TCRLA_Public/140220.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

           Thursday, February 20, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 36


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

FIDEICOMISO FINANCIERO: Moody's Rates ARS3.6 MM Certs. 'Caa3'


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

AGA INVESTMENT: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
AVIDOG: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
C.H. GUENTHER: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
CAPITAL GREEN: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
CLASSICS FUND LTD: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

CLASSICS FUND SPC: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
CX-SHANNON: Members to Receive Wind-Up Report on Feb. 27
G-NET HOLDING: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
GREEN EAGLE MASTER: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
GREEN EAGLE OFFSHORE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report

LISPENARD LANE: Members to Hold Final Meeting on March 14
MACE PROPERTIES: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
MURSELAGO INVESTMENT: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
SELIGMAN SPECTRUM: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
SELIGMAN SPECTRUM (MASTER): Members Receive Wind-Up Report

TOP HAT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
VINIK OFFSHORE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
VIOLETTA HOLDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
YGOF GP: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Power Firms Rebuff Govt.'s Push to Produce Energy


J A M A I C A

DIGICEL GROUP: Acquires Cable TV Operation
FINSAC: Jamaica Finance Minister to Update House on Enquiry Report
FIRST QUANTUM: S&P Raises Rating on $350MM Sr. Unsec. Notes to B+


P U E R T O  R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Wants to Incur More Debt to Regain Financial Footing
PUERTO RICO AQUEDUCT: Fitch Downgrades $3.4BB Bonds to 'BB+'
PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Fitch Lowers Rating on $8.7BB Bonds to 'BB+'


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

RBC ROYAL BANK: No Plan to Shut Down Any Branches


                            - - - - -





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A R G E N T I N A
=================


FIDEICOMISO FINANCIERO: Moody's Rates ARS3.6 MM Certs. 'Caa3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo rates the
new structure of Fideicomiso Financiero Banco Piano Serie XXXIV, a
transaction that will be issued by Banco Patagonia -- acting
solely in its capacity as Issuer and Trustee.

The securities for this transaction have not yet been placed in
the market. If any assumption or factor Moody's considers when
assigning the ratings change before closing, the ratings may also
change.

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings previously assigned to the Class
C Debt Securities and the CP because the structure of the
transaction has changed before issuance and as a result the rating
of Class C Debt Securities and CP tranches will change.

Moody's has assigned new ratings as follows.

ARS 140,509,875 in Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities of "
Fideicomiso Financiero Banco Piano Serie XXXIV, ", rated Aaa.ar
(sf) (Argentine National Scale) and Ba3 (sf) (Global Scale, Local
Currency)

ARS 18,014,087 in Class B Floating Rate Debt Securities of "
Fideicomiso Financiero Banco Piano Serie XXXIV, ", rated Aaa.ar
(sf) (Argentine National Scale) and Ba3 (sf) (Global Scale, Local
Currency)

ARS 18,014,087 in Class C Fixed Rate Debt Securities of "
Fideicomiso Financiero Banco Piano Serie XXXIV, ", rated Ba3.ar
(sf) (Argentine National Scale) and Caa1 (sf) (Global Scale, Local
Currency)

ARS 3,602,817 in Certificates of "Fideicomiso Financiero Banco
Piano Serie XXXIV, ", rated Caa2.ar (sf) (Argentine National
Scale) and Caa3 (sf) (Global Scale, Local Currency)

Ratings Rationale

The rated securities are payable from the cash flow coming from
the assets of the trust, which is an amortizing pool of
approximately 22,743 eligible personal loans denominated in
Argentine pesos, with a fixed interest rate, originated by Banco
Piano, in an aggregate amount of ARS 180,140,865.86.

These personal loans are granted mainly to pensioners that receive
their monthly pensions from ANSES (Argentina's National
Governmental Agency of Social Security - Administracion Nacional
de la Seguridad Social). Banco Piano is the payment agent entity
and automatically deducts the monthly loan installment directly
from the pensioner's account.

The pool also has a small percentage of loans granted to employees
of the National Government, using a "discount code" ("Codigo de
Descuento".) The "discount code" is an identifier granted by a
government-related entity that allows to deduct a personal loan's
installment directly from the borrowers' paycheck.

Overall credit enhancement is comprised of 22% of subordination
for the Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities, 12% for the Class B
and 2% for the Class C. In addition the transaction has various
reserve funds and excess spread.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Factors that may lead to a downgrade of the ratings include an
increase in delinquency levels beyond the level Moody's assumed
when rating this transaction, and a disruption in the flow of
payments from ANSES to pensioners.

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include the
building of credit enhancement over time due to the turbo
sequential payment structure, when compared with the level of
projected losses in the securitized pool.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis

Moody's considered the credit enhancement provided in this
transaction through the initial subordination levels for each
rated class, as well as the historical performance of Piano's
portfolio. In addition, Moody's considered factors common to
consumer loans securitizations such as delinquencies, prepayments
and losses; as well as specific factors related to the Argentine
market, such as the probability of an increase in losses if there
are changes in the macroeconomic scenario in Argentina. These
factors were incorporated in a cash flow model in order to
determine the expected loss for the rated securities.

In assigning the rating to this transaction, Moody's assumed a
lognormal distribution for defaults on the main pool with a mean
of 2.5% and a coefficient of variation of 50%. Also, Moody's
assumed a lognormal distribution for prepayments with a mean of
30% and a coefficient of variation of 70%. These assumptions are
derived from the historical performance to date of Piano's pools.
Servicer default was modeled by simulating the default of Banco
Piano as the servicer consistent with its current rating of
B3/A2.ar. In the scenarios where the servicer defaults, Moody's
assumed that the defaults on the pool would increase by 20
percentage points.

