TCRLA_Public/150414.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 072


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Asks Judge to Hold Separate Hearings on Debt Suits
ARGENTINA: Sues Citi Over Holdout Bondholder Agreement
ARGENTINA: 2nd Circ. Nixes Contempt Appeal in Bond Row
ARGENTINA: Takes $2.3 Billion Bond Payment Row to 2nd Circ.


B R A Z I L

BANCO PINE: Moody's Downgrades LT FC Sr. Unsec. Debt Rating to Ba3
JBS S.A.: Moody's Upgrades CFR to Ba2, Outlook Stable
OGX PETROLEO: Creditors Agree Not to Execute on DIP Financing
PARANA: S&P Lowers Rating to 'BB+'; Outlook Negative
RIO DE JANEIRO: S&P Lowers Rating to 'BB+'; Outlook Stable

* BRAZIL: Probes Alleged Corruption Among Tax Officials


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

CASTILLO INVESTMENTS: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 4
EDIOM FEEDER: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 22
FREMAR INVESTMENTS: Sole Member Receives Wind-Up Report
GREATDREAMS CARTOON: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 21
IBIZA BUSINESS: Sole Member Receives Wind-Up Report

JOVI INVESTMENTS: Sole Member Receives Wind-Up Report
MEME INVESTMENTS: Sole Member Receives Wind-Up Report
REPSOL INTERNATIONAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 22
WK CONSULTANTS: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 4
WL II LIMITED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 21

YCG (2001): Members' Final Meeting Set for April 20
ZS ENTERPRISES: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
ZS EQUITY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
ZS HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Gov't., Investors Enlist Ex-IMF Officials


X X X X X X X X X

* Large Companies With Insolvent Balance Sheets


                            - - - - -



=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Asks Judge to Hold Separate Hearings on Debt Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bob Van Voris at Bloomberg News reports that Argentina asked a
U.S. judge to separately consider a group of eight class actions
filed by holders of the country's defaulted debt from another set
of cases including claims by hedge funds.

Carmine Boccuzzi, a lawyer for Argentina, asked U.S. District
Judge Thomas Griesa to reject a request by lawyers for the
investor classes to consider their cases along with dozens of what
are known in the bond dispute as me-too cases, according to
Bloomberg News.

The report notes that those include lawsuits by hedge funds that
bought the debt at a discount after Argentina's 2001 default.

Both groups of investors are seeking the benefit of Judge Griesa's
rulings blocking Argentina from paying holders of its restructured
debt until it pays $1.7 billion owed to a group led by Paul
Singer's NML Capital, Bloomberg News relates.

Ms. Boccuzzi argued that Judge Griesa shouldn't consider whether
to extend the rulings to both groups at the same time, because a
federal appeals court is considering orders defining who's
included in the investor classes.

The two groups of claims are different and should be ruled on
separately, Ms. Boccuzzi said, Bloomberg News discloses.

The investors in the class action cases are seeking an order
requiring Argentina to make payments into escrow accounts for the
benefit of the investors in those cases, Bloomberg News notes.

The me-too investors want to be included in the group that must be
paid before Argentina can return to servicing its restructured
debt, Bloomberg News says.

The investors' request is based on a clause in the bond agreements
known as pari passu, which Judge Griesa has ruled requires
Argentina to give equal treatment to holders of its defaulted
bonds and holders of debt issued in two restructurings, in 2005
and 2010, Bloomberg News notes.  About 92 percent of Argentina's
creditors agreed to exchange their bonds for ones paying about 30
percent of what they were originally promised, Bloomberg News
relays.

The rulings triggered a new default in July when Argentina refused
to pay the NML group and was blocked from paying restructured debt
holders, Bloomberg News says.

The case is Seijas v. Republic of Argentina, U.S. District Court,
Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

                          *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, on Aug. 1, 2014,
reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30
after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million
interest payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a court- appointed
mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the country
and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds that the
country had defaulted on in 2001.  A U.S. judge had ruled that the
interest payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds led by
Elliott Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they claimed.
The country hasn't been able to access international credit
markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.

As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD).  The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5.  The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively.  The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings downgraded
Argentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'
from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon
payments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after the
expiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30.  According to
Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch
has downgraded the affected securities to 'D'.  In addition, Fitch
has affirmed:

   -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD';
   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'RD';
   -- Country Ceiling at 'CCC'.
   -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Global 17) at
      'C';
   -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
      Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law at 'D'.


ARGENTINA: Sues Citi Over Holdout Bondholder Agreement
------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Scurria at Law360.com reports that the Argentine government
escalated a legal offensive against CitiBank Argentina's recent
accord with hedge fund creditors pushing for full repayment on
defaulted sovereign debt, suing the bank in local court for
deserting its bond custody business.

The complaint brought in Argentine administrative court seeks to
invalidate a deal the CitiGroup Inc. unit reached to bow out of
Argentina's high-stakes tussle with a small group of determined
investors that refused to accept negotiated haircuts following the
nation's 2001 default, according to Law360.com.

Last month, Citi agreed to stop agitating for the right to forward
interest payments on local Argentine bonds, part of a deal in
which it won permission from the litigating creditors to make a
pair of one-time coupon payments on restructured bonds to ease its
exit from the custody business in Argentina, the report notes.

The agreement with hedge funds, including Paul Singer's Elliott
Management Corp., allowed Citi to process interest payments for
Argentine-law bonds that U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa has
held cannot be serviced unless the holdouts receive a
corresponding payment -- something that Argentina has steadfastly
refused to do, the report discloses.

"We are filing this lawsuit in Argentina to declare void the
agreement signed in the U.S., to interrupt the effects of that
agreement and preserve the rights of the customers of CitiBank,
the Argentine legal system, our sovereignty and to do so
immediately," Economic Minister Alex Kicillof said in a statement
obtained by Law360.com.

The bank had previously been blocked from passing along payments
to so-called exchange bondholders that swapped out their bonds for
restructured notes in 2005 and 2010, the report notes.  Judge
Griesa then refused to stay the effectiveness of existing equal
payment injunctions while Citi appealed, the report relates.

In response, Argentina steadily increased the pressure on Citi to
defy Judge Griesa's orders, removing the Argentine unit's CEO,
locking it out of local capital markets and threatening licensing
suspensions and criminal charges, the report says.

The hedge funds snapped up Argentine debt at deep discounts on the
secondary market and refused to tender their bonds for 30 cents on
the dollar in restructurings negotiated with holders of 93 percent
of the nation's outstanding bond debt, the report discloses.

Judge Griesa has held that under a so-called pari passu provision,
favored exchange bondholders cannot be paid ahead of claims from
the hedge funds, which Argentina invariably refers to as
"vultures." The Second Circuit upheld that finding, and the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to take up Argentina's appeal, the report
relays.

The nation fell into default in July after Judge Griesa prevented
Bank of New York Mellon from processing a $539 million interest
payment earmarked for U.S.-based exchange bondholders, the report
notes.  Argentina responded by enacting legislation authorizing
its economic ministry to take steps to remove BNY as the bonds'
trustee and make payments through an affiliate of state-backed
Banco de la Nacion Argentina instead, the report relays.

The legislation also allowed for the possibility of payments to
the holdouts, but under the same terms agreed to by exchange
bondholders, the report adds.

                          *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, on Aug. 1, 2014,
reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30
after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million
interest payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a court- appointed
mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the country
and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds that the
country had defaulted on in 2001.  A U.S. judge had ruled that the
interest payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds led by
Elliott Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they claimed.
The country hasn't been able to access international credit
markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.

As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD).  The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5.  The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively.  The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings downgraded
Argentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'
from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon
payments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after the
expiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30.  According to
Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch
has downgraded the affected securities to 'D'.  In addition, Fitch
has affirmed:

   -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD';
   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'RD';
   -- Country Ceiling at 'CCC'.
   -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Global 17) at
      'C';
   -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
      Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law at 'D'.


ARGENTINA: 2nd Circ. Nixes Contempt Appeal in Bond Row
------------------------------------------------------
Law360.com reports that the Second Circuit tossed an appeal of a
lower court's ruling holding Argentina in contempt for violating
an injunction preventing the country from paying out bondholders
who agreed to debt restructuring while not paying hedge funds who
didn't agree to the bond exchange, calling the appeal premature.
A two-judge Second Circuit panel dismissed the South American
country's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, according to a brief
order, reports Law360.com.  "We conclude that a final order has
not been issued by the district court . . . . and the collateral
order doctrine does not apply to this appeal," the panel wrote,
the report notes.

Law360.com said the decision is the latest in a long-running case
involving a number of hedge funds including Elliott Management
Corp.-controlled NML Capital Ltd. and affiliates of Aurelius
Capital Management LP, which bought Argentine sovereign debt at a
discount after the country defaulted on $100 billion in bonds in
2001.  The funds refused to swap them out in restructurings in
2005 and 2010, instead filing suit in the U.S. for full repayment,
the report relays.

Argentina again defaulted on its sovereign debt in July 2014 after
U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa blocked a $539 million bond
payment, the report recalls.  Argentina responded by enacting
legislation authorizing its economic ministry to take steps to
remove Bank of New York Mellon Corp. as the bonds' trustee,
allowing it to pay the exchange bondholders through an affiliate
of state-backed Banco de la Nacion Argentina instead, the report
discloses.

The legislation also allowed for the possibility of payments to
holdout hedge funds demanding full repayment, but under the same
terms agreed to by the so-called exchange bondholders, which the
hedge funds claim is less than one-third of the original price,
notes the report.

In a September ruling, Judge Griesa said Argentina's moves to
strip BNY as the trustee for the bonds and its plans to pay so-
called exchange bondholders locally without any recognition of the
country's obligation to the hedge funds were unlawful and found
the country to be in contempt of court but stopped short of
issuing sanctions, saying they would be decided in future
proceedings, the report discloses.  Argentina appealed the
contempt order in November.

In their Feb. 12 motion to dismiss, the hedge funds had argued
that because the district court has not yet ruled on whether to
issue sanctions, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over
Argentina's appeal, the report relays.

