TCRLA_Public/140212.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

           Wednesday, February 12, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 30


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Elliott Clashes With Gramercy Over Debt
BUENOS AIRES: S&P Lowers Global Scale Currency Rating to 'CCC+'


B R A Z I L

OGX PETROLEO: Bondholders to Pump $215 Million Into Firm
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: Struggles to Meet Targets by Odebrecht


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

BIG SHRIMP: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
BROOKLANDS 2004-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to Dsf
CAPULA INVESTMENTS: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
CNS CAYMAN: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
COANDA LEASING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

CRAFT 2012-2: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
CRAFT 2012-2 MEZZ: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
FUTURA INITIAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
GALENA CDO I: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
GREENE INVESTMENTS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

IB K4D-15V FEEDER: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
IB K4D-15V TRADING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
INA CBO 1999-1: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
MA ISAM: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
MA TRENDHEDGE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

ROTTERDAM DREDGING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
S.A.C. PEI CB: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
S.A.C. PEI CB II: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
SEQUOIA FUNDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
TRENDHEDGE SPMA: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

TRENDHEDGE TRADING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report


M E X I C O

SATELITES MEXICANOS: Moody's Hikes CFR & Senior Sec. Rating to Ba1
TENEDORA NEMAK: Fitch Hikes Issuer Default Rating to 'BB'


P U E R T O  R I C O

AES PUERTO RICO: Moody's Cuts Rating on $194MM Bonds to Ba2
UNIV. OF PUERTO RICO: Moody's Cuts System Revenue Bonds to Ba3


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Elliott Clashes With Gramercy Over Debt
--------------------------------------------------
John Carrey, writing for Daily Bankruptcy News, reports that as
Argentina struggles to stave off a second debt default in 13
years, two U.S. hedge funds are playing central but opposing roles
in the country's efforts to untangle itself from the previous
crisis.

The two firms, Gramercy Funds Management LLC and Elliott
Management Corp., have hundreds of millions of dollars at stake as
Argentina tries to wrap up a saga that dates back to its decision
to give up on its debt payments in December 2001, according to
Daily Bankruptcy News.

However, the report relates that the firms have taken conflicting
tacks in trying to get their money back.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Jan. 17, 2014, Daily Bankruptcy Review said that investors are
pulling out of Argentina's currency and bonds as its financial
situation deteriorates.  Bloomberg News disclosed that prices fell
as the state pensions agency Anses sold bonds to local investors,
including 2018 notes for the first time, in an attempt to
strengthen the peso rate that is implied from financial
transactions, known as the blue-chip swap.  Investors also dumped
the country's notes as the central bank's foreign currency
reserves and the parallel peso tumbled in spite of government
measures, reversing December gains, Bloomberg News relayed.

A TCRLA report on Dec. 10, 2013, citing Daily Bankruptcy Review,
relayed that the U.S. government has urged the Supreme Court to
intervene in Argentina's fight over paying up on its defaulted
debt, saying a lower court ruling against the country was wrong.
Bloomberg News said that Argentina lost its bid for a rehearing of
a federal appeals court ruling against it in litigation over $1.5
billion in the nation's defaulted bonds.  The U.S Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Manhattan on Nov. 18 rejected
Argentina's request that a larger panel of circuit judges
reconsider a decision that a three-judge panel reached in August,
according to Bloomberg News.


BUENOS AIRES: S&P Lowers Global Scale Currency Rating to 'CCC+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its global scale local
currency rating on the city of Buenos Aires to 'CCC+' from 'B-'.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC+' global scale foreign
currency rating on the city.  The outlooks remain negative.

"The downgrade follows our review of the cross-default clauses
included in the dollar-linked bonds that the city of Buenos Aires
recently issued in the local market," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Delfina Cavanagh.  On Dec. 20, 2013, the city
issued a series 5, dollar-linked bond for $113 million.  On
Jan. 28, 2014, it issued a series 6 dollar-linked bond for
$147 million.  Assuming that local currency debt payment with
cross-default clauses would accelerate upon the city's first
material foreign currency default, it would not have sufficient
liquidity to meet its foreign currency obligations or its local
currency obligations with cross-default clauses.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


OGX PETROLEO: Bondholders to Pump $215 Million Into Firm
--------------------------------------------------------
Luciana Magalhaes at Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that a group
of bondholders of Oleo e Gas Participacoes SA formerly known as
OGX Petroleo e Gas Participacoes SA have agreed to invest $215
million in the company as part of a restructuring plan to try to
help it emerge from bankruptcy proceedings, the firm confirmed.

