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                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Monday, August 4, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 152


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Default Sends Ripples Through Markets
ARGENTINA: Is in Default, and Also Maybe in Denial
ARGENTINA: No Deal Imminent on Debt Feud
ARGENTINA: Fitch Downgrades Foreign Currency IDR to 'RD'
FIDEICOMISO FINANCIERO: Moody's Rates ARS8.7MM Certs. 'C.ar'


B A R B A D O S

REDJET CARIBBEAN: Founder Dies at 58


B R A Z I L

BANCO BTG PACTUAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' FC Rating on Sub. Notes


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

DYNAMIC OPPORTUNITY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 19
HOLIDAY PARTNERS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 19
ICONS LTD: A.M. Best Lowers Rating on Class C Notes From 'bb'
NCH CASUALTY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PROVENA HEALTH: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

RIVERSIDE GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 28
SUERTE LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 27
TAMWEEL RESIDENTIAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
TERAMO FUND: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 19
TL SHARE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings


P U E R T O   R I C O

PUERTO RICO: S&P Affirms 'BB' GO Debt Rating; Outlook Neg.
PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: S&P Lowers Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'CCC'
PUERTO RICO: Lenders to Utility Extend Payment Deadline


X X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From July 28 to August 1, 2014


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Default Sends Ripples Through Markets
------------------------------------------------
Dan Strumpf and Saabira Chaudhuri at The Wall Street Journal
report that Argentina's failure to pay its debts sent ripples
through financial markets Aug. 1 as its bonds fell for a second
day and an industry group ruled investors can collect on insurance
that protects against a default.

The International Swaps and Derivatives Association ruled that
sellers of the insurance, called credit-default swaps, must
compensate buyers because the nation's failure to make an interest
payment to bondholders by July 30 qualified as a credit event that
triggers the contracts, according to The Wall Street Journal.  Up
to $1.04 billion stands to change hands as a result of the ruling,
according to the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp, the report
notes.

The report recalls that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt
late July 30 after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a $539
million interest payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a court-
appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the
country and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds
that the country had defaulted on in 2001.

A quick resolution appears unlikely, says The Journal.  In a
hearing Aug 1, U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa urged both sides
to restart negotiations.  However, a lawyer representing Argentina
said the country had lost confidence in the mediator's ability to
lead discussions.  Neither side has announced a date for talks to
resume, notes the report.

The immediate impact on financial markets was largely limited to
Argentina, though some traders in Europe and the U.S. said the
default added to anxieties over other trouble spots, including
financial problems at Banco Espirito Santo in Portugal, the report
relays.  Citigroup also said that it could lose up to $80 million
if U.S. banking regulators at the Interagency Country Exposure
Review Committee downgrade Argentina, potentially reducing revenue
and raising funding costs, the report discloses.

Dollar-denominated bonds due in 2033 were trading around 86 cents
on the dollar Aug 1, down from about 90 cents on July 31 and 96
cents before the default, according to traders, notes The WSJ.
Trading was thin, the traders said.  Argentine stocks rebounded,
with the Merval Index ending up 1.7%, the report relays.

Still, the report notes that the losses for the bonds were mild,
indicating many in the bond market expect Argentina to eventually
resume payments.  For investors, the main source of optimism
remains the prospect of a bank-engineered deal to help Argentina
pay off the debt it owes the holdout creditors and resume interest
payments to other bondholders, the report discloses.

Judge Griesa has ruled that Argentina must pay the holdout hedge
funds, including Elliott Management Corp.'s NML Capital Ltd. and
Aurelius Capital Management LP, when it pays investors who
accepted discounted bonds in restructurings in 2005 and 2010, the
report says.

"I think everyone is thinking this is going to be a temporary
default," The WSJ quoted Kathryn Rooney Vera, a senior
macroeconomic strategist at Bulltick Capital Markets, as saying.
"Usually, when a sovereign defaults, you have a total collapse in
prices."

The report notes that Argentine bonds held steady after the ISDA
decision, which affects buyers and sellers of credit default
swaps, including banks, insurance companies and such institutional
investors as hedge funds and pension funds.

ISDA said in a statement that it would hold an auction to
determine the size of the payout, though it didn't say when, the
report adds.  Separately, some $682 million in contracts tied to a
global emerging-market CDS index will need to be settled,
according to J.P. Morgan Chase, notes the report.

ISDA didn't immediately detail the reasoning backing up the
panel's unanimous decision, but Argentina's bond documents say
that the country can only be considered to have satisfied its
obligations once bondholders get the money they are owed, the
report relays.  While Argentina had deposited money with an
intermediary, that money had not reached holders, thanks to a U.S.
court ruling, reports The WSJ.

In the bond market, notes The Journal, investors are more
concerned with the status of negotiations with the holdouts.  On
July 31, Economy Minister Axel Kicillof said the country "wouldn't
oppose" a deal involving third parties, the report discloses.

However, prices could continue to drift lower the longer talks
drag on, the report quoted Siobhan Morden, head of Latin America
strategy at Jefferies LLC, as saying.

"Each day that time passes and there's no agreement, it shows that
this is a long-term situation," Ms. Morden said, notes The WSJ.
"If the market starts to believe there is no deal with the banks,
we could hit south of [70 cents]" on the bonds, Ms. Morden added.


ARGENTINA: Is in Default, and Also Maybe in Denial
--------------------------------------------------
Alexandra Stevenson and Irene Caselli, writing for The New York
Times' DealBook, report that Argentina may be in default, but one
might not know it if they have not lived in Buenos Aires.

Speaking to the nation in a televised news conference, Axel
Kicillof, Argentina's economy minister, called it "atomic
nonsense," to say that the country had entered into a default,
according to The New York Times' DealBook.

The report notes that the cabinet chief, Jorge Capitanich, said
that the decision by the ratings agency Standard & Poor's to put
Argentina in a so-called selective default was "an absurd lie"
that undermined the country's attempt to restructure its debt
after it defaulted on tens of billions of bonds in 2001.