"A contempt finding that reserves judgment on sanctions is not an
appealable final judgment and is not appealable under the
collateral order doctrine," the hedge funds said, the report
notes.  "Nor does Argentina's assertion of immunity from certain
sanctions render the contempt finding appealable; the district
court has not addressed the issue of sanctions and thus has not
conclusively ruled on these baseless claims of immunity," the
hedge funds added.

Circuit Judges Rosemary S. Pooler and Susan L. Carney sat on the
Second Circuit Panel. Circuit Judge Raymond J. Lohier recused
himself from the decision, the report notes.

NML Capital is represented by Theodore B. Olson, Matthew McGill
and Jason J. Mendro of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP.  Aurelius is
represented by Edward A. Friedman and Daniel B. Rapport of
Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP.

Argentina is represented by Jonathan I. Blackman, Daniel James
Northrop and Carmine D. Boccuzzi of Cleary Gottlieb Steen &
Hamilton LLP.

The case is NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, case number
14-4134, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

                          *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, on Aug. 1, 2014,
reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30
after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million
interest payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a court- appointed
mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the country
and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds that the
country had defaulted on in 2001.  A U.S. judge had ruled that the
interest payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds led by
Elliott Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they claimed.
The country hasn't been able to access international credit
markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.

As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD).  The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5.  The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively.  The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings downgraded
Argentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'
from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon
payments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after the
expiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30.  According to
Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch
has downgraded the affected securities to 'D'.  In addition, Fitch
has affirmed:

   -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD';
   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'RD';
   -- Country Ceiling at 'CCC'.
   -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Global 17) at
      'C';
   -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
      Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law at 'D'.


ARGENTINA: Takes $2.3 Billion Bond Payment Row to 2nd Circ.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Law360.com reports that Argentina appealed a New York federal
court's order that blocked Citibank NA from forwarding the
country's intended payments on a $2.3 billion basket of bonds,
weeks after the court allowed Citibank to pass on the payments
anyway as it exited the custody business in Argentina.

Citibank was dragged into the bond repayment fight after Argentina
said it wanted to make the payments on the $2.3 billion in bonds
to its favored creditors despite a 2012 injunction blocking it
from doing so without also making payments to a group of hedge
funds seeking full repayment, according to Law360.com.  Citibank
had said that its status in the country would be jeopardized if it
couldn't act as a conduit for the dollar-dominated Argentine-law
bonds, but U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa ruled last month that
his 2012 injunction applied to Citibank and it could not process
the payment, the report notes.

Argentina's notice of appeal took issue with the March 12 order,
saying it improperly extended the injunction, the report relates.
An attorney for Argentina had previously urged Judge Griesa to
allow Citibank to service the debt, reasoning that the bonds at
issue were offered exclusively in Argentina and therefore fell
outside the scope of the injunction, the report notes.

"The order erroneously modified and extended the [injunctions] so
as to enjoin payments on some U.S. dollar-denominated bonds
governed by Argentine law and payable in Argentina unless and
until the Republic makes a 'ratable payment' to plaintiffs,"
Argentina wrote, the report discloses.

Despite the ruling, Judge Griesa allowed Citibank to step away
from the dispute several weeks later, saying it would not be
punished for processing a quarterly interest payments of $3.7
million, says the report.

Citibank quickly said its Argentina branch would exit the custody
business following threats from the Argentine government to pull
its operating license and bring civil and criminal charges if it
did not pay holders of the Argentine-law exchange bonds, notes the
report.

Under the latest court order, Citi was allowed to pass along the
March 31 payment and a scheduled June 30 payment if Argentina
makes them -- even though the country has been legally ordered not
to do so, the report relays.

The ruling does not affect bonds denominated in non-dollar amounts
or under laws other than Argentina's, but it does allow Citi to
stay in the Argentine government's good graces, the report notes.

The plaintiffs bought Argentine sovereign debt at a discount after
the country defaulted on $100 billion in bonds in 2001, notes the
report.  The funds refused to swap them out in exchanges in 2005
and 2010, instead suing in the U.S. for full repayment, the report
discloses.

Judge Griesa has said that Argentina can't pay bondholders that
agreed to debt restructuring unless it also makes a ratable
payment to the "holdout" hedge funds, the report relays.  The
Second Circuit upheld that finding, and the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to take up Argentina's appeal, the report notes.

Separately, holders of euro-denominated bonds are also trying to
access their owed payments, the report relates.

Citibank is represented by Karen E. Wagner, Denis J. McInernay,
Michael S. Flynn and James L. Kerr Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP.

Argentina is represented by Jonathan I. Blackman and Carmine D.
Boccuzzi of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP.

The Aurelius plaintiffs are represented by Edward A. Friedman and
Daniel B. Rapport of Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP. NML
Capital is represented by Kevin S. Reed of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
& Sullivan LLP.

The case is NML Capital v. the Republic of Argentina, case number
1:08-cv-06978, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York.

                         *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, on Aug. 1, 2014,
reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30
after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million
interest payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a court- appointed
mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the country
and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds that the
country had defaulted on in 2001.  A U.S. judge had ruled that the
interest payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds led by
Elliott Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they claimed.
The country hasn't been able to access international credit
markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.

As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD).  The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5.  The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively.  The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings downgraded
Argentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'
from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon
payments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after the
expiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30.  According to
Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch
has downgraded the affected securities to 'D'.  In addition, Fitch
has affirmed:

   -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD';
   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'RD';
   -- Country Ceiling at 'CCC'.
   -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Global 17) at
      'C';
   -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
      Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law at 'D'.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO PINE: Moody's Downgrades LT FC Sr. Unsec. Debt Rating to Ba3
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Banco Pine S.A.'s long-term
global local and foreign currency deposit ratings and long-term
foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating to Ba3 from Ba2, as
well as its long-term foreign-currency subordinated debt rating to
B1 from Ba3. Pine's Brazilian national scale deposit ratings were
also downgraded to A3.br and BR-2, from A1.br and BR-1, long- and
short-term, respectively. The downgrades were driven by a decision
to lower Pine's baseline credit assessment to ba3, from ba2.  The
short-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings of
Not Prime were not affected by this rating action. The outlook on
the long-term ratings is negative.

The rating action concludes the review for downgrade on Pine's
ratings, initiated in Jan. 26, 2015.

The following ratings of Banco Pine were downgraded:

  -- Long-term global local-currency deposit rating: to Ba3, from
     Ba2, with negative outlook

  -- Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating: to Ba3, from Ba2,
     with negative outlook

  -- Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating: to A3.br,
     from A1.br, with negative outlook

  -- Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating: to BR-2,
     from BR-1

  -- Long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating: to
     Ba3, from Ba2, with negative outlook

  -- Long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured program rating:
     to (P)Ba3, from (P)Ba2

  -- Long-term foreign-currency subordinated debt rating: to B1,
     from Ba3

The lowering of the standalone BCA to ba3 reflects Moody's view
that Pine's already modest earnings will deteriorate further as a
result of an expected contraction in Pine's loan book, as the
economy continues to decelerate. In addition, Moody's anticipates
Pine will need to increase provisions against potential loan
losses in view of its large exposures to economic sectors and
borrowers that have been increasingly under pressure. For 2014,
the bank reported a 41.6% decline in net income to BRL94.3
million, or just 0.9% of assets.

Brazilian banks in general will be challenged as a result of the
country's weak economic environment, but Pine is particularly
exposed due to its large loan concentrations with high risk
borrowers, such as sugar and ethanol and construction companies.
While Pine's reported nonperforming loan ratio remained moderate
at 1.1% in December 2014, this was up from just 0.06% in December
2013 and Moody's expect it will continue to rise. The
deterioration in the financial standing of these borrowers will
likely trigger the need for additional provisions, which already
increased 21% in 2014 including provisions for bank guarantees and
securities with credit risk. With earnings projected to continue
to decline due to an expected contraction of the loan book in
2015, a significant further increase in provisions could result in
net losses and a reduction in capital.

In the first quarter of 2015, the bank released a new guidance
that placed loan growth for the year in the range of -5% and 5%,
which Moody's believe may be optimistic. While a reduction of risk
weighted assets in 2015 will alleviate pressures on capital,
capitalization ratios could nevertheless decline should the bank
record a sharp rise in provisions or write downs.

The negative outlook on Pine's ratings reflects the possibility
that asset quality could deteriorate more than currently
anticipated, causing capitalization to decline despite the
expected deleveraging, and that even higher than expected loan
loss provisions could potentially result in a net loss for the
year.

The last rating action on Banco Pine S.A. was on 26 January 2015,
when Moody's lowered Pine's BCA to ba2, from ba1, and downgraded
its BFSR to D, from D+. Moody's also downgraded the bank's long-
term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings to Ba2,
from Ba1; the long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured debt
rating to Ba2, from Ba1, the long-term foreign-currency
subordinated debt rating to Ba3, from Ba2, and the long-term
Brazilian national scale deposit rating to A1.br, from Aa2.br. The
short-term global local and foreign currency deposit ratings at
Not Prime and the short-term Brazilian national scale deposit
rating of BR-1 were not affected by the rating action. At the same
time, Moody's placed Pine's BFSR and long-term deposit and debt
ratings on review for further downgrade.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in March 2015.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in "za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in
June 2014 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale Ratings to
Global Scale Ratings".

Banco Pine S.A. is headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil. As of
Dec. 31, 2014, the bank had total assets of approximately BRL10.45
billion (USD3.93 billion) and equity of BRL1.26 billion (USD472
million).


JBS S.A.: Moody's Upgrades CFR to Ba2, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded JBS S.A.'s Corporate Family
Rating and the ratings of the notes issued by Bertin S.A. and JBS
Finance II and guaranteed by JBS to Ba2. At the same time, Moody's
upgraded JBS USA, LLC's senior unsecured ratings to Ba2 and senior
secured ratings to Ba1. The outlook for the ratings is stable.

Issuer: JBS S.A.

  -- LT Corporate Family Ratings: to Ba2 from Ba3

  -- $300 million GTD SR GLOBAL NOTES due 2016: to Ba2 from Ba3

Issuer: Bertin S.A.

