TCRLA_Public/140716.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Wednesday, July 16, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 139


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Refusing Talks With Elliott as Default Looms


B R A Z I L

BES INVESTIMENTO: Moody's Lowers Sr. Debt & Deposit Ratings to B1
BES INVESTIMENTO: Moody's Lowers Senior Unsec. Debt Rating to B1
COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Default Ratings
OSX BRASIL: Suspends Dutch Unit's Creditor Payments


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

CHINA YYAH: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 22
HV DIVERSIFIED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1
MA LYNX: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1
MA MARBLE BAR II: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1
MA ROTELLA: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1

MARBLE BAR II FEEDER: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1
MSL CHARTER: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 22
RHYNO CBO 1997-1: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1
SH JASMINE I: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 22
WESTPORT GLOBAL: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on July 24


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

* DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Says Haiti Must Lift Ban on Products Now


J A M A I C A

* JAMAICA: Hurricane Sandy Disrupts Growth Projections


P E R U

BANCO DE LA NACION: Fitch Ups Viability Rating From 'bb+'
BANCO INTERAMERICANO: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Support Rating Floor
CORPORACION AZUCARERA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Issuer Default Ratings
CORPORACION LINDLEY: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR; Outlook Stable


P U E R T O   R I C O

OFG BANCORP: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
PUERTO RICO AQUEDUCT: S&P Lowers Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB'
PUERTO RICO: Makes Bond Payments, But Muni Market Remains on Edge


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

* TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: IMF Concludes 2014 Article IV Consultation


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Refusing Talks With Elliott as Default Looms
-------------------------------------------------------
Katia Porzecanski and Jenna M. Dagenhart at Bloomberg News report
that less than three weeks before Argentina risks a default,
government officials still haven't met with hedge funds who won a
court ruling forbidding the country to make bond interest payments
before they get $1.5 billion.

"We have not seen any indication that Argentina is serious about
even beginning a negotiation," NML Capital, one of the holders of
bonds from Argentina's 2001 default that sued for full repayment,
said in a statement July 11, according to Bloomberg News.

While representatives of NML and Argentine met separately last
week with a court-appointed mediator in Manhattan, no direct
discussions have taken place almost a month after the U.S. Supreme
Court declined to hear Argentina's appeal in the case, Bloomberg
News relates.  The South American country has until July 30 to
make a payment on its performing bonds, which it can't do before
settling with NML, or default for the second time in 13 years,
Bloomberg News discloses.

While an eventual deal with the so-called holdout creditors is
likely, "it is hard to imagine this will happen soon," Federico
Thomsen, principal at Buenos Aires-based research company E.F.
Thomsen, said in an e-mailed response to questions by Bloomberg.
"Over the coming weeks, we will probably see markets fluctuate
between bouts of optimism and occasional scares as frictions and
obstacles become visible," Bloomberg News quoted Mr. Thomsen as
saying.

Argentina saw its dollar bonds due 2033 rally last week.  Prices
touched the highest in three years on speculation the nation are
making progress on reaching a deal to resolve the case, Bloomberg
News notes.  NML has said that it would be willing to accept a
combination of cash and new bonds to settle the dispute, Bloomberg
News relays.

                          Midtown Meeting

Jay Newman and Lee Grinberg, money managers at Elliott Management
Corp., the parent company of NML, were seen leaving mediator
Daniel Pollack's offices in midtown Manhattan on July 11 shortly
after Argentine officials, Bloomberg News notes.  While both sides
presented arguments to Mr. Pollack, they didn't do so in each
other's presence, Bloomberg News notes.

"No resolution has been reached," Bloomberg News quoted Mr.
Pollack as saying.  "It is my hope that there will be future
dialogue," Mr. Pollack said.

Mr. Pollack said that the legal battle stems from Argentina's
record $95 billion default in 2001, Bloomberg News relates.  The
nation restructured about 92 percent of the debt in 2005 and 2010
by imposing discounts of about 70 percent, Bloomberg News relays.
Creditors including Elliott shunned the debt swaps to seek better
terms through litigation.

                           No Default

The U.S. Supreme Court on June 16 left intact the decision that
bars Argentina from paying restructured debt unless holders of
defaulted bonds are paid in full, Bloomberg News discloses.  A
U.S. judge blocked a $539 million interest payment on June 27.

The country's negotiations with bondholders will succeed, Mario
Blejer, vice president of Banco Hipotecario and a former president
of the Argentine central bank, said in an interview with Bloomberg
TV.  Mr. Beljer said he was "absolutely certain" there will be no
technical default.

Argentine officials told the mediator that a delay on the orders
is necessary for talks, Bloomberg News relays.  A settlement risks
triggering as much as $15 billion in additional claims from other
bondholders, Economy Minister Axel Kicillof has said, Bloomberg
News notes.

"Argentina is open to continuing a dialogue that allows it to
reach a solution in fair, equal, and legal conditions for 100
percent of bondholders," the Economy Ministry said in a statement
released after the talks, Bloomberg News adds.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BES INVESTIMENTO: Moody's Lowers Sr. Debt & Deposit Ratings to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded BES Investimento do Brasil
S.A. 's ("BESI") ratings, including the bank financial strength
rating (BFSR) to E+ from D-, which now maps to a baseline credit
assessment of b1 from ba3; the long-term global local and foreign
currency deposit ratings to B1 from Ba3; and the long- and short-
term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to Baa2.br from
A2.br, and to BR-3 from BR-2, respectively. In addition, Moody's
affirmed the short-term global local and foreign currency deposit
ratings of Not Prime. Moody's has also placed all ratings on
review for further downgrade, with the exception of the Not Prime
short-term debt and deposit ratings.