The report says that this was the country's political machine in
overdrive after last ditch mediated talks to avert a default broke
down in New York. Argentina has been battling a group of hedge
funds -- so-called holdouts -- who sued the country for a full
payment of $1.5 billion on bonds that Argentina defaulted on in
2001, the report discloses.

The multiyear dispute reached a breaking point after Argentina
missed a deadline on a scheduled interest payment to its regular
bondholders, the report notes.  Argentina's predicament has arisen
from a ruling by a federal judge in the United States that it
could not make its regular payments on bonds without also paying
the hedge fund holdouts, reports Dealbook.  On July 30, a court-
appointed mediator issued a statement declaring Argentina to be
"imminently" in default.

But Argentines woke up on July 31 to headlines in some of the
country's most popular newspapers indicating that some sort of
private deal was in the works and that a default would be averted,
the report discloses.  Local reports described how Argentine and
foreign banks had put forth varying proposals to buy the debt from
the hedge funds, the report notes.

Such confusion did not come as a surprise to many ordinary
citizens, the report says.  For a nation that went through a
devastating default 13 years ago, the collective memory of what a
real economic default feels like is still fresh, notes the report.

"It's not comparable to 2001," said Gustavo, a 32-year old who is
a wholesale trader with a small family business, the report
relays.  Mr. Gustavo did not want to give his surname because he
described how he has traded pesos under the table for United
States dollars.

The report says that many Argentines who saw the value of the peso
spiral quickly and their savings vanish after the last default
have not been caught off guard this time.

"These past years have taught us a strategy of how to save up
money in a reliable way," the report quoted Mr. Gustavo as saying.

The report relays that for most Argentines, the currency of choice
is the dollar, but they have to go through the black market to
obtain it.  "It is difficult or almost impossible to keep those
savings safe in Argentina, because money loses value very quickly
here," Mr. Gustavo added.

Reaction to Argentina's default in financial markets was also
muted, in part because no one seems to know what would happen
next, the report says.  In Argentina, stocks and bonds responded
more forcefully; the price on Argentina's benchmark foreign bonds
slipped after rallying over, the report discloses.

The report relays that the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association will announce whether Argentina's missed payment could
trigger credit-default swaps on Argentine foreign securities.

While the mood in Argentina remains largely calm for now, this
could change, warned Barbara Kotschwar, a research fellow at the
Peterson Institute for International Economics and an adjunct at
Georgetown Center for Latin American Studies, the report notes.

"I think that many people buy the argument that Argentina did not
default, and buy into the hatred of the evil vultures," Ms.
Kotschwar said, referring to the government's attempt to vilify
the hedge fund holdouts, notes DealBook.

"The story to watch, however, is what conclusion Argentines will
draw in the medium term if their country's economy and their
personal welfare is affected and their daily lives become more
complicated," the report quoted Ms. Kotschwar as saying.


ARGENTINA: No Deal Imminent on Debt Feud
----------------------------------------
Nicole Hong, Ken Parks and Matt Day, writing for The Wall Street
Journal, reported that Argentina's default on $29 billion in debt
brought a stock-market selloff and finger pointing by the
Argentine government and creditors, but investors held out hope
that a resolution to the crisis could be reached.

According to the report, the main source of the optimism: efforts
by banks in Argentina and the U.S., including J.P. Morgan Chase &
Co., to strike a deal to help Argentina pay off the debt it owes a
small group of hedge funds and resume interest payments to other
bondholders.

On July 31, Argentina's dollar-denominated bonds due in 2033,
which were among the bonds in default, fell to near 90 cents on
the dollar, from 96 cents late July 30, The Journal said.
Argentina's benchmark Merval stock index fell 8.4%. In the black
market, the peso fell to 12.65 per dollar from 12.30 on July 30,
the report related.


ARGENTINA: Fitch Downgrades Foreign Currency IDR to 'RD'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgrades Argentina's ratings as follows:

-- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC';
-- Short-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from
'C'
-- Local Currency IDR to 'CCC' from 'B-';
-- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D' from 'CC';
-- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Pars and Global
17) to 'C' from 'CC';
-- Foreign Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law to 'C'
from 'B-';
-- GDP linked securities to 'CC' from 'B-';
-- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law to 'CCC'
from 'B-';
-- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
Argentine Law to 'CCC' from 'B-';
-- Country Ceiling to 'CCC' from 'B-'.

The ratings on the foreign currency exchanged bonds under
Argentine Law have been simultaneously withdrawn due to the
difficulty of monitoring the timely servicing of these bonds. The
ratings on the GDP linked securities have also been withdrawn as
these are no longer considered to be relevant to Fitch's coverage.

Key Rating Drivers

Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon payments on
its discount bonds issued under foreign law after the expiration
of the 30-day grace period on July 30. According to Fitch's
criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch has
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency IDR to 'RD' and the
affected securities to 'D'.

The legal process related to the dispute between Argentina and
certain holdout creditors that did not participate in the 2005 and
2010 exchange offers culminated with the denial of Argentina's
cert petition to the U.S. Supreme Court. As such, the U.S. Lower
Court ruling was upheld, which prohibited Argentina from making
payments to exchanged bond holders unless payments were also made
to the plaintiffs in the case. Argentina entered into the grace
period related to its coupon payments on foreign law exchanged
securities (the discount bonds) due on June 30. No agreement was
achieved between the government of Argentina and the holdout
creditors to avert a default upon the expiry of the grace period.

Fitch's downgrade of the local currency IDR by one notch reflects
the agency's view that the economy will suffer from higher
uncertainty and financial volatility following the sovereign
default, especially as the duration of default is unpredictable.
The Argentine economy is already in recession and this is likely
to worsen as the default event affects confidence and potentially
further constrains foreign exchange flows to the country, leading
to exchange rate volatility (official as well as parallel market
rates). Potentially higher fiscal deficits and monetization of
those deficits could further weaken Argentina's economy. Moreover,
pressure on foreign reserves is likely to resume, especially next
year as there are sizeable maturities falling due on some of these
bonds (e.g. Boden 2015).