The agreement signed is part of a bankruptcy protection plan for
Oleo e Gas which will now be presented to a judge by Feb. 17,
according to a person familiar with the company's plans, according
to Daily Bankruptcy Review.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 4, 2014, Daily Bankruptcy News said that Oleo e Gas
Participacoes confirmed Jan. 30 that it has postponed for the
second time the presentation of its judicial recovery plan.
The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, citing Daily
Bankruptcy Review, reported on Jan. 28, 2014, that Oleo e Gas said
bondholders had agreed to extend a deadline to finalize a
restructuring deal until Jan. 31.  OGP and bondholders had
originally set a Friday deadline to reach a deal on additional
financing to maintain the firm's operations, according to Daily
Bankruptcy Review.  The report added that OGP was then expected to
submit its restructuring plan to a Rio de Janeiro bankruptcy
court.

The Troubled Company Reporter, citing The Wall Street Journal,
reported on Jan. 24, 2014, that a crucial deadline for the
restructuring agreement of Oleo e Gas Participacoes SA might not
be met.  In one of Latin America's largest bankruptcy cases, OGP
filed for protection from creditors in late October.  In December,
the company announced a deal with creditors to exchange debts
valued at some $5.8 billion for shares, and to give bondholders an
option to invest an additional $200 million to $215 million in the
company.

                      About OGX Petroleo

Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, OGX Petroleo e Gas Participaaoes
S.A. is an independent exploration and production company with
operations in Latin America.

OGX filed for bankruptcy in a business tribunal in Rio de Janeiro
on Oct. 30, 2013, case number 0377620-56.2013.8.19.0001.  The
bankruptcy filing puts $3.6 billion of dollar bonds into default
in the largest corporate debt debacle on record in Latin America.
The filing by the oil company that transformed Eike Batista into
Brazil's richest man followed a 16-month decline that wiped out
more than $30 billion of his personal fortune.

The filing, which in Brazil is called a judicial recovery, follows
months of negotiations to restructure the dollar bonds, in which
OGX sought to convert debt to equity and secure as much as $500
million in new funds. OGX said Oct. 29 that the talks concluded
without an agreement. The company's cash fell to about $82 million
at the end of September, not enough to sustain operations further
than December.


PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: Struggles to Meet Targets by Odebrecht
-----------------------------------------------------------
Juan Pablo Spinetto at Bloomberg News reports that Petroleo
Brasileiro SA, the most indebted oil company, is facing
difficulties meeting its goal of doubling output by 2020, said
supplier Odebrecht Oleo & Gas SA.

Petrobras has a "full plate" and may face financial limitations to
speed up development, Roberto Ramos, head of Odebrecht's oil
equipment unit, said Jan. 30 during a meeting organized by the
Norwegian-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce (NBCC), according to
Bloomberg News.

"Petrobras is doing what they can to mobilize gear, equipment and
capex, and an enormous concentration of FPSOs are coming into
production in 2014 and 2015, but is it soon enough?" Mr. Ramos
said, Bloomberg News notes.  "The Petrobras balance sheet could
also limit the increase of development speed.  The current
logistic systems can't cope and won't be able to cope as Petrobras
doubles its production," Mr. Ramos added, Bloomberg News relays.

Petrobras, the biggest producer in waters deeper than 1,000 feet,
needs to deliver on its business plan for Brazil to recover
investor credibility, Mr. Ramos said, Bloomberg News relates.

"What is lacking the most in Brazil, is confidence," Mr. Ramos was
quoted as saying, Bloomberg News notes.  "To get confidence back,
Petrobras has to deliver.  2014 is not a year to rock the boat.
2015 will be a year for adjustments.  From 2016, we might see
improvements.  The question is how Petrobras will handle this,"
Mr. Ramos said, Bloomberg News adds.

OOG, as the company that started offshore drilling operations in
1979 is known, supplies seven offshore rigs to Petrobras,
according to data published by Rigzone.  Diamond Offshore Drilling
(DO) Inc. is the largest of Petrobras's 16 offshore rig suppliers,
followed by Queiroz Galvao Oleo & Gas SA, the data show.
Odebrecht SA is the holding controlling OOG.

Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. --
Petrobras (Brazilian Petroleum Corporation) -- explores for oil
and gas and produces, refines, purchases, and transports oil
and gas products.  The Company has proved reserves of about 14.1
billion barrels of oil equivalent and operates 16 refineries, an
extensive pipeline network, and more than 8,000 gas stations.

                          *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Oct. 7, 2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Petroleo
Brasileiro's multiple seniority shelf to (P)Ba1 from (P)Baa3.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


BIG SHRIMP: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Big Shrimp, Ltd received on Feb. 4, 2014, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Britannia Corporate Management Ltd
          c/o Gary F. Oakley
          196 Raleigh Quay, Grand Cayman, KY1-1104
          Telephone (345) 949 2700


BROOKLANDS 2004-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to Dsf
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Euro Reference-Linked Notes 2004-1
Limited (Brooklands 2004-1)'s class D notes and affirmed the
others, as follows:

Class A2 (ISIN XS0193141891) affirmed at 'CCsf'
Class B (ISIN XS0193142436) affirmed at 'Csf'
Class C-E (ISIN XS0193142782) affirmed at 'Csf'
Class C-Y (ISIN XS0193142865) affirmed at 'Csf'
Class D (ISIN XS0193143590) downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'
Class E (ISIN XS0193143913) affirmed at 'Dsf'

KEY RATING DRIVERS
The class D notes have been downgraded as EUR11.3 million has been
written off their notional as part of credit protection payments
made on the reference pool. Furthermore the entire notional
balance (EUR13.5 million) of the class E notes has now been
written off as part of the same series of payments.

The affirmation of the class A2 to C-Y and class E notes reflects
the notes' levels of credit enhancement relative to the reference
portfolio credit quality.  Fitch considers it unlikely that
principal will be repaid at maturity.  The reference pool
currently consists of 47.8% (EUR279 million) sub-investment grade
assets and 7% (EUR41m) assets rated 'CCC' or below.

Credit protection payments were made on two assets Deco 6-UK2X C
and Deco 6-UK2X D, which were classified as defaulted in November
2012. The payment amount for the two assets was determined on the
last auction date at EUR14.9 million. There are now no credit
protection payments outstanding. Seven credit protection payments
have been made over the lifetime of the deal for a total EUR47.5m
on EUR47.8m of assets.

The issuer, Brooklands, is a special purpose vehicle incorporated
with limited liability under the laws of the Cayman Islands.
Brooklands provides protection to UBS AG, London Branch on a
portfolio of reference credits with an initial notional value of
EUR750 million.

The class A to E notes' ratings address the full and timely
payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal by the final
maturity.  The class A1-b notes were redeemed in full in June
2013. The scheduled maturity date for the remaining notes is in
June 2014 and the legal final maturity date is in 2054.  The
margins for any notes still outstanding after the scheduled
maturity date are to increase.

Rating Sensitivities

All the outstanding notes are at distressed rating levels and as
such are unlikely to be affected by any further deterioration in
the respective underlying asset portfolios.


CAPULA INVESTMENTS: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------
The members of Capula Investments (US) Limited received on Jan. 8,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ogier Employee Benefit Services Limited
          Ogier Employee
          Benefit Services Limited
          Ogier House
          The Esplanade
          St Helier Jersey JE4 9WG


CNS CAYMAN: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------
The shareholders of CNS Cayman Holdings One Limited received on
Jan. 17, 2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


COANDA LEASING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Coanda Leasing Limited received on Jan. 17,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


CRAFT 2012-2: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Craft 2012-2, Ltd received on Jan. 17, 2014,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


CRAFT 2012-2 MEZZ: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Craft 2012-2 Mezz, Ltd. received on Jan. 17,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


FUTURA INITIAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Futura Initial Investor Limited received on
Jan. 29, 2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ian D. Stokoe
          c/o Sarah Moxam
          Telephone: (345) 914 8634
          Facsimile: (345) 945 4237
          P.O. Box 258 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


GALENA CDO I: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Galena CDO I (Cayman No.1) Limited received on
Jan. 17, 2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


GREENE INVESTMENTS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Greene Investments Limited received on
Jan. 17, 2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


IB K4D-15V FEEDER: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of IB K4D-15V Feeder I Limited received on
Jan. 17, 2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