The following ratings assigned to BES Investimento do Brasil S.A.
were downgraded, and placed on review for downgrade:

Bank financial strength rating to E+, from D-

Long-term global local-currency deposit rating to B1, from Ba3

Long-term foreign currency deposit rating to B1, from Ba3

Long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating to B1,
from Ba3

Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to Baa2.br, from
A2.br

Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to BR-3 from
BR-2

The following ratings were affirmed:

Short-term global local-currency deposit rating of Not Prime

Short-term foreign currency deposit rating of Not Prime

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of BESI's standalone financial strength rating to E+
from D-, and the lowering of its baseline credit assessment to b1
from ba3, reflect the ratings downgrade of its parent bank, Banco
Espirito Santo (BES), on concerns regarding BES's
creditworthiness. Please refer to "Moody's downgrades Banco
Espirito Santo's debt ratings to B3, deposit ratings to B2;
ratings remain on review for downgrade" published July 11th, 2014.

The rating action incorporates the uncertainty around the parent
bank's financial strength that could negatively affect BESI's
liquidity position and access to funding. Further, BESI's
profitability could also suffer were its cost of funding to rise
or its core investment banking deal flow be affected by recent
developments at the parent.

Moody's observes that BESI has maintained a meaningful liquidity
cushion over the course of this year, which has been enhanced by
the issuance of BRL 200 million in domestic debt (Letras
Financeiras) in mid-June 2014. The buildup of the bank's liquidity
cushion also targets the repayment of BESI's outstanding $500
million cross border bond, which matures in 1Q15.

BESI's standalone credit assessment, which is now multiple notches
higher than its parent's, also incorporates the subsidiary's
access to funding and liquidity independently from the parent, as
well as earnings generation capacity, which derives from the
subsidiary's own domestic franchise. Furthermore, local
regulations preclude BESI from engaging in related-party
activities, and therefore, limit direct interconnection with its
parent's risk.

The review for downgrade of BESI's ratings will focus on the
potential effects that the uncertainty around its parent
creditworthiness could have on BESI Brazil's ability to access
funding, and therefore, to sustain an adequate liquidity profile.
Also, the review will monitor any increased pressure on
profitability, particularly through higher cost of funds.

The B1 global local currency deposit rating derives from BESI's
standalone baseline credit assessment of b1, and does not benefit
from any parental nor systemic support uplift.

The last rating action on BESI was on 28 April 2014, when Moody's
affirmed all ratings assigned to BES Investimento do Brasil S.A.
("BESI"), including the D- financial strength rating (BFSR), which
maps to a ba3 baseline credit assessment in the global rating
scale; the Ba3 and Not Prime long- and short-term global local and
foreign currency deposit ratings; and the A2.br and BR-2 long- and
short-term national scale deposit ratings on the Brazilian
national scale. The outlook on all ratings was changed to stable
from negative.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".mx" for Mexico. For further information
on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings, please refer
to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in June 2014
entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale Ratings to Global Scale
Ratings".

BES Investimento do Brasil S.A. is headquartered in Sao Paulo,
Brazil and reported total assets of BRL8.1 billion ($3.5 billion)
and equity of BRL665.7 million ($284.2 million) as of 31 December
2013.


BES INVESTIMENTO: Moody's Lowers Senior Unsec. Debt Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. has downgraded BES Investimento do
Brasil S.A.'s (BESI) senior unsecured local currency debt rating
to B1 from Ba3, and the National Scale debt rating to Baa2.br from
A2.br. At the same time, Moody's has also placed the debt ratings
on review for downgrade.

The following ratings assigned to BES Investimento do Brasil S.A.
were downgraded, and placed on review for downgrade:

Long-term local currency senior unsecured debt rating to B1, from
Ba3

Long-term national scale debt rating to Baa2.br, from A2.br

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of BESI's senior unsecured local currency debt
rating to B1 from Ba3 derives from the downgrade of BESI's
standalone financial strength rating to E+ from D-, and the
lowering of its baseline credit assessment to b1 from ba3, which,
in turn, reflect the ratings downgrade of its parent bank, Banco
Espirito Santo (BES), on concerns regarding BES's
creditworthiness. Please refer to "Moody's downgrades Banco
Espirito Santo's debt ratings to B3, deposit ratings to B2;
ratings remain on review for downgrade" published by Moody's
Investors Service on July 11th, 2014.

The rating action incorporates the uncertainty around the parent
bank's financial strength that could negatively affect BESI's
liquidity position and access to funding. Further, BESI's
profitability could also suffer were its cost of funding to rise
or its core investment banking deal flow be affected by recent
developments at the parent.

Moody's observes that BESI has maintained a meaningful liquidity
cushion over the course of this year, which has been enhanced by
the issuance of BRL 200 million in domestic debt (Letras
Financeiras) in mid-June 2014. The buildup of the bank's liquidity
cushion also targets the repayment of BESI's outstanding $500
million cross border bond, which matures in 1Q15.

BESI's standalone credit assessment, which is now multiple notches
higher than its parent's, also incorporates the subsidiary's
access to funding and liquidity independently from the parent, as
well as earnings generation capacity, which derives from the
subsidiary's own domestic franchise. Furthermore, local
regulations precludes BESI from engaging in related-party
activities, and therefore limits the direct interconnection with
its parent risk.

The review for downgrade of BESI's ratings will focus on the
potential effects that the uncertainty around its parent
creditworthiness could have on BESI Brazil's ability to access
funding, and therefore, to sustain an adequate liquidity profile.
Also, the review will monitor any increased pressure on
profitability, particularly through higher cost of funds.

The last rating action on BESI was on 29 April 2014, when Moody's
assigned a Ba3 senior unsecured debt rating and A2.br National
Scale debt rating to BES Investimento do Brasil S.A.'s (BESI)
proposed senior unsecured debt under the program of "Letras
Financeiras".

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".mx" for Mexico. For further information
on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings, please refer
to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in June 2014
entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale Ratings to Global Scale
Ratings".

BES Investimento do Brasil S.A. is headquartered in Sao Paulo,
Brazil and reported total assets of BRL8.1 billion ($3.5 billion)
and equity of BRL665.7 million ($284.2 million) as of 31 December
2013.


COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Default Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term foreign and Local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of Companhia Siderurgica
Nacional (CSN) at 'BB+' and national scale rating at 'AA(bra)'.
The Rating Outlook remains Negative.