Fitch's downgrade of the Country Ceiling reflects the view that
capital controls could be tightened further in the context of the
sovereign's limited foreign financing options, especially as the
authorities attempt to prevent a faster decline in international
reserves. This could potentially impair the private sector's
ability to access foreign exchange to meet debt service.

Fitch has downgraded the rating of performing exchanged bonds
under foreign law to 'C' to reflect a very high level of default
risk, particularly given the imminence of the next scheduled
coupon payments. There is significant uncertainty pertaining to
any possible negotiations between the government of Argentina and
the plaintiffs in the case. A negotiated settlement could
facilitate the resumption of timely debt service payments by
Argentina on these securities but such an outcome is subject to
significant uncertainty.

The next coupon payments are due on 30 September (Par bonds) and 2
December (Global 17 bonds). Moreover, cross-default provisions
allow for holders of exchanged bonds series currently not in
default to declare the acceleration of bond payments.

Rating Sensitivities

The Foreign and Local Currency IDRs do not have Rating Outlooks.

In the absence of bond payment acceleration, Fitch would move the
rating of other Foreign Currency exchanged bonds under foreign law
(Pars and Global 17) to 'D' if missed payments on their scheduled
due dates are not remedied at the end of their respective grace
periods.

On the other hand, the resumption of timely debt service on
defaulted bonds will likely lead to the upgrade of the foreign
currency IDR. At such time, Fitch will review the ratings of
Argentina and make an assessment based on the sovereign's capacity
to service debt, its economic fundamentals, and the remaining
litigation risks.


FIDEICOMISO FINANCIERO: Moody's Rates ARS8.7MM Certs. 'C.ar'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo rates
Fideicomiso Financiero AMES IV, a transaction that will be issued
by TMF (Argentina) S.A. - acting solely in its capacity as Issuer
and Trustee.

The securities for this transaction have not yet been placed in
the market. The transaction is pending approval from the Comision
Nacional de Valores, If any assumption or factor Moody's considers
when assigning the ratings change before closing, the ratings may
also change.

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings of the transaction because the
asset and liabilities' structure has changed before issuance.
Moody's has assigned new ratings to this transaction as follows.

- ARS 14,535,086 in Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities (VRDA)
of "Fideicomiso Financiero AMES IV", rated Aaa.ar (sf) (Argentine
National Scale) and B1 (sf) (Global Scale, Local Currency)

- ARS 2,241,463 in Class B Floating Rate Debt Securities (VRDB) of
"Fideicomiso Financiero AMES IV", rated C.ar (sf) (Argentine
National Scale) and C (sf) (Global Scale, Local Currency)

- ARS 8,723,601 in Certificates of "Fideicomiso Financiero AMES
IV", rated C.ar (sf) (Argentine National Scale) and C (sf) (Global
Scale, Local Currency).

Ratings Rationale

The rated securities are payable from the cash flow coming from
the assets of the trust, which is an amortizing pool of
approximately 1,883 eligible personal loans denominated in
Argentine pesos, with a fixed interest rate, originated by the
Asociaci¢n Mutual de la Economia Solidaria ("AMES"), in an
aggregate amount of ARS 15,038,061.17.

These personal loans are granted to employees of the City of
Buenos Aires (rated Caa1/Baa1.ar) using a "C¢digo de Descuento".
The "C¢digo de Descuento" is an identifier granted by a
government-related entity (in this case the City of Buenos Aires)
that allows to deduct a personal loan's installment directly from
the borrowers' paycheck.

The originator access an Internet-based system to verify the
borrower's disposable income and originate the personal loan. The
maximum DTI ratio established by the City of Buenos Aires is 50%.
In this transaction, the City of Buenos will be instructed to
send, on a monthly basis, the scheduled principal and interest on
the securitized loans directly to the trust account. In turn, the
trustee, based on the master servicer's reports will reconcile any
amounts that might be owned to the originator.

The automatic deduction of the loans's installments reduces
significantly the probability of default of the loans, which is
not dependant on the borrower's willingness to pay.

In this type of loan the main causes of delinquency are: (i)
termination of the work relationship between the borrower and the
Government of the City of Buenos Aires, (ii) judicial embargos,
that may limit the maximum disposable income tan can be deducted
by the GCBA, (iii) increases in the Minimum Wage that increases
the minimum disposable income that the employee must receive net
of deductions, (iv) variable components of the wages that are not
collected in a particular month and therefore decreases the
disposable income (v) and unpaid work licenses.

Also, the online validation system prevents fraud and to originate
loans that do not have sufficient disposable income to pay the
installments.

Overall credit enhancement is comprised of 3.34% of subordination
for the Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities. In addition the
transaction has various reserve funds and excess spread.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Factors that may lead to a downgrade of the ratings include an
increase in delinquency levels beyond the level Moody's assumed
when rating this transaction, or a disruption in the flow of
payments from the City of Buenos Aires.

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include the
building of credit enhancement over time due to the turbo
sequential payment structure, when compared with the level of
projected losses in the securitized pool.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's considered the credit enhancement provided in this
transaction through the initial subordination levels for each
rated class, as well as the historical performance of AMES's
portfolio. In addition, Moody's considered factors common to
consumer loans securitizations such as delinquencies, prepayments
and losses; as well as specific factors related to the Argentine
market, such as the probability of an increase in losses if there
are changes in the macroeconomic scenario in Argentina.

These factors were incorporated in a cash flow model that takes
into account all the relevant features of the transaction's assets
and liabilities. Monte Carlo simulations were run, which
determines the expected loss for the rated securities.

