/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/130902.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Monday, September 2, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 173 Headlines A R G E N T I N A * ARGENTINA: DBRS Cuts LT Foreign Currency Issuer Rating to 'B' * ARGENTINA: Moody's Eyes Downgrades for MAPFRE Seguros and Vida B E R M U D A BRITISH AMERICAN: Policyholders Call Meeting to Discuss 'Options' B R A Z I L CEAGRO AGRICOLA: Fitch Affirms 'B/RR4' Rating on Sr. Sec. Notes C A Y M A N I S L A N D S AMERICAN PRAX: Commences Liquidation Proceedings AWASU IAGO: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 BRIDGEPORT PRAX: Commences Liquidation Proceedings CG TAIWAN: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up CLEARWATER CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 CPC ASIA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 CPC ASIA MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 CREDIT SUISSE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 16 KENMAR PRIVATE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 MARIAH RE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 26 MIRPAN LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 26 MULTI BANKING: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up THEOREMA MANAGED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 THEOREMA MANAGED MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 TOWNSEND LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 23 D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C * DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Business Leaders Slam Interest Rate Rise J A M A I C A * JAMAICA: Gov't. Slashes Spending by JM$6 Bil. For April-June M E X I C O CORPORACION PESQUERA: China Fishery Purchase No Impact on Ratings INDUSTRIAS UNIDAS: 1H Net Income Drops 9% to Ps.5,508.1 Million OFFSHORE DRILLING: Fitch to Rate New US$950MM Secured Debt 'BB' VISION BANCO: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Counterparty Credit Rating P A N A M A NEWLAND INT'L: Fitch Rates US$257.6MM Sr. Sec. Notes at 'CC' T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O CL FIN'L: UK Firms to Help With New Draft Agreement * TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: TTPostal Workers Demand Backpay X X X X X X X X * Risk Ceilings for Chile, Costa Rica and Dominican Rep. Adjusted BOND PRICING: For the Week From Aug. 26 to Aug. 30, 2013 - - - - - ================= A R G E N T I N A ================= * ARGENTINA: DBRS Cuts LT Foreign Currency Issuer Rating to 'B' --------------------------------------------------------------- DBRS Inc. has downgraded the Republic of Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating to B (low), and the short-term foreign currency rating to R-5. Argentina's long-term local currency rating has been confirmed at B, and the short-term local currency rating has been confirmed at R-4. The long-term foreign currency issuer rating and all local currency ratings remain Under Review with Negative implications (URN). The trend on the short- term foreign currency rating (which now corresponds to the lowest rating on DBRS' short-term rating scale) has been revised to Stable. On Friday, August 23, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed a New York District Court ruling that seeks to compel Argentina to repay in full its past due debts to holdout creditor NML Capital Limited (NML) the next time Argentina makes a payment on its restructured bonds. Although the Court of Appeals extended the stay on its ruling until the U.S. Supreme Court makes a decision on whether to hear the case, DBRS believes that this ruling materially increases the risk of a default on Argentina's restructured bonds issued under New York law, and is a key trigger for the downgrade. If the Supreme Court declines to hear the case, or if it hears the case but upholds the ruling, DBRS is likely to downgrade the foreign currency rating further, to CCC or lower. The URN reflects continued uncertainty regarding the Supreme Court's willingness to hear the case and the implications this could have for a default by Argentina. Both foreign and local currency ratings could come under pressure if Argentina fails to make needed policy adjustments and restore the credibility of its macroeconomic framework. Conversely, stronger fiscal policies following the upcoming elections in October and a serious effort to rein in inflation, particularly if supported by a recovery in Brazil and in advanced economies, could stabilize Argentina's ratings. Argentina's strong growth and earlier fiscal performance have significantly reduced indebtedness, which provides some support to its credit rating. The debt maturity profile remains relatively comfortable, though 2015 is likely to be a challenging year if market access has not been restored. DBRS remains concerned about the continued strains from Argentina's inconsistent mix of fiscal, monetary, trade and exchange rate policies. Fiscal performance continues to deteriorate in the lead up to Congressional elections on October 27, 2013, reflecting the rise in subsidy costs. Reserve losses have accelerated, declining by $5 billion since the start of 2013. In the context of Argentina's disputes with external creditors, the risk of a default on foreign currency debt in particular remains very high. Local currency financing sources remain adequate, but reliance on central bank financing is a key contributor to Argentina's high rate of inflation. Compounding these challenges, DBRS expects that Argentina could choose to default on its performing foreign currency denominated exchange bonds rather than make a payment to NML. It remains unclear whether Argentina will be willing to service all of its local currency denominated debt, particularly if any holders of peso-denominated bonds are located outside of Argentina. The government announced on Monday, August 26 that it would send to Congress a bill to reopen the 2010 debt exchange. This would be unlikely to prevent a default, since the existing holdouts continue to press for full payment. In addition, the government announced plans to launch an exchange of bonds issued under U.S. law for new securities issued under Argentine law if the U.S. Supreme Court affirms the ruling against Argentina. However, even if Argentina is successful in obtaining 100% participation of exchange bondholders in the new debt exchange, the terms of this exchange as announced by President Fern ndez de Kirchner appear likely to reduce the value of bondholder claims, and could consequently still be considered a default by DBRS. * ARGENTINA: Moody's Eyes Downgrades for MAPFRE Seguros and Vida ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Latin America placed the insurance financial strength (IFS) ratings of MAPFRE Argentina Seguros S.A. and MAPFRE Argentina Seguros de Vida S.A. -- both Ba3 global local-currency and Aa2.ar Argentine national scale -- under review for downgrade. Ratings Rationale: Moody's said the ratings were placed under review for downgrade because MAPFRE Seguros reported a significant net loss -- equivalent to 50% of the company's statutory capital at the start of the fiscal year -- and causing the company's non- compliance with local capital requirements as of June 30, 2013. The large loss was largely driven by weak underwriting margins. According to Moody's, the review for possible downgrade will focus on the company's ability to restore and maintain both profitability and capital adequacy in the near- and medium-term, as well as on the ability and willingness of MAPFRE Seguros' ultimate parent shareholder -- MAPFRE S.A. in Spain -- to provide further capital contributions, as necessary, to meet and exceed minimum regulatory capital requirements. The review will also consider the strategic importance of the 2 Argentine subsidiaries to their parent company MAPFRE S.A., and whether the current 2 notches of uplift