The model results showed 0.00% expected loss for the Class A
Floating Rate Debt Securities, 1.99% for the Class B Floating Rate
Debt Securities, 12.24% for the Class C Fixed Rate Debt Securities
and 28.84% for the Certificates.

Finally, Moody's also evaluated the back-up servicing arrangements
in the transaction. If Banco Piano is removed as servicer, Banco
Patagonia will be appointed as the back-up servicer.

Stress Scenarios

Moody's ran several stress scenarios, including increases in the
default rate assumptions. If default rates were increased 3% from
the base case scenario for the pool (i.e., mean of 5.5% and a
coefficient of variation of 50%), the ratings of the Class B
Floating Rate Debt Securities, Class C Fixed Rate Debt Securities
and the Certificates would likely be downgraded to B3 (sf), Caa2
(sf) and C (sf) respectively. The ratings of the Class A Floating
Rate debt securities would be unchanged.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


AGA INVESTMENT: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Aga Investment Ltd. received on Jan. 21, 2014,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          MBT Trustees Ltd.
          Telephone: 949-9808
          Facsimile: 949-9793/4
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands


AVIDOG: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Avidog received on Feb. 12, 2014, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Trident Liquidators (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Eva Moore
          Telephone: (345) 949 0880
          Facsimile: (345) 949 0881
          e-mail: cayman@tridenttrust.com
          One Capital Place, 4th Floor
          P.O. Box 847, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands


C.H. GUENTHER: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------
The members of C.H. Guenther Europe Limited received on Feb. 10,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          C.H Guenther & Son, Incorporated
          Telephone: (210) 351-6252
          e-mail tmcrae@chg.com


CAPITAL GREEN: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Capital Green Investments received on Feb. 12,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Jonathan Pierre
          541 Prospect Drive
          P.O. Box 12422 Grand Cayman KY1-1011
          Cayman Islands


CLASSICS FUND LTD: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Classics Fund Ltd. received on Feb. 3, 2014,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Gene Dacosta
          c/o Craig Fulton
          Telephone: (345) 814 732
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands


CLASSICS FUND SPC: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Classics Fund SPC received on Feb. 3, 2014,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Gene Dacosta
          c/o Craig Fulton
          Telephone: (345) 814 732
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands


CX-SHANNON: Members to Receive Wind-Up Report on Feb. 27
--------------------------------------------------------
The members of CX - Shannon Limited will receive on Feb. 27, 2014,
at 10:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Jagjit K. Comins
          c/o BNP Paribas Bank & Trust Cayman Limited
          P.O. Box 10632, Royal Bank House, 3rd Floor
          24 Shedden Road, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-1006
          Cayman Islands


G-NET HOLDING: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of G-Net Holding, Inc. received on Feb. 11, 2014,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidators are:

          John Robert Lees
          Mat Ng
          Henley Building, 20th Floor
          5 Queen's Road Central
          Hong Kong
          Telephone: +852 2842 5022
          Facsimile: +852 2526 0771


GREEN EAGLE MASTER: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------
The members of Green Eagle Credit Master Fund, Ltd. received on
Jan. 13, 2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


GREEN EAGLE OFFSHORE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The members of Green Eagle Credit Offshore Fund, Ltd. received on
Feb. 10, 2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


LISPENARD LANE: Members to Hold Final Meeting on March 14
---------------------------------------------------------
The members of Lispenard Lane Credit Fund Ltd. will hold their
final meeting on March 14, 2014, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidators' report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidators are:

          Stuart Brankin
          Desmond Campbell
          Telephone: (345) 949 5586
          c/o Aston Corporate Managers, Ltd.
          P.O. Box 1981 Grand Cayman, KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


MACE PROPERTIES: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Mace Properties Ltd. received on Jan. 21,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          MBT Trustees Ltd.
          Telephone: 949-9808
          Facsimile: 949-9793/4
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands


MURSELAGO INVESTMENT: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Murselago Investment Ltd. received on Jan. 21,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          MBT Trustees Ltd.
          Telephone: 949-9808
          Facsimile: 949-9793/4
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands


SELIGMAN SPECTRUM: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------
The members of Seligman Spectrum Focus Fund received on Feb. 10,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


SELIGMAN SPECTRUM (MASTER): Members Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------------------
The members of Seligman Spectrum Focus (Master) Fund received on
Feb. 10, 2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


TOP HAT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------
The members of Top Hat Yachts Ltd. received on Feb. 17, 2014, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Anthony McVeigh
          c/o 49 Bridge House,
          18 St. Georges Wharf,
          London SW8 2LP
          U.K.
          Telephone: +44 203 737 7507


VINIK OFFSHORE: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------
The members of Vinik Offshore Fund, Ltd. received on Feb. 10,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


VIOLETTA HOLDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Violetta Holding Ltd. received on Jan. 21,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          MBT Trustees Ltd.
          Telephone: 949-9808
          Facsimile: 949-9793/4
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands


YGOF GP: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------
The shareholders of YGOF GP Ltd. received on Jan. 20, 2014, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Robert P. Bermingham
          The Yucaipa Companies
          9130 West Sunset Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90069
          USA



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REP: Power Firms Rebuff Govt.'s Push to Produce Energy
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic's power companies
(ADIE) on Feb. 16 said the government's participation in
electricity generation should've been submitted to the Economic
and Social Council (CES) for discussion within the electricity
Pact.