In assigning the rating to this transaction, Moody's assumed a
lognormal distribution for defaults on the main pool with a mean
of 5% and a coefficient of variation of 70%. Also, Moody's assumed
prepayments of 20%. These assumptions are derived from the
historical performance to date of AMES' pools.

The model results showed 0.40% expected loss for the Class A
Floating Rate Debt Securities, 100.00% for the Class B Floating
Rate Securities and 100.00% for the Certificates.

Stress Scenarios:

Moody's ran several stress scenarios, including increases in the
default rate assumptions. If default rates were increased 6% from
the base case scenario for the pool (i.e., mean of 11% and a
coefficient of variation of 70%), the ratings of the Class A
Floating Rate Debt Securities would likely be downgraded to B2
(sf). The ratings of the Class B Floating Rate debt securities and
the Certificates would be unchanged.

Moody's also applied a stress to the cash flows by assuming an
interruption of the salary payments of the City of Buenos Aires
for three consecutive months. The assigned ratings are consistent
with this stress scenario.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan ABS Transactions" published in
May 2013.


===============
B A R B A D O S
===============


REDJET CARIBBEAN: Founder Dies at 58
------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that Ian Burns, the founder of REDjet
Caribbean Ltd., operating as REDjet (Airone Caribbean/Airone
Ventures Limited), the airline that was the flag carrier of
Barbados, has died.

Mr. Burns died in his native Ireland.

Mr. Burns, 58, died from a massive heart attack.

The report notes that Barbadian businessman Ralph 'Bizzy' Williams
said that Burns probably died of a broken heart due to the failure
of the low cost carrier.

Mr. Burns, the report recalls, founded Redjet in 2010 with one-way
fares as low as US$9.99 across regional destinations.  The airline
started operating from Barbados to Trinidad in July 2011 and
offered flights to nine destinations around the Caribbean.

The report notes that though widely popular among Caribbean
commuters, the airline never got the institutional support sought
from regional governments, Mr. Williams said.  It ran into
financial problems and collapsed in 2012.

"The man came to Barbados.  He tried to set up a regional airline.
He was frustrated non-stop by technocrats, here and in the other
islands," contended Mr. Williams, an investor who said he lost
millions in the venture, the report relays.

"And I guess he died of a broken heart.  His heart failed him, and
having to go back to Ireland to face all the people who invested
in his project would have been a tough time for him.  He was not a
guy who was trivial with people's money," the report quoted Mr.
Williams as saying.

REDjet Caribbean Ltd., operating as REDjet (Airone
Caribbean/Airone Ventures Limited), was a startup low-cost carrier
(LCC) based at the Grantley Adams International Airport in Christ
Church, Barbados, near Bridgetown.  The privately owned airline,
incorporated in Barbados featured a fleet of McDonnell Douglas MD-
82 and MD-83 aircraft.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO BTG PACTUAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' FC Rating on Sub. Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Banco BTG Pactual S.A.
(BTG Pactual) and its related parties: BTG Investments LP (BTGI)
Banco Panamericano S.A. (PAN), Brazilian Finance & Real Estate
(BFRE), Brazilian Mortgages Cia Hipotecaria (BM) and Brazilian
Securities Cia de Securitizacao (BS) and of its holding company
BTG Pactual Holding S.A. (BTGH). The Rating Outlook remains
Positive.


Rating Action And Rationale

The affirmation of BTG Pactual's ratings reflect Fitch's view that
the acquisition in conjunction with the bank's capital plans will
not have relevant impact on its leverage and its capitalization
should remain within adequate levels. The proposed transaction,
after its completion, will significantly expand BTG's income
diversification and enhance its stability given the recurring
nature of wealth management fees: the largest business engaged by
BSI. In addition to that, Fitch observes that BSI may help to
geographically diversify its assets and operations outside Brazil
(around 35% of expected combined assets), which will bode for its
growing franchise.

In terms of the strengthening of BTG Pactual's franchise, the BSI
acquisition should further expand the bank's distribution
capabilities by almost doubling its Assets Under Management to
roughly USD200 billion and strengthening mainly its Wealth
Management business unit and to a lesser extent its Asset
Management business. Cost synergies should be limited as BSI's
structure and team should be maintained. In Fitch's opinion, the
lower margin wealth management business would not enhance BTG
Pactual's current above average profitability levels, but it will
reduce its expected volatility.

According to information provided by BTG Pactual's management,
this transaction will not encumber its capital base with
intangible assets as goodwill, while the bank remains committed to
preserve an adequate cushion in their regulatory capital ratios to
current minimums, and those even after the changes in place due
the BIS III implementation in Brazil. The transaction valued in
around USD 1,700 million, will be paid 20% via the issuance of new
units (stapled shares of the bank and BTGI) and the rest with
resources of the bank.

Fitch understands that the bank manage several financing options
(own resources, additional capital increases and the issuance of
BIS III complaint securities) that will allow BTG to limit the
possible impact of this transaction on its capital ratios.

Even when integration risk of the intended acquisition exists, as
it does in any other M&A transaction, a solid history of
successful integration and management of M&A process in Brazil and
abroad and the good financial profile of BSI suggests that these
risks are manageable for BTG Pactual. Alternatively, a failure to
complete the proposed acquisition or a large use of debt for its
financing may result in negative implications for the bank credit
profile and ratings.

Measured on a consolidated basis, BTG Pactual's capital and
leverage ratios are expected to slightly deteriorate following the
acquisition even considering the plans to strengthen its capital
base by accessing the market. In Fitch's view, BTG Pactual's gross
leverage measured as tangible assets over equity should remain
around 10x; a level similar to its March 2014 level. Also, the
adjusted leverage ratio and net adjusted leverage ratio should
also remain similar to their current levels and not increase more
than 10x-12x; which are deemed as appropriate for its current
rating and considering its business model.

