TCRLA_Public/150427.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Monday, April 27, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 081


A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A

ANTIGUA & BARBUDA INVESTMENT: Gov't. Reveals Rescue Plan for Bank
LIAT: To Hold a Meeting With Regional Union Partners


PROVINCE OF MENDOZA: Moody's Assigns (P)Caa1 Global Scale Rating
YPF SA: Fitch to Rate New $1.5BB Unsecured Bonds 'CCC'


AMERICA LATINA: Moody's Puts 'Ba3' CFR on Review for Downgrade
SCHAHIN OIL: Fitch Cuts Currency Issuer Default Ratings to 'D'

C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ANTHRACITE BALANCED: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 6
ARES ENHANCED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 17
CITADEL DERIVATIVES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 17
CITADEL SECURITIES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 10
ELM RIDGE: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 15

LATAM CONSULTING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 10
MARQUEE 2004-1: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 19
SOFTWARE (CAYMAN): Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 8
TIGER GLOBAL VII: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 8
TIGER GLOBAL VIII: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 8


CARIBBEAN CEMENT: To Replace General Manager
UC RUSAL: Contemplates Further Cuts in Aluminum Production


BANCO DE LA NACION: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LT Issuer Default Ratings
HSBC BANK: Fitch Affirms 'b+' Viability Rating
SCOTIABANK URUGUAY: Fitch Affirms 'bb-' Viability Rating

P U E R T O    R I C O

AES PUERTO RICO: Fitch Puts 'CC' Bond Ratings on Watch Negative

T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

PETROTRIN: Plants Up and Running


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From April 20 to April 24, 2015

                            - - - - -

A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A

ANTIGUA & BARBUDA INVESTMENT: Gov't. Reveals Rescue Plan for Bank
The Daily Observer reports that Antigua and Barbuda Government
proposes to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in capital, as
part of a plan to not only bailout the Antigua & Barbuda
Investment Bank (ABIB), but to ultimately own the financial
institution by July.

During a sitting of Parliament, Prime Minister Gaston Browne
warned ABIB shareholders that their days of owning the bank are
numbered, according to The Daily Observer.

"Now here is a situation in which the bank has a hole of over
EC$450 million and they are taking the position that if the
government guarantees these deposits, and we were to get new
depositors to put in 100 million to make the bank very strong,
they still own it . . . .  how can that be so?," Prime Minister
Browne queried, the report notes.

Prime Minister Browne said, however, government will invest $51
million of the $100 million needed to secure the institution, in
order to maintain control of the bank, the report relates.
However, the remaining EC$49 million will come from investors, the
report notes.

In September last year, government said it would have to pump
EC$340 million into ABI Bank because of its growing financial
troubles, the report recalls.

The report discloses that Prime Minister Browne said if the
government takes the necessary action to save ABIB under the new
Banking Act, some shareholders would automatically lose ownership;
while others will have to find new capital to reinvest.

"They are some who may argue, what happened to their shares . . .
.  their shares are dead, bankrupted, finished, they lose it . . .
. ," Prime Minister Browne said. "They want to say that because
they have some papers saying they are shareholders of ABIB, that
after we fix it they can come back and say it's their bank," Prime
Minister Browne added.

                              About ABI

Antigua and Barbuda Investment Bank, the flagship of the ABI
Financial Group, has been in operation for just over 21 years,
having opened on March 1, 1990, when it acquired the collapsed
Fidelity Trust Bank.

                           *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 15, 2011, Caribarena Antigua News reports that the Antigua
and Barbuda Minister of Finance, Economy, and Government
Administration Harold Lovell has revealed further details on the
bailout of the Antigua and Barbuda Investment Bank (ABIB) after
its near-collapse in July.

The government provided ABIB a $40 million bailout to prevent
panic that could have resulted in the bank's collapse, according
to Caribarena Antigua News.  Mr. Lovell revealed that the money
used for the bailout initiative came from loans the government
acquired from the local banking sector.  Mr. Lovell also clarified
that the money pumped into ABI Bank by the government was not
actually to pay off its own loan with the bank, contrary to

In early 2011, Eastern Caribbean Central Bank took over ABIB but
the money for the takeover came from the government, not the ECCB,
Caribarena Antigua News added.

LIAT: To Hold a Meeting With Regional Union Partners
The Daily Observer reports that Leeward Islands Air Transport
(LIAT) is to hold a meeting with its regional union partners
within the next few weeks.  Word of this comes from General
Secretary of the Antigua Worker's Union, David Massiah, according
to The Daily Observer.

The report notes that on the agenda, Mr. Massiah said, will be the
airline's plan to cut almost 200 members of staff and the
possibility of a voluntary severance package, as suggested by the

In February, LIAT announced plans to restructure its operations,
rebasing two planes from Antigua to Barbados and sacking some 180
workers, the report relates.  However, officials at the airline
have been mum on the plans since then, the report notes.

The report discloses that Mr. Massiah said this silence moved him
to write to CEO of the company, David Evans, requesting a meeting
with LIAT'S union partners across the region.

"I was actually indicating to him that obviously LIAT was
proceeding with its plans with regards to restructuring.  We have
since received a letter from the CEO indicting that that it is not
so, but they do agree that there should be a meeting very shortly
with all the unions in the region," the report quoted Mr. Massiah
as saying.

The report relays that Mr. Massiah said he has further received
information from his counterparts in Grenada indicating that the
meeting will be held in early May.

Mr. Massiah explained that the unions had been informed of the
possibility that the airline would sever a portion of its staff in
November 2014, the report notes.  In response, the union then
suggested an employee severance package for the executive's
consideration, the report relays.

"That has been on the table since November.  We have not been able
to meet since.  We have not had another regional consultation
committee between LIAT and its union partners, so I felt that it
was time, Mr. Massiah said, the report notes.

The report relays that Mr. Massiah said several of his members,
not only in Antigua, but throughout the region, have expressed
interest in the severance package.  However, there have been no
formal discussions regarding such a package yet, the report says.

"The numbers were just put on the table, but I can't say that
there was much further discussion.  So, we were not able to say to
staff that this is the direct situation.  What was given was a
general position and it remains a general position until we hear
otherwise," Mr. Massiah added.