Key Rating Drivers

Strong Business Position

CSN is one of two of the largest flat steel producers in Brazil,
with a solid domestic position. Its market share in products such
as tinplate and galvanized steel in Brazil is 87% and 37%. CSN's
Brazilian market position resulted in a 20% EBITDA margin from its
steel division, which compares well with most of its global peers.
The company's solid position within the Brazilian steel industry
is complemented by its seaborne iron business. CSN exported 21.5
million tons of iron ore (which includes 60% of Namisa) during
2013, nearly 80% of which went to Asia. The company continues to
seek to expand its iron or export business. CSN is targeting
growth in exports that if successful would lead to a significant
increase in exports by 2017. Fitch's base case anticipates exports
of approximately 40 million tons during 2017. If CSN's is
successful in enhancing its iron ore output, the company's
profitability will improve dramatically. Iron ore accounted for
about 49% of the company's BRL5.4 billion of EBITDA during 2013.

Growing Leverage Projected

CSN's net debt/EBITDA ratio rebounded to 3.1x for the LTM ended
March 31, 2014 from 3.8x in 2012. The company benefited from
import restrictions on steel in Brazil, as well as a slight
improvement in iron ore prices and a growth in volumes. Combined,
these factors led to an improvement in the company's EBITDA to
BRL5.4 billion from BRL4.5 billion. Fitch projects CSN's net
leverage will stay relatively flat during 2014 as higher volumes
are being offset by declining iron ore prices. The company is
expected to end 2014 with an FFO adjusted net leverage ratio of
approximately 3.8x and a FFO fixed-charge coverage ratio of
approximately 2.5x. During 2015 and 2016, the company's net
debt/EBITDA ratio should climb to around 3.5x from 3.1x, while its
FFO adjusted net leverage ratio should slightly exceed 4.0x. The
growth in these ratios is due to Fitch's projection of a decline
in iron ore prices to $90 per ton in 2015 and 2016 in its models,
as well as heavy capex by CSN on the growth of its iron ore mines.

Solid Liquidity Position despite Negative Free Cash Flow

CSN has low refinancing risk. As of March 31, 2014 CSN held over
BRL10 billion in cash and marketable securities. During the next
12 months CSN faces BRL3.4 billion of debt amortizations. CSN has
generated consistent negative free cash flow over the years due to
heavy investments into its Iron Ore and Steel divisions and high
dividend payments. The company generated negative free cash flow
of BRL1.1 billion for LTM March 31, 2014 and BRL1.9 billion for
2013. Fitch's base case indicates negative FCF generation of more
than BRL 1 billion in both 2014 and 2015 as CSN continues to
invest in its iron ore operations.

Strong Pricing to Continue in 2014

The flood of steel imports into Brazil declined during 2013 with
volumes of 1.9 million metric tons indicating a 43% reduction from
3.4 million metric tons of steel that were imported during 2012.
Historically, the normalized level has been 2 million tons, while
the peak volume for imported steel was 5.6 million metric tons in
2010. The large reduction in 2013 was aided by the continued
devaluation of the Brazilian Real and steel tariffs of 12% imposed
by the government, that at one point last year was doubled to 24%
temporarily on specific steel products. In 2014, the tariffs are
expected to remain in place. Fitch projects this will foster a
modest growth in EBITDA to around BRL5.6 billion. A key component
of Fitch's forecast is the conservative assumption that iron ore
prices will average $100 per ton in 2014.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch could downgrade CSN's ratings if its credit metrics and cash
flow generation soften and the company continues to develop its
projects at a pace that will result in its net adjusted
debt/EBITDA climbing to higher than 3.5x and/or its FFO adjusted
net leverage ratio exceeding 4.0x during 2014 and 2015, two years
in which capex should exceed BRL2.0 billion per year. A downgrade
could also follow deterioration in the company's comfortable
liquidity position.

A ratings upgrade is unlikely in 2014 or 2015. A change in the
Rating Outlook to Stable could occur if the company brings on iron
ore capacity as scheduled and within budget. An upgrade in the
longer term would be contingent upon a reduction in the company's
net adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio to around 2.0x when iron ore prices
are in the range of $90 per ton. An increase in the company's iron
ore exports to more than 50 million tons would also be viewed
positively.

Fitch affirms CSN's and its subsidiaries ratings as follows:

-- CSN Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB+;
-- CSN Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB+';
-- CSN National Long-Term rating at 'AA(bra)';
-- CSN Islands IX senior unsecured Long-Term rating 'BB+';
-- CSN Islands XI senior unsecured Long-Term rating 'BB+';
-- CSN Islands XII senior unsecured Long-Term rating 'BB+;
-- CSN Resources S.A. Senior unsecured USD Note Long-Term rating
'BB+'.

In addition, Fitch has also affirmed and withdrawn the following
ratings:

-- CSN Islands VIII Long-Term IDR 'BB+;
-- CSN Islands IX Long-Term IDR 'BB+';
-- CSN Islands XI Long-Term IDR 'BB+';
-- CSN Islands XII Long-Term IDR 'BB+';
-- CSN Resources S.A. Long-Term IDDR 'BB+'


OSX BRASIL: Suspends Dutch Unit's Creditor Payments
---------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that a Netherlands-based subsidiary of Brazilian
tycoon Eike Batista's bankrupt shipbuilding and ship leasing unit
OSX Brasil SA suspended payments to creditors after being granted
protection by a Dutch court.

According to a securities filing, OSX Brasil sought protection for
its OSX WHP 1&2 Leasing BV unit after an unnamed "alleged
creditor" asked a court to order payment in a way that threatened
OSX's obligations to other creditors, Reuters relates.

OSX WHP was created to finance the building of two fixed, offshore
oil-production platforms for bankrupt sister oil company Oleo e
Gas Participacoes SA, according to Reuters.  The decision does not
affect Netherlands-based OSX units that own the company's three
oil production ships, which are known as FPSOs, the report notes.