in both companies' ratings from their stand- alone credit profile (due to MAPFRE S.A.'s ownership and implied support) is still appropriate, in the context of the parent company's recent sale of its workers' compensation and health insurance subsidiaries in Argentina. MAPFRE Seguros' intrinsic credit profile reflects its leading position in the Argentine insurance market as a major player in the local property and casualty segment, although its increasing penetration in softer segments -- such as auto and commercial property -- has resulted in greater volatility of earnings and has pressured capitalization. In the case of MAPFRE Vida, which is a mid-sized player in the Argentine life and annuity segment, Moody's commented that the company has sustained solid profitability and good capital adequacy relative to peers, along with very strong premium growth over the last five years, although its market presence is still modest. Both companies' ratings are uplifted by their ownership, brand sharing, and risk transfer arrangements achieved through intra-group reinsurance agreements. Among the factors that could lead to a downgrade of the companies' ratings are: 1) reduced ownership and/or support from their ultimate parent company or affiliates outside Argentina, 2) a downgrade of Argentina's sovereign bond rating and/or the country's operating environment, 3) persistent impairment of capital levels, or 4) sustained weak profitability. Conversely, the following could lead to a confirmation of the companies' ratings: 1) a significant capital injection to MAPFRE Seguros from any of MAPFRES.A.'s affiliates outside Argentina, 2) continued implicit and explicit support from parent to both companies, and 3) actions taken by the company leading to restore capital adequacy and profitability on a sustained basis. The principal methodology used in this rating is Moody's Global Methodology for Property and Casualty Insurers published in May 2010. Based in Buenos Aires, MAPFRE Seguros and MAPFRE Vida are indirect wholly-owned subsidiaries of MAPFRE S.A., headquartered in Madrid, Spain. For the 2012/13 fiscal year, ended June 30th 2013, total gross premiums for MAPFRE Seguros and MAPFRE Vida amounted to ARS 2 billion and ARS 317 million, respectively. As of that same date, MAPFRE Seguros and MAPFRE Vida reported a net loss of ARS 141 million and a net profit of 25 million, respectively. On June 30, 2013, total shareholders' equity was ARS 165 million for MAPFRE Seguros, and ARS 84 million for MAPFRE Vida. Moody's insurance financial strength ratings are opinions of the ability of insurance companies to pay punctually senior policyholder claims and obligations. Moody's National Scale Ratings (NSRs) are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the relevant country, as in ".mx" for Mexico. ============= B E R M U D A ============= BRITISH AMERICAN: Policyholders Call Meeting to Discuss 'Options' ----------------------------------------------------------------- Marina Mello at The Royal Gazette reports that British American Insurance Company Limited policyholders are calling a meeting for this week to discuss their concerns over the handling of the winding up of the insurance company. The Official Receiver, in his capacity as Provisional Liquidator of British American Insurance Company Limited, said they have now realized all assets available to Bermuda resident creditors of BAICL, and are in a position to make a final distribution to creditors under the Scheme of Arrangement, according to The Royal Gazette. "The final payment will be a distribution of 2.5% of Scheme Creditors' claims, as previously estimated. . . . The first distribution of 35% of Scheme Creditors' claims was paid in December 2011. After payment of this second and final distribution, Scheme Creditors will have received a total of 37.5% of their claims. . . . In accordance with the terms of the Scheme of Arrangement, final distribution cheques will be mailed to each Scheme Creditor's last known address on September 12, 2013. . . . The Official Receiver is conscious of the fact that in certain instances there is a cost associated with cashing a cheque in Bermuda. Scheme Creditors will therefore be given the opportunity to return their final distribution cheque and have their distribution paid by online transfer. . . . Details of what action is required by Scheme Creditors to take up this option will be included in the envelope containing the final distribution cheques," the statement said, the report notes. Policyholders are asked to e-mail before the end of Aug. 3, 2013. "It's time for British American policy holders to get together to discuss our concerns and the way forward -- since we can't seem to get answers from those who have them," the report quoted a policyholder as saying. "We want to know what our options are, what happened, and should there be further investigation," another policyholder said, notes the report. "Even if it means us paying collectively to take action." Some policyholders are also not happy that after their final payout they will have gotten back about 37 cents on the dollar, the report added. The report recalls that BAICO, which owned 40 percent of the Front Street building through its interests in a holding company, was wound up after its 2009 collapse. The other 60 percent belongs to the BAICO Bermuda pension scheme. The Official Receiver's press release earlier this summer stated that given the prevailing market conditions, completing a sale of the building has taken a considerable period of time and for a price considerably lower than the original valuation of BM$3.8 million, when the liquidation of British American commenced, the report adds. About BAICO British American Insurance Company is a Nassau, Bahamas-based insurance and financial services company. BAIC is owned by Trinidad-based parent CL Financial. BAIC listed debt of $500 million to $1 billion and assets of more than $100 million in its Chapter 15 petition (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Case No. 09-3588). By order entered Aug. 4, 2009, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court in the High Court of Justice Saint Vincent and the Grenadines appointed Brian Glasgow as Judicial Manager for BAICO under Section 52 of the Insurance Act, No. 45 of 2003 of the Laws of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. =========== B R A Z I L =========== CEAGRO AGRICOLA: Fitch Affirms 'B/RR4' Rating on Sr. Sec. Notes --------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Ceagro Agricola Ltda (Ceagro) as follows: -- Foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B'; -- National scale rating at 'BBB (bra)'; -- US$100 million senior secured notes due 2016 at 'B/RR4'. The Rating Outlook is Stable. The rating affirmation is based on Ceagro's 2012 annual financial statements and an initial discussion with management. Fitch intends on updating its analysis in the coming weeks following the group's publication of its half-year results, which are anticipated to be in line with expectations. The ratings affirmations reflect Ceagro's well-established position in the highly competitive Brazilian agricultural services sector, its strong operating margins in the high single digits. As this stage, Fitch anticipates that the group's net leverage will remain below 3.5x at year-end 2013, in line with the current ratings. Key Rating Drivers Established Business Position Ceagro Agricola Ltda. has established long-term relationships with grain producers, suppliers, and off-takers. The company's profile has benefited from an increase in its operating scale which has allowed it to purchase fertilizers at lower prices and increase the volume of barter originations. High Ebitda Margin But Cost Pressure The group's EBITDA margin remains strong at about 7.5% above the historical levels of between 3% and 5%. Fitch expects the group's EBITDA margin to remain steady in 2013 despite