Regulatory capital ratios are ample and well above the minimum
required, albeit, benefited by the low risk weight of its large
portfolio of government securities. The bank aims to keep a buffer
of 100/200 basis points (bps) compared to the required minimums
during the phase in period of the BIS III rules in Brazil; a
policy Fitch views reasonable.

The Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and National Scale Ratings of
its related parties: BTGI PAN, BFRE, BM and BS are driven by the
expected support from BTG. Under Fitch Rating criteria, these
companies are considered 'strategically important' to the parent,
and its ratings are notched once from BTG's IDR.

BTGH is a pure holding company and its long- and short-term IDRs
and National Scale Ratings are equalized to those of BTG thanks to
its moderate leverage levels and favorable regulatory framework
towards financial groups in Brazil.

PAN's Viability Rating (VR) remains limited by its still weak
operating performance, even though some improvements in asset
quality have been observed. Counterbalancing these aspects, the
bank enjoys a stable funding base, explained by committed funding
and liquidity lines from its other controlling shareholder: Caixa
Economica Federal (Caixa; foreign currency LT IDR of 'BBB'/Outlook
Stable) and an improved business model, derived from the
experience of the new management appointed by BTG since 2011. The
unfavorable market scenario has not allowed the bank to grow as
fast as it would expect and this has delayed some profitability
improvements. Some cost controls measures taken recently as well
as two capital injections confirmed by its two controlling
shareholders and announced this year should benefit the bank's
results in the coming periods.

Rating Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers - VRs and IDRs

BTG Pactual's VR and IDRs may be upgraded if the bank is able to
maintain its consolidated net adjusted leverage within an
acceptable range (net adjusted leverage below 9.0x); maintain its
operating ROAA around 2%, reflecting continued revenue growth and
diversification into recurrent fee income. A failure to achieve
this target may trigger the review of the Rating Outlook to
Stable.

The ratings may be negatively affected if the bank leverage and
capitalization levels deteriorate more than 15% compared to its
current levels and/or if its operating ROAA is reduced in a
sustained manner below 1.5%. In addition, sudden deterioration of
the operating environment, leverage, profitability or a
troublesome performance of one or some of its subsidiaries may
negatively affect BTG Pactual's ratings.

A possible failure of the BSI transaction with effects on BTG
Pactual franchise and/or funding may not only trigger a change on
the Outlook to Stable but also a review of the ratings with
possible negative implications.

PAN's VR may be upgraded after a sustained improvement of its
operational results (operating ROAA above 0.5%), that helps to
maintain its Fitch Core Capital Ratio in levels superior to 7% and
its funding profile remains aligned with the tenor and
characteristics of its assets. A negative rating action may be
triggered by a longer than expected breakeven point of its
operations and a backdrop of capital ratios reducing to low
levels.

Rating Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers - Support and Support
Rating Floors

Given its nature of merchant/investment bank and relative small
deposit base; Fitch believes that there is a possibility of
government support, but it cannot be relied upon; hence BTG
Pactual Support Rating is a '5' and its Support Rating Floor
remains in 'NF'.

Rating Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers - Subordinated Debt and
Other Hybrids Securities

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by BTG Pactual
are all notched down from the banks' VRs; as such these securities
are notched twice from BTG Pactual's VR: one notch lower due to
Loss Severity features and its subordinated status, and a one-
notch deduction due to moderate risk of non-performance. The
subordinated debt and hybrid capital ratings are primarily
sensitive to any change in the VR of the bank.

Rating Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers - PAN, BFRE, BM and BS

PAN, BFRE, BM and BS are 'strategically important subsidiaries'
for BTG Pactual and hence, notched once from the parent IDR. Fitch
believes that despite its current relative small size and
incipient earnings generation compared to the parent revenue
source; these entities are part of the business plan of BTG
Pactual and the tools to implement their diversification plans in
the medium term towards consumer banking, real estate financing
and other capital market related activities. The IDRs and National
Scale Ratings of BTG Pactual's subsidiaries may be affected if
their strategic importance and ability to provide support from BTG
Pactual changes; even though this scenario has a low probability
of occurrence.

Rating Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers - BTGI

BTGI's long-term IDR rating reflects its role as an integral BTG
Pactual group and the implicit support BTGI receives from BTGH.
According to Fitch's criteria, BTGI is deemed as a core part of
BTG Pactual group. Despite its evident links with the group
(franchise, common management, relevance of its revenue stream and
completely aligned business model); BTGI is not a direct
subsidiary of BTGH; hence, its rating its notched once from the
rating of BTGH, the primary source of support to the entity.

Changes to the rating of BTG Pactual or BTGH may lead to changes
to BTGI's ratings. A material deterioration of BTGI's financial
profile where sustained losses and/or a significant increase of
its leverage may hinder the overall financial profile of BTG
group, may trigger a rating downgrade.

Rating Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers - BTGH

BTGH's long and short-term IDRs and National Scale Ratings are
equalized to those of its sole operating subsidiary, Banco BTG
Pactual S.A.'s (BTG Pactual, IDR 'BBB-'/Outlook Stable). BTGH is a
pure holding company and directly controls 71.9% of BTG Pactual.
The equalization of the ratings is based on the high correlation
between the probability of default for BTGH and the bank. Both are
incorporated in the same jurisdiction, being overseen by Brazilian
authorities.

Changes to the rating of BTG Pactual may lead to changes to BTGH's
ratings. Also, an increase of its double leverage ratio above 120%
or a deterioration of its debt service metrics may result in a
downgrade of BTGH's ratings.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions:

BTG Pactual

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BBB-',
Outlook Positive;
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'F3';
-- Viability Rating affirmed at 'bbb-';
-- Support Rating affirmed at '5';
-- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'No Floor';
-- Long-term National Rating affirmed at 'AA(bra)', Outlook
Positive;
-- Short-term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(bra)';
-- Senior unsecured notes, due in March 2016, foreign currency
rating affirmed at 'BBB-';
-- Senior unsecured notes, due in July 2016, foreign currency
rating affirmed at 'BBB-';
-- Senior unsecured notes, due in September 2017, foreign
currency rating affirmed at 'BBB-';
-- Senior unsecured notes due in January 2020, foreign currency
rating affirmed at 'BBB-';
-- Senior unsecured notes due in January 2034, foreign currency
rating affirmed at 'BBB-';
-- Subordinated notes due in September 2022, foreign currency
rating affirmed at 'BB'.