OSX filed for bankruptcy in a Rio de Janeiro court in November,
less than two weeks after Oleo e Gas filed Latin America's
largest-ever bankruptcy-protection petition.  OSX depends on Oleo
e Gas, formerly known as OGX Petroleo e Gas Participacoes, for
nearly all its revenue, the report discloses.

On June 3, Oleo e Gas creditors, including OSX, agreed to a plan
to restructure nearly BRL12 billion ($5.4 billion) of unpaid
obligations in an operation expected to be complete by October,
Reuters relates.

OSX's November bankruptcy filing in Brazil did not include its
overseas subsidiaries such as OSX WHP or similar investment
vehicles that own the company's FPSOs, two of which are leased to
Oleo e Gas, Reuters adds.

                        About OSX Brasil

Brazilian shipbuilding firm OSX Brasil SA, controlled by
businessman Eike Batista, filed for protection from creditors on
November 2013 on liabilities of BRL5.34 billion (US$2.30 billion).
OSX Brasil filed for bankruptcy -- called "judicial recovery" in
Brazil -- after Oleo e Gas Participacoes SA, formerly known as OGX
Petroleo e Gas Participacoes, filed for bankruptcy on Oct. 30,
2013.

OSX had outstanding debts of around US$2.2 billion as of June 30,
2013, including dollar-and real-denominated loans and bonds held
by a mix of banks, investors and government institutions, such as
Brazil's Merchant Marine Fund, according to The Wall Street
Journal.

The move on Nov. 11 at a Rio de Janeiro court follows a default
and bankruptcy filing the prior month for Mr. Batista's flagship
oil firm OGX Petroleo e Gas Participacoes SA, n/k/a Oleo e Gas,
according to the WSJ report.  The firm went public in 2008 for
$4.1 billion but failed to produce nearly any of the up to 10.8
billion barrels it claimed to have.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


CHINA YYAH: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 22
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of China YYAH Ltd. will hold their final meeting
on July 22, 2014, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Hongdong Wang
          Telephone: +86 2162693000
          Facsimile: +86 2163847105
          Villa 2, No. 1350 Middle Huahai Road
          Xuhui District, Shanghai
          China 200031


HV DIVERSIFIED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of HV Diversified Strategies Limited will hold
their final meeting on Aug. 1, 2014, to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345) 949-8244
          Facsimile: (345) 949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


MA LYNX: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1
---------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of MA Lynx Limited will hold their final meeting
on Aug. 1, 2014, to receive the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345) 949-8244
          Facsimile: (345) 949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


MA MARBLE BAR II: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of MA Marble Bar II Limited will hold their final
meeting on Aug. 1, 2014, to receive the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345) 949-8244
          Facsimile: (345) 949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


MA ROTELLA: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of MA Rotella Limited will hold their final
meeting on Aug. 1, 2014, to receive the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345) 949-8244
          Facsimile: (345) 949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


MARBLE BAR II FEEDER: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1
----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Marble Bar II Feeder I Limited will hold their
final meeting on Aug. 1, 2014, to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345) 949-8244
          Facsimile: (345) 949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


MSL CHARTER: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 22
--------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of MSL Charter Corp will hold their final meeting
on July 22, 2014, at 1:00 p.m., to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Jeffrey Soffer
          19950 West Country Club Drive, Tenth Floor
          Aventura, FL 33180, USA
          Telephone: 1 305 937 6262
          Facsimile: 1 305 682 4109


RHYNO CBO 1997-1: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 1
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of RHYNO CBO 1997-1 Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on Aug. 1, 2014, to receive the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345) 949-8244
          Facsimile: (345) 949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


SH JASMINE I: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for July 22
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of SH Jasmine I Limited will hold their final
meeting on July 22, 2014, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Hongdong Wang
          Telephone: +86 2162693000
          Facsimile: +86 2163847105
          Villa 2, No. 1350 Middle Huahai Road
          Xuhui District, Shanghai
          China 200031


WESTPORT GLOBAL: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on July 24
--------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Westport Global Capital Ltd will hear on
July 24, 2014, at 10:30 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ogier
          c/o Anna Cummings
          Telephone: (345) 815 1858
          Facsimile: (345) 949-9877


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


* DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Says Haiti Must Lift Ban on Products Now
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic called on Haiti to
immediately repeal its ban on the import of Dominican products,
during a high-level meeting with officials from both countries.

Presidency Chief of Staff Gustavo Montalvo made the request in a
speech in the presence of Haiti Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe,
during the meeting in the resort town near San Pedro (east),
according to Dominican Today.

The report relates that Mr. Montalvo said the Dominican Government
takes all the necessary steps to cooperate with and formalize
trade between the Hispaniola countries.  "In the relations between
friendly countries, physical barriers to trade should not exist,
except for very exceptional reasons such as national security,"
the report relates.

Mr. Montalvo said the current ban have only led to an increase of
informal trade and created competitive disadvantages, the report
relays.

Mr. Montalvo said there's evidence that products banned from
crossing the border are allowed entry through Haiti's ports, the
report notes.  "We feel that there's no reason to treat the border
differently from the ports," the report quoted Mr. Montalvo as
saying.

The official added that it's difficult to have such disparaging
tariffs on similar goods along a common border, with 0% on one
side, and as high as 40% on the other, the report relates.  "We
propose the creation of a trade table in which we both nations sit
down to take the necessary measures to achieve this adaptation,"
Mr. Montalvo said, the report adds.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


* JAMAICA: Hurricane Sandy Disrupts Growth Projections
------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has
declared that the model currently being used to predict Jamaica's
economic growth has not been giving accurate outcomes.

The Fund, in its latest report on Jamaica, said the problem had
arisen largely because of the effects of Hurricane Sandy,
according to RJR News.  The Hurricane, which hit Jamaica in
October 2012, led to major economic disruptions, particularly in
agriculture and mining, the report relates.

The multi-lateral agency revealed that the economic growth
indicator over projected growth in the aftermath of the hurricane
and under projected the rebound, which occurred at the end of last
year, the report notes.