                           About LIAT

LIAT, operating as Leeward Islands Air Transport, is an airline
headquartered on the grounds of V. C. Bird International Airport
in Antigua.  It operates high-frequency inter-island scheduled
services serving 21 destinations in the Caribbean.  The airline's
main base is VC Bird International Airport, Antigua and Barbuda,
with bases at Grantley Adams International Airport, Barbados and
Piarco International Airport, Trinidad and Tobago.

                         *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 2, 2014, said that chairman of the
shareholder governments of the financially troubled regional
airline, LIAT, operating as Leeward Islands Air Transport, Dr.
Ralph Gonsalves said while he is unaware of the details regarding
any possible retrenchment of employees, the airline needs to deal
with its high cost of operations.

The TCR-LA on March 10, 2014, citing, reported
that LIAT said it will take "decisive action" to deal with
unprofitable routes as the Antigua-based airline seeks to make its
operations financially viable.

On Sept. 23, 2013, the TCRLA, citing Trinidad and Tobago Newsday,
reported that there's much upheaval at the highest levels of LIAT
-- the Board and the Executive. Following the sudden resignation
of Chief Executive Officer Captain Ian Brunton, David Evans
replaced Mr. Brunton as chief executive officer.


PROVINCE OF MENDOZA: Moody's Assigns (P)Caa1 Global Scale Rating
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo has
assigned a (P)Caa1 (global scale local currency) and
(Argentina National Scale) ratings to the 2015 Short-Term Treasury
Note Program of the Province of Mendoza. The ratings are in line
with the provincial's long term local currency issuer ratings,
which carry a negative outlook.

The 2015 program was created by Governor's Decree Nž542 of 2015
and considers a maximum issuance of ARS941.5 million. The
issuances under this program will present a maximum maturity of
365 days and the total amount to be issued under this program
represents approximately 2.5% of the province's 2015 expected
total revenues.

The assigned debt ratings reflect Moody's view that the
willingness and capacity of the Province of Mendoza to honor these
short-term treasury notes is in line with the provincial's long-
term credit quality as reflected in the Caa1/ issuer
ratings and the fact that the terms and conditions of these short-
term notes do not significantly differentiate them from the
general solvency of this province.

The assigned ratings are based on preliminary documentation
received by Moody's as of the rating assignment date. Moody's does
not expect changes to the documentation reviewed over this period
or anticipates changes in the main conditions that the notes will
carry. Should issuance conditions and/or final documentation of
any of the classes under this program deviate from the original
ones submitted and reviewed by the rating agency, Moody's will
assess the impact that these differences may have on the ratings
and act accordingly.

Given the negative outlook on the issuer ratings, Moody's does not
expect upward pressures in the Province of Mendoza's ratings in
the near to medium term. A downgrade in Argentina's bond ratings
would result in a downgrade of the ratings assigned. A sharp
deterioration in the province's metrics such as a rapid increase
in the debt to revenues ratio could exert downward pressure on the
ratings assigned and could result in a downgrade of the ratings.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.

YPF SA: Fitch to Rate New $1.5BB Unsecured Bonds 'CCC'
Fitch Ratings expects to assign a rating of 'CCC' to YPF S.A.'s
(YPF) proposed senior unsecured bond issuance of up to USD1.5
billion with a 10-year bullet maturity. On April 22, the company
announced in the Argentine Comision Nacional de Valores (CNV) it
intended to issue up to USD500 million in international bonds;
however, based on increased market interest the company is now
looking to issue up to USD1.5 billion. The proceeds will be used
to fund fixed asset investments in Argentina and working capital
requirements. The notes rank at least pari passu in priority of
payment with all other YPF senior unsecured debt. The notes would
be rated the same as all of YPF's senior unsecured obligations.


YPF's ratings reflect its strong linkage with the credit quality
of the Republic of Argentina and the company's relatively low
reserve life. YPF's 'CCC' ratings are linked to the sovereign
rating of Argentina, which has an 'RD' foreign/local currency
Issuer Default Ratings (IDR). Fitch has assigned a country ceiling
of 'CCC' to the Republic of Argentina, which limits the foreign
currency rating of most Argentine corporates, including YPF to

Country ceilings are designed to reflect the risks associated with
sovereigns placing restrictions upon private sector corporates,
which may prevent them from converting local currency (LC) to any
foreign currency (FC) under a stress scenario, and/or may not
allow the transfer of FC abroad to service FC debt obligations.
Key concerns of corporates domiciled in Argentina include high
inflation, government meddling, economic uncertainty, and limited
access to debt markets especially after the country's recent

LINKAGE TO SOVEREIGN: YPF's ratings reflect the close linkage with
the Republic of Argentina resulting from the company's ownership
structure as well as recent government interventions. The Republic
of Argentina controls the company through its 51% participation
after it nationalized the company on April 2012. Following this
action, the company's strategy and business decisions are governed
by the Republic of Argentina.

LOW HYDROCARBON RESERVE LIFE: The ratings consider the company's
relatively weak, though improving, operating metrics characterized
by low reserve life. As of year-end 2014, YPF reported proved
reserves of 1,212 million barrels of oil equivalent (boe) and
average production of 560,100 boe per day (44% crude oil). In
2014, proved reserves grew by a healthy 12% year-over-year rate,
with a 163% reserve replacement rate. Based on production trends,
the company's reserve life is below-optimal at approximately six
years. This factor could create significant operational challenges
in the medium to long term, and justifies the company's ramped up
capex program to increase upstream reserves/production.

IMPROVING PRODUCTION: The company's average production of 560,100
boe in 2014 was up nearly 14% year-over-year, driven in large part
by 25% growth in natural gas production. Given the company's
ambitious capital expenditure program, Fitch expects the company
to continue to grow production in 2015. Production in the fourth
quarter of 2014 showed an accelerating trend as it averaged
582,800 boe per day, which is 13% higher than 4Q'13 figures.

Both crude oil and natural gas production have steadily grown on a
quarterly basis helped in large part by the steady growth in tight
gas and shale oil production. After only two years, the Loma
Campana shale oil field is the second largest producing field in
Argentina with gross production increasing from 7,900 boe/day in
1Q'13 to 41,200 boe/day in January 2015.