ADIE Vice President Milton Morrison said the Government initiative
contradicts the spirit of the General Electricity Law and
criticized the adoption of short-term initiatives instead of
complying with what the National Development Strategy Law
stipulates, according to Dominican Today.  "It would've had more
sense to wait for the discussion to forge the power Pact so that
any action is contemplated in the guidelines provided for this,"
the report quoted Mr. Morrison as saying.

"It's not true that the Government has made efforts to channel
private participation to install new generation, as the bill
states," ADIE's spokesman said, adding that "the private sector's
sense of smell" tells it that the new coal-fired plants will cost
more than US$2.0 billion, or US$100 million than what's been
announced, the report relays.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


DIGICEL GROUP: Acquires Cable TV Operation
------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Digicel Group Limited has acquired SAT
Telecom in Dominica, marking its entry into the cable television
market.

Local media reported that the deal had been approved by the
Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority and the National
Telecommunications Regulatory Commission, according to RJR News.

The report notes that Digicel Group spokeswoman Antonia Graham
said the company would make a statement on the acquisition at a
later date and that Digicel would keep the business operational.

SAT Telecom, owned by Dominican, Marlon Alexander, was established
in July 1999 and awarded a licence in cable television and
broadcasting.  RJR News notes that SAT Telecom faced financial
constraints and last year laid off four employees from its news
department.

                      About Digicel Group

Headquartered in Jamaica, Digicel Group Limited provides mobile
telecommunications services in the Caribbean and the Central
American markets.   The company's services include rollover
minutes, GPRS data services, prepaid roaming, SMS to e-mail, and
multimedia messaging, as well as broadband.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter on Dec 13, 2013,
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Digicel Group Limited B2
Corporate Family Rating (CFR), B2-PD Probability of Default Rating
and the existing debt instrument ratings at DGL and Digicel
Limited ("DL") following the company's recent announcement that it
plans to issue up to $500 million of add-on notes to DGL's
existing $1.5 billion 8.25% senior unsecured notes due 2020. The
rating outlook remains stable.


FINSAC: Jamaica Finance Minister to Update House on Enquiry Report
------------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Jamaica is to get an update on the status of
the report from the Commission of Enquiry into the Financial
Sector Adjustment Company, FINSAC.

It will come in the form of answers from Finance Minister Dr.
Peter Phillips who will respond to questions regarding the report
during a sitting of Parliament, according to RJR News.

The report notes that the preparation of the report has been in
limbo since the Government signaled that it would not allocate
additional funds to the Commission.

RJR News notes that Opposition Spokesman on Finance, Audley Shaw,
has urged the government to find the J$10 to J$15 million needed
to publish the FINSAC report.

RJR News recalls that just over J$100 million was spent on the
Commission which was set up in 2009 to look into the operations of
FINSAC after it took control of failed financial institutions in
the 1990s.


===========
P A N A M A
===========


FIRST QUANTUM: S&P Raises Rating on $350MM Sr. Unsec. Notes to B+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it raised its rating
on the $350 million senior unsecured notes issued by Canada-listed
base metals group First Quantum Minerals Ltd. (FQM) to 'B+' from
'B' and removed it from CreditWatch, where it was placed with
positive implications on Feb. 4, 2014.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B+' long-term corporate credit
ratings on FQM.  The outlook is stable.

In addition, S&P assigned its 'B+' issue rating to the
$2.2 billion senior unsecured notes issued by FQM.

S&P withdrew its 'B+' long-term corporate credit rating on FQM's
subsidiary, Toronto-based mining company FQM (Akubra) Inc.
(Akubra; formerly Inmet Mining Corp.).  S&P also withdrew the 'B+'
rating on the $2.0 billion senior unsecured notes issued by
Akubra, which have been exchanged for the new $2.2 billion notes.

The rating actions follow FQM's recent changes to the group's
capital structure, after which its debt sits at the parent
company.  In S&P's view, the new capital structure improves the
standing of the various creditors, in particular the holders of
the $350 million unsecured notes, which now rank pari passu with
the other debt at the parent level.  The overall amount of
outstanding debt remains fairly similar.  As this stage, the key
rating factor for FQM remains its ambitious capital expenditure
(capex) program and relatively low current copper prices.

Specific changes to the capital structure include:

   -- Establishing a $2.5 billion five-year senior credit facility
      to replace the current revolving credit facility (RCF) at
      Akubra.  S&P had previously assumed that the current RCF
      would be refinanced.

   -- Exchanging the previous senior unsecured notes at the Akubra
      level--$1.5 billion notes due 2020 and $500 million notes
      due 2021--with $2.2 billion long-term senior unsecured
      facilities at the FQM level.

   -- Cancelling the financing of the Kevitsa project in Finland
      and downsizing the $1 billion facility at FQM's Zambian
      subsidiary Kansanshi.

   -- Changing the covenant package and streamlining the security
      package across all senior unsecured notes at the FQM level.

Under S&P's base-case credit scenario, it projects that FQM's
EBITDA will improve to about $1.8 billion in 2014 and 2015,
compared with its forecast of $1.6 billion in 2013.  This scenario
takes into account the following estimates and assumptions:

   -- Copper price of $3.1 per pound (/lb) in 2014.  The average
      price in 2013 was $3.3/lb and the current price is $3.2/lb.

   -- Gold price of $1,250 per ounce (/oz) in 2014.  The average
      price in 2013 was $1,400/oz and the current price is
      $1,270/oz.

   -- Copper production of 480,000-500,000 metric tons in 2014,
      slightly above production in 2013 (including Inmet Mining's
      production for the whole year).  S&P expects production to
      increase materially in 2015, as FQM commissions the Sentinel
      project in Zambia in late 2014.  However, S&P's projection
      of copper production in 2015 is lower than it previously
      assumed.  This is because the company lacks enough smelting
      capacity in Zambia, which is causing some changes in the
      commissioning of some projects.