It said the model had predicted zero per cent growth for the end
of December, but the actual out turn was 1.8 per cent, the report
relates.

It suggested that there may be a number of reasons for the failure
to accurately predict growth, including the implementation of the
IMF program and the ongoing depreciation of the currency, adds the
report.


=======
P E R U
=======


BANCO DE LA NACION: Fitch Ups Viability Rating From 'bb+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Peru's Banco de la Nacion's (BN)
support-driven foreign currency long-term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) at 'BBB+,' local currency long-term IDR at 'A-', foreign
currency short-term IDR at 'F2' and its Support Rating Floor at
'BBB+'. In addition, Fitch has upgraded Banco de la Nacion's
Viability Rating (VR) to 'bbb-' from 'bb+.'  The Rating Outlook is
Stable. A full list of rating actions is at the end of this rating
action commentary.

The VR has been upgraded in light of Banco de la Nacion's strong
and stable profitability, underpinned by ample margins, as well as
its exceptional asset quality, high levels of liquidity and access
to stable, low cost funding.

Key Rating Drivers - IDRS, SRF and VR

The bank's IDRs, reflect the potential support from Banco de la
Nacion's shareholder, the Republic of Peru ('BBB+/A-'/Outlook
Stable). Banco de la Nacion is an autonomous government agency and
in Fitch's opinion, forms an integral part of the government's
operations.

It performs basic government functions (collections and payments),
acts as the government's financial agent, finances key government
activities (e.g. defence procurement and infrastructure), and
maintains the country's most extensive branch network through
which it provides financial services in remote areas where private
banks are not present. Therefore, support from the government
should be forthcoming, if needed. By the same token, Banco de la
Nacion's support rating and support rating floor, indicate the
direct link between the entity's creditworthiness and that of its
shareholder, the Republic of Peru.

The bank's VR has been upgraded in light of the positive operating
environment, the bank's healthy asset quality, its stable
profitability and adequate capital base. BN's performance is
supported by the strength of the Peruvian operating environment,
including a dynamic economy, strong macroeconomic fundamentals,
low inflation, a healthy fiscal position and a capable banking
regulator. Fitch forecasts real GDP growth in Peru of 5.2% and
5.6% for 2014 and 2015, respectively.

BN's asset quality ratios are considerably healthier than the
Peruvian banking sector average and its international peers. BN's
risk profile is relatively low, as lending is directed primarily
to national and subnational governments, public agencies, public
servants and government retirees. Past due loans (PDLs) accounted
for a low 0.41% of gross loans and reserve coverage rose to
555.89% at the first quarter of 2014 (1Q'14).

In addition, despite downward pressure on interest rates, BN's
profitability has remained relatively stable and strong. BN
reported ROAA of 2.94% at 1Q'14 (2.92% at fiscal year-end 2012
[FYE12]). Profitability continues to be driven by asset growth and
ample albeit narrowing margins, and growing non-interest revenues.
BN's profitability is expected to remain robust in the near term
due to its cost of funds and scope to grow its loan portfolio from
existing liquidity.

Fitch Core Capital remains solid but has declined to 29.1% of
risk-weighted assets at FYE13 from 38.5% at FYE12 mainly due to
the bank's steady expansion and high dividend distribution.
Capital ratios at 1Q'14 are expected to partially recover by
FYE14, as dividends based on prior year earnings were paid early
in the year. BN continues to benefit from the low-risk weight of
its assets (45.01% in cash and 22.31% in government securities at
FYE13). Regulatory capital remains at 15.4% of risk weighted
assets at 1Q'14, significantly higher than the 10% regulatory
requirement.

A continuing constraint on the bank's VR is its exposure to
potential political influence, given its ownership and role.
Government influence manifests itself primarily in the appointment
of directors. Although current directors are highly qualified,
currently there are no eligibility standards in place for service
on the board.

Rating Sensitivities - IDRS, National Ratings And Senior Debt

As a fully state-owned financial institution, deeply integrated
within the government, Banco de la Nacion's creditworthiness and
ratings are directly linked to those of the Republic of Peru.
Hence, its ratings should move in line with any potential change
in Peru's sovereign ratings.

Rating Sensitivities - VR

BN's VR could be pressured by a change in risk appetite, including
an expansion into new business segments in which the bank has
little underwriting experience or an engagement in activities with
increased market risk. Similarly, BN's VR is also sensitive to a
sustained decline in tangible equity below 5% of tangible assets,
particularly if such decline resulted from a deterioration of
profitability or asset quality.

Conversely, greater protections against political influence, such
as stricter eligibility criteria for Directors, would be positive
for BN's VR. However, given the bank's narrow business model and
limited scope for franchise development, Fitch sees limited upside
potential in its viability rating.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

Banco de la Nacion

-- Foreign currency long-term IDR affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
Stable;
-- Local currency long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable;
-- Foreign currency short-term IDR affirmed at 'F2';
-- Local currency short-term IDR affirmed at 'F2';
-- Support Rating affirmed at '2';
-- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BBB+';
-- Viability Rating upgraded to 'bbb-' from 'bb+'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


BANCO INTERAMERICANO: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Support Rating Floor
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Interamericano de Finanzas,
S.A.'s (BanBif) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB-'.
The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

VR AND IDRs

BanBif's local and foreign currency IDRs are driven by its VR of
'bbb-', which reflects its solid asset quality, consistent
performance, as well as an improving funding and liquidity
profile. The ratings also factor in its moderate capitalization
and franchise.

BanBif's asset quality remains good despite showing a slight
increase in non-performing loans (NPLs) and exhibits one of the
lowest delinquency levels in the Peruvian banking system. NPLs
accounted for 1.12% of gross loans as of March 2014 (2010 - 2013
average: 0.84%). Prudent credit policies, a business model focused
on low-risk products (leasing finance and trade finance) and a
positive operating environment underpin the bank's low NPLs.
BanBif's main challenge is to continue growing in an orderly
manner in a high competitive environment and concentrated banking
system. Favourably, Peru's positive economic prospects and
relatively low banking penetration supports BanBif's growth
potential.