STRONG BUSINESS POSITION: Fitch expects the company to continue to
solidify its market leadership in Argentina. YPF benefits from a
strong business position supported by its vertically integrated
operations and dominant market presence in the Argentine
hydrocarbons' market. Fitch anticipates that YPF will continue to
exercise an active role in domestic fuel and gas supply. In the
downstream segment, the company benefits from relatively high
prices for refined products in Argentina, as domestic sales of
refined products grew by 6% for the year allowing YPF to increase
its market share of gasoline sales to nearly 58% (from 55% in
2013) and diesel sales to 60% (from 58%).

credit protection metrics, characterized by moderate leverage and
a manageable debt amortization schedule. For the full-year 2014
period, total financial leverage, as measured by total debt-to-
EBITDA, reached 1.2x, which is considered low for the assigned
rating. YPF's total debt-to-total proved reserves ratio was solid
at USD4.7 per boe.

Total cash and equivalents amounted to approximately USD1.1
billion as of Dec. 31, 2014, which is equivalent to 74% of short-
term debt totalling USD1.5 billion. In the first quarter of 2015,
the company's cash position was strengthened via international and
domestic debt issuances totaling approximately USD600, meaning
short-term debt is covered by more than 100% of YPF's cash

TARGET LEVERAGE OF 1.5x: Total debt as of the fourth quarter of
2014 amounted to approximately USD5.7 billion. EBITDA for 2014 was
approximately USD4.9 billion, which is up 18% on a year-on-year
basis, though Fitch is conservatively assuming flat EBITDA trends
in 2015. During recent years, the company's leverage has been
moderately increasing; mostly as a result of increases in debt to
fund the company's ramped up capital expenditure program.

Fitch believes leverage could increase to the 1.5x - 2x level in
the near to medium term given YPF's ambitious 2013-2017 USD28-
USD30 billion capex program. This would put the company above its
conservative long-term target of 1.5x, though these leverage
levels are still considered moderate for the rating category.
Incorporating the proposed bond issuance (conservatively assuming
USD1.5 billion) and 1Q15 debt issuances (approximately USD 600
million), the company's December 2014 leverage ratio would rise to
1.6x on a pro forma basis.


YPF's ratings could be negatively affected by a combination of the
following: a downgrade of the Republic of Argentina's ratings; a
significant deterioration of credit metrics; and/or the adoption
of adverse public policies that can affect the company's business
performance in any of its business segments.

A positive rating action in the short to medium term is considered
unlikely given the linkage with sovereign credit quality, and
Argentina's current sovereign restricted default rating.


AMERICA LATINA: Moody's Puts 'Ba3' CFR on Review for Downgrade
Moody's America Latina placed America Latina Logistica (ALL)'s
Ba3/ corporate family and senior unsecured ratings under
review for downgrade. The review will focus on ALL's new
management strategy, its revised business plan and the company's
perceived ability to improve credit metrics over the next couple
of years.

Ratings placed under review as follows:

Issuer: ALL - America Latina Logistica S.A. ("ALL")

-- Corporate Family Rating: Ba3 (global scale); (national

-- BRL500 million senior unsecured debentures with final
    maturity in 2016: Ba3 (global scale); (national scale)

-- BRL270 million senior unsecured debentures final maturity in
    2018: Ba3 (global scale); (national scale)

"The review of ALL's ratings was triggered by the release of very
weak 2014 year-end results as a consequence of restatements and
asset impairments, leading to increased leverage and covenant
breaches, as well as concerns regarding the company's ability to
improve its weaker than expected operating and financial
performance going forward ", says Moody's Vice President and lead
analyst for the company, Marcos Schmidt. "The review process will
focus on Moody's assessment of the new management strategy, the
company's revised investment plan, and estimates for its credit
metrics over the next couple of years, especially leverage ratios,
debt profile and free cash flow generation ", added Schmidt.

After the merger with Rumo, approved in March 2015, ALL made
adjustments and corrections of previous financial statements and
changed accounting practices that resulted in the impairment of
assets that totaled BRL 1.1 billion in 2014. As a result, Moody's
adjusted total debt to EBITDA reached 7.9x in the end of 2014 from
5.2x in the LTM ended September 2014. Moreover, ALL did not comply
with some financial covenants that included maximum leverage
ratios. According to the company, it received waivers from
creditors for the alterations resulting from the merger, as well
as for most of the cross-defaulted debt related to the debentures
from the 8th and 9th issuances. ALL also informed the market that
it has negotiated a BRL 1.4 billion line of credit with 3 years
tenor for the eventual repayment of the debentures.

ALL is the largest independent rail-based logistics operator in
Brazil. The company's rail operations comprise four long-term rail
concessions, totaling 13,000 kilometers of rail tracks, 1,000
locomotives and 28,000 railcars, through which the company
transports agricultural commodities and industrial products.
Additionally, ALL develops the intermodal logistic of containers
and related storage services through Brado Logistica. In the
fiscal year ended December 2014, ALL had net revenues of BRL 3.7
billion and adjusted EBITDA of BRL 1.67 billion.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Surface
Transportation and Logistics Companies published in April 2013.

SCHAHIN OIL: Fitch Cuts Currency Issuer Default Ratings to 'D'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the foreign and local currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) for Schahin Oil & Gas Ltd. (Schahin) to 'D'
from 'C' following the company's bankruptcy filing.


Fitch's rating action reflects Schahin's request for bankruptcy
protection after unsuccessful attempts to obtain new financing to
operate, and extend its debt maturity profile schedule. The
situation has been aggravated by the ongoing Lava-Jato
investigations related to the Engineering and Construction (E&C)
subsidiary of the group, Schahin Engenharia S.A., and the group's
temporary ban from participating in new contracts with Petrobras.


   -- Fitch assumes the court will accept Schahin's bankruptcy


The company's ratings reached the lowest level in Fitch's rating
scale. An upgrade is unlikely at this time given the group's
bankruptcy protection filling.