  -- $350 million GTD GLOBAL BONDS due 2016: to Ba2 from Ba3

Issuer: JBS Finance II Ltd.

  -- $900 million GTD GLOBAL BONDS due 2018: to Ba2 from Ba3

Issuer: JBS USA, LLC

  -- BACKED Senior Unsecured: to Ba2 from Ba3

  -- BACKED Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility: to Ba1 from Ba2

  -- $475 million SR SEC TERM LOAN B due 2018: to Ba1 from Ba2

  -- $500 million GTD SR SEC TERM LOAN due 2020: to Ba1 from Ba2

  -- $700 million GTD GLOBAL NOTES due 2020: to Ba2 from Ba3

  -- $1,150 million GTD GLOBAL NOTES due 2021: to Ba2 from Ba3

  -- $750 million SR GLOBAL NOTES due 2024: to Ba2 from Ba3

  -- The outlook for all ratings is stable.

The upgrade reflects primarily the improvement observed in JBS'
credit metrics resulted from the strong performance of key
business segments and the rapid, profitable expansion into the
processed food business in Brazil, which has already contributed
higher margins and will allow for a more stable cash generation
going forward. Accordingly, adjusted leverage declined to 3.8
times at the end of 2014 from 5.0 times at the end of 2013.
Assuming no major acquisitions in the near-term, as has been
publicly pledged by the company, and stronger cash generation,
Moody's estimate that normalized gross leverage could reach 3.5x
in 2015.

The Ba2 ratings incorporate the global strength of JBS' operations
as one of the world's largest protein producers and its
diversification in terms of protein products, raw material
sourcing and sales, which offset risks related to animal cycles,
diseases and export restrictions. The strategy to increase its
footprint in the global processed food business and invest on
strong domestic brands in Brazil via JBS Foods has improved the
business profile and will lead to higher and more stable margins
over time. Offsetting these positive attributes is the inherent
volatility of the protein industry, which is subject to risk
factors such as weather conditions and supply imbalances, a
weakening consumer scenario in Brazil, and a history of very
aggressive growth via acquisitions.

JBS has publicly stated that it will pursue a more conservative
growth strategy going forward with greater focus on organic
growth. Although Moody's anticipate that acquisitions are
possible, Moody's don't foresee any transformational transactions
that would materially hurt the company's credit profile, which is
reflected in the stable rating outlook.

During 2014, JBS successfully integrated packaged food maker Seara
into JBS Foods, which currently accounts for about 11% of revenues
and 19% of the company's EBITDA. In 2014 JBS Foods generated an
EBITDA margin of 16% as compared to 7.9% in the 4Q13 -- the first
quarter of the integration process. Besides benefiting from
stronger margins, this division helps to offset the more volatile
nature of the fresh and frozen meat businesses and, structurally,
it creates a platform for JBS to grow into the value added space.
In the near-term, a softening macroeconomic environment in Brazil
will pressure the industry's prices and margins, but Moody's
believe that the company will be able to profit from its strong
local market positioning and from efficiencies generated on the
acquired assets. Moreover, Moody's expect the US poultry segment
and overall exports markets to remain solid contributors to JBS'
overall profitability over the next several months.

The stable outlook incorporates Moody's expectations that JBS will
focus mainly on organic growth and will continue to post improved
operating margins and leverage metrics. Furthermore, it reflects
our assumption that the company will prudently manage capital
expenditures, acquisitions and dividend distributions to preserve
its liquidity profile.

An upgrade to the ratings could occur if JBS demonstrates
consistent and predictable execution of a more conservative
financial policy without acquisitions that could jeopardize its
credit metrics, and reports stronger and less volatile
consolidated cash flows and improving operating margins. An
upgrade would require a consistent healthy free cash flow, while
maintaining CFO to Net Debt above 25% and Debt-to-EBITDA below
3.2x on a sustained basis.

A downgrade to the rating could be caused by an inconsistent
financial policy, higher leverage, weaker liquidity profile, or if
the company fails to generate free cash flow on a consistent
basis. Quantitatively, a downgrade could occur if Debt-to-EBITDA
is sustained above 4.0x, EBITA/Interest below 2.0x or CFO to Net
Debt below 16%. All credit metrics are adjusted according to
Moody's standard adjustments and definitions.

Headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil, JBS S.A. ("JBS") is the
world's largest protein producer in terms of revenues, slaughter
capacity and production. It is the leader beef, chicken and
leather player and a leading lamb producer on a global basis,
besides being the third largest pork producer in the USA. The
company has large scale and diversification, with presence in more
than 100 countries.

In 2014, the company reported consolidated net revenues of BRL
120.4 billion, with adjusted EBITDA margin of 9.4%. JBS USA,
represented by beef operations in the US, Canada and Australia, is
the company's largest business segment, representing 43% of total
revenues. JBS Mercosul, which combines the beef operations in
South America, accounts for 22% of revenues, and the recently
created JBS Foods segment, comprising the company's poultry
operations and processed foods segment mainly in Brazil, is
responsible for 11% of revenues. Pilgrim's Pride, the company's
poultry business in the US, accounts for 17%, while the US pork
business contributes with 7%.


OGX PETROLEO: Creditors Agree Not to Execute on DIP Financing
-------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that creditors of Brazil's OGX Petroleo e Gas
Participacoes S.A., the bankrupt oil company created by tycoon
Eike Batista, agreed not to execute payments or guarantees
stipulated in a debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing secured in
2014 by the company.

In a filing published April 10, the company said creditors agreed
to convert DIP financing into common shares of OGX as stipulated
in the financial agreement, according to Reuters.  Creditors would
refrain from any new judicial demands or ask for early repayment,
the filing said, notes the report.

The agreement includes the continued operation and maintenance of
the OSX-3 and OSX-1 floating production, storage and offloading
vessels and the costs involved in the abandonment of the Tubarao
Martelo and Tubarao Azul oil fields, the report adds.

                          About OGX Petroleo

Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, OGX Petroleo e Gas Participacoes
S.A., now known as Oleo e Gas, is an independent exploration and
production company with operations in Latin America.

OGX filed for bankruptcy in a business tribunal in Rio de Janeiro
on Oct. 30, 2013, case number 0377620-56.2013.8.19.0001.  The
bankruptcy filing puts US$3.6 billion of dollar bonds into default
in the largest corporate debt debacle on record in Latin America.
The filing by the oil company that transformed Eike Batista into
Brazil's richest man followed a 16-month decline that wiped out
more than US$30 billion of his personal fortune.

The filing, which in Brazil is called a judicial recovery, follows
months of negotiations to restructure the dollar bonds, in which
OGX sought to convert debt to equity and secure as much as US$500
million in new funds.  OGX said Oct. 29, 2013 that the talks
concluded without an agreement.


PARANA: S&P Lowers Rating to 'BB+'; Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its global scale rating
on the State of Parana to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  S&P also lowered its
national scale rating to 'brAA' from 'brAAA'.  The outlook is
negative.

RATIONALE

The rating action reflects the state's "very weak" liquidity,
"weak" financial management and economy (compared with
international peers'), and "very weak" and volatile budgetary
performance due to the state's excessive spending that has led to
wide deficits after borrowings in 2014.  The state's "average"
financial flexibility, reflected in high own-source revenues and
its low debt burden, compared with that of other Brazilian states
and international peers, partly offset the negatives.

S&P views Parana's overall financial management as "weak."  In the
past two years, the state's finances have significantly
deteriorated, mainly due to a sharp acceleration in operating
spending.  Revenue and expenditure management have lacked clear
processes, which has led to inconsistent practices and substantial
budget revisions during fiscal year 2014.  The state
underestimated its spending needs in the past two years, which has
ramped up its debt to suppliers and resulted in large deficits
after borrowings.

In 2014, Carlos Alberto Richa from the Partido da Social
Democracia Brasileira party (PSDB, its Portuguese acronym) was re-
elected governor for a second four-year term. Governor Richa has
plans to carry out an ambitious fiscal overhaul, which aims to
freeze some operating expenses and wages.  The governor also plans
to reform the state's pension program.  The public payroll and the
pension system's deficits consume more than 90% of the state's tax
revenues.  S&P's base case incorporates its expectation that the
state will implement at least some corrective measures, but it's
still unclear what specific actions the state will take.

"In our view, Parana has "very weak" budgetary performance, as the
state significantly underestimated its spending needs for 2014 and
has been unable to effectively tackle the volatility in its
finances in the past two years.  Although Parana enjoyed strong
budgetary performance up until 2012 (operating surpluses
consistently surpassed 5% of operating revenues), in 2014, Parana
reported a fiscal deficit after capital expenditures (capex) of
11% (or about R$3 billion), reflecting additional deterioration
since 2013.  The deficit was mainly due to a spike in personnel
expenditures, which had also increased in 2013, which for all
Brazilian LRGs include pensions.  The pension fund registered
almost R$4 billion in payments in 2014 and the state also added
employees to its payroll during the election year.  These expenses
were not planned for and thus not included in its 2014 budget.
The resulting deficit after borrowings of around R$ 3 billion in
fiscal 2014 has crippled the state's liquidity, and S&P believes
it will be tough for the state to overcome the shortfall and
reverse the trend in the next few years.

S&P's base-case scenario incorporates some overhaul of the state's
finances that will close the operating deficit gap to less than 5%
of operating revenues by 2016 and 2017.  This overhaul will
include some effective cost controls and wage and hiring freezes.
Although the state's revenues have been strong since 2010, revenue
growth couldn't keep up with the recent sharp hikes in operating
expenditures.

S&P views Parana's economy as "weak."  The state's $12,087 GDP per
capita (as of 2013) is higher than most of its national peers',
except when compared with those of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro
states.  Parana's GDP per capita averaged $11,956 from 2011-2013,
and it's one of the largest states in the nation, with 10.4
million inhabitants that account for approximately 5.5% of the
total population.  As of 2013, the state's estimated GDP was
R$289.9 billion, which represents about 5.8% of the national GDP.
Parana is Brazil's fifth-largest economy.