recurring input costs inflation (fertilizer and logistics). Fitch's expectation is based on volume increase (notably for Corn) and the full consolidation in Ceagro's accounts of Agroextra Insumos Agricola in 2013. Agroextra is a leading distributor of Syngenta agricultural products (fertilizers and services) with an EBITDA of approximately BRL11.0 million as of FYE11. Agroextra was acquired by Ceagro during 2012 for approximately BRL20 million. High Commodity Risk and Small Size Ceagro's small size, lack of geographic and commodity diversification compared to its large and established competitors are constraining factors for the rating. The group's export capacity of soybeans remains constrained by Brazilian port infrastructures. This could cause execution risks and have a negative working capital impact on the company's cash flow and therefore on the group's leverage ratios during the year. Working Capital Requirements Impediment to Growth: Trades originated through Ceagro's barter system grew to 52% of revenue during 2011 from 46% in 2011.The group also implements some spot transactions. Unlike trades through the barter system, spot market trades require working capital for short periods of time and have lower profit margins. Asset Light Model Ceagro has a minimal amount of balance sheet assets. It depends on rentals for transportation and storage. While this has not been a problem in the past, the cost of renting equipment may rise in the future and compress operating margins. Fitch understands that the company will not invest in capex to increase its storage capacity. Ceagro will arrange new long-term lease agreements with warehouse owners to accommodate its growth strategy. Increased Net Leverage Ceagro's Net Debt to EBITDA increased to 3.4x at FYE12 from 2.2x at FYE11 because of the group's growth strategy and the implementation of one time securitization like financing (trial transaction) with Banco Indusval SA (BBB(bra)). Going forward, this type of financing will be done off-balance sheet through a newly created joint venture with Ceagro's shareholder and Banco Industrial; excluding this onetime on balance sheet financing, Ceagro's net leverage at 2.5x would have been in line with Fitch's expectation. Fitch expects Ceagro's Net Debt to EBITDA to remain below 3.5x at FYE13. Using Fitch RMI (readily marketable inventories adjustments) the net adjusted leverage was stable 2.2x at FYE12. Leverage can be negatively impacted during the year due to changes in working capital caused by any negative external factors such as weather changes or logistics issues (ports terminal). Weaker Liquidity The liquidity situation of the company has deteriorated as of FYE12 with a liquidity ratio (cash/short-term debt) at 0.4x at year-end 2012 vs 1.3x at FYE11. This was due to the group's growth strategy, export-financing transactions and the trial transaction (impacting the group's short-term debt by BRL80m of debt). However, the group's liquidity is supported by the liquidity of its commodities (corn and soybean). Using Fitch RMI, the group's liquidity score was at 1.8x which gives Fitch comfort on the group's liquidity. Rating Sensitivities Considerations that could lead to a negative rating action (Rating or Outlook) include an increase in the company's net debt/ebitda leverage above the range of 3.5 - 4.0x over a sustained period. Leverage could increase either by weakening profitability, the launch of a large debt-financed investment program or sudden drop in trading volumes. Changes in its risk management, resulting in a higher exposure to commodity prices and exchange rate volatility, would also be viewed negatively. Considerations that could lead to a positive rating action includes the group's demonstrated ability to maintain EBTIDA margins in the 8% - 10% level and an increase in trading volumes without disproportionately increasing leverage or deteriorating the liquidity profile. ========================== C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ========================== AMERICAN PRAX: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ------------------------------------------------ On Aug. 9, 2013, the members of American Prax Real Estate I, Ltd resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: John Sullivan c/o Maples and Calder, Attorneys-at-law P.O. Box 309, Ugland House Grand Cayman KY1-1104 Cayman Islands AWASU IAGO: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 -------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Awasu Iago are required to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 25, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 13, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited 190 Elgin Avenue, George Town Grand Cayman, KY1-9005 Cayman Islands c/o Kim Charaman/Jennifer Chailler Telephone: (345) 943 3100 BRIDGEPORT PRAX: Commences Liquidation Proceedings -------------------------------------------------- On Aug. 9, 2013, the members of Bridgeport Prax Real Estate I, Ltd resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: John Sullivan c/o Maples and Calder, Attorneys-at-law P.O. Box 309, Ugland House Grand Cayman KY1-1104 Cayman Islands CG TAIWAN: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up ----------------------------------------- On Aug. 14, 2013, the shareholders of CG Taiwan Fund Corporation resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Trident Liquidators (Cayman) Ltd c/o Mrs Eva Moore Trident Trust Company (Cayman) Limited Telephone: (345) 949 0880 Facsimile: (345) 949 0881 P.O. Box 847, George Town Grand Cayman KY1-1103 Cayman Islands CLEARWATER CAPITAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 ---------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Clearwater Capital Partners Pacific III Annex, Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 25, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 9, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited 190 Elgin Avenue, George Town Grand Cayman, KY1-9005 Cayman Islands c/o Kim Charaman/Jennifer Chailler Telephone: (345) 943 3100 CPC ASIA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 ------------------------------------------------ The creditors of CPC Asia Opportunities Fund are required to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 25, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 13, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited 190 Elgin Avenue, George Town Grand Cayman, KY1-9005 Cayman Islands c/o Kim Charaman/Jennifer Chailler Telephone: (345) 943 3100 CPC ASIA MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 ------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of CPC Asia Opportunities Master Fund are required to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 25, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 13, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited 190 Elgin Avenue, George Town Grand Cayman, KY1-9005 Cayman Islands c/o Kim Charaman/Jennifer Chailler Telephone: (345) 943 3100 CREDIT SUISSE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 16 ----------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Credit Suisse Fund Management (Cayman) Ltd are required to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 16, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 6, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Michael Saville c/o Prudence Pryce 10 Market Street #765, Camana Bay Grand Cayman Cayman Islands KY1 9006 Telephone: +1 (345) 769 7207 Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 7120 KENMAR PRIVATE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 ------------------------------------------------------ The creditors of Kenmar Private Investment Partnership I Ltd are required to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 25, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 9, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited 190 Elgin Avenue, George Town Grand Cayman, KY1-9005 Cayman Islands c/o Kim Charaman/Jennifer Chailler Telephone: (345) 943 3100 MARIAH RE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 26 ------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Mariah Re Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 26, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Jess Shakespeare c/o Camele Burke Kinetic Partners (Cayman) Limited The Harbour Centre, 42 North Church Street P.O. Box 10387 Grand Cayman KY1-1004 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 623 9904 Facsimile: (345) 943 9900 MIRPAN LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 26 ------------------------------------------------------ The creditors of Mirpan Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 26, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 13, 2013. The company's liquidator is: DMS Corporate Services Ltd c/o Nicola Wright Telephone: (345) 946 7665 Facsimile: (345) 946 7666 dms House, 2nd Floor P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108 Cayman Islands MULTI BANKING: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up --------------------------------------------- On Aug. 12, 2013, the shareholders of Multi Banking Corporation (Overseas) Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Trident Liquidators (Cayman) Ltd c/o Mrs. Eva Moore Trident Trust Company (Cayman) Limited Telephone: (345) 949 0880 Facsimile: (345) 949 0881 P.O. Box 847, George Town Grand Cayman KY1-1103 Cayman Islands THEOREMA MANAGED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 -------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Theorema Managed Portfolio Feeder, Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 25, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 13, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited 190 Elgin Avenue, George Town Grand Cayman, KY1-9005 Cayman Islands c/o Kim Charaman/Jennifer Chailler Telephone: (345) 943 3100 THEOREMA MANAGED MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 25 --------------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Theorema Managed Portfolio Master, Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 25, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 13, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited 190 Elgin Avenue, George Town Grand Cayman, KY1-9005 Cayman Islands c/o Kim Charaman/Jennifer Chailler Telephone: (345) 943 3100 TOWNSEND LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 23 -------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Townsend Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 23, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 14, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Varun Kumar Bery c/o TVG Capital Partners Limited World Trust Tower, Unit A, 8th Floor 50 Stanley Street, Central Hong Kong Telephone: (852) 2147 2080 Facsimile: (852) 2147 3320 =================================== D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C =================================== * DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Business Leaders Slam Interest Rate Rise -------------------------------------------------------------- Dominican Today reports that the National Association of Young Entrepreneurs (ANJE) said the increase in the interest rate from 4.25% to 6.25% will affect credit and public consumption capacity and will further undermine the low economic growth rate recorded this year. The organization described the measure as a "heavy blow" that limits the positive effects that were expected from the recent measures implemented by the Government to boost the country's economic growth, according to Dominican Today. "In recent months the government announced economic incentive measures, including the release of RD$20 billion of legal reserves and increased spending on infrastructural investment. We therefore believe that these measures will not have the expected positive effect for the economy as a result of the announced interest rate increase," the report quoted ANJE President Frank Elias Rainieri Kuret as saying. Dominican Today notes that ANJE expressed its concern about the slow increase in the GDP, just 1.6% in the first half of the year, pointing out that it had reached 7% in 2010 and 4% in 2011. The report relates that the business organization said that the economic information issued by the Central Bank indicates that the trade, construction and industrial manufacturing sectors are showing negative performance in the first semester, leading to the conclusion that "these inconsistencies and lack of policy coordination are having a negative impact on a weakened economy that has shown significant slowdown during this year". ============= J A M A I C A ============= * JAMAICA: Gov't. Slashes Spending by JM$6 Bil. For April-June -------------------------------------------------------------- RJR News reports that there was a near JM$6 billion dollar slash in Government spending between April and June. According to data from the Bank of Jamaica, expenditure for the three months was JM$92.4 billion or JM$5.6 billion lower than budgeted, according to RJR News. The report relates that this reflected containment in recurrent and capital expenditure. The lower-than-budgeted recurrent spending was domestic interest payments and programs which were down JM$1.8 billion and JM$930 million, respectively, the report discloses. Capital expenditure was JM$2.3 billion lower than anticipated due to delays in the implementation of projects, the report adds. =========== M E X I C O =========== CORPORACION PESQUERA: China Fishery Purchase No Impact on Ratings ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's does not expect at this time any change in Corporacion Pesquera Inca, S.A.C.'s B2 senior unsecured ratings or positive outlook from the announcement that its shareholders accepted China Fishery Group's tender offer for 20,222 of its shares, which combined with the current stake already owned by the Chinese company, would translate into a 99.1% ownership of Copeinca's shares. The transaction's settlement is expected to take place on August 30, 2013. The last rating action was on January 10, 2013 when Moody's rated Copeinca's $75 million add-on to its $175 million 9% global notes due 2017. The principal methodology used in rating Copeinca was the Global Protein and Agriculture Industry methodology published in May 2013. Corporacion Pesquera Inca S.A.C., headquartered in Lima, Peru, is the second largest fishmeal and fish oil producer in Peru and the third largest globally. The company has vertically integrated operations, with a fishing fleet it uses to catch anchovies off the Peruvian coast and plants that process this catch and those purchased from third parties into fishmeal and fish oil. Copeinca currently operates 28 vessels and five processing plants along the Peruvian coast. Over the last twelve months ended June 30, 2013 the company reported revenues of $201 million. INDUSTRIAS UNIDAS: 1H Net Income Drops 9% to Ps.5,508.1 Million --------------------------------------------------------------- Industrias Unidas, S.A. de C.V. disclosed its unaudited results for the first six months ended June 30, 2013. The Company's net revenues for the first six months ended June 30, 2013 decreased 9% to Ps.5,508.1 million from Ps.6,051.5 million in the same period of 2012. This decrease was due to lower volume of sales driven by market conditions, a decrease of 6.5 % in the Comex copper value and an appreciation of 5.2% of US dollar versus Mexican peso (average prices MTD June 30, 2012 and 2013). A full text copy of the company's financial results is available free at: http://is.gd/7Xfr18 About Industrias Unidas Industrias Unidas, S.A. de C.V. is a Mexican diversified industrial group, manufacturing a wide range of copper-based and electrical products for the housing and electrical