TCRLA_Public/150417.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Friday, April 17, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 075


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

FIDEICOMISO FINANCIERO: Moody's Withdraws Serie I and II Ratings


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: S&P Assigns Recovery Ratings to 143 Finance Issuances
SCHAHIN II FINANCE: Moody's Cuts Sr. Secured Notes Rating to B3
TONON BIOENERGIA: S&P Cuts Global Scale Ratings to 'CCC+'


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

BG CAYMAN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
BLOSSOMS DEVELOPMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 4
CONSTRUCTION INSURANCE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
F&C SENTINEL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 14
LINDSAY FIDUCIARY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 4

MAN DISTRESSED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
NORTH AMERICAN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
OMB INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 5
ORTUS MAC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
PENTA ASIA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11

REVELATION CAYMAN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
SUTTONBROOK CAYMAN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
UNION FUND: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11


C H I L E

AUTOMOTORES GILDEMEISTER: Asks Bondholders to Take Loss


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Agriculture to Buy Peppers to Offset US Ban
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Bank Helps Farmers Hurt by U.S. Ban


P U E R T O    R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Treasury Officials Increase Efforts With Finances


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

PETROLEUM COMPANY: S&P Cuts Senior Unsecured Debt Ratings to 'BB+'
* NATIONAL INSURANCE SYSTEM: Heading for Bankruptcy


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================


FIDEICOMISO FINANCIERO: Moody's Withdraws Serie I and II Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A. has
withdrawn the ratings of Fideicomiso Financiero Programa Federal
Plurianual de Construccion de Viviendas -Provincia del Chaco-
Serie I and Serie II.

The debt securities were issued by Instituto Provincial de
Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda de la Provincia del Chaco (IPDUV
Chaco), acting as seller to the transaction. IPDUV Chaco is an
autarchic entity of the Province of Chaco.

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

The following ratings have been withdrawn:

  -- Fideicomiso Financiero Programa Federal Plurianual de
     Construccion de Viviendas -Provincia del Chaco- Serie I --
     Caa2 (sf) Global Scale Rating and B2.ar (sf) National Scale
     Rating

  -- Fideicomiso Financiero Programa Federal Plurianual de
     Construccion de Viviendas -Provincia del Chaco- Serie II --
     Caa2 (sf) Global Scale Rating and B2.ar (sf) National Scale
     Rating

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in
June 2014 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale Ratings to
Global Scale Ratings".



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BRAZIL: S&P Assigns Recovery Ratings to 143 Finance Issuances
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has assigned recovery ratings
to Brazilian speculative-grade corporations', project finance
companies', and project developers' secured and unsecured
issuances.

"We have applied our recovery rating and issue-level rating
criteria guidelines to 143 instruments on global and national
scales issued by 55 corporations and their subsidiaries, nine
project finance structures, and two project developers."

"The launch of Standard & Poor's recovery analysis on speculative-
grade debt issues in Brazil represents a new stage in our efforts
to keep abreast of the country's evolving debt market. It follows
the existing analysis of recovery ratings in the U.S., Europe,
Mexico, and other markets, reflecting our belief that post-default
principal recovery is a key consideration for investors. Our
recent review of Brazil's insolvency regime, our analysis of past
debt recoveries there, and fundamental, issuer-specific and
instrument-specific, scenario-based recovery analysis supported
our initiative to assign recovery ratings on rated debts. (See
Standard & Poor's "Debt Recovery For Creditors And The Law Of
Insolvency In Brazil" published Oct. 27, 2014.)"

"Recovery ratings indicate the estimated recovery prospect for
creditors in the event of a debt issuer's payment default and
aggregates value to our traditional issue-level ratings. Going
forward, when assigning global and national scale issue-level
ratings on speculative-grade Brazilian issuers, we will consider
both the corporate credit rating--which indicates our view of the
entity's likelihood of default--and the issue-specific recovery
rating."

"The lion's share of recovery ratings we have assigned to
Brazilian bond issues reflect our expectations of a post-default
recovery of 30%-70%. Of the 143 issues we analyzed, we assigned a
recovery rating of '3' to 52%, '4' to 41%, and '2', '5' or '6' to
8%. Of the 73 recovery ratings in the '3' category, 32 issuances
presented recovery prospects that are higher than 90%. However, we
capped the recovery rating on unsecured obligations issued by 'BB-
' rated (or higher) corporate entities at '3' to indicate that the
issuance of additional priority or pari passu debt prior to
default raises the risk of impairing recovery prospects."