C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ANTHRACITE BALANCED: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 6
The members of Anthracite Balanced Company (JR-52) Limited will
hold their final meeting on May 6, 2015, at 9:15 a.m., to receive
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Simon Conway
          c/o Andrew Nembhard
          Telephone: (345) 914 8779
          Facsimile: (345) 945 4237
          P.O. Box 258 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands

ARES ENHANCED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 17
The creditors of Ares Enhanced Credit Opportunities Fund Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by May 17, 2015, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 9, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Marc Randall
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          P.O. Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands

CITADEL DERIVATIVES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 17
The creditors of Citadel Derivatives Trading Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by May 17, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 9, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Marc Randall
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          P.O. Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands

CITADEL SECURITIES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 10
The creditors of Citadel Securities International Holdings Ltd.
are required to file their proofs of debt by May 10, 2015, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 8, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mervin Solas
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          P.O. Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands

ELM RIDGE: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on May 15
The shareholder of Elm Ridge Value Partners Offshore Institutional
Fund Inc. will hear on May 15, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Anna Yonge
          IMS Liquidations Ltd
          Telephone: (345) 949-4244
          Facsimile: (345) 949-8635
          P.O. Box 61 Harbour Centre, George Town
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands

LATAM CONSULTING: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 10
The creditors of Latam Consulting Services Alpha Limited are
required to file their proofs of debt by May 10, 2015, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 8, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mervin Solas
          c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          P.O. Box 1093, Boundary Hall
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          Cayman Islands

MARQUEE 2004-1: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 19
The creditors of Marquee 2004-1 Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by May 19, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 15, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
          Grand Cayman KY1-1102
          P.O. Box 1093 Cayman Islands
          Boundary Hall

SOFTWARE (CAYMAN): Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 8
The creditors of Software (Cayman) GP Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt by May 8, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on April 15, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          K.D. Blake
          PO Box 493 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Cayman Islands
          c/o Georgina Lowry
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-4800
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-7164

TIGER GLOBAL VII: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 8
The creditors of Tiger Global PIP V China Holdings VII, Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by May 8, 2015, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on April 13, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Gregory Seidell
          c/o Campbells, Floor 4
          Willow House, Cricket Square
          Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 2648
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8613

TIGER GLOBAL VIII: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 8
The creditors of Tiger Global PIP V China Holdings VIII, Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by May 8, 2015, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on April 13, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Gregory Seidell
          c/o Campbells, Floor 4
          Willow House, Cricket Square
          Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 2648
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8613


CARIBBEAN CEMENT: To Replace General Manager
RJR News reports that Caribbean Cement Company Limited confirmed
it will be replacing General Manager Anthony Haynes at the end of
the month.  The company in a release, said Mr. Haynes, who has
been general manager at Caribbean Cement since January 2002 will
demit the post Thursday, April 30.

The report notes that Mr. Haynes goes on to be a consultant with
Caribbean Cement's parent company, TCL Group, for the next six

At Caribbean Cement, he is to be replaced by Alejandro Vares who
will take up the post on May 4, the RJR News relays.

The report notes that Mr. Vares is currently interim Country
Manager of CEMEX, Costa Rica.

The shake-up at Carib Cement has been expected since the CEMEX
struck a deal to become the largest shareholder of the TCL Group,
the report relates.

Headquartered in Rockfort Kingston, Jamaica, Caribbean Cement
Company Limited manufactures and sells cement.  The company is a
subsidiary of Trinidad Cement Limited.

                           *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Aug. 18, 2014, RJR News disclosed that company said it racked up a
loss of $89 million in the three months to the end of June,
compared to a $359 million profit in the corresponding period a
year ago.  The report noted that Caribbean Cement said the loss
was due to the shutdown of a clinker line to facilitate
maintenance work.

According to a TCRLA report on Aug. 7, 2013, RJR News said that
Caribbean Cement Company Limited suffered a consolidated loss of
J$137 million for the first six months of 2013 down from J$1.2
billion during the corresponding period last year, according to
RJR News.  The report related that the loss resulted from J$701
million of non-cash foreign exchange losses compared to J$136
million in 2012.

UC RUSAL: Contemplates Further Cuts in Aluminum Production
RJR News reports that UC Rusal, the Russian aluminum producer with
global reach, which has a major stake in Jamaica's mining sector,
is reviewing its aluminum smelting operations and may idle a
further 200,000 tons of  capacity.

UC Rusal, which has cut capacity by 800,000 tons in the last two
years, said its first quarter aluminum production came in at
900,000 tons, according to RJR News.  This was down two per cent
on the previous quarter, but up two per cent on a year ago, the
report relates.

The Hong Kong-listed company said it expected production this year
to be flat, the report notes.

The report discloses that UC Rusal has announced that it is
considering shuttering some production due to the weak price
outlook and a desire to shift production to cleaner energy

The company is looking to have almost all of its production using
electricity from hydroelectric power plants, the report relates.


UC Rusal is the dominant owner of bauxite and alumina capacity in
Jamaica, but much of that capacity has been idle for the last six
years, with only the Windalco Ewarton plant in operation during
this period, the report says.

Late last year, the company announced it would resume operations
at the Alpart plant at Nain in St. Elizabeth, starting with the
mining and shipping of bauxite, the report recalls.

                             *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 31, 2014, RJR News said that UC Rusal reported a massive
increase in net losses for 2013.  This was due mainly to a large
impairment cost and one-off restructuring charges combined with
lower production and a fall in aluminum prices.  The report said
the company reported a net loss of US$3.2 billion.  It suffered a
US$528 million loss in 2012.


BANCO DE LA NACION: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LT Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco de la Nacion Argentina's
(Sucursal Uruguay) (BNAUY) foreign currency (FC) and local
currency (LC) long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'CCC'.
Fitch has also affirmed its Support Rating (SR) at '5'.


BNAUY's IDRs are aligned with the Republic of Argentina's
sovereign ratings as it is an integrated branch of Banco de la
Nacion Argentina (BNA), fully owned by the Argentine government.
BNA's liabilities (including its branches abroad) are guaranteed
by the sovereign.

Argentina's sovereign FC IDR of 'RD' reflects the current default
status of certain debt securities affected by a court ruling.
However, in Fitch's view, Argentina's payment capacity for its LC
and FC debt securities issued under Argentina's Law is 'CCC'.

BANUY's support rating of '5' considers that external support,
although possible, cannot be relied upon given Argentina's weak
credit profile.

BNAUY is the smallest bank in Uruguay. As of Dec. 31, 2014, the
bank has a 0.76% and 0.82% share of total assets and deposits of
private banks, respectively. BNAUY's main function is to
facilitate foreign trade between Argentina and Uruguay.

BNA's creditworthiness is intrinsically aligned with that of the
sovereign, given the existing explicit guarantee and its systemic
importance. BNA is the largest commercial bank in Argentina, with
30% deposit and 19% loan market shares, with the largest
nationwide coverage, and is a leader in most business lines.


