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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

             Friday, July 4, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 131


                            Headlines



B R A Z I L

BANCO SAFRA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Support Rating Floor
BES INVESTIMENTO: S&P Revises Outlook on 'BB-' Rating to Negative


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ARTIO GLOBAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 9
AYOM INVESTMENTS: Members to Receive Wind-Up Report on July 15
CALLIDUS DEBT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 31
DKR WOLF FUND: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 9
DKR WOLF HOLDING: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 9

ELUSTRIA CAPITAL: Shareholder to Receive Wind-Up Report on July 25
LABRADOR LIMITED: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
NAC CREDIT: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1
SEQ STONE: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 9
TDL FUNDING: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 21


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

BANCO MULTIPLE: Fitch Withdraws 'B' IDR; Outlook Stable
* DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Retailers Demand an End to 'Tax Distortions'


G U A T E M A L A

INGENIO MAGDALENA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Default Rating


J A M A I C A

CARIBBEAN CEMENT: Takes Larger Share of Local Cement Market
JAMAICA: Shaw Wants Details on How US$300MM Borrowed Will be Spent


M E X I C O

GRUPO ELEKTRA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Default Rating


N I C A R A G U A

* Moody's B3 Rating Balances Growth vs. Susceptibility to Shocks


P E R U

* PERU: IDB OKs $15-Mil. Loan for Better Tax, Customs Management


P U E R T O   R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Moody's Downgrades $14.4BB GO Bond Rating to 'B2'


                            - - - - -


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B R A Z I L
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BANCO SAFRA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Support Rating Floor
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Safra S.A.'s (Safra) Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BBB'.  Fitch also affirmed the National
Ratings of Safra Leasing S.A. - Arrendamento Mercantil (Safra
Leasing) at 'AAA(bra)'.  The Outlook for both ratings is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Safra's Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs are driven by
the bank's Viability Rating (VR), which reflects its solid
franchise and consistent performance through challenging economic
cycles.  The bank's conservative risk policies have proven Safra's
ability to manage risks and preserve strong asset quality ratios
while improving its liquidity and asset liability management.  The
ratings also reflect the preservation of its strong efficiency
ratios and controlled margins resulting in a profitability level
that adequately generates internal capital.

Safra's Support Rating of '4' and Support Rating Floor of 'B+'
factor in its size within the Brazilian banking system, which is
relatively concentrated in nature; Safra is the fifth largest
private sector bank in the system.

Safra's long-term senior unsecured debt ratings are driven by
Safra's IDR (given its unsecured nature) and rank equally to all
other senior unsecured debt.  Given that the majority of the notes
are issued in Brazilian Real (BRL) while the settlement will be in
U.S. Dollar (USD) a subscript 'emr' was added to the ratings of
these issuances to reflect the embedded market risk of the
exchange rate fluctuation between the BRL and the USD.

Safra's strong efficiency and relatively low cost funding have
aided the bank to consistently post satisfactory profitability
ratios, below the average of Brazilian large banks, but less
volatile with an average ROAA of 1.37% over the last three years.
The recent downward trend in interest rates combined with a shift
to a lower risk lending mix and higher, but controlled, credit
costs have recently eroded this ratio.  As of March 31, 2014 the
ROAA was 1.1%.  However, Fitch expects that Safra's ROAA will
remain above 1% in the medium term.  This ratio is likely to be
below the average of the larger Brazilian banks and other Latin
American bank peers rated at the same rating level.  In a lower
net interest rate environment, prudent loan growth and further
income diversification will be needed to enhance profitability
ratios and compensate for lower margins.

Safra posts above average asset quality ratios by focusing on a
market that it knows well in conjunction with a well-articulated
business plan that takes advantage of economic boom periods and
allows for recovery when the environment deteriorates.  Safra's
good credit quality is evidenced by its March 31, 2014, 90 day
past due loans to total loans ratio of 1.3%, one of the lowest in
the banking system despite the continued volatility in the
operating environment.  Safra's Loan Loss Reserve coverage of
loans past due over 90 days was a healthy 218%.  In addition, the
levels of charge-offs continue the trend of being low, partly due
to the strength of its collections unit and its enhanced
underwriting policies.