power sectors mainly in Mexico and the U.S. As of September 2009, last twelve month revenues were about US$1.3 billion. * * * The company continues to carry Moody's "Caa3" long-term rating. OFFSHORE DRILLING: Fitch to Rate New US$950MM Secured Debt 'BB' --------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings expects to rate Offshore Drilling Holding S.A.'s (ODH) proposed USD950 million senior secured debt issuance 'BB'. Fitch has also assigned foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'BB-' to ODH. The Rating Outlook is Stable. The company expects to use the proceeds from the issuance to refinance existing debt at its Centenario and Bicentenario subsidiaries. The one notch uplift for the proposed debt issuance reflects the expected above average recovery given default as a result of the strong collateral provided to the note holders. Key Ratings Drivers ODH's ratings reflect the company's solid commercial relationship with Petroleos Mexicanos SA (Pemex, IDR 'BBB+') as well as the relatively stable cash flow generation resulting from its contractual agreements. The ratings also reflect the nascent nature of ultra-deep water exploration in Mexico as well as the company's moderately high leverage, partial structural subordination and contract roll-over risk. The company's expansion plan is considered aggressive and adds to risk. Solid Commercial Relationship with Strong Counterparty: ODH's ratings reflect the company's, as well as its shareholder's, strong commercial relationship with Pemex. ODH and its shareholder provide off-shore drilling services, as well as other energy related maritime services, to Pemex. ODH currently owns three ultra deep water (UDW) sixth generation dynamic positioning drilling semisubmersible rigs. The company charters its assets to three operating affiliates that in turn lease the drilling rigs to Pemex's exploration and production subsidiary at day rates ranging from USD489 thousand to USD565 thousand. ODH is part of Grupo R, a privately held conglomerate of companies that have been providing drilling and oilfield services to Pemex for over 25 years. Nascent UDW Exploration Phase in Mexico's Gulf Cost: Although oil and gas production in Mexico has been concentrated offshore with approximately 75% of production during recent years, this has been mainly in shallow waters. Pemex has only recently focused in deep water and UDW exploration, mainly given the need to incorporate new reserves to offset declining production from matured fields. Pemex has drilled only 29 deep-water wells in its operating history. Development of possible reserves in this sector might be challenging as Pemex has limited experience in deep water oil and gas exploration. A shift back to only shallow and mid- waters exploration at the expense of UDW exploration could negatively impact demand for the UDW drilling rigs the company owns. Moderately High Leverage: ODH's expected gross leverage ratio for year-end 2013 is considered moderately high for the rating category at approximately 5.2 times (x). This is mainly the result of La Muralla IV only reporting nine months of operations during 2013. During 2014, leverage is expected to moderately decrease to 4.2x as EBITDA is expected to increase to approximately USD325 million from approximately USD227 million reported during 2012 once La Muralla IV reports a full year of operations. Thereafter, total consolidated leverage is expected to trend downwards and to range between 3.5x and 4.5x with the exception of years when the company adds financial debt to fund expected Jack-up acquisitions and until the new assets begin generating cash flow. Partial Structural Subordination: The proposed senior secured notes will be guaranteed by certain ODH's restricted subsidiaries, including Rubicon Drilling Services and Utileduci subsidiaries, which own the Centenario and Bicentenario drilling rigs, respectively, as well as first priority security interest, i.e. Ship Mortgages, against these assests; these two assets will have no debt following the completion of the refinancing transaction. The notes will also benefit from a 12 months interest reserve account. The notes will initially be structurally subordinated to approximately USD515 million of project-finance like bank debt related to La Muralla IV, which amortizes through 2018 and has a small balloon payment. Upon repaying all of La Muralla IV related debt, this asset will also guarantee the proposed debt issuance together with ODH's other subsidiaries. On a pro forma basis and giving effect to the proposed transaction, total consolidated debt is expected to be approximately USD1.5 billion and to be composed by the proposed notes and La Muralla IV debt. In the future, the company expects to add approximately USD850 million of debt, which could rank pari passu with the proposed notes, to acquire five Jack-up rigs to contract to Pemex. Contracts Roll-over Risk and Adjustable Day Rates: The company is exposed to contract renewal risk given that the three UDW drilling rigs have contracts that expire before the maturity of the notes. The rating incorporates the expectation that Pemex will re-contract these drilling rigs shortly before the contracts expire at average or marginally below average market day rates for similar assets as these UDW rigs are considered important assets for exploration of new oil fields in Mexico. The debt services reserve account mitigates contract roll-over risk as it would allow ODH time to relocate the assets if required. The contracts for Centenario and Bicentenario rigs have fixed day rates for the first two years and are then adjusted annually with average market rates for the remaining three years. The La Muralla contract, the third and last UDW drilling rig to enter commercial operation, has a five-year contract with Pemex at fixed day rates for the duration of the contract. The company's cash flow stability and predictability will benefit if contracts were to be renewed at fixed day rates for periods of five years or longer. Aggressive Speculative Growth Strategy: ODH's ratings incorporate the expectation that the company would continue to add offshore drilling equipment without increasing its leverage on a sustained basis. Currently, the company has construction orders for five shallow waters drilling rigs, or jack-ups, for which ODH is yet to sign contracts with Pemex. The company expects to sign contracts with Pemex for this equipment once they are in Mexico. Although the company has been operating this way in the past, this risk adds to cash flow uncertainty and high carrying cost should Pemex not contract the rigs and ODH is forced to find alternative markets for the equipment. Rating Sensitivity A negative rating action could be triggered by a combination of the following factors: ODH's consolidated leverage increases in a sustained basis to above 5.5x, contracts are not rolled over within six months after expiration, and/or the company faces delays of six months or greater contracting new equipment after it is delivered. A rating upgrade could be considered under a combination of the following factors: ODH's leverage decreases below 3.5x in a sustained basis, and/or the company contracts all its drilling equipment under long-term contracts of no less than five years under fixed day rates and with very limited to none out-clauses. VISION BANCO: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Counterparty Credit Rating ---------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' long-term counterparty credit rating on Vision Banco S.A.E.C.A. (Vision). The outlook is stable. Standard & Poor's bases its 'BB-' rating on Vision on its "adequate" business position, "weak" capital and earnings, "adequate" risk position, "above-average" funding, and "strong" liquidity, as S&P's criteria define these terms. Vision Banco's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) is 'bb-'. "Our bank criteria use