BNAUY's ratings are sensitive to changes in Argentina's sovereign
rating and/or willingness to provide support to BNA and its

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:


   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Long-term local currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Support rating at '5'.

HSBC BANK: Fitch Affirms 'b+' Viability Rating
Fitch Ratings has affirmed HSBC Bank (Uruguay) S.A.'s foreign
currency (FC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB+' and its local
currency (LC) IDR at 'A-'. In addition, Fitch has affirmed the
bank's Support rating (SR) at '2' and its Viability Rating (VR) at


HSBC Uruguay's LC and FC IDRs, as well as its SR are driven by the
strong ability and propensity of its ultimate parent, HSBC
Holdings plc (HSBC, rated 'AA-'/Stable Outlook/VR 'aa-') to
provide support to HSBC Uruguay, if it would be required. HSBC
Uruguay's FC IDR of 'BBB+' is at the country ceiling, while its LC
IDR of 'A-' is two notches above that of the Uruguayan sovereign

Even though the Uruguayan bank does not operate in a core market
for HSBC, HSBC Uruguay's IDRs and SR remain linked to those of its
ultimate parent, reflecting Fitch's view that there is a high
probability of support due to reputational considerations and the
potential negative impact this could have on other subsidiaries.
Additionally, Fitch affirmed HSBC Uruguay's Support Rating at '2'
as required support would be immaterial relative to ability of
parent to provide it. Given the above, it is expected that HSBC
Uruguay would receive timely support from its parent, if required.
The above also is supported by the decision of HSBC to maintain
its operations in Uruguay.

The Stable Outlook on the IDRs is in line with that of the bank's
parent, HSBC Holdings.


HSBC Uruguay's foreign currency IDR is limited by the country
ceiling, while its LC IDR is two notches above the sovereign
rating in local currency. Additional rating actions on HSBC
Uruguay's IDRs are subject to changes in the sovereign rating.
Changes in its controlling shareholder's ability or willingness to
provide support would also negatively affect HSBC Uruguay's
ratings, but these scenarios are unlikely.


HSBC Uruguay's small franchise and low capitalization highly
influence its VR. Fitch also considered the bank's low, though
improving, profitability and relatively high loan and deposits
concentrations in evaluating HSBC Uruguay's intrinsic financial

The bank's operating revenues have grown along with its expansion
since 2008. In 2014, HSBC Uruguay's performance continued its
growth trend, driven by rising activity levels that generated
higher operating income and the revenue derived from effects of
depreciation of the exchange rate on the bank's dollar position
that offset negative inflation adjustments. Since 2012, ROE and
ROA ratios have improved steadily from negative figures reported
in 2011.

The bank's loan quality indicators have historically been sound,
underpinned by its corporate nature, accelerated growth and the
favorable performance of the economy in recent years. The stock of
non-performing loans (NPLs, credits with more than 60 days
overdue) represented only 0.53% of the total portfolio at December
2014, below the average of private-sector Uruguay banks. The
bank's loan loss reserve coverage has historically been very high.

The upswing in loans in recent years means that the portfolio,
though still highly concentrated, has gradually become more
diverse. As of Dec. 31, 2014, the 10 largest borrowers represented
14% of total loans (1.5x the bank's Tier I equity) compared with
17% in 2013. This concentration is normal given the corporate
profile of the bank's clientele, and it will probably become more
diversified as loan activity expands among SMEs.

The bank's capitalization ratios are low, partly due to the HSBC
Group's capital allocation policy that allows subsidiaries to work
with minimal regulatory capital levels. HSBC Holdings injected
capital into the bank several times from 2008 to 2010 and took on
USD17 million in subordinated debt (at a 10-year term) through
several HSBC Group subsidiaries. Even in March 2014, when the bank
was for sale, the group injected USD10 million of capital.

As of Dec. 31, 2014, HSBC Uruguay's Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio
was 8.16% and tangible equity-to-tangible assets was 6.04%. These
metrics have remained at those levels due to constant capital
contributions made by the group. Fitch anticipates that capital
ratios will decline over the medium term as credit continues to
expand. However, the agency believes that the bank will continue
to receive the capital it needs to finance its expansion and
maintain its regulatory capital at the minimum level required.

HSBC Uruguay's funding and liquidity are generally stable,
although there are material funding concentrations. The bank's
main source of funding is deposits from the non-financial sector,
which accounted for 77.4% of assets as of December 2014 and has
expanded considerably in recent years.

The bank's liquidity is ample but declining as a result of the
aggressive loan growth. As of December 2014, liquid assets (cash
and equivalents and loans to the financial sector) represented
37.9% of deposits and short-term funds. While HSBC Uruguay
operates with mostly short-term funding, its ample liquidity,
backing from its shareholder, and the relatively short-term nature
of its loan portfolio help to mitigate liquidity risk.

As in the rest of the Uruguayan financial system, the bank's
assets and liabilities are highly dollarized (79.1% and 77.9%,
respectively). While dollarization is on the decline (2013 levels
were 81.7% and 81.5%, respectively), Fitch believes that it will
remain high over the long term due to the nature of the Uruguayan
economy and the type of clientele served by HSBC Uruguay. While
HSBC Uruguay's open foreign exchange positions are usually high,
resulting in volatile earnings, it is the shareholder's policy to
hold the bank's equity in dollars.


HSBC Uruguay's VR could eventually be upgraded if the bank
achieves FCC ratios of above 9% through sustainable earnings and
profitability, i.e. sustains operating ROA ratios above 1%. Better
diversification of the bank's balance sheet would also be positive
for creditworthiness.

In turn, the bank's VR could be negatively affected if the bank
fails to sustain recent improvements in profitability metrics,
operating ROAs below 1%, and FCC ratios below 7.5%.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

HSBC Uruguay:

-- Long-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
-- Long-term Local Currency IDR at 'A-'; Outlook Stable;
-- Support rating at '2';
-- Viability rating at 'b+'.

SCOTIABANK URUGUAY: Fitch Affirms 'bb-' Viability Rating
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Scotiabank Uruguay S.A.'s (Scotiabank
Uruguay) Viability Rating (VR) at 'bb-'. Fitch has also affirmed
Scotiabank Uruguay's foreign currency (FC) and local currency (LC)
long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BBB+' and 'A-',
respectively. The Support Rating (SR) was affirmed at '2'. The
long-term Rating Outlook is Stable.


