TCRLA_Public/141223.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Tuesday, December 23, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 253


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ALTO PALERMO: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' FC Rating; Outlook Negative
ARGENTINA: US Bond Investors Balk at Swap Offer
ARGENTINA: Says it Won't Give in to "Extortion" in Debt Dispute
IRSA INVERSIONES: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' FC Rating; Outlook Negative


B R A Z I L

BES INVESTIMENTO: Moody's Confirms B2 Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating
BES INVESTIMENTO: Moody's Confirms B2 Long-Term Deposit Rating
BV FINANCEIRA: Moody's Cuts Mezz. Sub. Shares Rating to Caa3.br
OAS S.A.: Moody's Cuts Rating on Guaranteed Debt Issuances to B2
OSX BRASIL: Creditors Approve Company's Recovery Plan


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

BASTION CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
BRIGHT LIGHT: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
DELTA SPV1: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
EASTERN WISDOM: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
GEELY AUTOMOBILE: Profit Warning No Impact on Moody's Ba2 CFR

LIWA DEAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
MA YORK: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
MARK IV-LIG: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
MINETTE GP: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
MWAM STRATEGIC: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

QUARTER LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
STRONGHOLD CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
TRAFIN 2012-1: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
YORK EUROPEAN DAMA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
YORK EUROPEAN TRADING: Commences Liquidation Proceedings


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Exports to Grow 7%, IDB Says


E C U A D O R

ECUADOR: Signs MOU with Russian Oil Giant Rosneft
ECUADOR: IDB Oks US$300MM Loan to Help Protect Social Spending
ECUADOR: Moody's Upgrades Senior Unsecured Rating to B3


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA RAILWAY: Reduces Debt, Still Seeking Divestment


V E N E Z U E L A

BANESCO, BANCO UNIVERSAL: Fitch Cuts IDR to 'CCC'
CORPORACION ELECTRICA: Fitch Cuts IDR to 'CCC'; Outlook Negative
PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'CCC'


X X X X X X X X X

* Large Companies With Insolvent Balance Sheets


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


ALTO PALERMO: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' FC Rating; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC-' foreign
currency ratings on Alto Palermo S.A. (APSA).  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'CCC' local currency ratings on the company.  The
outlook remains negative.

S&P continues to view APSA's credit quality as highly intertwined
with that of its parent IRSA Inversiones y Representaciones S.A.
(IRSA; CCC-/Negative/--) and Cresud S.A.C.I.F. y A. (not rated),
the ultimate controlling shareholder.  This stems from the
companies' high degree of integration and S&P's assessment of the
potential benefits of increasing dividends from lower-leveraged
companies, such as APSA, to fund those with weaker liquidity in an
event of financial distress.  In addition, APSA generates 75% the
bulk of cash flow for IRSA, contributing about 75% to overall
EBITDA in the last 12 months.  Cresud owns 64.87% of IRSA, which
owns 95.73% of APSA.

The 'CCC-' foreign currency rating on APSA incorporates S&P's
views of the short- and intermediate-term prospects for economic
conditions in Argentina following the sovereign's selective
default on July 30, 2014.  S&P believes that the stress scenario
associated with the potential implementation of T&C controls could
lead to rapid deterioration in APSA's financial position.

However, S&P believes that the company benefits from certain
mitigating factors (in particular, existing liquidity sources
including cash in hand and liquid assets in foreign currency) that
would allow it to meet its financial obligations, at least for
some time, cushioning the blow from T&C controls and harsher
macroeconomic conditions.  As a result, the 'CCC' local currency
rating on IRSA is above the foreign currency ratings, which are
still capped by S&P's T&C assessment on Argentina.


ARGENTINA: US Bond Investors Balk at Swap Offer
-----------------------------------------------
Paul Kilby and Natalie Harrison at Reuters report that Argentina
is struggling to win over US-based investors on a bond exchange
designed to lower refinancing risks and possibly give it more
leverage in negotiations with holdout creditors.

The sovereign, which launched a tender and exchange offer on local
law bonds Dec. 10, may find a healthy local bid from the state-
owned pension system, according to Reuters.

Yet several US-based holders of Argentine debt contacted by IFR
said they had refused to take part in the deal, citing its poor
economics and possible legal risks, the report notes.

"I don't think it makes sense to engage in the swap, when you can
execute at better prices in the market," Reuters quoted Marco
Santamaria, a portfolio manager at AllianceBernstein, as saying.
"Most issuers give you an incentive to participate in a swap
and/or new issue . . . here you are paying a premium.  I don't get
it," Mr. Santamaria added.

Reuters notes that a Boston-based portfolio manager said his firm
ran the risk of exposing itself to legal action from its clients
if it agreed to such unfavorable terms.

"As a fiduciary, I could get sued by my investors for doing
something that on the face of it is so disadvantageous," Mr.
Santamaria said, the report relays.  "Our internal committee and
the mutual fund's board are going to come to me and ask for an
explanation. It is really, really difficult," Mr. Santamaria
added.

The report discloses that Argentina is offering holders of its 7%
Boden 2015 various options.  They can either cash in at 97 cents
on the dollar or swap into 8.75% Bonar 2024s at 99.70 for every
100 of the 2015s exchanged, plus accrued interest, the report
notes.

The country is also looking to tap the Bonar 2024s for up to US$3
billion at a price of 96.20.  The offer expired on Dec. 12.

                         Poor Economics

Observers, however, question the economics of the trade, given
that Boden 2015s were quoted on Dec. 10 morning at 97.60-97.85 and
the Bonar 2024 at 94.34-95.25, Reuters notes.

Effectively, an investor could sell the Boden 2015s at a higher
price and buy the Bonar 2024s at a lower level, the report relays.

The approximately US$3.25 billion in outstanding Bonar 2024s,
which were issued under Argentine law earlier this year as part of
a US$5 billion settlement with Spanish oil company Repsol, are not
covered by a US court injunction that prevents the country from
servicing its restructured bonds unless it also makes holdout
creditors whole, the report says.

Failure to comply with that injunction pushed Argentina into a new
default this summer on nearly US$28 billion of its restructured
foreign-law bonds, the report discloses.

The 2024 notes, however, might not be immune from litigation risks
either, as holdout investors could argue that they should rank
pari passu with Argentina's restructured bonds and ask the courts
to bring them under the injunction, the report says.

"Those contemplating participation (in the swap) don't seem to
realize that there is a significant risk that these bonds could be
brought under the pari passu injunction," said a source close to
the holdout creditors, the report notes.  "Holdouts could seek to
secure this ruling in the future," the source added.

The report discloses that others believe that convincing a judge
to agree to such changes may prove more difficult.

While agreeing that holdout claims on Argentine-law bonds
denominated in foreign currency might carry some weight, a lawyer
familiar with the situation said widening the scope of the
injunction may be a long shot, the report relays.

"A lot of the local-law bonds are carved out from the definition
of external indebtedness and tracing the roots of all of these
seems quite complicated," the lawyer added.

                           *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, on Aug. 1, 2014,
reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30
after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million
interest payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a court-
appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the
country and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds
that the country had defaulted on in 2001.  A U.S. judge had ruled
that the interest payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds
led by Elliott Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they
claimed.  The country hasn't been able to access international
credit markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.

As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD).  The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5.  The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively.  The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings downgraded
Argentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'
from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon
payments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after the
expiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30.  According to
Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch
has downgraded the affected securities to 'D'.  In addition, Fitch
has affirmed:

   -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD';
   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'RD';
   -- Country Ceiling at 'CCC'.
   -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Global 17) at
      'C';
   -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
      Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law at 'D'.


ARGENTINA: Says it Won't Give in to "Extortion" in Debt Dispute
---------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that President Cristina Fernandez's Cabinet chief
said that Argentina will continue to pursue the same strategy and
not give in to "extortion" from U.S. hedge funds seeking full
payment on defaulted debt.

The government will not cave to "extortion of any kind (from)
privileged creditors (who won) a judgment that is shameful and has
been roundly repudiated" internationally, Jorge Capitanich said,
referring to the hedge funds' legal victory in a U.S. federal
court, according to EFE News.

                          *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, on Aug. 1, 2014,
reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30
after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million
interest payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a court-
appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the
country and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds
that the country had defaulted on in 2001.  A U.S. judge had ruled
that the interest payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds
led by Elliott Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they
claimed.  The country hasn't been able to access international
credit markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.

As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD).  The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5.  The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively.  The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings downgraded
Argentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'
from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon
payments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after the
expiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30.  According to
Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch
has downgraded the affected securities to 'D'.  In addition, Fitch
has affirmed:

   -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD';
   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'RD';
   -- Country Ceiling at 'CCC'.
   -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Global 17) at
      'C';
   -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
      Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law at 'D'.


IRSA INVERSIONES: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' FC Rating; Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC-' foreign
currency ratings on IRSA Inversiones y Representaciones S.A.
(IRSA).  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC' local currency
rating on the company.  The outlook remains negative.

The 'CCC-' foreign currency rating on IRSA incorporates S&P's
views of the short- and intermediate-term prospects for economic
conditions in Argentina following the sovereign's selective
default on July 30, 2014.  S&P believes that the stress scenario
associated with the potential implementation of T&C controls could
lead to rapid deterioration in IRSA's financial position.

However, S&P believes that the company benefits from certain
mitigating factors (in particular, existing liquidity sources
including cash in hand and liquid assets in foreign currency) that
would allow it to meet its financial obligations, at least for
some time, cushioning the blow from T&C controls and harsher
macroeconomic conditions.  As a result, the 'CCC' local currency
rating on IRSA is above the foreign currency ratings, which are
still capped by S&P's T&C assessment on Argentina.

S&P views IRSA's credit quality as highly intertwined with that of
its subsidiary, Alto Palermo S.A. (APSA; CCC-/Negative/--) and
Cresud S.A.C.I.F. y A. (not rated), the ultimate controlling
shareholder.  This stems from the companies' high degree of
integration and S&P's assessment of the potential benefits of
increasing dividends from lower-leveraged companies, such as APSA,
to fund those with weaker liquidity in an event of financial
distress.  Cresud owns 64.87% of IRSA, which owns 95.73% of APSA.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BES INVESTIMENTO: Moody's Confirms B2 Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. has confirmed its senior unsecured
local currency debt rating of B2 and its National Scale debt
rating of Ba2.br on BES Investimento do Brasil S.A. (BESI Brasil).
Moody's has also changed the outlook to developing from review for
downgrade.