BTGI
-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB+';
Outlook Positive;
-- Support Rating affirmed at '2';
-- Senior guaranteed notes affirmed at 'BBB-'.

BTG Holding
-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BBB-';
Outlook Positive;
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'F3';
-- Support Rating affirmed at '5';
-- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'NF';
-- Long-term National Rating affirmed at 'AA(bra)'; Outlook
Positive;
-- Short-term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(bra)'.

PAN

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB+',
Outlook Positive;
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'B';
-- Viability Rating affirmed at 'b';
-- Support Rating affirmed at '3';
-- Long-term National Rating affirmed at 'AA-(bra)', Outlook
Positive;
-- Short-term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(bra)'.

BFRE

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB+',
Outlook Positive;
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'B';
-- Long-term National Rating affirmed at 'AA-(bra)', Outlook
Positive;
-- Short-term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(bra)'.

Brazilian Mortgages Cia. Hipotecaria (BM)

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB+',
Outlook Positive;
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'B';
-- Long-term National Rating affirmed at 'AA-(bra)', Outlook
Positive;
-- Short-term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(bra)'.

Brazilian Securities Cia. de Securitizacao (BS)

-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB+',
Outlook Positive;
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'B';
-- Long-term National Rating affirmed at 'AA-(bra)', Outlook
Positive;
-- Short-term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(bra)'.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


DYNAMIC OPPORTUNITY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 19
----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Dynamic Opportunity Fund, Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by Aug. 19, 2014, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on July 8, 2014.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ogier
          c/o Joanne Huckle
          Telephone: (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: (345) 949-9877
          c/o Ogier
          89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1-9007
          Cayman Islands


HOLIDAY PARTNERS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 19
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Holiday Partners Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by Aug. 19, 2014, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 4, 2014.

The company's liquidator is:

          Appleby Trust (Cayman) Ltd
          c/o Richard Gordon
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4900
          75 Fort Street
          P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


ICONS LTD: A.M. Best Lowers Rating on Class C Notes From 'bb'
-------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. Best Co. has downgraded the debt ratings on five tranches and
affirmed the debt rating on one additional tranche on a multi-
tranche collateralized debt obligation (CDO) co-issued by two
bankruptcy remote special purpose vehicles: ICONS, Ltd. (Cayman
Islands) and ICONS CDO Corp. (Delaware) (collectively known as
ICONS and issuers).  The outlook for all ratings is stable.

The principal balance of the rated notes is collateralized by a
pool of trust preferred securities, surplus notes and secondary
market securities (collectively, the capital securities),
primarily issued by small- to medium-size insurance companies.
The capital securities are pledged as security to the notes.
Interest paid by the issuers of the capital securities are the
primary source of funds to pay operating expenses of the issuers
and interest on the notes.  Repayment of the principal for the
notes is primarily funded from the redemption of the capital
securities.

These rating actions primarily reflect: (1) the current issuer
credit ratings (ICRs) of the remaining issuers of the capital
securities and the number of terminated capital securities; (2) a
stress of up to 250% on the assumed marginal default rates of
insurers (derived from Best's Idealized Default Rates of
Insurers); (3) the amount of capital securities considered to be
in distress; (4) recoveries of 0% after defaults of the capital
securities; and (5) qualitative factors such as the effect of
interest rate spikes; subordination level associated with each
rated tranche; the adjacency of very high investment grade ratings
to very low non-investment grade ratings in the transaction's
capital structure; and the possibility that additional redemptions
of highly rated entities will leave lower-rated companies in the
collateral pool.

The debt ratings could be upgraded or downgraded and/or the
outlook revised if there are material changes in the ICRs of the
remaining insurance carriers, an increase in the number of
defaulted capital securities or significant termination of the
number of existing capital securities.

The following debt ratings have been downgraded:

ICONS, Ltd. and ICONS CDO Corp.

-- to "a+" from "aa" on $40 million Class B Senior Notes Due 2034

-- to "b+" from "bb" on $8 million Class C-1 Deferrable Mezzanine
    Notes Due 2034

-- to "b+" from "bb" on $20 million Class C-2 Deferrable
    Mezzanine Notes Due 2034

-- to "b+" from "bb" on $6 million Class C-3 Deferrable Mezzanine
    Notes Due 2034

-- to "ccc+" from "b+" on $20 million Class D Deferrable
    Mezzanine Notes Due 2034

The following debt rating has been affirmed:

ICONS, Ltd. and ICONS CDO Corp.

-- "aaa" on $172 million Class A Senior Notes Due 2034


NCH CASUALTY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
On July 9, 2014, the members of NCH Casualty Insurance SPC
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Russell Smith
          c/o Derek Larner
          Telephone: (345) 815 4555
          e-mail: dlarner@bdo.ky
          BDO CRI (Cayman) Ltd.
          Floor 2-Building 3, Governors Square
          23 Lime Tree Bay Ave
          P.O. Box 31229 Grand Cayman KY1 1205
          Cayman Islands


PROVENA HEALTH: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on July 1, 2014, the members of
Provena Health Assurance SPC resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

The company's liquidator is:

          Marsh Management Services Cayman Ltd.
          Governors Square, 23 Lime Tree Bay Avenue
          Building 4, Floor 2
          P.O. Box 1051, KY1-1102, Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands


RIVERSIDE GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 28
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Riverside Global Value Fund are required to file
their proofs of debt by Aug. 28, 2014, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 7, 2014.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          Mourant Ozannes
          Reference: NDL
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4123
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 4647
          Reference: Peter Goulden
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4123
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 4647
          94 Solaris Avenue Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


SUERTE LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 27
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Suerte Limited are required to file their proofs
of debt by Aug. 27, 2014, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 28, 2014.