Scotiabank Uruguay's IDRs and SR are driven by its ultimate
parent, Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS, rated 'AA-' Stable Outlook),
ability and propensity to provide support, if would be required.

Fitch considers Scotiabank Uruguay as an important subsidiary for
its parent while it benefits from strong synergies with BNS. In
Fitch's view, Uruguay will remain as a strategic market for BNS,
enhanced by the recent announcement of the acquisition of Discount
Bank. Following the planned merger with Discount Bank, Scotiabank
Uruguay will stand as the third largest private bank in the


Scotiabank Uruguay's FC IDR is capped by the country ceiling while
its local currency IDR is two notches above the sovereign rating
in local currency. Hence, positive rating actions are contingent
upon upgrades in Uruguay's sovereign rating.

In turn, changes in Scotiabank Uruguay's shareholder's ability or
willingness to provide support could negatively affect its


The bank's VR considers its improved profitability and
capitalisation ratios, though they remain lower than those of its
closest peers. The VR is also underpinned by the bank's ample
liquidity and growing franchise while it is tempered by the below-
average asset quality metrics.

Fitch believes the expected acquisition of Discount Bank fits well
into Scotiabank Uruguay's current business model and could allow
potential cross-sales. The acquisition should contribute to
customer and funding diversification. As of end-2014, Discount's
loan portfolio accounted for 28.5% of Scotiabank Uruguay's total
loan portfolio and 65.2% of total deposits. Discount will also add
17 branches, 260 employees and a strong network of payroll

In Fitch's view, Scotiabank Uruguay's capital ratios could
stabilize in 2015, following a relevant improvement in the past
year (Fitch Core Capital [FCC] 2014: 9% vs. 2013: 7.6%). The
positive trend in the bank's operating performance will also
contribute in this regard. The acquisition of Discount Bank will
not materially affect Scotiabank Uruguay's capital position as BNS
is expected to finance the transaction and inject fresh capital to
absorb future expenses related to the transaction.

Sixty-day non-performing loan (NPL) ratios remained above domestic
private bank's averages; however, the bank has been able to
contain further deterioration through recurrent loan sales and a
consistent charge-off policy (1.33% of average loans). As of Dec.
31, 2014, NPLs represented 2.6% of the total loans and 4.4%
without the effect of the sale of the loan portfolio (2.3% and
3.6%, respectively, at end 2013). Fitch expects Scotiabank
Uruguay's delinquency levels will continue to be relatively high
considering its greater focus on retail loans compared to other
banks in the Uruguayan financial system.

Positively, Scotiabank Uruguay has a good level of loan loss
reserves (LLR) that Fitch believes will remain stable. LLR covers
4.65% of total loans and 176% of nonperforming loans. Obligor
concentrations are moderate, with the 10 largest borrowers
representing 8.7% of total loans.

Scotiabank Uruguay shows a growing, diversified, and stable
funding structure. The bank's liabilities are largely made up of
deposits, which have grown close to 20% over the last two years.
While Scotiabank Uruguay operates on mostly short-term funding,
its ample liquidity, relatively short-term nature of its loan
portfolio, and potential for support from BNS, facilitates ALM.


Scotiabank Uruguay's VR could eventually be upgraded if the bank
is able to sustain its recent improvements in profitability (i.e.
operating ROAA of around 1% and FCC ratio above 9%). NPL ratios
below 3% would also be positive for the rating.

In turn, the VR could be negatively affected if Scotiabank Uruguay
shows sustained operating ROAAs below 1% and FCC ratios below 8%.
NPL ratios above 3% would also be negative for the rating.


Scotiabank Uruguay is a universal bank and has a mid-sized
franchise in the retail and SMEs segments. Scotiabank Uruguay is
the fourth largest private bank in terms of loans and deposits,
with a market share of 12.1% and 11.0% for end-2014, respectively.

Fitch affirmed Scotiabank Uruguay's ratings as follows:

   -- Long-term FC IDR at 'BBB+', Outlook Stable;
   -- Long-term LC IDR at 'A-', Outlook Stable;
   -- SR at '2';
   -- VR at 'bb-'.

P U E R T O    R I C O

AES PUERTO RICO: Fitch Puts 'CC' Bond Ratings on Watch Negative
Fitch Ratings has maintained the following AES Puerto Rico L.P.
(AES PR) securities issued through the Puerto Rico Industrial,
Tourist, Educational, Medical & Environmental Control Facilities
Financing Authority on Rating Watch Negative:

   -- $161.87 million cogeneration facility revenue bonds, series
      A (tax-exempt bonds) due June 2026 at 'CC';

   -- $33.1 million cogeneration facility revenue bonds, series B
      (taxable bonds) due June 2022 at 'CC'.


The 'CC' rating reflects Fitch's view of the credit quality of the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA). PREPA is the revenue
counterparty under AES PR's power purchase agreement. PREPA's 'CC'
rating and Negative Watch constrain the rating of AES PR.

Contracted Revenue Profile - Revenue Risk: Weaker
The 25-year tolling-style power purchase agreement (PPA) with a
non-investment-grade counterparty effectively mitigates some risk
of exposure to capacity price, energy margin, and dispatch risks
throughout the debt term, subject to project availability and heat
rates. However, concerns loom regarding the offtaker's ability to
make future contractual payments.

Improving Operations - Operation Risk: Weaker
AES-PR has historically been susceptible to forced outages that
have reduced availability and capacity payments. Further, the
operating cost profile has exceeded original estimates. However,
management has taken a proactive approach to limit future forced
outages with encouraging initial results.

Manageable Supply Risk - Supply Risk: Midrange

Fuel supply risk is mitigated by a three-year, fixed-price fuel
supply agreement sufficient to meet the project's expected fuel
requirements. The short term of the agreement is mitigated by the
historical precedence for renewal and liquid market for coal. Fuel
price risk is mitigated by the tolling-style PPA, subject to heat
rates. Ash inventory is actively managed by the project via the
sale of its various ash products. AES-PR's efforts have helped to
offset near-term ash disposal concerns, but cash flow uncertainty
is heightened without a permanent solution.