Parana has "average" budgetary flexibility compared with its
international peers'.  The state improved its revenue collection
slightly in 2014; however, amid stalled growth at the national
level in 2015, this growth won't likely continue.  The state's
own-source revenues accounted for more than 79% of its operating
revenues in the past few years, and S&P believes this will
continue in the next three years.  In S&P's view, the state faces
expenditure restrictions similar to those applied to most
Brazilian LRGs.  Public-sector employee wages (including pensions)
and interest payments accounted for the bulk of its operating
expenditures for the past three years.  Moreover, the state's
capex has been very low, at about 5% of total expenses in the past
three years.  Therefore, the state has limited room to cut its
expenses by reducing its capex, given the latter's already low
levels.  S&P don't expect capex to change significantly in the
next couple of years.

Parana has moderate debt levels, which is better than most of its
Brazilian peers', particularly when compared with larger states'
debt, such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.  As of the end of
December 2014, Parana's debt reached R$19.9 billion, which is
equivalent to 55% of 2014 operating revenues.  This is lower than
previous years' because, unlike its peers, until 2014, Parana
hadn't taken on significant new debt over the past three to four
years, which drove down debt stock in relative terms to a moderate
61% of operating revenues as December 2013 from a high 99% at
year-end 2008.  In fiscal 2014, the state began to borrow again
and accessed about R$1billion in new debt.  S&P expects debt to
continue to gradually shrink in relative terms in the next three
years as loan disbursements will likely continue to move slowly,
reaching about R$1.2 billion in the next two years.  Despite the
debt increase in nominal terms, S&P expects the state's debt to
remain at moderate levels that are below 70% of operating
revenues.

"We assess Brazil's institutional framework as "evolving and
unbalanced."  The system that divides the fiscal powers between
the central and LRGs in Brazil is based on three key parameters
that have remained in place for a long time and have gained strong
political and economic support.  Still, there is an ongoing debate
over the need to modify some of them, though we don't expect major
changes in the intermediate term and if they do occur, they will
only have limited impact on the state's finances," S&P said.

Liquidity

Parana has "very weak" liquidity levels, as defined by S&P's
criteria.  According to the state's data and S&P's monthly cash
projections, Parana's liquidity coverage ratio is negative 48.25%
in terms of its 2015 projected debt service (R$830 million in
principal and R$730 million in interest payments).  The state owes
most of its debt to the federal government and the co-
participation transfers the state receives from the government
guarantee this debt, which diminishes rollover and nonpayment
risks.

S&P views Parana's access to external liquidity as limited.
Unlike its peers, the state has been unable to tap significant
funding sources.  S&P also believes availability of external
financing will be more restricted in the next two years, given
Brazil's recession.

Debt service costs have been a low, average 5.2% of operating
revenues in the past three years, and S&P expects them to remain
below 5% of total revenues in the next three years.

OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the potential for a downgrade in the
next 12 to 18 months if Parana's deficits after capital accounts
are consistently greater than 10% of its total revenues, and the
state fails to establish a clear plan to stabilize its finances
for the next two to three years.  S&P believes these deficits will
continue to hamper the state's already "very weak" liquidity.  On
the other hand, if the state steadily improves its operating
surplus and balances after capex in 2015 and 2016, and effectively
secures planned borrowings, S&P could revise the outlook to
stable.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded; Outlook Action
                              To                 From
Parana (State of)
Issuer Credit Rating
  Global Scale Rating        BB+/Negative/--    BBB-/Stable/--
  Brazil National Scale      brAA/Negative/--   brAAA/Stable/--


RIO DE JANEIRO: S&P Lowers Rating to 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its global scale rating
on the state of Rio de Janeiro (Rio) to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  At the
same time, S&P lowered its national scale rating to 'brAA+' from
'brAAA'.  The outlook is stable.

RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects the state's steady fiscal declines since
2012, which have weakened its budgetary performance and hampered
its liquidity.  Rio also continued with the implementation of its
ambitious infrastructure program amid a slumping economy, which
weakened the state's credit profile.  Adding to Rio de Janeiro's
constraints is the rigidity of its operating expenditure
composition (mainly interest payments and public payroll and
pension payments) as well as limited flexibility to cut capex
stemming from its Urban Mobility Program.  The state has secured
most of the funding for the upcoming 2016 Olympic Games
investments, mainly from the central government, and this funding
doesn't compromise the state's future own-source revenues, as most
of Rio de Janeiro's responsibilities are related to urban mobility
and transport projects.

The state's operating deficit to operating revenues reached 4% in
fiscal 2014 deteriorating from 0.6% in 2013.  Revenues declined in
fiscal 2014 reflecting a real decline in tax revenues and a
nominal decline in non tax revenues mainly reflecting 2013's one
off extraordinary revenues coming from judicial deposits.  At the
same time, personal expenses spiked, mainly stemming from salary
increases for public safety employees and expenses related to the
state's pension program.

As Brazil's economy contracts, S&P believes the state's revenues
will grow below inflation in fiscal 2015 but may begin to improve
in 2016 and 2017.  S&P's base case expects the state to implement
some fiscal measures, but it'll be tough to recover from the
current scenario while revenue collection remains weak.
Therefore, S&P expects operating deficits to be less than 5% of
operating revenues in the next two years.

Rio reported an after capex deficit of R$8.3 billion in 2014,
compared with the R$5.3 billion deficit the state reported in
2013. Capex in 2014 reached R$7.7 billion.  And these expenditures
will likely climb to R$8.3 billion in 2015, which represents 11.7%
of total expenditures.  This deficit may be lower in 2016 and
beyond.  During 2014, the state borrowed a total of R$7.6 billion
from Banco do Brasil, Caixa Economica Federal, Brazilian
Development Bank (BNDES), and the World Bank.  Additionally, the
state received R$4 billion from a RioPrevidencia issuance of
future flow notes backed by oil and gas royalties, which S&P
considers as gross borrowings, according to its criteria.
Including this, total gross borrowings reached R$11.6 billion in
2014.  For 2015 and 2016, S&P expects the state to borrow about
R$6 billion each year.

The state's already high debt will continue to increase in nominal
and relative terms for the next three years.  Debt hit R$89.9
billion as of the end of December 2014 from R$79.7 billion at the
end of 2013, which represents 156% of 2014 operating revenues.
S&P expects debt levels to remain above 150% of operating
revenues, yet well below 180%.

The state has "average" budgetary flexibility because its own-
source revenues account for 90% of operating revenues and its
capex accounts for 11% of total expenses.  Also, the state has
limited flexibility to cut capital expenditures (capex) given the
infrastructure needs stemming from the upcoming 2016 Olympic
Games.  The state has a diversified economy, but its GDP per
capita is lower than those of its international peers.  The
state's about $15,385 GDP per capita on average for the past three
years is the third-largest in Brazil.  Rio generates the second-
highest GDP in Brazil (almost 11.2%, according to 2011 official
data).

The state's diversified economy is a key rating strength.  In
addition to benefiting from a large tourist industry, both the
city and the state of Rio de Janeiro are home to heavy-hitting
industries such as pharmaceuticals, insurance, and telecom.
Moreover, the state is becoming the center of the country's
rapidly growing and dynamic oil industry.  About 80% of the
country's oil is produced in the state.  Additionally, about 90%
of the country's proven oil reserves and 60%-70% of the recently
discovered offshore oil reserves are located in the state.  About
$98.6 billion in domestic and foreign investments in the country
are planned for 2014-2016, about 60% ($59.8 billion) of which is
geared toward oil and gas exploration and production.

The state has "satisfactory" fiscal management, as it has
successfully secured new sources of funding and carried out capex.
The state's investment plans will continue to focus on
infrastructure development, and its ambitious investment plan will
require keen fiscal management.  The recently reelected Pezao
Administration has a formidable task ahead to maintain prudent
revenue and expenditure practices amid a slumping local and
national economy.

The state has "moderate" contingent liabilities because most of
them are incorporated into its budget and debt.  The remaining
debt accounted for about 5% of the state's 2014 operating
revenues. Companhia Estadual de Aguas e Esgotos - CEDAE (National
scale: brAA-/Negative/--). a sewage and water utility, is the
state's largest-owned entity.

Rio, similar to its national peers, operates in what S&P views as
an "evolving and unbalanced" institutional framework.  The system
that divides the fiscal powers between the central and the local
and regional governments (LRGs) in Brazil is based on three key
parameters that have remained in place for a long time and have
gained strong political and economic support.  Still, there is an
ongoing debate over the need to modify some of them, though S&P
don't expect major changes in the intermediate term, and if they
do occur, they will only have limited impact on the state's
finances.

Liquidity

S&P views the state's liquidity as "weak" as its average cash
reserves--including its projected cash--will likely cover only
32.7% of 2015's projected debt service.  The state's interest
payments are R$3.2 billion and debt of R$3.7 billion amortizes in
2015.  Still, the state owes most of its debt to the federal
government, and the state's coparticipation transfers guarantee
the debt, which diminishes rollover and nonpayment risks.

The state has been investing heavily in infrastructure during past
three years, which has led to a lower cash position.  Given the
state's ambitious investment plan, S&P expects similar liquidity
levels in the next two years.

S&P assess the state's access to external liquidity as limited.
Although, the state has consistently obtained new borrowings from
local banks and multilateral agencies in the past few years, over
the next two years the availability of external financing will be
more limited given the current recession in Brazil.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Rio de Janeiro
will continue to post small operating deficits below 5% of
operating revenues and fiscal deficits below 10% of total
expenses, as Rio struggles to reverse the trend in its
deteriorating finances through a fiscal overhaul.  The stable
outlook also reflects S&P's expectation that debt levels will
remain above 150% of operating revenues yet well below 180% of
operating revenues in the next two years.  The stable outlook also
presumes the state will implement adjustments as part of its
fiscal overhaul so that it can contain further deterioration of
its finances.  Additional, significant fiscal deterioration over
the next two years, with deficits after capital accounts of more
than 10% coupled with a deficit after borrowings of more than 10%
could lead to a downgrade.  On the other hand, if the state
improves its "weak" liquidity position and budgetary performance,
with consistent surpluses of 5% of operating revenues and lower
deficits after capex, S&P could take a positive rating action.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The /weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                 To                 From
Rio de Janeiro (State of)
Issuer Credit Rating
  Global Scale Rating       BB+/Stable/--      BBB-/Negative/--
  Brazil National Scale     brAA+/Stable/--    brAAA/Negative/--


* BRAZIL: Probes Alleged Corruption Among Tax Officials
-------------------------------------------------------
Paulo Trevisani at The Wall Street Journal reports that
prosecutors are investigating allegations that Brazilian tax
authorities solicited bribes from major companies in exchange for
reducing their liabilities in corporate tax disputes, officials
said.