"Following the recovery rating assessment, three global scale
issue-level ratings (all on Brazilian airline Gol S.A.'s
issuances) benefitted from a one notch uplift. The ratings on
Gol's issuances improved because we no longer apply the one-notch
deduction from the issuer credit rating that our previous notching
subordination methodology mandated for issues with moderate
recovery prospects. For the national scale public issue-level
ratings, eight debentures (divided into 13 different series)
benefitted from a one-notch uplift to the previous issue ratings.
The national scale ratings on PDG Realty S.A. Empreendimentos E
Participacoes's, BR Properties S.A.'s, and Companhia de
Locacao das Americas S.A.'s secured issuances improved by one
notch, and now are higher than the respective credit ratings on
the issuer. Also, we no longer apply the one-notch deduction from
the corporate credit rating on JSL's senior unsecured debentures.
All other global and national scale issue-level ratings remain
unchanged."

BRAZIL'S INSOLVENCY REGIME JURISDICTION HAS REASONABLE RECOVERY
PROSPECTS

"We reviewed and compared jurisdictions globally to determine the
respective creditor environment of each country's insolvency
regime and ranked them from 'A' (a creditor-friendly environment)
to 'C' (a least creditor-friendly environment). (See "Recovery:
Update: Jurisdiction-Specific Adjustments To Recovery And Issue
Ratings," published June 20, 2008.) According to our review
of the Brazilian insolvency regime and historical recovery
outcomes, we classified the sovereign in Group B of the publicly-
ranked jurisdictions."

Other sovereigns in Group B include France, Italy, Mexico, Spain,
and Turkey.  The June 2005 enactment of Law No. 11,101 Lei de
Falˆncias e Recuperacao de Empresas (the Brazilian Bankruptcy
Law), has created a hospitable environment with effective out-of-
court foreclosure procedures that facilitate speedy post-default
creditor recoveries, greater creditor influence over the
insolvency process, and timely and effective reorganization
proceedings, especially for secured creditors. Although some
aspects of the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law are still being tested,
and the predictability and efficiency of formal court proceedings
are still uncertain, the law has been largely positive for
creditors.

Although the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law provides a general
framework, grants creditors substantial influence over insolvency
proceedings, and can avoid formal court proceedings, the law still
presents some limitations. For example, it grants courts
discretion for judicial interpretation, but judges fail to
exercise this discretion uniformly among across jurisdictions.
Also, creditors may be adversely affected by a lack of full
disclosure and transparency in a judicial reorganization
proceeding because the law mandates only minimal financial and
legal information disclosure. Finally, although formal insolvency
proceedings have generally followed the timelines that are stated
in the law, some judicial reorganization processes can be lengthy
because, for example, involved parties can modify reorganization
plans, which leads to delays. As a result, only a few companies
have successfully emerged from judicial reorganization.

"Following the criteria for Group B jurisdictions, recovery
ratings in Brazil are generally capped at '2'. This means we limit
issue ratings at up to one notch higher than the corporate credit
rating on the issuer. Only in limited cases, specifically those
with strong collateral coverage, would we expect recovery to be a
solid 90% to 100%, absent our jurisdiction-related-concerns."


SCHAHIN II FINANCE: Moody's Cuts Sr. Secured Notes Rating to B3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded and maintained on review the
ratings of the senior secured notes of the following Schahin-
sponsored issuers:

Lancer Finance Company (SPV) Limited

  -- Senior secured global notes due July 2016 downgraded to B3
     from B1

  -- Approximately US$ 64 million of debt affected

Schahin II Finance Company (SPV) Limited

  -- Senior secured global notes due September 2022 downgraded to
     B3 from B1

  -- Approximately US$ 652 million of debt affected

The rating actions reflect the heightened concern about liquidity
pressures on Schahin Petroleo and Gas (unrated) as well as Schahin
Engenharia S.A. (unrated), the operators of the Schahin II and
Lancer vessels, respectively, and part of the Brazilian-based
Schahin Group (unrated). In the extreme case of bankruptcy of the
operators, Moody's believe that the transactions' charter and
services agreements can be terminated, which could trigger an
event of default under the respective bonds' indentures.