IB K4D-15V TRADING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of IB K4D-15V Trading Limited received on
Jan. 17, 2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


INA CBO 1999-1: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of INA CBO 1999-1 Ltd. received on Jan. 17, 2014,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


MA ISAM: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------
The shareholders of MA Isam Limited received on Jan. 17, 2014, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


MA TRENDHEDGE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of MA Trendhedge Limited received on Jan. 17,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


ROTTERDAM DREDGING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Rotterdam Dredging Company Ltd received on
Jan. 17, 2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


S.A.C. PEI CB: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of S.A.C. PEI CB Investment GP, Limited received
on Jan. 6, 2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P
          c/o Alison O'Shea
          72 Cummings Point Road
          Stamford, CT 06902
          U.S.A.
          Telephone: (203) 890-3584


S.A.C. PEI CB II: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of S.A.C. PEI CB Investment II, Limited received
on Jan. 6, 2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P
          c/o Alison O'Shea
          72 Cummings Point Road
          Stamford, CT 06902
          U.S.A.
          Telephone: (203) 890-3584


SEQUOIA FUNDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Sequoia Funding Limited received on Jan. 17,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


TRENDHEDGE SPMA: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Trendhedge SPMA Limited received on Jan. 17,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


TRENDHEDGE TRADING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Trendhedge Trading Limited received on
Jan. 17, 2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


===========
M E X I C O
===========


SATELITES MEXICANOS: Moody's Hikes CFR & Senior Sec. Rating to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Satmex's corporate family
rating and the senior secured rating of Satmex' global notes to
Ba1 from Caa1. This action concludes Satmex rating review process
started on August 2, 2013, when Moody's placed all Satmex's
ratings on review for upgrade. The outlook on the ratings is
stable.

The following summarizes Satmex' ratings and the rating actions:

Issuer: Satelites Mexicanos, S.A. de C.V.

Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to Ba1 from Caa1

Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture May 15, 2017, Upgraded to
Ba1 from Caa1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Satelites Mexicanos, S.A. de C.V.

Outlook, Changed To Stable from Rating Under Review For Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

The rating action follows Eutelsat Communication (Eutelsat,
unrated)'s successful acquisition of 100% of the share capital of
Sat'lites Mexicanos, S.A. de C.V. ("Satmex") announced last
January 2, 2014. As a fully owned subsidiary of Eutelsat, Satmex's
Ba1 ratings consider Moody's expectation of its support to Satmex.
The rating also reflects Moody's understanding that Eutelsat will
be looking to refinance Satmex's debt at Eutelsat SA (Baa3
stable), although it was not confirmed either by Eutelsat or
Satmex. Moody's expects Eutelsat to be strongly motivated by its
own self-interest to ensure that payments on Satmex's outstanding
notes are made on a timely basis. Moody's has not equalized
Satmex's ratings with those of Eutelsat SA because support is less
certain than would be the case if the latter guaranteed or legally
assumed the debt of Satmex.

"Moody's have upgraded Satmex's ratings given our consideration of
implicit support from Eutelsat, despite the lack of a guarantee to
the company's debt," says Nymia Almeida, a Moody's Senior Credit
Officer and lead analyst for Satmex.

The acquisition amounted USD 831 million, that Eutelsat ultimately
financed with part of the proceeds of the EUR 930 million local
notes issued by its subsidiary Eutelsat SA (Baa3 stable) in
December 2013. Currently, Satmex's USD 360 million notes, due in
2017, remain outstanding and do not bear any guarantee from its
parent company. Despite the lack of guarantees, the Ba1 rating on
Satmex's notes is reflective of the implicit support Moody's
expects Satmex to receive from Eutelsat, in the context of the
latter's expansionary business strategy in Latin America.

Satmex Ba1 rating is in line with the Ba1 rating of the senior
unsecured bank facilities at Eutelsat Communications SA,
reflecting the structural subordination to the debt and other
claims at Eutelsat SA.

Prior to the acquisition, Satmex's standalone rating was being
driven by the large credit risk posed by its satellite launch
program. The program included the satellites Satmex 7 and Satmex
9, expected to be launched in 2015, with a total cost of
approximately USD 170 million each. As of September 30, 2013,
Moody's estimates that more than USD 200 million were unfunded and
without clear funding sources.