The bank continues to focus on ensuring a stable liquidity
position through conservative asset liability management policies
to mitigate gaps through hedging and funding diversification.
Strategies include the sourcing of longer term funding which
include the use of longer term instruments such as Letras
Financeiras which saw a significant growth during the past two
years ending with BRL13 billion at March 2014.  Fitch expects that
Safra will be able to maintain the improvements achieved in asset
and liability maturity management in the medium term, which will
help to mitigate the challenges of its mostly wholesale funding
business model.

Safra continues to maintain satisfactory capital ratios.  Fitch
Core Capital ratio (FCC) has been stable at around 10%.  Fitch
expects that it will remain around that level in the future.  At
March 31, 2014 the Fitch core ratio was 10.1%.  The bank nearly
met the Central Bank regulatory minimum total capital requirement
solely by means of its Tier I regulatory capital ratio of 10.3%.
Fitch does not expect Safra to have any difficulty adjusting the
upcoming implementation of Basel III according to the Brazilian
Central Bank's timetable.  Safra currently has a total Regulatory
ratio of 12.8%, which could be higher at 13.9% if it recognized
nearly BRL1.1 billion of tax credits.  Differing from local peers,
the bank maintains a highly conservative policy of non-recognition
of these tax credits.

Safra Leasing's National ratings are equalized to those of its
parent bank.  According to Fitch criteria, this subsidiary is
'Core' to Safra by the means of its significant participation as a
funding source of the consolidated activities.  The leasing
subsidiary is operationally aligned with the bank and shares in
the reputational risk.  Also, the ratings of its subordinated debt
incorporate the support to be provided by Safra and are notched
down once in view of the lower expected recovery of the securities
due its contractual subordination in case of a liquidation.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Further upgrades to Safra's ratings may be limited considering
that the company's current business model, despite increased
diversification, still primarily relies on a wholesale funding
structure and the maintenance of sufficient, albeit tight, capital
ratios.  If those structural characteristics are significantly
altered, a rating review may occur.  An unlikely deterioration of
Safra's FCC capital ratio to below 9% or an operating return on
assets ratio of below 1% for a sustained period of time, may also
trigger a rating review.  Also a change in the sovereign rating of
Brazil may also trigger a rating review.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco Safra:

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs at 'BBB'; Outlook
Stable;
   -- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs at 'F2';
   -- Viability rating at 'bbb';
   -- Support rating at '4';
   -- Support rating floor at 'B+';
   -- National Long-term rating at 'AAA(bra)'; Outlook Stable;
   -- National short-term rating at 'F1+(bra)';

Market Linked Securities due 2016:

   -- Long-term Foreign Currency at 'BBBemr'.

Market Linked Securities due 2017:

   -- Long-term Foreign Currency rating at 'BBBemr'.

Senior notes due 2017:

   -- Long-term Foreign Currency rating at 'BBB'.

Safra Leasing S.A. Arrendamento Mercantil:

   -- National long-term rating at 'AAA(bra)'; Outlook Stable;
   -- National short-term rating at 'F1+(bra)'.
12th, 13th, 14th and 15th Subordinated Debenture Issues:
   -- National long-term rating at 'AA+(bra)'.


BES INVESTIMENTO: S&P Revises Outlook on 'BB-' Rating to Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised the outlook on its
'BB-' global scale and 'brA' national scale ratings on BES
Investimento do Brasil (BESI Brasil) to negative from stable
following a similar action on its parent companies.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed all ratings on the bank.

The rating action followed S&P's July 1, 2014 outlook revision on
BESI Brasil's parents, Portugal-based Banco Espirito Santo S.A.
(BES) and Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento S.A. (BESI), to
negative from stable, and the affirmation of S&P's 'BB-/B'
counterparty credit ratings on them.  The outlook revision on BESI
Brasil's parents reflected S&P's view of the incremental pressures
we see on BES' business and financial positions.