Weaker Debt Structure - Debt Structure: Weaker

The project's bonds are fixed-rate and mature within the PPA term,
but have back-loaded amortization profiles. The equity
distribution, leverage, and debt service reserve provisions are
consistent with standard project finance structures. AES-PR does
not have O&M or major maintenance reserves, which increases the
importance of operational stability and heightens the project's
reliance on other sources of liquidity. Approximately 55% of the
total debt outstanding, including unrated bank loans, is variable
rate with over 80% synthetically fixed with investment-grade


Positive/Negative - Counterparty Rating: The rating is currently
capped by PREPA's rating. A change in PREPA's long-term rating
would likely impact the rating on AES Puerto Rico.

Positive - Operational Performance: Sustained improvements to
plant availability or heat rate could enhance the long-term


PREPA Developments: Since August 2014, PREPA and its creditors
have maintained forbearance agreements to provide temporary relief
related to PREPA's maturing bank lines of credit to allow for
additional time for negotiations with creditors. The current
agreements extend the forbearance to April 30, 2015, though the
lenders have the right to terminate the forbearance at any time,
with written notice to PREPA. Negotiations are ongoing though a
full comprehensive public plan is not anticipated until July 15,
2015. Fitch believes that a restructuring of PREPA's debt
obligations remains likely and has therefore maintained the rating
of PREPA's power revenue bonds at 'CC' with a Negative Watch.

At AES PR, plant operations have improved substantially and the
2014 effective forced outage rate of 1.2% was the best in the
plant's history. Average heat rates have also demonstrated
considerable stability in recent quarters. The sponsor attributes
improved performance to a renewed commitment to fund major capital
expenditures since 2012.

The project has also added new agreements for fuel supply and ash
management that support cash flow stability. The fuel supply
agreement extends through 2017, offers more favorable and stable
pricing, and provides more flexible payment terms. The ash
management agreements promote the disposal of AES PR's ash
products to on-island landfills for beneficial use, and are
expected to be sufficient to cover all the project's ash
management needs.

T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

PETROTRIN: Plants Up and Running
Trinidad and Tobago Newsday reports that Trinidad and Tobago
Energy Minister Kevin Ramnarine has observed that all of
Petrotrin's plants, including its catcracker unit, were fully
functional after the Pointe-a-Pierre oil refinery had undergone a
$15 billion gasoline optimization program which had began in

"We inherited an incomplete Gasoline Optimisation plant at
Petrotrin which had a cost overrun of 400 percent, but I am
pleased to inform you that the refinery is fully up and running
tonight as we speak the refinery is up to full capacity. All
plants in the refinery especially the Catcraker is running and we
have come a long way in that refinery for the past few years," the
report quoted Mr. Ramnarine as saying.

Mr. Ramnarine was addressing an interactive session titled "Energy
and the Economy" at Achievors Hall, Duncan village, San Fernando
on Thursday night, according to Trinidad and Tobago Newsday.

The report notes that Mr. Ramnarine also pointed out that the
People's Partnership Administration had revitalized the drilling
sector which had stagnated during the PNM administration.

"In 2010, there was one rig offshore and no drilling taking place
in Trinmar for three years.  There was little or no drilling
taking place on land and many of the business here will know what
I am taking about.  There was a stagnating upstream sector taking
place," Mr. Ramnarine added, the report notes.

The report adds that Mr. Ramnarine also noted that sales of
cement, which was a barometer of economic activity in the
construction sector had also experienced an upswing from 2010.

                     About Petrotrin

Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago is the major state-owned
oil company in Trinidad and Tobago.  The company was established
in 1993 by the merger of Trintopec and Trintoc, two state-owned
oil companies.  Petrotrin's main holdings are extensive, mature
onshore fields located across southern Trinidad.  Large areas
have been leased out to small private producers who are able to
make a profit on wells that are unprofitable for Petrotrin,
giving it higher labor costs.  The company operates a refinery at
Pointe-Pierre, just north of San Fernando in south Trinidad.
Most crude petroleum produced in Trinidad is exported without
being refined. The refinery depends on imported crude (mostly
from Venezuela), which is either used domestically or exported.

                         *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Dec.
2, 2014, Trinidad and Tobago Newsday said that in the face of
falling global oil prices, which is beginning to impact on
Trinidad and Tobago's earnings from its petroleum resources,
Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago has rolled out a plan to
remain viable and to survive in the harsh global oil industry.
Petrotrin said in a media release that it is forging ahead with
objective cost management decisions imperative to secure its
viability, according to Trinidad and Tobago Newsday.  The report
said Petrotrin's operations have also been severely impacted due
to unfavorable margins.

The TCRLA reported on Jan. 21, 2014 that Trinidad Express, citing
Energy Minister Kevin Ramnarine, said Petrotrin will make a loss
for its 2013 financial year.  According to Mr. Ramnarine,
Petrotrin was scheduled to make the loss even before the series of
oil spills affecting Trinidad's southwestern peninsula since
December, reports Trinidad Express.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From April 20 to April 24, 2015

Issuer Name     Cpn   Bid Price Maturity Date Country    Curr
-----------     ---   --------- ------------- -------    ----
PDVSA            8.5     56.25   11/2/2017      VE       USD
PDVSA            8.5     66.7    11/2/2017      VE       USD
PDVSA            5.25    42.09   4/12/2017      VE       USD
Int'l Bond       12.75   44.7    8/23/2022      VE       USD
Transocean Inc    6.8    73.8    3/15/2038      KY       USD
PDVSA            12.75   47.52   2/17/2022      VE       USD