This rating action follows the 8 December 2014 announcement of the
sale of BESI Brasil's controller. Under this agreement, Novo Banco
S.A. (B2 review for downgrade, E/ca review for upgrade) will sell
its entire stake in Banco Espirito Santo de Investimentos S.A.
(unrated), to Haitong Securities Company Limited (unrated). BESI
Brasil is 80%-owned by Banco Esp¡rito Santo de Investimentos S.A.
The sale is now subject to regulatory approval.

The following ratings assigned to BES Investimento do Brasil S.A.
were confirmed, with outlook changed to developing:

Long-term local currency senior unsecured debt rating of B2

Long-term national scale debt rating of Ba2.br

Ratings Rationale

Moody's senior unsecured local currency debt rating derives from
BESI Brasil's B2 global local currency deposit rating, which
incorporates the bank's standalone baseline credit assessment of
b2.

The change in outlook to developing follows the change in BESI
Brasil's global local currency deposit rating outlook, which
reflects the announcement that its controlling parent is to be
acquired by one of the leading securities firms in China, reducing
the risks that further negative developments at BESI Brasil's
ultimate parent, Novo Banco, could have on the Brazilian
subsidiary's franchise and strategy. The developing outlook on the
deposit ratings incorporates the expectation that the change in
ownership eliminates the concern derived from uncertainties around
a long-term problem solving process at Novo Banco that could have
impaired BESI Brasil's performance, and which was a key factor
behind Moody's ratings review.

Moody's noted that BESI Brasil's b2 standalone credit assessment
adequately captures the bank's intrinsic credit profile, as
reflected in its modest profitability and liquidity. Over the past
months, BESI Brasil has taken measures to contain any contagion
arising from its parent bank, including the sale of non-strategic
assets and particularly the protection of its liquidity, supported
by the short duration of its assets relative to liabilities. The
decision to preserve cash ahead of a about BRL800 million euro
bond maturity in the first-quarter 2015 has led to limited new
business generation and to earnings that remain below target, also
because of the weak economic environment. As a result of its
deleveraging, BESI Brasil's capital position remains a credit
strength.

In Moody's view, earnings pressure will subside as BESI Brasil's
franchise is preserved and asset and liability management
gradually normalizes. A return to business-as-usual activity is
likely to be gradual, because it will depend on the timeframe for
the closing of the acquisition, as well as the recovery in
investment banking business in Brazil. In the first-half 2014, the
bank generated net income of BRL25 million, up 77% year over year,
which creates a cushion for year-end results.

Moody's also notes that Haitong's acquisition is part of its
geographic expansion strategy in international markets, and BESI
Brasil is one of the largest subsidiaries of Banco Espirito Santo
de Investimentos S.A.

The last rating action on BESI was on 22 August 2014, when Moody's
downgraded BESI's senior unsecured local currency debt rating to
B2 from B1 and the National Scale debt rating to Ba2.br from
Baa2.br, and kept all of ratings on review for further downgrade.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in July 2014.

BES Investimento do Brasil S.A. is headquartered in Sao Paulo,
Brazil. It reported total assets of BRL7.4 billion ($3.4 billion)
and equity of BRL679.3 million ($308.4 million) as of 30 June
2014.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in
June 2014 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale Ratings to
Global Scale Ratings".


BES INVESTIMENTO: Moody's Confirms B2 Long-Term Deposit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed BES Investimento do Brasil
S.A. (BESI Brasil)'s B2 long-term global local- and foreign-
currency deposit ratings and its Ba2.br long-term Brazilian
national scale deposit rating. The rating action concludes the
review for downgrade, initiated in August 2014. The outlook on the
ratings is developing.

Moody's also affirmed, with a stable outlook, BESI Brasil's E+
unsupported bank financial strength rating, which maps to a
standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) of b2. The Not Prime
short-term global local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings and
the BR-4 short-term Brazilian national scale deposit ratings were
also affirmed.

This rating action follows the 8 December 2014 announcement of the
sale of Banco Espirito Santo de Investimentos S.A. (unrated), BESI
Brasil's controlling shareholder, to Haitong Securities Company
Limited (unrated). Under this agreement, the ultimate parent bank,
Novo Banco S.A. (B2 review for downgrade, E/ca review for upgrade)
will sell its entire stake in Banco Espirito Santo de
Investimentos to the Chinese securities firm. BESI Brasil is 80%-
owned by Banco Esp¡rito Santo de Investimentos S.A. The conclusion
of the acquisition is now subject to approval by regulators in
Brazil, China and Portugal.

The following ratings assigned to BES Investimento do Brasil S.A.
were confirmed, with a developing outlook:

Long-term global local-currency deposit rating of B2

Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating of B2

Long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating of B2

Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of Ba2.br

Senior Unsecured Program foreign-currency of (P)B2

The following ratings were affirmed, with stable outlook:

Bank financial strength rating of E+

The following ratings were affirmed:

Short-term global local-currency deposit rating of Not Prime

Short-term foreign-currency deposit rating of Not Prime

Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-4

Short-term program of (P)NP

Ratings Rationale

In confirming BESI Brasil's deposit ratings, Moody's took into
account the announcement that its controlling parent is to be
acquired by one of the leading securities firms in China. The
acquisition, yet to be approved by regulators in Brazil, China and
Portugal, reduces the risks that further negative developments at
BESI Brasil's ultimate parent, Novo Banco, could have on the
Brazilian subsidiary's franchise and strategy. The developing
outlook on the deposit ratings incorporates the expectation that
the change in ownership eliminates the concern derived from
uncertainties around a long-term problem solving process at Novo
Banco that could have impaired BESI Brasil's performance, and
which was a key factor behind Moody's ratings review.

Moody's noted that BESI Brasil's b2 standalone credit assessment
adequately captures the bank's intrinsic credit profile, as
reflected in its modest profitability and liquidity. Over the past
months, BESI Brasil has taken measures to contain any contagion
arising from its parent bank, including the sale of non-strategic
assets and particularly the protection of its liquidity, supported
by the short duration of its assets relative to liabilities. The
decision to preserve cash ahead of a about BRL800 million euro
bond maturity in the first-quarter 2015 has led to limited new
business generation and to earnings that remain below target, also
because of the weak economic environment. As a result of its
deleveraging, BESI Brasil's capital position remains a credit
strength.

In Moody's view, earnings pressure will subside as BESI Brasil's
franchise is preserved and asset and liability management
gradually normalizes. A return to business-as-usual activity is
likely to be gradual, because it will depend on the timeframe for
the closing of the acquisition, as well as the recovery in
investment banking business in Brazil. In the first-half 2014, the
bank generated net income of BRL25 million, up 77% year over year,
which creates a cushion for year-end results.

Moody's also notes that Haitong's acquisition is part of its
geographic expansion strategy in international markets, and BESI
Brasil is one of the largest subsidiaries of Banco Espirito Santo
de Investimentos S.A.

The last rating action on BESI was on 22 August 2014, when Moody's
lowered BESI baseline credit assessment to b2 from b1 (equivalent
to an E+ standalone bank financial strength rating). At that time,
Moody's also downgraded BESI's long-term global local- and
foreign-currency deposit ratings to B2 from B1, as well as the
long- and short-term Brazilian national scale deposit ratings to
Ba2.br from Baa2.br and to BR-4 from BR-3, respectively. In
addition, Moody's affirmed the short-term global local- and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of Not Prime. The ratings other
than the Not Prime short-term debt and deposit ratings remained on
review for downgrade.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Banks
published in July 2014.

BES Investimento do Brasil S.A. is headquartered in Sao Paulo,
Brazil. It reported total assets of BRL7.4 billion ($3.4 billion)
and equity of BRL679.3 million ($308.4 million) as of 30 June
2014.


BV FINANCEIRA: Moody's Cuts Mezz. Sub. Shares Rating to Caa3.br
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. has downgraded the ratings on the
mezzanine shares issued by BV Financeira FIDC VI (FIDC BV VI). The
ratings of the senior shares will continue on review for
downgrade.

FIDC BV VI is a closed-end transaction, with a legal final
maturity in October 2016. The seller distributed the senior and
mezzanine shares to qualified investors through a restricted
public placement (ICVM 476) and retained all of the junior shares.
The shares are backed by a pool of auto loans originated by BV
Financeira S.A. -- Credito, Financiamento e Investimento (BV
Financeira, not rated).

Issuer: BV Financeira FIDC VI

Senior Shares - A2.br (sf) (National Scale) & Ba3 (sf) (Global
Scale, Local Currency) continue on review for downgrade

Mezzanine Subordinated Shares -- ratings downgraded to Caa3.br
(sf) from Caa2.br (sf) previously on review for downgrade
(National Scale, Local Currency) and to Caa3 (sf) from Caa2 (sf)
previously on review for downgrade (Global Scale, Local Currency);

Ratings Rationale

Moody's downgrade of the mezzanine shares is primarily based on:
(1) the junior shares (not rated) having been reduced to zero and
the negative subordination of 0.7% for the mezzanine shares,
considering a provisioning level of BRL 149.7 million; (2) the
negative excess spread in the transaction (3) the cease of leak of
cash to the mezzanine shares.

Between April 2014 and November 2014, the level of provisioning
reported increased by BRL 59.8 million to BRL 149.7 million. This
provisioning level is still below the amount of receivables over
180 days past due, which as of November 2014 totaled BRL 238.6
million. The increased provisioning level, and the continued
negative excess spread of the transaction, caused the total junior
shares in the transaction to drop from BRL 95.5 million in April
2014 to zero as of November 2014. The mezzanine shares' value has
also been impacted with a negative adjustment of BRL 3.4 million
due to insufficiency of subordination. Moreover, if receivables
over 180 days were appropriately provisioned, the negative
subordination of the mezzanine shares would be 19.4%. Therefore,
any further losses due to provisioning or negative excess spread
will directly impact the value to the mezzanine shares.

The transaction has continued to present negative excess spread
between April and October 2014, returning to a positive spread in
November 2014 at 1.52%.

Since June 2014, the transaction has not further amortized the
mezzanine shares, therefore preserving the cash of the transaction
and allocating losses on the mezzanine and junior shares. Any
furture losses will be absorbed by the mezzanine shares. The
senior shares have amortized BRL 276 million between April and
November 2014. The fund held BRL 1.08 billion in cash and cash
equivalent assets as of the end of November, an amount that would
allow a substantial pay-down of the BRL 1.28 billion in senior
shares outstanding.

Senior shares continue on review for possible downgrade due to:
(1) the weak governance issues, (2) the lack of a resolution under
a shareholder's meeting of the potential early amortization of the
transaction.