"In our view, the recent and unexpected resignation of the BES
executive committee's chairman and several of its board members,
along with proposed management changes in the context of a
reported dispute among BES' ultimate controlling shareholders,
pose significant challenges to BES' management stability and
focus," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Sebastian Liutvinas.
These developments occurred since we last revised our outlook on
BES to stable from negative on May 21, 2014.  S&P also believes
that the disclosure of further accounting irregularities at
Espirito Santo International, over and above what S&P had
incorporated into its ratings at the time of its May 21 outlook
revision, compounds the challenges to BES' franchise and may
affect its financial strength.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ARTIO GLOBAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 9
--------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Artio Global Credit Opportunities Fund Ltd
will hold their final meeting on July 9, 2014, at 10:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Aberdeen Asset Management Inc.
          c/o Jennifer Shields
          1735 Market Street, 32nd Floor
          Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
          United States of America


AYOM INVESTMENTS: Members to Receive Wind-Up Report on July 15
--------------------------------------------------------------
The members of Ayom Investments Ltd will receive on July 15, 2014,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


CALLIDUS DEBT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 31
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Callidus Debt Partners CDO Fund I, Ltd will
hold their final meeting on July 31, 2014, to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Commerce Corporate Services Limited
          P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 949 8666
          Facsimile: 949 0626


DKR WOLF FUND: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 9
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of DKR Wolf Point Fund Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on July 9, 2014, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Daniel Woolston
          Telephone: (345) 814 7782
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands


DKR WOLF HOLDING: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 9
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of DKR Wolf Point Holding Fund Ltd. will hold
their final meeting on July 9, 2014, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Daniel Woolston
          Telephone: (345) 814 7782
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands


ELUSTRIA CAPITAL: Shareholder to Receive Wind-Up Report on July 25
------------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Elustria Capital Partners Offshore Fund Ltd.
will receive on July 25, 2014, at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
          190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-9005
          Cayman Islands
          c/o Kim Charaman/Jennifer Chailler
          Telephone: (345) 943-3100


LABRADOR LIMITED: Members Receive Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------
The members of Labrador Limited received on June 30, 2014, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          MBT Trustees Ltd.
          Telephone: 945-8859
          Facsimile: 949-9793/4
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands


NAC CREDIT: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1
-------------------------------------------------
The members of NAC Credit Value Fund will hold their final meeting
on Aug. 1, 2014, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


SEQ STONE: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 9
------------------------------------------------
The members of SEQ Stone SPV Ltd. will hold their final meeting on
July 9, 2014, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report on
the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stephen Duval
          c/o Maples and Calder, Attorneys-at-law
          P.O. Box 309, Ugland House
          Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


TDL FUNDING: Members' Final Meeting Set for July 21
---------------------------------------------------
The members of TDL Funding Company will hold their final meeting
on July 21, 2014, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Benjamin Booker
          69 Dr. Roy's Drive
          P.O. Box 1043, George Town Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


BANCO MULTIPLE: Fitch Withdraws 'B' IDR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Banco Multiple Leon's (BML) ratings as
the merger with Banco BHD has been completed as of July 1, 2014.
Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical
coverage for BML.

Fitch has withdrawn the following ratings for BML:

   -- Foreign and local currency long-term IDR 'B', Outlook
      Stable;
   -- Foreign and local currency short term IDR 'B';
   -- Viability Rating 'b-';
   -- Support Rating '4';
   -- Long-term National Rating 'AA-(dom)'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Short-term National Rating 'F1+(dom)';

The following rating will be moved and issued under the new merged
entity 'Banco Multiple BHD Leon S.A.', formerly known as 'Banco
BHD, S.A.':

   -- Long-term National subordinated debt 'A+(dom)'.


* DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Retailers Demand an End to 'Tax Distortions'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the country's retailers grouped in
the ONEC asked president Danilo Medina to eliminate the country's
tax distortions, which, among other things, provides tax breaks to
companies operating outside the territory, which in their view
nether create jobs nor contribute to the economy nor to
development.

"Our businesses, our employees, our suppliers struggle for their
survival, we're not competing on equal terms," said ONEC chairman
Ernesto Martinez in an open letter to Medina, signed by 21
business groups nationwide, according to Dominican Today.

The report notes that Mr. Martinez said urgent measures are needed
to correct at once the serious distortions contained in Decree
402-05, which provides generalized tax exemptions to companies
operating outside the country, and don't create any jobs or pay
taxes within the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Martinez, the report relates, added that more than 25 business
and associations that represent the country's productive sectors
requested equal tax status in November last year.