Int'l Bond       11.95   41.95    8/5/2031      VE       USD
CSN Islands

XII Corp          7      70.25                  BR       USD
Banco Mercantil
do Brasil SA      9.62    45.5    7/16/2020     BR       USD
Banco do
Brasil SA/Cayman  6.25    68.5                  KY       USD
Transocean Inc    3.8     73.8    10/15/2022    KY       USD
MIE Holdings
Corp              7.5     60.12    4/25/2019    HK       USD
PDVSA             9       39.5    11/17/2021    VE       USD
Anton Oilfield    7.5     68.85   11/6/2018     CN       USD
PDVSA             5.37    31.84    4/12/2027    VE       USD
PDVSA             6       33.15    5/16/2024    VE       USD
PDVSA             6       32.24   11/15/2026    VE       USD
PDVSA             9.75    38.25    5/17/2035    VE       USD
Schahin II
Finance Co
SPV Ltd           5.87    60.5     9/25/2022    KY       USD
Odebrecht Oil
& Gas
Finance Ltd       7       54.5                  KY       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd     10.25    57       1/8/2020     CN       USD
Int'l Bond       11.75    41.75   10/21/2026    VE       USD
Offshore Group
Investment Ltd    7.5     57.27   11/1/2019     KY       USD
PDVSA             5.5     31.5     4/12/2037    VE       USD
PDVSA             5.12    60.25   10/28/2016    VE       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd      9       51.5     6/6/2019     CN       USD
Cimento Tupi SA   9.75    40       5/11/2018    BR       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd      6.87    52.12    4/22/2016    CN       CNY
Group Ltd         7.45    53.75    9/25/2019    CN       USD
Int'l Bond        7.75    36.75   10/13/2019    VE       USD
Int'l Bond        9.37    37.9     1/13/2034    VE       USD
Int'l Bond        6       34.75    12/9/2020    VE       USD
Gildemeister SA   8.25    40.25     5/24/2021   CL       USD
Bioenergia SA     9.25    29.75     1/24/2020   BR       USD
Gol Finance       8.75    68.4                  BR       USD
MIE Holdings
Corp              6.87    68        2/6/2018    HK       USD
Int'l Bond        9       37.1      5/7/2023    VE       USD
Int'l Bond        7       40.95    12/1/2018    VE       USD
Mining Corp       8.87    70        3/29/2017   MN       USD
USJ Acucar
e Alcool SA       9.875   45        11/9/2019   BR       USD
Int'l Bond        9.25    37.4       5/7/2028   VE       USD
Gildemeister SA   6.75    34         1/15/2023  CL       USD
Offshore Group
Investment Ltd    7.12    53.95      4/1/2023   KY       USD
de Caracas        8.5     37         4/10/2018  VE       USD
Kaisa Group
Holdings Ltd      8       66.2      12/20/2015  CN       CNY
Int'l Bond       13.62    68         8/15/2018  VE       USD
Alsacia SA        8       67.03     12/31/2018  CL       USD
Polarcus Ltd      2.87    51.40      4/27/2016  AE       USD
China Precious
Metal Resources
Holdings          7.25     49.83      2/4/2018  HK       HKD
SMU SA            7.75     71.8       2/8/2020  CL       USD
NQ Mobile Inc     4        65        10/15/2018 CN       USD
Holdings Ltd      13.25    63.37      3/4/2018  HK       USD
Schahin II
Finance Co
SPV Ltd           5.87     60.715     9/25/2022 KY       USD
BA-CA Finance
Cayman Ltd        1.21     61.625               KY       EUR
Finance Ltd       8.25     74.35      4/25/2018 KY       BRL
BCP Finance Co    2.10     56.375               KY       EUR
Polarcus Ltd      8        25.5       6/7/2018  AE       USD
Properties Corp   9.5      38.5       7/3/2017  PA       USD
PSOS Finance
Ltd              11.75     73.25      4/23/2018 KY       USD
BA-CA Finance
Cayman 2 Ltd      0.69     60.5                 KY       EUR
Polarcus Ltd      8.73     25         7/8/2019  AE       NOK
Inversora de
de Buenos
Aires SA IEBA     6.5      44.5       9/26/2017 AR       USD
Bioenergia SA     9.25     30.35      1/24/2020 BR       USD
PDVSA             8.5      66.6      11/2/2017  VE       USD
MIE Holdings
Corp              7.5      69.5       4/25/2019 HK       USD

Banco do Brasil
SA/Cayman         6.25     67.25                KY       USD
Partners Inc      11.5     73.5      11/13/2018 CA       USD
PDVSA              6       32         5/16/2024 VE       USD
International Ltd  5.75     0.326               KY       EUR
USJ Acucar
e Alcool SA        9.87    46        11/9/2019  BR       USD
Odebrecht Oil
& Gas Finance
Ltd                7       54                   KY       USD
PDVSA             12.75    53.25     2/17/2022  VE       USD
Gildemeister SA    6.75    34.5      1/15/2023  CL       USD
Mining Corp        8.87    70.25     3/29/2017  MN       USD
Gildemeister SA    8.25    36.31     5/24/2021  CL       USD
PDVSA              9       37.12    11/17/2021  VE       USD
Int'l Bond         13.62   61.88     8/15/2018  VE       USD
Anton Oilfield
Group/Hong Kong     7.5    70       11/6/2018   CN       USD
EDNAR              10.5    84.5     10/9/2017   AR       USD
Cimento Tupi SA     9.75   48        5/11/2018  BR       USD
Honghua Group Ltd   7.45   54.75     9/25/2019  CN       USD
Banco Mercantil
do Brasil SA        9.625  42.625    7/16/2020  BR       USD
PDVSA               9.75   38.7      5/17/2035  VE       USD
EDNAR               9.75   74       10/25/2022  AR       USD
Petroleum Corp      9      25.05     5/31/2017  US       CAD
CSN Islands
XII Corp            7      70.47                BR       USD
Gol Finance         8.75   65.875               BR       USD
Argentina Bocon    21.875  73.73      1/4/2016  AR       ARS
Properties Corp      9.5   37.75      7/3/2017  PA       USD
TICC Bond            5.25  55.36     3/21/2019  VE       USD
SMU SA               7.75  72.44     2/8/2020   CL       USD
de Tucuman
Argentina            0.40   42.7     9/5/2015   AR       USD
Ruta del Bosque
SA                   6.3     65.67   3/15/2021  CL       CLP
Cia Cervecerias
Unidas SA            4       53.32  12/1/2024   CL       CLP
Cia Sud
de Vapores SA        6.4     54.31  10/1/2022   CL       CLP
del Chaco            4       68.01  12/4/2026   AR       USD
Talca Chillan
Concesionaria SA     2.75    48.77  12/15/2019  CL       CLP
Int'l Bond           7.65    34.5    4/21/2025  VE       USD
Int'l Bond           7       35      3/31/2038   VE      USD
Decimo Primer
de Bonos de
Pres                 4.54    66.5   10/25/2041   PA      USD
Int'l Bond          13.62    66.12   8/15/2018   VE      USD
Int'l Bond           8.25    35.4   10/13/2024   VE      USD
Int'l Bond           9.25    40.25   9/15/2027   VE      USD
Empresa de
los Ferrocarriles
del Estado           6.5     71.4    1/1/2026    CL      CLP


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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