Regarding the governance issues, the trustee, VAM DTVM, called a
shareholders' meeting related to the excess spread trigger breach,
which was held 15 July 2014. However the meeting was not
concluded. Senior shareholders will still decide whether to early
amortize the transaction. The conclusion of the review on the
senior shares will be pending such resolution.

The cash flow modeling of the transaction indicate that if the
transaction enters into early amortization in February 2015,
senior shares are expected to be paid completely and the expected
loss to the mezzanine shares would be 38%. However, if the
transaction does not enter into early amortization, the expected
losses to the mezzanine shares would rise to 47% due to the
transaction's negative carry.

Stress Scenarios:

Moody's analyzed the transaction based on a stress scenario
assumption of 1.4x stress on the CDI forward rate and annualized
losses at 3%.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Factors that would lead to a downgrade are deterioration in
collateral performance and if the transaction resumes payments on
a pro-rata basis between senior and mezzanine shares.

Rating Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Auto Loan-Backed ABS," published in May 2013.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in
June 2014 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale Ratings to
Global Scale Ratings".


OAS S.A.: Moody's Cuts Rating on Guaranteed Debt Issuances to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B2 from B1 the ratings
assigned to OAS S.A. (OAS) and to its guaranteed debt issuances at
OAS Investments GmbH (OIG) and OAS Finance Limited (OFL). At the
same time, Moody's placed all ratings under review for downgrade.

The downgrade of OAS' ratings reflect a deterioration in the
company's credit profile due to Moody'saker than anticipated cash
generation in 2014 and Moody's expectation that an organic
improvement in leverage will take longer to occur. The ratings
remain under review given the company's increased liquidity risk
and the challenges ahead of the management to address short term
debt maturities on a timely basis amid evolving industry
fundamentals and ongoing judicial and administrative disputes.

Ratings changed:

Company: OAS S.A. (OAS)

--Corporate Family Rating: to B2 from B1

Issuer: OAS Finance Limited (OFL)

-- USD500 million Perpetual Notes: to B2 from B1

-- USD400 million senior unsecured notes due 2021: to B2 from B1

Issuer: OAS Investments GmbH (OIG)

--USD875 million senior unsecured notes due 2019: to B2 from B1

All ratings remain under review for further downgrade.

Ratings Rationale

The ratings downgrade to B2 was prompted by Moody's perception of
increased credit risk following OAS' weaker than anticipated
financial performance up to September 2014, as reflected in its
earnings release published early last week. The deterioration in
financial performance relates to higher than expected operating
expenses and a longer cash conversion cycle. The last twelve
months EBITDA at BRL896 million was 10% south of Moody's
projections for the period, while the leverage ratio, as measured
by the adjusted gross debt to EBITDA, reached 10.1 times by
September 30, 2014, up from 7.8 times at fiscal year end 2013.

The ratings remain under review for further downgrade given OAS'
limited liquidity to address significant debt maturities over the
next twelve months and at the same time finance its high working
capital requirements. The group ended the 3Q14 with an
unrestricted cash and cash equivalent position of BRL1.5 billion,
which covers its BRL1.4 billion in short term debt maturities
(including recourse and non-recourse debt consolidated according
to the International Financial Reporting Standards). Despite
adequate cash coverage of short term debt, the company reported a
significant cash burn during the first nine months of this year,
resulting from a negative operating cash generation of BRL1.1
billion and interest payments of BRL564 million, which stand 55%
higher than the same period in 2013. Although cash flow generation
seasonally picks up towards year-end, the anticipated operating
cash inflow during the fourth quarter could not be enough to
largely offset the negative performance up to September 2014.

Moody's believes that liquidity risk for OAS has increased with
further deterioration in its operating environment stemming from
Brazil's economic slowdown, increased foreign currency volatility,
as well as by the judicial and administrative proceedings
involving corruption allegations and some of its main executives.
Although the legal disputes are still in the beginning and will
probably take longer before conclusions have been reached, these
events will immediately impose limitations for the company's
financing alternatives, reflecting in higher debt cost and
possible material changes in its debt structure.

The ratings review, which Moody's expects to conclude swiftly,
will focus on operating performance prospects for OAS in 2015, as
well as alternative sources of cash to reduce its liquidity risk
in the short term along with asset monetization strategies. The
review will also take into account its expected capital structure
considering possible new secured or guaranteed credit lines.

Accordingly, the ratings could be further downgraded if OAS proves
unable to improve its liquidity cushion or indicate a clear
deleveraging trend within a reasonable timeframe. In Moody's view,
although cash generation could improve towards year end, supported
by the high number of receivables, leverage should remain
pressured in the absence of a substantial capital increase or a
major asset divesture.

The review will also revisit the company's strategies to improve
its current margins and support its market position in an evolving
competitive environment. Moody's will also review the company's
debt structure to assess the potential impact on the subordination
level of unsecured creditors, which could be reflected in a multi-
notch downgrade.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Construction
Methodology published in November 2014.

Headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil, OAS S.A. (OAS) is a major
engineering, construction and infrastructure investment company in
Brazil. Incorporated in 1976, the company has now presence in 16
countries, with construction works in Brazil, in 10 countries in
Latin America and 5 countries in Africa. OAS construction projects
include highways, railways, bridges, power plants, tunnels,
subways, airports, ports, commercial and residential buildings,
mining and industrial facilities. The company also has 22
infrastructure projects in its portfolio. In September 2014, the
company generated consolidated net revenues of BRL8.3 billion
(USD3.2 billion) and adjusted EBITDA of BRL896 million (USD344
million).


OSX BRASIL: Creditors Approve Company's Recovery Plan
-----------------------------------------------------
Luciana Magalhaes at The Wall Street Journal reports that
creditors of shipbuilder OSX Brasil SA approved the company's
recovery plan at a meeting at the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange.

More than 90% of the creditors who participated in the meeting
approved the plan for the holding firm, said Thomas Benes
Felsberg, a lawyer who represents the international bondholders of
the oil platform OSX-3, who are owed some US$500 million by OSX,
according to The Wall Street Journal.

The report notes that the spanish construction firm Acciona SA was
among the creditors that voted against the plan, said Leonardo
Antonelli, the company's lawyer, in an e-mail.

Changes to the plan were made over the last few days to make the
approval possible, according to lawyers representing several OSX
creditors, the report notes.

The report relays that creditors also approved the recovery plan
for OSX's naval construction arm.  Close to 90% of the creditors
of the subsidiary at the meeting, representing 60% of its debt,
voted in favor of the plan, according to people who participated
in the meeting, the report says.

Creditors still need to vote on the recovery plan for OSX's
service arm.

The report notes that Claudio Zuicker, OSX's chief financial
officer, said some creditors agreed to invest a minimum of 30
million reais in the firm.  Those creditors will be paid back in
an average maximum period of a little over 20 years, the report
relays.  Creditors who don't subscribe to the debentures issuance
will be paid in 25 years, Mr. Zuicker added, the report notes.

OSX, which has $2.7 billion in debt, is in talks to sell at least
one of the three floating production, storage and offloading
vessels, known as FPSOs, the report notes.

OSX oil platforms are set up as separate corporate entities in the
Netherlands and aren't part of the bankruptcy-protection process,
the report says.  The platforms acted as collateral for some $1.4
billion in dollar-denominated loans and bonds when the court
protection was requested, the report adds.

                        About OSX Brasil

Brazilian shipbuilding firm OSX Brasil SA, controlled by
businessman Eike Batista, filed for protection from creditors on
November 2013 on liabilities of BRL5.34 billion (US$2.30 billion).
OSX Brasil filed for bankruptcy -- called "judicial recovery" in
Brazil -- after Oleo e Gas Participacoes SA, formerly known as OGX
Petroleo e Gas Participacoes, filed for bankruptcy on Oct. 30,
2013.

OSX had outstanding debts of around US$2.2 billion as of June 30,
2013, including dollar-and real-denominated loans and bonds held
by a mix of banks, investors and government institutions, such as
Brazil's Merchant Marine Fund, according to The Wall Street
Journal.

The move on Nov. 11 at a Rio de Janeiro court follows a default
and bankruptcy filing the prior month for Mr. Batista's flagship
oil firm OGX Petroleo e Gas Participacoes SA, n/k/a Oleo e Gas,
according to the WSJ report.  The firm went public in 2008 for
$4.1 billion but failed to produce nearly any of the up to 10.8
billion barrels it claimed to have.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


BASTION CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On Oct. 31, 2014, the members of Bastion Capital Limited resolved
to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Nov. 25, 2014, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Portcullis Trustnet (Cayman) Ltd
          c/o Michelle R. Bodden-Moxam
          Telephone: 946-6145
          Facsimile: 946-6146
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          Oleander Way, 802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 32052 Grand Cayman KY1-1208
          Cayman Islands


BRIGHT LIGHT: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary general meeting held on Oct. 29, 2014, the
shareholders of Bright Light Limited resolved to voluntarily wind
up the company's operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Dec. 3, 2014, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Buchanan Limited
          c/o Allison Kelly
          Telephone: (345) 949-0355
          Facsimile: (345)949-0360
          P.O. Box 1170, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


DELTA SPV1: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
On Nov. 4, 2014, the sole shareholder of Delta SPV1 Limited
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Dec. 17, 2014, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          c/o Mourant Ozannes
          Attorneys-at-Law for the Company
          Reference: NDL
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4123
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 4647; or

          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          Reference: Peter Goulden
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4123
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 4647
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


EASTERN WISDOM: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary general meeting held on Oct. 27, 2014, the
shareholders of Eastern Wisdom Investment Limited resolved to
voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Dec. 17, 2014, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidators are:

          Sarah Baudet
          Paula Hegarty
          c/o Citron 2004 Limited
          Telephone: +44 1534 282276
          Facsimile: +44 1534 282400
          Clifton House, 75 Fort Street
          P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands

GEELY AUTOMOBILE: Profit Warning No Impact on Moody's Ba2 CFR
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service says that Geely Automobile Holdings
Limited's profit warning for its 2014 results is credit negative,
but has no impact on the Ba2 corporate family and senior unsecured
bond ratings.

The ratings outlook remains stable.

On 16 December 2014, Geely announced that it expects its 2014
profits attributable to equity holders to decline by about 50%
from the RMB2,663 million achieved in 2013.

The expected weak profit is attributable to: (1) the unrealized
foreign exchange loss recorded by Geely's Russian assets,
consisting mainly of inventories, as a result of the depreciation
of the Russian Rouble against the USD and the RMB; and (2) a 26%
year-over-year sales volume decline in the first 11 months of
2014, driven by the sharp decline in export sales to some of
Geely's major export markets, including Russia, and the company's
dealership network restructuring in China.