In addition, Moody's continues to be concerned about the increased
liquidity risk associated with the deteriorating credit profile of
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. ('Petrobras') (Ba2/On Review), the sole
contractual off-taker and revenue source to service the
outstanding debt issued by the above referenced entities. On
February 24, 2015 Moody's downgraded all ratings for Petrobras
(including debts rated based on Petrobras' guarantee), including a
downgrade of the company's senior unsecured debt to Ba2 from Baa3,
and assigned a Ba2 Corporate Family Rating (CFR) to the company.
Moody's also lowered the company's Baseline Credit Assessment
(BCA) to b2 from ba2. All Petrobras' ratings remain on review for
downgrade.

Petrobras' rating downgrade reflects continued concerns about the
potential impacts of the on-going corruption investigations, which
also affect Schahin Engenharia, as well as significant liquidity
pressures that could arise as a consequence of Petrobras' failure
to provide timely financial statements. Petrobras' debt agreements
include covenants for the timely provision of financial
statements. Extended delays in providing financial statements pose
the risk that creditors may take actions that could eventually
lead to payment acceleration. For a more detailed discussion of
the recent Petrobras rating action, please refer to Moody's press
release 'Moody's downgrades Petrobras' ratings to Ba2; maintains
review for downgrade', dated February 24, 2015.

The rating actions also take into account, on a relative basis,
the vessels' recent operating performance in December 2014 and
January 2015 as measured by average uptime, the age and value of
the vessels, chartered daily rates as compared to current market
daily rates, maturity of the outstanding debt, re-contracting
risk, liquidity arrangements as measured by level of reserve
accounts, and the potential impact on the issuers of the
corruption investigations at the off taker's and sponsors' level,
where applicable.

Moody's do not anticipate upward pressure in the near to medium
term. The ratings review will continue to focus on a number of
credit factors including: (i) the credit quality of the operators;
(ii) Petrobras' ratings, (iii) Petrobras' production and
exploration strategy amid weakening sector fundamentals due to
falling oil prices and other developments, and how the rated
vessels fit into Petrobras' strategy, (iv) uncertainties due to
the on-going corruption investigations, (v) financial and
operating performance of the issuers and the rated vessels, (vi)
legal constructs, and (vii) the risk that bondholders may
accelerate a material amount of debt if Petrobras does not produce
audited financial statements in a timely basis;(viii) the risk
that the issuers' bondholders may accelerate the outstanding debt
principal in case of bankruptcy, insolvency or reorganization,
pursuant to the bonds' indentures.

In case of a negative outcome related to the ongoing corruption
investigations at Petrobras and/or certain issuers' sponsors, the
review will assess the ability of the issuers' sponsors to renew
their contracts or continue to provide services to Petrobras
pursuant to their respective executed charter and services
agreements. Moody's expect that re-chartering risk will be
exacerbated by lower market-based daily rates caused by falling
oil prices worldwide. The review will assess whether further
differentiation among the issuers ratings is deemed necessary
based on the specifics of each transaction on an individual as
well as on a relative basis.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Generic
Project Finance Methodology published in December 2010.


TONON BIOENERGIA: S&P Cuts Global Scale Ratings to 'CCC+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its global scale
ratings on Tonon Bioenergia S.A. (Tonon) to 'CCC+' from 'B'.

"At the same time, we are lowering the  debt rating on Tonon's
secured debt to 'CCC+' from 'B' and the rating on the company's
unsecured bond to 'CCC' from 'B-' issued through its subsidiaries,
Tonon Bioenergia S.A. and Luxembourg S.A., respectively."

"The negative rating actions reflect our expectation that Tonon
will face cash flow deficits in the next harvests, increasing
refinancing needs for about R$100 million this year. The current
refinancing landscape is more difficult due to the negative
investor sentiment towards the sector because of low sugar prices
and the effects of the 2014 drought that affected Sao Paulo's
surrounding areas, including some of Tonon's production plants.
Moreover, Tonon is facing weak agricultural productivity, sizable
interest burden, while capex levels continue to climb above
expectations. Debt levels also rose due to the depreciation of the
Brazilian real, because more than 90% of Tonon's debt is dollar-
denominated. Somewhat higher ethanol profits due to price hikes
amid governmental support to the industry and the higher revenues
and EBITDA from exported sugar, won't be enough to offset the
negatives."

"Management's expectations in terms of crushing volumes, capex,
cash and refinancing needs have consistently fallen short. This
has resulted in considerable changes from our previous forecast
and has led us to revise some of our Management & Governance
scores downward," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Flavia
Bedran.