Following the transaction, Satmex credit profile has significantly
improved as it is now part of a larger and better capitalized
company. Eutelsat's solid business position as a multi-regional
satellite service provider, its ability to achieve revenue growth,
and its solid liquidity should support Satmex's satellite launch
program. Moreover, Moody's evaluates Eutelsat's willingness to
support its new subsidiary based on the perceived relevance Satmex
has to Eutelsat's strategy to complement its footprint in fast-
growing markets, and securing future sources of growth. However,
the ratings are also cognizant of Eutelsat's exposure to industry-
typical technology risks, and are tempered by near-term
constraints on free cash flow generation given the company's
ongoing capex program and high dividend payouts.

The stable outlook on the ratings reflects our consideration of
implicit support from Eutelsat, as well as the parent's solid
business profile, good operating performance and track record of
predictable revenues.

An upgrade on Satmex's ratings will depend on Eutelsat's ratings.
Moody's do not expect any immediate upward rating pressure, given
Eutelsat's increased leverage resulting from the Satmex
acquisition as well as free cash flow absorption through
shareholder remuneration and capex. Positive rating pressure could
develop over time if Eutelsat's debt/EBITDA ratio (as adjusted by
Moody's) decreases below 3.25x on a sustainable basis.

Conversely, negative pressure could arise if Eutelsat's
performance weaken, in the context of a negative free cash flow
over the next couple of years. The negative pressure would be
developing in the event of a significant deterioration in
operating performance (growth rate, margin) and in case of
increasing leverage such that the Debt / EBITDA ratio (as adjusted
by Moody's) sustainably exceeds 3.75x.

Satmex's standalone credit profile is much weaker than when
incorporating support from its parent company. Therefore, any
change in our consideration of the support from the parent company
could result in negative pressure for Satmex ratings. Support
could be revised for example due to a change in Satmex relevance
within Eutelsat's overall strategy, evidence of lack of support
from Eutelsat to any of its subsidiaries or to Satmex's funding
needs.

Based in Mexico, Satmex is a satellite operator providing fixed
satellite services (standard C- and Ku-band services) to local and
international broadcasting and telecom firms as well as to
government-related entities. Satmex operates three satellites in
geo-synchronous orbital slots allocated to Mexico, covering the
Americas. The company's satellite fleet includes Satmex 5, Satmex
6 and the recently launched Satmex 8. As of September 30, 2013,
the company's last twelve month revenue amounted to about USD 137
million, of which fixed satellite services represented around 84%.
Moody's adjusted EBITDA for the same period was USD 91.5 million
(66.6% margin). Starting January 2014, the company will fully
consolidate within the accounts of Eutelsat Communications.

Headquartered in Paris, France, Eutelsat Communications is a
leading operator of communications satellites, providing satellite
capacity to broadcasters and broadcasting associations, pay-TV
operators, video, data and Internet service providers, enterprises
and government agencies. Through its fleet comprised by 34
satellites, Eutelsat covers Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia-
Pacific and the Americas. As of June 30, 2013, the company's last
twelve months revenues amounted to about EUR 1,284 million.
Moody's adjusted EBITDA for the same period was EUR 1,020 million
(79.5% margin).

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Communications Infrastructure Rating Methodology published in June
2011.


TENEDORA NEMAK: Fitch Hikes Issuer Default Rating to 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Tenedora Nemak, S.A. de C.V.'s (Nemak)
ratings as follows:

-- Foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB' from
    'BB-';

-- Local currency IDR to 'BB' from 'BB-';

-- Long-term national scale rating to 'A(mex)' from 'A-(mex)';

-- USD500 million senior unsecured notes due 2023 to 'BB' from
    'BB-';

-- MXN3,500 million Local Certificados Bursatiles due 2017 to
    'AA-(mex)' from 'A+(mex)'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

The ratings upgrade reflects Nemak's strengthened credit profile,
its strong business position as a large Tier-1 supplier of
aluminum components, increased size, regional and product-
portfolio diversification, and reduced concentration of Detroit
three original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). In the last five
years, Nemak has doubled its revenue and EBITDA, maintained
relatively stable debt levels and improved its working capital
cycle considerably, and as result its credit metrics have
strengthened significantly. In addition, the company has shown an
ability to generate cash flow consistently, even with adverse
economic conditions.