"Geely's profit warning mainly stems from the unrealized foreign
exchange loss on its Russian assets, which is non-cash in nature
and does not affect the company's 2014 EBITDA," says Gerwin Ho, a
Moody's Vice President and Senior Analyst.

Moody's expects Geely will record about 5%-10% year-over-year
sales volume growth in 2015. The projected sales growth will be
driven by China's growing passenger vehicle market, Geely's
product line up renewal, and export sales stabilization.

Moreover, the company's profit warning impact and weaker export
sales outlook remain in line with Moody's expectation. In Moody's
view, the expected weak results for 2014 reflect the company's
efforts to restructure its operations as it prepares for new model
launches in 2015.

Nevertheless, Moody's considers the weak export sales a negative
rating driver. In its revised forecast -- which assumes that the
company can increase domestic sales to cover weaker export sales -
- Moody's expects the company's EBITA margin to be 9%-10% and
debt/EBITDA about 1.0x in the next 12 months. These metrics still
support its Ba2 rating.

Geely's cash holdings of around RMB6.4 billion at end-June 2014,
proceeds from its USD300 million bond issuance in October 2014 and
operating cash flow will be sufficient to cover its short-term
debt and estimated capex over the next 12 months.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Automobile Manufacturer Industry published in June 2011.

Geely Automobile Holdings Limited is incorporated in the Cayman
Islands and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.

The company is one of the largest privately owned, local brand
automakers in China. Geely develops, manufactures and sells
passenger vehicles that are sold in China and globally. Its
chairman and founder, Mr. Li Shufu, became Geely's controlling
shareholder in June 2005. Mr. Li and his family held a 42.6% stake
in the company at end-2013.


LIWA DEAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Nov. 6, 2014, the members of
Liwa Deal Limited resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


MA YORK: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Nov. 6, 2014, the members of
Ma York European Strategies Limited resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


MARK IV-LIG: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Nov. 6, 2014, the members of
Mark IV-LIG Holdings Limited resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


MINETTE GP: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Nov. 6, 2014, the members of
Minette GP resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


MWAM STRATEGIC: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
On Nov. 3, 2014, the sole shareholder of MWAM Strategic Income
Fund, Ltd resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Dec. 17, 2014, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          c/o Mourant Ozannes
          Attorneys-at-Law for the Company
          Reference: NDL
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4123
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 4647; or

          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          Reference: Peter Goulden
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4123
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 4647
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


QUARTER LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On Oct. 29, 2014, the members of Quarter Limited resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Dec. 9, 2014, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Bruce Spencer Dent Putterill
          c/o Appleby Trust (Cayman) Ltd.
          75 Fort Street
          PO Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4900


STRONGHOLD CAPITAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------
On Oct. 31, 2014, the members of Stronghold Capital Management
Limited resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Nov. 25, 2014, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Portcullis Trustnet (Cayman) Ltd
          c/o Michelle R. Bodden-Moxam
          Telephone: 946-6145
          Facsimile: 946-6146
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          Oleander Way, 802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 32052 Grand Cayman KY1-1208
          Cayman Islands


TRAFIN 2012-1: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Nov. 6, 2014, the members of
Trafin 2012-1, Ltd resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


YORK EUROPEAN DAMA: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Nov. 6, 2014, the members of
York European Strategies Dama Limited resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


YORK EUROPEAN TRADING: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Nov. 6, 2014, the members of
York European Strategies Trading Limited resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Exports to Grow 7%, IDB Says
------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic exports will grow
around 7% this year beating most of Latin America, projected to
fall around 1.4 percent in 2014.

In a study, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) said LatAm
would end with sales of US$1.05 trillion, a figure which poses the
first contraction in the region's exports since trade plunged in
2009, according to Dominican Today.

The report "Estimates of Latin America trade trends 2014" says in
2014 only exports from Mexico (+5%) and Central America, and
Dominican Republic (+ 3%) grew at rates slightly higher than world
trade and benefiting from a resurging US market, Dominican Today
notes.

In the Dominican case, the IDB says growth of 7% (RD$8.5 billion)
is strongly influenced by gold shipments expanding 35% in 2014,
the report relays.

                              Imports

Dominican Today discloses that Latin American imports shrank 2% in
2014, evidencing a slumped growth of the region's economies.


=============
E C U A D O R
=============


ECUADOR: Signs MOU with Russian Oil Giant Rosneft
-------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that an Ecuadorian government official and
Russian state-controlled oil giant Rosneft's representative for
Latin America signed a memorandum of understanding on exploring
future investments in the Andean nation's hydrocarbons sector.

"This is a strategic and complementary alliance between Russia and
Ecuador. We have the political willingness to work with Russia and
Rosneft," Ecuador's minister coordinator of strategic sectors,
Rafael Poveda, who signed the MOU, said, according to EFE News.


ECUADOR: IDB Oks US$300MM Loan to Help Protect Social Spending
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) approved a stand-by line
of credit for up to US$300 million to help Ecuador protect its
social spending from potential external economic shocks.

The stand-by credit line, which will be in place for three years,
will allow the government of Ecuador to temporarily sustain its
levels of spending in programs to reduce poverty should exogenous
events limit its revenues.

The IDB made the assistance available under its Contingent stand-
by credit line for Sustainable Development , which made available
up to US$6 billion for the IDB's lending nations from 2012 to
2015.

This stand-by line of credit aims to help countries to protect
social programs that focus on their poorest and most vulnerable
citizens in case of financial problems caused by external factors,
such as sudden fluctuations in the prices of basic products or a
sudden freeze in international financial markets.

In the line of credit for Ecuador, the triggers for the
disbursements are linked to oil prices, exports and refining
capacity, as well as changes in the LIBOR rate.

The credit will be for six years, with a grace period of three
years and a variable interest rate.


ECUADOR: Moody's Upgrades Senior Unsecured Rating to B3
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Ecuador's issuer and senior
unsecured ratings to B3 from Caa1 and maintained the stable
outlook.

The key drivers of the rating action are the following:

1. An improvement in Ecuador's credit profile that clearly
differentiates it from Caa-rated sovereigns given stronger credit
metrics that are more in line with B-rated peers.

2. Incentives that effectively increase Ecuador's willingness to
pay its debt obligations, derived from the country's renewed
access to international capital markets.

3. Sufficient fiscal flexibility to manage the effect of an oil
price shock, which should only have a moderate impact on sovereign
creditworthiness.

The stable outlook balances the potential negative impact of lower
oil prices on the fiscal accounts against the upside possibility
that the government's capital expenditure program will reduce the
country's dependency on refined oil imports and the subsidies it
provides, which would benefit Ecuador's external and fiscal
accounts. Transformation of the country's energy matrix through
the program has the potential to boost output.

The senior unsecured bond rating on the 2030 global bond was
affirmed at C, reflecting unresolved bondholder claims related to
the 2008 default. Moody's also changed Ecuador's long-term foreign
currency bond ceiling to B2 from B3 and the long-term foreign
currency deposit ceiling to Caa1 from Caa2. The short-term foreign
currency bond and deposit ceilings remain at Not-Prime (NP).
Ceilings reflect a range of undiversifiable risks to which issuers
in any jurisdiction are exposed, including economic, legal and
political risks. These ceilings act as a cap on ratings that can
be assigned to the foreign and local-currency obligations of
entities domiciled in the country.

Ratings Rationale

The first driver of the upgrade of Ecuador's rating is the
improvement in the sovereign's credit profile relative to Caa1-
rated peers. Ecuador is less susceptible to external shocks that
might lead to a credit event. Additionally, Ecuador's economic and
fiscal metrics are more in line with those of B-rated peers, and
stronger when compared to other B3-rated sovereigns.

Unlike other sovereigns rated Caa1, Ecuador has enjoyed
macroeconomic stability over the last five years. Moody's
estimates the economy grew on average 5.0% annually during 2010-
14, higher than the 2.8% median for Caa1-rated countries and in
line with the 5.0% for countries rated in the 'B' category.
Average inflation for the five year-period was 3.8%, lower than
the 9.4% median for Caa1 sovereigns and the 5.3% median for B-
rated sovereigns. Moody's notes that Ecuador's economic
performance contrasts sharply with that of Caa1-rated Argentina
and Venezuela, which Moody's expects will experience recessions in
2014 and 2015 reporting two-digit inflation.

Additional comparisons with other Caa1-rated sovereigns, such as
Egypt and Pakistan, as well as some B3-rated peers, like Barbados
and Honduras, point to Ecuador's relative economic and fiscal
strengths. In Moody's view, the government's credit profile
implies that the sovereign is better positioned within the 'B'
category.

The second driver of the upgrade is the impact that incentives
associated to Ecuador's renewed market provide to the government's
willingness to pay its debts. Over the past years, the Ecuadorian
government has actively sought to engage the international
investment community. This effort included ongoing negotiations
with holdouts from the 2009 restructurings as well as with the
International Monetary Fund -- the latter led to the first Article
IV staff report in six years. Ecuador's re-entry to the markets
with the issuance of a $2 billion global bond in June 2014,
allowed the government to diversify its funding sources. Access to
additional sources of funding should support government plans to
maintain high levels of public investment, a key component of its
economic agenda. These elements provide important incentives for
the government to maintain market access. Additionally, a track
record of timely debt servicing of the 2015 global bond,
reinforces Moody's expectation that the government's willingness
to repay $650 million of principal due in December 2015.

The third driver of the upgrade is Moody's assessment that Ecuador
has sufficient financial flexibility to absorb the recent fall in
the oil price. Given that oil exports represent over 50% of
exports and the government derives about 45% of revenues from oil
sales, Ecuador is susceptible to oil price shocks. This condition
is partially mitigated by the fact that lower oil prices provide
relief to both balance of payments and the fiscal accounts, since
the country imports a considerable amount of refined oil products
and subsidizes consumer energy costs.

Moody's estimates that if the average price of the Ecuadorian oil
basket stands at $60 dollars per barrel (dpb) in 2015 -- the
budget incorporates $79.7 dpb -- the government would face a
revenue shortfall of about $1.4 billion, or 1.4% of GDP. To date,
the authorities have announced a tax reform that seeks to increase
government revenues and clamp down on tax fraud.