S&P expects these estimates and assumptions to translate into
funds from operations (FFO) of about $1.0 billion-$1.1 billion per
year in 2014-2015.  At the same time, S&P expects FQM's capex to
peak, with investments of more than $4.0 billion until the end of
2015.  S&P therefore forecasts significant negative free operating
cash flow (FOCF) of about $2.5 billion after factoring in the
dividends and a debt increase of about $2.7 billion by the end of
2015.

At this stage, S&P considers a key risk in its rating to be
execution risk related to the Cobre Panama mine in Panama,
particularly the risk of cost overruns.  FQM recently communicated
the results of a review of the mine, which indicated higher capex
and a longer period until commissioning than Inmet Mining had
previously assumed.  However, FQM's assumption for higher
production should offset these extra costs.  The Cobre Panama mine
should improve FQM's portfolio and geographical diversification
once it is commissioned in late 2017.

S&P's view of FQM's "fair" business risk profile, as its criteria
define the term, reflects the group's adequate geographic
footprint and favorable position on the global unit cash cost
curve.  Although S&P views positively the significant growth
potential from FQM's capex program, notably the greenfield copper
project in Panama, S&P considers such sizable investments to have
significant execution risk.

S&P's assessment of the group's financial risk profile as
"aggressive" is based on its forecast of sizable negative FOCF in
the next years, with adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 3.0x and
adjusted FFO to debt of about 20% by 2015.  In S&P's view, FQM's
credit metrics will remain very sensitive to changes in the capex
programs and copper prices.  In the near term, the negative FOCF
is supported by the group's "adequate" liquidity.

The stable outlook reflects the group's "adequate" liquidity,
following the recently agreed $2.5 billion five-year senior credit
facility.  S&P also assumes that FQM will be able to execute its
various ongoing expansion projects (including the expansion of the
Kansanshi mine and ramp-up of the Sentinel mine) according to
plan, bringing group copper production to about 600,000-620,000
metric tons in 2015.  While FQM maintains negative FOCF, S&P
considers adjusted FFO to debt of about 20% to be commensurate
with the current rating.

S&P might consider a negative rating action if FQM faced a more
severe drop in copper prices or cost overruns on its key projects.
In addition, pressure on the rating could be triggered by a
revision of S&P's assessment of country risk in Zambia, which
accounts for about 50% of FQM's EBITDA (although the 'B+' rating
on Zambia does not constrain the rating on FQM).

A positive rating action in the medium term would require the
successful commissioning of FQM's key projects in Zambia.  It
would also hinge on FQM demonstrating sound management of the
Cobre Panama mine development, including by maintaining "adequate"
liquidity to mitigate FQM's significant negative free cash flow
over the mine's growth phase.


====================
P U E R T O  R I C O
====================


PUERTO RICO: Wants to Incur More Debt to Regain Financial Footing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mary Williams Walsh and Michael Corkery at DealBook News report
that Puerto Rico still has the capacity to issue more than US$3
billion in new debt, senior officials said, adding that they hoped
to tap the credit markets in March despite concern about whether
the commonwealth can sustain its current large debt load.

In a conference call, officials said the Puerto Rican legislature
had proposed raising the commonwealth's legal debt limit and
proposed creating an independent authority, Cofim, which would
issue secured debt on behalf of Puerto Rico's municipalities,
according to DealBook News.  Puerto Rico had already created one
such debt-issuing authority, Cofina, to help it through a
financial crisis in 2006.  But Cofina has used up its entire
capacity and was downgraded recently, the report relates.

The report notes that officials said the borrowing in March would
consist of general-obligation debt, which is given a special, top-
priority status by Puerto Rico's Constitution.

Much of the proceeds will be used to refinance existing debt,
including US$330 million owed to Barclays, the report relates.
The proceeds are also to be used to terminate interest-rate swaps,
fill a US$245 million hole in the current fiscal year's budget and
bolster the liquidity of Puerto Rico's Government Development
Bank, which orchestrates the commonwealth's borrowing and tracks
the complex payment schedules and cash flows of different branches
of its government, the report discloses.

The report notes that officials of the Government Development Bank
said the March borrowing would be the territory's last during the
current fiscal year, which ends on June 30.  The bank also said
this would be the last time the commonwealth would borrow to
balance its budget, a practice that cannot be sustained in the
long run, the report relays.

Despite the risk, the report says, there is reportedly deep demand
for fresh debt from Puerto Rico, especially among sophisticated
investors seeking big returns.  Hedge funds and other alternative
asset managers believe they see ways of protecting themselves in
the face of increasing risk that Puerto Rico's other debt will
have to be restructured at some point, the report discloses.  But
holders of Puerto Rico's outstanding municipal bonds fear that
special protections for the new lenders will push their own
holdings back a place in line, the report relates.

The report discloses that whether and how much Puerto Rico can
borrow is of intense interest, in part because the commonwealth's
high-risk profile means its new debt wills most likely pay
unusually high returns-a big selling point in the current low-rate
environment.  Market participants said they expected the new debt
to pay at least 10 percent, which could translate into an after-
tax return of nearly 20 percent for high-income investors in high-
tax jurisdictions, the report relates.

Because of its legal status, Puerto Rico can issue bonds that pay
interest that is tax-exempt in all 50 states, at the federal,
state and local levels.