The Finance Ministry said the alleged scheme wasn't systematic but
rather, involved "isolated acts" carried out by a small group of
government tax officials, according to The Wall Street Journal.
When prosecutors announced the investigation on March 26 they said
that losses to the nation's treasury totaled $6.1 billion over 15
years, the report relates.

The report discloses that the case comes amid a scandal at state-
owned Petroleo Brasileiro SA, or Petrobras, in which authorities
have arrested dozens of people for their alleged roles in bribery
and money laundering.  That unrelated case, involving hundreds of
millions of dollars in losses, has roiled the government because
prosecutors allege some illicit money was funneled to some members
of President Dilma Rousseff's ruling Workers' Party, the report
notes.  The party denies that and Ms. Rousseff is not accused of
wrongdoing.

The new case, which prosecutors dub Operation Zealots, has no
apparent links to the government, The Wall Street Journal relays.
But it comes as Ms. Rousseff is trying to convince an emboldened
opposition to support unpopular measures aimed at resuscitating a
moribund economy, the report discloses.

The new probe is focused on the Finance Ministry's Administrative
Council for Tax Appeal, an arbitration board that hears appeals
from taxpayers who dispute how much they owe the government, the
report notes.

Prosecutors said 74 companies and 24 individuals are under
investigation.  None have been named publicly and no charges have
been filed, the report relays.  But a leading investigator on the
case said companies under investigation include Ford Motor Brazil,
a unit of Ford Motor Co.; JBS, the world's largest meatpacker, the
Brazilian unit of the Spanish bank Banco Santander SA; and
Brazil's second largest private-sector bank, Bradesco SA, says the
report.

Banco Santander said that all its dealings with the council have
been "ethical and in accordance with applicable law." In a written
statement, Bradesco denied wrongdoing and said its appeals to the
council were "supported by well-known law firms" and that the
company follows "the best governance practices," the report notes.
Ford Brazil said in an email that it hasn't "been contacted by
government officials or the public attorney on this
investigation," the report relays.  A representative for JBS
declined to comment.

According to WSJ, Brazil's Finance Ministry is investigating the
case alongside Brazil's internal revenue service, the federal
police and the federal prosecutor.  The ministry said it was
taking steps to increase the transparency of the appeals process.
The ministry said that, as of Feb. 28, it was deliberating on
112,000 tax cases with a total of about $171 billion in dispute,
the report relays.

Brazil's tax system is among the most onerous and complex in the
world, according to WJS.  Penalties can be steep.  That has
fostered an environment where corruption can flourish, experts
say, notes the report.

"Taxes in Brazil are so high and complicated that it is easy for
companies to get in trouble with the taxman," the leading
investigator told WSJ.  The investigator said frequent tax
disputes created opportunities for ill-intentioned public servants
to profit by helping firms circumvent red tape, notes the report.

Prosecutors say the probe began in 2013 after they received an
anonymous letter describing details of the alleged scheme, reports
WSJ.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


CASTILLO INVESTMENTS: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 4
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Castillo Investments Limited will hear on
May 4, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Commerce Corporate Services Limited
          P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 949 8666
          Facsimile: 949 0626
          Telephone: 949 8666


EDIOM FEEDER: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 22
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Ediom Feeder Fund Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on April 22, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Forsix Asset Management Inc.
          c/o Nicholas White
          1770 Promontory Circle
          Greeley
          Colorado 80634
          United States of America
          Telephone: +1 (970) 506 8114
          e-mail: Nicholas.White@jbssa.com


FREMAR INVESTMENTS: Sole Member Receives Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------
The sole member of Fremar Investments Limited received on
March 31, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lion International Management Limited
          Craigmuir Chambers
          Road Town Tortola VG1110
          British Virgin Islands


GREATDREAMS CARTOON: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 21
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Greatdreams Cartoon Group, Inc. will hold
their final meeting on April 21, 2015, at 9:00 a.m., to receive
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands


IBIZA BUSINESS: Sole Member Receives Wind-Up Report
---------------------------------------------------
The sole member of Ibiza Business Inc. received on March 31, 2015,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lion International Management Limited
          Craigmuir Chambers
          Road Town Tortola VG1110
          British Virgin Islands


JOVI INVESTMENTS: Sole Member Receives Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------------
The sole member of Jovi Investments Limited received on March 31,
2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lion International Management Limited
          Craigmuir Chambers Road Town
          Tortola VG1110
           British Virgin Islands


MEME INVESTMENTS: Sole Member Receives Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------------
The sole member of Meme Investments Limited received on March 31,
2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lion International Management Limited
          Craigmuir Chambers
          Road Town Tortola VG1110
          British Virgin Islands


REPSOL INTERNATIONAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 22
------------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Repsol International Capital Ltd. will hold
their final meeting on April 22, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., to receive
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Francisco Javier Nogales Aranguez
          Repsol International Finance B.V.
          Koninginnegracht
          19 2514 AB The Hague
          The Netherlands
          Telephone: +31 70314 1617
          e-mail: jnogales@repsol.com


WK CONSULTANTS: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 4
-----------------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of WK Consultants Ltd. will hear on May 4,
2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Commerce Corporate Services Limited
          P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 949 8666
          Facsimile: 949 0626
          Telephone: 949 8666


WL II LIMITED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 21
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of WL II Limited will hold their final meeting on
April 21, 2015, at 10:10 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          UBS Nominees Ltd.
          c/o Valerie Mullen or Liliana Forbes
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914 6000
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 914 4006
          227 Elgin Avenue
          P.O. Box 2325 Grand Cayman KY1 1106
          Cayman Islands


YCG (2001): Members' Final Meeting Set for April 20
---------------------------------------------------
The members of YCG (2001) Ltd. will hold their final meeting on
April 20, 2015, to receive the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidators are:

          Susan Craig
          Jo-Anne Stephens
          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


ZS ENTERPRISES: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
On March 2, 2015, the sole shareholder of ZS Enterprises Limited
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
April 13, 2015, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Westport Services Ltd.
          c/o Evania Ebanks
          Telephone: (345) 949 5122
          Facsimile: (345) 949 7920
          P.O. Box 1111 Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


ZS EQUITY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------
On March 2, 2015, the sole shareholder of ZS Equity Limited
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
April 13, 2015, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Westport Services Ltd.
          c/o Evania Ebanks
          Telephone: (345) 949 5122
          Facsimile: (345) 949 7920
          P.O. Box 1111 Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


ZS HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
On March 2, 2015, the sole shareholder of ZS Holdings Limited
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
April 13, 2015, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Westport Services Ltd.
          c/o Evania Ebanks
          Telephone: (345) 949 5122
          Facsimile: (345) 949 7920
          P.O. Box 1111 Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO: Gov't., Investors Enlist Ex-IMF Officials
------------------------------------------------------
The Wall Street Journal reports that the Puerto Rico government
and the hedge funds that own its bonds are turning to former
International Monetary Fund officials to help resolve a growing
debt crisis that may require a restructuring more akin to Greece
than a troubled city like Detroit.

The move comes as Puerto Rico is in talks with the funds and other
investors to borrow up to about $3 billion in new bonds to
replenish its nearly empty coffers, according to The Wall Street
Journal.  The commonwealth has more than $70 billion in debt,
including that of its agencies such as the Puerto Rico Electric
Power Authority (Prepa), which is in restructuring talks with
creditors ahead of deadline to extend some payments, the report
relates.

The development reflects the junk-rated commonwealth's unusual
status as neither a U.S. state nor a sovereign nation, unable to
permit its municipal entities to access U.S. bankruptcy
protections, the report notes.

The report discloses that Puerto Rico has retained Anne Krueger,
the IMF's former first deputy managing director, as a consultant,
while a committee representing the hedge funds is in talks about
an engagement with Claudio Loser, the former director of the IMF's
Western Hemisphere department, said people familiar with the
matter.

The involvement of IMF veterans highlights how market perception
of Puerto Rico -- a former darling of the $3.7 trillion municipal-
bond market -- has changed, notes the report.  The IMF serves as
the lender of last resort to emerging-market countries, something
some investors say Puerto Rico increasingly resembles, the report
says.

Peter Hayes, head of BlackRock Inc.'s municipal-bonds group, said
Puerto Rico is beyond simple fixes and it will be difficult for
the island to escape restructuring, the report notes.  "The
problem is they're running out of time," Mr. Hayes said, discloses
WSJ.

The report recalls that a federal judge in February blocked a
local law that would have created a restructuring process for
PREPA and other public authorities, and a U.S. House committee is
considering a bill that would permit the commonwealth to allow
those agencies access to the same Chapter 9 protections granted
Detroit.

Investors have faced months of uncertainty from Puerto Rico, where
the government is struggling with a weak economy, declining
population and high unemployment, the report relays.  Its bonds
are widely held around the U.S. because they are exempt from
federal, state and local taxes and often provide higher yields
than other munis.

As a U.S. commonwealth, the island also doesn't qualify for IMF
aid, but the excessive borrowing, inconsistent financial reporting
and low tax collection that landed Puerto Rico in hot water are
common in the developing countries that IMF economists deal with,
reports WSJ.  Like a lot of those countries, Puerto Rico is
wrestling with how to make politically contentious budget cuts and
tax increases without strangling already-weak economic growth, the
report notes.

Puerto Rico's government has relatively low levels of debt by
international standards, and tackling the deficit is manageable,
said Charles Blitzer, a former assistant director of the IMF's
monetary and capital-markets department and now principal at
Blitzer Consulting, WSJ relays.