In Moody's view, these measures will only partially cover the
shortfall in oil revenues. The remainder will be derived from cuts
to capital expenditures -- investment represents around 45% of
total central government expenditure. The authorities have
indicated that even though some projects will be prioritized,
e.g., those related to overhauling the energy matrix, several new
projects would be delayed in order to ensure fiscal
sustainability. In Moody's view, this approach demonstrates
willingness to adjust, as well as a degree of fiscal flexibility
that should mitigate the impact of lower oil prices on the fiscal
accounts.

What Could Lead To A Change In The Rating

There could be upward pressure on the rating if (i) an improvement
in the investment environment leads to significantly higher
foreign direct investment inflows; (ii) the government adopts
fiscal rules that lead to a build up of financial buffers and;
(iii) there is material improvement in the country's external
balance as ongoing projects increase the domestic supply of
energy.

Downward pressure on the rating would develop if there is a
material deterioration in government and balance-of-payments
finances, particularly against the current backdrop of lower oil
prices; or a return of political instability.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 10,908 (2013 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 4.6% (2013 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 2.7% (2013 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -5.8% (2013 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -1.2% (2013 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 20% (2013 Actual)

Level of economic development: Very Low level of economic
resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On 17 December 2014, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Ecuador, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: An analysis of this issuer, relative
to its peers, indicates that a repositioning of its rating would
be appropriate.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in September 2013.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this rating action, if applicable.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA RAILWAY: Reduces Debt, Still Seeking Divestment
-------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that there has been a reduction in the massive
debt owed by the Jamaica Railway Corporation (JRC).

According to its 2013 annual report tabled recently in the House
of Representative, the state-owned entity's indebtedness at the
end of the year was J$655.7 million, according to RJR News.  This
represented a reduction of J$105 million, the report notes.

RJR News relates that a portion of the debt was paid from funds
invested at the Development Bank of Jamaica.

The JRC also reduced its losses, the report notes.  It came out at
J$33 million, down from nearly J$80 million at the end of the
previous financial year, the report says.

The report discloses that net profit reported, after Government
assistance as well as waiver and elimination of past liabilities,
was J$56.5 million.

                          Privatization

Meanwhile, the management of the JRC is continuing with plans for
the privatization of the rail operations, the report discloses.

With that accomplished, it says the primary area of focus for the
Corporation would then be the performance of its duties under the
track user agreement, the report notes.

It says attention would also be placed on real estate
administration, maximizing revenue earning potential of its
properties and improving its rent collections machinery, the
report relays.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


BANESCO, BANCO UNIVERSAL: Fitch Cuts IDR to 'CCC'
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions on the following private-
sector Venezuelan banks and one holding company subsequent to the
downgrade of the sovereign's Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs):

   -- Banesco, Banco Universal, CA (BBU);
   -- Banco Provincial, S.A., Banco Universal (Provincial);
   -- Mercantil, C.A. Banco Universal (Mercantil);
   -- Mercantil Servicios Financieros (MSF);
   -- Banco Occidental de Descuento (BOD);
   -- Banco del Caribe, C.A. Banco Universal (Bancaribe);
   -- Banco Exterior, C.A. Banco Universal (Exterior);
   -- Banco Nacional de Credito C.A. (BNC).

These rating actions follow the downgrade of Venezuela's IDRs to
'CCC' from 'B'.  International ratings have been downgraded in
line with the sovereign.  As with other emerging market commercial
banks in this rating category, the operating environment is a
constraint to bank ratings.  In addition, the significant level of
government intervention and high level of exposure to sovereign
securities further undermines the financial flexibility of
Venezuelan banks.

All long-term national ratings have been downgraded considering
the relative strengths and weaknesses of each bank.  All short-
term national ratings have been either downgraded or affirmed
accordingly.

These downgrades reflect the severe deterioration in the operating
environment and the Venezuelan economy's reduced capacity to
respond to external shocks, such as a sustained drop in oil
prices.  Additionally, the banks' lower profitability, increased
exposure to retail and compulsory loans (segments more vulnerable
to an economic shock), as well as their reduced cushion to absorb
unexpected losses were also considered.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, VRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS

These entities are the seven largest private sector universal
commercial banks in Venezuela, with operations primarily in the
country.  All of these banks' Viability Ratings (VRs), or
standalone intrinsic financial strengths, drive their IDRs and do
not take into account either institutional or state support.

The operating environment is the key factor constraining the VRs
of all Venezuelan banks.  Fitch recognizes that the current set of
foreign exchange controls have helped preserve the system's
funding base relative to past periods of severe macroeconomic
imbalances before these controls were implemented.

All national ratings for each bank consider the same strengths and
weaknesses as international ratings, but are based on the relative
creditworthiness of entities within Venezuela.

BBU

Despite sound profitability (even when adjusted for inflation) and
loan quality indicators, BBU's international ratings are limited
by the operating environment.  High exposure to the Venezuelan
public sector, large asset and liability tenor mismatch due to the
short contractual maturities (mostly demand deposits) of its
funding base also weigh on the bank's ratings.  BBU's ratings also
consider its adequate liquidity and capitalization.

PROVINCIAL

Provincial's ratings are supported by its solid profitability
(even when adjusted for inflation) and its strong franchise
compared with its peers.  The ratings also incorporate the bank's
conservative risk management and operational support from Spain's
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), its majority shareholder,
which has a 55% stake in the bank.

However, the bank's ratings are limited not only by the operating
environment (international ratings) but also, by a large asset and
liability tenor mismatch given that the vast majority of funding
consists of demand deposits and short-term time deposits.
MERCANTIL

Although Mercantil's credit risk profile relative to domestic
peers has been resilient, its international ratings are limited by
the operating environment.  High exposure to the Venezuelan public
sector, large asset and liability tenor mismatch due to the short
contractual maturities (mostly demand deposits) of its funding
base and a decline in the bank's overall loss absorption capacity
in recent years, as measured by its equity/assets ratio and loan
loss reserves/gross loans, also weigh on the bank's ratings.

In addition, Mercantil's ratings consider the strength of its
balance sheet, management's experience in dealing with the
inherently volatile operating environment in Venezuela, and its
ample market share and strong franchise which allowed the bank to
maintain a relatively stable deposit base.

MSF

MSF's national ratings reflect the geographical diversification of
its operations, adequate liquidity and the holding company's low
double leverage.  The ratings also take into account the strengths
of its main subsidiary, Mercantil.

As MSF's cash flow is dependent on Mercantil, which by local
regulation can only pay dividends up to 50% of net income, rather
than its own generation of cash flows, the holding company's long-
term national rating is one notch below its main operating
subsidiary's national rating.  The ratings assigned to MSF's
issuances in the local market are in line with its national
ratings as these are all senior unsecured debt issuances.

BOD

BOD's ratings incorporate a history of volatile profitability,
capitalization, and asset quality indicators relative to peers.
With the exception of liquidity, the bank's financial metrics are
weaker than other large universal commercial banks in Venezuela.
High exposure to the Venezuelan public sector, large asset and
liability tenor mismatch due to the short contractual maturities
(mostly demand deposits) of its funding base and a decline in the
bank's overall loss absorption capacity in recent years, as
measured by its equity/assets ratio and loan loss reserves/gross
loans, also weigh on the bank's ratings.

The bank is controlled by Cartera de Inversiones Venezuela (CIV),
a diversified holding company with interests in financial and
nonfinancial companies.

CARIBE

Notwithstanding Bancaribe's resilient performance and stable asset
quality indicators, its international ratings are limited by its
operating environment and a less robust franchise compared to
larger Venezuelan banks.  High exposure to the Venezuelan public
sector, large asset and liability tenor mismatch due to the short
contractual maturities (mostly demand deposits) of its funding
base also weigh on the bank's ratings.  Bancaribe's ratings also
incorporate a strengthening of capital ratios in 2013, following
pressures related to high nominal asset growth in recent years and
adequate liquidity.

Scotiabank has a minority stake of 27% in Bancaribe.

EXTERIOR

Exterior's ratings reflect its solid loan quality indicators and
profitability ratios (even when adjusting for inflation).
Liquidity and capitalization remain adequate, though weaker than
some of its larger domestic peers.  Its ratings are limited not
only by the operating environment (international ratings) but
also, by a less robust franchise compared to larger banks.  Its
ratings are also limited by a significant asset and liability
tenor mismatch, given that the vast majority of its funding is
represented by demand deposits and short-term time deposits, as
well as a large exposure to Venezuelan sovereign debt.

Grupo Bancario IF has a 83% stake in Exterior.

BNC

Despite BNC's moderate but growing franchise as well as improved
capital ratios and loan quality indicators, the bank's ratings are
limited by high nominal credit growth in excess of its domestic
peers, lower profitability relative to local banks, and the
operating environment.

High exposure to the Venezuelan public sector, large asset and
liability tenor mismatch due to the short contractual maturities
(mostly demand deposits) of its funding base and a decline in the
bank's overall loss absorption capacity in recent years, as
measured by considering both its equity/assets ratio and loan loss
reserves/gross loans, also weigh on the bank's ratings.  The
ratings also take into account adequate liquidity and funding.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, VRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS

A downgrade of the sovereign's IDRs would result in a similar
action on the IDRs and VRs of these banks, which are currently
capped at the sovereign.  Additional government intervention that
pressures financial performance of these banks could negatively
affect the banks' IDRs, VRs and National ratings.  While not
Fitch's base case due to capital controls and liquidity in the
domestic market, a persistent decline in deposits would pressure
ratings.

Upside potential to any of the banks' ratings in the near term is
limited in light of current macroeconomic vulnerabilities.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT
RATING FLOOR

The banks' Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) of 'NF' reflect Fitch's expectation of no support.  Despite
these banks' systemic importance, support cannot be relied upon
given Venezuela's highly speculative rating and lack of a
consistent policy on bank support.  For those banks with foreign
shareholders, government interference in the banking system could
also negatively influence shareholder support if required.

Venezuela's propensity or ability to provide timely support to
these banks is not likely to change given the sovereign's very low
speculative-grade ratings.  As such, the SR and SRF have no
upgrade potential.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

BBU

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs downgrade to 'CCC'
      from 'B';
   -- Short-term foreign and local currency ratings downgraded to
      'C' from 'B';
   -- Viability downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b';
   -- Support affirmed at '5';
   -- Support Floor affirmed at 'NF';
   -- Long-term national-scale rating downgraded to 'A+(ven)' from
      'AA-(ven)';
   -- Short-term national-scale rating affirmed at 'F1+(ven)'.
      Provincial
   -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs downgrade to 'CCC'
      from 'B';
   -- Short-term foreign and local currency ratings downgraded to
      'C' from 'B';
   -- Viability downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b';
   -- Support affirmed at '5';
   -- Support Floor affirmed at 'NF';
   -- Long-term national-scale rating downgraded to 'AA-(ven)'
      from 'AA+(ven)';
   -- Short-term national-scale rating affirmed at 'F1+(ven)'.