our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) economic risk and industry risk scores to determine a bank's anchor, the starting point in assigning an issuer credit rating. Our anchor for a commercial bank operating only in the Republic of Paraguay is 'b+'. We base the economic risk score on our view that Paraguay's economy is largely dependent on agriculture and international trade and that its monetary flexibility is limited. With regard to industry risk, we believe the Paraguayan financial system has an aggressive risk appetite, as demonstrated by rapid credit growth, and is insufficiently supervised and regulated. Despite a significant increase in domestic credit during the past four years, the economy still has relatively low leverage," S&P said. "We view Vision's business position as adequate as a result of its good market position, especially in the microfinance segment where 60% of its portfolio is concentrated," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Ivana Recalde. With the largest network in the country (90 branches, 105 ATMs and 156 non-banking centers), Vision is the leading financial institution in the microfinance segment. Over the last year, despite harsh competition, the entity has consolidated its position in the market ranking fifth in terms of assets, loans and deposits among the 16 banks operating in the Paraguayan financial system. As of June 30, 2013, Vision held 6.8% of the system's total loans and almost 6% of total deposits, from 6.4% and 5.5%, respectively, as of March 2012. =========== P A N A M A =========== NEWLAND INT'L: Fitch Rates US$257.6MM Sr. Sec. Notes at 'CC' ------------------------------------------------------------ Fitch Ratings has assigned a rating to the restructured senior secured notes issued by Newland International Properties, Corp. (Newland). In April 2013, Newland, a Panamanian company established to develop the Trump Ocean Club (TOC) luxury hotel and condominium, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States. One month later, Newland received approval to restructure the defaulted $220 million senior secured notes due November 2014. Newland's principal assets are the real property and facilities that comprise the TOC. Newland provided Fitch with updated sales, collections and defaults information together with the prepackaged plan of reorganization and amended documentation. Fitch has assigned a rating and Recovery Estimate (RE) to the restructured notes due July 2017 as indicated: -- $257.6 million senior secured notes due July 2017 'CCsf'; RE60%. The $257.6 million restructured notes replace the $220 million defaulted notes and include accrued interest on the defaulted notes. Fitch's rating addresses timely payment of principal and interest on a semiannual basis. The transaction is mainly backed by (i) a first priority mortgage on the real property owned by Newland; (ii) all cash, installment payments and unit purchase agreements from property sales; (iii) a first priority lien on all Newland accounts and all deposits therein; (iv) the Trump license agreement; (v) Newland's rights to all other revenues from the operation of the project, including: (a) revenues from the operation, sale and/or lease of the Casino, and hotel amenities such as restaurants and spa, and (b) all of Newland's rights to the Beach Club (BC) and Newland's rights to the BC Ferry, BC Ferry Payment and the BC Senior Loan, as applicable; and (vi) 100% of the shares in Newland. Key Rating Drivers The rating of the restructured notes is constrained by the following factors: i) reliance on favorable real estate conditions to meet timely interest and principal payments during the life of the notes, ii) significant liquidity constraints in the near term, iii) additional indebtedness, and iv) limitations related to priority of payments and use of payments. The transaction is no longer exposed to construction risk. Additionally, the noteholders now have a pledge and assignment of the voting rights of 100% of the shares of Newland. This feature was not provided under the previous Indenture of the defaulted notes. Real Estate Market Risk: Payment on the restructured notes relies on unit price increases, pace of sales and overall collections. Break-even scenarios assume sales of 5-15 units per month with annual unit price increases in the 10%-16% range, and hinge on strong market demand for the units. Demand could be affected by a lack of access to mortgage financing for prospective buyers and global real estate prices for luxury units. During 2011-2012 average prices per square meter for TOC units decreased by 16%- 17%, and they remain volatile. This risk is exacerbated by the target market of the project, which is foreign buyers who wish to acquire units in the TOC as a secondary residence. Liquidity Risk: Adequate liquidity for debt service depends on consistent collections and down-payment collections from sales. Sales and collections were greatly affected by the global slowdown and the recent restructuring. Recent sales remain low, but the company is attempting to counter this with a new marketing strategy which focuses on sales and timely collections. Slow sales and collections and low cash reserves expose the new notes to significant liquidity pressure in the near term. As of July 3, 2013, the cash balance of the Trust accounts stood at $0.45 million down from $16.3 million in June; the money was used to: i) make the first payment due on the restructured notes ($5.855 million for payment of principal which includes capitalized interest on the defaulted notes and approximately $0.535 million interest due on the restructured notes); and ii) pay legal fees, legal settlement fees and other expenses. The next debt service payment is due in January 2014 in an amount equal to $11.4 million in interest and $11.7 million in principal; therefore, Newland must collect $22.7 million within the next 5-6 months to meet its next debt service payment on a timely basis. Additional Indebtedness: In addition to the completed hotel and condominiums, the project includes the implementation, completion and operation of a beach club on Isla Viveros (the BC), for which construction is expected to be completed this year, and the acquisition and operation of a ferry connecting TOC with the BC. To date, the BC's development has been financed by the shareholders. The Indenture allows for the development to be financed through a senior loan granted by Newland. Additionally, the Indenture allows for Newland to finance the acquisition or concession of a ferry for transportation between TOC and the BC (BC Ferry Loan) through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) which will be 100% owned by Newland. If such loans are drawn, payments on these loans will be subordinated to payments on the $257.6 million senior secured notes. Waterfall and Priority of Payments: Short-term liquidity stress could arise if cash on hand is not sufficient to cover timely payment of principal and interest on the notes. This is exacerbated by the transaction's waterfall which allocates flows depending on their origin. Proceeds from the sale of a prime unit such as the casino, spa or penthouse can be used to prepay the notes; however, the prepayment must be made in reverse chronological order and cannot be used to make the next amortization. This exposes the transaction to a possible default on the notes if there are not enough collections from non-prime unit sales during such period. No Exposure to Construction Risk: Construction and finishing work of TOC were completed in January 2013. Premium units will be sold as grey space. The project is composed of 630 residential condo units, 369 'hotel-condo' units, a casino, a pier facility, pool decks, retail shops, gourmet restaurants, a fitness center and spa, along with a 1,592-spot parking garage. The only unfinished work relates to the BC and remains in process. Rating Sensitivities