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G U A T E M A L A
=================


INGENIO MAGDALENA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Default Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and simultaneously withdrawn the
following ratings of Ingenio Magdalena S.A. (Imsa):

   -- Foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-';
   -- Local currency IDR at 'BB-'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

The reason for the withdrawal is that Imsa's ratings are no longer
considered by Fitch to be relevant to the agency's coverage.  The
company's intended debt issuance did not occur and it does not
plan to access the capital markets in the midterm.  In addition,
Imsa has no debt issuance in the markets.



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J A M A I C A
=============


CARIBBEAN CEMENT: Takes Larger Share of Local Cement Market
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jamaica Observer reports that cement manufacturer Caribbean Cement
Company Limited indicated that its share of the local marketplace
increased from roughly three-quarters to four-fifths.

The claim holds some merit as Carib entered into an agreement with
then competitor Arc Systems last year, according to the report.

"Carib Cement's market share improved to 86 per cent as a result
of one of the traditional importers foregoing importation to
purchase from Carib Cement," stated the audited annual report
released late June, the report notes.  The local cement
manufacturer previously stated that its market share hovered at 75
per cent, the report relates.

Carib added that its market share increased despite a single-digit
percentage reduction in the domestic market to roughly 690,000
tonnes, the report adds.

In April 2013, Jamaica Observer recalls, the company forged a
medium-term supply deal with the Norman Horne led Arc Systems to
solely sell Carib cement. The agreement reduced CCC's major
competitors from three to two -- Tank-Weld and Buying House.

Last year, the report notes, the company supplied 100,000 tonnes
of clinker to Venezuela under the Trade Compensation Mechanism of
the PetroCaribe Agreement.  The first shipment left the island in
December 2013 and CCC wants to extend that contract into 2014 with
plans to ship an additional 240,000 tonnes, the report adds.

It previously indicated that the Venezuela market offered vast
potential to grow its annual sales by 50 per cent, the report
notes.  Already, total sales rocketed to $12 billion for the
financial year ending December 2013 compared with $9 billion a
year earlier, relays Jamaica Observer.

The local cement manufacturer started negotiations to enter
Venezuela years ago but it was stalled due to the ill health and
eventual death of President Hugo Chavez, notes the report.

According to Jamaica Observer, last year Carib also restructured
US$75 million in debt owed to its parent Trinidad Cement Limited
by converting US$37 million into preference shares and converting
US$38 million as capital.

"As a result the balance sheet was considerably strengthened.
Group equity stood at $4.7 billion compared to a negative equity
position of $2.9 billion," said management in its analysis and
discussion accompanying the financials, the report relates.

The group made $35 million profit for its March quarter 2014
compared to a loss of $497 million in the same quarter a year
earlier due to debt restructuring, the report relates.  Carib
added that its export cement sales volumes grew 87 per cent based
on regional growth in Suriname and Guyana, the report adds.

Caribbean Cement Company Limited manufactures and sells cement.

                           *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Aug. 7, 2013, RJR News said that Caribbean Cement Company Limited
suffered a consolidated loss of J$137 million for the first six
months of 2013 down from J$1.2 billion during the corresponding
period last year, according to RJR News.  The report related that
the loss resulted from J$701 million of non-cash foreign exchange
losses compared to J$136 million in 2012.


JAMAICA: Shaw Wants Details on How US$300MM Borrowed Will be Spent
------------------------------------------------------------------
Jamaica Observer reports that opposition Spokesman on Finance and
Planning, Audley Shaw, called on Minister of Finance and Planning,
Dr Peter Phillips, to provide details to the country on how he
will spend an additional US$300 million borrowed Tuesday, July 1,
on the International Capital Market.

In acknowledging the successful placement, which was originally to
raise US$500 million, in line with the announced budgetary plans,
Shaw said that additional money should not be borrowed simply
because the issue was oversubscribed, according to Jamaica
Observer.

"These are not earnings but borrowings that add to our debt stock
and must be paid back," the report quoted Mr. Shaw as saying.

Mr. Shaw, the report notes, said that in 2011, when the then
Government borrowed US$400 million at less than 8 per cent
interest rate, the issue was oversubscribed with orders for US$1.2
billion.

