Long-term global local currency senior debt rating of Ba3, on
review for downgrade

Long-term Argentinean national scale local currency senior debt
rating of Aaa.ar, on review for downgrade

Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Chile (BBVA Chile)

Long-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings to
Baa1, stable, from A2

Short-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings to
Prime-2, stable, from Prime-1

Long-term foreign currency senior debt rating to Baa1, stable,
from A2

Long-term Mexican national scale debt rating of Aaa.mx affirmed,
stable

Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Colombia S.A. (BBVA Colombia)

Long-term global local currency deposit rating to Baa2, on review
for further downgrade, from Baa1

Long-term global foreign currency deposit rating of Baa3 affirmed,
stable

Short-term global local currency deposit rating to Prime-3 from
Prime-2

Short-term global foreign currency deposit rating of Prime-3,
affirmed

Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Paraguay S.A. (BBVA Paraguay)

Long-term global local currency deposit rating to Ba2, stable,
from Ba1

Long-term global foreign currency deposit rating of B2 affirmed,
stable

Long-term global foreign currency debt rating of Ba3 affirmed,
stable

A list of the Affected Credit Ratings is available at:

  http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_143530

Rating Rationale

Santander Chile

The review for downgrade of Santander Chile's standalone B- BFSR
and BCA of a1 is driven by the downgrade of the standalone rating
of its 67.2% parent, Santander, to baa2 on review for further
downgrade from a3. As a result, Santander Chile's Aa3 global local
and foreign currency deposit ratings have also been placed on
review for downgrade, together with the bank's Aa3 and A1 foreign
currency senior and subordinated debt ratings, respectively, as
they are derived from the global local currency deposit rating.
The bank's Prime-1 global local and foreign currency short term
deposit ratings were also placed on review for downgrade.

The review for downgrade of Santander Chile's standalone BFSR and
BCA reflects the bank's degree of strategic and operational
interdependence with its parent, whose standalone credit profile
has been lowered. While Moody's recognizes a satisfactory level of
ring-fencing from risks elsewhere in the Santander Group, the
correlation in the areas of reputation and investor confidence
give reason to reassess the positioning of the standalone rating
at multiple notches above the parent's and in light of the
continuing review of the parent's ratings. Moody's will assess the
positioning of Santander Chile's BCA relative to that of the
parent, taking into account its (i) funding or operating
dependence; (ii) profitability and liquidity; (iii) exposure to
the parent and common client relationships; and (iv) regulatory
barriers that control the distribution of capital resources from
the subsidiary to its parent.

The review for downgrade of Santander Chile's ratings is driven by
the outlook on the parent's BCA and indicates that these ratings
are likely to be lowered if the parent bank's standalone rating is
lowered. Because Santander Chile's BCA is higher than that of its
parent bank, its deposit ratings do not benefit from uplift due to
parent support assumptions. Santander Chile's Aa3 deposit and
senior debt ratings currently derive one notch of uplift from the
bank's a1 BCA based on Moody's assessment of a very high
probability of government support if needed, due to the importance
of the bank's deposit and lending franchise in Chile.

Santander Rio

Santander Rio's Ba3 global local currency deposit rating and
Aaa.ar local currency deposit rating on the Argentinean national
scale have been placed on review for downgrade in line with the
action on the standalone rating of its 95.7% Spanish parent,
Santander. Moody's Latin America has also placed the Ba3 global
local currency debt rating and Aaa.ar local currency debt rating
on the Argentinean national scale on review for downgrade. The
bank's global local and foreign currency short-term deposit
ratings of Not Prime were affirmed.

The review for downgrade of Santander Rio's global and national
scale deposit and debt ratings is based on the downgrade and
continuing review of the parent's baa2 standalone rating, which
may reduce the level of parental support incorporated in the
subsidiary's ratings. Currently Santander Rio's ratings benefit
from three notches of uplift reflecting Moody's assessment of a
high probability of parental support in case of need. The review
of the national scale ratings derives directly from the review of
the global ratings.

Santander Uruguay

Moody's has placed Santander Uruguay's Baa3 and Prime-3 long-term
and short-term global local currency deposit ratings on review for
downgrade, indicating the weakening of the parent bank's BCA.
Moody's Latin America has also placed the bank's Aa1.uy local
currency deposit rating on the Uruguayan national scale on review
for downgrade.