Newland's ratings could be negatively affected by any combination of the following factors: a lack of consistent price increases, continued slow pace in sales, and lower than expected collections allocated to the noteholders. A rating upgrade could be considered under a combination of the following factors: Newland's marketing strategy proves to be effective; sales increases result in uninterrupted collections; real estate market conditions are favorable and unit prices rise; and the transaction starts to de-lever quickly. =============================== T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O =============================== CL FIN'L: UK Firms to Help With New Draft Agreement --------------------------------------------------- Camille Bethel at Trinidad Express reports that Trinidad and Tobago Minister of Finance Larry Howai said the State has enlisted United Kingdom firms to assist in its decision on the revised CL Financial Limited draft agreement. Speaking with reporters following the National Enterprises Ltd (NEL) luncheon in celebration of the company's TT$4 billion shareholder dividend payout in 14 years, Mr. Howai said the draft agreement was being worked on, according to Trinidad Express. The report notes that Cabinet did not approve a draft agreement that is supposed to replace the current shareholders' agreement which will allow it to manage CL Financial assets. The current agreement was extended by one month and ended on Aug. 30, 2012. The report discloses that the new agreement was supposed to be approved by Cabinet in time for last month's annual general meeting of CLF. "We are being told that there aren't any real issues and so on but I haven't received the formal document in hand yet. I know they were actually working on it when I left the office so this will be an extension (on the deadline). . . . The UK firm of international attorneys -- Freshfields -- as well as a UK investment adviser has been hired as an international adviser to assist with the CL matter. I think Cabinet just wants to be sure the structure is one that can stand up to scrutiny from anyone and just wanted to have it double-checked again before we proceed and to ensure that there are no risks that we may have overlooked. To ensure that the entire thing is well structured and there aren't any gaping holes where there could be potential loss," the report quoted Mr. Howai as saying. The report notes that Mr. Howai said although the UK firms have been given 45 days to give their report, the State's deadline has been extended to a bit longer. The report relays that Mr. Howai said they were moving quickly with regard to legislation and measures in the financial sector to regulate the sector, mainly because of the issues coming out of the CL Financial crisis and also because of the projected expansion of the financial sector. "There are a number of things I would like us to do but before we can get some of the big players to come in we have to ensure that we have a proper legislative framework, a regulatory structure that will allow them to be comfortable that we are operating in an environment that will not create unnecessary risk," Mr. Howai added, the report notes. Mr. Howai described NEL's payout of TT$4 billion in dividends over the past 14 years to its 6,000 shareholders as a landmark achievement, the report adds. About CL Financial CL Financial Group Limited is a privately held conglomerate in Trinidad and Tobago. Founded as an insurance company by Cyril Duprey, Colonial Life Insurance Company was expanded into a diversified company by his nephew, Lawrence Duprey. CL Financial encompasses 65 companies in 32 countries worldwide with total assets standing at roughly US$100 billion. * * * As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on August 10, 2009, A.M. Best Co. downgraded the financial strength rating to C (Weak) from B (Fair) and issuer credit rating to "ccc" from "bb" of Colonial Life Insurance Company (Trinidad) Limited (CLICO) (Trinidad & Tobago). The ratings remain under review with negative implications. CLICO is an insurance member company of CL Financial Limited (CL Financial), a diversified holding company based in Trinidad & Tobago. According to a TCR-LA report on Feb. 20, 2009, citing Trinidad and Tobago Express, Tobago President George Maxwell Richards signed bailout bills for CL Financial, giving the government the authority to control the company's unit, Colonial Life Insurance Company, and giving the central bank extensive powers to treat with CL Financial's collapse and the consequent systemic crisis. * TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: TTPostal Workers Demand Backpay ---------------------------------------------------- Rachael Espinet at Trinidad and Tobago Newsday reports that Postal services were disrupted when employees of the TT Postal Corporation (TTPost) staged a protest at the National Mail Centre, Piarco, demanding outstanding backpay for January 1, 2008 to Dec. 31, 2010. The employees also raised concerns about their health and safety on the job, according to Trinidad and Tobago Newsday. "The workers are here to address the situation of health and safety in the workplace and the arrears of their salaries. We have come to let the head of the organization know that the workers have had enough," the report quoted David Forbes, president of the TT Postal Workers Union, as saying. The report notes that workers gathered to request their salary arrears and better working conditions. Addressing health issues, Mr. Forbes complained of poor ventilation and air-conditioning at several TTPost offices, the report relates. Mr. Forbes said workers have been waiting six years for their back pay for 2008 to 2010, the report notes. Mr. Forbes said TTPWU is yet to negotiate for the period of 2011 to 2013, the report discloses. "We have already reached 2013, which makes it six years. We haven't started negotiating for the period of 2011 to 2013 as yet, and 2013 is almost up. There is no agreement as to when exactly the workers will receive their arrears," the report quoted Mr. Forbes as saying. A media release from TTPost stated, "Management has supplied all requested information for the payments of these funds to the relevant parties, and are currently awaiting the disbursement of funds," the report discloses. The release said the industrial action would affect normal business operations, and they apologized for the inconvenience, the report adds. =============== X X X X X X X X =============== * Risk Ceilings for Chile, Costa Rica and Dominican Rep. Adjusted ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has adjusted the local currency (LC) country risk ceilings for Chile, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. The sovereign bond ratings and the foreign currency (FC) bond and deposit ceilings are not affected by the changes in the LC ceilings. Ratings Rationale: Moody's decision to adjust the LC country ceilings is based on application of the rating agency's Local Currency Country Risk Ceiling for Bonds and Other Local Currency Obligations methodology published earlier this year. The change in ceilings mean that the highest rating that can be assigned to a domestic-currency bank deposit or domestic issuer in these countries, or to a structured finance security backed by local currency receivables, is now as follows: Chile 1) The long-term LC bond ceiling was changed to Aa1 from Aaa; 2) The long-term LC deposit ceiling was changed to Aa1 from Aaa; 3) The long-term FC bond ceiling remains at Aa1; 4) The long-term FC deposit ceiling remains at Aa3; 5) The short-term FC bond and deposit ceilings remain unchanged at P-1. The adjusted local currency ceilings are consistent with the methodological framework which positions the ceiling against Chile's Sovereign Bond rating of Aa3 and Sovereign Bond Methodology factor scores, three of which are the key drivers of the ceiling. In Chile's