"But we resisted the temptation to borrow more than was required
to close the financing gap," Mr. Shaw said, the report notes.

"The only way it makes sense to borrow these additional funds is
if is used to retire existing expensive debt instruments," Mr.
Shaw argued, the report discloses.

The report relates that the Opposition finance spokesman expressed
the hope that with the injection of foreign exchange into the
country, it will stem the rapid depreciation of the currency and
halt the negative trend that has now developed where interest
rates on business and personal loans are rising.

Mr. Shaw said that the Government should not "squander the
opportunity" offered by passing IMF tests and raising funds at
attractive interest rates, adds the report.

"The Government must now hasten to put in place aggressive growth
inducement policies that can quickly turn the country's attention
to investing, working and earning our way out of our difficulties
instead of borrowing more and more whether on the local or
international capital markets," Mr. Shaw said, the report notes.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


GRUPO ELEKTRA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Issuer Default Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the following ratings of Grupo Elektra,
S.A.B. de C.V. (Elektra):

   -- Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at
      'BB-';
   -- Long-term National Scale rating at 'A(mex)';
   -- Short-term National Scale rating at 'F2(mex)';
   -- USD550 million senior notes due 2018 at 'BB-';
   -- MXN6 billion long-term Certificados Bursatiles issuances
      (ELEKTRA13 & ELEKTRA14) due 2016 at 'A(mex)';
   -- Short-term portion of Certificados Bursatiles program for up
      to MXN10 billion at 'F2(mex)'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Elektra's ratings reflect its operation's geographical
diversification; its market position both in the retail and
finance business, the latter including Banco Azteca S.A. (BAZ;
rated 'A+(mex)' and 'F1(mex)' by Fitch); as well as the linkage
between both operations.  The ratings also incorporate the cash
flow generation coming from its payday lending subsidiary, Advance
America (AEA) and take into account the company's extensive retail
network in Mexico and Latin America, as well as decreases in
revenues at the Mexican retail division that have been offset by
additional cash flow generation by AEA.

Grupo Elektra's retail operations are linked to those of BAZ due
to its business strategy of selling on credit (approximately 61%
of sales).  BAZ's National Scale rating is supported by its
management expertise in consumer credit, asset quality, strong
liquidity and the credit risk of its portfolio.  Continued growth,
strength and diversification at BAZ should continue to underpin
Elektra's ratings.  The ratings also consider the controlling
ownership by the Salinas family.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Retail Sales Stabilizing

Revenue decline in the Mexican retail business during the last few
quarters seems to be stabilizing.  For the last 12 months (LTM)
ended March 31, 2014, retail sales were MXN20.3 billion pesos,
similar to the two previous quarters, but below historical levels.
Despite drops in most categories' retail sales, increased revenues
from money transfer fees and newly acquired Blockbuster Mexico has
helped in stabilizing revenues.  Fitch believes that the retail
operation, by diversifying geographically across Latin America,
somewhat mitigates revenue concentration (operations in Mexico,
both retail and financial, generate about 75% of the Group's
consolidated revenues).

Elektra's second-quarter 2012 acquisition of AEA, a payday lender
provider with operations mainly in the United States, has also
mitigated to some extent lower results from the retail business.
Fitch views AEA's business risk profile to be higher than
Elektra's, but this is balanced by BAZ's rating of 'A+(mex)',
above Elektra's National Scale rating.  Fitch estimates that, as
of March 31, 2014, on an LTM basis, AEA generated approximately
MXN1.5 billion of EBITDA.

BAZ Supports Elektra's Ratings

BAZ's ratings consider the bank's robust franchise in its main
market, consumer loans, giving it a considerable competitive
advantage, as well as its high and stable interest margins.
Furthermore, they incorporate the bank's adequate ability to
absorb losses, its solid funding structured through an ample,
stable, diversified and low-cost base of core customer deposits.
Its adequate capitalization ratios despite the strong growth of
its loan portfolio in recent years also support the ratings.

Nonetheless, Fitch considers that BAZ has shown deterioration in
its asset quality metrics, particularly in non-performing loans,
which have reached post-2009-crisis levels.  Similarly, BAZ shows
lower profitability levels as of year-end 2013 and March 31, 2014,
due mainly to higher than expected impairment charges.