"We consider the recent changes in Tonon's agricultural management
team and new cost cutting initiatives it plans to implement in the
2016 fiscal year as positives--including downsizing Tonon's fixed
structure related to cut, carry, transport (CCT), as it will
outsource many of these services and postpone the beginning of the
harvest--but these cost reductions aren't enough to significantly
revert free operating cash flow trends," continued the analyst.

"Tonon's credit metrics have worsened mostly due to the real's
devaluation, which drove up the company's dollar-denominated debt,
combined with weaker free cash flow generation, which we estimate
will remain negative for the next two years, at least. Therefore,
we expect the company to maintain its "highly leveraged" financial
risk profile and will continually need to refinance its short-term
maturities."


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


BG CAYMAN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
-----------------------------------------------
The creditors of BG Cayman Fund Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by May 11, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 30, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Claire Loebell
          c/o Steve Bull
          Telephone: (345) 814 9060
          Facsimile: (345) 814 8529
          Ernst & Young Ltd
          62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands


BLOSSOMS DEVELOPMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 4
---------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Blossoms Development Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt by May 4, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 27, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Alric Lindsay
          Artillery Court, Shedden Road
          P.O. Box 11371 George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-1008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345)-926-1688
          e-mail: alric@caymanfs.com


CONSTRUCTION INSURANCE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------------
On March 20, 2015, the shareholders of Construction Insurance
Company, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Terri D. Klatzkin
          Clark Enterprises, Inc.
          7500 Old Georgetown Road
          15th Floor, Bethseda
          MD, 20814


F&C SENTINEL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 14
--------------------------------------------------
The creditors of F&C Sentinel Fund Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by May 14, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 23, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ian D. Stokoe
          c/o Sarah Moxam
          Telephone: (345) 914 8634
          Facsimile: (345) 945 4237
          P.O. Box 258 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


LINDSAY FIDUCIARY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 4
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Lindsay Fiduciary Services (Cayman) Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by May 4, 2015, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 13, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Alric Lindsay
          Artillery Court, Shedden Road
          P.O. Box 11371 George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-1008
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345)-926-1688
          e-mail: alric@caymanfs.com


MAN DISTRESSED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Man Distressed Strategies (Master) Ltd are
required to file their proofs of debt by May 11, 2015, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 30, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Claire Loebell
          c/o Steve Bull
          Telephone: (345) 814 9060
          Facsimile: (345) 814 8529
          Ernst & Young Ltd
          62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands


NORTH AMERICAN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of North American Opportunity MAC Limited are
required to file their proofs of debt by May 11, 2015, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 30, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Claire Loebell
          c/o Steve Bull
          Telephone: (345) 814 9060
          Facsimile: (345) 814 8529
          Ernst & Young Ltd
          62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands


OMB INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 5
----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of OMB Investments (Cayman) Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by May 5, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 26, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Appleby Trust (Cayman) Ltd.
          c/o Richard Gordon
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4900
          75 Fort Street
          P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


ORTUS MAC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
-----------------------------------------------
The creditors of Ortus MAC Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by May 11, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 30, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Claire Loebell
          c/o Steve Bull
          Telephone: (345) 814 9060
          Facsimile: (345) 814 8529
          Ernst & Young Ltd
          62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands


PENTA ASIA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Penta Asia MAC 91 Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by May 11, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 30, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Claire Loebell
          c/o Steve Bull
          Telephone: (345) 814 9060
          Facsimile: (345) 814 8529
          Ernst & Young Ltd
          62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands


REVELATION CAYMAN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Revelation Cayman Fund Limited are required to
file their proofs of debt by May 11, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 30, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Claire Loebell
          c/o Steve Bull
          Telephone: (345) 814 9060
          Facsimile: (345) 814 8529
          Ernst & Young Ltd
          62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands


SUTTONBROOK CAYMAN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Suttonbrook Cayman Fund Limited are required to
file their proofs of debt by May 11, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 30, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Claire Loebell
          c/o Steve Bull
          Telephone: (345) 814 9060
          Facsimile: (345) 814 8529
          Ernst & Young Ltd
          62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands


UNION FUND: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 11
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Union Fund Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by May 11, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 30, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Claire Loebell
          c/o Steve Bull
          Telephone: (345) 814 9060
          Facsimile: (345) 814 8529
          Ernst & Young Ltd
          62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands


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C H I L E
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AUTOMOTORES GILDEMEISTER: Asks Bondholders to Take Loss
-------------------------------------------------------
Eduardo Thomson and Sebastian Boyd at Bloomberg News report that
Automotores Gildemeister SA, Chile's only Hyundai Motor Co.
dealer, wants investors to accept losses of as much as 50 percent
in the country's third corporate-bond restructuring of the past 12
months.