The bank's Ba2 and Not Prime foreign currency deposit ratings are
unaffected by this rating action and remain constrained by the
Uruguayan country ceiling. SantanderUruguay's deposit ratings
benefit from one notch of uplift from the bank's ba1 BCA based on
Moody's assessment of a moderate probability of parental support
in case of need.

Bbva Chile

BBVA Chile's deposit and debt ratings have been downgraded to Baa1
from A2, in line with the downgrade of the BCA of its 68.2%
parent, BBVA, to baa3, on review for further downgrade, from a3.
BBVA Chile's global local and foreign currency short-term ratings
were also downgraded, to Prime-2 from Prime-1. The rating outlook
is now stable for these ratings.

The foreign currency senior debt rating assigned to the bank's
issuances of Certificados Bursatiles in the Mexican market has
therefore also been downgraded to Baa1 from A2. Moody's de
Mexico's Aaa.mx debt rating on the Mexican National Scale was
unaffected by this action and has therefore been affirmed. BBVA
Chile's D+ and baa3 standalone BFSR and BCA, which are at the
parent level, have also been affirmed, with stable outlooks.

BBVA Chile's ratings now hinge on the bank's standalone strength
together with Moody's assessment of the probability of government
support, as they no longer derive uplift from parental support
assumptions. The Baa1 global scale deposit and senior debt ratings
now benefit from two notches of uplift due to government support
from the bank's baa3 BCA versus four notches previously,
reflecting the importance of BBVA Chile's deposit and lending
franchise.

Bbva Colombia

Moody's has downgraded BBVA Colombia's long-term global local
currency deposit rating to Baa2 on review for downgrade from Baa1,
and short-term global local currency deposit rating to Prime-3
from Prime-2, in line with the action on the standalone ratings of
its 95.43% parent, BBVA.

BBVA Colombia's global local currency deposit rating of Baa2
continues to benefit from two notches of uplift from the bank's
BCA of ba1, reflecting Moody's assessment of a very high
probability of both parental and government support if necessary,
the latter in light of the bank's considerable market shares in
deposits and loans and the fact that it is the largest mortgage
lender in Colombia.

Bbva Paraguay

The downgrade of BBVA Paraguay's global local currency deposit
rating, to Ba2 from Ba1, is in line with the downgrade of the
standalone ratings of the 99.98% parent, BBVA. BBVA Paraguay's Ba2
deposit rating now incorporates two notches of uplift from the
bank's b1 BCA reflecting Moody's view of the probability of both
parental and government support, compared with three notches
previously. The rating now receives one notch of uplift due to
parental support, versus two previously, and one notch reflecting
government support.

BBVA Paraguay's foreign currency deposit and debt ratings of B2
and Ba3, respectively, have been affirmed with stable outlook,
along with the respective Not Prime short-term global local and
foreign currency deposit ratings, and remain constrained by the
Paraguayan foreign currency country ceilings for deposits of B2
and debt of Ba3.

Last Rating Actions

Moody's last rating action on Santander Chile was on 9 February
2012, when Moody's assigned a (P)Aa3 rating to the bank's global
medium-term note program.

Moody's last rating action on BBVA Chile was on 7 November 2011,
when Moody's assigned new global and Mexican national scale debt
ratings of A2 and Aaa.mx to the bank's issuances of Certificados
Bursatiles.

Moody's last rating action taken on BBVA Colombia was on 18 July
2011, when Moody's assigned first-time ratings.

Moody's last rating action taken on BBVA Paraguay was on 18 May
2012, when Moody's downgraded the standalone rating and affirmed
the supported debt ratings, with stable outlook.


* Moody's Cuts Ratings on Spanish Banks' North American Units
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded certain long-term
supported ratings of Banco Santander S.A.'s (Santander) and Banco
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.'s (BBVA) North American bank
subsidiaries. Following the downgrades, Moody's placed the
subsidiaries' long- and short-term ratings, including their
standalone bank financial strength ratings (BFSR)/baseline credit
assessments (BCA), on review for downgrade.

The actions follow the downgrades of Santander (standalone
BFSR/BCA to C-/baa2 from C/a3, on review for further downgrade)
and BBVA (standalone BFSR/BCA to D+/baa3 from C/a3, on review for
further downgrade). These actions are discussed in the press
release "Moody's downgrades Spanish banks," dated 25 June 2012 and
available on moodys.com.