Mercantil

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs downgraded to
      'CCC' from 'B';
   -- Short-term foreign and local currency ratings downgraded to
      'C' from 'B';
   -- Viability downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b';
   -- Support affirmed at 5;
   -- Support Floor affirmed at NF;
   -- Long-term national-scale rating downgraded to 'AA-(ven)'
      from 'AA+(ven)';
   -- Short-term national-scale rating affirmed at 'F1+(ven)'.

MSF

   -- Long-term national-scale rating downgraded to 'A+(ven)' from
      'AA(ven)';
   -- Short-term national-scale rating affirmed at 'F1+(ven)';
   -- Long-term senior unsecured bonds national-scale rating
      downgraded to 'A+(ven)' from 'AA(ven)';
   -- Short-term commercial paper national-scale rating affirmed
      at 'F1+(ven)'.

BOD

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs downgraded to
      'CCC' from 'B';
   -- Short-term foreign and local currency ratings downgraded to
      'C' from 'B';
   -- Viability downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b';
   -- Support affirmed at '5';
   -- Support Floor affirmed at 'NF';
   -- Long-term national-scale rating downgraded to 'BBB-(ven)'
      from 'BBB(ven)';
   -- Short-term national-scale rating downgraded to 'F3(ven)'
     'F3(ven)'.

Caribe

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs downgraded to
      'CCC' from 'B';
   -- Short-term foreign and local currency ratings downgraded to
      'C' from 'B';
   -- Viability downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b';
   -- Support affirmed at '5';
   -- Support Floor affirmed at 'NF';
   -- Long-term national-scale rating downgraded to 'A-(ven)' from
      'A+(ven)';
   -- Short-term national-scale rating downgraded to 'F2(ven)'
      from 'F1(ven)'.

Exterior

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs downgraded to
      'CCC' from 'B';
   -- Short-term foreign and local currency ratings downgraded to
      'C' from 'B';
   -- Viability downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b';
   -- Support affirmed at '5';
   -- Support Floor affirmed at 'NF';
   -- Long-term national-scale rating downgraded to 'A+(ven)' from
      'AA(ven)';
   -- Short-term national-scale rating downgraded to 'F1(ven)from
      'F1+(ven)'.

BNC

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs downgraded to
      'CCC' from 'B';
   -- Short-term foreign and local currency ratings downgraded to
      'C' from 'B';
   -- Viability rating downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b';
   -- Support affirmed at '5';
   -- Support Floor affirmed at 'NF';
   -- Long-term national-scale rating downgraded to 'BBB-(ven)'
      from 'BBB(ven)';
   -- Short-term national-scale rating affirmed at 'F3(ven)'.


CORPORACION ELECTRICA: Fitch Cuts IDR to 'CCC'; Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Corporacion Electrica Nacional S.A.'s
(CORPOELEC) foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) to 'CCC' from 'B'.  Fitch has also downgraded approximately
USD650 million of senior unsecured debt outstanding to 'CCC/RR4'
from 'B/RR4'.  Concurrently, Fitch has downgraded CORPOELEC's
national long-term rating to 'AA(ven)' from 'AAA(ven)' and has
also affirmed its national short-term rating at 'F1+(ven)'.  The
Rating Outlook is Negative.

The rating downgrade follows the downgrade of the sovereign
ratings of Venezuela to 'CCC' from 'B'.  The downgrade of the
sovereign ratings reflects the sharp decline of international oil
prices, which increase balance of payments pressures in the
context of reduced external financing flexibility and rising
macroeconomic instability.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

CORPOELEC's ratings reflect the company's strong linkage to the
government of Venezuela (rated 'CCC'/Outlook Negative by Fitch),
given its tight integration into the public sector determined by
its 100% public ownership and its dependence on public funding to
carry on its day to day operations, honor its financial
obligations and finance its capital expenditure needs.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The key rating triggers that could lead to a negative rating
action include:

   -- A downgrade of the sovereign;
   -- Lack of financial support coming from the central government
      and its agencies in order to allow CORPOELEC to service its
      financial obligations on a timely basis, particularly the
      EDC bonds maturing in October 2018 (USD 650 million).


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'CCC'
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.'s
(PDVSA) foreign and local currency issuer default ratings (IDRs)
to 'CCC' from 'B'.  Fitch has also downgraded approximately
USD26.4 billion of senior unsecured debt outstanding to 'CCC/RR4'
from 'B/RR4'.  Concurrently, Fitch has downgraded PDVSA's national
long-term rating to 'AA(ven)' from 'AAA(ven)'.

The rating downgrade follows the downgrade of the sovereign
ratings of Venezuela to 'CCC' from 'B'.  The downgrade of the
sovereign ratings reflects the sharp decline of international oil
prices, which increase balance of payments pressures in the
context of reduced external financing flexibility and rising
macroeconomic instability.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

PDVSA's credit quality reflects the company's linkage to the
government of Venezuela as a state-owned entity, combined with
increased government control over business strategies and internal
resources.  This underscores the close link between the company's
credit profile and that of the sovereign.

PDVSA's cash flow generation is significantly affected by the
large amount of funds transferred to the central government each
year.  During 2013, total transfers to central government and
external parties amounted to more than USD60 billion, or
approximately 50% of total reported revenues in the form of
royalties, social development expenditures, oil bartering
agreements, taxes and dividends.

The high level of transfers to central government renders PDVSA's
FFO negative.  The company has historically received government
treasury notes in exchange for these transfer payments.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Catalysts for a downgrade include a downgrade to Venezuela's
ratings, a substantial increase in leverage to finance capital
expenditures or government spending and a sharp and extended
commodity price downturn.  Catalysts for an upgrade include an
upgrade to Venezuela's sovereign rating and/or real independence
from the government.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* Large Companies With Insolvent Balance Sheets
-----------------------------------------------

                                                         Total
                                         Total       Shareholders
                                         Assets          Equity
Company                Ticker           (US$MM)        (US$MM)
-------                ------         ---------      ------------