The report notes that the rare tax provision has, in the past,
generated tremendous demand for Puerto Rico's bonds and allowed
the commonwealth to amass an eye-popping debt burden relative to
the size of its economy.  The report relates that by some measures
it has US$70 billion in outstanding debt.  Both its economy and
its population have been shrinking in recent years, trends that
will make the debt difficult to repay unless they are reversed,
the report says.

The report discloses that investors said they thought the new debt
might contain "acceleration" provisions, which would commit Puerto
Rico to repaying it much more quickly if certain events came to
pass.  That would bolster investor confidence that they would be
repaid, even if Puerto Rico's severe financial problems led it to
delay payment on other obligations, the report relays.

In addition, the report says that they said the new debt could
commit Puerto Rico to resolving any future debt-related legal
disputes in United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, a venue considered friendlier to creditors than a
court in Puerto Rico might be.  Even though the constitution
explicitly gives general-obligation bonds priority over all other
expenditures, which provision has not been tested in court, the
report discloses.  Having a preselected court is an important
detail to experienced investors in distressed sovereign debt, who
cited the recent legal successes of investors in pressing
Argentina to make good on its debt, the report notes.  Those
disputes were adjudicated in federal court in New York.

The report notes that the possibility that the new debt would
offer preference above the older debt troubled some market
participants.

The report relays that the conference call came in the wake of
downgrades by the three main ratings agencies, which all cut
Puerto Rico's general-obligation bonds to junk status.  Officials
said that they intended to follow through with existing plans to
restore fiscal balance despite the downgrades, the report notes.

In addition to explaining their plans to borrow, they offered
signs of encouragement to bondholders who hope the commonwealth
will be able to fuel economic growth enough to pay its debts
without incident, the report discloses.  They said Puerto Rico had
been shrinking the size of its budget deficit and would have a
balanced budget in the 2015 fiscal year, DealBook  News relays.

The report notes that Puerto Rico has had difficulty tapping the
municipal market ever since last summer, when Detroit's huge
bankruptcy case rattled small investors and raised concern about
the overall credibility of the general-obligation pledge.  The
markets have long treated an issuer's "full faith and credit"
pledge as unshakable, but Detroit stunned participants by putting
general-obligation bonds into the same category-unsecured credit-
as pensions and retiree health benefits for former city workers,
the report relays.

If Puerto Rico needs to restructure its debt at some point, it
cannot use bankruptcy law as its legal framework because United
States territories cannot declare bankruptcy, the report says.
The framework for restructuring its debt would thus have to be the
covenants written into the bonds themselves, the report adds.


PUERTO RICO AQUEDUCT: Fitch Downgrades $3.4BB Bonds to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades the following ratings on Puerto Rico
Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, Puerto Rico (PRASA, or the
authority):

   -- Approximately $3.4 billion of outstanding revenue bonds,
      series A, B, 2012A and 2012B (senior lien), to 'BB+' from
      'BBB-'.

The Rating Outlook remains Negative.

                             SECURITY

The bonds are secured by a gross lien of all authority revenues
related to PRASA's combined water and sewer system (the system),
as defined in the amended master agreement of trust (MAT), senior
to all other debt or expenses of PRASA.  Authority revenues
include operating revenues, as defined in the amended MAT (e.g.
user charges and impact fees), as well as governmental funds
available to pay current expenses; amounts from the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico (the commonwealth) for payment of commonwealth
guaranteed indebtedness (CGI) or commonwealth supported
obligations (CSO); and any amounts transferred from the budgetary
reserve fund, as created in the amended and restated Fiscal
Oversight Agreement between PRASA, the commonwealth and the
Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico (GDB).  The authority
revenues received from the commonwealth for CGI and CSO are not
subject to lien of the MAT and are not available to pay debt
service on the bonds.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

COMMONWEALTH DETERIORATION DRIVES PRASA DOWNGRADE: The credit
deterioration and recent downgrade of the commonwealth's general
obligation (GO) rating to 'BB' Negative Outlook due to a weak
economy and challenges to liquidity and capital markets access
pose the same obstacles to PRASA warranting a downgrade to below
investment grade.  However, PRASA's improving financial and debt
profiles currently keep the authority's rating from falling
further.  The Negative Outlook on the authority's bonds includes
possible additional capital and service area pressures that could
adversely affect the authority's financial profile over the long
term, particularly in the event further deterioration of the
commonwealth's GO occurs.

SELF-SUFFICIENT OPERATIONS FROM RATE HIKE: PRASA enacted a 67%
average rate increase for the current fiscal year which has
allowed PRASA to become self-sufficient without assistance from
the commonwealth and GDB, alleviating a major concern that had
developed. Year to date collections are in line with PRASA's
projections and annualized figures are expected to produce sound
financial results for not only fiscal 2014 but the next several
years as well without support of the commonwealth or GDB.

FAVORABLE CAPITAL DEVELOPMENTS: The capital improvement program
(CIP) continues to be substantial but negotiations with regulators
are expected to lead to a cap in required annual spending by the
end of the year.  Also, the expected annual cap is expected to be
meaningfully less than recent CIP projections.

HIGH UTILITY RATES: The rate hike for fiscal 2014 has pushed
residential charges well above Fitch's 2% of median household
income (MHI) affordability measure and has increased bad debt
levels.  However, no additional increases to user charges are
forecasted through at least fiscal 2018 and delinquency rates have
been within PRASA's budget expectations.

WEAK DEBT PROFILE: Debt levels are high both in terms of absolute
dollars as well as the relative percentage of carrying costs to
revenues.  Costs will also continue to increase as the system
pushes forward with its ongoing CIP funding but the rate of growth
will slow from previous expectations.