The company's liquidator is:

          Edward Martin-Du Pan
          Wardour Management Services Limited
          Telephone: (345) 945-3301
          Facsimile: (345) 945-3302
          P O Box 10147 Grand Cayman KY1-1002
          Cayman Islands


TAMWEEL RESIDENTIAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on July 4, 2014, the members of
Tamweel Residential AbS CI (1) Ltd resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited
          P.O. Box 1984, Boundary Hall
          Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue
          Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


TERAMO FUND: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 19
--------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Teramo Fund are required to file their proofs of
debt by Aug. 19, 2014, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 10, 2014.

The company's liquidator is:

          Appleby Trust (Cayman) Ltd
          c/o Richard Gordon
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4900
          75 Fort Street, PO Box 1350
          Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


TL SHARE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on July 8, 2014, the members of
TL Share Holding Corporation resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited
          P.O. Box 1984, Boundary Hall
          Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue
          Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================


PUERTO RICO: S&P Affirms 'BB' GO Debt Rating; Outlook Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has affirmed its 'BB' general
obligation (GO) and 'BB-' appropriation ratings on the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico following an examination of Puerto
Rico's enacted fiscal 2015 budget, updated quarterly disclosure,
and current and projected liquidity position.  The outlook is
negative.

"We believe that the combined cash position of the commonwealth
and the Government Development Bank, which provides liquidity to
the commonwealth and plans to assist Puerto Rico in its tax and
revenue note cash flow financing, is currently adequate for the
assigned speculative-grade rating based on our view of Puerto
Rico's projections," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst David
Hitchcock.  The current speculative-grade ratings and negative
outlook continue to reflect S&P's opinion of the commonwealth's
ongoing fiscal pressures.  "We are concerned about several of the
risks outlined in the July quarterly disclosure report, which we
believe continue to point to Puerto Rico's weakened ability and
willingness to repay its debt obligations," Mr. Hitchcock added.

"We have also affirmed our 'BBB' ratings on Puerto Rico Sales Tax
Financing Corp.'s (COFINA) first-lien sales tax-secured debt and
our 'BBB-' ratings on COFINA's second-lien sales tax-secured debt
based on what we view as strong legal protections on the security
of pledged sales tax revenues, tempered by the potential in our
view for a decreased willingness to pay either GO or COFINA debt
given a choice between paying governmental functions and debt
repayment if general fund liquidity worsened significantly.  Our
rating on rum tax and hotel tax debt is also affirmed and remains
on a par with our GO rating, based on the our view of the
potential diversion of revenue in favor of GO bondholders under
the Puerto Rico Constitution, while our rating on the Highways and
Transportation Authority is affirmed at 'B' due to our view of the
authority being potentially subject to Puerto Rico's recent debt
restructuring act for public corporations.  The outlook on all of
these ratings is negative," S&P said.

"We had anticipated that the commonwealth would have been in a
position to exhibit a stronger commitment to its GO debt
obligations after having obtained $3.5 billion in financing -- an
amount well above what it had previously indicated would be
necessary to fund its operations for the current and next fiscal
years.  In addition, as we understood it, the recently enacted
restructuring legislation was intended to erect a level of
protection around the commonwealth's GO bonds.  Instead, we
believe there are risks relating to timely repayment of debt,
which risks continue to be a significant focus of disclosure.  The
commonwealth indicates that, despite this disclosure, it is firmly
committed to servicing its GO and other tax-supported obligations
and has provided updated liquidity information to support this.
We will continue to monitor budget and liquidity developments to
assess future credit direction and expect a regular flow of timely
information and disclosure from the commonwealth in order to
assess this," S&P added.

"The negative outlook reflects our view of Puerto Rico's weak
economic trends, strained finances, a scheduled increase in debt
service in fiscal 2016, continued deferred pension payments, and
the potential difficulty in accessing the market for liquidity
purposes if unanticipated budget shortfalls develop.  In
particular, lower-than-forecast revenue collections in fiscal 2015
could pose near-term problems over our one-year outlook horizon.
If we believe additional liquidity pressure develops that could
create a reduced willingness in the commonwealth to repay
creditors in order to preserve other governmental functions, we
could lower the ratings," S&P noted.


PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: S&P Lowers Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'CCC'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has lowered its rating on
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's (PREPA) power revenue bonds
two notches to 'CCC' from 'B-'.  The rating remains on CreditWatch
with negative implications, where S&P originally placed it
June 18, 2014.

PREPA has $8.3 billion of power revenue bonds outstanding.  A
pledge of the electric system's net revenues secures the bonds.

The lower rating indicates that, in S&P's opinion, the authority's
debt is vulnerable to nonpayment, and depends upon favorable
business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to
meet its commitment.  In the event of adverse business, financial,
or economic conditions, PREPA is not likely to have the capacity
to meet its financial commitment on its obligations.

"We believe that the absence of an overarching solution to
liquidity issues and the structural imbalance among its revenues,
operating expenses and debt service commitments suggests an
increasing likelihood that the authority will not be able to
satisfy debt service obligations on time and will avail itself of
the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery
Act, signed into law June 28, 2014, and restructure all or
portions of its debt," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Judith Waite.

The law "allows public corporations, among other things, to adjust
their debts in the interest of all creditors affected thereby;
provides procedures for the orderly enforcement and, if necessary,
the restructuring of debt in a manner consistent with the
Commonwealth Constitution and the U.S. Constitution; and maximizes
returns to all stakeholders by providing them going concern value
based on each obligor's capacity to pay."