Fitch expects that Nemak will continue to show positive momentum
in revenues and EBITDA as a result of continued recovery in the
U.S and an improved outlook for automobile demand in Europe, and
estimates that by the end of 2014 Nemak's gross leverage will be
at or below 2.4x. Also considered in the ratings is Nemak's
geographic diversification of cash flows and its good liquidity
position. The ratings are tempered by cyclicality of the
automotive industry and by the company's still large concentration
in North America as well as to some OEMs.

The rating of the Certificados Bursatiles issuance takes into
account the partial guarantee granted by Bancomext equivalent to
29% of the principal amount and 100% of the first interest payment
in case of anticipated or scheduled maturity. Fitch believes that
a Partial Credit Guarantee (PCG) can reduce loss severity given
default and uplifts the guaranteed issuance's rating by some
notches above the issuer's stand-alone rating. The overall
recovery estimate considering the execution of the guarantee and
the proceeds from company liquidation determine the number of
notches for the uplift.

Key Rating Drivers

Strong Global Business Position
Nemak's ratings reflect the company's strong position in high-tech
aluminum components for the automotive industry in North American,
South American and European markets; its presence in high-growth
regions, such as Asia and its high percentage of installed
capacity in low-costs countries. The ratings also reflect Nemak's
long-term customer relationships, and its position as an essential
supplier for Detroit three OEMs and in several of the largest
global engine platforms.

Geographical Diversification Will Likely Strengthen Operating
Results

The company's expansion in Europe, South America and Asia --
through organic growth and the acquisitions made in 2007 --
increases its geographical diversification, scale and ties to
manufacturers. Fitch believes, these investments will continue to
improve Nemak's revenue and cash flow generating ability. In
Fitch's view, auto sales in Europe are likely to bottom out in
2014 and to rebound moderately throughout the year. In addition,
the company's presence in China and its recently announced plans
to expand operations in Russia, provide attractive growth
opportunities and diversification. In the U.S., Fitch expects
Nemak to benefit from projected low-single digit light vehicle
sales growth.

Higher Volumes and Favorable Pricing Trends Support Results
During the past four years, Nemak's volumes, revenues and EBITDA
generation have grown consistently as a result of new programs
awarded with OEMs in America, Europe and Asia, along with
increased market share of American OEMs. Nemak's results have also
been driven by higher consumer confidence, in conjunction with a
better sales mix, improved productivity and higher fixed costs
absorption, as well as by the incorporation of the JL French
operations acquired in 2012. Fitch estimates, Nemak's 2013 EBITDA
above USD600 million compared to the USD309 million that the
company reported in 2008, before the global financial crisis.

Improved Leverage

Fitch expects year-end 2013 gross leverage including parent
company loans to be 2.5x and to strengthen below 2.4x by 2014. In
Fitch's opinion, parent loans provided flexibility to service and
amortize its debt. These loans are subordinated by contract from
the rest of Nemak's senior debt and amortize pro rata with senior
creditors. During the past four years, Nemak's leverage metrics
have improved significantly as a result of the company's larger
scale and increased EBITDA generation. Fitch expects neutral to
slightly negative free cash flow (FCF) as a result of higher capex
related to the construction of the company's new plant in Russia.
Fitch's FCF estimate also considers that dividend payments will
not exceed USD70 million in 2014. During the last 12 months to
Sept. 30, 2013, Nemak generated USD207 million in FCF and total
debt as of the third quarter of 2013 was USD1.4 billion.

Adequate Liquidity and Extended Debt Maturity Profile
As of Sept. 30, 2013, the company's short-term debt was USD247
million and cash balances were USD86 million. The company
maintains good access to bank loans and debt capital markets,
which in conjunction with cash balances, FCF generation and
available committed revolving credit lines of approximately USD190
million maturing in 2015 and 2016, Fitch believes, will be
sufficient to face short-term debt maturities. In February 2013,
Nemak issued USD500 million of 2023 senior unsecured notes and
used the proceeds to refinance existing bank debt with shorter
maturity.

RATING SENSITIVITY:

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to a negative rating action include, a material decline in volumes
that leads to a reduction in EBITDA resulting in higher leverage
ratios for a sustained period of time could pressure the ratings.
In addition, a material deterioration in FCF could also pressure
the ratings.