SOLID MANAGEMENT AND COMMONWEALTH/GDB SUPPORT: PRASA management is
strong and the system also benefits from GDB advisory support.
Unlike recent years where PRASA relied extensively on commonwealth
and GDB financial funding, limited to no support is expected over
the foreseeable future.

WEAK BUT EXTENSIVE SERVICE AREA: The service territory is diverse,
although weak economic conditions have been protracted and
customer wealth levels are limited.

ESSENTIAL UTILITY: The system provides an essential service to the
residents of Puerto Rico.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

FURTHER COMMONWEALTH CREDIT DECLINE: Continued erosion in the
commonwealth's credit quality could heighten concerns regarding
PRASA's ongoing market access and long-term service territory
fundamentals that are beyond the current rating level.

WEAKENED FINANCIALS: Deterioration in financial results that
threatens the authority's expected ongoing self-sufficiency would
almost assuredly result in a downgrade given the weakened credit
quality of the commonwealth and its constrained ability to provide
ongoing support to PRASA.

                          CREDIT SUMMARY

PRASA provides water service to virtually the entire island,
including the roughly 4 million residents and 5 million annual
tourists; sewer service is limited to around 60% of the island.
After a decade of privatization, operations were transitioned back
to the public side in 2004 and the commonwealth reorganized
PRASA's board and executive management with the goals of limiting
political interference, improving the organizational structure,
and returning the authority to financial viability without
commonwealth subsidization.  Since this change, operating,
financial, and regulatory performance have improved overall
although challenges persist.

MARKET ACCESS ENVIRONMENT CHALLENGED

The authority has meaningful market access risk exposure stemming
from certain lines of credit (LOCs) with local banks that come due
over the course of the next year and will need to be refinanced
with long-term debt or renegotiated for an extended term.  The
LOCs total $350 million and are expected to be fully drawn for
fiscal 2014 and 2015 capital projects leading up to the
termination of the agreements in March 2015.

The recent deterioration in the credit quality of both the
commonwealth and PRASA is expected to lead to higher borrowing
costs for the authority at a minimum when PRASA seeks to take out
the LOCs, which may in turn reduce the authority's financial
results from current expectations.  There is also the possibility,
albeit considered relatively unlikely by Fitch, that (a) PRASA
would be unable to either access the capital markets to take out
the LOCs or (b) that PRASA's current LOC bank consortium would be
unwilling to extend the LOCs for a period of time until market
access became feasible, either of which situation would lead to an
event of default on the LOCs and consequently the senior lien
bonds; the LOCs are senior lien obligations that are on parity
with the bonds.  The higher capital cost structure and the
existence of market access risk are better reflected at the
current 'BB+' level considering PRASA's other credit factors.

RATE HIKE LEADS TO MODEST BUT SELF-SUFFICIENT OPERATIONS
Apart from recent market access and rising cost structure
concerns, the most pressing weakness for PRASA over the last few
years has been a significant budget gap that had developed and was
growing from lack of rate action.  The gap had required
commonwealth and GDB support as well as deficit financing.  For
fiscal 2013, a $145 million budget gap was met from 2012 bond
proceeds. But starting with fiscal 2014, projections pointed to
the budget gap widening to $342 million and escalating annually
thereafter.  PRASA had received both direct and indirect
commonwealth support in prior years to balance operations, but the
commonwealth determined not to provide an appropriation for PRASA
for fiscal 2014, requiring PRASA's governing board to begin the
process of revising its rate structure in accordance with the rate
covenant under the MAT securing the bonds.

The approved rate hike, which became effective at the beginning of
fiscal 2014, resulted in an average increase in user charges of
67%.  The adjustment as enacted was designed to provide self-
sufficient operations not only for fiscal 2014 but also for each
year through fiscal 2018.  The anticipated positive financial
performance helps to address the concern of self-sufficiency over
an extended period of time.  Also, there is some positive
consideration from the rate adjustment being implemented at once
as opposed to piecemeal over multiple years where future political
interference could have derailed one or more annual rate hikes.
On the negative side, residential charges which were already on
the high side (2.2% of MHI) have now jumped to around 3.3% of MHI
as a result of the rate increase.  The escalation in user charges
has correlated to a spike in bad debt expenses (to around 10% from
roughly 3% in fiscal 2013) and reduced user flows somewhat.
However, PRASA's budget estimates for bad debt and consumption are
in line with actual results.

Overall, the rate adjustment has improved PRASA's recurring
revenue base to the point that total debt service coverage (DSC)
for fiscal 2014 is expected at 1.12x without consideration of any
possible transfers to the rate stabilization fund (RSF); any
transfer to or from the RSF would result in an offsetting change
in pledged revenues in the year of the transfer.  Senior lien DSC
for fiscal 2014 is expected at 4.47x in accordance with the MAT's
calculation.  Using the more traditional net revenue method that
Fitch applies to all utility credits, senior lien DSC for the year
is expected at 1.51x.

Total DSC in almost all other years through the fiscal 2018
forecast is scheduled to be lower than fiscal 2014 results and be
near sum-sufficient operations without taking into consideration
any potential RSF transfers for the year.  Senior lien DSC will
also be lower but should remain favorable given around 30% of debt
service costs are related to liens subordinate in payment to
PRASA's senior lien bonds.  The slimmer out-year DSC margins are
the result of generally annual moderate increases to operating
expenses and costs related to additional planned borrowings.
Fitch believes PRASA's projections are reasonable and achievable
given revenue collections for the first one-half of fiscal 2014
have largely mirrored budget expectations (less than a 1%
difference overall) and PRASA has significant certainty with
regards to its two largest operating costs for much if not all of
the forecast period.  In essence, PRASA has labor agreements with
the majority of its workers that extend into fiscal 2016, with
contractual salary adjustments programmed into the cash flows.
Also, PRASA now receives a preferential power rate from Puerto
Rico Electric Power Authority and this rate will drop in fiscal
2017, generating savings for the authority which are required by
law to be used for the authority's capital needs.  Consequently,
PRASA's future borrowing demands will be reduced from prior
estimates, helping to alleviate pressure on PRASA's already weak
debt profile.