Reasonable and stable interest margins and sustainable generation
of non-interest revenues supported BanBif's consistent performance
(operating ROAs above 2.0% in the last 3 years). Nevertheless,
relatively high funding costs and operating expenses related to
the bank's expansion continue to weigh on profitability. BanBif's
operating profitability remained stable in the first months of
2014. Positively, due to good asset quality, the bank's loan loss
provisions remain under control.

BanBif has a relatively diversified funding structure, although it
is reliant on deposits (74% of the total funding at March 2014),
in where the proportion of individuals has significantly increased
since 2011 given the expansion strategy followed by the bank. As
of March 2014, deposits from individual represented 36% of total
deposits, in contrast with 30% two years ago. BanBif continues to
show maturity mismatches within its balance sheet due to a
relatively long-term credit portfolio; however this has been
managed by increasing its long-term funding through credit lines
and local bond issuances.

Fitch views BanBif's capitalization as moderate in light of its
accelerated growth. BanBif's capital position has remained stable
over the past years, driven by the consistent earnings retention.
BanBif's Fitch Core capital (FCC) to risk-weighted assets (RWA)
ratio has remained around 8%, although relatively low to its
international peers. BanBif's capital ratios may continue to be
supported by its good profitability and prudent dividend pay-out
ratio.

BanBif is a medium-sized universal bank that has grown to be
Peru's fifth largest bank, with a markets share of approximately
3.4% of total loans and 3.0% of total deposits. BanBif's strategy
focuses in diversifying its business portfolio in small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) and retail products, mainly to B and C segments
without neglecting its core target market, corporates.

Support Rating And SRF

BanBif's Support Rating of '4' and Support Rating Floor of 'BB-'
indicate its systemic importance for the Peruvian banking system.
Being the fifth largest Peruvian bank, Fitch believes that there
would be a limited propensity for support from the government,
should it be required.

Rating Sensitivities

VR AND IDRs

A sustained performance that strengthens BanBif's FCC to RWA
metrics consistently above 10% could benefit the bank's VR and
IDRs. A more diversified low-cost funding mix and sustained
improvements in efficiency levels could also benefit the bank's
ratings.

On the other hand, a constant increase of BanBif's risk appetite
that erodes its profitability and drives FCC to RWA consistently
below 8% could pressure ratings downward.

Support Rating And SRF

Upside potential for the SR and SRF is limited and can only occur
over time with a material growth of the bank's systemic
importance. These ratings could be downgraded if the bank loses
material market share in terms of loans and customer deposits.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
-- Foreign Currency Short-Term IDR at 'F3';
-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
-- Local Currency Short-Term at 'F3';
-- Viability rating at 'bbb-';
-- Support Rating at '4';
-- Support Rating Floor at 'BB-'.


CORPORACION AZUCARERA: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Issuer Default Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed at 'BB' the Long-term Foreign Currency
(FC) and Local Currency (LC) Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) of
Corporacion Azucarera del Peru S.A. (Coazucar). Fitch has also
affirmed Coazucar's senior unsecured notes at 'BB'. The Rating
Outlook has been revised to Negative from Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The Negative Outlook is the result of a deterioration in
Coazucar's EBITDA margin due to a structural change in the pricing
premium enjoyed by Peruvian sugar companies in response to a surge
in imported sugar. This change was responsible for about 50% of
the decline in the company's EBITDA to USD99 million in 2013 from
USD186 million in 2012. Price declines occurring at a faster pace
than the drop in international prices for sugar will pressure the
company's operating cash flow while the company is in the midst of
around USD200 million of capex planned for the next two to three
years, mainly for the Olmos Project. Beginning in November 2014,
the company will also need to make annual payments of around USD9
million for water resources for the Olmos Project due to take-or-
pay contracts, even though this project will not become
operational until the middle of 2016.

The ratings reflect Coazucar's strong business position as the
largest sugar producer in Peru. The company has a low cost
structure and high operating margins due to the proximity of its
operations to the sugar cane fields, its low dependence on third-
party cane producers, and some of the world's highest sugar cane
yields per hectare as a result of its favorable geographic
location that allows for a continued growing period. Coazucar's
ratings benefit from its shareholders, which have large and
profitable investments in the dairy and cement industries within
Peru. Fitch believes these shareholders could provide liquidity
and support if needed. Balanced against these strengths is the
volatility of earnings associated with the sugar industry, the
company's exposure to currency exchange fluctuations, and event
risk associated with the natural phenomenon, El Nino.

EBITDA and Margins Deterioration

Coazucar's EBITDA for the LTM ended March 31, 2014 was USD90
million. This compares unfavorably to the USD186 million in 2012.
During these time periods, the company's EBITDA margin declined to
19% from 33%. About 50% of the downturn was due to the 3 cent and
4 cent decline in international prices for brown and white sugar,
respectively, which is typical with a cyclical industry and was
incorporated in the rating. The balance was primarily a result of
a sharp decline in the spread for local prices versus
international prices. Unfavorable weather conditions in Argentina
and a strike in the company's lower margin business in Ecuador
also contributed to a decline in EBITDA and margins. Fitch does
not expect Coazucar to recover its historical EBITDA margins of
around 40%. If sugar prices remain at depressed levels, the
company's margins should improve slightly from the startup of its
new refinery, which will result in an increase in the production
of white refined sugar. During 2013, about 45% of the company's
sugar sales were from white sugar. Lower margin brown sugar sales
accounted for around 50% of sales. This ratio should reverse
following the completion of the new refinery.

Increased Leverage

As of March 31, 2014, Coazucar had USD500 million of total
adjusted debt and USD65 million of cash and marketable securities.
This level of debt, in relation to USD90 million of EBITDA,
resulted in a total leverage ratio of 5.6x for the LTM March 2014
and a net debt ratio of 4.8x. The net leverage ratio compares
unfavorably against the 2.0x at the end of 2012. During 2013, the
company spent USD73 million on capex, which contributed to
negative free cash flow (FCF) of USD49 million. FCF is expected to
be negative/neutral in 2014. Coazucar's leverage and FCF in the
next few years would depend on recovery in prices and the amount
of capex involved in the Olmos Project developments.