List of Affected Ratings

Subsidiaries of Santander:

- Santander Holdings USA, Inc.: all long- and short-term ratings
(senior at Baa2) placed on review for downgrade

- Sovereign Bank, N.A.: long-term bank deposit, senior debt and
issuer ratings downgraded to Baa1 from A3; subordinate debt rating
downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1; all long- and short-term ratings,
including the standalone BFSR/BCA of C-/baa1, placed on review for
downgrade

- Sovereign Real Estate Investment Trust: non-cumulative
preferred stock rating downgraded to Ba1 (hyb) from Baa3; placed
on review for further downgrade

- Sovereign Capital Trust IV: Ba1 (hyb) preferred stock rating
placed on review for downgrade

- Sovereign Capital Trust V: (P)Ba1 preferred stock rating placed
on review for downgrade

- Sovereign Capital Trust VI: Ba1 (hyb) preferred stock rating
placed on review for downgrade

- Banco Santander Puerto Rico: long-term bank deposit, senior
debt and issuer ratings downgraded to Baa1 from A3; all long- and
short-term ratings placed on review for downgrade; the standalone
BFSR/BCA of C-/baa1, which was placed on review for downgrade on
10 April 2012 because of Puerto Rico's difficult operating
environment, remains on review

Subsidiaries of BBVA:

- BBVA USA Bancshares, Inc.: long-term issuer rating downgraded
to Baa3 from Baa1 and placed on review for further downgrade

- Compass Bank: long-term bank deposit, senior debt and issuer
ratings downgraded to Baa2 from A3; subordinate debt rating
downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1; all long- and short-term ratings,
including the standalone BFSR/BCA of C-/baa2, placed on review for
downgrade

- Phoenix Loan Holdings: non-cumulative preferred stock rating
downgraded to Ba2 (hyb) from Baa3 and placed on review for further
downgrade

- Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Puerto Rico: long-term bank
deposit, senior debt and issuer ratings downgraded to Baa2 from
A3; subordinate debt rating downgraded to Baa3 from Baa1; all
long- and short-term ratings placed on review for downgrade; the
standalone BFSR/BCA of C-/baa2, which was placed on review for
downgrade on April 10, 2012, remains on review

Ratings Rationale

The downgrades reflect the potential adverse effects of
Santander's and BBVA's lower capacity to support their
subsidiaries in North America, reflected by their lower standalone
ratings. The downgrades of the parents' ratings were driven by the
reduced creditworthiness of the Spanish sovereign, as captured by
Moody's recent three-notch downgrade of Spain's government bond
rating (Baa3, on review for further downgrade), which implies a
weaker credit profile for Spanish banks. This results from the
banks' multiple linkages with the sovereign, including (i) the
impact of the government's financial position on the domestic
economy; and (ii) the large exposures of most banks to their
domestic government and to other counterparties that depend on the
credit strength of the government.

The downgrade of Santander's and BBVA's standalone ratings, which
are now one notch below the respective standalone ratings of their
North American bank subsidiaries, means that the subsidiaries'
ratings will no longer benefit from any uplift from parental
support, with the exception of Santander Holdings USA, Inc. and
its capital trust subsidiaries. Previously, Santander's North
American bank subsidiaries benefited from one notch of parental
support uplift, while BBVA's North American subsidiaries benefited
from two notches of uplift.

The ratings of Santander Holdings USA, Inc. and its capital trust
subsidiaries continue to benefit from one notch of uplift given
the parent's continued capacity to support these subsidiaries.
This is reflected by Santander's higher standalone rating of baa2,
one notch above Santander Holdings USA, Inc.'s intrinsic financial
strength of baa3.

Moody's has also attached a hybrid (hyb) indicator to the non-
cumulative preferred stock ratings of Sovereign Real Estate
Investment Trust & Phoenix Loan Holdings.

Rationale For Reviews For Downgrade

Following the downgrades, all of the North American subsidiaries'
ratings were placed on review for downgrade. The reviews reflect
the potential adverse effects from weakening creditworthiness at
the parent level on the standalone financial strength of their
subsidiaries.

During its reviews of the bank subsidiaries' standalone ratings,
Moody's will focus on the independence and resilience of the North
American banks' financial strength in the event that the parents'
creditworthiness is further affected and their ratings lowered.
Generally, Moody's is comfortable with subsidiaries' standalone
ratings exceeding those of their parents, but this is typically
limited by linkages between the subsidiary and the parent bank.
The extent to which the regulatory framework in the US insulates
the subsidiaries from potential adverse developments in Spain will
also be factored into Moody's review of the ratings.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR-LA. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick,
Maryland USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.


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