      ELEVATED DEBT BURDEN BUT FAVORABLE CAPITAL DEVELOPMENTS

Central to PRASA's challenges has been the scope of needed capital
investment to maintain regulatory compliance and renew system
assets given the limited historical investment in the system's
infrastructure and the resulting pressure this places on
operations.  The system traditionally has relied on borrowable
resources to meet its capital demands and this has resulted in an
elevated debt profile.  For fiscal 2013, the authority's debt per
customer of $2,555 was over 60% higher than Fitch's 'AAA'-'A'
category medians.  Similarly, PRASA debt to net plant for the same
period was 1.6x greater than the same rating group median.

For the five-year period covering fiscals 2014-2018, CIP costs
remain elevated at $1.4 billion, which will lead to an additional
weakening in PRASA's debt profile.  However, forecasted capital
expenditures are down around $100 million from last year's CIP.
More importantly, PRASA is in the final stages of renegotiating
its consent decree (CD) with regulators that should have a
significant positive effect on PRASA's ongoing operations and its
ability to plan and deploy capital assets.

Unlike other traditional CDs that detail specific projects and set
out strict milestones, PRASA's proposed CD will be groundbreaking
in that it will institute a cap on PRASA's required annual
spending based on the authority's overall financial capacity to
support the capital program.  This spending cap, while still a
significant amount, is expected at around $200 million to
$250 million annually or around a 10%-30% reduction in ongoing CIP
levels.

PRASA will work with regulators to identify and prioritize
projects that address system regulatory issues within the annual
spending cap.  On the negative side, this will mean that there
will be no definitive termination date of the proposed CD,
providing regulators the ability to add or delete projects from
the priority list indefinitely.  However, because the proposed CD
would be all-encompassing it would protect PRASA from infractions
associated with current and future regulations and would also
require that any projects to address future regulations would only
be funded if it was within PRASA's approved annual spending level.
PRASA expects the proposed CD to be filed with the court and
become final before the end of the year.


PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Fitch Lowers Rating on $8.7BB Bonds to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the rating on $8.7 billion of Puerto
Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) power revenue bonds to 'BB+'
from 'BBB-'.

The Rating Outlook is also revised to Negative from Stable.

                             SECURITY

The power revenue bonds are secured by a senior lien on net
revenues of the electric system.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

COMMONWEALTH DETERIORATION DRIVES DOWNGRADE: The rating downgrade
and Outlook revision reflect concerns prompted by Fitch's recent
downgrade of the debt ratings of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
(to 'BB' from 'BBB-' with a Negative Outlook) as a result of
continuing challenges related to a weak economy, increasingly
strained liquidity and deteriorating capital markets access.
While PREPA's debt is not supported by the commonwealth, Fitch
believes that these same challenges warrant a downgrade to below
investment grade.

WEAK FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: PREPA's financial performance has
significantly weakened in recent years and drove Fitch's two-notch
downgrade of the utility to 'BBB-' from 'BBB+' in July 2013.
PREPA remains challenged by slim margins, inadequate cash flow and
minimal debt service coverage due to the effects of the economic
recession, declining energy usage and growing account receivables.
Leverage is high and has steadily risen since 2009, but is
expected to stabilize through fiscal 2015.

STRAINED LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL MARKETS ACCESS: Fitch believes that
the most recent challenges faced by the commonwealth and PREPA
could strain the authority's liquidity, limit access to the
broader capital markets, raise borrowing costs and deter
improvement in outstanding government and municipal account
receivables, further pressuring PREPA's weak financial position.
Favorably, PREPA's anticipated capital needs are funded through
fiscal 2015.

RECEIVABLES REMAIN HIGH: Total receivables remain high at 28.8% of
fiscal 2013 revenues, an ongoing negative credit factor.  Despite
efforts by the commonwealth along with the Government Development
Bank of Puerto Rico (GDB) to reduce outstanding receivables in
recent years, government and municipal receivables rose 44% to
$618 million in fiscal 2013.  Private customer receivables also
rose in 2013.

BROAD BUT WEAK SERVICE AREA: PREPA's retail customer base is
diversified and not as dependent on tourism as other islands.
However, the commonwealth remains economically weak, with a
declining population base, limited wealth levels and high debt
burden.  Through the first six months of fiscal 2014, energy sales
continued to fall by 2%.

POWER SUPPLY DIVERSIFICATION: Management is focused on reducing
dependency on costly oil-fired generation, primarily via the
conversion of existing plants to dual fuel (oil and natural gas)
generation, which Fitch views favorably.  Oil generation
dependency has declined from close to 100% pre-2000 to roughly 61%
currently.  If remaining plant conversions are completed, annual
fuel costs could decline 40% ($1 billion) by 2018.  However, PREPA
will need to access the capital markets in fiscal 2016 to fully
execute this capital plan.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

INABILITY TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT LIQUIDITY: Negative rating action
would result from additional strain on PREPA's weak liquidity as
evidenced by insufficient cash reserves, a failure to extend or
replace existing bank lines, further growth in accounts receivable
or the inability to finance its proposed capital plan.

FURTHER COMMONWEALTH CREDIT DECLINE: Continued erosion in the
commonwealth's credit quality could heighten concerns regarding
PREPA's ongoing market access and long-term service territory
fundamentals that are beyond the current rating level.