Automotores Gildemeister is asking investors to surrender as much
as $700 million of dollar-denominated bonds due in 2021 and 2023
as part of a debt swap intended to strengthen the company's
capital structure, according to a statement obtained by Bloomberg
News.

In return, investors would receive as much as $690 million worth
of bonds due in 2020 and non-interest-paying certificates maturing
in 2035, the company said, Bloomberg News notes.

Traders had been bracing for a bond restructuring from Santiago-
based Automotores Gildemeister after a plunge in the peso drove up
the company's cost of importing vehicles, just as a slowdown in
Chile's economy sapped sales, Bloomberg News relays.  The proposed
debt swap may be a tough sell because it would be worth as little
as half of the existing bonds' face value, according to brokerage
GMP Securities LLC, notes the report.

The proposed exchange "leaves bondholders with the stick while
local banks and the company's shareholders keep on enjoying the
carrots," GMP analysts in New York wrote in a note to clients,
Bloomberg News discloses.  "In our view, it is unlikely that the
company will get the 50 percent-plus approval needed," GMP
analysts added.

Bloomberg News relays that the company, which sells the vehicles
from Seoul-based Hyundai through more than 100 dealerships in
Chile and Peru, had raised prices yet couldn't fully pass along
the higher cost of its imports.

                         Foreign Currency

Diego Torres, the head of emerging-market credit research at MCC
Securities Inc. in Santiago, told Bloomberg News in a phone
interview that the proposed $330 million of non-interest-paying
notes would be hard to trade and practically worthless, partly
because they're denominated in Chilean inflation-linked units.

That's likely to make them unattractive to foreign investors, Mr.
Torres said, Bloomberg News relays.

They also pay no interest and don't mature for 20 years, Bloomberg
News discloses.

Even the new $359.9 million of interest-paying bonds, due in 2020
with a coupon of 9 percent, would probably trade below face value,
Mr. Torres said, Bloomberg News relays.  The yield on Automotores
Gildemeister's 2021 bonds is now close to 30 percent.

"The terms of this exchange are very disadvantageous," the report
quoted Mr. Torres as saying.

                           Bonds Climb

Bloomberg News notes that the company's bonds due in 2023, which
had fallen as low as 35 cents on the dollar, rose after the
announcement, since investors had been bracing for terms that were
even worse.

Automotores Gildemeister had tripled its debt load during the past
four years to expand amid a consumer-spending boom in Chile,
Bloomberg News relays.  Since then, economic growth in Chile has
fallen to its slowest in five years, sapping demand for cars,
notes the report.

The proposed debt swap would reduce the company's annual interest
payments to about $30 million from $53 million, according to
Bloomberg calculations.

"If this goes through, it will be good for the company as it will
reduce annual interest payments and lower currency risk," Felipe
Lubiano, an analyst at Credicorp Capital, said in a phone
interview from Santiago, Bloomberg News relays.

Automotores Gildemeister's debt restructuring would be the third
in a year after bus company Inversiones Alsacia SA last year used
a debt exchange to delay principal payments to 2018, Bloomberg
News discloses.  The new Alsacia bonds traded first week of April
at 67 cents on the dollar, Bloomberg News discloses.  Retailer
Empresas La Polar SA completed its local-debt restructuring in
December, the report adds.


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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Agriculture to Buy Peppers to Offset US Ban
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today, citing Acento.com.do, reports that the Dominican
Republic Agriculture Ministry announced an agreement to offset
losses from the US ban on Dominican fruit and vegetable producers
in Jarabacoa and Villa Trina, and to place much of the peppers
harvested for export in the local market.

Jarabacoa Greenhouse Cluster President Romulo Abreu said
Agriculture will buy a considerable amount of bell peppers to
supply the Government's social programs relating to food,
according to Dominican Today.

Mr. Abreu said the agreement was reached in a meeting with
Agriculture minister Angel Estevez, Cluster representatives, the
Jarabacoa Farmers Co-op and other entities, the report notes.  "We
agreed on a program where Agriculture will receive virtually the
entire production of ripe peppers to alleviate the situation from
the US ban," the report quoted Mr. Abreu as saying.