"This is doable without great pain," the report quoted Mr. Blitzer
as saying.  "In fact, countries that have adjusted have found
growth rates actually increase. I'm hopeful that the hiring of ex-
IMF people by Puerto Rico signals their willingness to adjust
their budgetary problems credibly and rapidly."

The hedge funds that own much of Puerto Rico's bonds are looking
for tips from the IMF playbook on how to use the promise of new
loans to coax governments into financial overhaul and, if that
fails, how to negotiate with a sovereign in default, people
familiar with the matter said, the report notes.

Early this year, the bondholder group including Brigade Capital
Management LP, Centerbridge Partners LP, Davidson Kempner Capital
Management, Fir Tree Partners and Monarch Alternative Capital sent
the island's financial authorities a list of terms to include in
the coming bond sale, discloses the report.  The proposed
covenants are meant to prod Puerto Rico into budget cuts and
better financial disclosure, while ranking holders of the new bond
above other creditors if there is a default, the people familiar
with the matter said, the report relays.

When Puerto Rico borrowed $3.5 billion in bond markets a year ago
hoping to get financial breathing room, hedge funds bought more
than half of the deal, the report says.  The firms snapped up the
bond for its attractive 8.7% yield but also because they hoped a
successful financing would lift the prices of other Puerto Rico
bonds they owned, the report relates.

Since then, Puerto Rico has struggled to deliver a promised tax
overhaul and bond prices have fallen, notes WSJ.  The price of the
2014 bond touched record lows below 80 cents on the dollar last
month after three legislators proposed removing constitutional
protections for bondholders.

Melba Acosta, president of the island's Government Development
Bank, has said that the bank and the administration oppose such
legislation, notes the report.

The tax-overhaul plan has also received an uneasy response, facing
resistance from "many quarters of the Puerto Rico economy" and its
passage remains uncertain, according to Janney Capital Markets,
the report relays. Ms. Acosta said it would fight tax evasion and
contained exemptions aimed at protecting low-wage workers, the
report notes.

WSJ says Puerto Rico's hedge-fund creditors want more than
promises of reform before they buy more bonds. The group has asked
Ms. Acosta to include clauses that would raise the interest rate
of the bond if the government fails to hit budget targets and
would require timely standardized financial reports, the people
familiar with the matter said.

"This financing explicitly seeks to bridge Puerto Rico to economic
health," Mr. Loser said in an email obtained by the news agency.
"The Commonwealth needs to commit to developing a comprehensive
plan that balances the budget with timely and transparent
financial reporting," Mr. Loser added.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


* Large Companies With Insolvent Balance Sheets
-----------------------------------------------