AGRENCO LTD            AGRE LX        339244073      -561405847
AGRENCO LTD-BDR        AGEN33 BZ      339244073      -561405847
AGRENCO LTD-BDR        AGEN11 BZ      339244073      -561405847
ARTHUR LAN-DVD C       ARLA11 BZ     11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LAN-DVD P       ARLA12 BZ     11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANGE           ARLA3 BZ      11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANGE SA        ALICON BZ     11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANGE-PRF       ARLA4 BZ      11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANGE-PRF       ALICPN BZ     11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANG-RC C       ARLA9 BZ      11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANG-RC P       ARLA10 BZ     11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANG-RT C       ARLA1 BZ      11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANG-RT P       ARLA2 BZ      11642254.9     -17154460.3
BALADARE               BLDR3 BZ       159449535     -52990723.7
BATTISTELLA            BTTL3 BZ       115297369       -19538107
BATTISTELLA-PREF       BTTL4 BZ       115297369       -19538107
BATTISTELLA-RECE       BTTL9 BZ       115297369       -19538107
BATTISTELLA-RECP       BTTL10 BZ      115297369       -19538107
BATTISTELLA-RI P       BTTL2 BZ       115297369       -19538107
BATTISTELLA-RIGH       BTTL1 BZ       115297369       -19538107
BOMBRIL                BMBBF US       309951278     -57714449.4
BOMBRIL                FPXE4 BZ      19416013.9      -489914853
BOMBRIL                BOBR3 BZ       309951278     -57714449.4
BOMBRIL - RTS          BOBR11 BZ      309951278     -57714449.4
BOMBRIL CIRIO SA       BOBRON BZ      309951278     -57714449.4
BOMBRIL CIRIO-PF       BOBRPN BZ      309951278     -57714449.4
BOMBRIL HOLDING        FPXE3 BZ      19416013.9      -489914853
BOMBRIL SA-ADR         BMBPY US       309951278     -57714449.4
BOMBRIL SA-ADR         BMBBY US       309951278     -57714449.4
BOMBRIL-PREF           BOBR4 BZ       309951278     -57714449.4
BOMBRIL-RGTS PRE       BOBR2 BZ       309951278     -57714449.4
BOMBRIL-RIGHTS         BOBR1 BZ       309951278     -57714449.4
BOTUCATU TEXTIL        STRP3 BZ      27663605.3     -7174512.12
BOTUCATU-PREF          STRP4 BZ      27663605.3     -7174512.12
BUETTNER               BUET3 BZ      95403660.1     -37550595.1
BUETTNER SA            BUETON BZ     95403660.1     -37550595.1
BUETTNER SA-PRF        BUETPN BZ     95403660.1     -37550595.1
BUETTNER SA-RT P       BUET2 BZ      95403660.1     -37550595.1
BUETTNER SA-RTS        BUET1 BZ      95403660.1     -37550595.1
BUETTNER-PREF          BUET4 BZ      95403660.1     -37550595.1
CAF BRASILIA           CAFE3 BZ       160933830      -149277092
CAF BRASILIA-PRF       CAFE4 BZ       160933830      -149277092
CAFE BRASILIA SA       CSBRON BZ      160933830      -149277092
CAFE BRASILIA-PR       CSBRPN BZ      160933830      -149277092
CAIUA ELEC-C RT        ELCA1 BZ      1029019993      -128321599
CAIUA SA               ELCON BZ      1029019993      -128321599
CAIUA SA-DVD CMN       ELCA11 BZ     1029019993      -128321599
CAIUA SA-DVD COM       ELCA12 BZ     1029019993      -128321599
CAIUA SA-PREF          ELCPN BZ      1029019993      -128321599
CAIUA SA-PRF A         ELCAN BZ      1029019993      -128321599
CAIUA SA-PRF A         ELCA5 BZ      1029019993      -128321599
CAIUA SA-PRF B         ELCA6 BZ      1029019993      -128321599
CAIUA SA-PRF B         ELCBN BZ      1029019993      -128321599
CAIUA SA-RCT PRF       ELCA10 BZ     1029019993      -128321599
CAIUA SA-RTS           ELCA2 BZ      1029019993      -128321599
CAIVA SERV DE EL       1315Z BZ      1029019993      -128321599
CELGPAR                GPAR3 BZ       202489694     -1054621126
CENTRAL COST-ADR       CCSA LI        271025064     -37667553.4
CENTRAL COSTAN-B       CRCBF US       271025064     -37667553.4
CENTRAL COSTAN-B       CNRBF US       271025064     -37667553.4
CENTRAL COSTAN-C       CECO3 AR       271025064     -37667553.4
CENTRAL COST-BLK       CECOB AR       271025064     -37667553.4
CIA PETROLIFERA        MRLM3 BZ       377592596      -3014215.1
CIA PETROLIFERA        MRLM3B BZ      377592596      -3014215.1
CIA PETROLIFERA        1CPMON BZ      377592596      -3014215.1
CIA PETROLIF-PRF       MRLM4 BZ       377592596      -3014215.1
CIA PETROLIF-PRF       MRLM4B BZ      377592596      -3014215.1
CIA PETROLIF-PRF       1CPMPN BZ      377592596      -3014215.1
CIMOB PARTIC SA        GAFP3 BZ      44047412.2     -45669964.1
CIMOB PARTIC SA        GAFON BZ      44047412.2     -45669964.1
CIMOB PART-PREF        GAFP4 BZ      44047412.2     -45669964.1
CIMOB PART-PREF        GAFPN BZ      44047412.2     -45669964.1
COBRASMA               CBMA3 BZ      73710194.2     -2330089496
COBRASMA SA            COBRON BZ     73710194.2     -2330089496
COBRASMA SA-PREF       COBRPN BZ     73710194.2     -2330089496
COBRASMA-PREF          CBMA4 BZ      73710194.2     -2330089496
D H B                  DHBI3 BZ       103378506      -180639480
D H B-PREF             DHBI4 BZ       103378506      -180639480
DHB IND E COM          DHBON BZ       103378506      -180639480
DHB IND E COM-PR       DHBPN BZ       103378506      -180639480
DOCA INVESTIMENT       DOCA3 BZ       187044412      -204249587
DOCA INVEST-PREF       DOCA4 BZ       187044412      -204249587
DOCAS SA               DOCAON BZ      187044412      -204249587
DOCAS SA-PREF          DOCAPN BZ      187044412      -204249587
DOCAS SA-RTS PRF       DOCA2 BZ       187044412      -204249587
EBX BRASIL SA          CTMN3 BZ      2670745328      -202996314
ELEC ARG SA-PREF       EASA6 AR       945325071     -56471446.1
ELEC ARGENT-ADR        EASA LX        945325071     -56471446.1
ELEC DE ARGE-ADR       1262Q US       945325071     -56471446.1
ELECTRICIDAD ARG       3447811Z AR    945325071     -56471446.1
ENDESA - RTS           CECOX AR       271025064     -37667553.4
ENDESA COST-ADR        CRCNY US       271025064     -37667553.4
ENDESA COSTAN-         CECO2 AR       271025064     -37667553.4
ENDESA COSTAN-         CECOD AR       271025064     -37667553.4
ENDESA COSTAN-         CECOC AR       271025064     -37667553.4
ENDESA COSTAN-         EDCFF US       271025064     -37667553.4
ENDESA COSTAN-A        CECO1 AR       271025064     -37667553.4
ESTRELA SA             ESTR3 BZ      76575881.3      -120012837
ESTRELA SA             ESTRON BZ     76575881.3      -120012837
ESTRELA SA-PREF        ESTR4 BZ      76575881.3      -120012837
ESTRELA SA-PREF        ESTRPN BZ     76575881.3      -120012837
F GUIMARAES            FGUI3 BZ      11016542.2      -151840378
F GUIMARAES-PREF       FGUI4 BZ      11016542.2      -151840378
FABRICA RENAUX         FTRX3 BZ      66603695.4     -76419246.3
FABRICA RENAUX         FRNXON BZ     66603695.4     -76419246.3
FABRICA RENAUX-P       FTRX4 BZ      66603695.4     -76419246.3
FABRICA RENAUX-P       FRNXPN BZ     66603695.4     -76419246.3
FABRICA TECID-RT       FTRX1 BZ      66603695.4     -76419246.3
FER HAGA-PREF          HAGA4 BZ      19848769.9     -38798309.5
FERRAGENS HAGA         HAGAON BZ     19848769.9     -38798309.5
FERRAGENS HAGA-P       HAGAPN BZ     19848769.9     -38798309.5
FERREIRA GUIMARA       FGUION BZ     11016542.2      -151840378
FERREIRA GUIM-PR       FGUIPN BZ     11016542.2      -151840378
GRADIENTE ELETR        IGBON BZ       346216965     -42013205.9
GRADIENTE EL-PRA       IGBAN BZ       346216965     -42013205.9
GRADIENTE EL-PRB       IGBBN BZ       346216965     -42013205.9
GRADIENTE EL-PRC       IGBCN BZ       346216965     -42013205.9
GRADIENTE-PREF A       IGBR5 BZ       346216965     -42013205.9
GRADIENTE-PREF B       IGBR6 BZ       346216965     -42013205.9
GRADIENTE-PREF C       IGBR7 BZ       346216965     -42013205.9
HAGA                   HAGA3 BZ      19848769.9     -38798309.5
HOTEIS OTHON SA        HOOT3 BZ       238958413     -22929896.5
HOTEIS OTHON SA        HOTHON BZ      238958413     -22929896.5
HOTEIS OTHON-PRF       HOOT4 BZ       238958413     -22929896.5
HOTEIS OTHON-PRF       HOTHPN BZ      238958413     -22929896.5
IGB ELETRONICA         IGBR3 BZ       346216965     -42013205.9
IGUACU CAFE            IGUA3 BZ       214061113     -63930746.9
IGUACU CAFE            IGCSON BZ      214061113     -63930746.9
IGUACU CAFE            IGUCF US       214061113     -63930746.9
IGUACU CAFE-PR A       IGUA5 BZ       214061113     -63930746.9
IGUACU CAFE-PR A       IGCSAN BZ      214061113     -63930746.9
IGUACU CAFE-PR A       IGUAF US       214061113     -63930746.9
IGUACU CAFE-PR B       IGUA6 BZ       214061113     -63930746.9
IGUACU CAFE-PR B       IGCSBN BZ      214061113     -63930746.9
IMPSAT FIBER NET       IMPTQ US       535007008       -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER NET       330902Q GR     535007008       -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER NET       XIMPT SM       535007008       -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER-$US       IMPTD AR       535007008       -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER-BLK       IMPTB AR       535007008       -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER-C/E       IMPTC AR       535007008       -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER-CED       IMPT AR        535007008       -17164978
INVERS ELEC BUEN       IEBAA AR       239575758     -28902145.8
INVERS ELEC BUEN       IEBAB AR       239575758     -28902145.8
INVERS ELEC BUEN       IEBA AR        239575758     -28902145.8
KARSTEN                CTKCF US       161482221     -4141092.01
KARSTEN                CTKON BZ       161482221     -4141092.01
KARSTEN SA             CTKA3 BZ       161482221     -4141092.01
KARSTEN SA - RCT       CTKA9 BZ       161482221     -4141092.01
KARSTEN SA - RCT       CTKA10 BZ      161482221     -4141092.01
KARSTEN SA - RTS       CTKA1 BZ       161482221     -4141092.01
KARSTEN SA - RTS       CTKA2 BZ       161482221     -4141092.01
KARSTEN-PREF           CTKPF US       161482221     -4141092.01
KARSTEN-PREF           CTKA4 BZ       161482221     -4141092.01
KARSTEN-PREF           CTKPN BZ       161482221     -4141092.01
LAEP INVES-BDR B       0163599D BZ    222902269      -255311026
LAEP INVESTMEN-B       0122427D LX    222902269      -255311026
LAEP INVESTMENTS       LEAP LX        222902269      -255311026
LAEP-BDR               MILK33 BZ      222902269      -255311026
LAEP-BDR               MILK11 BZ      222902269      -255311026
LOJAS ARAPUA           LOAR3 BZ      38857516.9     -3355978520
LOJAS ARAPUA           LOARON BZ     38857516.9     -3355978520
LOJAS ARAPUA-GDR       3429T US      38857516.9     -3355978520
LOJAS ARAPUA-GDR       LJPSF US      38857516.9     -3355978520
LOJAS ARAPUA-PRF       LOAR4 BZ      38857516.9     -3355978520
LOJAS ARAPUA-PRF       LOARPN BZ     38857516.9     -3355978520
LOJAS ARAPUA-PRF       52353Z US     38857516.9     -3355978520
LUPATECH SA            LUPA3 BZ       584100366      -304853641
LUPATECH SA            LUPTF US       584100366      -304853641
LUPATECH SA            LUPAF US       584100366      -304853641
LUPATECH SA            LUPTQ US       584100366      -304853641
LUPATECH SA -RCT       LUPA9 BZ       584100366      -304853641
LUPATECH SA-ADR        LUPAY US       584100366      -304853641
LUPATECH SA-ADR        LUPAQ US       584100366      -304853641