Leverage Expected to Decline Gradually

The retail operation's gross leverage (excluding BAZ and other
Latin American financial businesses) is expected to decline
gradually as a consequence of improved results from both retail
and AEA and expectation of stable debt levels.  Fitch estimates
that total adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR and net adjusted debt-to-
EBITDAR (March 31, 2014 on an LTM basis) are about 4.3x and 4.0x,
respectively, relatively unchanged from 4.3x and 3.8x a year
before. Also for March 31, 2014 LTM, total debt-to-EBITDA was
3.1x, and incorporated into the ratings is that it will gradually
reach below 2.5x.

As of March 2014, the retail business' total debt (excluding BAZ
and other financial businesses) was MXN18.1 billion, down from
MXN19.8 million in the same period the previous year.  Debt is
composed of bank loans, local and international debt issuances and
local structured issuances and is expected to remain at broadly
the same level at year-end 2014.  Furthermore, Fitch estimates
off-balance-sheet debt related to operating leases at about
MXN18.7 billion.  In 2013, Elektra paid annual dividends of MXN522
million and also brought forward MXN546 million in dividends
originally intended for 2014.  In 2015, Fitch expects dividends of
about MXN570 million.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that may, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating actions include a sustained decrease in adjusted leverage
and adjusted net leverage to levels of about 3.5x and 3.0x over
time, respectively, due either to an increase in retail sales and
EBITDA or through debt reduction.  Other factors would be a
strengthening of the bank's creditworthiness coupled with
stabilization and recovery of the retail operations' revenue and
cash flow dynamics.

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating actions include the prospect of further
deterioration in leverage from current levels, a breach of
covenants, an accelerated increase in debt, without a
corresponding increase in EBITDA at the retail division or at AEA,
as well as a deterioration in Banco Azteca's creditworthiness.

Fitch currently rates these entities as follows:

Banco Azteca de Guatemala, S.A.

   -- National long-term rating 'BBB+(gtm)';
   -- National short-term rating 'F2(gtm)'.

Banco Azteca (Panama), S.A.

   -- National long-term rating 'BBB(pan)';
   -- National short-term rating 'F3(pan)'.

Punto Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V.

   -- National long-term rating 'A-(mex)';
   -- National short-term rating 'F2(mex)'.

Intra Mexicana, a subsidiary of Grupo Elektra

   -- MXN2.5 billion Certificados Bursatiles Fiduciarios issuance
(DINEXCB-12) 'AA-(mex)vra'.



=================
N I C A R A G U A
=================


* Moody's B3 Rating Balances Growth vs. Susceptibility to Shocks
----------------------------------------------------------------
The government of Nicaragua's B3 rating with stable outlook
reflects economic growth that is among the highest in Central
America, a constructive relationship between the government and
business, as well as the country's susceptibility to external
shocks, brought on by its dependence on Venezuela through its
Petrocaribe agreement, says Moody's Investors in its annual credit
analysis on the country.

Nicaragua's current account deficit is structurally large at
around 12% of GDP and is due mainly to oil imports, 90% of which
come from Venezuela. Under a Petrocaribe agreement, Nicaragua pays
100% of the oil imports at full market price but receives half the
amount back in the form of concessional loans.

The concessional loans are off-budget and help fund social
spending and infrastructure investments. Should Venezuela reduce
its support, Nicaragua's balance of payments would come under
pressure and the government would have to accrue more external
debt from alternate sources at less favorable terms or adjust
public finances, says Moody's.

Moody's notes that Nicaragua is becoming less dependent on oil and
foreign direct investment has increased significantly, which would
mitigate the impact should Venezuela reduce its Petrocaribe
program.

Helping Nicaragua's credit quality is the growth of its economy,
which has averaged 3.2% over the past five years, although
Nicaragua remains one of the poorest and smallest countries that
Moody's rates. Also supporting credit quality is the country's
close and ongoing relationship with the International Monetary
Fund.

An important credit positive is the strategic partnership the
government has developed with the private sector. Coordination
with the private sector has helped the government to pass two
fiscal reforms and attract foreign investment.