                                                         Total
                                         Total       Shareholders
                                         Assets          Equity
Company                Ticker           (US$MM)        (US$MM)
-------                ------         ---------      ------------
FABRICA TECID-RT         FTRX1 BZ    66603695.4     -76419246.3
METROGAS SA-A          153255Z AR     331403741     -24462400.6
METROGAS SA-C          153263Z AR     331403741     -24462400.6
LA POLAR SA           NUEVAPOL CI     571550458     -31565432.3
TECTOY-PF-RTS5/6        TOYB11 BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TEKA-ADR                 TEKAY US     313948165      -395261073
GOL-PREF                 GOLL4 BZ    3769323901      -125802483
GOL-ADR                    GOL US    3769323901      -125802483
GOL                      GOLL3 BZ    3769323901      -125802483
METROGAS-B               MGSBF US     331403741     -24462400.6
BOMBRIL                  BMBBF US     323685704       -31241748
KARSTEN                  CTKCF US     174656858     -10482924.6
KARSTEN-PREF             CTKPF US     174656858     -10482924.6
MANGELS INDL-PRF         MGIRF US     176399866     -61689625.2
TEKA                     TKTQF US     313948165      -395261073
TEKA-PREF                TKTPF US     313948165      -395261073
SNIAFA SA-B              SDAGF US    11229696.2     -2670544.86
TEC TOY SA-PREF          TOYDF US    27114628.6     -8215580.95
PUYEHUE RIGHT         PUYEHUOS CI      17878064     -7344408.97
BATTISTELLA-RIGH         BTTL1 BZ     120474772     -21271905.1
BATTISTELLA-RI P         BTTL2 BZ     120474772     -21271905.1
BATTISTELLA-RECE         BTTL9 BZ     120474772     -21271905.1
BATTISTELLA-RECP        BTTL10 BZ     120474772     -21271905.1
AGRENCO LTD-BDR         AGEN33 BZ     285996574      -543142756
GOL-ADR                    GOQ GR    3769323901      -125802483
PET MANG-RIGHTS       3678565Q BZ     140957879      -410925540
PET MANG-RIGHTS       3678569Q BZ     140957879      -410925540
PET MANG-RECEIPT      0229292Q BZ     140957879      -410925540
PET MANG-RECEIPT      0229296Q BZ     140957879      -410925540
MMX MINERACAO            TRES3 BZ    1223308090      -312940530
INEPAR-RT ORD         3697782Q BZ    1191789041      -214360998
INEPAR-RT PREF        3697786Q BZ    1191789041      -214360998
INEPAR-RCT ORD        3697790Q BZ    1191789041      -214360998
INEPAR-RCT PREF       3697794Q BZ    1191789041      -214360998
RB CAPITAL              RBCS3B BZ    13996658.5     -815.062365
MMX MINERACA-GDR         MMXMY US    1223308090      -312940530
BOMBRIL HOLDING          FPXE3 BZ    19416013.9      -489914853
BOMBRIL                  FPXE4 BZ    19416013.9      -489914853
SANESALTO                SNST3 BZ    21339668.9     -6954061.77
BOMBRIL-RGTS PRE         BOBR2 BZ     323685704       -31241748
BOMBRIL-RIGHTS           BOBR1 BZ     323685704       -31241748
MMX MINERACA-GDR      0567931D CN    1223308090      -312940530
MMX MINERACA-GDR          3M11 GR    1223308090      -312940530
LAEP-BDR                MILK33 BZ     222902269      -255311026
AGRENCO LTD               AGRE LX     285996574      -543142756
LAEP INVESTMENTS          LEAP LX     222902269      -255311026
INVERS ELEC BUEN         IEBAA AR     239575758     -28902145.8
INVERS ELEC BUEN         IEBAB AR     239575758     -28902145.8
OSX BRASIL SA            OSXB3 BZ    2592199410      -291661108
MMX MINERACAO            MMXCF US    1223308090      -312940530
CELGPAR                  GPAR3 BZ     233784351     -1156798479
RECRUSUL - RT         4529781Q BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RT         4529785Q BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT        4529789Q BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT        4529793Q BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL-BON RT         RCSL11 BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL-BON RT         RCSL12 BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
BALADARE                 BLDR3 BZ     159449535     -52990723.7
TEXTEIS RENAU-RT         TXRX1 BZ    48951015.5     -73535330.8
TEXTEIS RENAU-RT         TXRX2 BZ    48951015.5     -73535330.8
TEXTEIS RENA-RCT         TXRX9 BZ    48951015.5     -73535330.8
TEXTEIS RENA-RCT        TXRX10 BZ    48951015.5     -73535330.8
CIA PETROLIF-PRF         MRLM4 BZ     377592596      -3014215.1
CIA PETROLIFERA          MRLM3 BZ     377592596      -3014215.1
NEWTEL PARTICIPA         NEWT3 BZ    10517157.2     -10542831.7
NOVA AMERICA SA          NOVA3 BZ    21287488.9      -183535526
NOVA AMERICA-PRF         NOVA4 BZ    21287488.9      -183535526
EBX BRASIL SA            CTMN3 BZ    2592199410      -291661108
GOL-ADR                   GOLN MM    3769323901      -125802483
OSX BRASIL SA            EBXB3 BZ    2592199410      -291661108
LA POLAR-RT           LAPOLARO CI     571550458     -31565432.3
ELECTRICIDAD ARG      3447811Z AR     948261051      -148983927
TEC TOY-RT            7335610Q BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TEC TOY-RT            7335614Q BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TEC TOY-RCT           7335626Q BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TEC TOY-RCT           7335630Q BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
MMX MINERACAO-RT      4111484Q BZ    1223308090      -312940530
MMX MINERACA-RCT      4111488Q BZ    1223308090      -312940530
GOL-RT                0113333D BZ    3769323901      -125802483
GOL-RT                0113334D BZ    3769323901      -125802483
GOL-RCT               0113335D BZ    3769323901      -125802483
GOL-RCT               0113338D BZ    3769323901      -125802483
PET MANG-RT           4115360Q BZ     140957879      -410925540
PET MANG-RT           4115364Q BZ     140957879      -410925540
INEPAR-RT ORD            INEP1 BZ    1191789041      -214360998
INEPAR-RT PREF           INEP2 BZ    1191789041      -214360998
INEPAR-RCT ORD           INEP9 BZ    1191789041      -214360998
INEPAR-RCT PREF         INEP10 BZ    1191789041      -214360998
MINUPAR-RT            9314542Q BZ    76619687.5     -91780261.5
MINUPAR-RCT           9314634Q BZ    76619687.5     -91780261.5
MMX MINERACAO-RT      0626050D BZ    1223308090      -312940530
MMX MINERACA-RCT      0626051D BZ    1223308090      -312940530
PET MANG-RT           0229249Q BZ     140957879      -410925540
PET MANG-RT           0229268Q BZ     140957879      -410925540
RECRUSUL - RT         0163579D BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RT         0163580D BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT        0163582D BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT        0163583D BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
PORTX OPERA-GDR          PXTPY US     976769385     -9407990.18
PORTX OPERACOES          PRTX3 BZ     976769385     -9407990.18
OSX BRASIL S-GDR         OSXRY US    2592199410      -291661108
TEC TOY-RT            1254570D BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TEC TOY-RT            1254571D BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TEC TOY-RCT           1254572D BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TEC TOY-RCT           1254573D BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
MMX MINERACAO           MMXM11 BZ    1223308090      -312940530
MINUPAR-RT            0599562D BZ    76619687.5     -91780261.5
MINUPAR-RCT           0599564D BZ    76619687.5     -91780261.5
PET MANG-RT              RPMG2 BZ     140957879      -410925540
PET MANG-RT           0848424D BZ     140957879      -410925540
PET MANG-RECEIPT         RPMG9 BZ     140957879      -410925540
PET MANG-RECEIPT        RPMG10 BZ     140957879      -410925540
GOL-RT                   GOLL1 BZ    3769323901      -125802483
GOL-RT                1003237D BZ    3769323901      -125802483
GOL-RCT                  GOLL9 BZ    3769323901      -125802483
GOL-RCT               1003238D BZ    3769323901      -125802483
LAEP INVESTMEN-B      0122427D LX     222902269      -255311026
LAEP INVES-BDR B      0163599D BZ     222902269      -255311026
RECRUSUL - RT         0614673D BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RT         0614674D BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT        0614675D BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT        0614676D BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
TEKA-RTS                 TEKA1 BZ     313948165      -395261073
TEKA-RTS                 TEKA2 BZ     313948165      -395261073
TEKA-RCT                 TEKA9 BZ     313948165      -395261073
TEKA-RCT                TEKA10 BZ     313948165      -395261073
MINUPAR-RTS              MNPR1 BZ    76619687.5     -91780261.5
MINUPAR-RCT              MNPR9 BZ    76619687.5     -91780261.5
LA POLAR-RT           LAPOLAOS CI     571550458     -31565432.3
RECRUSUL SA-RTS          RCSL1 BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL SA-RTS          RCSL2 BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL SA-RCT          RCSL9 BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT          RCSL10 BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
OSX BRASIL - RTS      0701756D BZ    2592199410      -291661108
OSX BRASIL - RTS      0701757D BZ    2592199410      -291661108
LA POLAR SA            LAPOLAR CI     571550458     -31565432.3
MMX MINERACA-RTS         MMXM1 BZ    1223308090      -312940530
MMX MINERACA-RCT         MMXM9 BZ    1223308090      -312940530
OSX BRASIL - RTS      0812903D BZ    2592199410      -291661108
OSX BRASIL - RTS      0812904D BZ    2592199410      -291661108
OSX BRASIL SA            OSXRF US    2592199410      -291661108
OSX BRASIL - RTS         OSXB1 BZ    2592199410      -291661108
OSX BRASIL - RTS         OSXB9 BZ    2592199410      -291661108
NEWTEL PARTI-RTS      1051621D BZ    10517157.2     -10542831.7
PET MANG-RTS          1227980D BZ     140957879      -410925540
AGRENCO LTD-BDR         AGEN11 BZ     285996574      -543142756
LAEP-BDR                MILK11 BZ     222902269      -255311026
MMX MINERACA-GDR         MMXMD US    1223308090      -312940530
MMX MINERACAO            MMXXF US    1223308090      -312940530
GOL PREF - RTS           GOLL2 BZ    3769323901      -125802483
GOL PREF - RCT          GOLL10 BZ    3769323901      -125802483
BOMBRIL - RTS           BOBR11 BZ     323685704       -31241748
KARSTEN SA - RTS         CTKA1 BZ     174656858     -10482924.6
KARSTEN SA - RTS         CTKA2 BZ     174656858     -10482924.6
KARSTEN SA - RCT         CTKA9 BZ     174656858     -10482924.6
KARSTEN SA - RCT        CTKA10 BZ     174656858     -10482924.6
NEWTEL PARTI-RCT        NEWT9B BZ    10517157.2     -10542831.7
NEWTEL PARTI-RTS        NEWT1B BZ    10517157.2     -10542831.7
CELGPAR-RTS             GPAR11 BZ     233784351     -1156798479
LA POLAR-RTS BON      LAPOLAOB CI     571550458     -31565432.3
PET MANGUINH-RTS         RPMG1 BZ     140957879      -410925540
METROGAS-B                METR AR     331403741     -24462400.6
METROGAS-B BLOCK         METRB AR     331403741     -24462400.6
METROGAS-B               METRC AR     331403741     -24462400.6
METROGAS-B               METRD AR     331403741     -24462400.6
METROGAS SA               MGAI US     331403741     -24462400.6
METROGAS-B                MGSB GR     331403741     -24462400.6
METROGAS-ADR               MGS US     331403741     -24462400.6
METROGAS-ADR              MGSA GR     331403741     -24462400.6
ARTHUR LANGE             ARLA3 BZ    11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANGE SA         ALICON BZ    11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANGE-PRF         ARLA4 BZ    11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANGE-PRF        ALICPN BZ    11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANG-RT C         ARLA1 BZ    11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANG-RT P         ARLA2 BZ    11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANG-RC C         ARLA9 BZ    11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANG-RC P        ARLA10 BZ    11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LAN-DVD C        ARLA11 BZ    11642254.9     -17154460.3
ARTHUR LAN-DVD P        ARLA12 BZ    11642254.9     -17154460.3
BOMBRIL                  BOBR3 BZ     323685704       -31241748
BOMBRIL CIRIO SA        BOBRON BZ     323685704       -31241748
BOMBRIL-PREF             BOBR4 BZ     323685704       -31241748
BOMBRIL CIRIO-PF        BOBRPN BZ     323685704       -31241748
BOMBRIL SA-ADR           BMBPY US     323685704       -31241748
BOMBRIL SA-ADR           BMBBY US     323685704       -31241748
BUETTNER                 BUET3 BZ    82872146.2     -36299304.3
BUETTNER SA             BUETON BZ    82872146.2     -36299304.3
BUETTNER-PREF            BUET4 BZ    82872146.2     -36299304.3