Positive rating actions seem limited in the medium term given this
upgrade. However, significant strengthening in EBITDA generation
and consistent positive FCF generation resulting in improvement of
leverage levels across the cycle could have positive implications
for credit quality.


====================
P U E R T O  R I C O
====================


AES PUERTO RICO: Moody's Cuts Rating on $194MM Bonds to Ba2
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of approximately
$194 million of secured bonds issued by the Puerto Rico
Industrial, Tourist, Educational, Medical, and Environmental
Control Facilities Financing Authority on behalf of AES Puerto
Rico L.P (AES PR) to Ba2 from Ba1 and revised the outlook to
negative. The rating action is driven by Moody's recent rating
downgrade of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA: Ba2,
negative) revenue bonds.

Ratings Rationale

AES PR's revenues are entirely dependent upon PREPA which in turn
is heavily dependent on the economic health of Puerto Rico. On
February 7th, Moody's downgraded the ratings of both these
entities to Ba2 with a negative outlook. The rating actions
reflected continued weakness in the economy of Puerto Rico which
Moody's expect will weigh heavily on PREPA's ability to meet
numerous important initiatives or to improve its weak credit
metrics and liquidity position. Although Moody's recognize the
strategic importance of the project to PREPA as a source of fuel
diversity and relatively low-cost base-load power coupled with the
priority of PREPA's contractual payments to AES PR as an operating
expense, ultimately the financial strength of AES PR is dependent
upon the financial health of its off-taker and its ability to make
timely payments.

AES PR's own operational and financial performance continues to be
generally consistent with our expectations; however, the amount
and timing of payments from PREPA continue to be somewhat erratic,
periodically impacting cash flow metrics. For the twelve months
ending November 2013, AES PR calculated a cash based debt service
coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.12x -- this ratio includes the impact
of a one-time charge for higher legal expenses and the receipt of
a PREPA payment four days after the end of the reporting period.
Adding back the delayed payment, the ratio would have been 1.26x;
further adding back the one-time charge brings the ratio to
approximately 1.31x. For the twelve months ending September 2013
Moody's  calculate a DSCR of about 1.40x. Going forward, on the
basis of earned revenue, Moody's expect AES PR should be able to
demonstrate DSCR's that are above 1.30x; for the twelve months
ending November 2014, AES projects a cash based DSCR of about
1.26x.

The negative outlook for AES PR is consistent with the negative
outlook for PREPA and reflects the potential for the rating to
move downward in the event the Ba2 rating of PREPA was to be
downgraded. Downward pressure on the rating could also develop if
the project were to experience prolonged operating difficulties
which result in reductions to PREPA's capacity payments or if
increases in unrecovered operating and/or capital costs cause debt
service coverage ratios to fall below 1.20x for an extended
period.

In light of the negative outlook, the rating is not likely to
revised upward over the near-to-medium term and is currently
upwardly constrained by the Ba2 rating and negative outlook of
PREPA. In the event the rating outlook at PREPA stabilized, the
outlook for AES PR would also likely be revised to stable. Longer
term, upward pressure on the rating could develop if the rating of
PREPA were to be revised upward and if the project is able to
demonstrate debt service coverage ratios above 1.3x on a
sustainable basis.

AES PR, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of AES Corporation
(AES: Ba3, stable), owns and operates a 454 megawatt (MW) coal-
fired cogeneration facility located on the southeastern coast of
Puerto Rico. The project sells all of its firm energy and capacity
pursuant to a 25-year power purchase agreement to the PREPA, a
public corporation and governmental agency of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico. The project began operating in 2002.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Power
Generation Projects published in December 2012.


UNIV. OF PUERTO RICO: Moody's Cuts System Revenue Bonds to Ba3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the University of Puerto
Rico's University System Revenue Bonds to Ba3 from Ba1 and
Educational Facilities Revenue Bonds, 2000 Series A issued through
AFICA to B1 from Ba2. The rating differential reflects the
subordinate pledge and lease structure of the 2000 Series A bonds.
The rating action affects $561 million of rated debt. The outlook
is negative.