PREPA's inability to successfully negotiate renewal of liquidity
facilities needed to purchase oil has compounded its weakened
financial position.  The negotiating deadline for the revolving
credit that matured in January was extended to July 31, and if the
facility is not renewed, the authority will have to repay the
$146 million outstanding, and probably relatively quickly.  PREPA
also has $525 million outstanding under a second revolving credit
facility matures Aug. 14, 2014. If not renewed, the authority will
have to repay the $525 million outstanding on that date.
Normally, it repays the lines with revenue associated with fuel
costs recovered from customers.  However, PREPA does not have
surplus liquidity to repay the amounts.

Although not making credit facility payments is not a default
under the revenue bond indenture, S&P believes the authority's
inability to repay the amounts outstanding will increase the
likelihood that it will restructure its debt.

The CreditWatch placement reflects an ongoing structural imbalance
among revenues, operating expenses and debt service commitments,
compounded by liquidity pressures.  S&P could lower the rating
further if these mismatches remain unresolved and the likelihood
of meeting debt service obligations erodes.  S&P expects to
resolve the CreditWatch placement within the next three months.


PUERTO RICO: Lenders to Utility Extend Payment Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------
Michael Corkery, writing for The New York Times' DealBook,
reported that lenders to Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
(PREPA) are giving the beleaguered utility another two weeks
before it has to make past-due payments on its lines of credit --
a roughly $250 million line from Citigroup and a $550 million line
from a syndicate of banks.

The agreement allows Prepa to delay until Aug. 14 certain payments
that were due last month, the report related.  According to the
report, if Citigroup and the other lenders force Prepa to pay
immediately, it could trigger the authority's restructuring and
increase the likelihood of losses for the banks.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From July 28 to August 1, 2014
-----------------------------------------------------------


Issuer                     Coupon   Maturity   Currency   Price
------                     ------   --------   --------   -----

BES Finance Ltd                 2.9              EUR     211913000
PDVSA                             6  11/15/2026  USD    4500000000
ESFG International Ltd          5.8              EUR      52950000
PDVSA                             6  5/16/2024   USD    5000000000
PDVSA                           5.4  4/12/2027   USD    3000000000
Mongolian Mining Corp           8.9  3/29/2017   USD     600000000
PDVSA                           5.5  4/12/2037   USD    1500000000
Hindili Industry                8.6  11/4/2015   USD     380000000
BES Finance Ltd                 4.5              EUR      95767000
Automotores Gildemeister SA     8.3  5/24/2021   USD     400000000
SMU SA                          7.8  2/8/2020    USD     300000000
NQ Mobile Inc                     4  10/15/2018  USD     172500000
Inversiones Alsacia SA            8  8/18/2018   USD     347300000
Venezuela Governement           7.7  4/21/2025   USD    1599817000
Glorious Property Holdings Ltd   13  3/4/2018    USD     400000000
Renhe Commercial                 13  3/10/2016   USD     600000000
Bank Austria                    1.9              EUR      97608000
China Precisoin                 7.3  2/4/2018    HKD    1028000000
BCP Finance Co                  2.4              EUR   99063406.25
Automotores Gildemeister SA     6.8  1/15/2023   USD     300000000
BA-CA Finance Cayman 2 Ltd        2              EUR      51481000
Argentina Bonar Bonds            26  9/10/2015   ARS    5424358000
Inversora de Electrica          6.5  9/26/2017   USD     130263886
BCP Finance Co                  4.2              EUR      72112000
Mongolian Mining Corp           8.9  3/29/2017   USD     600000000
Argentina Government            4.3  12/31/2033  JPY    5840497000
PDVSA                             6  5/16/2024   USD    5000000000
Argentina Boden Bonds             2  9/30/2014   ARS     930445250
PDVSA                             6  11/15/2026  USD    4500000000
Greenfields Petroleum Corp        9  5/31/2017   CAD      23750000
Hindili Industry                8.6  11/4/2015   USD     380000000
Argentina Government            4.3  12/31/2033  JPY    2553017000
Argentina Bocon                   2  1/3/2016    ARS    1608749924
Argentina Government            0.5  12/31/2038  JPY   21037843000
Automotores Gildemeister SA     8.3  5/24/2021   USD     400000000
Caixa Geral De Depositos Finance  1              EUR      44885000
SMU SA                          7.8              USD     300000000
Renhe Commercial                 13  3/10/2016   USD     600000000
Caixa Geral De Depositos Finance  2              EUR      65843000
Inversiones Alsacia SA            8  8/18/2018   USD     347300000
Automotores Gildemeister SA     6.8  1/15/2023   USD     300000000
BPI Capital Finance Ltd         2.9              EUR      15290000
Banif Finance Ltd               1.6              EUR      42234000
Banco BPI SA/Cayman Islands     4.2  11/14/2035  EUR      20000000
Empresas La Polar SA            3.8  10/10/2017  CLP       5000000
City of Buenos Aires Argentina    2  1/28/2020   USD     146771000
Aguas Andinas SA                4.2  12/1/2026   CLP    3289471.68
City of Buenos Aires Argentina    2  12/20/2019  USD     113229000
Venezuela Governement             7  3/31/2038   USD    1250003000
Empresa de Transporte           5.5  7/15/2027   CLP     3732799.8
Cia Cervecerias Unidas SA         4  12/1/2024   CLP       1050000
Almendral Telecomunicaciones SA 3.5  12/15/2014  CLP     644441.04
Cia Sud Americana de Vapores SA 6.4  10/1/2022   CLP     607142.76
Decimo Primer                   4.5  10/25/2041  USD      37800000
Provincia del Chaco               4  12/4/2026   USD   10111047.85
Ruta de Bosque                  6.3  3/15/2021   CLP    5062781.25
Talcan Chillan                  2.8  12/15/2019  CLP    2978764.16
EMP Ferrocarriles Estado        6.5  1/1/2026    CLP     788572.14




                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
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written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


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