Weak Liquidity

Coazucar's amortization schedule is weak, despite most of its debt
being associated with its USD325 million note due in 2022. As of
March 31, 2014, the company had USD65 million in cash which
covered adjusted short-term debt of USD54 million by only 1.2x.


Strong Equity Holder

Fitch views as positive the fact that the company is part of a
conglomerate of companies owned by the Rodriguez Banda Family
(50/50% by the two brothers) which has a tangible presence and
long tradition of operations in Peru and the region. The
conglomerate has leading business positions in every sector in
which it participates. Fitch factors into its rating the potential
support from the shareholder to Coazucar and believes that cash
will be injected into the company if its liquidity deteriorates
further.

Rating Sensitivities

A negative rating action could occur in case of further
deterioration in the group's liquidity position due to increased
capital investment or lower margin without any tangible support
from its shareholder. A downgrade could occur if Coazucar's net
leverage exceeds 3.5x consistently during mid-cycle sugar prices.

An Outlook revision to Stable could occur if Coazucar improves its
pricing power, reduces leverage and improves cash flow through the
investment cycle. Tangible support from the shareholder that
improves liquidity and lowers leverage could also lead to positive
rating actions.


CORPORACION LINDLEY: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' corporate
credit rating on Corporacion Lindley S.A. (Lindley).  At the same
time, S&P affirmed the 'BB+' rating on its senior unsecured notes
due 2021 and 2023.  The outlook remains stable.

"The rating affirmation follows our view that Lindley's key credit
metrics continue to be in line with its "significant" financial
risk profile despite lower-than-anticipated volume and revenue
growth in 2013 and during the first few months of 2014," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Laura Martinez.

Lower volumes and revenues growth reflect difficult weather
conditions and weaker consumer spending, which has hit the food
and beverage industry in Peru, amid stronger competition.  S&P
expects Lindley will remain focused on reaching operating
efficiencies and improving its distribution system while
completing its capital investments this year, which should allow
the company to improve its profitability and strengthen its credit
metrics in the next two years.


=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================


OFG BANCORP: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it placed its 'BB-'
counterparty credit rating on Puerto Rico-based regional banking
company OFG Bancorp on CreditWatch with negative implications.  At
the same time, S&P placed its 'BB+' counterparty credit rating on
OFG's main bank subsidiary, Oriental Bank, on CreditWatch
negative.

The CreditWatch placement largely reflects S&P's recent downgrades
of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and the Government Development Bank for Puerto
Rico.  All these rating actions are associated with the passage of
legislation allowing certain Puerto Rican public entities,
including PREPA, to restructure their debt obligations.  "We think
the passage of this legislation increases the risk that one or
more of such public entities may choose to restructure their debt
and, as a result, OFG could be subject to material losses related
to certain of these exposures," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Robert Hansen.  "Despite a notable decline in recent
quarters, we think Oriental Bank still has very substantial loan
and securities exposures to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
instrumentalities, and municipalities, which we view very
unfavorably from a geographic risk concentration perspective."

Specifically, the company's loan and securities exposures to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, instrumentalities, and municipalities
declined to roughly $761 million as of March 31, 2014, from nearly
$1 billion as of Sept. 30, 2013.  Despite the decline, S&P still
views these exposures as very large relative to the size of the
company's capital base.  These exposures exceed the company's
total adjusted capital (TAC), which was $712 million as of
March 31, 2014, by S&P's calculation.  S&P expects the bank to
remain profitable but think further improvements in loan
performance will be difficult over the next two years given the
still-weak economy in Puerto Rico.

S&P thinks management turnover has increased modestly, which it
views somewhat negatively.  For example, effective July 3, the
employment of Norberto Gonzalezas executive vice president and
chief risk officer ended, and on July 9, OFG appointed Cesar Ortiz
senior vice president and chief risk officer and Maritza Arizmendi
senior vice president of corporate finance and chief accounting
officer.  Nonetheless, these two newly appointed executives have
substantial experience in the industry and with the company, in
our opinion.

S&P could lower the rating on OFG Bancorp and Oriental Bank if
certain instrumentalities, particularly PREPA, or municipalities
miss debt or interest payments or restructure their debt
obligations resulting in material losses for OFG.  S&P could also
lower its rating if it expects loan performance to weaken
materially, if S&P no longer views capital as strong, or if S&P
again lower its rating on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.  S&P
expects to address or resolve the CreditWatch within the next 60-
90 days.


PUERTO RICO AQUEDUCT: S&P Lowers Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has lowered its ratings on
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority's (PRASA) revenue bonds,
guaranteed by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, by one notch to
'BB'.  At the same time, Standard & Poor's lowered its rating on
PRASA's revenue bonds to 'BB-' from 'BB+'.  The outlook is
negative.

"The actions reflect our our downgrade of the commonwealth's
general obligation debt," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Theodore Chapman.

The negative outlook affects PRASA's series 2008A and 2008B
revenue bonds, of which $285 million are outstanding.

"We have also lowered PRASA's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to
'bb-', from 'bb+'.  The SACP reflects our view of the authority's
general creditworthiness based solely on its own fundamentals,
absent any uplift or headwinds associated with its relationship
with the general government.  The lower SACP is because we view
the current climate surrounding all Puerto Rico obligations as
creating adverse business conditions for PRASA.  Its liquidity has
no immediate challenges because of a 2012 bond restructuring that
included the injection of temporary working capital, as well as a
60% rate increase in 2013.  However, we view the authority's
ability to extend its lines of credit (LOCs; expiring in March
2015) or convert them to long-term debt as now being more
difficult.  PRASA has little discretion in its capital improvement
program given the large share of regulatory-ordered, date-certain
mandates as a share of total projects.  Although an SACP does not
carry an outlook, the outlook on the revenue bonds is negative
because we believe there is at least a one-in-three chance that
the adverse business conditions could worsen for the authority
within our two-year outlook horizon," S&P said.