Moody's views are contained in its credit analysis "Nicaragua ",
which looks at the country's credit profile in terms of Economic
Strength (assessed as "low +"); Institutional Strength ("low -");
Fiscal Strength ("high -"); and Susceptibility to Event Risk
("high").

These represent the four main analytic factors in Moody's
Sovereign Bond Rating Methodology. The analysis constitutes an
annual update to investors and is not a rating action.


=======
P E R U
=======


* PERU: IDB OKs $15-Mil. Loan for Better Tax, Customs Management
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has approved a $15
million loan to Peru in an effort to improve its tax and customs
management, both at the national and municipal level, with the
goal of increasing structural government revenue as a percentage
of GDP.

At the national level, Peru will improve the effectiveness of the
tax and customs oversight carried out by the National Directorate
of Customs and Tax Administration (SUNAT in Spanish) by
implementing systems aimed at improving taxpayer compliance and
will develop a Coordinated Border Management (GCF in Spanish)
program.  This is a groundbreaking initiative for the region,
which seeks tighter customs controls and more streamlined trade
and circulation of travelers using modernized computer systems to
conduct these tasks.

Also, the project will improve management of the public revenue
policy carried out by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF in
Spanish), with an emphasis on collecting taxes at the municipal
level.  In particular, a New System of Municipal Tax Collection
(NSRTM) will be developed and designed to improve the tax
administration policy carried out by municipalities.  The same new
instrument will be used in a sample of urban municipalities.  The
new tool will boost municipal tax revenues, in particular from
property taxes, which in 2012, as a proportion of GDP, accounted
for just half of the average for other countries in Latin America
and the Caribbean.

The IDB has a long track record of supporting tax and customs
policy and administration, both in Peru and other countries of the
region, favoring the exchange of good practices on issues similar
to those which will be financed by this operation.

The estimated cost is $73 million, of which $15 million will come
from the IDB's ordinary capital and $58 million will be
contributed locally.

The loan is over 8 1/2 years with a grace period of 6 1/2 years,
and an interest rate based on LIBOR.


=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================


PUERTO RICO: Moody's Downgrades $14.4BB GO Bond Rating to 'B2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico to B2 from Ba2, affecting $14.4 billion of outstanding
general obligation (GO) bonds. Concurrently, commonwealth agencies
and public corporations have been downgraded, affecting about $46
billion of non-GO bonds, including $15.6 billion of senior- and
subordinate-lien bonds issued by the Sales-Tax Financing
Corporation (COFINA), which respectively were lowered to Ba3 and
B1. The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) was
downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3, while the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and
Sewer Authority (PRASA) was downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3. The
Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority (PRHTA) was
downgraded to Caa1 (senior 1998 resolution and 1968 resolution)
from Ba3, and to Caa2 from B1 (subordinate 1998 resolution). For
PREPA, PRHTA and PRASA, the newly lowered ratings remain under
review for possible further downgrade. The debt of the Government
Development Bank (GDB) was downgraded to B3 from Ba2, and the debt
of the University of Puerto Rico was downgraded to Caa1 and Caa2.
The outlook for the GDB as well as for commonwealth GO and related
debt remains negative. All the rating and outlook changes
incorporated in this action are listed at the end of this release.

Summary Rating Rationale

The downgrades of Puerto Rico and its debt-issuing entities follow
the commonwealth's enactment of a law (the Puerto Rico Public
Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act) that will allow
public corporations to defer or reduce payments on outstanding
bonds. By providing for defaults by certain issuers that the
central government has long supported, Puerto Rico's new law marks
the end of the commonwealth's long history of taking actions
needed to support its debt. It signals a depleted capacity for
revenue increases and austerity measures, and a new preference for
shifting fiscal pressures to creditors, which, in our view, has
implications for all of Puerto Rico's debt, including that of the
central government. Application of the law may further limit the
commonwealth's market access, leaving it more vulnerable to
financial risk and unable to fund capital projects.

The COFINA ratings have now been positioned closer to the GO,
reflecting their increased susceptibility to any action that
impairs bondholders' claims on sales tax revenues if the
commonwealth invokes its police powers and acts to protect the
health and safety of the general public ahead of bondholders. The
new GO and COFINA bond ratings face heightened risk of default,
given the commonwealth's stagnant economic conditions and
disproportionately large debt burden.