BUETTNER SA-PRF         BUETPN BZ    82872146.2     -36299304.3
BUETTNER SA-RTS          BUET1 BZ    82872146.2     -36299304.3
BUETTNER SA-RT P         BUET2 BZ    82872146.2     -36299304.3
CAF BRASILIA             CAFE3 BZ     160933830      -149277092
CAFE BRASILIA SA        CSBRON BZ     160933830      -149277092
CAF BRASILIA-PRF         CAFE4 BZ     160933830      -149277092
CAFE BRASILIA-PR        CSBRPN BZ     160933830      -149277092
IGUACU CAFE              IGUA3 BZ     190073766       -74308212
IGUACU CAFE             IGCSON BZ     190073766       -74308212
IGUACU CAFE              IGUCF US     190073766       -74308212
IGUACU CAFE-PR A         IGUA5 BZ     190073766       -74308212
IGUACU CAFE-PR A        IGCSAN BZ     190073766       -74308212
IGUACU CAFE-PR A         IGUAF US     190073766       -74308212
IGUACU CAFE-PR B         IGUA6 BZ     190073766       -74308212
IGUACU CAFE-PR B        IGCSBN BZ     190073766       -74308212
SCHLOSSER                SCLO3 BZ    46981417.3     -55419754.7
SCHLOSSER SA             SCHON BZ    46981417.3     -55419754.7
SCHLOSSER-PREF           SCLO4 BZ    46981417.3     -55419754.7
SCHLOSSER SA-PRF         SCHPN BZ    46981417.3     -55419754.7
KARSTEN SA               CTKA3 BZ     174656858     -10482924.6
KARSTEN                  CTKON BZ     174656858     -10482924.6
KARSTEN-PREF             CTKA4 BZ     174656858     -10482924.6
KARSTEN-PREF             CTKPN BZ     174656858     -10482924.6
COBRASMA                 CBMA3 BZ    68585867.9     -2324358597
COBRASMA SA             COBRON BZ    68585867.9     -2324358597
COBRASMA-PREF            CBMA4 BZ    68585867.9     -2324358597
COBRASMA SA-PREF        COBRPN BZ    68585867.9     -2324358597
D H B                    DHBI3 BZ    94806424.1      -188014922
DHB IND E COM            DHBON BZ    94806424.1      -188014922
D H B-PREF               DHBI4 BZ    94806424.1      -188014922
DHB IND E COM-PR         DHBPN BZ    94806424.1      -188014922
DOCA INVESTIMENT         DOCA3 BZ     187044412      -204249587
DOCAS SA                DOCAON BZ     187044412      -204249587
DOCA INVEST-PREF         DOCA4 BZ     187044412      -204249587
DOCAS SA-PREF           DOCAPN BZ     187044412      -204249587
DOCAS SA-RTS PRF         DOCA2 BZ     187044412      -204249587
FABRICA RENAUX           FTRX3 BZ    66603695.4     -76419246.3
FABRICA RENAUX          FRNXON BZ    66603695.4     -76419246.3
FABRICA RENAUX-P         FTRX4 BZ    66603695.4     -76419246.3
FABRICA RENAUX-P        FRNXPN BZ    66603695.4     -76419246.3
HAGA                     HAGA3 BZ    17930008.8       -31863962
FERRAGENS HAGA          HAGAON BZ    17930008.8       -31863962
FER HAGA-PREF            HAGA4 BZ    17930008.8       -31863962
FERRAGENS HAGA-P        HAGAPN BZ    17930008.8       -31863962
CIMOB PARTIC SA          GAFP3 BZ    44047412.2     -45669964.1
CIMOB PARTIC SA          GAFON BZ    44047412.2     -45669964.1
CIMOB PART-PREF          GAFP4 BZ    44047412.2     -45669964.1
CIMOB PART-PREF          GAFPN BZ    44047412.2     -45669964.1
IGB ELETRONICA           IGBR3 BZ     307112239     -59872446.9
GRADIENTE ELETR          IGBON BZ     307112239     -59872446.9
GRADIENTE-PREF A         IGBR5 BZ     307112239     -59872446.9
GRADIENTE EL-PRA         IGBAN BZ     307112239     -59872446.9
GRADIENTE-PREF B         IGBR6 BZ     307112239     -59872446.9
GRADIENTE EL-PRB         IGBBN BZ     307112239     -59872446.9
GRADIENTE-PREF C         IGBR7 BZ     307112239     -59872446.9
GRADIENTE EL-PRC         IGBCN BZ     307112239     -59872446.9
HOTEIS OTHON SA          HOOT3 BZ     207664352     -21612890.7
HOTEIS OTHON SA         HOTHON BZ     207664352     -21612890.7
HOTEIS OTHON-PRF         HOOT4 BZ     207664352     -21612890.7
HOTEIS OTHON-PRF        HOTHPN BZ     207664352     -21612890.7
RENAUXVIEW SA            TXRX3 BZ    48951015.5     -73535330.8
TEXTEIS RENAUX          RENXON BZ    48951015.5     -73535330.8
RENAUXVIEW SA-PF         TXRX4 BZ    48951015.5     -73535330.8
TEXTEIS RENAUX          RENXPN BZ    48951015.5     -73535330.8
INEPAR                   INEP3 BZ    1191789041      -214360998
INEPAR SA               INPRON BZ    1191789041      -214360998
INEPAR-PREF              INEP4 BZ    1191789041      -214360998
INEPAR SA-PREF          INPRPN BZ    1191789041      -214360998
INEPAR-COM DVD          INEP11 BZ    1191789041      -214360998
INEPAR BONUS B          INEP12 BZ    1191789041      -214360998
INEPAR-PRF DVD          INEP13 BZ    1191789041      -214360998
PARMALAT                 LCSA3 BZ     388720096      -213641152
PARMALAT BRASIL         LCSAON BZ     388720096      -213641152
PADMA INDUSTRIA          LCSA4 BZ     388720096      -213641152
PARMALAT BRAS-PF        LCSAPN BZ     388720096      -213641152
PARMALAT BR-RT C         LCSA5 BZ     388720096      -213641152
PARMALAT BR-RT P         LCSA6 BZ     388720096      -213641152
MANGELS INDL             MGEL3 BZ     176399866     -61689625.2
MANGELS INDL SA         MISAON BZ     176399866     -61689625.2
MANGELS INDL-PRF         MGEL4 BZ     176399866     -61689625.2
MANGELS INDL-PRF        MISAPN BZ     176399866     -61689625.2
ESTRELA SA               ESTR3 BZ     101429217      -112373470
ESTRELA SA              ESTRON BZ     101429217      -112373470
ESTRELA SA-PREF          ESTR4 BZ     101429217      -112373470
ESTRELA SA-PREF         ESTRPN BZ     101429217      -112373470
MET DUQUE                DUQE3 BZ    75039127.4     -2847420.37
MET DUQUE                MDUON BZ    75039127.4     -2847420.37
MET DUQUE-PREF           DUQE4 BZ    75039127.4     -2847420.37
MET DUQUE-PREF           MDUPN BZ    75039127.4     -2847420.37
WETZEL SA                MWET3 BZ      85449973     -19170318.6
WETZEL SA               MWELON BZ      85449973     -19170318.6
WETZEL SA-PREF           MWET4 BZ      85449973     -19170318.6
WETZEL SA-PREF          MWELPN BZ      85449973     -19170318.6
MINUPAR                  MNPR3 BZ    76619687.5     -91780261.5
MINUPAR SA              MNPRON BZ    76619687.5     -91780261.5
MINUPAR-PREF             MNPR4 BZ    76619687.5     -91780261.5
MINUPAR SA-PREF         MNPRPN BZ    76619687.5     -91780261.5
NOVA AMERICA SA         NOVA3B BZ    21287488.9      -183535526
NOVA AMERICA SA         NOVAON BZ    21287488.9      -183535526
NOVA AMERICA-PRF        NOVA4B BZ    21287488.9      -183535526
NOVA AMERICA-PRF        NOVAPN BZ    21287488.9      -183535526
NOVA AMERICA-PRF        1NOVPN BZ    21287488.9      -183535526
NOVA AMERICA SA         1NOVON BZ    21287488.9      -183535526
RECRUSUL                 RCSL3 BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL SA             RESLON BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL-PREF            RCSL4 BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
RECRUSUL SA-PREF        RESLPN BZ    25757600.8     -21626049.7
PETRO MANGUINHOS         RPMG3 BZ     140957879      -410925540
PETRO MANGUINHOS        MANGON BZ     140957879      -410925540
PET MANGUINH-PRF         RPMG4 BZ     140957879      -410925540
PETRO MANGUIN-PF        MANGPN BZ     140957879      -410925540
RIMET                    REEM3 BZ     103098359      -185417651
RIMET                   REEMON BZ     103098359      -185417651
RIMET-PREF               REEM4 BZ     103098359      -185417651
RIMET-PREF              REEMPN BZ     103098359      -185417651
SANSUY                   SNSY3 BZ     164647493      -171565662
SANSUY SA               SNSYON BZ     164647493      -171565662
SANSUY-PREF A            SNSY5 BZ     164647493      -171565662
SANSUY SA-PREF A        SNSYAN BZ     164647493      -171565662
SANSUY-PREF B            SNSY6 BZ     164647493      -171565662
SANSUY SA-PREF B        SNSYBN BZ     164647493      -171565662
SNIAFA SA                 SNIA AR    11229696.2     -2670544.86
SNIAFA SA-B              SNIA5 AR    11229696.2     -2670544.86
PILMAIQUEN             PILMAIQ CI     169175281     -28425493.1
BOTUCATU TEXTIL          STRP3 BZ    27663605.3     -7174512.12
STAROUP SA              STARON BZ    27663605.3     -7174512.12
BOTUCATU-PREF            STRP4 BZ    27663605.3     -7174512.12
STAROUP SA-PREF         STARPN BZ    27663605.3     -7174512.12
TECTOY                   TOYB3 BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TECTOY SA               TOYBON BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TECTOY-PREF              TOYB4 BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TECTOY SA-PREF          TOYBPN BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TEC TOY SA-PREF          TOYB5 BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TEC TOY SA-PF B          TOYB6 BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TECTOY                  TOYB13 BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TECTOY-RCPT PF B        TOYB12 BZ    27114628.6     -8215580.95
TEKA                     TEKA3 BZ     313948165      -395261073
TEKA                    TEKAON BZ     313948165      -395261073
TEKA-PREF                TEKA4 BZ     313948165      -395261073
TEKA-PREF               TEKAPN BZ     313948165      -395261073
TEKA-ADR                 TKTPY US     313948165      -395261073
TEKA-ADR                 TKTQY US     313948165      -395261073
F GUIMARAES              FGUI3 BZ    11016542.2      -151840378
FERREIRA GUIMARA        FGUION BZ    11016542.2      -151840378
F GUIMARAES-PREF         FGUI4 BZ    11016542.2      -151840378
FERREIRA GUIM-PR        FGUIPN BZ    11016542.2      -151840378
VARIG SA                 VAGV3 BZ     966298048     -4695211008
VARIG SA                VARGON BZ     966298048     -4695211008
VARIG SA-PREF            VAGV4 BZ     966298048     -4695211008
VARIG SA-PREF           VARGPN BZ     966298048     -4695211008
WIEST                    WISA3 BZ    34107195.1      -126993682
WIEST SA                WISAON BZ    34107195.1      -126993682
WIEST-PREF               WISA4 BZ    34107195.1      -126993682
WIEST SA-PREF           WISAPN BZ    34107195.1      -126993682
ELEC ARG SA-PREF         EASA6 AR     948261051      -148983927
ELEC ARGENT-ADR           EASA LX     948261051      -148983927
ELEC DE ARGE-ADR         1262Q US     948261051      -148983927
LOJAS ARAPUA             LOAR3 BZ    37959788.7     -3613691912
LOJAS ARAPUA            LOARON BZ    37959788.7     -3613691912
LOJAS ARAPUA-PRF         LOAR4 BZ    37959788.7     -3613691912
LOJAS ARAPUA-PRF        LOARPN BZ    37959788.7     -3613691912
LOJAS ARAPUA-PRF        52353Z US    37959788.7     -3613691912
LOJAS ARAPUA-GDR         3429T US    37959788.7     -3613691912
LOJAS ARAPUA-GDR         LJPSF US    37959788.7     -3613691912
BATTISTELLA              BTTL3 BZ     120474772     -21271905.1
BATTISTELLA-PREF         BTTL4 BZ     120474772     -21271905.1
HOPI HARI SA             PQTM3 BZ     129077627     -2031408.69
HOPI HARI-PREF           PQTM4 BZ     129077627     -2031408.69
PARQUE TEM-DV CM          PQT5 BZ     129077627     -2031408.69
PARQUE TEM-DV PF          PQT6 BZ     129077627     -2031408.69
PARQUE TEM-RT CM         PQTM1 BZ     129077627     -2031408.69
PARQUE TEM-RT PF         PQTM2 BZ     129077627     -2031408.69
PARQUE TEM-RCT C         PQTM9 BZ     129077627     -2031408.69
PARQUE TEM-RCT P        PQTM10 BZ     129077627     -2031408.69
INVERS ELEC BUEN          IEBA AR     239575758     -28902145.8
NEWTEL PARTICIPA        NEWT3B BZ    10517157.2     -10542831.7
NEWTEL PARTICIPA        1NEWON BZ    10517157.2     -10542831.7
MMX MINERACAO            MMXM3 BZ    1223308090      -312940530
TRESSEM PART SA         1TSSON BZ    1223308090      -312940530
CIA PETROLIFERA         MRLM3B BZ     377592596      -3014215.1
CIA PETROLIF-PRF        MRLM4B BZ     377592596      -3014215.1
CIA PETROLIFERA         1CPMON BZ     377592596      -3014215.1
CIA PETROLIF-PRF        1CPMPN BZ     377592596      -3014215.1
PUYEHUE                  PUYEH CI      17878064     -7344408.97
IMPSAT FIBER NET         IMPTQ US     535007008       -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER NET       330902Q GR     535007008       -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER NET         XIMPT SM     535007008       -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER-CED          IMPT AR     535007008       -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER-C/E         IMPTC AR     535007008       -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER-$US         IMPTD AR     535007008       -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER-BLK         IMPTB AR     535007008       -17164978
VARIG PART EM TR         VPTA3 BZ    49432119.3      -399290357
VARIG PART EM-PR         VPTA4 BZ    49432119.3      -399290357
VARIG PART EM SE         VPSC3 BZ      83017828      -495721697
VARIG PART EM-PR         VPSC4 BZ      83017828      -495721697


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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