case, these consist of a 'moderate' assessment of Economic Strength, a 'very high' assessment of Institutional Strength and a 'low' assessment of susceptibility to political, economic or financial event risks. Costa Rica 1) The long-term LC bond ceiling was changed to A3 from Aa2; 2) The long-term LC deposit ceiling was changed to A3 from Aa3; 3) The long-term FC bond ceiling remains at Baa2; 4) The long-term FC deposit ceiling remains at Ba1; 5) The short-term FC bond and deposit ceilings remain unchanged at P-3. The adjusted local currency ceilings are consistent with the methodological framework which positions the ceiling against Costa Rica's Sovereign Bond rating of Baa3 and Sovereign Bond Methodology factor scores, three of which are the key drivers of the ceiling. In Costa Rica's case, these consist of a 'moderate' assessment of Economic and Institutional Strength and a 'moderate' assessment of susceptibility to political, economic or financial event risks. Dominican Republic 1) The long-term LC bond ceiling was changed to Ba1 from A1; 2) The long-term LC deposit ceiling was changed to Ba1 from A1; 3) The long-term FC bond ceiling remains at Ba2; 4) The long-term FC deposit ceiling remains at B2; 5) The short-term FC bond and deposit ceilings remain unchanged at NP. The adjusted local currency ceilings are consistent with the methodological framework which positions the ceiling against Dominican Republic's Sovereign Bond rating of B1 and Sovereign Bond Methodology factor scores, three of which are the key drivers of the ceiling. In Dominican Republic's case, these consist of a 'low' assessment of Economic and Institutional Strength and a 'moderate' assessment of susceptibility to political, economic or financial event risks. Methodology Moody's country ceilings capture externalities and event risks that arise unavoidably as a consequence of locating a business in a particular country and that ultimately constrain domestic issuers' ability to service their debt obligations. As such, the ceiling encapsulates elements of the economic, financial, political, and legal risks in a country, including political instability, the risk of government intervention, the risk of systemic economic disruption, severe financial instability risks, currency redenomination, and natural disasters among other factors that need to be incorporated into the ratings of even the strongest domestic issuers. The ceiling caps the credit rating of all issuers and transactions with material exposure to those risks -- in other words, it affects all domestic issuers and transactions other than those whose assets and revenues are predominantly sourced from or located outside of the country, or which benefit from an external credit support. The methodology used in this action is Local-Currency Country Risk Ceiling for Bonds and Other Local Currency Obligations published in March 2013. BOND PRICING: For the Week From Aug. 26 to Aug. 30, 2013 -------------------------------------------------------- Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price ------ ------ -------- -------- ----- Argentine Republic Government 7.82 12/31/2033 EUR 56 International Bond Argentine Republic Government International Bond 7.82 12/31/2033 EUR 55.5 Argentine Republic Government International Bond 8.28 12/31/2033 USD 55 Provincia de Buenos Aires/Argentina 10.9 1/26/2021 USD 69.8 Argentine Republic Government International Bond 8.28 12/31/2033 USD 57.5 Provincia de Buenos Aires/Argentina 9.38 9/14/2018 USD 68.4 Empresa Distribuidora Y Comercializadora Norte 9.75 10/25/2022 USD 51 Banco Macro SA 9.75 12/18/2036 USD 67.8 Provincia de Buenos Aires/Argentina 9.63 4/18/2028 USD 63 Capex SA 10 3/10/2018 USD 71 Cia Latinoamericana de Infraestructura & Servicios SA 9.5 12/15/2016 USD 63 Cia de Transporte de Energia Electrica en Alta 8.88 12/15/2016 USD 47.6 Tension Transe Provincia de Mendoza Argentina 5.5 9/4/2018 USD 74 Argentine Republic Government International Bond 1.18 12/31/2038 ARS 43.7 Argentine Republic Government International Bond 8.28 12/31/2033 USD 55 Argentine Republic Government International Bond 7.82 12/31/2033 EUR 45 Cia de Transporte de Energia Electrica en 9.75 8/15/2021 USD 50 Alta Tension Transe Argentina Bocon 2 3/15/2014 ARS 32.5 Empresa Distribuidora Y Comercializadora Norte 9.75 10/25/2022 USD 50 Argentine Republic Government International Bond 4.33 12/31/2033 JPY 36.5 Argentine Republic Government International Bond 8.28 12/31/2033 USD 59.9 Cia de Transporte de Energia Electrica en 9.75 8/15/2021 USD 45.4 Alta Tension Transe MetroGas SA 8.88 12/31/2018 USD 65.5 Provincia de Buenos Aires/Argentina 10.9 1/26/2021 USD 70 Empresa Distribuidora Y Comercializadora Norte 10.5 10/9/2017 USD 51.3 Argentine Republic Government International Bond 4.33 12/31/2033 JPY 36 Banco Macro SA 9.75 12/18/2036 USD 67.8 City of Buenos Aires Argentina 3.98 3/15/2018 USD 68.6 Capex SA 10 3/10/2018 USD 67.6 Provincia de Buenos Aires/Argentina 9.38 9/14/2018 USD 68.8 Provincia de Buenos Aires/Argentina 9.63 4/18/2028 USD 63 MetroGas SA 8.88 12/31/2018 USD 63.4 Argentine Republic Government International Bond 0.45 12/31/2038 JPY 8 Banco Macro SA 9.75 12/18/2036 USD 67.8 Provincia de Mendoza Argentina 5.5 9/4/2018 USD 73.5 Provincia del Chaco 4 11/4/2023 USD 53.8 Provincia del Chaco 4 12/4/2026 USD 25.5 Formosa Province of Argentina 5 2/27/2022 USD 61.9 Argentine Republic Government International Bond 8.28 12/31/2033 USD 61.8 Cia Energetica de Sao Paulo 9.75 1/15/2015 BRL 64.6 Gol Finance 8.75 USD 60 Banco Bonsucesso SA 9.25 11/3/2020 USD 73.5 Sifco SA 11.5 6/6/2016 USD 50.3 Gol Finance 8.75 USD 58.3 Banco Bonsucesso SA 9.25 11/3/2020 USD 72.5 Cia Sud Americana de Vapores SA 6.4 10/1/2022 CLP 69.8 Almendral Telecomunicaciones SA 3.5 12/15/2014 CLP 33 Cia Cervecerias Unidas SA 4 12/1/2024 CLP 58.2 Aguas Andinas SA 4.15 12/1/2026 CLP 72.5 Quinenco SA 3.5 7/21/2013 CLP 12.9 Talca Chillan Sociedad Concesionaria SA 2.75 12/15/2019 CLP 60.8 Empresa de Transporte de Pasajeros Metro SA 5.5 7/15/2027 CLP 4.58 Hidili Industry International Development Ltd 8.63 11/4/2015 USD 71.5 Renhe Commercial Holdings Co Ltd 13 3/10/2016 USD 62.8 Renhe Commercial Holdings Co Ltd 11.8 5/18/2015 USD 63.1 China Forestry Holdings Co Ltd 10.3 11/17/2015 USD 37 JinkoSolar Holding Co Ltd 4 5/15/2016 USD 66.3 Renhe Commercial Holdings Co Ltd 13 3/10/2016 USD 56 Hidili Industry International Development Ltd 8.63 11/4/2015 USD 71.8 Renhe Commercial Holdings Co Ltd 11.8 5/18/2015 USD 63.8 China Forestry Holdings Co Ltd 10.3 11/17/2015 USD 37 BES Finance Ltd 5.58 EUR 65.5 Bank Austria Creditanstalt Finance Cayman Ltd 1.61 EUR 49.7 ERB Hellas Cayman Islands Ltd 1.8 6/8/2017 EUR 55.2 Bank Austria Creditanstalt Finance Cayman Ltd 2 1.84 EUR 49.9 BCP Finance Co Ltd 5.54 EUR 41.7 ESFG International Ltd 5.75 EUR 50.8 BCP Finance Co Ltd 4.24 EUR 42.8 BES Finance Ltd 3.03 EUR 74.3 Banco Finantia International Ltd 2.46 7/26/2017 EUR 44.1 BES Finance Ltd 4.5 EUR 56.4 Caixa Geral De Depositos Finance 1.02 EUR 34.7 BCP Finance Bank Ltd 5.31 12/10/2023 EUR 66.3 ERB Hellas Cayman Islands Ltd 9 3/8/2019 EUR 31.9 Banif Finance Ltd 1.58 EUR 44 BCP Finance Bank Ltd 5.01 3/31/2024 EUR 63.5 Banco BPI SA/Cayman Islands 4.15 11/14/2035 EUR 41.6 Petroleos de Venezuela SA 5.38 4/12/2027 USD 60.2 Venezuela Government International Bond 7 3/31/2038 USD 67.3 Petroleos de Venezuela SA 5.5 4/12/2037 USD 58.8 Venezuela Government International Bond 7.65 4/21/2025 USD 74.6 Venezuela Government International Bond 6 12/9/2020 USD 74.2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 7 3/31/2038 USD 66.8 *********** Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to publication. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each Thursday's edition of the TCR-LA. Submissions about insolvency- related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Frauline S. Abangan, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200. * * * End of Transmission * * *