Mr. Abreu said Agriculture will buy the first batch of 100,000
pounds of chili peppers at RD$15 per pound in the next few days,
which equals roughly half of what is normally paid for export, the
report notes.  "For us the average export price is RD$28 per
pound, but it will now be RD$15 per pound. We're losing almost
half, but we have no choice for now," Mr. Abreu said, the report
relays.

                            Hot Peppers

Acento reported a similar agreement reached with hot chili farmers
of Villa Trina, in northeastern Espaillat province, the report
adds.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Bank Helps Farmers Hurt by U.S. Ban
-------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that state-owned Reservas bank
administrator Enrique Ramirez announced financial help for fruit
and vegetable exporters hurt by the US ban, in the heels of the
Med-fly detected in the east region last month.

Mr. Ramirez said Banreservas will adjust capital payments on loans
to according to need, a measure he affirms will help fruit and
vegetable growers and exporters, as part of Reservas' policy to
support the agro sector, according to Dominican Today.

The official said bank executives have been holding meetings with
growers of peppers, avocados, tomatoes, oranges and lemons, among
others, to review claims, the report notes.

The report relates that Mr. Ramirez said Banreservas' assistance
will continue until the US Dept. of Agriculture lifts the ban in
effect since mid-March on 18 varieties of fruits and vegetables
from Dominican Republic.

The fruit fly was detected near Punta Cana Airport, where it
reportedly arrived on a flight from Peru, the report adds.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


PUERTO RICO: Treasury Officials Increase Efforts With Finances
--------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Corkery and Mary Williams Walsh at Dealbook report that
Antonio Weiss, the former Wall Street banker who became a top
adviser to the Treasury secretary this year, has made two trips to
Puerto Rico in recent weeks.

Kent Hiteshew, who runs the Treasury Department's office of state
and local finance, has also met with government officials in San
Juan multiple times this spring, according to Dealbook.

The report notes that the Treasury Department is quietly stepping
up its involvement in Puerto Rico, indicating that the island's
financial problems, which have been simmering for years, are
reaching a critical point.  High-ranking officials have been
shuttling between Washington and Puerto Rico, advising
commonwealth officials as they try to stabilize the island's
finances, the report relates.

But it is a quandary with no clear-cut solution and potentially
far-reaching effects, notes Dealbook.  Puerto Rico is struggling
with far more debt than analysts believe it can repay, and no
legal framework exists to reduce the burden, the report discloses.
Financially troubled cities and counties in the United States can
take shelter in bankruptcy court, but federal law denies that
option to United States territories and commonwealths, and
attempts to amend the law face an uphill battle, the report
relates.

Neither a federal bailout nor a takeover of the island's finances
by the Treasury is under discussion, according to officials
briefed on the matter who spoke on the condition of anonymity, the
report relays.

"The big issue is liquidity, which they seem to be running out of
quickly," said Joseph Rosenblum, director of municipal credit
research at AllianceBernstein, which over the last few years has
sold nearly all its Puerto Rico debt holdings, the report notes.

The report says that on a per-capita basis, Puerto Rico's debt
load of $73 billion is bigger than that of any state.  Much of it
is owned by middle-class Americans who bought the island's
municipal bonds indirectly, as part of their retirement accounts,
so any default would reverberate far past Puerto Rico's shores.
But to avoid a default in the near term, Puerto Rico has little
choice but to add to the mountain of debt and is seeking to borrow
as much as $2.9 billion more this spring, says Dealbook.

Treasury officials have been encouraging the commonwealth to come
up with a long-term fiscal plan and to find ways to maintain
credibility with skittish bond investors, who are proposing
increasingly stringent demands before they will lend more money,
the report says.

A group of hedge funds, for example, is demanding that as one
condition of lending $2.2 billion to Puerto Rico, lawmakers must
balance its budget for the long haul or agree to be found in
default if a gap emerges -- an almost unheard-of requirement in
the municipal bond market, where cities have access to credit no
matter how many gimmicks it takes to close their books, the report
relays.  The bond would be paid for by a fuel tax, a proposal that
has angered some island residents who say the government is
putting the needs of Wall Street creditors over those of the
general populace, notes the report.

Treasury officials are steering clear of negotiations between the
commonwealth and the hedge funds, but they are encouraging the
government to find ways to stabilize its finances beyond borrowing
more money, the people briefed on the matter said, the report
discloses.