PRASA is the sole water and sewer service provider in Puerto Rico,
serving approximately 1.25 million customers.  The system consists
of a relatively fragmented series of water and wastewater
facilities divided into five regional service areas.  The
primarily residential base has seen little customer growth, given
the island's economic profile and population trend.  Due to the
system's noncontiguous nature and condition, the authority has a
very high level of nonrevenue water (slightly less than 60% of
total water produced) as well as multiple regulatory violations.
Steps to remediate these problems include large-scale meter
replacements, more aggressive collections, staffing reductions,
and aggressive efforts to reduce energy demand.

The negative outlook on the Puerto Rico-backed bond reflects
Standard & Poor's outlook on its GO debt.  The negative outlook on
PRASA's gross-lien revenue bond reflects S&P's view that the
climate surrounding all commonwealth obligations is furthering the
adverse business conditions in which the authority is operating.
A further downgrade to Puerto Rico's GO debt would lead to a
downgrade on the guaranteed revenue bonds.  An outlook revision to
stable would be mainly predicated on what S&P views as unimpeded,
apolitical access to working capital sufficient in nature to
support ongoing operations and address the highest priority
capital projects.


PUERTO RICO: Makes Bond Payments, But Muni Market Remains on Edge
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lisa Lambert, writing for Reuters, reported that creditors to
Puerto Rico's electricity provider were given a slight respite
when the bonds' trustee made a scheduled payment, but the U.S.
municipal bond market remained worried the Puerto Rico Electric
Power Authority (PREPA) will soon use a new bankruptcy-like
process to restructure its debts.  According to the report, the
law establishing the process has rattled the $3.7 trillion
municipal market since it was passed and has prompted Moody's
Investors Service to push ratings on Puerto Rico debt deeper into
junk territory.


===============================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
===============================


* TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: IMF Concludes 2014 Article IV Consultation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
concluded the Article IV Consultation with Trinidad and Tobago.

Trinidad and Tobago's economy is embarking on a sustainable growth
path.  Maintenance-related slowdowns in the energy sector are
ending, while non-energy growth is robust, with economic slack
being used up.  Headline inflation is trending down (in part for
statistical reasons), while core inflation remains contained at
about 2-3 percent.  The unemployment rate has fallen to only 3 3/4
percent, although this masks sizable underemployment in government
"make-work" programs.

The fiscal balance is likely to improve in fiscal year 2013/14,
with the deficit falling to only 1 1/2 percent of GDP, but largely
for ad hoc reasons rather than durable improvements in revenues or
expenditures.  The external current account surplus has rebounded
to over 10 percent of GDP and reserves are at 12 months of
imports.  However, the foreign exchange allocation system,
although it had generally worked well for several years, led to
fairly widespread and persistent foreign exchange shortages, as
supply and demand imbalances grew from late 2013.  A recent series
of actions by the central bank has improved the supply of foreign
exchange to the market.

The time is drawing near for policy tightening.  The main external
risk is from a sustained decline in energy prices.  The domestic
medium-term challenges are to boost long-run growth through
structural reforms and reorienting fiscal policy, with measures to
save more of the nation's nonrenewable energy wealth, and limiting
current expenditures while increasing growth-enhancing capital
spending.  Such policies would likely pose near-term headwinds,
but enhance competitiveness and boost potential growth in the non-
energy sector.  However, significant reforms are likely to be
delayed by the electoral calendar. A greater degree of flexibility
is needed in the foreign exchange system to avoid further
shortages.

                    Executive Board Assessment

Executive Directors welcomed the improved growth outlook, and
noted the strong external position and limited fiscal
vulnerabilities.  They agreed, however, that the reduction in
economic slack and the need for a durable consolidation of the
fiscal position suggest that a tightening of macroeconomic
policies may be necessary in the near future.  Over the medium
term, Trinidad and Tobago remains vulnerable to a decline in
energy prices, which calls for structural reforms to diversify the
economy and improve its growth potential.

Directors concurred that the authorities should stand ready to
start tightening monetary policy in view of the reduced labor
market slack and high consumer credit growth, and to prepare for
the spillovers from the normalization of monetary policy in the
United States.  Implementing this tightening, however, could be
complicated by banks' excess liquidity and the weak monetary
transmission mechanism.  Against this background, Directors
concurred that tighter prudential regulations could be considered.
Directors welcomed recent measures to improve the budget outturn
for the current fiscal year.  They underscored the importance of
moving toward fiscal surpluses as soon as feasible, using more
durable improvements in revenues and expenditures, in order to
make better use of the country's nonrenewable energy endowment.
Spending should be reoriented away from current expenditure toward
growth-enhancing capital projects, including by better targeting
social benefits and reducing energy subsidies.  Broadening the
non-energy tax base remains key to strengthening revenues.

Executive Directors welcomed continued progress in financial
sector reform, including improvements to the legislative framework
for financial regulation.  They also supported the actions taken
to bring systemically important non-bank financial institutions
into the regulatory perimeter and looked forward to a
comprehensive assessment of Trinidad and Tobago's regime against
money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

Directors took note of recurring shortages in the foreign exchange
market.  They encouraged the authorities to allow for sufficient
flexibility in the operation of the market to ensure that it
clears, especially given the ample foreign reserve position.
Directors expressed concerns about the lack of reliable and timely
economic statistics, which severely limits the ability to conduct
surveillance.  They recommended prompt action to provide adequate
resources to the statistical office.

Directors emphasized the benefits of further structural reforms to
boost competitiveness and lay the foundation for sustainable and
diversified growth.  They welcomed recent measures taken to reduce
business impediments, but noted that action remains necessary in
several areas.  In particular, inefficiencies in the public sector
and distortions in the functioning of labor markets hinder private
investment and should be addressed decisively.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


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