IMPROVED FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND MARKET ACCESS: The current
rating takes into account PREPA's weak balance sheet and marginal
debt service coverage projected through fiscal 2015.  Successful
implementation of PREPA's plan to diversify fuel exposure,
improvement in operating margins and stable access to capital
would be required to stabilize the Outlook.

                          CREDIT SUMMARY

PREPA is one of the largest public power systems in the U.S. and
the sole provider of power to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, an
island of about 4 million people and about 1.49 million electric
customers.  The authority operates independent from the
commonwealth.

PREPA's concentration of power resources in oil generation exposes
the authority to volatile fuel costs and environmental mandates.
Fitch views the utility's efforts to diversify its energy mix
positively, as the continued reduction in oil generation
dependency should alleviate some of the pressure on future
financial margins as well as meet required U.S. EPA mandates.

              EFFECT OF COMMONWEALTH RATING DOWNGRADE

PREPA operates as a self-funded utility enterprise. As a result,
Fitch does not strictly link the two ratings.  However, PRPEA's
financial strength is affected by the economic and financial
viability of the commonwealth and its residents, as evidenced by
PREPA's growing account receivables and declining energy sales.
The authority has meaningful market access risk exposure stemming
from short-term lines of credit (LOCs) that come due over the
course of the year and will need to be refinanced with long-term
debt or renegotiated for an extended term.  The LOCs total
$900 million and are heavily utilized ($812 million at Dec. 31,
2013).  Longer-term debt issuance is not expected until after
fiscal 2015 but will be necessary to fund planned capital
investment and refinance maturing debt.

At a minimum, the recent deterioration in the credit quality of
both the commonwealth and PREPA are expected to lead to higher
borrowing costs when the authority seeks to renew its LOCs or
refinance maturities.  Although failure to address the expiring
LOCs would not lead to an event of default on the power revenue
bonds, according to PREPA, it would further evidence the
authority's strained financial profile.  The higher capital cost
structure and market access risk, however unlikely, are better
reflected at the 'BB+' rating level.

                    WEAKENED FINANCIAL PROFILE

Fitch downgraded PREPA on July 1, 2013 due to its weakened
financial performance resulting from the ongoing economic
recession (2008-2013) coupled with high fuel costs that
contributed to a significant decline in electricity sales and
reductions in PREPA's operating and cash flow margins.  Net
account receivables have returned to historically high levels,
after progress had been made in reducing municipal receivables in
fiscal 2009 and 2010.

Fitch-calculated debt service coverage for the past five years
(fiscal 2009-2013), which includes CILTs as an operating expense,
was close to 1.0x and declined to less than 1.0x in fiscal 2011
and 2013.  Additional borrowings were periodically necessary to
meet total obligations.  A reluctance to raise base rates also
persists, as base rates remain unchanged since 1989.

                   REASONABLE OPERATING STRATEGY

PREPA has previously developed a reasonable plan to restore
prospective financial margins in concert with the GDB and with the
support of legislative initiatives.  PREPA is implementing
measures to improve revenue collections and reduce operating costs
(non-fuel) that were designed to improve operating margins by
$120 million per year by 2014.  However, realizing the savings may
be more challenging given current strains.  Operating cost
reductions achieved through the first six months of 2014 were
largely offset by declining energy sales.

With PREPA's completed conversion of the Costa Sur generating
facility to dual-fuel (25% of energy mix) fuel costs are also
expected to decline in fiscal 2014, providing some rate relief due
to the lower fuel cost component.

         NO MEANINGFUL IMPROVEMENT EXPECTED THROUGH 2016

Based on PREPA's last financial forecast and capital strategy
reviewed by Fitch, debt service coverage, including CILTs as an
operating expenses, was forecast at about 1.0x through fiscal 2016
reflecting cost cutting initiatives, a somewhat aggressive
electric sales growth forecast (CAGR 0.9% per year 2014-2017), and
annual debt service payments that are scheduled to increase over
the same period.

Additionally, PREPA's equity-to-total capitalization ratio is not
likely to notably improve going forward (-9.8% as of fiscal year-
end 2013) given the authority's $1.5 billion five-year capital
expenditure program and plans for debt funding.



===============================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
===============================


RBC ROYAL BANK: No Plan to Shut Down Any Branches
-------------------------------------------------
Carla Bridglal at Trinidad Express reports that RBC Royal Bank
does not "at this time" intend to close any branches, the company
said in a full page ad published in the national press.

The ad, which features a joint statement by RBC Royal Bank's Chief
Executive Officer for Caribbean Banking Suresh Sookoo and Trinidad
and Tobago Managing Director Darryl White, said because of a tough
economic climate and challenging market conditions in many parts
of the Caribbean, the bank had been restructuring its business in
recent months to improve its performance, service and
competitiveness, according to Trinidad Express.

The report notes that the ad follows several media reports over
the past month that highlighted the bank's staff downsizing and
consolidation of certain divisions within others; its profit
performances; and rumors of potential branch closings and a buy-
out from global banking powerhouse HSBC.

"Restructuring always involves difficult decisions, particularly
when our employees are impacted, and we are not taking this action
lightly.  We are supporting our employees; we will provide career
and financial support for those unable to find other roles at
RBC," the bank said, the report notes.

The report relates that the bank said Trinidad is a high potential
market, and it is committed to building on the legacy of the RBTT
brand.

The Royal Bank of Canada, RBC Royal Bank or RBC Financial Group is
a financial institution in Canada.  It has operations in Trinidad
and Tobago.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


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