Ratings now assigned to PREPA, PRASA and PRHTA and the Puerto Rico
Convention Center District Authority are under review for further
downgrade, reflect the escalating risk that these entities could
default voluntarily under the new restructuring law. We have also
lowered ratings on certain bonds previously considered as
equivalent to the general obligation rating, or "capped" at the GO
rating, because of their increased risk of default and potentially
lower recovery rates than the GO. The ratings on Puerto Rico's
pension funding bonds, as well as debt issued by the GDB and the
Municipal Finance Agency, and the Puerto Rico Infrastructure
Financing Authority (PRIFA, bonds secured by rum tax remittances
from the federal government) were downgraded to B3 from Ba2 and
are now rated one notch below the GO bonds due to our view that
the expected loss rates on these securities are now higher. GDB
has direct exposure to the risks implicit in the restructuring
law, given its substantial loans to PRHTA and other public
corporations.

Summary Of Debt Affected By Legislation

Downgraded to Ba3 from Baa1; outlook negative

--COFINA Senior

-- Industrial Development (PRIDCO)

Downgraded to B1 from Baa2; outlook negative

--COFINA Subordinate

Downgraded to B2 from Ba2; outlook negative

--General Obligation

Downgraded to B3 from Ba2; outlook negative

--GDB notes

--Infrastructure Financing Authority (PRIFA)

--Municipal Finance Agency

--Pension funding bonds

Downgraded to B3 from Ba3; outlook negative

--Appropriation debt of commonwealth

Downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3; ratings under review

-- Aqueduct & Sewer Authority(PRASA)

-- Highway & Transportation (PRHTA)

Downgraded to Caa1 from Ba2; outlook under review

Convention Ctr (Hotel Occupancy Tax)

Downgraded to Caa2 from Ba3; ratings under review

-- Electric Power Authority (PREPA)

Downgraded to Caa2 from B1; ratings under review

-- PRHTA Subordinate-lien

Downgraded to Caa1 from Ba3; outlook negative

--University of Puerto Rico (System)

Downgraded to Caa2 from B1; outlook negative

--University of Puerto Rico (Facilities)

Rating Methodologies

The principal methodology used in rating the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico Municipal Finance Agency, Puerto Rico
Public Buildings Authority, Puerto Rico Highway & Transportation
Authority, Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, Puerto Rico
Infrastructure Financing Authority, Government Development Bank
for Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico Public Finance Corporation, Puerto
Rico Convention Center District Authority and Puerto Rico
Employees Retirement System debt was US States Rating Methodology
published in April 2013.

The additional methodology used in rating the Puerto Rico Highway
& Transportation Authority debt, the Puerto Rico Infrastructure
Financing Authority debt, and the Puerto Rico Convention Center
District Authority debt was US Public Finance Special Tax
Methodology published in January 2014.

The additional methodology used in rating the Puerto Rico Aqueduct
and Sewer Authority debt was Analytical Framework For Water And
Sewer System Ratings published in August 1999.

The additional methodology used in rating the Government
Development Bank for Puerto Rico debt was Rating Transactions
Based on the Credit Substitution Approach: Letter of Credit
backed, Insured and Guaranteed Debts published in March 2013.

The additional methodology used in rating the appropriation debt
was The Fundamentals of Credit Analysis for Lease-Backed Municipal
Obligations published in December 2011.

The principal methodology used in rating the Puerto Rico Sales Tax
Financing Corporation debt and the Puerto Rico Industrial
Development Company debt was US Public Finance Special Tax
Methodology published in January 2014. An additional methodology
used in this rating was US States Rating Methodology published in
April 2013.

The principal methodology used in rating the Puerto Rico Electric
Power Authority debt was U.S. Public Power Electric Utilities with
Generation Ownership Exposure published in November 2011.

The principal methodology used in rating the University of Puerto
Rico debt was U.S. Not-for-Profit Private and Public Higher
Education published in August 2011. The additional methodology
used in rating the lease debt was The Fundamentals of Credit
Analysis for Lease-Backed Municipal Obligations published in
December 2011.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
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or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
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issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
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                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

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