Summary Rating Rationale

The downgrade of the University of Puerto Rico's bonds follows the
downgrade of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Government
Development Bank (GDB) to Ba2 from Baa3. The outlook is negative.
Driving the two-notch downgrade of the University of Puerto Rico
(UPR) is its extraordinarily high reliance on the commonwealth for
operating revenue (67% of revenues) and for governance coupled
with its reliance on GDB for liquidity and financial management
support. The university has weak liquidity and limited ability to
grow other revenue sources, conditions that Moody's expect to
continue given generally stagnant enrollment and historic
resistance to tuition increases. The rating action is parallel to
the 2 notch downgrade of the commonwealth's appropriation-backed
debt and reflected the high reliance of the university system on
commonwealth funding relative to the commonwealth's other
government owned enterprises.

The Ba3 rating reflects ongoing enrollment pressures, exposure to
Pell Grant reductions, the need for ongoing capital and
infrastructure investment and significant pension and OPEB
liabilities. It also reflects susceptibility to possible reduction
in federal funding and/or reductions or delays in operating
appropriations. The rating favorably incorporates University of
Puerto Rico's role as the commonwealth's only public higher
education institution and an essential contributor to the
commonwealth's economic activity through its academic, medical and
research programs. All debt is fixed rate and amortizing and there
are no immediate debt plans. Further, debt service coverage from
pledged revenues supports the rating.

Challenges

University of Puerto Rico is highly reliant on commonwealth
operating support which represents 66.9% of total operating
revenues (compared to the public university median of 25.9% in
fiscal year (FY) 2012) and that dependence is projected to
increase.

Liquidity is weak with only $99 million of unrestricted monthly
liquidity or 32 monthly days for FY 2012. The university has
relied on the Government Development Bank for liquidity and
financial management support. No additional financial support has
been provided during the past two years, although the GDB
permitted conversion of a previous working capital revolving
facility to a ten-year term loan.

The university owns and operates Servicios Medicos Universitarios
(SMU), its academic medical center with a 55% Medicaid payor share
that produced substantial operating losses and reported a $20.4
million accumulated deficit at June 30, 2012. In addition to
hospital patient care revenue, 10% of the university's operating
revenues are derived from patient care.

Enrollment has been stagnant, with fall 2012 enrollment of over
54,000 full-time equivalents (FTEs) down from prior years.
Enrollment growth may prove challenging given the large
outmigration of younger professionals and smaller high school
graduating classes.

The university is subject to political changes that can impact
operations and cash flow. Following the governor's inauguration in
2013, he replaced the university's Board of Trustees with a new,
smaller governing board. The president of the university was also
replaced.

Two-thirds of university students receive Pell Grants. As such,
the university is exposed to possible reductions in Pell Grant
awards, which amounted to $174 million for the university in FY
2012.

*The rising unfunded pension and OPEB liabilities -- $197 million
and $1.58 billion, respectively, for FY 2012 -- will exert
continued funding pressure from operating cash flow.

Strengths

The university has a key role as Puerto Rico's public university
system, enrolling a significant share of commonwealth high school
graduates from both public and private high schools.

The commonwealth's annual appropriations are legislatively
mandated as a percentage of general fund revenues.

University operations produced improved cash flow, with a 10.8%
operating cash flow margin that is up from 4.4% in FY 2010.

The University of Puerto Rico is a major research site in the
commonwealth. The National Science Foundation lifted its
suspension of research funding at the Central Administration and
Mayaguez campuses in November 2013.

SMU generated operating cash flow margins of 10.0% and 10.7% for
FY 2011 and FY 2012, respectively, following a negative 1.5% for
FY 2009 (and weaker results prior to FY 2009) that resulted in a
"Going Concern" note in SMU's FY 2010 statements.

Outlook

The negative outlook reflects both the commonwealth's negative
outlook and concerns about pressures on enrollment and Pledged
Revenues, failure to grow balance sheet liquidity and uncertainty
about ability to maintain positive hospital operating performance.

What Could Make The Rating Go Up (Return To Stable)

Absent a sustained and material improvement in the commonwealth
economy, a rating upgrade is not likely.

What Could Make The Rating Go Down

Further downgrade of the University of Puerto Rico could result
from credit deterioration of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. A
downgrade could also result if there were a notable weakening in
fundamental elements of the university's profile such as
enrollment or tuition, or contraction in liquidity or
deterioration in hospital operations. Moreover, any adverse change
in commonwealth support could negatively impact the rating.

Rating Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was U.S. Not-for-
Profit Private and Public Higher Education published in August
2011.

                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

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                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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