LUPATECH SA-RT         LUPA11 BZ      584100366      -304853641
LUPATECH SA-RTS        1041054D BZ    584100366      -304853641
LUPATECH SA-RTS        LUPA1 BZ       584100366      -304853641
MANGELS INDL           MGEL3 BZ       186096273       -50186882
MANGELS INDL SA        MISAON BZ      186096273       -50186882
MANGELS INDL-PRF       MGIRF US       186096273       -50186882
MANGELS INDL-PRF       MGEL4 BZ       186096273       -50186882
MANGELS INDL-PRF       MISAPN BZ      186096273       -50186882
MINUPAR                MNPR3 BZ      90210352.5      -117166643
MINUPAR SA             MNPRON BZ     90210352.5      -117166643
MINUPAR SA-PREF        MNPRPN BZ     90210352.5      -117166643
MINUPAR-PREF           MNPR4 BZ      90210352.5      -117166643
MINUPAR-RCT            9314634Q BZ   90210352.5      -117166643
MINUPAR-RCT            0599564D BZ   90210352.5      -117166643
MINUPAR-RCT            MNPR9 BZ      90210352.5      -117166643
MINUPAR-RT             9314542Q BZ   90210352.5      -117166643
MINUPAR-RT             0599562D BZ   90210352.5      -117166643
MINUPAR-RTS            MNPR1 BZ      90210352.5      -117166643
NORDON MET             NORD3 BZ      10859129.2     -33570700.5
NORDON METAL           NORDON BZ     10859129.2     -33570700.5
NORDON MET-RTS         NORD1 BZ      10859129.2     -33570700.5
NOVA AMERICA SA        NOVA3 BZ      21287488.9      -183535526
NOVA AMERICA SA        NOVA3B BZ     21287488.9      -183535526
NOVA AMERICA SA        NOVAON BZ     21287488.9      -183535526
NOVA AMERICA SA        1NOVON BZ     21287488.9      -183535526
NOVA AMERICA-PRF       NOVA4 BZ      21287488.9      -183535526
NOVA AMERICA-PRF       NOVA4B BZ     21287488.9      -183535526
NOVA AMERICA-PRF       NOVAPN BZ     21287488.9      -183535526
NOVA AMERICA-PRF       1NOVPN BZ     21287488.9      -183535526
OGX PETROLEO           CTCO3 BZ      2104841243     -4244633894
OLEO E GAS P-ADR       OGXPY US      2104841243     -4244633894
OLEO E GAS P-ADR       OGXPYEUR EO   2104841243     -4244633894
OLEO E GAS P-ADR       OGXPYEUR EU   2104841243     -4244633894
OLEO E GAS P-ADR       8OGB GR       2104841243     -4244633894
OLEO E GAS PART        OGXP3 BZ      2104841243     -4244633894
OLEO E GAS PART        OGXP5 BZ      2104841243     -4244633894
OLEO E GAS PART        OGXP6 BZ      2104841243     -4244633894
OLEO E GAS PART        OGXPF US      2104841243     -4244633894
OSX BRASIL - RTS       0701756D BZ   2670745328      -202996314
OSX BRASIL - RTS       0701757D BZ   2670745328      -202996314
OSX BRASIL - RTS       0812903D BZ   2670745328      -202996314
OSX BRASIL - RTS       0812904D BZ   2670745328      -202996314
OSX BRASIL - RTS       OSXB1 BZ      2670745328      -202996314
OSX BRASIL - RTS       OSXB9 BZ      2670745328      -202996314
OSX BRASIL SA          OSXB3 BZ      2670745328      -202996314
OSX BRASIL SA          EBXB3 BZ      2670745328      -202996314
OSX BRASIL SA          OSXRF US      2670745328      -202996314
OSX BRASIL S-GDR       OSXRY US      2670745328      -202996314
PADMA INDUSTRIA        LCSA4 BZ       388720096      -213641152
PARMALAT               LCSA3 BZ       388720096      -213641152
PARMALAT BRASIL        LCSAON BZ      388720096      -213641152
PARMALAT BRAS-PF       LCSAPN BZ      388720096      -213641152
PARMALAT BR-RT C       LCSA5 BZ       388720096      -213641152
PARMALAT BR-RT P       LCSA6 BZ       388720096      -213641152
PETROLERA DEL CO       PSUR AR       70120174.9       -27864484
PILMAIQUEN             PILMAIQ CI     200140666     -20597929.7
PORTX OPERACOES        PRTX3 BZ       976769385     -9407990.18
PORTX OPERA-GDR        PXTPY US       976769385     -9407990.18
PUYEHUE                PUYEH CI      21553021.9     -5145184.07
PUYEHUE RIGHT          PUYEHUOS CI   21553021.9     -5145184.07
RECRUSUL               RCSL3 BZ      41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL - RCT         4529789Q BZ   41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL - RCT         4529793Q BZ   41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL - RCT         0163582D BZ   41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL - RCT         0163583D BZ   41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL - RCT         0614675D BZ   41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL - RCT         0614676D BZ   41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL - RCT         RCSL10 BZ     41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL - RT          4529781Q BZ   41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL - RT          4529785Q BZ   41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL - RT          0163579D BZ   41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL - RT          0163580D BZ   41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL - RT          0614673D BZ   41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL - RT          0614674D BZ   41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL SA            RESLON BZ     41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL SA-PREF       RESLPN BZ     41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL SA-RCT        RCSL9 BZ      41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL SA-RTS        RCSL1 BZ      41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL SA-RTS        RCSL2 BZ      41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL-BON RT        RCSL11 BZ     41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL-BON RT        RCSL12 BZ     41395863.2     -21007926.7
RECRUSUL-PREF          RCSL4 BZ      41395863.2     -21007926.7
REDE EMP ENE ELE       ELCA4 BZ      1029019993      -128321599
REDE EMP ENE ELE       ELCA3 BZ      1029019993      -128321599
REDE EMPRESAS-PR       REDE4 BZ      1029019993      -128321599
REDE ENERGIA SA        REDE3 BZ      1029019993      -128321599
REDE ENERGIA SA-       REDE2 BZ      1029019993      -128321599
REDE ENERGIA-RTS       REDE1 BZ      1029019993      -128321599
REDE ENERG-UNIT        REDE11 BZ     1029019993      -128321599
REDE ENER-RCT          3907731Q BZ   1029019993      -128321599
REDE ENER-RCT          REDE9 BZ      1029019993      -128321599
REDE ENER-RCT          REDE10 BZ     1029019993      -128321599
REDE ENER-RT           3907727Q BZ   1029019993      -128321599
REDE ENER-RT           1011624D BZ   1029019993      -128321599
REDE ENER-RT           1011625D BZ   1029019993      -128321599
RENAUXVIEW SA          TXRX3 BZ      54394844.4     -90675345.2
RENAUXVIEW SA-PF       TXRX4 BZ      54394844.4     -90675345.2
RIMET                  REEM3 BZ       103098359      -185417651
RIMET                  REEMON BZ      103098359      -185417651
RIMET-PREF             REEM4 BZ       103098359      -185417651
RIMET-PREF             REEMPN BZ      103098359      -185417651
SANESALTO              SNST3 BZ      20127540.6     -7418183.32
SANSUY                 SNSY3 BZ       188091749      -164364290
SANSUY SA              SNSYON BZ      188091749      -164364290
SANSUY SA-PREF A       SNSYAN BZ      188091749      -164364290
SANSUY SA-PREF B       SNSYBN BZ      188091749      -164364290
SANSUY-PREF A          SNSY5 BZ       188091749      -164364290
SANSUY-PREF B          SNSY6 BZ       188091749      -164364290
SCHLOSSER              SCLO3 BZ      51334306.9       -58463309
SCHLOSSER SA           SCHON BZ      51334306.9       -58463309
SCHLOSSER SA-PRF       SCHPN BZ      51334306.9       -58463309
SCHLOSSER-PREF         SCLO4 BZ      51334306.9       -58463309
SNIAFA SA              SNIA AR       11229696.2     -2670544.86
SNIAFA SA-B            SDAGF US      11229696.2     -2670544.86
SNIAFA SA-B            SNIA5 AR      11229696.2     -2670544.86
STAROUP SA             STARON BZ     27663605.3     -7174512.12
STAROUP SA-PREF        STARPN BZ     27663605.3     -7174512.12
TEC TOY SA-PF B        TOYB6 BZ      33401974.6     -468978.338
TEC TOY SA-PREF        TOYDF US      33401974.6     -468978.338
TEC TOY SA-PREF        TOYB5 BZ      33401974.6     -468978.338
TEC TOY-RCT            7335626Q BZ   33401974.6     -468978.338
TEC TOY-RCT            7335630Q BZ   33401974.6     -468978.338
TEC TOY-RCT            TOYB9 BZ      33401974.6     -468978.338
TEC TOY-RCT            TOYB10 BZ     33401974.6     -468978.338
TEC TOY-RT             7335610Q BZ   33401974.6     -468978.338
TEC TOY-RT             7335614Q BZ   33401974.6     -468978.338
TEC TOY-RT             TOYB1 BZ      33401974.6     -468978.338
TEC TOY-RT             TOYB2 BZ      33401974.6     -468978.338
TECTOY                 TOYB3 BZ      33401974.6     -468978.338
TECTOY                 TOYB13 BZ     33401974.6     -468978.338
TECTOY SA              TOYBON BZ     33401974.6     -468978.338
TECTOY SA-PREF         TOYBPN BZ     33401974.6     -468978.338
TECTOY-PF-RTS5/6       TOYB11 BZ     33401974.6     -468978.338
TECTOY-PREF            TOYB4 BZ      33401974.6     -468978.338
TECTOY-RCPT PF B       TOYB12 BZ     33401974.6     -468978.338
TEKA                   TKTQF US       367577608      -421708949
TEKA                   TEKA3 BZ       367577608      -421708949
TEKA                   TEKAON BZ      367577608      -421708949
TEKA-ADR               TEKAY US       367577608      -421708949
TEKA-ADR               TKTPY US       367577608      -421708949
TEKA-ADR               TKTQY US       367577608      -421708949
TEKA-PREF              TKTPF US       367577608      -421708949
TEKA-PREF              TEKA4 BZ       367577608      -421708949
TEKA-PREF              TEKAPN BZ      367577608      -421708949
TEKA-RCT               TEKA9 BZ       367577608      -421708949
TEKA-RCT               TEKA10 BZ      367577608      -421708949
TEKA-RTS               TEKA1 BZ       367577608      -421708949
TEKA-RTS               TEKA2 BZ       367577608      -421708949
TEXTEIS RENA-RCT       TXRX9 BZ      54394844.4     -90675345.2
TEXTEIS RENA-RCT       TXRX10 BZ     54394844.4     -90675345.2
TEXTEIS RENAU-RT       TXRX1 BZ      54394844.4     -90675345.2
TEXTEIS RENAU-RT       TXRX2 BZ      54394844.4     -90675345.2
TEXTEIS RENAUX         RENXON BZ     54394844.4     -90675345.2
TEXTEIS RENAUX         RENXPN BZ     54394844.4     -90675345.2
VARIG PART EM SE       VPSC3 BZ        83017828      -495721697
VARIG PART EM TR       VPTA3 BZ      49432119.3      -399290357
VARIG PART EM-PR       VPTA4 BZ      49432119.3      -399290357
VARIG PART EM-PR       VPSC4 BZ        83017828      -495721697
VARIG SA               VAGV3 BZ       966298048     -4695211008
VARIG SA               VARGON BZ      966298048     -4695211008
VARIG SA-PREF          VAGV4 BZ       966298048     -4695211008
VARIG SA-PREF          VARGPN BZ      966298048     -4695211008
WETZEL SA              MWET3 BZ      97509409.1     -4549842.72
WETZEL SA              MWELON BZ     97509409.1     -4549842.72
WETZEL SA-PREF         MWET4 BZ      97509409.1     -4549842.72
WETZEL SA-PREF         MWELPN BZ     97509409.1     -4549842.72
WIEST                  WISA3 BZ      34107195.1      -126993682
WIEST SA               WISAON BZ     34107195.1      -126993682
WIEST SA-PREF          WISAPN BZ     34107195.1      -126993682
WIEST-PREF             WISA4 BZ      34107195.1      -126993682


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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