For years, Puerto Rico has bounced from one bond deal to the next,
borrowing billions of dollars to fill budget gaps or to make
interest payments on previous debt, the report recalls.
Investors, for the most part, have been willing to lend the
government as much money as it wanted because the yields on the
bonds were so lucrative and the interest on the bonds is tax-
exempt to investors in all 50 states, the report relays.  The
commonwealth's pledge to pay back its debts also seemed ironclad.

But that changed last summer when lawmakers passed the so-called
Recovery Act, which would give the commonwealth the legal tools it
needed to restructure the debt of some of its public corporations,
the report notes.  The law threatened longstanding protections for
bond investors and seemed to conflict with officials' claims that
Puerto Rico intended to pay its debt, the report recalls.  A
federal judge ruled the restructuring law was invalid, and the
commonwealth has appealed. But Puerto Rico's credibility with
investors and credit analysts was badly damaged, the report
discloses.

Further fanning investors' fears was a recent proposal by a group
of Puerto Rico lawmakers that would effectively allow the
commonwealth to default on its general obligation debt, says
Dealbook.

Even though such proposals appear to lack broad support in the
legislature, credit analysts say that at least one Puerto Rico
municipal bond issuer, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority,
is likely to default on its debt this year, the report notes.
Moody's Investors Service expects that the power authority will
skip a debt payment that is coming due in July.

"Puerto Rico has indicated it is no longer going to move heaven
and earth to support its debt," said Ted Hampton, a senior analyst
at Moody's, which rates Puerto Rico debt as junk, according to the
report.  "That's a major divergence from past practice and
policy," Mr. Hampton added.

As Puerto Rico's problems deepen, existing creditors are grabbing
whatever security they can to protect their investments, the
report relays.  Normally, a hierarchy of creditors emerges in a
bankruptcy case, but because Puerto Rico cannot seek bankruptcy
court protection, it is not clear how its various types of debt
and creditors would be ranked, the report notes.

Municipal bond holders are still recovering from the shock they
endured in Detroit's recent bankruptcy, where the city's bonds
were impaired more sharply than the city's pensions, and some debt
instruments were threatened with outright repudiation, notes
Dealbook.

The report relates that investors who hold some of the $9 billion
of debt issued by Puerto Rico's electric power authority fear
something similar could happen to them.  With cash getting tight
this summer, they say the government may default on those bonds to
conserve cash to pay other debts, especially general-obligation
bonds, which have a constitutional guarantee..

Investors in the electric authority's bonds have already offered
debt forbearance and extended it several times, in hopes of
getting a consensual restructuring deal, the report notes.
Another deadline was on April 15, and the Puerto Rican legislature
was to hold a hearing on April 14 on why there has been so little
visible progress, notes the report.  If the talks fail, and the
electric authority defaults, it could spoil appetites for the $2.2
billion of new debt for the commonwealth that the hedge-fund group
has been pushing, the report relays.

Investors say the public would rally to the cause of nonpayment,
because electric rates are high on the island and service is poor,
the report relays.

The report discloses that many investors are putting their faith
in the federal government to find a way to sort out the mess.

Some bond investors have suggested that, should Puerto Rico get
shut out of the debt markets, the Government Development Bank
could borrow from the Federal Reserve's discount window, just as
teetering Wall Street banks did during the financial crisis, the
report notes.

But the Government Development Bank, which oversees the
commonwealth's debt deals and lends money to the island's
municipalities and public corporations, is not a traditional bank,
the report says.  It may not be impossible for the bank to borrow
from the Fed, but it would face multiple regulatory hurdles to
qualify for access to the discount window, the report relays.

Hedge funds that own more than a quarter of the island's debt have
also raised the possibility that Puerto Rico could be placed under
some kind of federal receivership or control board like the one
the federal government imposed on Washington in the 1990s, the
report discloses.  Because Puerto Rico is a commonwealth, they
argue, the federal government could also take over its finances,
the report notes.

A federal takeover seems unlikely, particularly because Puerto
Rico's residents have debated for years about whether they want to
remain a commonwealth, become a state or break away entirely from
the United States, says Dealbook.  A control board could
exacerbate these tensions.

"It would be offensive.  It would show a lack of respect," said
Pedro R. Pierluisi, who is Puerto Rico's representative in
Congress, the report relays.

Puerto Rico's relationship with the federal government is a
double-edged sword, the report notes.  On one hand, its residents,
many of whom pay no federal income tax, receive a lot of federal
aid -- an estimated $6 billion this fiscal year.  That is down
from $6.3 billion in fiscal year 2014.  That money supports a
range of benefits like water treatment in Puerto Rico's rural
areas and children's nutrition programs, the report notes.

On the other hand, Puerto Rico lacks a full voting member in
Congress, where a key initiative to sort out its debt problem now
lies, says the report.

The report discloses that Mr. Pierluisi, who cannot vote on the
House floor, has proposed a bill that would allow some of the
commonwealth's public corporations, like the electric authority,
to seek federal bankruptcy protection.

The bill has drawn the ire of a Tea Party group and the lobbyists
hired by some of the investors that own the public corporations'
bonds, the report notes.

"I want insolvencies in Puerto Rico to be handled the American
way," the report quoted Mr. Pierluisi as saying.


===============================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
===============================


PETROLEUM COMPANY: S&P Cuts Senior Unsecured Debt Ratings to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term corporate
credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on Petroleum Co. of
Trinidad & Tobago Ltd (Petrotrin) to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'. The
outlook on the corporate credit rating is stable.

The downgrade is based on Petrotrin's weaker-than-expected credit
metrics, due to refinery operations interruptions following major
plant upgrades, which led to significant delays and undermined the
company's throughput. The downgrade also reflects lower oil
prices, rising global refined product supply, and high labor
costs. As a result, we now view the company's financial risk
profile as "highly leveraged."

"We expect debt to EBITDA to weaken significantly in 2015,
resulting from a sharp decline in oil prices, which led the
company to register an extraordinary cost as it marked to market
its inventories during the first quarter of the year," said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Marcela Due¤as.

"Although we expect debt-to-EBITDA ratios to improve from 2016
onward, we believe they will remain above 5.0x and in line with a
"highly leveraged" financial risk profile. We also anticipate
negative free operating cash flow (FOCF) generation derived from
the company's large capital expenditure (capex)program, which we
expect the company to finance with debt."


* NATIONAL INSURANCE SYSTEM: Heading for Bankruptcy
---------------------------------------------------
Verne Burnett at Trinidad and Tobago Newsday reports that the
National Insurance System will be completely bankrupt in 24 to 25
years unless something is done to modify the contributions
received by the NIS and benefits paid out, according to the latest
actuarial review of the National Insurance System.

The Eighth Actuarial Review, dated September 2012, was done for
the NIS by the Centre for the International Promotion of Quebec
Public Expertise, according to Trinidad and Tobago Newsday.

In the executive summary to the review, the actuaries caution the
NIS that "Financial projections reveal that (the) system's
expenditure will exceed contribution income from financial year
2012- 2013, the report relates.  Total assets of the NIS will
however continue to increase until 2026-2027, the report notes.
From 2027-28, assets will rapidly decrease and the NIS funds will
be completely depleted in 2039-40 if nothing is modified in terms
of contributions or benefits of the system," the report discloses.

The review continued that "The pay-as-you-go (PAYG) cost rate is
projected to increase from its current level of 9.1 percent in
2010-11 to 29.8 percent in 2059-60.  The general average premium
of the system (the constant contribution rate necessary to finance
all NIS benefits over the next 50 years) is 17.6 percent.  This
may be compared to the present contribution rate of 11.4 percent.
The contribution rate should be increased from 2013 at least to
face the PAYG cost of the system over the period 2013-2017.
Thereafter, there is a need to plan for long-term contribution
rate increases," notes the report.

The warning is based on what the actuaries describe as
"demographic pressure" on Trinidad and Tobago -- the long known
fact that birth rates are falling, the report relays.

In fact, fertility rates are so low that they have been below
replacement rates for the population since 1995.  The review said
that the total population of this country will increase from
1,317,714 in 2010 to 1,431,642 in 2036 and then begin a slow
decline to 1,341,694 in 2060, notes the report.

The number of persons at pensionable age (60 and over) will grow
from 161,051 in 2010 to 412,423 in 2060, while the working age
population, which contributes the funds from which pensions are
paid -- persons aged between 16-59 -- will fall by 18 percent.
According to the report, "The number of working-age persons for
each person aged 60 and over will thus fall dramatically from 5.4
to 1.7" by 2060.

The actuaries propose that the contribution rates should be
increased by 12 percent between 2013 and 2017; 15 percent between
2018 and 2020 and 17 percent from 2021 to 2040 with an increase of
25 percent in the period 2041 to 2060, the report adds.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

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of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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                   * * * End of Transmission * * *